

## Investigations into Josephus and the History of the Jewish Revolt 66-70

By Hans Drexler [*Klio* 19 (1925), 277-312]

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Translator's note: The German text is difficult, partly because the author expects the reader to have Josephus' Greek text open: he often comments on passages without first indicating their content (see n. 1). He also assumes knowledge of Greek, and his style can be terse and cryptic. We have attempted as literal a rendering as possible given the time available for this project. In a few cases we have inserted brief explanatory glosses in [square brackets], but the English necessarily retains much of the original's opacity; we hope not to have added to it. Corrections and suggestions for improvement are welcome.

[277] The starting point for this work was the question of Josephus' role in the Jewish revolt. Now, from some passages in his account it is possible to identify clearly his connections with the Jewish parties: for example: B. II 562 ff., with the dispatch of the commanders to the various toparchies; and according to *Vita* 2, 21ff., 204, he belongs to the Jewish aristocracy. From this resulted in the necessity of undertaking a more precise examination of the party relationships on the Jewish side, which produced several interesting results. In the context of that investigation the strange character of Philip ben Jacimus, Agrippa's captain, for whom the *Vita* provides the definitive material, drew one's attention. Therefore, the investigation necessarily took on a broader framework: on the basis of a correct insight into the Jewish party relations it is possible to determine Josephus' role; of course, the problem of Justus had to be dealt with afresh; and the investigation concludes with Philip, whose behaviour creates even more of a puzzle than is generally thought, throwing a particular sort of light on the history of the revolt.<sup>1</sup>

### 1. The Jewish Parties

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<sup>1</sup> Because of the limited space available I am forced to omit all citations and to assume that each passage under consideration is known. The essay expects to be read, therefore, as a critical commentary on the text and only makes a claim to intelligibility as such.

We begin the investigation with an examination of the section B. II 408–456, the account of about the outbreak of revolt in Jerusalem after the departure of Gessius, and Agrippa’s peace initiative.

Section 409 narrates that Eleazar,<sup>2</sup> the son of the high priest Ananias, νεανίας θρασύτατος, who at the time was [temple] commander, prevents [278] gifts and sacrifices being accepted from a foreigner. This Eleazar is doubly identified, through his office and his descent. Concerning the office of commander, Schürer II<sup>4</sup> 264 ff. has collected the necessary [material]. His “position is the highest after the high priest.” From Josephus the decisive passage is A. XX 131 ff. ≈ B. II 243: the high priest Jonathan (according to the *Bellum*), Ananias und his son, the commander Ananus, are sent to give an account in Rome, of course as οἱ τῶν Ἰουδαίων πρῶτοι (A. XX 135).

About Ananias, the father of Eleazar (see, as always, the Niese Index), the following can be said: A. XX 204 narrates how Ananias’ power increases and how he forms armed gangs. He becomes the powerful high priest after section 213. We do not know what to make of the dispute with the priests (206f.), though indeed it is not relevant for us. But the conflict with the *sicarii* is interesting (208ff.). They take prisoner the secretary of Eleazar, Ananias’ son, and thus put pressure on the father. Father and son belong together, therefore, as is natural.

It is the same Eleazar who, by seizing the emperor’s sacrifices, furnished the open declaration of war: he is the first official after the high priest, the son of the most powerful man in Jerusalem. νεανίας θρασύτατος certainly is a misleading description.

And now one should also consider what sort of high priests and powerful men they might be, who in 411ff. create the scene of a peace initiative against Eleazar and his people, and give that strange speech, in which which the seizing is described as an

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<sup>2</sup> Compare W. Weber’s reference to this section. *Josephus and Vespasian* Stuttgart 1921 p. 21: “(Josephus) describes how Eleazar, the temple guard’s officer, who puts forward the first nationalist demand to the high priests and who thus becomes the first leader of the revolution, has his support among the Zealots (BJ. II 408 ff.)” This is roughly the *communis opinio*. Except that unfortunately, W. Weber confused Eleazar b. Ananias and Eleazar b. Simon (II 563), the Zealot, as is plain to read on p. 29. That is terrible: Josephus himself is confused enough. This oversight should be added to that noted by Laqueur in the *Phil. Wochenschrift* 1921 S. 1110, which is in part much more consequential.

ἀσέβεια and the Jews are threatened, μὴ ... γένηται ... ἕκσπονδος τῆς ἡγεμονίας ἡ πόλις.

The problems only accumulate in what follows. First it is the behaviour of the king's relatives and of his field commander Philip b. Jacimus, and then the opposition between the peace party under Ananias' leadership and the rebels under Eleazar and Manaem.

In 418 ff. the peace-lovers decide to send an envoy to Florus and Agrippa. Simon b. Ananias is otherwise not known: we cannot say whether this is a brother of the high priest and thus a brother of Eleazar. Also the very strange behaviour of the Roman procurator at 320 we want to leave aside for the time being. But we do otherwise hear enough of Saul, Costobar, Antipas, and Philip. The first two are mentioned at A. XX 214 as gang leaders in Jerusalem; [279] unfortunately we cannot determine more precisely the historical meaning of this notice. In our section, 426 reports that the royal troops had to yield to the rebels; in 429, that they, the Romans, Ananias, his brother, and the king's relatives are locked up in Herod's palace. The surrender follows at 437 and, with the exception of the Romans, the besieged are granted safe passage. Where they go is not stated. But if it is extremely serious for the troops of a Roman vassal prince to abandon a Roman cohort, then it is of course an impossibility [for them] to remain in the rebellious city even one hour longer. Thus, we are surprised indeed to read at 556 ff. that only after the defeat of Cestius Gallus do Costobar, Saul, and Philip finally think it appropriate to leave the city.<sup>3</sup> What did they have to do in Jerusalem for these two months? That both the reason Josephus offers at 558 for Cestius Gallus' sending them to Nero and the thing itself [i.e., their being sent] are not quite accurate, perhaps *Vita* 408 alone shows, for it says that *Vespasian* had sent them [to Nero], and indeed this was to give an account of themselves. Concerning Antipas, one should neither be fooled by sentence 557,<sup>4</sup> so characteristic of Josephus, nor by the presentation of his death IV 144 ff, to which he alludes. No martyr-aura can free him from the guilt that he assumed on the

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<sup>3</sup> Besides, we cannot tell exactly why they escape from Jerusalem. Josephus portrays it as their love of peace. This at least is out of the question.

<sup>4</sup> It does not mean that Antipas remained in Jerusalem, but rather: how Antipas, who failed to escape, was killed by the στασιασταί, we shall report below.

administration of the state treasury in rebellious Jerusalem. Just think, one of the king's relatives!<sup>5</sup>

This is the sort of people, who were the contenders against the rebels, who led the embassy of the peacefully minded to Agrippa.

-- But the decisive arguments are yet to come. I do not want to stress the word στρατιώταις at II 450 (however, see the variant στασιασταῖς), although I would not know how to explain this expression otherwise. It is not otherwise used of the rebels.<sup>6</sup> But we should not press such a sloppy writer on the details. – Rather more serious are the following passages: II 520 (in the report about Cestitus Gallus' attack) mentions Silas the Babylonian,<sup>7</sup> and so a countryman of Philip: αὐτομολήσας εἰς τοὺς Ἰουδαίους ἀπ' Ἀγρίππα τοῦ βασιλέως. The same [280] Silas is mentioned in III 11 in the action against Ascalon, and other defectors from royal service at B. V 474; *Vita* 220, 397 – Should any doubt remain, it is put aside by *Vita* 407: The Tyrians started to malign the king (before Vespasian) and called him an enemy of the Tyrians and the Romans because his field commander Philip had betrayed the Roman troops in Jerusalem at the order of Agrippa.

This is all of the greatest importance, of course, and fortunately the *Vita* offers more material about this question. But for this we must first deal with the problem of the *Vita*, and the matter should be postponed until then.

The second large question concerns the relationship of Ananias, Eleazar and Manaem. We had already seen that the [temple-] commander Eleazar, who issued the public declaration of war by halting the sacrifices from foreigners, was the son of the Ananias who appears as the leader of the peace party in this section—there was no other high priest of that name at the time—but that according to what we learn elsewhere, as one might expect, father and son really belong together. And now Eleazar fights here against the peace party under the leadership of his father; and if this were not enough, his people set Ananias' house on fire (426) and finally kill him περὶ τὸν τῆς βασιλικῆς αὐλῆς

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<sup>5</sup> Also the Levias and Syphas mentioned there are of royal decent.

<sup>6</sup> For the hoplites commanded by Josephus in Galilee may not be adduced as a parallel here.

<sup>7</sup> What this means we can read at A. XVII 23ff. and elsewhere. W. Weber (p. 21, see above) misunderstands this fundamentally.

εὐρίπτον where he was hiding [cf. 441]. It is hard to see why, since he had been granted safe passage.

Eleazar and his people, I said. But here we must look more closely. In the meantime (after the burning of Ananias' house and the conquest of the Antonia, during the siege of Herod's palace, as Josephus arranges it), Manaem won the leadership in the way portrayed at 433 f. He now leads the siege: it is to him that the royal troops and the ἐπιχώριοι surrender; he conquers the palace except the towers; he has command when Ananias is killed. What happened to Eleazar in the meantime is unknown. In any case, we are surprised to suddenly find him as the leader of the movement against Manaem on 443 ff. This is clearly described as an aristocratic reaction (443) and at 449 it is said of precisely these people and Eleazar that they killed Manaem only to wage a more secure and undisturbed war. Following Josephus, we would much rather seek the aristocrats among the peace-lovers. Finally, at 429 the relatives of the king are named together with Ananias as peace-lovers, though we have found good reason for doubt concerning their capacity for peace. The connection among these men is reason to suspect Ananias as well. In short, we cannot save ourselves from contradictions. Luckily, some of them can be solved.

With respect to Manaem, a comparison of §§ 433–434, 425, and 408 seems plausible. Why does Manaem go to Masada during the siege of the royal palace [281] to get weapons, as if there were not available in Jerusalem at that time, especially after the conquest of the Antonia? Why does he break into Herod's armory, when Masada was already (408) occupied? In 425: at the festival of the wood-bearing, Sicarii stream into the city together with the weak mob, who support the rebels under Eleazar. What kind of people are these, and where do they come from?

[*War*] VII 253 ff. brings the solution. It deals with the conquest of Masada: the leader of the Sicarii, who kept control of the festivals, was Eleazar, a descendant of Judas of Galilee. In 254 Judas and his people are described as Sicarii, and this is generally the name used by Josephus. Now, Manaem is a son of Judas, Eleazar of course is identical with the one mentioned on II 427. So we have a name for Manaem and his people. But then the Sicarii of 425 could not have been others. Concerning the Sicarii and Masada we read further at VII 297: when Eleazar conquered the fortress with the Sicarii he found

everything well prepared and armed. At 299: a mass of different weapons were found as well, which had been stored by the king—so many that they were enough for 10,000 men. Finally IV 400: when those named Sicarii had occupied Masada. . . .

So we simply have a doublet. 433 f. has to be crossed out and the content of 425 has to be filled out with this paragraph: The leader of the Sicarii is Manaem; they armed themselves in Masada, which they had conquered. Now, the victorious advance in 425 gets a completely different meaning. Ananias no longer needs to play the role of the peace-lover, which suits him really badly, and we do not have to separate Eleazar from his father. Here we have the contradiction between aristocracy and radicals as we find it expressed in 443, as it already existed before the war (XX 208 f.), and as it comes to a conclusive resolution under Ananus (IV 151-325).

It will not be difficult to give the reasons for Josephus' distortion, just exposed. This will come below. However it is, as usual, impossible to present a coherent illustration of the events once Josephus' web is destroyed. We should be satisfied if the main lines of the events become somewhat clear. That they are, I think, and we need not occupy ourselves with it any longer.

The passage that we just dealt with is preceded by the report of Gessius Florus' march on Jerusalem and Agrippa's peace initiative, of which the core is the great speech. This passage seems to me to be full of improbabilities, even if unfortunately it is not so easy to bring certain proof of the falsification, given the lack of external handle points [282]. At one place, certainly, is a disagreement that cannot be overlooked. In 404 Agrippa warns the Jews to rebuild the halls between the temple and Antonia (cf. 330) and to pay the tribute to prove their innocence: οὔτε γὰρ Καίσαρι δεδώκατε τὸν φόρον. The people obey and the money is collected: 40 talents (405). But there is no talk of delivery. On the contrary, in 407 the king sends the ἄρχοντες to Florus, so that he would select people from them for the collection of the tribute. So the money had not been collected at all. – Above all, the fact of the tax-refusal by itself of extreme importance, and it is very curious that we only get to hear about it *en passant*. Unfortunately, one cannot go further. Even the amount of the reported sum does not help, insofar as such data are trustworthy. We do not know for which region this money was owed, and we do not know the precise amount of the tribute for Judaea and the other Jewish territories (cf. II

386, 93 ff.). Thus, for the decisive question—from what point the teaxes had been refused—we are unable to draw conclusions.

This is the most obvious obstacle in this section, but one should also have a closer look at the presentation of Florus' march. How is Florus' march to Jerusalem justified? His overall aim is to ignite war so that his shameful deeds would not become known (II 282)—as if a Roman governor would not be held responsible also for the outbreak of revolt. Preceding events are the removal of 17 talents from the temple treasury (293), the Jews' outrage and mockery of Florus, but otherwise everything is quiet in Jerusalem. The expedition's motive is only greed, and the wish to spread fear in the city (295 f.). The double welcome scene displays his complete shamefulness: twice he has the Jews who are loyally coming out to the Roman troops, to welcome them, cut down—a strange doubling of events. According to 305, only because those guilty of the mockery cannot be identified, he orders [his troops] to plunder and murder in the upper city.<sup>8</sup> Then one may see the role the high priests and aristocrats play in all this. They are constantly brokering, and they are still repeatedly able to calm the very impatient Jews—only to give Florus further opportunity for shameful deeds. Again at 332, with the departure of Florus they guarantee order and security. I think that the analysis of section 408 ff. has not been [283] conducted for nothing here: according to what we know of the aristocracy from elsewhere, this is simply impossible. – Finally and most importantly, Florus is angry that those creating unrest are silenced, and he is trying to awaken them again (318). That is why he causes the second welcoming scene, παρεγίνοντο δὲ δύο σπείραι. Why are they called in? Florus has clearly moved out already, decisively enough. Florus' intention is successful: the mob is chased into the city with bloodshed. We think that the cohorts would now, happy over the successful engagement, withdraw to their quarters. But no, they advance against the Antonia and the temple, and Florus leads his troops from the

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<sup>8</sup> Indicative of Josephus's narrative tendency is the story of Berenice at 310 ff. Her advocacy for the innocent is futile, and indeed her own life is endangered at 312. At 314 she appears begging before Florus καὶ πρὸς τῷ μὴ τυχεῖν αἰδοῦς αὐτὴν τὸν περὶ τοῦ ζῆν κίνδυνον ἐπέπρασεν. It looks as though Florus had threatened to kill her, and no doubt it is meant to look this way, but it is certainly nothing other than a recapitulation of 312—and who knows how true the things told in this paragraph actually are! The precise parallel to this story is *Vita* 343 and 355: without doubt it concerns only a case of condemnation and an act of grace toward Justus.

palace for the same reason. The attack does not succeed. At 331, the breaking-off of the halls between Antonia and the temple cools his greed and leaves him to move away from his intention to force his way through to the Antonia. But this is very strange. At 329 it still looks as if the resistance that the Jews were putting up against the Romans was a simple spontaneous consequence of their bitterness about the acts of violence. But from 331 we learn that throughout his entire stay in Jerusalem, Florus was not able to establish the connection with the Antonia, which indeed had a Roman garrison (he only wanted this out of greed, to place himself in possession of the temple's riches). What this means is very clear. Jerusalem was not at all as peaceful as it appears here in Josephus. Herein we have ascertained the reason for Florus' fights in the upper city 305 ff., for the movement of the two cohorts, and more generally for his entire expedition; and we also proved that the counter piece to the priests' readiness for peace in Josephus' system—Florus' evil intention to allow matters to come to war—is an invention.<sup>9</sup>

Similar difficulties are presented, it seems to me, by the account of Cestius Gallus' expedition. Again, the Jews' love of peace is heavily stressed. It is the sole fault of the heinous *στασιασταί* and Gessius Florus in his corruption (531). I mention this here especially because no compelling proof for Josephus' distortion results from this section itself. But we already know our author's method by now.

To pursue in detail the development of internal Jewish relations during the revolt would lead too far afield and unnecessarily burden this essay. Analyzing point by point [284] would show how incredibly patchily and superficially we are instructed by Josephus about things that are so interesting, to say nothing at all about the distortions.

At any rate, one thing at least may be established, and this again only of course through a process of gathering what we discover of the individual personalities, parties, and groups. Though the facts remain still so tangled and hard to grasp, the law of identity must hold valid for the subjects of events, and therefore the contradictions in them must also find a resolution.

Let us begin from B. VII 252 ff., the chapter that provides an overview of the groups of radicals, before the account of the siege and conquest of Masada, the last place

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<sup>9</sup> Cf also A. XVIII 25; XX 257; B. II 420, 558.



that remained standing.<sup>10</sup> There are five: the Sicarii under Eleazar, at the time the garrison of Masada, John of Gischala, Simon b. Giora, the Idumaeans, and the Zealots.

Among these five groups the Sicarii take a special position: they are the only ones with a long history, the heirs of Judas of Galilee, whose direct successors are their leaders Manaem and Eleazar. For the significance of Judas' movement we have striking testimony in the two passages A. XVIII 4-10. 23-25 and B. II 118., which at the same time present us with a curious philological problem.

The B. is the older writing, but the version that it offers cannot be as original. First, the agitation of Judas is connected with the name of Coponius at 118. Factually, this is non-sensical: Quirinius directs the census, and the Jews' resentment is directed toward this. Quirinius' name has fallen away. Second, Judas is identified as σοφιστῆς ἰδίας αἰρέσεως, and then 119-166 speaks about the three schools: Essenes, Pharisees, Sadducees. It is clear that the αἵρεσις of Judas must be placed somehow in relation to the three schools. This too is missing. The third obstacle is the conspicuously broad treatment of the Essenes. That this is not original is shown by 162 and 164: δύο δὲ τῶν προτέρων Φαρισαῖοι and Σαδδουκαῖοι δέ, τὸ δεύτερον τάγμα. Clearly, the real order is: Pharisees, Sadducees, Essenes—whether one should understand this as a ranking of preference or a historical-chronological one—and the last of these was originally treated much as the other two schools. What stands here to be read in the B. must have a different provenance, because it breaks the framework and also comes before. [285] All of this would be inferable from the account in the B.: the parallel account of the A. clearly shows it. In [*Ant.* 18.] 11 there is a reference to the B.;<sup>11</sup> yet it is known that the account of A. does not go back to B. but rather directly to the source. The strangely artificial ruin [spoken of] in 9 also betrays the use of such [a source].

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<sup>10</sup> I do not believe it to be correct that there was a communist inclination in this radicalism. The parts that talk about social-revolutionary aspirations are only very dispersed (cf. II 427). On the other side, VI 282 reports that the wealthy had deposited their money in the treasure chamber of the temple. So this was not taken from them. It is also self-evident, actually, that with the Jews the nationalistic and the religious were always in the foreground.

<sup>11</sup> The three schools, Pharisees, Essenes, and Sadducees, are also mentioned at A. XIII 171-175, similarly with a reference to the *Bellum*. This passage contributes nothing of help to our question.

This much we may say with certainty. But now the difficulties begin. We said that in addition to the three schools, the source must have also contained something about the αἵρεσις of Judas. If it was what A. XVIII 23–25 contains, then the source falls into the period between the war and the publication of the B., i.e. prior to 79. It would at least be strange if a Jew—it must have been a Jew—wrote about these things during that time, under the fresh impression of the catastrophe. If the source is older, then the content of 23 remains for it. Then the testimony would be doubly important for the significance of the movement prior to the war. This was certainly large, even if the Sicarii's largest time only came during the war. That they accomplished much more and were much more important at the war's beginning than B. makes it appear, Josephus himself says here in [A. XVIII.] 24–25. – I cannot see how to solve this problem. Both possibilities are not satisfying.<sup>12</sup> Of course it has to be said that the juxtaposition of Judas' movement with the three old schools is in itself a curiosity. And one would also like to know something about the emergence of the triad.

From the passages mentioned, the most important [item] for us is A. XVIII 25: ἀνοίκα ... τῆ ἐντεῦθεν ἤρξατο νοσεῖν τὸ ἔθνος etc.: how it stands in relation to the establishment Gessius Florus' guilt, we have already seen.

A. XX 102 reports the punishment of Judas' sons by Tiberius Alexander. After that the killing method of the Sicarii is depicted in A. XX 186 f. and B. II 254 f., and under the general description ληστοαί at XX 164f. It was in this way also that the murder of the high priest Jonathan occurred at the instigation of Felix (XX 162). That this involved the supporters of Judas (the parallel report B. II 254 ff. mentions [286] the Sicarii), however, is hard to imagine. These people do not lend themselves to use as the governor's hanging-

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<sup>12</sup> In this context, I cannot refrain from noting two *crucis*. First, the sentence A. XX 259 τὰ τῆς ἀρχαιολογίας μεθ' ἣν καὶ τὸν πόλεμον ἤρξάμην γράφειν is still not clarified. Second, B. I 17 is always very striking to me: Ἀρχαιολογεῖν μὲν τὰ τῶν Ἰουδαίων... νῦν τε ἄκαιρον ὠήθην εἶναι καὶ ἄλλως περιπτόν. So already at that time he must have been entertaining a plan for an *Archaeology*. And one might still wonder: what does the whole history from Antiochus Epiphanes have to do with the war? I do not believe Weber regarding the antithesis of the νεομάχοι Antiochus and Pompeius against Titus (p. 66ff.) It is indeed nothing other than a piece of *Archaeology*, and precisely the Hellenistic-Roman part of the same. But who would dare make conjectures in this matter?

assistants. Certainly, the above-mentioned section XX 208 (Ananias and Eleazar) knows to relate the opposition between Sicarii and high priests before the war.

We have to emphasize that Judas and his supporters are called Sicarii everywhere. At B. II 444 the word ζηλωταί does not have the charged sense, but means only supporters.

We already discussed Manaem. With his death, the role of the Sicarii was played out. As bravely as Eleazar defends himself in Masada at the end, he does not seem to have been the man to claim the leadership of the radicals as heir of Judas. But at the beginning of the revolt they must have played a decisive role. A. XVIII 25 has already been mentioned. The same can be read at B. VII 257; yet more clearly at 324 (πρῶτοι... γὰρ πάντων ἀπέστημεν) and 329 (οἱ καὶ τοὺς ἄλλους ἐδιδάξαμεν); further A. XX 172. These passages need to be taken very seriously, but admittedly in Josephus' presentation nothing can be made of them.

From the expedition of Cestius Gallus, the Zealots take the place of the Sicarii in Jerusalem. They are first mentioned at B. II 564: Eleazar, the son of Simon, had seized the Roman spoils, but for all that he is kept out of leadership by the aristocracy, though indeed his influence is growing. How this happens in detail, how the Zealots bring down the aristocracy, cannot be discussed here and there is no need for it. It is interesting, however, that according to Josephus the first attack against Antipas and the king's other relatives occurs immediately after the Galilean defeat. Surely there is a causal connection between them. – The aristocratic counter-movement starts and leads to a regular siege of the Zealots in the temple. In this moment, John of Gischala becomes a traitor against the high priests. We must be careful with this enemy of Josephus, but everything conforms to what is reported elsewhere. While he is still in Galilae he has good relations with the high priests, whereas later on he is one of the radicals' two leaders. On his advice, so Josephus reports, the Idumaeans are called in, who make an end of Ananus' regime. Unfortunately, we do not learn more about these Idumeans, who are one of the radical groups. According to the account of B. II 566, commanders were sent out from Jerusalem into the territory, to whom Niger was to be subordinate. That is the only thing that we get to hear earlier on. Just like their arrival [in Jerusalem], so also the Idumeans' departure is not quite understandable. According to Josephus at IV 345 ff., resentment and opposition to

the Zealots' actions are the reason. At any rate, the Zealots and John, who can also count on a good number of supporters, a σύνταγμα of Galileans, remain in the city and bit by bit John gains control over the Zealots; [287] they break away only temporarily and without continuing success. The last time we hear of the Zealots is at the destruction of the group in the Jardes forest at VII 210 ff.

In the meantime, however, an even stronger man rose to power in the countryside, Simon b. Giora. He had first distinguished himself in the struggles against Cestius Gallus, was then driven away from the toparchy of Acrabeta by the government, and found a welcome in Masada. He had grown over the heads of the Sicarii. The Zealots try to put a stop to his increasing power, but they suffer defeat. He then turns against the Idumeans and after an undecided battle becomes their master, as Josephus narrates, through the betrayal of their leader. He takes possession of the entire territory and eventually moves against Jerusalem. He wins the city, but John and the Zealots are able to confine him to the temple and lower city. With this, the development of the internal Jewish struggles comes to an end.

With a few examples one may demonstrate how much of the detail in Josephus' briefly sketched account is unclear and problematic. Most importantly, we do not learn anything about the most fundamental issue: What are the driving forces and ideas of this national and religious radicalism, and what are the differences among the various groups? For Josephus, they are λησται and criminals, indeed those guilty of the people's ruin, -- to which he had become a traitor himself. He has cheated us of what was truly interesting and great about this war. What he does offer, nevertheless, allows us to say this much: that the fact of group formation among the radicals is probably attributable to a situation in which there were several leaders, none of whom was able to fully dominate the others. Simon finds refuge in Masada, so there exists no basic opposition between him and Sicarii; just as little between himself and the Idumeans, who voluntarily subordinate themselves to him (cf. the names of their leaders IV 235, 271, 521, V 290, 249), after they have been defeated by him. Yet these same Idumeans had previously protected the Zealots against the aristocracy.

Over against the high priests, all these groups are enemies in the same sort of way. We have proved, however, that they themselves are not *eo ipso* to be regarded as peace

lovers. That the high priests later change sides, when radicalism rules in Jerusalem, proves nothing against this, though it does show that they lacked a devotion to the end. If one will not allow Ananus' leadership at the outset to count—one must still say that after the first big victory over the Romans it was impossible for people who were not participants in this victory to receive or retain leadership positions—, then the absolutely compelling proofs here are the relationship between John of Gischala and the aristocracy, which certainly was good at the beginning, and that of Niger of Perae, one of the [288] heroes from the struggles against Cestius Gallus and leader against Ascalon, who stands with the high priests and plainly must die because of them. Finally, VII 257 seems to attest to this directly: οἱ μὲν γὰρ (the other Jews in opposition to the supporters of Judas) τῆς ἀποστάσεως ἐκοινώνησαν καὶ τοῦ πρὸς Ῥωμαίους συνήραντο πολέμου.

It has already been said that it would be a hopeless undertaking, were one to attempt to recover from Josephus' misleading account the actual events. Even after the critical work, a vast range of awkward details in this false and falsified framework remain on the debris field as *fragmenta incerta*. We must be satisfied if we can make for ourselves a rough picture of things. First, one must hold firm that the large national and religious movement that Judas of Galilae called into existence did not dissolve during the sixty years following his rise. Alongside this: most of the so-called λησταί, as Josephus unfortunately loved to call them, who kept making trouble for the Romans, were similar freedom heroes. It has been proven that Judas' supporters were largely responsible for the revolt, but unfortunately Josephus' account fails utterly here. Already before the war there had been a clear opposition between the high priests and the Sicarii. This is, as it seems, not hard to explain: the aristocracy had to engage and reach agreements with the Romans. Then when war came, they took part in the general movement. But they did not succeed in washing off the stain of the past, nor were they capable of fanaticism and total devotion. They were after all high clerics, rich, earthly minded, and oriented toward Realpolitik. They found themselves in a most unhappy position in relation to the radicals. If one favoured these [the radicals], then as a consequence of the greater energy they now possessed, they necessarily should have taken the leadership. This could not be allowed. It was perfectly possible however to keep away from the leadership, even to harass, those who were fighting the war with the greatest zeal. It was for this reason—that the

aristocracy actually did this and had to do it in order to save their position—that their downfall came. For the populace had to withdraw from them, especially its best representatives. A small indication, perhaps, of their inner weakness is that the nobles were buying their way out of guard duty against the Zealots (IV 207)—one cannot retain one's position in this way—and then later the complete defection of the high priests.

This role of the aristocracy might represent the most tragic part in the story of this war. At the time of the Maccabees the high priests had failed, and so they were no hindrance to the priestly—but not high-born—family who were rising through their heroism and success. This time the Jewish cause found no great leader, primarily because the high priestly aristocracy was at first in the way, in such a war, and when the high priests were eliminated there was no more glory to be won. The natural-born leader of the radicals, Manaem, paid with his life for his attempt to assert himself. The high priests were too Jewish to step aside; too little [Jewish] to have become actual leaders in this revolt.

This is the picture of things, with all due reservations, that one has to create. Regarding the falsification that Josephus committed, as we proved, the decisive reason is certainly not his relations with the emperors—not even for the image that he creates of Titus, his mercy with the people and his desire to spare the city and temple—but primarily his treason. This brought with it the reassessment of all values, and the fortunate outcome of the revolt seemed to prove him right. God's temple was a heap of rubble: he remained too much of a Jew for this not to have affected him. And it was doubtless correct that all this would not have happened if one had acquiesced in the situation. In principle the chauvinists were responsible for all misfortune, and in his [Josephus'] eyes they became all the more so since he hated them from the depths of his soul. His benefactor Titus could not have been the guilty one; his bad conscience could not admit this. That Caesar should have had any interest in standing as the protector of the Jewish temple is unbelievable.<sup>13</sup> And of course the actual people, as they were supposed to be according to his conception and therefore were—in particular members of his own class, the aristocracy in Jerusalem—were free of any guilt; they were only victims of enemies in their own ranks and of the governor, who had heinously and systematically driven them

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<sup>13</sup> Cf. Sulp. Sev., *Chron.* II, 30, 6, in W. Weber p. 72 f.

to revolt. This presentation is both a justification before his conscience and his people and, at the same time, the programme according to which this [people] could make its peace with the Romans and come to terms with what had happened. This, it seems to me, is how we can explain Josephus' development. We shall be able to see another reason, surely no less important, at the end of the essay.

It remains for the moment to discuss a couple of particular inconsistencies in Josephus and to elucidate by way of some examples his manner of reporting.

[290] The report about Simon b. Giora's flourishing (IV, 503 ff.) is preceded and followed by an action of Vespasian that also affects Idumaea: 447 and 553 ff. It is now very strange to see how Vespasian and Cerealis conquer Idumaea as if Simon were not there, and the way in which Simon is at home in Idumaea as if there were no Romans in the world, not to mention right in the middle of that territory. Thus Hebron is conquered, at 529 ff. by Simon and at 554 f. by the Romans, without there seeming to be any connection between the two. The worst is that immediately after the subjection of the entire territory by the Romans, Simon turns against τὰ λείψανα τῆς Ἰδουμαίας, i.e. against all that he himself had not yet won. Luckily, this striking contradiction can be resolved by an examination of the chronology. The action of Vespasian at 447 falls in the year 68 and thus can be ignored here. For the second action, the 5. Daisos = 23 June 69 is mentioned at 550 as the day of departure. W. Weber showed on p. 156 f. that this cannot be correct. July 1 is the day of the proclamation [by the legions of Egypt in favour of Vespasian]. In this short time such a large territory could not be crossed, to say nothing of being subjected. It makes sense to take June 23 as the day of return and accordingly to move back the beginning of the action to about mid-May. According to 557, however, Simon won Jerusalem in the month of Xanthikos = April/May. It is reasonable to assume that he evacuated the territory before Vespasian. In any case, the reports about Vespasian's expeditions and Simon's enterprises are all mixed up together without any respect for the chronology. This shows, first, what one has to expect of Josephus and, moreover, a discovery that sets itself in a striking way to Weber's thesis—without saying anything on that account about its correctness or incorrectness.

A similar problem is posed by the paragraphs B.V 71 ff. and 98 ff. In the city the στάσις, now three-headed since the Zealots withdrew themselves from John's leadership,

celebrates its debaucheries. The Romans advance there and it becomes clear to the hostile parties how much damage they are doing by attacking each other. Out of this realization emerges a spontaneous decision, it seems (75), to attack the Tenth legion on the Mount of Olives. After this, at 98: λωφήσαντος δὲ πρὸς βραχὺ τοῦ θύραζε πολέμου πάλιν τὸν ἔνδον ἢ στάσις ἐπήγειρεν. It is the Pesach festival, on 14 Xanthikos = May 1: John uses the people's entrance to the temple to take the Zealots back under his control. This is odd. As long as a state of war still existed between John and Eleazar, there was no thought of a common spontaneous action. It is even less plausible that the internal dispute broke out again in its old strength after a common military operation. Now we read the following at B. V 567 (cf. also VI 421): a defector, Manneos, reports that through the gate that had been entrusted to him, so and so many [291] tens of thousands of dead had been carried out since the day on which Titus had set up camp before Jerusalem—Xanthikos 14 until 1. Panemos. The day on which Titus sets up camp in front of Jerusalem is surely the one mentioned at [V.] 67 ff. From 69 it is not perfectly clear whether the Tenth Legion arrives on the same day, but it seems so. In that case, the attack on the Mount of Olives would have happened on the same day. Of course, this does not agree at all with what is reported at 98 ff. We cannot resolve this discrepancy with our resources. There seems to be more involved here than a basic error of chronology, though we cannot say anything more precise. Nevertheless, just as with the discrepancy in the story of Simon, treated above, so also here it is clear that the Roman and internal Jewish matters stand next to each other in splendid isolation.

Concerning the στάσις, Josephus is under suspicion of having thoroughly exaggerated. This is one of the passages in which this inference is easily drawn. The attack on the Mount of Olives is undoubtedly historical. Whenever the account concerning the internal struggles does not match this, it is incorrect. In other passages the following [points] come into view: V 278, defence command area; VI 72 and 227, Simon's collaboration in the defence of the temple; the hero lists at 92 and 148; 326, John moves into the upper city after the conquest of the temple. Add to this V 474: a certain Γεφθαῖος from Garis in Galilee is identified. This man is without question identical with Γυφθαῖος at VI 92 and Γεφθαῖος at VI 148. John's people are predominantly Galileans. Thus, John supported Simon. These passages are by no means few, then, not to the credit



of Josephus' literary competence. It was a function of his system to paint the στάσις in the darkest colours; information about a comradeship-in-arms among the contending groups in Jerusalem destroys the picture.

Now for a style test: at IV 347, where remorse visits the Idumeans over their intervention in favour of the Zealots, we read that there were no indications of treason by the high priests. Thus, the high priests were not such peace-lovers as they were meant to appear in Josephus? That is correct, as [I have] shown, but the reason for this sentence in Josephus is a different one. The high priests are the suffering innocent; that is why they are peace-loving at one point, and only participate in the war under compulsion, but then must suffer from it most harshly. The other time they are accused in an unjust way of treason and defection, and are butchered because of this false attribution of guilt. As indeed is fitting. A classic example: the high priest Matthew and his four sons (V 527 to 531 and VI 114). One son succeeds in defecting, but the [292] brothers and fathers are accused of the intention, innocently of course.<sup>14</sup>

And then some palpable examples of confusion from what has been treated so far. IV 129 ff. reports how intense fighting erupted between the war party and peace party across the land, in the cities occupied by the Romans. The Roman occupation force happily allows it to happen, out of hatred for the Jews, that they tear each other to pieces. Finally, the bandits stream into the city: γενόμενοι πονηρίας στίφος εἰς τὰ Ἱεροσόλυμα παρεισφθείρονται. That the Romans should have let this happen cannot be understood. – According to IV 353, before their departure from the city the Idumeans free τοὺς ἐν τοῖς δεσμοτηρίοις περὶ δισχιλίους δημότας. This obviously refers to those imprisoned at 327. These δημόται now move to Simon b. Giora, an odd destination indeed for peace-lovers. It seems that they were not that [peace-lovers], after all, but even of the aristocracy and those who supported them [mentioned at 327], this cannot be understood. – At IV 413 ff. and 487 the conquest of Gadara and Gerasa is reported. There are two parties in the former city: it falls through a betrayal. In the case of Gerasa nothing is said about a Rome-friendly party. Given everything else that we know about these cities (one can find the passages in Niese's index), we are very surprised to find them on the side of the

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<sup>14</sup> Moreover, both passages are good proof for Josephus' unreliability in details: in [B.] V 530 the son has deserted beforehand; in VI 115 [sic: 114] he deserts after his father's death.

revolt. It should be mentioned here such contradictions also occur with respect to Sepphoris and Tiberias, about which we are generally much better informed. – A special *crux* is the account of Simon b. Giora's entry into Jerusalem at IV 557–576. What is there in the city for Idumeans, who rise up against John (566)? Why does Simon not use the unrest in the city, but must first be asked explicitly? – This might suffice. Those who want more cases will find them without difficulty. Even where Josephus reports in detail,<sup>15</sup> an impenetrable cloud lies over the facts. We know now the main reason for this circumstance: the tendency that distorts the picture. Unfortunately, we cannot determine with precision how much beyond this to attribute simply to Josephus' incompetence in genuine historical reportage.

It seemed necessary to elaborate this cloudiness with some further examples, in order to warn about our standard handbooks, which in a hazardous way mislead about this circumstance. There, everything appears processed in the most admirable way, in the manner of modern historical work. I am afraid [293] that in our own historical presentation of this war, as far as the Jewish side is concerned, we must content ourselves with a complete disavowal [or renunciation, abandonment].

## 2. The *Vita* and *Justus of Tiberias*<sup>16</sup>

It is good that out of the previous discussion we have at least a somewhat solid base under our feet as we now turn toward matters in Galilee and Josephus' effectiveness there. Even so remains a hopeless undertaking to want to recover a picture of the events there from a few *strategemata*, which are not themselves reliable in the least, and from a few fragments of real historical knowledge.

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<sup>15</sup> Everything Roman is an exception. These parts are concise, factual, and understandable. The difference is immediately noticeable. Cf. Weber's book.

<sup>16</sup> Concerning the *Vita* there are already correct things in A. Baerwald, *Josephus in Galiläa* etc. (Diss. Breslau 1877); Niese in *Historische Zeitschrift* 76, 1896, 193–237; Luther, *Josephus und Justus von Tiberias* (Diss. Halle 1910); Schürer, *Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes* I<sup>4</sup> 86ff. Since the question has been led in completely mistaken directions by Laqueur, however, it seems necessary to formulate even the most obvious things again, pointedly. I believe that I can spare myself from detailed engagement with those mentioned, chiefly because their basic method remained inadequate. It is constantly asked, 'What is historically possible and probable?'—not, 'What is the report's value?' On this point at least, Laqueur is far superior to them.

For these matters, as is well known, we possess two accounts, B. II 569 through IV 120 and the *Vita*: we must also mention one or two passages from the work C. Ap. (I 25 ff., 45 ff.) in which Josephus obviously polemizes against Justus of Tiberias. Up until Vespasian's invasion the *Vita* is the most detailed, and so it will be most important. It is all the more necessary, therefore, to obtain an accurate picture of the book's character.

As is well known, the dispute with Justus takes up a rather large part of the book. Now, there is a question whether this [Justus material] is in the strict sense *excursus*, or whether Justus' attack is in fact the reason for the *Vita*'s appearance. Since this attack is directed not only at the author but also, as we will see shortly, against the person [of Josephus], it is entirely possible that he [Josephus] selected autobiography as his form of response, in order to elaborate this [issue]. It is possible too that this form, in turn, decided the content, so that now there are pieces in there that do not belong in the strict sense to the response to Justus' attack. Certainly this hypothesis has the advantage of simplicity. If this were not the case, then the nature of the foundation into which the passages about Justus are embedded would need to be determined and explained [in some other way]. It remains at all events a strange sort of biography, as one sees at the first glance.

We must, then, begin with the Justus passages, above all with the great digression at 336-367. Quite obviously this has to do [294], if not exclusively at least primarily, with a conflict over the truth. Justus had claimed for himself that he gave a better presentation than others—that is, than Josephus (340, 357, 359). The last two passages show that this relates to the content, that is to the truth, and not, or at most only incidentally, to the form: the autopsy has value only for the content; it had to be the content that was not flawless, if Justus did not dare to publish his work while Vespasian, Titus and Agrippa were still alive—so Josephus argues. Josephus, on his side, intends to prove that Justus made an inaccurate presentation.

Regarding the specific differences, the long chapter tells us remarkably little. 357 is so general that we cannot infer anything at all. Certainly we can infer that the two single issues treated there were not the only divergences, which would be unlikely in itself. Regarding these: the one is the contradiction between Justus' presentation and Titus' *commentarii* regarding the siege of Jerusalem. Unfortunately, we learn nothing more precise. On the other hand, the response to Justus' claim that Josephus (and the Galileans)

were responsible for his home city's revolt against the Romans and the king (34) takes up considerable space.<sup>17</sup>

It is important in this context to ask how Justus' accusation was intended: if he was referring only to the accuracy of the historical reportage or also to the politics, and how he was understood by Josephus. As far as I can see, this cannot be decided with certainty from the text before us. Regarding Josephus: in the *Bellum* he reported so openly about his fight against the Romans that the question whether or not he was responsible for the defection of Tiberias becomes completely pointless. Thus, it would be strange if had been struck by the political side of the matter. With Justus, things are different. From the sentence (345) ὅτι μήτε φιλωρώμαιοι μήτε φιλοβασιλεῖς γεγόνατε one might conclude that Justus prided himself on the loyalty of himself and his home city, which would mean at the same time that Josephus was not treated in a friendly manner as participant in and leader of the revolt. I do not want to present this as certain either, however. I believe that I can prove that Justus' work must have also contained things that were unfavourable to Agrippa. Perhaps the issue cannot be decided with our resources. At any rate, extreme caution is urged with respect to the view current until now, which understood the opposition between Josephus and Justus as essentially political. Also the consequences to which [this view] leads appear to have little to recommend it.

[295] And now to Josephus' arguments against Justus. Josephus finds himself from the outset in in a most unfortunate position: he is forced to go into matters about which nothing was said in the B. and therefore tries to protect himself in 338/9 against the consequences that might be inferred from this. In fact, there is nothing in the B. about the action against the Decapolis, in which Justus took part. This action is well attested in Vespasian's *commentarii*, and it would therefore serve as a serious argument for Justus' participation in the revolt—if, regrettably, we had not been entirely left in the dark about the operation, its cause, goal, and meaning, both here and at 410 and 42, where Josephus uses it [the Decapolis action] as the only tangible evidence for Justus' bellicose disposition— probably because there was no other [evidence] at his disposal. Everything else that Josephus has to say is utterly worthless. When he turns the tables at 344 and

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<sup>17</sup> Whether ἐμοῦ κατέψευσται and καταψευδομαρτυρούμενος in 338 are only related to this or also to other things cannot be deduced from the previous section.

accuses Justus, that he himself brought down his home city, this is an empty claim: in what follows, we wait in vain for the τεκμήρια.<sup>18</sup> What he brings forward in the sequel needs no basis other than that Tiberias in general participated in the revolt, which requires no discussion. This is the result of the comparison between Sepphoris and Tiberias and of the presentation of the city's later behaviour.

Particularly noteworthy in this section is the transition at 350, to which the beginning of 355 presents an exact parallel. Pathetic rants cannot, of course, take the place of good reasons. Further at 353: while Josephus is being being besieged at Jotapata, there are bloody internal struggles in Tiberias, οὐ διὰ τὴν πρὸς Ῥωμαίους καὶ τὸν βασιλέα φιλίαν, διὰ δὲ τὴν ὑμετέραν αὐτῶν πονηρίαν. But it seems completely unthinkable that at this moment internal disagreements in Tiberias should have had any basis other than an external-political one, and if they did have, this would need to be divulged. The πονηρία is no reason, but only an accusation, and of course it carries no weight. One could assume that the Roman party made to achieve peace with the Romans and one will ask if this was not mentioned by Justus and also ask if this is proof for the candid effort by the peace party.

At 355f. we learn something about Justus' life. It has been mentioned above that close scrutiny reveals that he was only sentenced to death once: a comparison with 343 shows this. This is therefore a distortion. And unfortunately we also learn nothing about the reasons for his apparent double prison sentence (the one is certainly accommodated by 343) and double banishment. And so, much against the wishes of Josephus, the office of *ab epistulis* remains at the end the most tangible item in this passage.

[296] Then too, the proof from the late publication of Justus' work is worth nothing at all, if indeed this fact is not rather to be interpreted in the opposite sense. We have seen some of the distortion that Josephus engaged in to exonerate Agrippa's field commander, Philip: here of course the appeal to full agreement with the king is fatal, completely, or so the second of his letters will seem to suggest. [Ed.: because histories involving living personalities laboured under suspicion of flattery.] the And most striking is the suggestion that Justus would interpret him [Agrippa] ironically. –

This is the great digression. Thus, we look at § 6: οὕτως παρατίθεμαι τοῖς

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<sup>18</sup> Or was this passage supposed to be understood as a reference to 32 ff.?

διαβάλλειν ἡμᾶς πειρωμένοις χαίρειν φράσας.<sup>19</sup> Who else would have slandered him, such that Josephus would take it as cause to defend himself here in the *Vita*, except Justus? In that case, the whole introduction, as far as 12, should be understood as something called forth by Justus' attack.

One should not object that this has too slender a connection with the attacks in the part already treated: this would be entirely personal, whereas there it is all about historical-political matters. With respect to [such] issues, the section 80–83 stands in the middle between both sides. The defence (and it certainly is one; cf. 80 διαβολάς, 81 ὁμολογῶ) talks about the purity of his ethical conduct, his unselfishness, and his restraint. Thus, the accusation was ἀσέλγεια, greed, and tyranny. The continuation of the narrative (83) is supposed to prove that this was slander. He was so upright that God's mercy protected him visibly as it allowed his betrayal to become a blessing for him. Again, we have the attack [by Justus] to thank indirectly for the similarly important and interesting, if unfortunately isolated, information about Josephus' action against the neighbouring Syrian cities (81). This brief sentence reveals more for the question of Josephus' role than long pages in the rest of the text. They are highly selected items that the defamer knows to report; here again, of course, he is none other than Justus.

Let us look further at what the continuation of the narrative has to say about Josephus' moral traits. As a matter of fact this [theme] penetrates the entire book. [Sections] 79 and 84 form the beginning, the latter paragraph being a true Josephan transition. It must have to do with cities conquered by the Romans [ed.: when it speaks of popular concern for Josephus safety as the Galilean cities were stormed]. But then this much later εὔνοια cannot have been the reason for John's much earlier φθόνος [ed.: i.e., John was envious of Josephus long before the Romans came to Galilee]. – I simply write down the paragraphs that praise his positive behaviour: 100 (restraint), 103 (the Galileans' goodwill, [his] restraint), 110 (pardoning), 125 (the Galileans' goodwill), 174 (χωρὶς φόνων), 194 (ὅτι καλῶς ἐγὼ στρατηγῶ), 198 (love of the Galileans), 205–207 (the Galileans implore him to stay), 210–212 (the same), 230 (good general), 233 (the same), 244 (εὐεργέτης καὶ σωτήρ), 250 f. (the Galileans' goodwill), 256–259 (εὐεργέτης καὶ [297] σωτήρ. πάντες δ' ὄμνουν ἀνυβρίστους μὲν ἔχειν τὰς γυναῖκας, λελυπησθαι δὲ

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<sup>19</sup> Against this Laqueur sets, rightly, XX 266.

μηδέποτε), 262–266 (pardoning and restraint), 299 ff. (goodwill of the δῆμος of Tiberias), 303 (the same), 307 (restraint), 321 (πρὸς μὲν τοὺς πολίτας ἐξάπτειν πόλεμον οὐκ ἐνόμιζον εὐσεβὲς εἶναι), 377 (τοιαῦτα δρᾶν ὁμοφύλους οὐκ ἔστιν ὅσιον)—380 (the Sepphorites are saved by him), 385–389 (Tiberias is also saved by him), 404 (the Galileans' concern for him), 418 (Josephus pleads for the lives and freedom of fellow-citizens and for [a copy of] the law) 430 (ταῦτα μὲν τὰ πεπραγμένα μοι διὰ παντὸς τοῦ βίου ἐστίν, κρινέτωσαν δ' ἐξ αὐτῶν τὸ ἦθος ὅπως ἂν ἐθέλωσιν ἕτεροι).

The picture is completed by several passages that describe attacks against him (we shall speak later about the reason and sense of the animosity that Josephus met): 260 (tyrant), 277 (bad field commander), 284 ὡς τοῦ μὲν τὸν πόλεμον ἐπελαφρύνειν αὐτοῖς ἀμελοῦντος, ἐν τρυφαῖς δὲ διάγοντος), 295 ff. (misuse of public funds), 302 (tyrant), 315 (ὅτι μὴ καλῶς τὰ κατὰ τὴν Γαλιλαίαν διοικῶ).

These thoughts, as Josephus promises, continue throughout everything that follows. In particular, the report of the delegation is filled with such things. It is very important that in the final paragraph of the composition he invites the reader's judgement on his character, on the basis of his actions. Indeed, I think that Josephus' main interest is in these matters, and that the connection of the writing with Justus lies in this moral perspective, and that his attack on *the person* of Josephus is the reason why he [Josephus] chose the form of autobiography. This [hypothesis] has only one problem. The *Bellum* (II 623, 630, 646) also speaks about his restraint, albeit not in such detail, and without the same advertisement of the moral perspective—thus II 623, 630, 646. I do not know how far one should engage the fact that these are featured much more prominently in the *Vita*. At any rate the account in the *Bellum*, with its discomfiting lack of content, is also in other ways a bigger puzzle than the *Vita*.

Next, 177 f. This passage, which is almost completely unintelligible to us unfortunately, shows that there were connections of some sort between Justus and Philip b. Jacimus. Certainly this does not mean that the passages about Philip in the *Vita* also go back to Justus. But this can be proven through different ways.

Moreover: we saw in the great digression us that Justus had claimed that Josephus brought about his home city's defection. So it is very interesting to hear what Josephus wants to relate about his first encounter with Tiberias. The account of this is in 64—69.

About this, the following should be said: The house that was built by Herod the Tetrarch is of course not just any house, but it is the palace of Agrippa; this is revealed by the fact that the goods robbed during its destruction were the king's property. But the order for its destruction is of course the highest political affair. When Josephus indicates [298] that he gave this order for purely religious reasons in an official directive, as one of the three envoys, this is plainly therefore an obfuscation. It is very clear: the fact is on the one hand admitted, on the other hand presented as completely harmless.<sup>20</sup> It seems certain to me that we have here Josephus' answer to Justus' presentation. The same method holds for the following. Josephus issued and implemented the order, but instead of pursuing the matter, surprisingly, he departs. In his place Jesus b. Sapphia destroys the royal palace and robs everything of value, while Josephus prepares to take the things back from the robbers and deposit them with Capellas for the king. Compare with this 295: Jesus asks Josephus who has the plunder from the destruction of the palace. Capellas acknowledges the deposit. Thus, Justus had accused Josephus of concealing this plunder. 66—29 and 295 contain his answer to this accusation, an answer that shows in every possible way that Justus was right in all ways.

Finally, the section 30—61. It presents the situation that Josephus discovered upon his arrival in Galilee. Sepphoris is not yet participating in the revolt. Josephus protects the city from the threat that the Galileans were posing to it. – In Tiberias are three parties: the Roman party under the leadership of Capellas, of which Pistus appears to consider himself a part, since from what concerns his son he is explicitly excluded; the war party under the command of the otherwise well known Jesus b. Sapphia, who eagerly supported the revolt, disappears entirely, probably to make room for the middle party and Justus. We recall 344: here is reported what was only claimed there, that Justus had brought his home city to secession from the Romans. It is strange, too, that this role was taken up by the leader of the middle party. Let us take a closer look. Justus gives a speech in which he details how Tiberias' position has suffered because Nero gave it to Agrippa as a present. Sepphoris is said to have gained the leadership in Galilee. "This and other things he was saying against the king"—surely, no one can figure out why what has been

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<sup>20</sup> That it had to do with a political upheaval, and indeed in the national-Jewish sense, might also follow from 67, in the information about the slaughter of the Greeks.



said should have any point against the king—and he summons his citizens to a retaliatory action against Sepphoris, in which the Galileans would gladly take part because of their hatred for that city. Even if the retaliatory action was not the most obvious beginning of the revolt, at least it was a war-like action against a Rome-friendly city. But it was not at all carried out. After two paragraphs of personal attacks against Justus follow nothing but the well known story of the burning of the villages in the Decapolis. Here, if anywhere, Josephus needed to present facts. It is clear that he does not have any, and thus: what Josephus is trying to impute to Justus [299] is simply made up. – And then Gischala and Gamala. Two big surprises. About Gamala and the figure of Philip we must speak in detail below. At any rate, everywhere else Gamala fully takes part in the revolt. Above all, to find in John a peace-lover is the biggest surprise that one could imagine. Only the attack by the Gadarenes and the Tyrians compels him to take up arms. He does nothing else but re-fortify Gischala as protection against similar attacks. “What is that about?” we ask in astonishment. Well, this picture emerges: Gischala is peaceful, just as Gamala; Sepphoris even defies danger for the sake of peace. Only Tiberias, then [was restive], and Justus alone was the guilty one there. We think of the comparison between Sepphoris and Tiberias at 346 ff. I think that if this entire section should not remain completely unintelligible, it would be difficult to find another explanation for it. It provides the answer to Justus’ attack, that Josephus first brought Tiberias to defection: to the contrary, everywhere else it was quiet; only in Tiberias did you foster unrest.

This entire section also, therefore, may belong to the dispute with Justus. And so it seems that one can make do with this: if one assumes that Justus’ work was the reason for the *Vita*’s appearance.

### **3. Josephus’ Mission**

In the same context, I mean the question of the *Vita*’s dependency on the dispute with Justus, belongs—it seems—the question about Josephus’ mission. But this can no longer be treated only incidentally.

In the first part we formed a basis for the solution of this question through the demonstration that at the beginning of the revolt the aristocracy of Jerusalem participated fully, and that it is a falsification by Josephus when he presents them as peace-loving.

Josephus is also part of this aristocracy. From the *Vita* the main passages are 21—23 and 204; from the B. II 562—568, a passage that should be discussed immediately. The conclusion of our investigation of the account of the beginning of revolt in Tiberias fits this well, as does, for example, the news about Josephus' action against the Syrian cities (*Vita* 81). This provides the *praeiudicium*.

As is well known, two versions of Josephus' mission are available. The first is mainly presented in B. II 562—568. According to this, after the defeat of Cestius Gallus a joint election of generals took place. One of those elected is Josephus.

Unfortunately, it is not possible to reach a sure verdict on the historical worth of this passage. It is certain that Ananus held the leadership in the sequel. Next to him, Gorion b. Joseph, who is probably identical with the Joseph b. Gorion named here (cf. the same confusion with the names [300] of one of the envoys against Josephus, Judas b. Jonathan B. II 628 [451], Jonathan at *Vita* and more often) plays a significant, though not decisive, role. In Josephus' portrayal, however, it appears that Ananus' influence and position were based more on his honour as high priest, his age, and his personal qualities than that he had been elevated as the one elected general from among his peers in rank and office. There is thus nothing in here to serve as proof of the accuracy of Josephus' account. And indeed this is completely impossible, unfortunately, for the others named. Eleazar might perhaps be the son of the high priest Ananias; but even if this were correct it would not help us. Only Niger of Peraea and John the Essene are known. At least in their cases the situation of their toparchies fits with their attack on Ascalon at III 9 ff. Yet the toparchies do not provide us any further help. We only hear anything worth mentioning from Idumaea and Acrabatene, and only about the later one we hear something relevant for us: Simon b. Giora is chased away from the toparchy [of Acrabatene] at the initiative of Jerusalem (652 ff., IV 504). So people are doing things to hold on to the power in the countryside, which means that they needed to use men who cared about this [purpose]. It is not possible to say more. But it is important that Josephus appears in the role of general not only in the B. but also in the *Vita*—except at the beginning.

There the matter sounds quite different. It starts at 17. On returning from Rome, Josephus comes into the beginning of the unrest and initiates his activities for peace. After

the removal of the Manaem, he joins the high priests. They, because they fear the people, do not dare to stand up for their political aims openly. We now know how to regard all of this, and so we also know how to evaluate paragraphs 28 and 29 correctly:

The principal men in Jerusalem see that the bandits have an abundance of weapons, while they themselves are unarmed and thus are afraid of being defeated by them, as indeed happened later. And they also learned that not all Galilee had defected from the Romans, but that one part remained calm. Thus, Josephus and two others are sent to Galilee as a delegation with this directive: to persuade the bad ones to lay down their weapons, and to instruct them that it would be better if they remained faithful to the nobles and the good; for these men were determined to keep the weapons always ready for what was coming, and to wait and see what the Romans would do.

It must be asked, of course, whether Josephus acts in keeping with this, his mandate, and whether the envoys step into action. In this regard, the first thing we hear hardly inspires trust: the *synedrion* leaves it up to Josephus to keep the envoys there if that should be their wish. Yet they want to go home, whereas Josephus decides them to remain. He needs them, too, in what follows. We have already spoken about the story of the destruction of the royal palace in Tiberias, [301] and we know how the official order is supposed to relieve him. Then they [the envoys] let themselves be bribed by John and support his wishes (73); at 77 they are sent away. That is all!

But Josephus himself begins his activities, as said, in Galilee and (64ff.) Tiberias. Immediately afterwards, at 72, one reads: διὰ τὸ καὶ τὴν ἔξουσίαν τῶν ἐκεῖ πραγμάτων αὐτὸς παρὰ τοῦ κοινοῦ τῶν Ἱεροσολυμιτῶν πεπιστεῦσθαι; the same is at 226, 267, 310 f., 324, 341, 393. With this notice [that Josephus was entrusted by Jerusalem with authority over the war in Galilee] fits completely: the action against the Syrian cities at 81, which is verified by Justus; at 115—121 the fight against Aebutius and Neapolitanus; at 186, support of Gamala and construction of the wall; at 187 ff., fortification of the Galilean cities; at 209, the dream in which he is reminded of his task to wage war against the Romans; at 212, the fight against Placidus—and so forth, until the fight against Vespasian himself.

Only two passages of a different substance remain: 175, in the strange

conversation with Justus (I myself know the Romans' power, but I remain silent about it because of the robbers. They, the council of Tiberias, should do the same and accept him as general.) And 77: when he sent away the envoys, he takes care of the supply of arms. He summons the bravest bandits, sees that it is impossible to disarm them, and thus convinces the masses to pay a levy, under the condition that they would only enter the region if they were called or received no pay. At the same time he gives them an order not to fight neither the Romans nor those living nearby. For he was concerned with the peace of Galilee.

It was on the two passages just introduced, as is well known, that Laqueur (p. 247 ff.) based his theory of a development in Josephus' positions in Galilee: he came as a peaceful envoy, created the *tyrannis* with the help of the "bandits," had them paid by the cities, became dependent on the national Bolsheviks<sup>21</sup>—for this is what the bandits were—, and was thereby unintentionally pressed into a war policy. It seems that these passages are very poor supports for Laqueur's hypotheses.

Concerning 77—79, the sense of this passage will become immediately apparent if one recognizes that it corresponds precisely to B. II 569-576, specifically: 79 to II 569—571, and the first sentence of 77 to 572—576. The inversion of the order is insignificant. The passage seems to have been written with a memory of the *Bellum*. Concern for internal relations and concern for external security stand together closely in both cases. But it is conspicuous that the latter item is dispatched in the *Vita* dispatches with just one sentence: the first of 77. We expect more precise information about the fortifications of the respective cities. That comes at 187 after the request from Gamala. At 77 the very general first sentence is followed by the story of the bandits—quite suddenly, it appears, and undermining the context attested by the parallel in the B. If I see it [302] correctly, the weapons provide the keys to understanding. One should compare ὄπλων κατασκευῆς and ἀφελέσθαι αὐτῶν τὰ ὄπλα. The course of events is plainly this: while Josephus writes the first sentence at 77, he remembers how badly the supply of weapons and the fortification of cities fit with his delegation's mandate. So this [mandate to disarm] is quickly disposed of. Namely, it proves not to be executable. Instead of it: the payment of the levy and the contract with the robbers to leave the territory. With this he

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<sup>21</sup> See above p. 284, note 1.

fortunately gets rid of both the bandits and the ad hoc—that is, invented as an effective counter to Justus’ claims—mandate.<sup>22</sup> The fatal contradiction between the first sentence of 77 and the last one of 78 is of no concern, of course, to such a scribbler with no conscience. After to this passage there is no further difference between the *Vita* and the *Bellum* concerning Josephus’ mission, with the sole exception of 175 ff.

This passage and indeed the entire context are equally untrustworthy, even granted that it will be hard to find an easy explanation. The situation here is that the Tiberians have wanted to call for the king’s help, but Josephus intimidates them with the fleet from Tarichaea and brings the city’s council under his control. He is speaking with people, therefore, who have dealings with the Romans and with the king. That is the situation, and Josephus’s words fit well with it. That he speaks of his peaceful inclination agrees at least with the general tendency of the *Vita*. And if he was forced into his warlike disposition, the “bandits” adapted themselves as those who did the deeds. Parallels to this are 22, B. II 651: Ananus’ wish to return to peace and the like. It is rather awkward, besides, that Justus appears as one of the peace-lovers.<sup>23</sup>

The result is that the peace-oriented mandate proves itself to be a falsification: the delegation of three plays a role in the conflict with Justus and therefore likewise deserves no trust. Against this there is no evidence that Josephus was sent to Galilee as a strategist by the government in Jerusalem. At first, we have to assume this even though we also have to consider the possibility that, however he might have gotten to Galilae, achieved his powerful position by himself, as it is mentioned on 302. One always has to aware that all attacks against Josephus in the *Vita* can go back to Justus and probably really go back to him, and he has not been proven as a bad person to trust at any point.

#### **[303] 4. Josephus and the Internal Relationships in Galilee.**

##### **Conduct of the War**

We turn now to Josephus’ activity in Galilee, and begin with the internal relations.

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<sup>22</sup> It may be further noted that there is no trace of a Zealot opposition against the high priests in Galilee. At that time, John enjoyed good relations with Jerusalem.

<sup>23</sup> Cf. also 206.

It looks as though there is nothing in the entire revolt about which we are as well informed as we are about these matters. A lengthy piece of the *Bellum* and almost the entire *Vita* deal with this. And yet hardly anything is as useless a source as these stories. Nowhere is Josephus's writing so lacking in substance and so unreal. The ruses and tricks are each described in detail, but the cause, the aim, and the general situation remain completely in the dark. Yet only these are truly historical. That the stories themselves, as they stand, often fail the test of accuracy is shown by the Dabaritta incident. Josephus allows that he wants to use the money for wall construction in Taricheae, the remainder and other monies for wall construction in other cities, especially Tiberias (B. II 606 ff.; *Vita* 142). But at B. III 465 we learn that Tiberias received its walls right at the beginning of the revolt, with significant pecuniary disbursements, whereas Taricheae ἀυτοῦ τὰ λείψανα τῆς φιλοτιμίας μετέλαβον. This is contained in a "Roman" section, which as usual has a much more real and true character, and it also corresponds to the [relative] significance of the two cities. Thus, the whole stratagem [i.e., Josephus' promise to build these cities' walls] collapses on itself.<sup>24</sup> It is wasted effort to engage oneself with these stories at all. And a comparison of the *Vita* with the *Bellum* is completely futile. Helm<sup>25</sup> saw correctly that Josephus wrote from memory in the *Vita*, at least without immediate examination of the older writing. The numbers that are given provide the clearest proof. All of the small departures are explainable in this way [i.e. writing without consultation of the *War*].

Into this cloudy world of chicanery and deception intrude some figures and things from reality, and only fastening on these can have any point. But even if one collects what is reported about them, one experiences only disappointments. Using Niese's Index it is an easy matter for everyone to test this for himself. One simply needs to pursue the story of John of Gischala, Jesus b. Sapphia, and Justus; of Sepphoris, Tiberias, and Tarichaea. As especially impressive examples of the case in which one must beware of Josephus, I offer the story of the construction of Gischala's wall by John, which appears in a completely different light the three times it is mentioned: B. II 575, 590 and *Vita* 189. Alongside this we should compare *Vita* 45, according to which the city was fortified

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<sup>24</sup> Cf. Luther, op. cit., p. 28.

<sup>25</sup> *Phil. Wochenschrift* 1921 p. 489.

much earlier. One might compare also the accounts of the construction of the Sepphoris' wall [304] at *Vita* 347, 188, B. II 574. With this city, whose Rome-friendly attitude we can regard as relatively well established, the contradictions are especially conspicuous. Or one might look through the Justus passages: at 36 he vacillates over the question about participation in the war, even though he undertakes the action against the Decapolis; at 39 he speaks against Agrippa, though surely he does not say anything really hostile; at 65 he is to be found among Capellas' people; at 88 he and his father want to join with John; at 175 he is part of the imprisoned council of Tiberias that is friendly to the king; at 279 he supports Jesus b. Sapphia. Most of these passages' are of the sort that makes it understandable why Laqueur could come up with the idea of treating them as later additions. Yet it would certainly be difficult to find a common tendency [among them]. It will seem to some that at times Josephus only drags in his enemy to place his bad intentions before the reader's eyes.

What interests us above all, of course, is the question of the reason for the animosity between Josephus and John of Gischala, with whom Jesus b. Sapphia seems to be close. The situation is this: In the case of Josephus we have proven his active participation in the revolt, with which also the reported fact of his good relations with the very war-like Tarichaea fits perfectly. And John is fully, whole-heartedly aligned with the cause of revolt. At that time, to be sure, he did not yet belong to the radical wing: his connections with the government in Jerusalem are good (cf. *Vita* 190 ff.) Since there existed no fundamental political opposition between the two men, there could have only been personal grounds. One could well imagine that John unhappily saw himself hindered by Josephus in the development of his own power base. But above all one should not forget the attacks against Josephus' personal conduct, against which he had to defend himself in the *Vita*, and which probably originated with Justus. There must be something to them [these personal accusations], and one cannot be surprised that men like John and Jesus b. Sapphia were not especially pleased about the leadership of Josephus. One may well believe that in other areas there was a good relationship between them at the outset. The point receives support from the evident fact that Jesus b. Sapphia first brought his policy to triumph in Tiberias with Josephus' help (cf. *Vita* 67).

On that point, a general source-critical observation. Time after time we observe

that everything reported about Roman matters is characterized by objectivity and clarity. It is as if we were in another world, one that is real—in the true sense of the word. Unfortunately, the information about Jewish relationships in these parts is not rich. Only in the *Vita*, where Josephus opposes Justus, and to that extent the presentation is coloured by a marked tendency—fortunately, this tendency can be traced for the most part—is there information [305]: truly excellent, selective, and most of it unfortunately also fragmentary. The *Vita* is otherwise fairly useless. Still worse is the corresponding part of the *Bellum*: above all, it is sketchier. The origin of this piece is a difficult question. Whatever the quality of Josephus' literary work may be—we have obtained a rather unfavourable impression of it—, still he must have thought *something* while he was writing. And one must also explain why there is so much that he did not write about. Without doubt, he positioned himself in the centre of the world, so that everything that concerned him personally was more important to him than the history of the great war; without doubt, John of Gischala's animosity must have meant something both to him and for its consequences (also later, he [John] does play a large role) so that one would happily allow special room for the struggles and intrigues between him and Josephus: but after all that, the account in the *Bellum* is by no means clarified. The fact that the *Bellum* also mentions something about Josephus' restraint, which in *Vita* is probably attributable to Justus' attacks on his person that go back to Justus, only complicates the difficult question further. If we do not succeed in finding an explanation from what is available, the reason must be sought elsewhere. One could, for example, consider whether some personal connections forced Josephus' mouth shut. We shall return to this presently.

As far as the account in the *Bellum* is concerned, in this context we must draw attention to IV 85. Here John is introduced as [if] unknown, and supplied with a characterization, even though a very similar one already stood at II 585 ff. and he played the main role in what followed. To me it seems out of the question, even with Josephus, that after all this John should be treated here in this way. So this passage was not written in a series with the end of [Book] II. This [much] may surely be conceded. But unfortunately this discovery is hardly fruitful, and given the peculiar nature of the author we cannot count on further indications about the origins of the work.

Concerning Josephus' war-related activities, unfortunately we can—and must



only—be very brief. It is miserable, how meagerly we are instructed about these things. Josephus' historical world map is blank in all four directions and as empty as the white part of the world [*sc.* uninhabited regions on the map]; alone in the middle is the familiar region of Galilee. At its edge a few figures dive in, who intimate something about the existence of an outside world. Without the *Vita* we would not even have this. – Tyre and Gadara undertake, certainly before Josephus' arrival, an action against John (44 f.). The oil story (*Vita* 74 ff.; B. II 591 ff.) at least attests the existence of trade relations with Caesarea Philippi in spite of the war. The imperial grain in the villages of upper Galilee, which John brings into his possession (*Vita* 71 ff.), has a parallel in that [grain] of Bernike (119), which Josephus [306] commandeers. At *Vita* 81 there is the completely isolated notice about Josephus' victory over the Syrian cities; at 112f. and 149–154, the wholly mysterious βασιλικοὶ μεγιστᾶνες. Aebutius is stationed in the Great Plain with 100 riders and 2,000 foot soldiers, supported by the residents of Gaba. With him Josephus has several indecisive battles, as also with Neapolitanus, who directs the siege of Scythopolis (115–121). In this vicinity too belongs the Dabaritta incident. At 126 the wife of Ptolemaeus (according B. II 595 P. himself), the king's governor, travels through the Great Plain on her way from the royal area into the Roman province—that is, probably to the south around Galilee via Scythopolis to the sea. So that was possible. At 213 ff. Josephus camps near Chabulon across from Ptolemais, where Placidus is. In 269 he writes to his friends in Samaria, that they might take responsibility for his envoys' trip; at that time, Samaria was already in Roman hands. Since when? Had it earlier participated in the revolt? The account of Cerealis' battles in Samaria at III 307 relates to this. Unrest breaks out there. Vespasian decides to intervene quickly. All of Samaria was occupied with dispersed troops and the mass that they had gathered seemed dangerous. These must have been Roman military posts. Anything more precise remains obscure. At 157 several Roman riders are seen on the march not far from Tiberias. This patrol that popped up ghostlike is typical of the cloudiness of the whole environment. At 285 threatening Roman attacks are characterized as imaginary. – And that is in fact everything, up to the moment when Vespasian arrives in Galilee, and this of course marks the end of Josephus' initiative. It must be observed that owe the only information about Josephus' aggressive way of waging war to Justus. This [information] is as spare as can be, but it is important

enough that we [at least] have it.

## 5. Philip b. Jacimus<sup>26</sup>

We have not yet spoken about the passages from the *Vita* that deal with Philip. They have not been saved for the end for no reason.

Let us recall what we heard about him in the *Bellum*. At II 421 he is sent to Jerusalem by Agrippa, ostensibly to assist the peaceful δῆμος. Yet we have found reason to doubt the peaceful inclination of both the embassy that, according to 418, brings about the deployment and particularly that of the δῆμος. Philip is trapped by the rebels in Herod's palace, together with the Romans and the high priest Ananias [307], (429) and surrenders by leaving the Romans in the lurch (437). If this is extremely serious already, even more so is the fact that he only quits Jerusalem after the defeat of Cestius Gallus (556). We have already adduced *Vita* 408 f. as a parallel to [ *War* 2.] 558, where it is reported that he (and the king's relatives) were sent by Cestius Gallus to Nero, to give a report and exonerate the former. There [in *Vita* 408 f.] it is *Vespasian* who sends him, and it is to answer for himself. This latter, and the fact that Philip heads straight into the disturbances in Rome [following Nero's death], and for this reason can happily return, has so much intrinsic probability that we must take the passage in the *Vita* as the accurate account. Besides the cited passages, Philip's name appears one more time, at IV 81: from the conquered Gamala only two of Philip's nieces are able to escape alive. It is no accident that his name appears here. Of his connections with Gamala, the *Vita* has more to relate.

Let us draw together what we learn about this city's disposition. For this [purpose] B. IV 1-83, the account of the siege and conquest by Vespasian, is the main passage—also because the Roman portions [of the *Bellum*] are more credible. At IV 4 we read that whereas the king is able to win Sogane and Seleucia by peaceful means at the beginning of the uprising (ὑπὸ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ἀποστάσεως), Gamala did not want to join him, given its trust in the security of its position. Relevant to this is II 568, according to which, at the dispatch of Josephus (re: the selection of field commanders) Gamala belongs to his

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<sup>26</sup> The only one, as far as I can see, who saw something of the difficulties discussed here is A. Bawerwald in his previously mentioned dissertation. His conclusions are, even where they are correct, unmethodical. The *vulgaris opinio* can be found e.g. in Schürer I<sup>4</sup> 593 and 603 with note. It is very instructive to read this again with him.

sphere of command; further, the accounts of the wall construction at IV 9, II 574 and *Vita* 186.<sup>27</sup> These two latter passages contradict IV 4 [viz. Sogane and Seleuceia had early come to peace terms], inasmuch as in both, Sogane and Seleuceia are named together with Gamala, and in case one would otherwise perhaps give them [these passages] no weight, they are supported by *Vita* 398: Sulla, sent by the king, strikes camp close by Julias and blocks the roads to Seleuceia and Gamala, ὑπὲρ τοῦ τὰς παρὰ τῶν Γαλιλαίων ὠφελείας τοῖς ἐνοικοῖς ἀποκλείειν. One could conclude from this that these cities would somehow necessarily have had the Galilaeans' help, and then combine with this the account of the siege of Gamala by Aequus Modius (*Vita* 114, IV 10). But this is of course uncertain. As far as the contradiction concerning Seleuceia and Sogane goes, this cannot be resolved with our resources. Unfortunately, the expression ὑπὸ τὴν ἀρχὴν τῆς ἀποστάσεως—see (p. 310 n. 1) [308] the strange phrase at 83, still to be discussed: τῆς ἀποστάσεως ἀρξαμένης—does not provide a secure dating. But on a whole one gets the impression that Gamala defected early and remained true ever after to the cause of the revolt.

*Vita* 46 is very different. The attempt has already been made to interpret the very odd peaceful inclination of the city against the context, and the conflict with Justus. Another reason is without doubt Philip's role. Against expectation, Philip escapes alive from the siege of the royal palace (there is nothing here about his surrender), and then runs into the danger of being killed by Manaem. On the fifth day he flees Jerusalem in disguise and gets himself to one of his villages near Gamala. The lacuna at the end of 47 unfortunately does not allow us to detect the purpose of his direction to some of his people [to meet him], and so too our understanding of what follows is somewhat impaired. It seems that he had wanted to get to Caesarea Philippi, but that fortunately for him he was hindered by an illness. At that time Agrippa and Berenice are with Cestius Gallus—why, we shall see presently—and they have left Varus behind as governor, who is

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<sup>27</sup> The last passage is interesting. Philip, as will be discussed shortly, has happily left Gamala, since the revolt breaks out, and they request support from Josephus—and construction of a wall. To this is appended [*Vita* 187] a brief sentence about the further Gaulanitis, then the wall construction in Seleuceia and Sogane, then in the other cities. But the three cities will be named together at IV 2, at II 574 with the wall construction. So this is the thread. It is a good example for Josephus' manner of "composing."

an enemy of Philip and, besides, seeks to make his fortune from this opportunity. This must be the Varus whose tetrarchy Nero tacks on to Agrippa's kingdom at B. II 247. So if he wished to become a sovereign again, one cannot be too surprised. The Syrians in Caesarea encourage him (52): they say that Agrippa διὰ τὰς ὑπὸ Ἰουδαίων ἀμαρτίας will be killed by the Romans (cf. 59, last sentence) and he will be able to become king himself. What kind of ἀμαρτία are these? The answer to this question seems obviously to be in 182—a rumour circulated widely that Philip was field commander of the Jews in their revolt against the Romans; Agrippa is happy to be able present himself to the Roman leaders as innocent—and 407: the Tyrians slander Agrippa: his field commander, Philip, betrayed the royal palace and the Roman troops in Jerusalem at his directive. That this rumour could bring Agrippa's life in jeopardy certainly does not surprise us. Since Philip is ill and cannot go himself, he twice sent letters to Varus for the king,<sup>28</sup> neither of which was allowed to go further. For he [Varus] knows that these letters must save the king—this is obviously the sense of 53. Now, 50 is very odd. Varus leads the messenger before the mob, accuses him of forging the letters, says that his message was false—that Philip was waging war against the Romans in Jerusalem—, and has him killed. One struggles to achieve any real clarity about what Josephus was thinking with this sentence. Varus should have been very interested in spreading this rumour. Why does he deny it? Or does Josephus forget the role [309] ascribed to Varus because he is preoccupied with the denial that he also provides on 182 and 407. It is clear in any case that the rumour, here as in those other two passages, is assumed to be current. And now let us consider what this means in chronological terms. After his rescue from the palace of Herod, Philip stayed in Jerusalem for another four days, then traveled to Gamala, which was on the way to Caesarea, then fell sick but must have written immediately. All of this could not have required much time. But the rumour must already have been current before Agrippa's journey to Berytus. This is, of course, impossible. Consequently, Philip could not have returned so early from Jerusalem. And so the conclusion seems to be that we must stay with the *Bellum*: Phillip surrendered and left the Romans in the lurch, then remained in

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<sup>28</sup> Of course, τοῖς πασι at 48 is corrupt. Here as so often, Niese should not have let a faulty text stand without an indication of the corruption. Probably it should read τοῖς βασιλεῦσιν; cf. 49, 50 and others.

Jerusalem for a longer period. So the Tryians, at least in the case of Philip, were right. And it follows likewise that the entire passage [*Vita*] 46 ff. was written only to whitewash Philip: he is only in Jerusalem for a very short time, then falls ill, and the letters that he sends are intercepted; that is how the rumour could begin in the first place. But from this it is clear at that same time that *someone* must have declared Philip's betrayal, so that Josephus found himself prompted to answer in the *Vita*. But given what we know about this writing, who could this have been other than Justus?

The story told in 54 ff. is obscure to us, even though we have an interesting parallel to it in B. II 481—483, which only shows, however, how little both accounts are worth. In the *Bellum* the Babylonians' seventy envoys (of course this name is not mentioned there) ask for support against the looming unrest; in the *Vita* they are supposed defend themselves against the accusation that they were planning an action against the king. At the end only the notice about the Babylonians' desire for revolt remains as a fact. That Varus would have had the 70 killed without any reason whatsoever does not stand to reason. The changing motivation for his removal (for his intent to kill all Jews, according to 61, see also the end of 53) is, in view of the more serious obscurities, a secondary issue. What is important now is the connection between the rather suspicious Babylonians and Philip, who is not only their compatriot, but indeed their rightful leader. The question is, whether it is correct that he kept them in loyalty toward the Romans. But for this we must consult [*Vita*] 177—186 and 407—409.

As we have come to expect by now, distressing contradictions quickly appear. For this we put aside entirely the question of the relationship between Justus and his relatives in Gamala, about which there can be no clarity is possible. The strange thing is that, according to Josephus' presentation, Chares, Jesus, and his wife—Justus' sister—seal their loyalty to the king and the Romans with their death, whereas it is precisely Justus' participation *in the revolt* that is supposed to be proven here. [310]

In our context, it deals with the following. At 183 Philip receives an order from the king to take his relatives out from Gamala and to lead the Babylonians back to Batanea. In addition, he should ensure that no unrest erupted among his charges. Apparently, the king had suspected *ex eventu* that this [unrest] would happen immediately: at 185 we read about it. Philip is exculpated, for he had indeed brought out

his subjects and relatives beforehand. At least, he should have done so. In fact, however, we see from 186 and 177 that there are still Babylonians in the city, in particular Chares, one of Philip's relatives. In addition, we recall Philip's nieces, who escape the conquest of Gamala with their lives. Chares is killed indeed by the rebels; but this is not completely certain either. At IV 18 and 68 a certain Chares is mentioned along with Josephus [not the author] as one of the leaders in the besieged Gamala. It would be very strange if this were a different one.

Even weightier is a chronological contradiction. Agrippa's stay in Berytus, which is mentioned at 49, falls into the period before the action of Cestius Gallus—the king participates in this, and for some reason he needed to be rehabilitated—the same time as the siege of Herod's palace in Jerusalem and the return of Philip, according to *Vita's* presentation. Further, the *Bellum* sets Varus' expedition against the Babylonians in that same period. This all fits together. So the removal of Varus from office and his replacement with Aequus Modius, which we hear about at *Vita* 61, also belongs in the same time. As soon as this happened, Philip opens communication with him; the king orders his field commander to be fetched and introduces him to τοῖς ... Ῥωμαίων ἡγεμόσιν. This plural, however, can indicate none other than Vespasian and Titus. 407–409 also proves that this is correct. Yet between Varus' removal from office and Agrippa's stay with Cestius Gallus in Berytus, on the one hand, and the arrival of Vespasian in Syria, on the other hand, lies the entire winter. Josephus' presentation again shows itself, therefore, to be impossible. If Philip appeared just before Vespasian, and was sent to Nero by him, this would mean that he had disappeared for the entire winter [before this]. It should then be assumed, according to what we hear in the *Vita*, that he was in Gamala and therefore took part in the revolt there too. Perhaps one could say this much. Everything else is shrouded in eternal darkness: for example, how Philip's stay in Gamala relates to the siege of the city by Aequus Modius (*Vita* 114, B. IV 10; for the beginning-date of this seven-month blockade, assuming that it passed over directly into the siege by Vespasian and so reckoning from beginning of that one,<sup>29</sup> [311] we come to March 12;

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<sup>29</sup> This is dated through IV 83. The expression τῆς ἀποστάσεως ἀρξαμένης is very odd. According to the conception of the passage it is out of the question that the date refers to the year 60. The city has been rebellious for much longer than since the 12<sup>th</sup> of October

Vespasian probably is in Tyre later: 407), and above all, by what means Philip made peace with Agrippa and the Romans.

These are only petty and incidental details. The puzzle that the entire topic presents us with is much larger. It is established that Philip did commit treason and it is also certain that Agrippa does not for that reason let him go, but welcomes him back with joy.<sup>30</sup> This must have weighed heavily on the king and is a confirmation of the Tyrians' attack (407), which is also directed toward him. Let us recall to memory the other burdensome facts: Agrippa must give account for himself in Berytus (*Vita* 52); his and his sister's animosity toward Florus appears strange, just as Berenice's behaviour during his advance against Jerusalem is striking; we can unfortunately say nothing about Agrippa's trip to Tiberius Alexander (B. II 309, 335); his peace efforts are too obtrusive to be entirely convincing, and the account is contestable in its details (e.g., the collection of the tribute in arrears at 403ff.); then we got to know the king's relatives, Saul, Costobar, and Antipas (XX 214, B. II 556. IV 144 ff.); precisely these people had gone to Agrippa as envoys at B. II 418, and ostensibly had asked him for help against the rebels; the outcome was the dispatch of Philip; and to all this one must add the notice that Justus has held back his finished work for twenty years, until the king's death (*Vita* 360).

On the other hand: from Cestius Gallus' advance onward, the king certainly stood with the Romans; of the envoys that he sends to the rebels (B. II 523 ff.), one was killed, the other wounded. Further, Josephus destroys the king's palace in Tiberias, and we could come up with more of these kinds of incidents, which attest to the clear opposition between the rebels and Agrippa.<sup>31</sup> Further, would the client prince have ventured to

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67. This date must refer to the beginning of the siege. Parallels are IV 1 ἀφροστάναι; III 445 ὡς δ' αὐτῷ Τιβεριᾶς μὲν νεωτερίζειν, ἀφροστάναι δ' ἠγέλλοντο Ταριχέαι; III 289 νεωτερίζουσιν (Ἰαφα); III 289 νεωτερίζουσιν (Ἰαφα); but they do not clarify the matter.

<sup>30</sup> This is also proven by A. XVII 30. This passage was written after Agrippa's death (cf. 28). Thus, the friendship between the two must have continued uninterruptedly until their deaths.

<sup>31</sup> Above all, the burning of the royal palace in Jerusalem by Manaem (also together with the house of Ananias). Similarly, the mob's behaviour during the Dabaritta incident. Josephus' concern for the royal governor's possessions is not very convincing. As for the story about the royal μεγιστᾶνες (*Vita* 112—113, 149—154): unfortunately it remains opaque to us. Perhaps it too was prompted by Justus. Maybe Justus had accused Josephus

undertake some sort of action against Rome, whose power he understood very well, and when he had to have known that any cooperation between him and the Jews was impossible in the long term (cf. XX 189 [312] for the story of how they obstruct his view of the temple), and that in the eyes of the pious he could never be fully accepted?

The difficulties are nearly as great when we try to form a picture of Justus' position in relation to the king. Unfortunately we had to leave unanswered above the question, whether his attacks against Josephus were related to the latter's account and his personal behaviour, or whether he intended also to confront him with proof of his anti-Roman position, while making mention with pride of his own loyalty toward Rome and that of his home city. That on the whole he had close relations with Agrippa seems certain, and Josephus' assertion about his repeated punishments by the king lacks any descriptive details. Now, if there is no doubt that what Josephus says about Philip in the *Vita* is a response to Justus' presentation, so also he [Justus] said things about the king that were highly unfavourable to him. It is not possible to combine all of this into a single picture. It remains likewise to be asked why Josephus does not raise just as loud a protest against Justus' allegation in relation to the king as he had done against the one that he, Josephus, had brought Tiberias to defection.

We see unsolvable questions at every step. How much we would like to answer them. From Wilhelm Weber's book one gains a conception of how fraught with danger was the time immediately before Nero's downfall. It cannot be doubted that also the prehistory of the Jewish revolt has dimensions of which today we can hardly even conceive. Throughout the Diaspora, as far as Alexandria, struggles flare up in the cities; from Adiabene the Jews receive support and reinforcements; Agrippa takes at least a two-sided position; and internally, before the revolt there must have been an unprecedented height of religious and nationalist tension. Today we can form only a very general conception of all this. Josephus does not spare us from meaningless twaddle, but for what is essential he leaves us desperately in the lurch, to a degree that, I think this analysis has shown, will probably mean a powerful chill for all future efforts to write the history of the Jewish war. We had found a reason for the worthlessness of the historical presentation

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of acquiring their property? In Justus' account the matter probably had a better sense of reality.



that Josephus gives in the fact that he had become a traitor to his people. It can now be counted a further result of this unfortunately so destructive critique, so it appears, that the other reason for Josephus' silence lay in his connection with Agrippa, for which we have the decisive evidence in *Vita* 359 ff.—especially 366, in the second letter cited. If this result seems all too meagre: I am afraid we shall have to be content with it.

Breslau.