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SOLOMON BEN JUDAH AND SOME OF HIS CONTEMPORARIES

BY A. MARMORSTEIN, Jews' College, London.

When Neubauer published for the first time the Chronicle of an anonymous writer of the year 1047, no one could have suggested what an important place the Solomon ben Judah mentioned therein, who is styled by the Anonymous as 'the head of the Academy in Jerusalem', occupied in his days in the history of the Jews. Only a few years later there appeared a fragment from the Collection of the Archduke Rainer, published by D. Kaufmann and D. H. Müller, which contains a letter written by a head of an Egyptian congregation to the Gaon Solomon ben Judah Hehasid. Both learned editors thought that the letter was directed to a Gaon in Bagdad. Afterwards Schechter edited a letter, written by Solomon ben Judah to Ephraim ben Shemariah, and thus attention was drawn more and more to the part played by both Solomon and Ephraim in their age and in their countries. Poznański gave us later on a sketch of Ephraim's life-story, based on published and unpublished material. The latter contribution shed light on some dark parts of a hitherto unknown chapter in the

1 See Medieaval Jewish Chronicles, Oxford, 1887, p. 178.
history of the Jews in Palestine and Egypt in the first half of the eleventh century. But to recognize the moving forces of that age we must weigh the merits of the leading personages of the time we speak of. The most important man was not Ephraim, but the Gaon Solomon ben Judah. We know from Worman's publications that a great many of the letters exchanged between both are preserved in the Genizah Collection in Cambridge. From that collection we learn further that Ephraim was not the only one with whom the Gaon corresponded. We come across new names quite or partly unknown, as that of Sahalon ben Abraham or of Abraham ben Isaac Hakohen. Fortunately enough, we obtain not only names, but some very important material and valuable details on the inner life in the communities, as well as on the political influence exercised upon the Jews in the countries ruled by the Fatimides.

The period during which Solomon officiated as Gaon and spiritual guide, was full of troubles and struggles. Within and without the communities there was bitter enmity and warfare. To show the causes of the events as well as their consequences is the aim of the present contribution.

The first question we should wish to have answered is: Who was Solomon ben Judah? In order to do this we must refer to two new Memorial-lists, which throw some light upon the chief leaders of Jewry in Palestine and Egypt in the tenth and eleventh centuries.

5 See JQR., XIX, pp. 725–30. As we know now, there are surely more than twenty letters by him.

6 We are able to understand and explain the contents of the letters with the help of Dr. C. H. Becker's Beiträge zur Geschichte Ägyptens unter dem Islam, Strassburg, 1902 ff.
Scholars have known for some time that there were two families who supplied Jewry in those days with teachers and leaders. The one traced its origin back to the early Patriarchs, the descendants of Hillel, the other to the priestly (Kohanim) Geonim. The result of the lists available thus far is given by Poznański, in his recent book on the subject, as follows: ‘Der Begründer des palästinensischen Gaonats war also Abraham’ (Babylonische Geonim, p. 84 = BG.). Poznański dealt with the earliest history of these Geonim in several of his essays, and he repeats his assumptions as though they were definitely settled: firstly, that Abraham, the supposed brother or son of the famous Ben Meir, founded in the year 943 the Palestinian Gaonate; and secondly, that the circumstances were especially favourable just after the death of Saadia for such an attempt, namely to establish (or re-establish?) the seat of the gaonic authority in the Holy Land. We are now able to prove, first of all, that Abraham was not the first Gaon of this family at all, since at least five of Abraham’s ancestors were thus styled, and, moreover, among Abraham’s predecessors we find Meir Gaon, who officiated in the fourth generation before Abraham. We learn, by the way, that we must drop the assumption that Abraham was the son or brother of Ben Meir. The whole of it is based on the belief that the Memorial-lists known thus far contained the earliest Geonim of this family. This is not so. The Dukran Tob, discovered by the present writer (MS. Adler, No. 2592), runs thus:
Of these new Geonim all but one are unknown. Meir was known by name as the father of the rival of Saadia, Ben Meir. Meir lived, therefore, before 922. In this year (922) Meir's son was already at the head of the party which disturbed the peace of Jewry in the East. Meir's father was Judah. This Judah is probably to be identified with Judah ben Alan Altabrani (of Tiberias), who is styled by Japheth ben Ali. If this be right, then the often-discussed Judah of Tiberias would find his place in the history of our race (v. Pinsker, Likkute Kadmoniot, p. 62; Dukes, Likkute Kadmoniot, p. 2; Geiger, Mikraot Gedolot, II, 158; Baer, Dikduke ha-Teamim, p. 80; Steinschneider, Die arabisce Literatur der Juden, p. 111; cf. MS. Bodl. 2805, 142). Whether this Judah was the founder of the Gaonate or not, must be left undecided. He is the first Gaon of this family known to us. His time must be fixed about 900, if not somewhat earlier. Judah's son Meir held the dignity of Gaon before 922. The next Gaon is Moses.

In a Cambridge fragment (T-S. 13 J. 16, 16) we came across a letter, which bears the signature: חַתֲנָה בְּנֵי מְשַׁה חַתֲנָה בְּנֵי מְשַׁה חַתֲנָה בְּנֵי מְשַׁה חַתֲנָה. Mr. Adler discovered among his fragments an epigram with the acrostic, and the heading נַחֲנָה בְּנֵי מְשַׁה נַחֲנָה בְּנֵי מְשַׁה נַחֲנָה בְּנֵי מְשַׁה נַחֲנָה. It was only natural to suggest that this Solomon was the Ben Meir (REF, LXVII, 52). Poznański (ibid., LXVII, p. 291) raised three objections to this view. First of all Ben Meir is nowhere styled Gaon. This is true; moreover, his own grandson, Moses, mentions him, as it appears from the signature above, with the title המבוגרים מארס יִמְשַׁה. Poznański says...
hereto: 'Es wurde aber von den offiziellen Vorstechern der Lehrhäuser den auswärtigen Gelehrten als Auszeichnung verliehen (s. weiter unten, p. 103, n. 1).'

Now, turning to p. 103, n. 1, we read: 'Es ist nun wahrscheinlich, dass Petachja diesen Titel von der ägyptischen Hochschule erhalten, die auch in dieser Hinsicht die palästinensische nachahmen wollte, und von ihr die Verleihung des Titels übernahm. Jedenfalls ergibt sich daraus, dass dieser Titel auch ausserhalb Palästinas verliehen wurde, wonach ZfHB., X, 146, zu berichtigen ist.'

If we refer to the passage ZfHB., X, 146, we still remain unsatisfied: 'Alle diese Daten zeigen nun, dass ihre Träger den Titel eines von Palästina empfangen haben.' All these data do not, however, prove in the least that one could not be a in Palestine or in Jerusalem itself. We admit our inability to explain why Solomon, having been the Ben Meir, was styled , and not Gaon, yet the objection raised does not hold good. The same is the case with Poznański's second objection. Poznański asks: 'Why does Ben Meir refer to his ancestors, the Patriarchs Gamaliel and Judah I, and not to Meir and so on?' We think he did this because the authority of the former was of more importance and of greater weight than that of the latter. We come now to the third point. The Epigram can have nothing to do with the Palestinian school. Why? Because the use of the word points to Persia. We beg to differ again. We find, namely in the addresses of letters from the Genizah, scores of times or (v. Ernest Worman, JQR., XIX, pp. 735-43; Chapira, 'Un Document judéo-arabe de la Gueniza du Caire', in Mélanges Hartwig Derenbourg, Paris, Leroux, 1909, p. 125; in a letter, written about 1015 by Josiah ben
Aaron ben Abraham, T-S. 12. 16; Fragm. Bodl. 2878, no. 135, no. 36, no. 81; MS. Adler, beginning of the eleventh century). Possibly the Jewish population in Palestine was increased by Persian emigration. We find many famous men in the ninth and tenth centuries, who came from Persia. Therefore there can be no reasonable refutation on the ground that Solomon used the word נא הַאָבִּים.

Moreover, we have proofs for the fact that Solomon was the Ben Meir. The latter mentions in his letters a certain Isaac, 'father of the court' בן תֶּה דִּיִּא (see REJ., XLVII, 187 and LXVII, 60). In the letter of Moses, he (Moses) gives the name of his father Isaac, and of his grandfather Solomon. We have an analogy to the case, in later times, of a father being the head of the Academy and his son ד א ב, in Sherira and Hai. [Weiss, IV, p. 173, thought it quite unusual that the father and son should act as 'Gaon' and 'Ab' together. It was, according to Weiss, a thing unheard of before. Therefore Sherira was attacked, and imprisoned. The whole suggestion lacks, however, any proof, and is based on the misunderstanding that father and son could not act together; Sherira would not have introduced such an innovation.] We have further an instance that the later Gaon began his 'gaonic' career by acting as 'sofer' at the Academy. The case is that of Israel Sofer, the son of Samuel ben Hofni. In JQR., XVIII, p. 413 f., we read: ד א ב הנר און מאי דא גַּ'ה נא הַאָבִּים [Sherira also calls his son Haj הנר און דא גַּ'ה נא הַאָבִּים, v. Schechter, Saadyana, no. XLV, p. 118, ll. 9-11: ד א ב הנר און דא גַּ'ה נא הַאָבִּים, and Eppenstein, MGWJ., 1911, p. 495, n. 5]. This Israel Sofer is the son and successor of Samuel ben Hofni, Gaon of Sura. | We are able, now, to confirm the suggestion made by Poznański, REJ., LXII, p. 120; LXIII, p. 318;
v. Ginzberg, Geonica, I, pp. 13 and 61; JQR., N. S., IV, 403, that this Israel was the later Gaon of Sura. In a Memorial-list of MS. Adler 2594 we found: ויראלא ירושי יישוב ישלח ונהל בן שתחא ירושי ישבח ישלח ונהל בן או היושב ישבח [ר. וני]. In a letter of the same valuable collection we read: תחלות נשא ولمחר אחר חכמי תלמוד והנה אלנהלאה ויהו אל משה יאלאנאברר פלטורה ואמ אל מיתובא ולפיו בין לברכה ולפיו אלמתובה להא יזורה ובר עדין לברכה. Perhaps we have to add here the letter Or. Brit. Mus. No. 5338, 1, from יישאל בן ראובן יישבה to Jacob ben Maimun. On the secretaries of the Geonim in Babylon see further תלמוד והנה, ed. Vienna, p. 131a; ed. Hildesheimer, p. 316 A; Epstein, in III, 76; and JQR., XVIII, p. 401 f.: ר' יוחנה והוא שמעれて יוזר 'מעי, cf. MGWY., LII, 457.]

In our present state of knowledge it is quite impossible even to suggest why Solomon and his son Isaac are styled thus in the letter of their offspring Moses. The Dukran Tob leads us to the assertion that really neither of them—neither the father (Solomon) nor the son (Isaac)—succeeded Meir Gaon. Meir's direct successor was Moses Gaon. Is it possible that this Moses Gaon was Moses, the Sofer, the son of Isaac, the grandson of Solomon? It seems not so, because the Memorial-list speaks of ונהל! Yet, we have several instances of grand-children being called not after their father’s name, but by that of their grandfather’s. Thus the famous Massorete’s name is Ben Asher, in reality he was Aaron ben Moses ben Asher, likewise the other Massorete Ben Naphtali bore the name Moses ben David ben Naphtali, and still he is known as
Ben Naphtali (v. Baer-Strack, Diḳduḳe ha-Teamim, pp. x ff.; Ibn Ezra on Exod. 2. 16, and Nahmanides, ad loc.; cp. Ginzberg, MGWJ., 1910, p. 693, n. 1, and Kimhi, 1 Chron. 2. 23 based on b. Kid. 4 a; b. Yeb. 70 a; b. BB. 143 a; Gen. r. 946: כי נופש הר אבות; for later instances v. H. B., XIX, p. 91). It seems not unlikely that Moses succeeded, for some reason or other unknown to us, his grandfather Meir.

We have further a fragment which enables us to fix the chronology of these Geonim. A letter, fragm. Adler, mentions severe persecutions in Sicily. The letter is written by יֵָּרָשׁ bar Hakim to Hananiah ‘Ab beth din’ ben חֲנָנָיָה דְּבָרָא דְּבָרִים. . . . The father's name is missing. Hananiah is the father of Sherira, who became Gaon in the year 938/9 (v. Neubauer, M. F. Chr., I, p. 40). We assume, therefore, that Moses and his son Aaron I lived before 939. We see, according to this, between 900-40 the following Geonim in Palestine:

Judah (about 900)

Meir (before 923)

Moses

Aaron I (before 938)

Josiah I (about 938/9).

Josiah I was succeeded by his son Abraham, who lived according to Poznański, about 943. We are unable to see whence Poznański has obtained this date. Josiah III lived about 1015, he was the son of Aaron II, the son of Josiah II, the son of Abraham (v. T-S. 13 J. 1. 2; cp. RÉJ., LXXVIII, p. 47). There are several letters of Josiah III
preserved. We cannot describe them here, because we should trespass on the space at our disposal. What we have to prove is that the Geonim of this family functioned from about 900 till after 1015. Afterwards the members of this family became 'the Fathers of the Court' up to the twelfth century.

There is, however, another genealogical list of which we have to speak before dealing with Solomon ben Judah. We mean the Dukran Tob in fragment Or. Brit. Mus. 5557 A, p. 7 B. It reads as follows:

This list has many similarities with that published by Poznański (REJ., LI, p. 52), and many new points of information. Both give us the genealogy of Mazliaḥ Gaon. Or. Brit. Mus. 5549, 1, does not indicate this, however. Further, we must not read No. 5549, 1, l. 12 מדרש בחנה ברה מ or רכ פחח רבח, but מך רכ פחח רבח [Poznański repeats his suggestion ZDMG., LXVIII, p. 128, n. 1, cp. now G. Margoliouth, Catalogue fol. 562], and the identification with Kahana ben Haninai (REJ., LI, 56) is obviously wrong. Mazliaḥ's pedigree up to Jehoseph's is in both the same. Jehoseph's ancestral line is, however, differently put:

5549, 1
Jehoseph
Mordecai
Menahem
Solomon
Elijah.

5557 A, 7 B
Jehoseph
Menahem
Elijah.
In the first D. T. Mordecai is styled Wi:n:n3, in the second Menahem. In the first the title is: bufo HTK'^ npi:, in the second |1NJ.

The new genealogical list throws light upon more than one unsettled problem of the history of this period. We have to refer again to Poznański, who says: 'Damals [after 1094] bekleideten wohl die Gaonwürde die in einer von mir edierten Gedächtnisliste erwähnten Elia ha-Kohen, Salomo und Menahem, die alle obigen Titel tragen' (BG., p. 101). Further: 'Das ägyptische Gaonat dauerte also insgesamt etwa 130 Jahre (1063–1194)' [BG., p. 104]. We will consider this view.

Let us begin with the last member of this family. Mazliah was Gaon between 1127–38. He liked very much, even in his letters, to remind his contemporaries of his ancestors. Thus is T-S. 24. 26: 

Let us begin with the last member of this family. Mazliah was Gaon between 1127–38. He liked very much, even in his letters, to remind his contemporaries of his ancestors. Thus is T-S. 24. 26:

Mazliah was the eighth successor of the first Gaon in our list; we may therefore take for granted that
the Egyptian Gaonate existed already about 900, and had a duration not of 130, but at least of 290 years. According to this, David ben Daniel's statement: "לא לישבנה עב二维ו תש mét חל ותנה בי מזדウィ זותו לאומין," (v. Saadyana, p. 109), 'from the time of our ancestors the Academy of Palestine had no right in Egypt, because it is קהצה לארון (abroad) like Babylon,' must be considered. The letters of Solomon ben Judah do not disprove this, since they were addressed to the members of the נינסה שלארון, the Palestinian community (see against this view, BG., p. 99, n. 1). Even Ebiathar does not deny the existence of the Geonim in Egypt (v. Saadyana, p. 106).

Mazlia'h's father was Solomon I, Gaon between 1119-27. Very little is known of him. A letter in Or. Brit. Mus. No. 5535, written on the 19th of Adar 1427 (= 1116) to車ון ben Joseph מהק at שגלנה המדהנה (v. ZfHB., XVI, 92), and the letter published by S. Kandel (Genizai Kesiratok, Budapest, 1903, vol. III, p. 17) must be considered in this connexion. Solomon's brother Ebiathar is, of course, not mentioned in our list, his date is between 1085-1110. The father of Solomon and Ebiathar was Elijah, who officiated between 1062-85. Poznański gives his biography based on the material published. The unpublished material enables us to follow step by step his 'gaonic' career. In 1031 we find him as יבש 갖שה the sixth. Thus he signed a document with יבש 갖שה עב 의해ר הירח and ב البيان יבש 갖שה ראיה ר"יינט, "בברק. His father was already dead, as is seen from his signature: אלא יה ז"ז גת שמשה בנתור [בנ אמא] (MS. Adler 3011, 1). On the 10th of Ijar, on Wednesday, 4797 or 4799, i.e. 1037 or 1039, he signed with Solomon ben Judah at Damascus in the following way: אליהו הגת; המבר בכלי, ניבלה יבר, שלמה ראו ישיבת ויאמא.
From this we infer that the had a higher position than a . In 1045 he signs as , in the year A.M. at Jerusalem with . Elijah's signature is: (TS. 13. 1. 11). We have two other letters by him, one to his uncle's son, Abraham ha-Kohen ben Isaac ha-Kohen (TS. 13. 23. 12), signed , the second one to Ephraim ben Shemariah (MS. Adler, No. 2804), signed . Elijah had family connexions with the latter, too, since the latter's son-in-law is called (Joseph?). Elijah could not have been Ab before 1049 or 1050. In this dignity Daniel ben Azariah found him about 1054. He reached the age of seventy-five, and died 1085. He was, therefore, born in 1010.

Elijah's father, Solomon ben Jehoseph, died before 1031. He could not have been, as Poznański thinks (BG., p. 91), the successor, but must have been the predecessor of Solomon ben Judah. Yet before coming to the question we started from, we have to deal with his successors and with one or two unsolved problems. Solomon ben Joseph's Gaonate was, as we established, before 1031 and not after 1053. It is impossible to say, owing to the lack of material, when Solomon ben Joseph died, and when Solomon ben Judah became Gaon. We shall have to bear in mind in dealing with these two Solomons, that where we have the signature of Solomon 'the young one', we have a document by Solomon ben Judah, if not, they are by Solomon ben Joseph. Of Solomon's father we know only that he never was Gaon, but (28). Since his grandson Elijah was born 1010, the year of his birth must have been
at least about 960; his ancestors Menahem, Elijah and Mordecai lived, according to this date, from 960 to 960. We are thus able to state that as there were 960 in Palestine, likewise there were 960 in Egypt at the beginning of the tenth century. We said in Egypt! Is this statement correct, since we know that Elijah ha-Kohen, Solomon, and Menahem, according to the first list, or Mordecai, Elijah, and Menahem, according to the second one, were the ancestors of the Palestinian Geonim from Solomon ben Joseph onwards, and not contemporaries of Ebiathar and his brother Solomon and their father Elijah? That is impossible. Was there a Gaonate in Egypt in the tenth century? From the installation letter of Paltiel ben Samuel we learn of a 960 in Egypt ( Yemen, IX, 717-18; cf. E. N. Adler, נמי והודם, p. 51). If there had been a Gaon in Egypt, certainly he would be mentioned at least, either as a supporter, or as an antagonist of the Nagid. The Achimaaz Chronicle mentions the Palestinian and Babylonian Geonim of this period (v. M. F. Chr., II, pp. 128 and 130), why not the Academy and heads of it in Egypt? How else are the two different titles to be explained? It seems that in Palestine itself there were two seats of the Academies, one in Ramleh, and the other in Jerusalem. This suggestion seems to be a daring one. Many centuries passed away, and the historians had nothing to report of one Academy in Palestine, and now we suddenly have two? Still, as we shall see later, there is some corroboration for our suggestion.

Besides these two families we find about 989-90 another family of Kohanim bearing the title תצבא עב in Palestine. First of all Joseph Hakohen and his sons
Samuel, Aaron, and Abraham. The first occurs in a fragment Adler, where both father and son have the same title, דָּרָשׁ תְּעֻבָּה נְאוֹנָא הַעַל. He is further mentioned in a colophon of a Midrash, with Josiah as Ab, and Isaac as third (v. הָנהָלֵי, 1877, p. 134). Further, in a fragment Adler there is a document signed by Joseph ha-Kohen דָּרָשׁ, his son Samuel, then the third דָּרָשׁ, and Aaron, the fourth דָּרָשׁ, with the addition דָּרָשׁ. And, finally, in MS. Adler, No. 223 we find Abraham דָּרָשׁ, the son of Joseph Gaon (see JQR., N.S., V, 621; REJ., LXVIII. 38 ff.). Poznański asserted that this Joseph was Daniel ben Azariah’s rival (ZDMG., LXVIII, 122, yet BG., p. 68, withdrawn), which is quite impossible, since this Joseph is never called דָּרָשׁ, but הָנהָלֵי (see JQR., N.S., VI, 157). At any rate, we see Joseph and his son Samuel invested with the dignity of Gaon about 990, and before.

Solomon ben Judah belonged to none of these families, he was not even a Palestinian by birth. N. Brüll identified him with the well-known poet Solomon ben Judah ha-Babli. This suggestion is still worthy of consideration. In a fragment Adler there is a Selihah, beginning: גָּאִלְּלָה נֵסָא דָּרָשׁ written in the year 1362 (= 1051), when he was still alive. It was suggested by Poznański that his grandfather’s name was Berechiah. The Bodleian fragment referred to does not furnish us, unfortunately, with any particulars about his date and origin. Solomon is considered by Poznański as having founded the organization of the דָּרָשׁ וְהַעַל and so on, which is wrong, since we find these titles already about 1000, or a few decades before his time. Yet Solomon

7 See Jahrh.cher, IX, p. 112, and X, p. 182.
8 REJ., LXVI, p. 62, note.
9 See my article in JQR., 1914, no. 22, and Appendix p. 27.
prevented the re-establishment of the dual authority of the Palestinian Gaonate. This we may infer from his words:

ואנה יזדמע א"ל חותי לברך"ו המלך ב' עידיון והא מדומה ולא בין הלוקמ ולחית סעדרו א"ל חותי לו שעדיון והא משם וין הלוקמה והחתים האסיאים והישים והישים לישיהם.

The letter is addressed to Ephraim ben Shemariah. It may be that the Gaon's rival wished to restore the old order. For Sahl ben Mazliah speaks of two seats of learning in Palestine, when he says:

ואם יאמר אדם כי הנה א"ל המלך והמותי וברך"ו המלך (read so instead of המלך והמותי וברך"ו המלך).

Josiah Gaon ben Aaron ben Abraham, lived at Ramleh, and it is impossible to think that there was no seat of authority at this time in Jerusalem. The letter is written to Nathaniel ben Aaron. Solomon's elevation to his dignity and the first year of his office were full of trouble, as the numerous letters bear evidence.

Our suggestion pointed out on a previous occasion that there were frequently struggles in the time of these Geonim, will be proved by one of our fragments later on. First of all, we shall give some details about Solomon's native place and time. If we are right in interpreting a letter written to Ephraim ben Schemariah, not by the Gaon himself, but at any rate by a man of the Gaon's circle, the Gaon was born neither in Palestine, nor in Egypt. As for his time, we can establish now that Solomon was Gaon already before the year 1025. However, he must have been invested with that dignity a few years previously,
as will be proved later on. We may say therefore that the years of his Gaonate were from 1025 till his death about 1052/3. For about thirty years Solomon held the leadership in the Holy Land and in Egypt. The history of his office will show how unenviable the lot of a leader in Israel was in those good old days.

2.

Solomon's first and most severe trouble occurred before he was elevated to the high position which he had so much desired and which he held for more than two decades. The history of the Geonim in Palestine reveals many a tragedy, which a poet might dramatize to better purpose than an historian might describe, or the latter must be a dramatist, without disregarding the truth. The Geonim always feared that somebody might rise against them and attack their dignity. We hear it very soon, already in Solomon's time, that people said: The former leaders always stood against the blood of their colleagues—hard allegation, indeed. There must have been, of course, a shadow of a reason for imputing so hideous a crime to Israel's leaders and teachers. If we recollect the fate of Joseph ben Abraham Hakohen, the thought may occur to us whether Joseph's misfortune was not caused by Solomon, so as to become Gaon... Joseph passed perhaps away in a dark prison, vainly struggling for liberation. That suggestion, however, is still to be proved.

In no case did Solomon obtain his high office so easily as might have been thought. There was surely a severe struggle before the success on the side of Solomon was complete. Solomon's own statements will strengthen that

16 T.-S. 13 J. 9 2; v. now REJ., LXVIII, p. 15.
opinion, for he says: 'I trust and hope in God, but when the hands of my enemies and the arms of the quarrellers will get power, then they can do whatever they want, appoint a man whom they like as head and leader; then the priest will be as the people, and they will judge their own judges.' Is it not undeniably established that the enemies wanted another man in Solomon's place, and had one ready? Of course, Solomon regards that man, his possible rival, as unworthy and as a sinner. He goes on to say: 'I am living in the holy city, sorrowful over myself and the age relying upon me; I am too good for these people, but what can I do? God has appointed me in my place, I ought to obey.' Thus the Gaon speaks.

Another difficulty lay in the appointment of Ephraim ben Schemariah as spiritual head of the community in Egypt, with the title הָרָבָה חַשְׁעָלָה בֵּנוֹ הַמַּחֲרָה יְוהֵל. It is probably a consequence of the first-mentioned struggle that the enemies were against Ephraim. The Gaon calls him frequently: ועמה בְּעַמְּרוֹתְוָה, therefore it might be that the people hated Ephraim because he advocated the Gaon. But it seems that even the Gaon's adherents regarded Ephraim as unworthy, and not qualified for this office. The whole trouble was caused by a man whose name we do not yet know. But it is certain that the particular man envied the position of Ephraim. In one case the opposition

17 See T-S. 13 J. 15⁴, or [קָנֲאַתְוָה]. תָּכִּנָּא קָנֲאַתְוָה [קָנֲאַתְוָה] וַעֲמָרֹה בְּעַמְּרוֹתְוָה. VOL. VIII. C
alleged misbehaviour on the part of Ephraim. That was of course heaping coals of fire upon the heads of his enemies. The latter wanted Samuel Hakohen ben Abtalion in Ephraim's place. We conjecture that the same Samuel was the chief of the court before Ephraim, having the highest dignity in the community and ר' תב.19

In connexion with these proceedings we find a number of instances when the ban was proclaimed against ministers of the congregations, who were not willing to obey their spiritual guide.20 Although we do not know the name of the head of the adversaries, we see in one letter that he is inclined to come to an agreement. The letter21 is thoroughly obscure and in a few parts enigmatic. In order to solve the difficulties we should have access to the whole material from the Genizah. One or two points, however, are clear. First of all, that the antagonist is content if he gets the title of an אלוף, instead of the higher degree of a רב. We learn that the Haber stood over the Alluf, an important detail in the history of the organization of the Palestinian Geonim. During the entire time, Solomon supported, advised, and helped Ephraim by every possible means.22

19 Fragment Adler.
20 See Saadyana, p. 111; T-S. 13 J. 11. 9 has a letter to a community (perhaps חלֵנִין), to the effect that the Ḥazan and preacher Abraham ben Aaron is under the ban, because he behaved improperly towards Ephraim. The same will be the case in the letter published by Kaufmann and Müller (mentioned above). See further, Monatsschrift, 1906, pp. 597 ff.
21 T-S. 13 J. 15. 1.
22 קָרָם שָׁוֵהּ אֲלֹהֵי אֲדֹנֵינוֹ אַהֲרֹן הַמְשָׁרֵד בּוֹהוֹרָה שָׁלֹם יִהְיֶה שָׁמֹת חָרוּתָה וּאֵשֶׁר יֶעַשׁ נִכְתָּב בְּיִשְׁלָה [Isa. 8.6] מָרְאֵהוּ וּמָרְאֵהוּ לְעֶשֶׁמֶנָּה עַל אֲבוֹתֵינוּ שָׁלֹם יִהְיֶה בְּבִית הָרְפָּאָה. שָׁמְן הַכַּל בְּכַלָּה בֵּין לַחֲבָרָה. חָיוֹת הַשָּׁלוֹחַ אֶֽחָד אַלּוֹנִיָּהוּ וְאִם הַכַּל בְּכַלָּה בֵּין לַחֲבָרָה. חָיוֹת הַשָּׁלוֹחַ אֶֽחָד אַלּוֹנִיָּהוּ וְאִם הַכַּל בְּכַלָּה בֵּין לַחֲבָרָה.
Furthermore, we see that he asked a man, perhaps the lay head of the communities in the Diaspora or in Palestine, Saadya ben Israel, during his stay in Egypt, to support Ephraim with the royal authorities. It is possible that the enemies went to the courts, as they threatened, just as we have seen on a previous occasion.

3.

We can see how deplorable the situation must have been, when the Gaon writes in such a manner, as given above; the more so, knowing as we do how eagerly the need for internal peace was felt in those days of danger. One passage in the letters enables us to fix the date of our letters.

There is mentioned (נינות לנה), that is, Ephraim. There are at the beginning another eleven lines I had not copied.

23 T-S. 13 J. 17. 17:

There is mentioned (נינות לנה), that is, Ephraim. There are at the beginning another eleven lines I had not copied.

Solomon describes the state of things in a lively manner: the armies have devastated the holy land, the sons of the oriental tribes destroyed the roads of Palestine, none can go out or enter in peace. He is always praying to God for the king's victory. These lines were written undoubtedly in the days when the Arabic prince Hasan, of the Banu Gariah, Salih, the Mursid, of the Banu Kilab, and Sinan ben Alyan made the secret covenant to dethrone their lord and master the ruler Abu'l Hasan Ali el Zahir l'iziz din Allah. In that disturbance the inhabitants of Palestine suffered very much indeed, Solomon turning to the leaders of the communities for help. One of the friends who helped the Gaon was Sahalon ben Abraham, why was styled סדניאל. His residence can be traced from various passages, as Kairuwan. There are several letters from Solomon Gaon to Sahalon ben Abraham. The first relates that Solomon sent a messenger to Sahalon and the latter inspired the members of his community to do what there was in their power. The Gaon gives hearty thanks for the kindness evinced.

More importance should be attached to the second letter we are speaking of. The Gaon reports the events in Damascus. The letter aims at inspiring the Resh Kalla to take steps with the authorities on behalf of the Jewish

26 See C. H. Becker, Beiträge zur Geschichte Ägyptens unter dem Islam, Strassburg, 1902, 1, pp. 32 ff.
27 See Worman, JQR., XIX, 725; Poznański, הדריה אירא, p. 44, and יעקבונ סינא, p. 50. It can be taken for certain that Sahalon lived in Kairouan, as can be proved through the fragment published in H. Hirschfeld's The Arabic Portion of the Cairo Genizah at Cambridge, V, p. 3, ver. xv. He was the סדניאל in Kairouan.
28 T-S. 13 J. 11. 5.
29 T-S. 13 J. 13. 28.
prisoners in Damascus. It seems that we possess the second letter dealing with the prisoners.\textsuperscript{30} We give here

\textsuperscript{30} We give here the whole letter, as far as it is legible:

\begin{quote}
ולוקיניו ווריוניו וב כנ. מ. סולומון בן יהודה מאריס בלעתיו החוב ע"ע ז"ע החודשיים בט נא

ביה אברך_heatב כ"ע. קדמי ימכ Percy אל ידוי של ת"ע החודשיים בט נא

החותם באשר צנטואו ההוחם הוא לב א㶦י נсимו החודשיים בט נא

ולפ ז"ע ויראלה ידעך...

כ החקק ידוע במלאכת צאן הרוח על רע חצלאת האסמרו ידוע

לאחריו של ז"ע נשלחו... ידוע אמרו יסائهم חטש והלตนเอง

והנה הבחים אנ מпром כי עוזם בכי הכסלך אנ שעך וחצורו והמומו

אבל הפקריה עליה يبدو בכלי יח חולם המלך הבכור ישלח ברור

ויראלה ידוע

לז"ע ז"ע ב펀קמה ומבות בכי נשך אליהם פיתח מראת ז"ע במנישה

ותבר ואלהות

בתוח ובתי כי נבשו רובינו המקדים כי_frame הנביאיםpci

ותבר לא השירנו

א גם יתיראלאים לכל ארם ישראלי בישרנו נלוח ואstruments לא

והם אתנינו רוזים לשמח דברי הפרוק פי חסן ונשב ל"ע מה

ז"ע הניאר

ועמדו על הפרוג נっこ ינן על מבוז ואריה אר נאם לא כי ישב ית

וכו לאחר התנה חותך ע"ע ע"ע יאשר על השופעת האמונת והודנה שמו

בי ויביא

\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{a} Ruth 2. 12. \textsuperscript{b} Cp. Ps. 107. 10 ff. \textsuperscript{c} Ps. 107. 20.

\textsuperscript{d} Jer. 45. 3. \textsuperscript{e} Isa. 59. 9.
the whole report: 'We received letters from Damascus that they (the men) are still in prison, although the iron chains
are still around them. They received letters from Damascus that they are still in prison, but the iron chains
are still around them. Therefore, we received letters from Damascus that they are still in prison, although the iron chains
are still around them.'

On the margin of the letter: 'Ps. 31. 11. Cp. Gen. 42. 4. Amos 3. 9.'
are taken from them, notwithstanding they get their punishment every day from the overseers, while they are sick and ill, God send them health. There came an order from Adi ben Manasseh in which there is written the condition that they should swear by their God and by the life of the king that they will never call them partners nor serve their brethren in the land of Israel either in great or in small matters, neither rightly nor wrongly.' It can be understood only when we take into account the conditions in the countries where that happened. We know that the rebels stood in continuous connexion with the officers of the ruler, who was the servant of his ministers. The rebels kept the Jews in prison and alleged that they did it in the name of the king. Perhaps the prisoners served the rebels and were taken by the soldiers of the king. It is, however, more likely that just the reverse happened. At any rate, we see the Jews participating in the struggles. In another passage the Gaon expresses fear that Ramleh, where he is dwelling, and Damascus as well, will come under the new rulers. He prays that God may help the ruler.

If there were still the slightest doubt about the dating of the letters, one other fragment shows undeniably that the revolution took place in the time of Solomon, and furthermore that it had a very sad influence on the Jews in those countries. The fragment has neither address nor signature,
but we are fortunately able to fix the time. There is mentioned the name of R. Nathan, who occurs in one letter from Solomon to Ephraim. The letter is an account of the transactions between the Jews and the rebels. There is mentioned the name of R. Nathan, who seems to be one of the tribal princes. Moreover the Banu Guriah are mentioned quite expressly. What the letters say is to the effect that the rebels wanted huge sums for the captives, but the leaders could furnish only smaller sums.

31 See Schechter's Saadyana, pp. 112 ff.
32 T-S. 13 J. 20. 25.
A third correspondent of Solomon was Abraham Hakohen ben Isaac Hakohen. We have thus far come across a few letters, one of which throws light upon Solomon's relation to the non-Jewish officers.\textsuperscript{33} The others require further investigation.\textsuperscript{34} We wish only to mention here that this Abraham was perhaps a relative of Solomon ben Joseph, for the son of Solomon calls him in one letter his uncle.\textsuperscript{35} We hope to be able to say more of Abraham on another occasion.

APPENDIX

This article was written in December 1913. Since then a very important contribution on the same subject by Dr. S. Poznański, under the title ‘Babylonische Geonim im nachgaonäischen Zeitalter’ (Berlin, 1914, Mayer und Müller, \textit{Schriften der Lehrenanstalt für die Wissenschaft des Judentums}, Bd. IV, Heft 1, 2), has appeared, which necessitated a thorough revision of the first part of our article. There has also appeared an article on the Palestinian Geonim in the eleventh and twelfth centuries in the \textit{REJ.}, vol. LXVIII, pp. 37-49, under the title ‘Les Gueonim en Palestine aux XI\textsuperscript{e} et XII\textsuperscript{e} siècles’, by the present writer. Further material was brought to light in the weekly periodical \textit{ה凡本网 העברתה}, 1914, nos. 19, 20, 24, 25, and in the \textit{Islam}, ‘Die Wirren unter dem Fatimiden al-Zahir und die Juden in Palästina’. The article was printed before the outbreak of the war, we do not know whether it was published.

\textsuperscript{33} T-S. 13 J. 14. 5.
\textsuperscript{34} T-S. 13 J. 19. 3; T-S. 13 J. 19. 18.
Since writing this article we have been enabled to see more of the manuscript material. The more we have studied this period the more we have recognized that the last word can be said only when the whole material has been published. So it must be doubtful whether T-S. 13 J. 13. 28 was written by Solomon ben Jehoseph or Ben Judah. We are inclined to think that the writer was the former, and not the latter. Solomon must have been very old before 1024, how could he have endured all the trials and struggles for another thirty years, as Solomon ben Judah did? It was hard for the strength of youth, how much more for the weak, aged Gaon?

Here we endeavour to give new material for the biography of Sahalon ben Abraham. Besides the references given in note 28, we have to consider T-S. 20. 6, which preserved his contract of marriage with Esther, the daughter of Joseph ben Amram, the judge נשיא הפועלים, dated Fustat, 1037 (see JQR., N. S., VI, p. 159). Sahalon was a very industrious liturgical writer in his time, although the liturgy did not preserve even his name. A very sad memento for 'the great men' of the day! He shared the fate of an older contemporary, whose name was buried with his liturgies in the dust of the Genizah; we mean Samuel, the third נשיא הפועלים, of whom we will speak on another occasion. We have compiled the following list, which is by no means a complete one, of his liturgical pieces:

1. MS. Oxford 2738, 11.

(a) מזבח חרשים.
(b) מתן שערים כל חורי.
(c) מזבח נחרשים קרי.

36 Cf. now my Midrash Hacerot we-Yeserot, London (Luzac), 1917, pp. 76-9.

37 See also MS. Oxford 2712, 10. 6; 2727, p. 9; and 2731. 1.
SOLOMON BEN JUDAH—MARMORSTEIN

It has been asserted that Solomon ben Judah organized the dignities of the religious hierarchy, and so on. It is our duty to prove that long before this time this organization prevailed in the Palestinian Gaonate. This we can do by giving a list of dignitaries as far as we know them:

1. The Ryshiyot:

Before 990. Isaac, under Joseph ha Kohen ב' 990 (v. more, 1877, p. 132).

Before 990. Samuel ha Kohen ben Joseph ב' 990 (Fragment Adler).


? Solomon ben Tobiah ר' 2878. 4).
2. The ידוע:
   About 990. Aaron ha-Kohen (Fragment Adler).
   About 1010. Abraham, son of Samuel הכהנים (T-S. 13 J. r. 20, Fragment Adler).
   About 1013. Ahijah הכהן ben Hilkiah ח' Harkavy, Altvjudische Denkmäler aus der Krim, St. Petersburg, 1876, p. 245.
   About 1027. Joseph ha-Kohen ben Jacob (MS. Oxf. 2874. 12, cp. 2873. 28).
   About 1080. Ebiathar ha-Kohen, T-S. 24, 49.
   About 1100. Eliah ben Ebiathar.
   About 1120. Mazliach הрабатыва (MS. Adler).

3. The ידוע:
   About 1031. Eliah ha-Kohen (MS. Adler 3011, 1).
   About 1031. Anonymous (Fragment Erzherzog Rainer).
   About 1128. Moses (MS. Oxf. 2876, 70; v. Pinsker, L. K., p. 316, مشה חגי ח' הילל כהן, מה הנדרש ר?).
   About 1120. Abu Saad (see JQR., XVIII, 730).

5. The ידוע:
   About 13 J. 15. 7.
On the organization of the Palestinian Gaonate see *JQR.*, N.S., I, 66. It will not be superfluous to draw attention to the fact that, according to the canon, even if the city was great, the deacons of the church 'ought to be seven' (*v. Eus. H. Eccl.*VI,43, Council of Nicaea, in 315, Canon XV). We may definitely say, therefore, that the organization of the 'seven members' of the Gaonic authority is older than Solomon ben Judah.
TWO ANCIENT ISRAELITE AGRICULTURAL FESTIVALS*

By Julian Morgenstern, Hebrew Union College, Cincinnati.

Mishnah Ta'anit IV, 8 records a highly interesting ceremony. Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel said: 'Israel had no festivals like the fifteenth of Ab and the Day of Atonement, for on them the maidens of Jerusalem used to go out, clad in white garments, that had been borrowed, in order not to put to shame those who had none (of their own). All these garments had to be previously dipped in water. And the maidens of Jerusalem would go out and dance in the vineyards. And what would they say? "Young man, lift thine eyes and see what thou dost choose. Set not thine eyes upon beauty, but upon family, &c."'

* This paper was written in the winter of 1913 in response to the invitation of a committee of European Semitic scholars to contribute an article to a Festschrift, by means of which they intended to commemorate the sixtieth birthday of Immanuel Löw, Rabbi at Szegedin, Hungary, and famous Semitic scholar. The European war, however, prevented the publication of the Festschrift. After waiting for over two years, the author has determined to follow the example of Nöldeke, Littmann, and other scholars, and publish this article independently. He trusts that the scholarly world, and particularly he whom it was designed to honour, will still accept it as a small token of appreciation of and reverent tribute to true and exalted scholarship.

1 According to the traditional interpretation, as recorded by Rashi (l. c.), משליה means ritual washing, on the supposition that the owner may have worn the garments during menstruation. But the statement of R. Eliezer (Bab. Ta'anit 31 a), that even if the garments had been laid away in a chest משליה was still necessary, shows that this was not for ritual purposes.
This custom presents many peculiar and interesting features, well worthy of investigation; the dances of the maidens in the vineyards, the white, borrowed garments, which had first to be dipped in water, and the words of the maidens, all give rise to wonder and question. A full and detailed investigation of the origin and significance of these strange rites would lead too far afield for the present study. But the consideration of the two days upon which these rites were celebrated, and the association of the rites with these days, may form the natural approach to the subject proper, and in itself yield valuable results.

Assuming for the present that the statement of the Mishnah has direct historic value, there cannot be the slightest doubt that these ceremonies could not have been performed on the Day of Atonement after its institution in post-exilic times according to the ritual of Leviticus. That was altogether a day of fasting, humility, and repentance, 'a day of self-affliction' (Lev. 16. 29), while these rites must by their very nature have been essentially joyful. Nor can we regard as convincing the reasons for the observance of these ceremonies on the Day of Atonement, advanced in the Mishnah, viz. that this was the anniversary of the consecration of Solomon's temple, and in the Talmud (Bab. Ta'anit 30 b), viz. that this was the day of divine pardon and forgiveness, as well as the day upon which the second tablets were given to Moses (Exod. 34 and Deut. 9. 25 ff., and cp. Rashi to Exod. 34 and Deut. 9. 10 and to Ta'anit 30 b), and consequently, because it was thus essentially a day of gladness and festivity, these joyful ceremonies were altogether appropriate to its celebration. The nature and peculiar ceremonies of the Day of Atonement are too firmly established
by the legislation of the Priestly Code (Lev. 16; 23. 26-32; Num. 29. 7-11) to either permit or justify festivities such as these. If, therefore, historical value can be attributed to this tradition, it must picture the celebration of a festival on the tenth day of the seventh month at a time previous to the institution of the Day of Atonement on this day according to the Priestly legislation, or more correctly, in view of the actual facts of Jewish history, previous to the Babylonian exile.

Now we do know that still by Ezekiel the tenth day of the seventh month was regarded as the New Year’s Day (Ezek. 40. 1; cp. Bertholet, 195; Kraetzschmar, 263). This is to be inferred also from the fact that the blowing of the Jubilee cornet and the proclamation of the Jubilee year, which must naturally have taken place on the first day of the year, were fixed for the tenth day of the seventh month (Lev. 25. 9; cp. Bertholet, 89 f.; Baentsch, 416). The celebration of this day must have been primarily of a joyful nature. In this light the merry dances of the maidens of Jerusalem in the vineyards would seem an altogether natural and appropriate way of celebrating the joyful New Year’s Day. And since the celebration of these dances on the tenth of the seventh month, if at all historical, must have taken place in pre-exilic times, when this day was actually regarded as the New Year’s Day, it may well be that there was some intimate relation between the two, and that we have thus stumbled upon one of the actual details of the pre-exilic New Year’s Day celebration.

But according to the Mishnah these dances were held, not only on the Day of Atonement, but also on the fifteenth of Ab. Accounting for the celebration of this day in this joyful manner the Talmud records a number of interesting
and significant traditions (Ta'anit 30b; 31a; cp. also Baba batra 121a and b and Midrash Lamentations Rabba, Introduction XXXIII, ed. Buber, 34ff.). Of these, four have direct bearing upon our study.

I. According to R. Nahman, the fifteenth of Ab was the day upon which the Benjamites, after the battle of Gibeah, captured the maidens of Shiloh, while dancing in the vineyards, and took them as wives (Jud. 21).

II. Said R. Johanan, the fifteenth of Ab was the day upon which the number of those who were doomed to die in the wilderness was completed. In explanation the following tradition is related (Jer. Ta'anit IV, 69c; Midrash Lam. Rab., l.c.). During the entire forty years that the Israelites were in the wilderness, on the eve of every ninth of Ab, Moses would cause a herald to go and call out, 'Come forth to dig'. Then every man would come forth and dig a grave for himself and would sleep therein, that he might not die without his grave being dug. And on the morrow the herald would go and call out, 'Let the living separate themselves from the dead'. Then every one in whom there was life would stand up and come forth. So they would do every year. And in the fortieth year they did so, but on the morrow they all stood up. And when they saw this they were surprised and said, 'Perhaps we have erred in reckoning the new moon (and consequently this is not the ninth of the month)'. So they lay down again in their graves during the succeeding nights, until the night of the fifteenth. And then, when they saw that the moon was full, and that not a single one of them had died, and thus knew that they had reckoned the month correctly, and that the forty years in which it was decreed that those who had come forth
from Egypt should perish in the wilderness, were completed, that generation appointed that day, the fifteenth of Ab, as a festival. In addition to this the Tosafists (ad locum) relate that during the forty years in the wilderness deaths occurred only on the ninth of Ab.

III. According to Ulla, quoting R. 'Imri (cp. Midrash Lam. Rab., l. c.), the fifteenth of Ab was observed as a festival because on that day Hoshea b. Elah abolished the guards that Jeroboam b. Nebaḥ had set up over the roads to prevent the people of the northern kingdom from going to celebrate the three annual pilgrimage festivals in Jerusalem (cp. 1 Kings 12. 26–33).

IV. R. Mathna said that the occasion of the celebration of the fifteenth of Ab was that on that day permission was given to bury those who had fallen at the capture of Bethar (on the ninth of Ab, A.D. 135, cp. Graetz, IV, 150 f. and Jer. Ta'anit IV, 69 a).

It is significant that of these traditions two (I and III) correlate the celebration of these dances of the maidens of Jerusalem in the vineyards with the observance of an annual hag, or even with the three annual haggim, Pesah, Shabuot, and Succot. And not only that, but tradition I, which states that the dances of the maidens of Shiloh in their vineyards were also held on the fifteenth of Ab and were attended by the marriage of the maidens of Shiloh with the Benjamites, concealed in the vineyards, clearly identifies these dances with those of the maidens of Jerusalem in their vineyards, with the young men gathered about them too and selecting their wives from the dancers. The inference is justified that dances such as these may have been a regular, and even integral, part of the folk-celebration of the annual hag or of the three annual haggim.
This inference is supported by considerable evidence. Josephus expressly states (Antiquities, V, 2, 12) that the dances of the maidens of Shiloh were held three times during each year, when the men of Israel came up to the sanctuary to celebrate the three annual pilgrimage festivals, accompanied by their wives and children, precisely in the manner described in 1 Sam. 4. Furthermore, it is now generally recognized that the original meaning of hag was the sacred dance (cp. Gesenius-Buhl 14, 191 ff.), primarily around the sacred stone or cult object (cp. Wellhausen, Reste des altarabischen Heidentums 2, 110), but which, by a very natural extension in folk custom, might easily come to be practised, in part at least, in the form of these dances by the maidens in the vineyards. And, finally, it is significant that every vineyard apparently had to have its mahol, or dancing-place, as the name must have originally connoted. This mahol, surrounding every vineyard, was a narrow, open space, intended undoubtedly, at least in its origin, for just these dances. The exact dimensions of the mahol are prescribed in Mishnah Kil'aim IV, 1–3. All this evidence makes it certain that these dances were not mere sporadic celebrations of the maidens of Jerusalem and Shiloh, but were regularly observed, though not necessarily in identically the same form, throughout the country, at least in early times. And it is equally certain that these dances, clearly of a religious, as well as of a joyful character, were not celebrated occasionally, but as all the evidence indicates, at fixed times of the agri-

2 Cp., also the Aramaic equivalent of mahol, bodega (from מנה), the dancing-place in the vineyard (Jastrow, 458 a), and also my article, 'The Etymological History of the Three Hebrew Synonyms for "to Dance";' J.IOS., XXXVI (1916), 321-33.
cultural year, and in connexion with the annual *hag* or *haggim*.

On the other hand, two of the traditions (II and IV) connect the dances of the maidens of Jerusalem in the vineyards on the fifteenth of Ab with the cessation of some great national calamity that had happened on the ninth of Ab, but from the evil effects of which the people were freed only on the fifteenth.\(^3\) From ancient times the

\(^3\) In this connexion it may be noted that Josephus (*Wars*, II, 17.5-7) relates that on the fifteenth of Ab an attack was made on the fortress of Antonia, which practically began the war with the Romans. On the previous day, which was also the festival of the Xylophory, or bringing the wood for the altar, the Sicarii, mingling with the crowds that thronged the temple, had already begun the attack upon the garrison. It is most natural to connect this festival of bringing the wood for the altar with the tradition recorded in the Talmud (Ta'anit 31a; Baba batra 121b; Midrash Lam. Rab., *l. c*.), also accounting for the celebration of the fifteenth of Ab by the dances of the maidens in the vineyards, that according to Rabba and R. Joseph this was the day upon which they ceased to cut wood for the altar. In support of this statement, a saying of R. Eliezer the Great, found in a Baraita, is cited, affirming that from the fifteenth of Ab on the heat of the sun began to diminish, and so they ceased to cut wood for the altar because it was no longer dry. Hence that day was called 'the day of breaking the saw'. One cannot but feel that Josephus has here confused matters somewhat, and that the festival of bringing the wood for the altar was celebrated, not on the fourteenth of Ab as he says, but on the fifteenth. In fact, it must be admitted that just here he has expressed himself rather obscurely as to the exact date in question, and that most probably he too meant that the fifteenth of Ab was the actual date of this festival. This is borne out by the fact that Mishnah Ta'anit IV, 5 records nine different annual occasions or festivals upon which wood was brought to replenish the temple supply. Of these the fifteenth of Ab was evidently the most important (cp. Bab. Ta'anit 28a). This is also clearly stated in Megillat Ta'anit V (ed. Neubauer, p. 9). According to the Mishnah, the observance of the fifteenth of Ab as the festival of the wood-offering began in the days of Nehemiah (Neh. 10.35). That, however, the festival is of more ancient origin will soon be demonstrated. Josephus further states that the massacreing had been going on for seven days previous to the fifteenth of Ab, i.e. from the ninth on. This might, therefore, be cited as another instance where the fifteenth of Ab, celebrated as a joyful festival, is intimately
ninth of Ab has been celebrated as a fast day in Judaism commemorating the destruction of the temple by Nebuchadrezzar. In fact Zech. 7. 5 ff. and 8. 19 would seem to imply that this fast in the fifth month was instituted immediately after the destruction of the temple, and had by the time of the prophet been thus observed for seventy years. The actual question there raised is whether the completion of the second temple did not abrogate the celebration of that fast, as well as the fasts of the fourth, seventh, and tenth months, all of which were by tradition associated with the destruction of the temple and the fall of Jerusalem. But it is quite significant that according to 2 Kings 25. 8, Jerusalem fell on the seventh of Ab, while according to Jer. 52. 12, this happened on the tenth of the month. It is impossible to determine which of these two dates is historically correct. But certainly if, as the passages from Zechariah actually imply, the celebration of the anniversary of the destruction of the temple as a fast day began immediately after the occurrence of that event, there would be no reason for holding this fast on the ninth of Ab, instead of on the seventh or tenth, as the case might have been. Furthermore, the very fact, already noted, of the traditional connexion between the joyful celebration of the dances in the vineyards on the fifteenth of Ab and some national calamity that had occurred on the ninth of the month, and the other evidence that these dances were merely a feature of the celebration of an annual hag, the usual duration of associated with certain events that transpired, or began to transpire, on the ninth. At the same time, Josephus, being a contemporary, probably has recorded actual historical events, rather than semi-historical traditions, and therefore this incident may hardly be applied directly to our present question.
which seems to have been seven days, lead us rather to suppose on the one hand that the fast on the ninth of Ab was older, probably much older, than the fall of Jerusalem, probably marked the beginning of the seven-day hag that concluded with the dances on the fifteenth, and on the other hand that its association with the fall of Jerusalem and the destruction of the temple, which had actually taken place on almost that very day, was the result of that process of attaching an historical significance to the ancient festivals, which probably began with the definite association of the story of the exodus from Egypt with the Passover festival, or rather with the combined Passover and Mazzot-festivals. No certain mention of this association is found in the oldest legislation (Exod. 23. 15; 34. 18), but yet it had become a firmly established tradition by the time of the composition of the J and E codes. Similarly the Holiness Code (Lev. 23. 43), undoubtedly the product of the early exilic period, for the first time definitely associated the Succot festival with the tradition that in the wilderness Israel had dwelt in booths. It is only post-Biblical tradition that associated Shabuot with the giving of the Decalogue (cp. Jewish Encyclopaedia, IX, 594). It was undoubtedly the same spirit which thus sought to justify the continued observance of the old agricultural festivals, most of the details of the celebration of which were certainly of non-Jahwistic origin, by correlating them with definite events in the history of Israel, that now associated the ancient fast on the ninth of Ab with the destruction of the temple. And, as we have seen, so complete and thoroughgoing was this association that only

4 Exod. 23. 9 b and 15 a β and 34. 18 b are undoubtedly redactorial insertions into the original text; cp. Holzinger 96, 117 and Baentsch 206 f., 283 f.
seventy years after the destruction of the temple the day had become to Zechariah and his contemporaries only the anniversary of that catastrophe, and, it now seemed, need no longer be celebrated, since the new temple replaced that for which they mourned and fasted. That this hypothesis is correct will soon become completely apparent.

We return now to the celebration of the dances on the tenth day of the seventh month. We have seen that if the account of these dances be historical, and there seems no adequate reason to doubt this, they must have been celebrated before the exile and in connexion with the observance of New Year's Day. As we have seen, both Mishnah and Talmud associate their celebration with historical events other than those by which they account for the celebration of the dances on the fifteenth of Ab. Yet the Mishnah itself seems to imply that the dances on the two days were of the same nature and purpose. And the very fact that the attendant ceremonies, the borrowing of the white garments that had to be dipped in water, and the words of the maidens, recited or chanted in chorus during the dances, were the same on both days, leads to the same conclusion. If, therefore, as we have inferred, the celebration of the dances on the fifteenth of Ab represented the concluding rites of a great seven-day hag, which began on the ninth with fasting and mourning, we would expect to find this true also of the dances on the tenth day of the seventh month. That this was actually the case is easily demonstrated.

According to Exod. 23. 16 and 34. 22, the oldest Biblical legislation, the hag ha'asiph was celebrated at the end of the year. In itself it was hardly the new year festival. Rather the language seems to imply that its
celebration marked the close of the old year, and that the beginning of the new year came immediately thereafter, fell probably on the very day after the close of the hag. Neither of these oldest Biblical references mentions the actual duration of the festival. But according to all other pre-exilic and exilic writings it was celebrated for seven days (Lev. 23. 39 ff.; Deut. 16. 13; 1 Kings 8. 65; Ezek. 14. 25). Now, since the New Year's Day was celebrated, at least in the period immediately preceding the exile, on the tenth day of the seventh month, and probably followed immediately upon the seven-day celebration of the ancient hag ha'asiph, or, as finally called in Deut. (16. 13), hag hassuccot, it follows that this last must have been celebrated during this period from the third to the ninth of the seventh month.5

In this connexion the tradition recorded in the Mishnah

5 It is true that Deut. 16. 13 dates the celebration of the Succot-festival only at the time of the gathering in of the produce of the threshing-floor and wine-press. This must have been the original practice in the days of the local shrines. Then the varying times of the harvest and threshing seasons in the different parts of the country must have caused a slight variation in the dates of celebration of the local festivals (cp. 1 Kings 13. 2 f.). But the practical application of the Deuteronomical principle of the central sanctuary naturally necessitated the fixing of one definite date for the celebration of the festival by the entire nation. And, as the evidence has now made clear, this must have been from the third to the ninth of the seventh month, with the tenth celebrated as New Year's Day. This probably explains the selection of the Succot-festival as the time for reading the law to the people every seven years (Deut. 31. 10 f.). Not so much because of the multitude assembled for the celebration of the festival (ver. 11 a; this is probably secondary, cp. Steuernagel, 111) as because of the association of the Succot-festival with New Year's Day, marking the beginning of the year of release, was this time selected for this purpose. Similarly, the opening ceremonies of the Jubilee year took place on this day (cp. above, p. 33), and similarly, too, Ezra began to read the law to the people on the New Year's Day, celebrated, however, in his time on the first of Tishri (Neh. 9. 1 ff.).
that the tenth day of the seventh month was the anniversary of the dedication of Solomon's temple acquires new significance. According to 1 Kings 8. 2, 65 f., the dedication of the temple was celebrated in connexion with the annual *hag* of seven days. On the eighth day the closing ceremonies of Solomon's dismissal of the people to their homes and their blessing of him occurred. It is a very plausible conjecture that the dedication of the temple was made coincident with the *hag*, not only because of the large crowds that would thus be enabled to be present, but also because so important an event, which, especially in the king's mind, clearly marked the beginning of a new epoch in Israel's history, might be fixed most fittingly for the beginning of a new year. The actual New Year's Day would in all likelihood be the eighth day of the festival, the day of the dismissal of the people. It is noteworthy that just in this connexion the Targum records that the month of 'Etanim, in which the dedication was celebrated, was actually the beginning of the year. In all likelihood the memory of the association of the dedication of the temple with the ancient New Year's Day prompted this remark of the Targum. At any rate this tradition of the Mishnah, which undoubtedly rests upon a firm, historic foundation, like the other traditions, recorded above, unmistakably associates the tenth day of the seventh month with the pre-exilic celebration of the annual *hag* for seven days, apparently from the third to the ninth of the month, and implies at the same time that the tenth itself was the ancient New Year's Day as well as the day of the conclusion of the ceremonies of dedication and the dismissal of the people.

We have seen that the first day of the *hag*, which, we
have ventured to assert, was celebrated from the ninth to the fifteenth of Ab, was observed as a day of fasting and mourning. We might therefore expect to find the ḥag from the third to the ninth of the seventh month beginning in the same manner. Nor are we disappointed. The third day of the seventh month has become fixed in the Jewish calendar as an annual fast day commemorating the murder of Gedaliah b. Ahikam after the destruction of Jerusalem (cp. 2 Kings 25. 25; Jer. 41. 1 ff.). In Zech. 7. 5 ff. the fast of the seventh month is correlated with that of the fifth month, as if to imply that both fasts had a common origin. This would naturally go hand in hand with the tradition preserved in our Mishnah that the dances on the fifteenth of Ab and on the tenth day of the seventh month likewise had a common origin and manner of celebration. It has been suggested that the fast of the seventh month may perhaps refer to that fast described in Neh. 9. 1 ff. on the twenty-fourth of the month. But there it is clearly implied that that fast is celebrated as a special occasion of expiation and purification, and by no means as an annual occurrence (cp. Siegfried, 104 ff.; Bertholet 72). This is certain from the fact that Neh. 8 states clearly that the system of holy days instituted by the Priestly Code had been adopted and put into practice. And in this system no provision is made for a fast on the twenty-fourth of the seventh month. This could therefore have been celebrated on only this one occasion.

It follows accordingly that the fast of the seventh month referred to in Zech. 7. 5 ff. and 8. 19 can mean only this fast on the third of the month, which tradition has associated with the murder of Gedaliah. And just as with the fast of the fifth month, so too it is clearly stated that the fast
of the seventh month had been instituted already seventy years before, at the time of the destruction of the temple, or rather of the murder of Gedaliah. But though there is every reason to believe that the murder of Gedaliah actually occurred on the third day of the seventh month, it is nevertheless difficult to understand why it should have come to be celebrated immediately by a general fast. The story in Jer. 41 nowhere implies that the effects of the murder were far-reaching or partook in any way of the nature of a great national calamity, similar to the destruction of the temple, but merely explains why Jeremiah and his companions sought refuge in Egypt. Nor did the murder apparently have the slightest effect upon the subsequent fortunes of Israel. And since we have had reason to infer that the fast on the ninth of Ab was of ancient origin, and only artificially associated with the destruction of the temple, so too we may be justified in inferring that the fast on the third day of the seventh month, in Zechariah directly, and in our Mishnah indirectly, correlated with the fast on the ninth of Ab, was likewise of ancient origin, and only in the course of time came to be regarded as commemorative of the murder of Gedaliah.

Luckily this hypothesis can be fully corroborated. Jer. 41 gives a detailed account of the murder of Gedaliah and the attendant circumstances. Among other things, the singular detail is chronicled that on the day after the murder, but before it had yet become known to any one, eighty men came from Shechem, Shiloh, and Samaria, with beards shaven, garments rent and having made incisions in their bodies, bringing a minhah and incense to the house of God. Ishmael b. Nethaniah, the murderer, goes out to meet them, weeping, and decoys them into Mizpah,
where he murders them too. All the details of this strange scene cannot be easily explained, above all why Ishmael should go out weeping to meet these men, and why he should decoy them into the city only to murder them. But this much is certain, that the men are clearly represented as in deep mourning, as if for some one dead. Yet it cannot have been Gedaliah, for not only is it expressly stated that this was known to no one as yet, but also they are decoyed into the city by the invitation to come to Gedaliah. That they are bringing up a minḥah to the house of God, i.e. apparently to the ruins of the temple at Jerusalem (cp. Duhm, 317; Cornill, 416), would point to the celebration of the ḥag or Succot-festival and the bringing of a grain-offering, probably a first-fruit sacrifice, to the central sanctuary. In fact Cornill says that this rite would have to be regarded as a part of the Succot celebration, were it not that the latter fell later in the month, from the fifteenth to the twenty-second. Apparently he has, along with other commentators, lost sight of the fact that the Succot-festival was celebrated at this date only in the post-exilic period, after the adoption of the Priestly Code, and, as we have already established, before the exile, i.e. at the time of the murder of Gedaliah, must have been celebrated from the third to the ninth of the seventh month. Therefore just the piece of evidence that Cornill missed leads to the conclusion that we have to do here with the account of a pre-exilic celebration of the Succot festival, and that the pilgrimage of the eighty men to the house of God, bringing their minḥah with them, as well as the accompanying rites of mourning, were all regular details of the pre-exilic celebration of the festival.

It has been suggested that the mourning of the men, so
graphically portrayed, was because of the destruction of the temple, barely two months before (Stade, Geschichte des Volkes Israel, I, 698). But this hypothesis is altogether groundless. Certainly the text implies that these rites of mourning, especially the shaving of the beards and the incisions in the bodies, had not been performed two months before, but were still so fresh and recent as to merit remark. The clear implication is that these incisions had just been made, presumably the day before, at the moment of starting out on the pilgrimage to the sanctuary. As Jer. 16. 6 implies, just these were the characteristic rites of mourning for the dead. And on the other hand both Deut. 16. 1 and Lev. 19. 27 f. and 21. 5 definitely and positively prohibit just these rites of mourning as abominations, presumably because they partook of the nature of heathen rites, which both the Deuteronomic and Holiness codes sought to abrogate. It is certain, therefore, that these were no rites of mourning for the destruction of the temple, almost two months before, but that they were regular rites of mourning with which the celebration of the Succot-festival in this early period must have always begun. And as rites of mourning necessarily and invariably imply fasting, we have here positive confirmation of our hypothesis that the third day of the seventh month was celebrated from early times as a fast day and day of mourning, as if for some one dead, marking the beginning of the seven days of the Succot-festival, which culminated in the New Year's Day on the tenth of the month, with the dances of the maidens in the vineyards.

That these dances of the maidens in the vineyards were a regular and integral part of the celebration of the ḡag, and particularly of the Succot-festival in the pre-exilic
period, is clear also from the beautiful picture in Jer. 31. 4–6, 12, of the maidens of Israel, adorned with timbrels, going forth to the dances of the merry-makers, apparently at a time closely related to the sacred pilgrimage to Zion and the beginning of the planting season. At least this much is certain, that this picture is based upon the celebration of just such dances as those of the maidens of Jerusalem and Shiloh in connexion with the celebration of the annual ḥag.

We have thus, we believe, established the existence in pre-exilic Israel of two festivals of ancient origin, and, by the very nature of their rites, especially the dances in the vineyards, of agricultural significance. Each festival was of seven days' duration, beginning with a period of fasting and mourning, as if for some one dead, continuing then with the sacred pilgrimage and bringing of first-fruits, in later times to the central sanctuary at Jerusalem, but in earlier times certainly to the local shrines, and culminating on the last day with the actual ḥag, or sacred dance, of which the dances of the maidens in the vineyards were probably a gradual evolution. That in these seven-day agricultural festivals the sacred dance or ḥag was celebrated regularly on the last day, or perhaps in some form or other, on the last night (cp. Isa. 30. 29), may be safely inferred from Exod. 13. 6, according to which the actual ḥag of the

Certainly Graetz's hypothesis (Geschichte der Juden, III, 141 f.) that these dances were instituted by the Pharisees during the happy reign of Salome Alexandra (79–69 B.C.) in opposition to the Sadducees is altogether groundless. Ceremonies like these are seldom, if ever, introduced artificially; they can be the result only of the evolution of ancient folk beliefs and practices. Graetz has, moreover, completely ignored the fact that these dances were held on the tenth day of the seventh month, as well as on the fifteenth of Ab. Certainly Pharisaic rigorism would not have countenanced these dances on Yom Kippur.
Mazzot-festival took place on the seventh day. The one festival was celebrated from the ninth to the fifteenth of Ab; the other, the pre-exilic Succot, from the third to the ninth of the seventh month, with the additional celebration of New Year's Day on the following day, the tenth of the month.

In the ritual legislation of the Priestly Code, which regulated the religious calendar in the period after Ezra, the festival in Ab found no place. The fast on the ninth, however, continued to be celebrated traditionally in commemoration of the destruction of the temple, and later in commemoration of the destruction of the second temple and the fall of Bethar, while still later Messianic tradition made it the birthday of the Messiah (Talmud Jer. Berakot II, 45a, where the story is told that on the very same day that the temple was destroyed the Messiah was born). And the dances of the maidens of Jerusalem in the vineyards survived for a time, probably until within the recollection of Rabban Simeon b. Gamaliel, as a pretty folk custom. On the other hand the festival of the seventh month, while retained, was completely recast in the new ritual. New Year's Day was logically transferred to the first day of the seventh month. The tenth was made the day of the celebration of the great penitential and expiatory ceremonies of Atonement, while the Succot-festival was

7 There cannot be the least doubt that the institution of the Day of Atonement with its peculiar purpose and ceremonies, particularly that of the goat of Azazel, upon the pre-exilic New Year's Day was no mere chance or arbitrary arrangement of the priestly codicists, but was so fixed for very definite and positive reasons. The ceremony with the goat of Azazel was unquestionably the survival of some ancient ceremony (perhaps a local Jerusalem ceremony, since the goat seems to have been cast down the rocks in historical times at Beth Hadudo not far from Jerusalem (Mishnah Yoma VI, 8. The place is elsewhere called Beth Hadure and
transferred from its original date to the fifteenth-twenty-second of the month, probably to conform to the date

Beth Horon: Jastrow 332 ff. Now the purification of the sins of an entire people, often by means of scapegoats upon which the sins are supposed to be laden bodily, and which are then driven away to perish in some desert place, the abode of evil spirits, is a common practice. It is usually practised once a year, and generally on New Year's Day (cp. Frazer, The Golden Bough, vol. VIII; The Scapegoat, 127-30, 133, 145-50, 155, 165, 197, 202 ff., 209). It is a by no means far-fetched hypothesis that, in addition to the other New Year's Day ceremonies, to which reference has already been made, on this day rites of purification of the entire people, or at least of the people of Jerusalem, and probably in similar manner of other local communities, were practised, such as that of the goat of Azazel, or other related rites similar to those described by Frazer (op. cit.).

The little tufts of red wool, which, as the Mishnah records Yoma VI, 6, 8, were affixed to the goat, were merely the physical representation of the sins of the people laden upon the goat. From Isa. 1, 18, and probably with it Ps. 51, 9, we may safely infer that sins were commonly represented as being red in colour, and the corresponding state of purity white. This too explains the symbolism of the tuft of red wool which, according to R. Ishmael (Mish. Yoma VI, 8.), was affixed to the door of the temple, and turned white at the very moment when the goat was cast down the cliffs of Beth Hadud. It would lead too far afield to enter into a detailed discussion of the symbolism of the red colour that plays so prominent a role in various Biblical purification ceremonies, as, for example, the red heifer (Num. 19), the cedar wood (probably chosen because of its red colour), the scarlet thread, and the hyssop (there is no evidence that the hyssop was red in colour. If its identification with the Origanum Maru, L. (cp. Immanuel Löw, 'Der biblische 'ezob' (Sitzungsber. d. kais. Akad. d. Wissenschafter in Wien, CLXI (19199), 3, p. 15; also Aramäische Pflanzennamen, no. 93, pp. 134 ff.) be correct, it would seem to have white flowers. At the same time, the plant itself, exclusive of the flowers, may have been of reddish colour, or may have been selected for these purification ceremonies for some other reason. According to the Zohar (I, 220a; II, 41a, 80b; quoting Löw, Der biblische 'ezob, 11) it was effective in the expulsion of evil spirits. Dalman tells us (Zeitschrift des deutschen Palästinavereins, 1912, 124 ff.) that the Samaritans use a bunch of the common za'atar, or Origanum Maru, in their Passover rites, and hold that it is identical with the biblical hyssop. They believe that this plant possesses a certain mysterious, supernatural power, in that a bunch of it placed in blood prevents the latter from congealing. Not improbably this traditional association of the hyssop
of Passover, six months earlier, from the full moon of the month on. But whereas in the pre-exilic period Succot had actually been a festival of only seven days' duration with the following day, however, the supplementary New Year's Day, in the post-exilic ritual, while still nominally a seven-day festival, there was also intimately associated with it the celebration of the eighth day, Shemini Azeret, a day of particular sanctity and taboo, the real significance of which, even in the Bible, seems shrouded in uncertainty. Yet after our previous exposition there cannot be the slightest doubt that it is nothing but the outcome of the realization that there had been eight actual days of celebration in connexion with the pre-exilic Succot, of which the eighth day was important in itself and bore only a rather loose connexion with the rest of the festival. Thus it happens that Shemini Azeret appears in the Priestly Code as a day, the celebration of which is supplementary to, yet at the same time somewhat independent of, the actual celebration of the seven days of the Succot-festival proper.

with blood may account for its use in the various purification ceremonies in which, as a rule, blood plays the leading role], in the ceremonies of the red heifer, and the purification of a leper (Lev. 14. 6 f., 51 ff.). It may, however, be noted in passing that in Babylonian purification ceremonies cedar wood was used extensively (cp. my 'Doctrine of Sin in the Babylonian Religion' (MVAG., 1905, 3, 151), while, at least occasionally, the priest seems to have worn dark-red garments (ibid. 145). Similarly, too, among the Beduin to-day a child about to be circumcised, certainly a critical moment when danger from evil spirits is to be feared, is clad in a red garment (Musil, Arabia Petraea, III, 222). Red seems to have been the favourite colour of evil plague spirits (cp. Gollancz, The Book of Protection, XXXIII and LI; Musil, op. cit., 328; v. Duhn, 'Rot und Tod', Archiv f. Religionswiss., IX (1906), 22 f.). In various parts of the world the colour red plays a prominent part in purification ceremonies (Frazer, op. cit., 146, 190-92, 205, 208, 209, 213). This hypothesis would account completely for the fixing in the new religious calendar of Yom Kippur upon the pre-exilic New Year's Day.
The question still remains, in whose honour were these festivals originally celebrated, and, especially, for whom were the rites of mourning, that marked their beginning, performed? It is to-day a generally accepted fact that the biblical agricultural festivals were of Canaanite origin, and merely adopted by Israel when they began to follow an agricultural life in the conquered land. The ancient agricultural religious practices continued to be observed, with comparatively slight modification, at least in the folk religion, down to the exile itself. Against just these rites and practices the prophets protested and the Deuteronomic and Holiness codes legislated, but practically in vain. It needed the complete cutting off of the people from their ancient land and the gods from of old associated with it, and the complete recasting of the religion and ritual in a foreign land, to permit of a fairly, though by no means absolutely, complete eradication of the old Canaanite agricultural rites from the religious practice of the people. Before the exile the old agricultural festivals were celebrated from year to year in form but slightly modified from that of the ancient Canaanite days. But since these festivals must have primarily been celebrated in honour of the old Canaanite gods, we cannot help seeing in these rites of fasting and mourning as if for some one dead, that marked their beginning, survivals of the ancient mourning for Adonis, the Canaanite god of vegetation, cut off in the flower of his youth, and thus mourned as dead at the

8 That the Canaanite Mazzot-festival likewise began with fasting is to be inferred from the present custom of pious Jews that the first-born sons fast on the fourteenth of Nisan (‘Oraḥ Hayyim 470) in preparation for the Passover. Furthermore, that the hag, or sacred dance, of the Mazzot-festival was celebrated on the seventh or last day of the festival is, as said above, to be inferred from Exod. 13. 6.
beginning of all these festivals, and yet believed to rise again to new life. In accord with this belief the rites of these festivals rapidly changed from fasting and mourning to rejoicing and merry-making, often, if not generally, culminating in scenes of gross licence, of which the dances of the maidens in the vineyards, while the young men stood by and selected their wives, were merely a mild survival. This unquestionably correct explanation of the origin and significance of the rites, both of the fasting and mourning that began these festivals, and of the dances that formed their culmination, rounds out, as it were, and completes our chain of argument.

Perhaps final proof, if such be needed, may be found in the fact that the fifteenth of Ab has continued to be celebrated in the Greek and Maronite Churches of Syria as the Festival of the Repose or Assumption of the Virgin. Referring to this day the Syrian text of *The Departure Of My Lady Mary From This World* says, "And the apostles ordered that there should be a commemoration of the blessed one on the thirteenth of Ab (another manuscript reads [more correctly] the fifteenth of Ab), on account of the vines bearing bunches (of grapes), and on account of the trees bearing fruit, that clouds of hail, bearing stones of wrath, might not come, and the trees be broken, and their fruits, and the vines with their clusters". Similarly in the Arabic text of the apocryphal work *On The Passing Of The Blessed Virgin Mary*, which is attributed to the Apostle John, there occurs the following passage: "Also a festival in her honour was instituted on the fifteenth day of the month Ab, which is the day of her passing from this world, the day on which the miracles were performed, and the time when the fruits of the trees are ripening."
Further, in the calendar of the Syrian Church the fifteenth of August (undoubtedly meaning the fifteenth of Ab) is repeatedly designated as the festival of the Mother of God "for the vines". Bliss likewise informs us that in the Greek Church the festival is preceded by a fourteen-days' fast, while the Maronites observe a fast of eight days. During this fast meat, eggs, cheese, and milk are strictly forbidden (The Religions of Modern Syria and Palestine, 156 f.). Likewise, he says, 'on this day (the fifteenth of Ab) huge crowds, bent quite as much on merry-making as on worship, flock to the convent of the Virgin' (op. cit., 169). Frazer has correctly surmised that this festival represents merely a christianized survival of an ancient heathen festival. And the evidence here presented shows that it must have been an agricultural festival, calculated to promote the fertility of the trees and vines, that it must have begun with a period of fasting, and presumably of mourning for the dying deity, and culminated on the fifteenth of Ab in a period of merry-making and pilgrimage. This reminds us directly of our pre-exilic festival from the ninth to the fifteenth of Ab. But its picture of the passing of the Virgin reminds us equally of the customary Adonis festivals as described by Lucian (De Dea Syra, 6), and others, and even more particularly suggests a connexion with the ancient Babylonian Saccacca-festival, also celebrated in honour of Ishtar, the virgin-goddess, in the same month Ab, presumably at the time when she was thought to depart into the nether-world, the 'land of no return', the realm of the dead, in search of her dead lover, Tammuz, the Babylonian Adonis (cp. Baudissin, Adonis und Esmun, 9 I have quoted directly from Frazer, The Golden Bough, vol. I, The Magic Art and the Evolution of Kings, 14 f., since the works cited were inaccessible to me.
97-108; Fraser, The Golden Bough, vol. VIII, The Scapegoat, 354 ff.). Perhaps, too, it would not be at all far-fetched to find here a striking parallelism with the annual four-day festival by which the maidens of Israel, or probably originally, of Gilead, commemorated the passing of the virgin daughter of Jephtha, undoubtedly with rites similar to those with which she herself is represented as, in company with her maidens, bewailing her virginity upon the mountain tops of Gilead upon which, as the text strangely enough puts it, she had descended (Judges 11. 36–40). It requires no great stretch of the imagination to picture the dances of the maidens of Gilead in connexion with the annual hag in that part of the country. Whether this was celebrated in Ab, or in the seventh, or even in the eighth month, as was at one time actually the case in Israel (1 Kings 12. 32 f.), and what may have been the real import of the two months represented as elapsing between the moment when Jephtha announces his daughter’s impending doom, and the fulfilment of this, cannot be determined.

Into a further discussion of the attendant features of these festivals, the dances of the maidens in the vineyards, the presence of the young men seeking wives in the ranks of the dancers, the white garments, borrowed and dipped in water, the use of the leaves and branches of the four trees (Lev. 23. 40; Neh. 8. 15–17), almost the only detail of the pre-exilic celebration of the Succot-festival preserved in biblical legislation, and undoubtedly a survival of the old Adonis rites, we cannot enter here. As said before, it would lead into a detailed and lengthy consideration of some of the fundamental principles and practices of primitive Semitic religion. We must accordingly reserve this for treatment elsewhere.
TENTATIVE LIST OF EXTANT MANUSCRIPTS
OF RASHI'S TALMUDICAL COMMENTARIES

BY D. S. BLONDHEIM, University of Illinois.

For a number of years I have been engaged in completing and preparing for publication the materials gathered by the late Arsène Darmesteter for an edition of the French glosses (le'azim) contained in the Talmudical commentaries of Rashi. For this purpose I have endeavoured to locate all extant manuscripts of these commentaries. The following list embodies the results so far reached. It is published with the object of eliciting further information from scholars who may know of other manuscripts.

The list includes manuscripts of all the commentaries ascribed to Rashi, whether correctly or not. It does not include Genizah fragments. No attempt is made to list manuscripts of the commentary to Alfasi attributed to Rashi, which is of comparatively little value for the study of the le'azim.

The list is divided into two parts, the first including fifty-four manuscripts seen by Darmesteter or me, or excerpted for me by various copyists, the second enumerating seven manuscripts known or believed to exist, but hitherto inaccessible. The cities in which the different manuscripts are found are arranged in alphabetical order. In listing the manuscripts in a given library I generally preserve
Darmesteter's arrangement. He placed the manuscripts in the order of the Talmudical treatises upon which they bear.

For assistance in drawing up the list I am indebted to many scholars. Two eminent masters of Hebrew bibliography, Professor Alexander Marx and Dr. A. Freimann, have indicated the greater part of the seventeen manuscripts excerpted that were unknown to Darmesteter. Among others who have aided me I would mention especially Mr. Elkan N. Adler, Professor V. Aptowitzer, Rabbi D. Camerini, Dr. H. Ehrentreu, Professor Israel Lévi, Mr. J. Mann, Dr. Felix Perles, Professor N. Porges, and M. Moïse Schwab.

Cambridge, England, University Library:
MS. Additional 477. 8: Rosh ha-Shanah.
""" 478. 8: Baba ḫamma, Baba meši‘a.
""" 479. 8: Shebu’ot.

Frankfort-on-the-Main, Stadtbibliothek:
MS. Merzbacher 132: Beṣah, Kiddushin.
""" 133: Ḥullin.

Hamburg, Stadtbibliothek:
Cat. Steinschneider 171. 63: Baba batra.¹

Leipsic, Library of Professor N. Porges:
MS. (a) Megillah, Sukkah, Gitṭin.
""" (b) Baba meši‘a.

Universitätsbibliothek:
MS. 1105 (Cat. Vollers): Pesāḥim.

¹ MS. Steinschneider 172. 192, described as 'Rashi über Tr. Aboda Sara', is in reality a modern copy of the text of the Talmudical treatise 'Abodah zarah.
London, Library of Mr. Elkan N. Adler:

MS. 1621: Be'ah, Shabbat.
2553: Be'ah, Rosh ha-Shanah, Ta’anit, Megillah, Haigah.
" 1408: Shebu’ot.

British Museum:

MS. Harley 5585, Cat. Margoliouth 411: Baba ḫamma.
" Additional 27196, Cat. Marg. 413: Baba ḫamma, Baba meši’a.
" Oriental 73, Cat. Marg. 412: Baba meši’a.
" " 2891, Cat. Marg. 410: Ḳiddushin.
" " 5975, Cat. Marg. 409: Ḅerakot, Shabbat.

Munich, Hofbibliothek:

Cod. hebraicus 216: Shabbat, 'Erubin, Pesahim, Sukkah, Be'ah, Rosh ha-Shanah, Haigah, Ta’anit, Mo’ed Ḫaṭan.

Oxford, Bodleian Library:

MS. Opp. add. 4to 23, Cat. Neubauer 420: 'Erubin, Be'ah.
" Laud 318, Cat. Neub. 419: Yoma.
" Opp. 97, Cat. Neub. 421: Ketubbot.

² In the Dikduke Soferim, vol. XVI (edited after Rabbinovich’s death by Dr. H. Ehrentreu), p. 43 v, there is mentioned a fragmentary manuscript of Ḫullin (ff. 42 b-63) in the Munich Library. This manuscript seems to have been lost. This loss is not very serious, however, as the readings of the more interesting le'aein are given in the Dikduke Soferim. The trustworthiness of the readings may be inferred from the fact that I have verified a number of citations from other texts in this volume of the Dikduke Soferim, and found them extremely accurate, in sharp contrast to citations in previous volumes.
" Opp. 249, Cat. Neub. 369: Baba batra.
" Opp. 726, Cat. Neub. 370: 'Arakin.¹

Paris, Bibliothèque Nationale:
MS. fonds hébreu 323: Ye'amot (ff. 1-95 b).
" " " 324: Shabbat, 'Erubin.
" " " 325: Ze'ahim.

Parma, Biblioteca Palatina.
MS. 2087, Rossi 1324: Shabbat.
" 25⁸⁹, " 1309: Berakot, Ḥullin.
" 22⁴⁴, " 808: Beṣah, Rosh ha-Shanah, Ḥagigah, Mo'ed ḳaṭan.
" 2⁹⁰⁶, " 12⁹⁹: Kiddushin, Niddah, Shebu'ot, Beṣah, Yoma.
" 3¹⁵⁵, " 12⁹²: Makkot, Horayot, 'Abodah zarah.
" 2⁵⁹⁰, " 13¹⁰: Ketubbob.
" 3⁰⁵⁵, " 13⁰: Baba Ḷamma.
" 3¹⁵¹, " 12⁹³: Shebu'ot.
" 2⁷⁵⁶, " 13⁰⁴: Ḥullin, Niddah.⁴

Rome, Biblioteca Angelica:
MS. Orientale, Fondo Antico 57 (Cat. di Capua, 13): Ketubbob, Gitṭin.⁵

¹ Darmesteter was in error in supposing (Reliques scientifiques [Paris, 1890], I, p. 113) that MS. Michael 23⁷ (Cat. Neub. 373; Ḥullin) was of value for constituting the text of the le'azim. The manuscript is simply an Italian copy of the printed text, dated 1765: such variants as it offers are blunders or abbreviations.

⁴ MS. 2415, Rossi 44⁵, listed by Darmesteter (Reliques scientifiques, I, 121), is a commentary upon Shabbat, containing some excerpts from Rashi, inter alia, but omitting the French glosses.

⁵ Di Capua erroneously ascribes to Rashi the anonymous commentary upon Ye'amot with which the manuscript begins.
Vatican Library:

MS. Vaticano Ebraico 127: 'Erubin (Per. I-II); Shabbat (Per. I-II); Gitṭīn (Per. I-II); Niddah (Per. I).

MS. Vaticano Ebraico 129: Shabbat (Per. I-II).

" " " 131: Baba méṣī'a.
" " " 132: Baba ḫamma.
" " " 135: Gitṭīn.
" " " 138: Shabbat.
" " " 139: Ḥullin.
" " " 140: Gitṭīn, Shebu'ot.
" " " 157: Baba ḫamma.
" " " 158: Kiddušin.
" " " 487: Menāḥot (ff. 49a-93b).§

Turin: Biblioteca Nazionale:

MS. Fondo Ebraico, A, v, 29: Menāḥot, Bekorot, Keritot, Me'īlah.

" " " A, iv, 38: Kiddušin, Ketubbot, Gitṭīn.
" " " A, vi, 47: Bekorot, Temurah, Menāḥot (Per. IV, III).
" " " A, ii, 9: Yoma, Megillah, Ḥagi-gah, Sukkah, Beṣaḥah, Rosh ha-Shanah.¶

§ MS. Vaticano Ebraico 16o, a commentary on Ketubbot, ascribed by Assemani to Rashi, is an abridged version of Rashi’s commentary, with excerpts from other authorities, such as Maimonides, R. Tam, R. Isaac ibn Ghayyath. The French glosses are omitted, and Arabic glosses occasionally introduced. The library of the University of Illinois possesses a complete photograph of this manuscript.

¶ According to a letter of Signor A. Pesenti, librarian of the Turin Library, dated June 22, 1914, all four of the valuable manuscripts just enumerated
The following manuscripts have hitherto been inaccessible. It will probably be possible to secure extracts from some or all of them, in case they are still in existence.

Ancona:

Bielitz (olim), Library of S. J. Halberstamm:
M.S.: Nazir [cp. Weiss, Rashi (Vienna, 1882), p. 70].

Jerusalem, Library of Rabbi Isaac M. Badhab:
M.S.: Bekorot (ff. 45 to end; No. 190, Cat. Pardes ha-
Torah weha-Hokmah [Jerusalem, n. d.]).

Königsberg, Universitätsbibliothek:
M.S.: contents as yet undetermined (information from
Professor Marx and Dr. Perles).

Nikolsburg:
M.S.: Shebuʻot (letter from Professor Aptowitzer).

Petrograd, Günzburg Library:
M.S. 548: Baba Ḳamma.
M.S. 594: Yebamot. (Cp. Diḳduḳe Soferim, IV,
pp. 7–8).

were completely destroyed in the disastrous fire of 1904. I list the
manuscripts because the notes of Darmesteter preserve the readings of
the French glosses.
TAKKANOT 'EZRA

BY SOLOMON ZEITLIN, Dropsie College.

An ancient Baraita in the Talmud\(^1\) ascribes to Ezra ten takkanot. These, as explained by the compilers of the Talmud, are not definitely clear to us. In fact, for a long time many have been astonished by the Baraita's ascribing them to Ezra. Moreover, when we investigate Rabbinic sources, we find that to the editors of the Talmud the takkanot presented difficulties, as some of these takkanot had been considered as already contained in the Torah. However, it is evident that the sources of these takkanot were unknown to the Rabbis,\(^2\) and also the underlying causes and reasons. As we investigate these takkanot carefully and thoroughly we realize their significance in Jewish religious life. The Pharisees, who, animated by the general purpose to harmonize religion and life, brought about reforms in religious life, e.g. the laws of Erub that made the Sabbath less burdensome,\(^3\) also made important reforms in the laws of clean and unclean, that were extremely burdensome to Israel if literally construed and enforced according to the Torah. For example, such as were suddenly affected by bodily impurity (noctis pollutio, מַפְּלֵה) or defiled by contact with a corpse would, by literal interpretation of the Torah,

\(^{1}\) B. Baba ḫamma 82 a; Pal. Megillah IV, 1, 75 a.

\(^{2}\) See Weiss, Dor Dor ve-Doreschaw, 11, 66.

\(^{3}\) Concerning the time when Solomon introduced the device of 'erubin' (Erubin 21 a and Shabbat 14 b) see Geiger in he-Ḥaluṣ, VI, and also Derenbourg, Essai sur l'Histoire de la Palestine, p. 144.
have to depart from the city, the law being as severe in their case as in the case of those having a contagious disease like leprosy. It would have been impracticable in the period, when the Jewish people were at the pinnacle of their intellectual and material development, that a person merely by reason of such an occurrence should be constrained to give up communal life and leave the city. So the Sages amended the law in accordance with the new requirements. Such men as these, having no contagious disease (including those affected by noctis pollutio, and others), were merely incapacitated from entering the Temple-court or the Sanctuary, but were not compelled to keep apart from their fellow citizens and leave the city.

Now we will examine the takkanot themselves, that the Baraita ascribes to Ezra. This is the list: (1) Reading from the Scroll at Sabbath afternoon service; (2) Reading from the Scroll at morning service on Mondays and Thursdays; (3) Holding court on Mondays and Thursdays; (4) Ritual bath (tebilah) for מְעָל הַר; (5) Eating garlic on Eve of Sabbath; (6) Washing clothes [giving them out to be washed] on Thursdays; (7) That a woman should rise early and bake; (8) That a woman should gird herself with a belt; (9) That pedlars should carry about their wares in the cities; (10) That a woman should dress her hair before immersion.

The first three, concerning the reading from the Pentateuch on Sabbath afternoon, and on Monday and Thursday

4 Num. 5. 2; Deut. 23. 11. 5 Pesahim 67 and 68.
6 In Pal. Megillah, ibid., the takkanot to read from the Scroll during Minhah of Sabbath and on Monday and Thursday are reckoned as one takkanah; and there is another to complete the list, viz. מִזְרַח הַנּוֹס מְעָל וְמַעְרָב וּמַעְרָב מְעָל. But this, we are informed in the Talmud Babli (Sanhedrin 19a), was a ruling of R. Jose in Sepphoris.
mornings, and sessions of court on Mondays and Thursdays, are fairly intelligible to us. The fourth takkanah concerning the requirement that a לַעֲבֹד must receive or undergo tebilah, seems thus to have been understood by the compilers of the Talmud, and so the Gemara asks in reference thereto: 'Is this not known from the Torah—that one who has experienced pollution should undergo tebilah?' But such is not the real purport of the takkanah; there is involved in it a reform in the laws of purification.

As we have noted above, originally it was incumbent on the לַעֲבֹד to leave the camp, to undergo tebilah, and thereafter to wait until evening (after sunset he became clean). For historical evidence that such was at one time the Jewish law, note what King Saul said when David failed to appear at his father in-law’s table: מַרְאוֹת אֵל מַתָּה; the expressions he uses are quite consonant with the obligation of a man suddenly confronted with pollution to leave the city, and the observance of such a law might not be felt as a hardship or obstacle in such a small kingdom.

However, what was not felt to impede progress in the days of Saul was felt by the Pharisees to be a great hindrance in their desire to bring about agreement between religion and a larger life. By their method of exegesis they explained מַתָּה (camp) as מַתָּה שֶׁבֶּית (camp wherein the Shechinah resided); therefore the law of temporary banishment could apply only to the Sanctuary proper, and to the 'Azarah, known also as נֵס הָלַעֲבֹד 'camp of the Levite group', and not to the whole city.

7 See Derenbourg, ibid., pp. 22-3.
8 Lev. 15. 16; Deut. 23. 12. 9 Ibid. 10 1 Sam. 20. 24-6.
11 See Zeitlin, 'Les dix-huit Mesures', Revue des Études Juives, LXVIII. p. 29; Pesahim 68a; Sifre, 255.
Similarly in the matter of sunset. For according to the Torah, mere bathing of the body in water would not have been deemed sufficient to render a person pure, unless the sun had set on him thereafter, and he is called by the Talmud מובלח. The Sages then ordained that, if he had taken the prescribed bath, he was *ipso facto* pure, and relieved of the necessity of waiting until sunset.\(^{12}\) This reform the Talmud ascribes to Ezra in these words, "ואם נבלח לבלו קר楽, meaning to say, that it is sufficient for him to undergo *tebilah*, as he need not leave the city nor concern himself as to when the sun will set.

The law of מובלח, according to which *tebilah* alone does not suffice, but it is necessary to wait for sunset, the Pharisees made, by their decree, apply in cases of *terumah*—if a priest was unclean, he would not only have to undergo *tebilah*, but be inhibited from eating *terumah* until night.\(^{12a}\) This is one of the ‘Eighteen Measures’ that were decreed by Bet Shammai and Bet Hillel.\(^{13}\)


\(^{12a}\) ים אע הדbara... שוחר לחהומ ים לחהומ משותיעך.

\(^{13}\) See Zeitlin, *ibid.* This decree was a consequence of the Pharisees' hostility to the priesthood, which was particularly strong in the last days of the Second Temple, so strong indeed that they virtually decreed that almost everything disqualified *terumah*, and *terumah* disqualified had to be burnt (see my article, *ibid.*); and also that almost everything rendered the priest unclean and unfit to eat *terumah* and *kodesh*, going so far as to say that if any man (of the priesthood) carried any object on his shoulder, though it touched nothing unclean, still some object polluted might be lying underground as far down as the spade might dig—and who knows but that there might be some pollution at that depth?—consequently it would also render unclean the man who carried the object (see Ohalot 16, 1). In line, possibly, with this general principle, they made the ruling that the
now we are able to understand the controversy between the Pharisees and the Sadducees in the matter of the burning of the Red Heifer. The Sadducees, adhering as they did to the old Halakah, and basing their arguments on the plain meaning of Scripture, said: When is a man purged of his uncleanness? After sunset. *Tebilah* alone does not render him pure. As the priest who burns the Red Heifer must be pure, and we are apprehensive lest by accident he come under the head of מַכָּר הָאֵזֶר, or lest his brother priests have touched him, in which case the *tebilah* (ablution) would not have the immediate effect of purging him and qualifying him to burn the Heifer—therefore the Sadducees considered it necessary to defer that burning until after sunset.

The Pharisees, however, who had adopted the principle that, if one took the prescribed bath, he is rendered pure without waiting for the sun to set, said the priest may burn the Heifer before sunset, immediately after *tebilah*.

As for the pomp wherewith the ceremony of the Red Heifer was surrounded, the purpose of the Pharisees was priests should not eat of *terumah* until after sunset, apprehending that the priest might have been contaminated by some object, and maintaining, as they did, that for eating of *terumah* immersion did not suffice, but that setting of the sun was necessary, consequently *terumah* could not be eaten in the day-time. This makes intelligible the first *Mishnah* of the Talmud, as, after asking from what time we are allowed to read נֹמָן, it says, when the priests begin to eat *terumah* נָאַלְתָּא שְׁמִיטָא בַּעֲרָבָה מִשְׁמַעְתָּא שְׁלַחַתָא נוּסָהָא לַאֲסָל בַּמַּתְרָהָא. The Talmud is astonished, asking why the *Mishnah* does not in so many words say ‘from the appearance of the stars’. But if we say that the Sages decreed that the priests should not eat *terumah* until after sunset, that is, until nightfall, the *Mishnah* very clearly indicates to us when we can read the נוּמָן, when the priests gather to eat their *terumah*, which did actually serve the people as a criterion whereby, the sun having set, they might know that they could read the נוּמָן.

14 Num. 19. 5-9.

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to demonstrate in public that their view had won recognition. They actually defiled the priest who was to burn the Heifer. A pool was there in which he could immerse his whole body, after which he might burn the Heifer, without waiting for the sun to set—all this the Pharisees did, 'so that the Sadducees should not have occasion to say that it had to be done at sunset'.

This is the reason underlying the difference between the Pharisees and the Sadducees in the matter of the burning of the Red Heifer, namely, the principle of דבון, and not, as is generally believed, that the Sadducees were more exacting in the matter of the purity of the priest who burned the Heifer, and the Pharisees less exacting, less scrupulous.

The fifth takkanah is 'to eat garlic on the eve of the Sabbath'. The Talmud's explanation, that garlic is מטניס יהב and not, as is generally believed, that the Sadducees were more exacting in the matter of the purity of the priest who burned the Heifer, and the Pharisees less exacting, less scrupulous.

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This takkanah has, in my opinion, no connexion with מטניס יהב but was really a great and significant reform in the development of the laws of clean and unclean. Originally, they did not permit the eating of garlic, because before plucking it from the ground they moistened it with water, and by this pouring of water upon it they rendered it susceptible to demonstrate in public that their view had won recognition. They actually defiled the priest who was to burn the Heifer. A pool was there in which he could immerse his whole body, after which he might burn the Heifer, without waiting for the sun to set—all this the Pharisees did, 'so that the Sadducees should not have occasion to say that it had to be done at sunset'.

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of becoming unclean. For in Leviticus 11:38 the expression occurs "איך נים ולא והי". However, the earlier Sages so revised the Law, that seed is rendered susceptible of receiving impurity through the pouring of water thereon, only when detached, not when attached (by nature) to the soil (Sifra Shemini 11, 3); and this ta\kkanah the Talmud ascribes to Ezra. What hitherto was obscure now becomes clear—we are able to understand a Mishnah in Yadaim 4 which brings in a disputation between the Sadducees and the Pharisees: אוצרים זדוקים עבטלים ואו עלמים פרושים שאמו מושרים את הנוזק; אוצרים הפרושים עבטלים ואו עלמים פרושים שאמו מושרים את הנוזק מה חוץ משאריהם 'The Sadducees say, We complain against you, Pharisees, because ye declare clean the zam. The Pharisees say, We complain against you, Sadducees, that ye declare clean the stream of water that comes from the cemetery.' All the commentators who have discussed this Mishnah, and all the scholars who have spoken about the matters of dispute between the Pharisees and the Sadducees, have taken for granted that the word נוזק implies pouring from one vessel into another, and hence they interpret the Sadducees as saying, 'We find fault with you, O Pharisees, because in case a man

18 This enables us to understand the answer the Sages gave Ḥalafta ben Konia: איה נים ונמא לצלחתא בן קניה ו%!הה לעל יראה (Tosefta, ibid.), equivalent to saying, 'Ye who do not avail yourselves of the ta\kkanah, that seed never becomes susceptible of uncleanness through pouring thereon of water save when detached from the soil, have occasion to investigate, but not the great bulk of Israel who abide by that ta\kkanah; for them it is clean and unquestionably permissible as food'. Similarly they disposed of the objection that Joshua ben Perahiah made to importing wheat from Egypt, where, as no rain falls, water is necessarily poured upon the seed, making it, according to that teacher, susceptible of uncleanness. The Sages, applying to Egyptian wheat the ruling concerning that which was attached to the soil, observed that it might be unclean for Joshua ben Perahiah but not for the vast body of Israel who abided by the ta\kkanah.
pours a liquid from a clean vessel into a vessel that is unclean ye maintain that what is left in the upper vessel remains clean', and that the Pharisees rejoin thereto, 'We have as much right to find fault with you that ye declare clean the stream of water that issues from a cemetery'. This interpretation of the Mishnah appears to me unacceptable. For, aside from our not being able to find any evidence that the Sadducees ever declared unclean the water that remained in the upper vessel when part thereof had been poured into an unclean vessel, and aside from inability to see whereon they could base such a view—according to this interpretation, the answer that the Pharisees give does not fit in with the question that the Sadducees propound. The Sadducees are thus represented as asking why they (the Pharisees) declare clean the water in the upper vessel when a part has been poured therefrom into an unclean vessel, and the Pharisees are represented as answering with the query, why they (the Sadducees) declare clean the water that issues from the cemetery—which is wholly irrelevant and bears no relation to the original question.

The word פָּסַל which almost everywhere has the connotation of pouring out from one vessel into another, has, it appears to me, misled the commentators; they thought that in this passage also it had that connotation. Here, however, פָּסַל, nif'al of פָּסַל, refers to the status of that which has received the water. The dispute resolves itself thus: 'The Sadducees say, We object to your declaring seed clean in case water has been poured thereon—we mean that ye make distinction (as far as the Law is concerned) between that which is attached to the soil and that which is detached—which is above the ground, and claim that
in case water is poured on the seed while it is attached to the soil, that seed does not become susceptible of receiving pollution; that only when the seed has been removed from the ground does the pouring of water thereon render it susceptible of impurity.’ To this, the answer of the Pharisees appears to be directed, and in fact proves that to have been the purport and burden of the question; for the rejoinder is virtually, ‘Do ye not also make a similar distinction in the matter of defilement between that which is attached to the ground and that which is detached, when ye admit that the stream of water, though coming from a cemetery (than which nothing is more unclean), is clean, because the stream of water is attached to the soil?’

That the eating of garlic served as a means of emphasizing some principle we can see from another Mishnah, also very ancient. He that forsweares benefit from ‘men who rest on the Sabbath’ is forbidden to derive benefit from Cutheans as well as Israelites, since the Cutheans, though they do not regard as binding the takkanot and gezerot added by the Sages (e.g. the Erub), do rest on Sabbath in conformity with the Torah. He that forsweares benefit from ‘men who eat garlic’ is forbidden in case of Israelites, and permitted in case of Cutheans. The reason in the latter case is that the Cutheans adhered to the old Halakah based on Scripture, and consequently did not eat garlic, because before plucking it from the ground, it was customary to wet it, pouring water upon it, and thereby

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20 Nedim 3. 10: חֹזֵב בְּבָשָׂר שְׁבַת אֲסוֹר بִּשְׁרָאֵל אֲסוֹר בְּבָשָׂר מָנוֹכֶל לִשְׁמַנְא אֲסוֹר בִּשְׁרָאֵל תִּשָּׁבֵעַ תִּשָּׁבֵעַ מְנוֹכֶל is the correct reading. See Bet Joseph, *Tur Yoreh De'ah*, § 214.
it was rendered susceptible of becoming unclean; and since the Torah makes no distinction between detached from and attached to the soil, and the emendation of the Sages, that only such seed as is detached is susceptible of receiving defilement, but not that which is attached to the soil, had not been adopted by the Samaritans. Hence, he who had forsworn benefit from people who ate garlic was regarded as not having included Cutheans in his vow, since they did not eat garlic, whereas he was forbidden benefit from Israelites, who having accepted the takkanah of the Sages, did eat garlic. Now we can understand why this (fifth) takkanah was considered so important as to be ascribed to Ezra.21

The sixth takkanah, שוהי מכסים חמה לשבה, evidently permitted giving garments to the launderers on Thursdays. This accords well with the Hillelite Halakah that allows giving work to a Gentile three days before the Sabbath, though it is probable that he may not finish it before Sabbath. See Shabbat 11 a.22

The seventh takkanah, שוהי אשת מכסכת ואופה, is explained in the Talmud to mean, the housewife should get up early to bake in order to give of her bread to the poor man. According to my opinion, this takkanah also bore some relation to Sabbath observance, particularly as in the Palestinian Talmud, the reading is שוהי אמה פהר בורך, that is, this regulation had for its purpose, that on Fridays baking should be begun in time for a crust to be

21 In ordaining that garlic be eaten on Sabbath eve the Sages appear to have availed themselves of a custom that already existed (Nedarim 8. 6), and by sanctioning it to have given concrete expression to their views.
22 R. Zadok says that in Rabban Gamaliel's house they used to give clothes to the launderer three days before Sabbath. see ibid.
formed on the bread while it was still day (see Shabbat 19 and last Mishnah of Shabbat 1). This takkanah emanated from the Hillelite school; the Shammaite school, however, insisted that the work must be completely finished before sunset (Shabbat 1. 4-11).

The eighth takkanah, the Talmud regards as designed to promote modesty in behaviour. The etymology of סנה is a bit obscure. Rashi says that 'Senar' is a pair of trousers. Apparently the purpose of the takkanah was, as explained in the Talmud, to promote modest behaviour; the essence thereof accordingly would have been: though trousers are originally included in men's garments which are ipso facto forbidden to women, still since the wearing of them by women will be promotive of modesty, we commend and even recommend the new custom. Or it is possible that the takkanah was required by reason of the סנה being a garment of foreign origin, whether in vogue among the Persians (רִזָעָא) or identical with the ζωυάριον (belt) in vogue among the Greeks; however, ניניא, or feminine delicacy, motivated the reform in dress.

The ninth takkanah, which facilitates the sale of women’s ornaments. It seemed better that the pedlars should carry their stock into all parts of the cities rather than that by their coming into the houses jealousy of the husbands be aroused, and domestic unpleasantness result—so the sales should be negotiated on the street. In the Yerushalmi,

In case a pedlar is seen leaving the house and his wife girding herself with a ‘Senar’, the husband has the right to divorce her without dower. See ibid., 63b, where the Talmud quotes Ben Sira as saying: רבינו וי פattività והптילול לברר עבדה.
in connexion with the pedlars hawking their wares in
the open, the expression is used ‘on account of the dignity of the daughters of Israel’, and
after this they made a regulation that the citizens must
not prevent these pedlars from freely moving about to sell
their wares.24

The tenth takkanah, נמוהAndre נביה ירהיאל, evokes
expressions of surprise in the Babylonian Talmud, to this
effect: Since according to the ordinance of the Torah a
woman must dress her hair before taking the ritual bath,
wherein does the takkanah consist? what new element does
it contain? Had the redactors of the Babylonian Talmud
been aware in this case of the Palestinian Gemara, they
would not have asked this question, for there they would
have seen והא (יוויאי) התוקן השחתה את השופט קודם למשהה השלחנה יספ
‘He (Ezra) amended the law, so that a woman
might dress her hair three days before her purification’.

The reason for the takkanah was as follows: When
a woman at the close of her separation period desired
to cast off her uncleanness, she had to take the prescribed
ritual bath at night;25 the dressing of her hair had
(originally) to be on the day immediately preceding her
tebilah.26 However, if her time for tebilah fell on Saturday
night or on a Sunday night, Sunday itself being Yom Ṭob,
and so she could not by reason of the sanctity of Sabbath
or of Yom Ṭob cleanse and comb her hair—what was

24 This takkanah, that the citizens should not hamper the pedlars in their
efforts to sell their goods, was made because these men, who had formerly
entered houses, were now, out of regard for the reputation of Jewish women,
disallowed to enter houses; the merchants of the city were, therefore, not
to hinder them from exercising the privilege granted by the other takkanah
of going about in the cities to sell their wares. See Baba batra 22a.
25 Yoma 6a.
26 See Niddah 67b and 68a.
there for her to do? Then the Sages ordained that in case the night for tebilah of a Niddah was at the conclusion of Sabbath, or at the close of the festival of Rosh-ha-Shanah that fell on Thursday and Friday, making it impossible for her to cleanse and comb her hair immediately previous to her tebilah, she might instead cleanse and comb her hair on Friday, that is, three days before her purification.\textsuperscript{27} This was the takkanah that the Talmud ascribed to Ezra.

Now we can fully understand why just these takkanot were ascribed to Ezra, inasmuch as we have seen their importance and their value in the development of the laws of נידה, the laws of the Sabbath, and in domestic life.

As for the time of these takkanot, Weiss\textsuperscript{28} has well shown that they do not go back to Ezra’s day. In my opinion, they were instituted neither by one man nor in one period, but were the results of the evolution of the ancient Halakot according to the demands of the time, some of these takkanot being very ancient, and others not quite so ancient. The takkanot in the matter of נידה are very ancient, e.g. the ‘takkanot shum’, that the only time that seed becomes susceptible of receiving pollution is when it is detached from the soil. That it is very old is seen by what is stated of Joshua ben Perahiah as opposed thereto.\textsuperscript{29} The takkanot or amendments in the laws of Sabbath enabling the Jews to give clothes to the launderer on Thursday, and to bake bread on Friday while it was day, are from the times of Bet Hillel and Bet Shammai;\textsuperscript{30}

\textsuperscript{27} The Babylonian Amoraim were divided in opinion on this matter. See Niddah, \textit{ibid}.

\textsuperscript{28} \textit{Dor Dor we-Doreschaw}, II, p. 66.

\textsuperscript{29} See Tosefta Makshirin 3. 4.

\textsuperscript{30} It is very likely that this takkanah about reading from the Scroll
therein we can see traces of how the ancient Halakot were remoulded, and how the Pharisees strove to bring the religion into consonance with life, and to amend the Pentateuchal law, if such were life's demands.

during the Sabbath afternoon service was instituted at the close of the period of the Second Temple, the purpose being (on Sabbaths) to restrict it to the afternoon, as the Sages preferred that the people free from work should go to the Bet-ha-Midrash to hear the exposition of the Sages and not read the Holy Scriptures, and therefore they decided that reading of the Scriptures was permissible on Sabbath from Minḥah and after. And this we find in a Tosefta (Shabbat 14): אַּחַּת עָלָיו מִי שֲנָאַמֵּר אֶת קֹדֶמֶת בֵּית הַמִּדְרָשׁ, and we also find in the Talmud that it is not allowed to read the Scriptures until the afternoon service: אֵין קֵרוֹת בֵּית הַמִּדְרָשׁ אֶלֶּהָ מֵאֲלֵף מִי חָכְמָם לְמַעַלָה (Pal. Shabbat 15c); and also the question arose among the Amoraim: If the fifteenth of Adar falls on a Sabbath, what should be done in regard to reading of Megillat Esther, as it is forbidden to read from the Scriptures before Minḥah (J. Megila 74b)? See S. Zeitlin, 'Les dix-huit Mesures', REJ, LXVIII, pp. 34-5.
The Composition of the Book.*

63. (ch. 22.) The author continues his narrative in ch. 22. There is no reason whatever to doubt, as some critics do, the genuineness of 22. 3–5. As soon as David openly becomes an outlaw his whole clan joins him, probably out of fear of Saul's revenge. But David would not expose his aged parents to the dangers of his roving existence, and so he entrusted them to the protection of the king of Moab. He was encouraged to do so both by the enmity which existed between Saul and Moab (cf. above, §§ 49, 57), and also by his connexion with the land of Moab through Ruth, his reputed ancestress (cf. R. Isaiah's note, \textit{ad loc}). That there was a prophet in David's company is not at all surprising, considering the unfriendly relations which existed between Samuel, the head of the prophetical order (19, 20 a), and Saul. Gad may have belonged to the school of Ramah, where David had vainly sought an asylum. The passage is, however, fragmentary. It tells us only indirectly that David stayed at the מַעֲדָה, which appears from ver. 5 to have been outside Saul's territory. But it does not tell us precisely where the מַעֲדָה was, how David lived there, or how Gad came to him.

* Continued from vol. VI, pp. 267 ff., and pp. 555 ff.
64. Many critics declare the account of David's visit to Nob in ver. 9 ff. to be independent of, and contradictory to, the account in 21. 2-10, and they assign the account in ch. 21 to E, and the account in this chapter to J. But this is altogether incorrect. The two accounts are interdependent and supplementary. The dependence of this chapter on ch. 21 is evident. Doeg is here introduced as a person already known to the reader (cf. above § 61). The clause 'and נב הוהי is not intended to describe the person of Doeg, but only to explain his presence at the court, like the explanation of his presence at Nob given in 21. 8 a. הנעים in ver. 10, and הנל in ver. 13, evidently refer back to 21. 4 f. It is true that here the bread is not described as sacred, but that is because it is immaterial to the charge of conspiracy brought against the priest, whether the bread was sacred or profane. It is also possible that Doeg did not see what kind of bread the priest had given to David. Likewise, לֶוֶת (לֶוֶת הָעָלֶת) מִנַּה in ver. 10, and מִנַּה in ver. 13 are dependent on 21. 10. The particular detail that the sword was that of the Philistine champion is, perhaps, mentioned by Doeg, in order to make sure that the king will believe him, as it might have been known that the sanctuary did not harbour within it any weapons (cf. Exod. 20. 25). Perhaps also Doeg intended to intensify the king's resentment by the allusion to the famous exploit of David, which was the first cause of the king's jealousy and hatred. It is characteristic that Saul himself says only מִנַּה נֶאֶה (ver. 13), being unable to recall with his own lips the great achievement of his hated rival. Budde (op. cit., 226) says that ver. 10 b 'hinkt . . . störend nach'. As a matter of fact this clause, with the verb at the end, is intended to be very emphatic and impressive. On the other hand, ch. 22
gives an additional detail not found in ch. 21, viz. the inquiry of the oracle. But, as we have stated before (§ 61), 21. 10 ends rather abruptly, and seems to be fragmentary. It may be that our author purposely omitted this detail in ch. 21 because he knew that the reader would learn it from ch. 22, where it would have to be mentioned as one of the chief counts in the indictment against the priest (cf. 22. 15); whereas in ch. 21, which tells the story from David’s point of view, the inquiry of the oracle was of minor importance. Bread and a sword were to David in his plight a more vital necessity than an inquiry of the oracle. Thus, just as ch. 22 presupposes ch. 21, so ch. 21 presupposes ch. 22, which proves that both chapters are by one and the same hand, viz. by the author of our book.

65. Critics hold ver. 19 to be an interpolation modelled on 15. 3 b, because the verse interrupts the connexion between ver. 18 and ver. 20, and because its statement is improbable. One may ask: if this is not the right place for the verse, where else could the writer have placed it? Not before ver. 18, nor far down below after ver. 23, nor anywhere between vers. 20–23. The argument that Doeg could not have slain single-handed all the inhabitants of Nob is of no force. הָאָנָה need not mean that Doeg slew them all with his own hand any more than, for example, וַיִּשְׁלָב in 15. 7 means that Saul slew all the Amalekites with his own hand. The king’s attendants may have hesitated to lay their hands on the priests; but this hesitation of the courtiers would not have prevented Doeg from obtaining outside the court plenty of assistance in his nefarious work. The occurrence of the phraseology of this verse in 15. 3 b only strengthens our contention that both ch. 15 and ch. 22 emanate from one and the same author. Note the omission
here of בֵּית given in 15. 3 b. Camels were an important possession of the marauding Amalekites (cf. 30. 17, &c.), but useless to the settled priests of Nob, and therefore not found among their cattle.

66. (ch. 23.) 23. 1–13 is evidently by our author. Note the references in ver. 3 to 22. 5; in vers. 6, 9 b to 22. 20 ff., and in vers. 7 ff. to 22. 6. Ver. 6, which seeks to explain how David came to possess an ephod, may very well belong to the author, and need not be a gloss. Naturally it had to precede ver. 9 b, but in order that it may not interrupt the context it is placed at the beginning of the paragraph. The contention of the critics that this verse should have preceded ver. 2 is of no force. There were other means of inquiring of God besides the ephod. The inquiry in ver. 2 may have been made through the prophet Gad. Ver. 14 is, as shown by clause b, a summary of the history of David during the whole period. David dwelt in the wilderness, namely, in the fastnesses; he dwelt in the high land, namely, in the wilderness of Ziph. Ver. 15, where we should point with LXX נַעֲשָׂה for M.T. נַעֲשֶׁה, is introductory to vers. 16–18: David was afraid of Saul while he was in Horshah in the wilderness, and Jonathan came out to him and encouraged him, and concluded a covenant with him. We hold that this passage belongs to our author. Hitherto the author has not recorded the well-known fact of the existence of a covenant between David and Jonathan (cf. II. 9. 3; 21. 7); for, as we have shown above (§§ 52, 58), 18. 3, 20. 10 are not the author's, but belong to interpolations. In view of the breach between Saul and Jonathan

35 נַעֲשָׂה is obviously a more comprehensive term than נַעֲשֶׁה. Similarly נַעֲשֶׁה 'the mountainous region', comprised a wider area than נַעֲשָׂה.
revealed by 22. 8 (cf. also 20. 30 ff.), we need not be surprised that Jonathan dared to visit David in defiance of his father.

67. Ver. 19 is found again in a shorter form in 26. 1. Since, as we shall show later (§ 72), ch. 26 was embodied by our author in his work from an older source, we may conclude that he deliberately borrowed the phraseology of ver. 19 from 26. 1. That our verse is not a duplicate of 26. 1, as the critics assert, is evident from the fact that the story which it introduces in vers. 20–28 has nothing in common with the story of ch. 26. The narrative of vers. 19–28 seems to be the sequel of ver. 14 above, and is intended to illustrate the statement in ver. 14 b. We see no reason to deny the passage to our author. Ver. 19 b is best interpreted as follows: David hides himself in our region, now in the fastnesses, now in Ḥorshah, now in the hill of the Ḥakilah. Had the latter two localities been intended to serve as a specification of the first (= גזירתה) they would no doubt have been introduced by the relative הוא, like the last clause of the verse (וְנֵסָיוֹן). This interpretation is further supported by the request of Saul that they should return and find out the exact spot in which David was hiding. If the Ziphites had only mentioned one locality as David’s hiding-place, and had, moreover, added the names of other places in order to describe and specify its exact situation, then the whole of Saul’s speech in vers. 22, 23 would seem both superfluous and irrational.

68. (ch. 24.) In ch. 24 the author continues the story of David’s adventures. The critics have denied the integrity of vers. 5–8. They hold that the present order of the verses is unnatural. Hence some of them propose the
following rearrangement: vers. 5a, 7, 8a, 5b, 6, 8b. This new order seems at first sight plausible enough. But the question arises, as H. P. Smith (op. cit., 217) observes, how did this complicated dislocation arise, and what was its cause? Further, we may ask, how did the writer divine that David had felt in his heart remorse for cutting off the skirt of Saul's mantle (ver. 6), unless David had evinced this feeling by some speech or act, as is really the case in our present text, where he gives expression to this feeling by his speech in ver. 7? H. P. Smith seeks to solve the difficulty in the usual fashion of the critics: he holds the incident of the cutting off of the skirt of Saul's mantle to be a later invention, and proposes to cut out as an interpolation vers. 5b, 6, and also ver. 12, which, he says, 'is as readily spared as vers. 5b, 6'. But ver. 12 cannot be spared. For ver. 13 a can have sense and force only after ver. 12 b, where David demonstrates his own innocence and also charges Saul with seeking his life. No such charge is brought against Saul in ver. 11. Again, it will not do even if we delete only the first half of ver. 12 (up to נורılmיה); for נשיא עד presupposes a demonstrative proof of his innocence, such as is produced only by ver. 12 a. As a matter of fact, the present order of the verses is not unnatural. It is both rational and true psychologically. The alleged difficulties are simply the creation of the critics themselves. The course of the narrative is as follows: Saul enters the cave, in the recesses of which David and his men lie in hiding (ver. 4). David is urged by his men to slay Saul with his own hand (= שfindAll, ver. 5). Moved by their words and by his own impulse David rises and approaches Saul stealthily, but his chivalry and magnanimity are suddenly aroused, and he shrinks from the dishonourable act of slaying his enemy by
stealth. All that he can bring himself to do is to cut off the skirt of Saul's mantle (ver. 5). But even this harmless deed arouses in his generous heart feelings of self-reproach and shame (ver. 6). He returns to his men and explains that he cannot bring himself to lay hands on the 'Anointed of the Lord' (ver. 7), and energetically prevents them from attacking the unsuspecting king (ver. 8). The cutting off of the skirt is thus seen to be an essential detail of the story. It may also have been intended to bear a symbolic significance, like the rending of the mantle in 15. 27-8; 1 Kings 11. 30-31.

69. All the critics agree that ver. 14 is a gloss. They argue that David would not have chosen that moment for displaying his familiarity with the gnomic wisdom of the ancients. But the speech ascribed to David is not intended to be regarded as a stenographic report of what David actually said on the occasion. Hebrew authors may, like Thucydides and Livy, have put speeches of their own composition into the mouths of their heroes. Why should not the narrator, desirous of impressing a moral lesson on the minds of his readers, have put such a proverb into the mouth of David? And if this verse be a gloss, how is one to explain the repetition in clause b of ver. 13 b? H. P. Smith objects that David would not dare to call Saul ימך. But David does not mean to brand Saul as wicked. He cites the proverb that evil brings its own punishment only in order to explain his own assurance, in ver. 13 a, and to warn Saul that a wicked act against him would inevitably bring upon its doer condign retribution.

Budde (op. cit., 229) condemns also vers. 21-23 a as redactional. These verses may not, indeed, be quite historical,
but there is no reason why the original narrator should not have shared the general belief of his contemporaries that even at that early stage of his career David had already been recognized by Saul himself as the only legitimate successor to the throne of Israel. Cf. our remarks above, § 25.

70. (ch. 25.) Ch. 25 stands out from among the other chapters of this section by its distinctive individuality of style and diction. The narrative is rich in detail and in local colour, full of life and movement, and distinguished by a number of characteristic phrases and expressions. Note ver. 3: וַיְהֵבָהוּ מִשְׁפָּלִים; ver. 6: וְיָוהֲקָם; ver. 12: וַיהֵשׁוֹנָה; ver. 14: וַיִּתֶּהוּב. We have, however, no reason to deny the chapter to our author; we should rather conclude that he utilized some older written material, from which he derived the most characteristic portions of his narrative. Cf. vers. 42–4 with 27. 3; 30. 5; II. 3. 2–3, 13 ff. The critics agree that ver. 1a is an interpolation from 28. 3. But what is the purpose of this interpolation here? Only one of them has attempted an answer to this question, viz. Budde (op. cit., 231), who thinks that the interpolation was made in order not to let the reader lose sight of the nation. But why should this reminder of the existence of the nation, if such reminder was necessary, have been made exactly here, and not in any other of the many chapters since ch. 18? We think it likely that there was in the mind of the writer some connexion between the two clauses of this verse. It seems that he meant to imply that through Samuel's death David enjoyed in the wilderness of Ma'on (LXX) a period of rest from Saul's persecution. It may be that Samuel's death kept Saul back from pursuing David. Samuel's followers, the prophets and the priests, who were friendly to David, may, perhaps, have
begun to show signs of restiveness now that the calming influence of Samuel had been removed. For with all his opposition to Saul, Samuel retained to the end of his life a certain personal attachment to the man he had raised to the throne of Israel; cf. 15. 11, 35. On the other hand, it is also possible that the connexion between clause a and clause b of this verse is purely of a chronological character. In any case, it is certain that the critics are wrong in regarding clause a as being derived from 28. 3a. On the contrary, the statement seems to be original here, where it occupies the place of a principal affirmation in the course of the historical narrative, whereas in 28. 3 it serves, like the following clause, merely a subordinate purpose, viz. to prepare the reader for the story of the raising of Samuel's spirit by the necromancer.

71. Budde (loc. cit.) is of opinion that originally 25. 2 ff. followed immediately upon 23. 28. But the sense of security and repose which characterizes ch. 25 is out of accord with the trepidation and hairbreadth escapes of ch. 23. From 25. 7b, 15-16 it is obvious that David and his men had stayed in one locality for a considerable length of time, and had freely and openly fraternized with the natives. This is quite intelligible after the assurance given by Saul in 24. 17-22, but is inconsistent with 23. 19, 22, 23, where David is described as hiding in secret retreats and in danger of being betrayed by the natives.

72. (chs. 24, 26.) The striking similarities between ch. 26 and ch. 24 present an interesting problem as to the origin and mutual relationship of the two chapters. The critics solve the problem by their usual method of declaring the two accounts to be independent duplicates of the same story. At first sight this solution seems quite plausible,
but a closer comparison of the two chapters proves it to be altogether inadequate to account for all the facts of the problem. Let us examine both the similarities and the differences of the two stories. The main outline of the adventure is common to both stories. In both stories David gets Saul into his power without the king’s knowing it, and his men seek to slay Saul stealthily, but David prevents them. When Saul is out of danger David proves to him his innocence, and complains of Saul’s ceaseless persecutions, and Saul confesses his guilt. There are also striking similarities in language; cf. . . . לֶאֱלֹהִים אֲלֵהַ בַּהֲרֹר . . . לֶאֱלֹהִים אֲלֵהַ בַּהֲרֹר in 26. 2 and 24. 3; רָדִּיוּ הָעֲבִי in 26. 3 b with 24. 4 b; 26. 11 a with 24. 7; 26. 17 ‘ ם הָעֲבַי לָגו מִי with 24. 17; 26. 20 b with 24. 15. On the other hand, there are also important differences in the general presentation of the story and in the details. The temper of the two men is differently represented in each of the stories. In 24 David’s speech is very bitter and almost vindictive (vers. 10–16); in 26, on the other hand, it is respectful and supplicatory (vers. 18–20). Again, in 24 Saul is profuse, humble, and remorseful (vers. 18–22); in 26 he is brief and dignified (ver. 21). Further, the style in 24 is diffuse and verbose as compared with the conciseness and terseness of 26. There are also marked differences in the details of the story. 26 takes place in the wilderness of Ziph, 24 in the wilderness of Engedi. In 26 it is the Ziphites who betray David, in 24 the informers are unnamed. In 26 David, accompanied only by one follower, goes down to the encampment of Saul; in 24 Saul comes to the hiding-place of David and all his band. In 26 the proof of David’s innocence is the spear and pitcher of water; in 24 it is the skirt of the king’s mantle. In 26 it is Abishai
who wishes to slay the king; in 24 David is incited to slay him with his own hand. In 26 David first addresses Abner, and the king only after the latter had spoken to him; in 24 David addresses Saul straightway, and Abner’s presence is entirely ignored. Now, the identity of the main outline certainly proves the original identity of the adventure. On the other hand, the differences in detail preclude the assumption that the two accounts in their literary form are both derived from a common source, or that one account is derived from the other. Yet the linguistic similarities demonstrate the dependence of one account upon the other, viz. the dependence of ch. 24 upon ch. 26, which is no doubt the older of the stories.\(^{87}\) The only solution which will satisfy all the facts of the problem is the following: The writer of ch. 24, who, as we remarked above (§ 68), is the author of our book, knew ch. 26 in its present literary form from some old document. But he also knew from oral tradition a story of a similar character, which, however, contained so many striking differences in detail as to lead him to believe that the two stories were not identical, and that David and Saul really had two such adventures. Judging by our modern criteria of historical criticism, we may think that this belief of his was wrong; but we have no right to impose our modern ideas upon an ancient writer, and to assert, as the critics seem to do, that his belief in the independence of the two stories was unjustifiable and impossible from his own point of view. The story which he found in his old source he reproduced in ch. 26, but the story which he derived from oral tradition he related in his own words in ch. 24. In this latter composi-

tion he was, consciously or unconsciously, strongly influenced by the phraseology of the older story; hence the linguistic similarities between ch. 26 and ch. 24. We have already found our author elsewhere repeating in his own compositions phrases and expressions belonging to the older documents which he incorporated into his narrative; cf. 10. 23 b with 9. 2 b; 15. 19 b with 14. 32 a; 16. 12 a with 17. 42 b; 23. 19 with 26. 1 (see §§ 28, 50, 67). We should, of course, expect 26. 1 to begin with 'יהו or יהוה, but our author seems to have left the expression as he found it in his document either through an oversight, or because he was unwilling to tamper with the text of the document. The assumption that the author of our book is responsible for the appearance in his narrative of both ch. 24 and ch. 26 will help to explain the resentful tone of David's speech in 24. 10-16 as compared with the more calm and respectful tone of his speech in 26. 18-20. In ch. 24 his mind was still full of the bitter feelings engendered by Saul's pursuit described just before in 23. 25-8. In ch. 26, on the other hand, David was still fresh from the enjoyment of a long repose in the wilderness of Ma'on (ch. 25). These facts will also account for the difference in the bearing of Saul in ch. 24 and ch. 26.

73. This solution of ours is also strongly supported by another consideration. According to the analysis of the critics, 23. 19-24. 23 is the duplicate of ch. 26. The Ziphites thus informed against David only once, and Saul confessed his guilt only once. If so, it is incomprehensible that after the assurance just given in 26. 21, 25, an assurance which had never yet been broken, David suddenly despair
so utterly of his safety that he resolves upon taking the
desperate step of going over to the hereditary foe, the
heathen Philistines, among whom he would be forced, as
he says himself (26. 19), to abjure his God (27. 1 ff.). But
according to our explanation David's resolve becomes quite
clear and intelligible. He had been pursued by Saul on
three occasions, in 23. 19-28, in ch. 24, and in ch. 26. He
had been three times betrayed by his neighbours, and twice
by the same people, the Ziphites (23. 19; 24. 2 b; 26. 1).
Saul's promises and confessions had been proved to be
deceptive: the promise made in Engedi (24. 18-22) had
been broken by the subsequent pursuit into the wilderness
of Ziph (26. 2 ff.). Most of the natives of the Negeb were
hostile and ungrateful, like Nabal (25. 10), or treacherous
like the Ziphites. In these circumstances, with the repeated
experience of danger and betrayal, it is quite natural and
intelligible for David to despair of the future safety of
himself, his wives, and his followers in the land of the
Judean Negeb, and to resolve upon taking the extreme
step of flight into the land of the Philistines.

74. (ch. 27.) The author continues his narrative in
ch. 27. Some critics have questioned the integrity of the
chapter. They hold that ver. 11 contradicts vers. 5-6. But
ver. 11 says only that David had to bring his spoil to
Akish at Gath, not that David lived at Gath. Had
David been living at Gath, his duplicity towards the king
would no doubt have been soon discovered either by
betrayal or by an unguarded remark from his men. That
David refrained in his raids from attacking his own tribes-
men and their allies is only what we should expect of him.
This consideration for his own people is also confirmed by
30. 26; cf. also 25. 15-16, 21, 28 ('n תונש, viz. against
the heathen enemies of the Judeans and their allies). The confidence placed in David by Akish (ver. 12; 29. 3, 6, 9), and the ignorance of the Philistines of the real character of David's expeditions, prove conclusively that David lived at Ziklag and not at Gath. Hence vers. 7-12 presuppose vers. 5-6—which proves the unity of the whole chapter. David's residence at Ziklag is also confirmed by 29. 4 and ch. 30. This disposes of H. P. Smith's conjecture that vers. 5-6 are an interpolation. 39

75. (chs. 28-31.) The story of Saul's death in his last war with the Philistines includes two episodes, viz. Saul's interview with the spirit of Samuel (28. 3-25) and the Amalekite raid on Ziklag (ch. 30). The latter, being part of the story of David, forms undoubtedly an integral portion of our section. Chs. 29-30 are, therefore, by the same hand as 28. 1-2, and as these two verses are the sequel of ch. 27, we may safely assign 28. 1-2 and chs. 29-30 to the author of our book. As regards the other episode, critics are agreed that it is an interpolation from another document, but on very insufficient evidence. They argue that the passage breaks the context, but that is natural to an episode. Again, they point out that the tone and style are different from those of the preceding and following pieces; but that, too, is adequately accounted for by the profound difference of the subject-matter. Finally, the critics discover a discrepancy between this piece and ch. 29. Here in ver. 4 the Philistines are encamped at Shunem and the Israelites at Gilboa, whereas in 29. 1 the Philistines are at Aphek and the Israelites at some fountain in Jezreel. But the fact is that 28. 4-25 is posterior in time to ch. 29, as is evident

39 Cf. also Kamphausen in ZATW., 1886, pp. 90 ff., and Budde, op. cit., 231 f.
from 28. 5, where Saul was already surveying the Philistine camp. Ch. 29 describes the situation at the opening of the campaign and the mobilization of the Philistine hosts, while 28. 4 shows us the position of the two armies at the eve of the battle; cf. 28. 19 ... הנשך. Aphek (probably identical with the one mentioned in 4. 1) served as the place of muster for the various Philistine armies: 29. 1 does not say that the Philistines encamped at Aphek, only that their hosts assembled there for the purpose of moving northwards, while Jezreel was the place of the first encampment of the Israelites. When the Philistines marched from Aphek on Jezreel (29. 11 b), the Israelites, out of fear of the enemy, moved backwards to Gilboa, south-east of Jezreel. The Philistines then, for some strategical reason, moved up farther north to Shunem, where they pitched their encampment (28. 4), and from there pushed back southwards to attack the Israelites on the heights of Gilboa (31. 1; II. 1. 21).

76. The nocturnal scene at Endor must have taken place at the time of David's fight with the Amalekites, which latter occurred three days after David had left Aphek (cf. the chronological references in 30. 1 a, 13 b), but before 30. 26. For this reason the author placed the story of Endor where he did, and not after ch. 30, as Budde has injudiciously done in his badly deranged text in Haupt's Polychrome Bible. Besides this chronological reason, the author also had an aesthetic reason for placing 28. 3-25 before chs. 29-30, viz. to afford the reader some relief in chs. 29-30 between the depressing effects of the ghostly scene at Endor and the gory battlefield of Gilboa in ch. 31. Chs. 29-30 are thus treated by the author as an episode and a break in the course of his narrative. This explains
the wording of the opening clause of ch. 31 as a subordinate statement: 'The Philistines were fighting', viz. during the time covered by the preceding account; cf. Rashi's note ad loc.: . On the other hand, the Chronicler, who had not previously mentioned anything of the Philistine war, makes of these words a principal statement, using the perfect tense: . This disposes of H. P. Smith's hasty conjecture (op. cit., 252) that our text in 31. 1 requires emendation in accordance with the reading of the Chronicler (1 Chron. 10. 1). We, therefore, see no reason to deny 28. 3-25 to the author of our book, to whom this scene must have appeared as the final and supreme climax in the story of his great hero, the prophet Samuel. It is admitted by practically all critics that this story is by the same hand as ch. 15. In fact, 28. 17 points back expressly to 15. 28. But we have already assigned ch. 15 to the author of our book (§ 50). Hence we conclude that this story, as well as the rest of the section comprising chs. 28-31, is the work of our author. This view is supported by the use of in vers. 15, 16, which reminds us of 16. 14, 23, and by the introductory character of vers. 3-4. The latter is evidently an essential part of the story and not the work of an interpolator. On the other hand, vers. 18-19 seems to have suffered expansion by a late hand. Ver. 18 is rather diffuse, and clause b in ver. 19 is practically a repetition of the first part of clause a. Perhaps the whole of vers. 18-19 a a (to ) is a later addition.

77. (II. ch. 1.) The narrative of Saul's death is continued in II. 1, which describes the reception of the news by David. The chapter is homogeneous, and as it continues the story of i. 31 it must be assigned to the author of our book.

Budde (op. cit., 233) is the only exception.
Ver. 4 is reminiscent in its phraseology and climactic arrangement of I. 4. 16 b-17 (cf. Ralbag's note ad loc.). With ver. 14 compare I. 24. 7; 26. 9, 11. Some critics, however, hold that vers. 6-11, 13-16 belong to another document; that ver. 5 is a redactional link connecting vers. 1-4, which form the continuation of I. 31, with the contradictory account given in the interpolation, vers. 6-11, 13-16, while ver. 12 is a later addition, because lamentation and fasting were at the stage of that verse still premature. But, as H. P. Smith asks (op. cit., 254), where did vers. 6-11, 13-16 come from? We may further ask, what was the original continuation of ver. 4? It could not have been ver. 17, for we require first some such statement as is contained in ver. 11; much less could it have been 2. 1, even if we omit נברצ ברך; for David would certainly have paid some honour to the fallen heroes before proceeding to utilize the new situation for his own benefit. Finally, is it likely that in this alleged original document to which vers. 1-4 belong, David accepted the truth of the tidings in ver. 4 without adequate proof, and without inquiring for further details? The truth is, that we obtain a logical and consistent account of the affair only if we accept vers. 1-17 as one continuous and homogeneous narrative. After the man's general statement in ver. 4, David naturally inquires for the source of his knowledge (ver. 5). The answer to this is given in vers. 6-10. Convinced of the truth of the death of Saul and Jonathan by the irrefutable evidence supplied by the man's producing Saul's regalia, David and his men perform the usual rites of mourning over the fallen heroes (vers. 11-12). Then, as part of the reparation due to the manes of the slain king, David punishes the Amalekite for his self-confessed crime (vers. 13-16), and finally pro-
ceeds to pronounce on the heroes the dirge of lamentation which usually accompanied the dead to the grave (cf. 3. 33; 1 Kings 13. 30, &c.).

78. The reason which has compelled the critics to mutilate our chapter is the contradiction between the account of Saul's death in 1. 31 and the report of the Amalekite. The easiest way for our critics to overcome the difficulty is by resorting to their usual contrivance of postulating two different documents with redactional links and additions. But the fact is, as already noted by Qimhi and Ralbag, that the Amalekite's story in vers. 6–10 a is a pure fabrication. The narrator does not, indeed, say so explicitly, but there is no need for such an explicit statement, since the lie has just been given to the Amalekite's story in the narrator's own account in 1. 31. No one except perhaps a modern Bible critic, whose constitutional scepticism is sometimes balanced by an astounding gullibility, would be taken in by the tissue of falsehoods which the brazen-faced Amalekite sought to palm off on David. His lies stare one in the face. First, he did not, as he says, come to Gilboa by mere chance (תְחֹלָהְךָ אֲנַשִּׁים, ver. 6). He came there either as a combatant, or as a thief to strip the dead and wounded. Secondly, he could not have managed to get right into the thick of the battle—also by mere chance!—and penetrate through the chariots and horsemen, so as to reach the wounded king. Thirdly, if the king had already been overtaken by the enemy's cavalry, he would not have had the time to engage the Amalekite in a conversation (vers. 7–9). Fourthly, Saul would not have been deserted by all his own men and forced to solicit help from the Amalekite; at least his armour-bearer would have remained by his side, as in fact he did (1. 31. 4–5). It is evident that the
Amalekite was a member of some band of robbers, who, like vultures, usually haunted the battlefields and preyed upon the dead and wounded. He succeeded in discovering the body of the dead king before the Philistines (1. 31. 8), stripped him, and carried the royal insignia to David in expectation of a rich reward. The narrator does not say that David really believed the details of the Amalekite's story. David accepted only the truth of the general statement of the defeat of the Israelites, which he must have expected himself, and of the death of Saul as testified by the Amalekite's possession of the regalia. Perhaps he also believed it possible that the Amalekite had found Saul lying mortally wounded and had dispatched him of his own accord (vers. 14-16).

79. Budde (op. cit., 238) and other critics regard 4. 10 as contradictory to our account here, since there David kills the Amalekite with his own hand, whereas here (ver. 15) he has him killed by one of his men. They think, therefore, that 4. 10 is based upon a different document, and that originally some such account as in 4. 10 followed here between ver. 10 and ver. 17, which, however, had been suppressed by the redactor in favour of the account in vers. 6-16. But surely 4. 10 is not a complete statement of the incident. For even assuming that it is based on a different document, that hypothetical document could not have said what 4. 10 says. that David slew the bearer of tidings for no other cause than that of having brought him the news of Saul's death. Was death the usual reward for bringing the tidings of the death of a king? Or was David a bloodthirsty tyrant, to slay innocent people for his mere pleasure? It is plain that the bearer of tidings must have been guilty of something more criminal than anything men-
tioned in 4. 10, though not so criminal as the act of Rekab and Ba’anah. If, then, 4. 10 is incomplete, and the real cause of David’s action was some unnamed crime committed by the man, there is nothing to prevent us from assuming that 4. 10 refers back to 1. 15–16, and that the real cause of the man’s death was as stated in our narrative here. The critics have been misled by the literal interpretation of המ in 4. 10. But that expression need not mean that David slew the man with his own hand, any more than, for example, נב in 5. 9 means that David built his fortress with his own hands (cf. above, § 65). Assuming, therefore, as we must, that 4. 10 points back to our passage here, it is noteworthy that in the outburst of his passionate indignation David reports the words of the Amalekite as לאו ויהי, and not יכ ה nip. This seems to confirm our view that David did not really believe the details of the Amalekite’s story in vers. 6–10 a.

The insertion of the elegy in vers. 19–27 was probably made by the author himself, like the similar insertion of the elegy on Abner in 3. 33–4. For a discussion of the original form of the elegy, see the writer’s paper in this REVIEW, vol. V, pp. 202–8.

DAVID AND ISHEBOSHETH.

80. (ch. 2.) The story of David’s accession to the throne, first of Judah, and then of all Israel, contained in chs. 2–5, 5, must as a whole be assigned to the author of our book. 2. 2 refers back to 1. 25. 42–3: 2. 4 f. to 1. 31. 11–13; and 3. 13 f. to 1. 18. 27; 25. 44. The author may, however, have used some older material, particularly in his account of the fight at Gibeon. It is also possible that the critics are right in regarding the chronological notes
in 2.10,11 as a later addition, similar to I.13.1. It has been argued by the critics that Ishboseth must have been a minor when he succeeded to the throne of Israel, since he did not accompany his father to Gilboa. But we have no evidence that he was not present at Gilboa. He might have escaped the slaughter of his brothers. And if he did not go to the war, it was perhaps due to his lack of physical courage rather than to his youthfulness. His remonstrance with Abner in 3.7 would lead us to think that he had already reached manhood. Note also his description as pnv' in 4.11. Nevertheless, he does not seem to have been as old as forty years on his accession (2.10), i.e. ten years older than David. For in this case the difference in age between David and Jonathan, the eldest son of Saul, would have been rather too great to allow for such a warm and intimate friendship as existed between them.

81. Budde (op. cit., 240) regards 2.14-16 as an interpolation. He thinks that the story of the twenty-four champions was invented to explain the name of the field (ver. 16b), and that ver. 17 originally followed immediately on ver. 13. But it is difficult to see how the battle in ver. 17 ff. could have developed out of ver. 13b. If the two rival hosts had deliberately come out to fight, the narrator would have said in ver. 13b, and not התיו. We want an explanation of the immediate cause of the outbreak of hostilities. For it is apparent from vers. 22b,26 that Abner had entered on the fight unwillingly and unpreparedly. And the ready consent of Joab to stop the fighting (ver. 27) proves that Joab, too, did not come out originally with the set purpose of fighting a battle. It is evident, therefore, that the outbreak of the fighting was unexpected and against the wish of the generals, and must
therefore have been due to some chance incident such as that described in vers. 14-16, which inflamed the passions both of the men and of their leaders. It is, however, possible that there is a lacuna between ver. 16 and ver. 17. For we expect a statement that the fatal play had led to a quarrel and to mutual recriminations, which resulted in a pitched battle between the rival hosts. Perhaps the author derived his account from an older source, which he abridged, as he did, for example, in I. 10. 7 ff. (cf. above, § 48).

82. (ch. 3.) Critics have denied the integrity of this chapter, but on insufficient evidence. They hold that vers. 2-5 are a late redactional insertion removed here from behind 8. 15, whither they also propose to transfer 5. 13-16. It is very magnanimous on their part to credit the ancient Hebrew writer with so much of their own Germanic sense of method and orderliness as to assert that he must have placed all these lists together, but truth forces us to decline the flattering compliment. For it is hard to see why a redactor should have transferred these lists from ch. 8 to their present places. The fact is that 3. 2-5 is quite in its right place here, and is the work of the author of the rest of the chapter, who intended the list to illustrate the growing strength of David (ver. 1 b a. Cf., for example, Esther 5. 11 a). Dr. H. P. Smith conjectures that two different documents have been joined together in the account of the negotiations between David and Abner. 'One of the two accounts made Abner send to David by the hand of messengers; the other made him come in person. In the former document his motive was simply the conviction that David was the man of the future. The other gave the quarrel with Ishbaal as the occasion' (op. cit., 275). But it must be doubted whether any document would
have represented Abner as a selfish traitor ready to betray his weak protégé Ishbosheth and the whole house of Saul for no cause whatever except his own personal advantage. The change in Abner's attitude to Ishbosheth must have been the result of some very powerful motive, such as is supplied by our narrative in ver. 7 ff. Again, is it likely that Abner would have been represented as coming personally to David, after the long war which he had waged against him (ver. 1), without first obtaining through some trusted messengers a guarantee against violence to his person? Finally, the fact that Abner's visit to David took place during Joab's absence proves conclusively that this meeting between David and Abner had been fully arranged beforehand through ambassadors.

83. Equally groundless is the theory of others that vers. 12–16 are an interpolation. It is impossible to believe that Abner would have begun his agitation among the elders in favour of David before he had concluded a secret agreement with David. 'Why should David send to Ishbaal for Michal when, as we learn from ver. 13, the marriage was to confirm the secret alliance which Abner was seeking with David?' 41 The answer is, that Paltiel would not have given up his wife, to whom he was so deeply attached (ver. 16), except at the bidding of his king—Ishbosheth. David insisted on the restoration of Michal as a preliminary to the negotiations with Abner. The only way to secure her restoration without using forcible means was for David to make a formal demand to Ishbosheth (ver. 14), and for Abner to press his weak master to accede to the demand of his powerful rival. The procedure must have been arranged secretly through the ambassadors.

41 S. A. Cook, AJSL., ibid., p. 149.
between David and Abner. That Abner accompanied Michal as far as Bâhurim (ver. 16 b) is only what we would expect, considering the rank of Michal and his own anxiety to secure the satisfaction of David's demand. Perhaps the arrival of Michal at Hebron coincided with the visit of Abner to David described in ver. 20. If so, vers. 17-19 a would be anterior to ver. 16, but this is not likely. Further, we need not be surprised that the narrator omitted to describe Michal's arrival at Hebron. For the whole Michal episode is given here not for its own sake, but only as a sequel to I. 18. 27; 19. 11-17; 25. 44, and as an introduction to II. 6. 16 ff.

84. The critics also declare ver. 30 to be an interpolation, without, however, giving a valid reason for this view. The verse may very well be by the hand of our author, and be intended as a summary of the narrative, after the usual fashion of Biblical writers, and also to explain that the murder was an act of blood revenge on behalf of the whole family. For this reason Abishai is coupled with Joab in the act. And though he did not actually assist in the murder, yet he must have been privy to Joab's design. That Joab did not act for himself alone, but for the whole of his family, is proved by the fact that David's curse is called down not only upon the head of Joab, but also upon the whole house of his father (ver. 29 a; cf. also ver. 39: בנה ע ieee).

85. (ch. 4.) Critics have failed to understand the meaning of 4. 2-3, and, as usual in such a case, have questioned the genuineness of these verses. Rimmon, as shown by his name, which is that of the Syrian storm god, was a Canaanite, or, more exactly, a Hivvite. When Saul destroyed the Gibeonites (21. 1) he must also have attacked their confederates, the Beerothites (cf. Josh. 9. 17, &c.).
Therefore the Beerothites with Rimmon among them fled to Gittaim, where they lived as gerim, retaining the name Beerothites. In the course of time the sons of Rimmon became officers of Ishbosheth, and ultimately murdered him, no doubt as an act of blood revenge. The writer describes them as הני ביניים. But as they were really Hivvites, he adds in self-correction that they are reckoned to Benjamin, not because they are Benjamites, but only because Beeroth is reckoned a part of Benjamite territory (ver. 2).

86. The critics hold ver. 4 also to be an interpolation. According to most of them, it stood originally after 9. 3 in the answer of Ziba to David's inquiry. But this is altogether improbable. The answers of Ziba to the king's questions in 9. 2, 4 are fittingly very brief. It is not likely that he would have launched forth into such a long statement about Mephibosheth as that contained in 4. 4 b without having been asked by the king to do so. Again, if our verse originally stood after 9. 3, why was it transferred here to a place which, according to the critics, is much less appropriate for it? There can be no doubt that our verse was placed here by the author, though he may have derived it from some old source. For 4. 1-4 is really introductory and preparatory to the narrative of the death of Ishbosheth and the accession of David to the throne of Saul (4. 5—5. 3). 4. 1 describes the state of alarm and confusion which followed on Abner's death, and emboldened the Beerothites to commit their nefarious deed. Vers. 2-3 describe the murderers, as introductory to vers. 5-12, while ver. 4 describes the helplessness of the sole remaining heir to Saul's throne. Because of this helplessness he failed to take possession of the vacant throne, and therefore the
tribes of Israel were forced to turn to David and invite him to become their king.\footnote{ Cf. Rashi, \textit{ad loc.}: מונה והולך איינן נשבת \textit{etc.}} This verse is, therefore, introductory to 5. 1–3, and as such is an integral and necessary part of the author's narrative.

\footnote{ Cf. Rashi, \textit{ad loc.}: מונה והולך איינן נשבת \textit{etc.}}

(\textit{To be continued.})
BACHER'S TRADITION AND TRADITIONISTS
IN THE SCHOOLS OF PALESTINE AND BABYLON.


This last, posthumously published work of the great talmudical scholar, the late Professor W. Bacher, deals, as its title indicates, with the teachings of the traditional Law and the manner in which it was studied and preserved in the various talmudical academies of Palestine and Babylon. It records the names of the teachers or groups of teachers by whom the vast bulk of the traditional teachings, Halakah and Haggadah, was discussed in the schools, brought from one school to another, and transmitted from generation to generation. It also describes the manner, the different forms and methods in which these traditional teachings were studied and arranged in the schools and communicated by one teacher to another, the various collections in which they were embodied, and how they have been preserved in the literature of Talmud and Midrash.

The work bears the sub-title, Studien und Materialien zur Entstehungsgeschichte des Talmuds. In this sub-title the object of the work is thus expressly stated to be, to present studies and material for the history of the genesis of the Talmud.

Now, as regards the studies in the genesis of the Talmud, which are contained in this work, most of them are found in other previous publications by the author. Thus, the first introductory chapter has been previously published in the Jewish Quarterly Review, vol. XX (1908), pp. 572–96. The third chapter
on the *Satzung vom Sinai* has been published in *Studies in Jewish Literature*, issued in honour of Dr. K. Kohler (Berlin, 1913), pp. 56-70. And the other studies and brief discussions of terms and forms are, with very few exceptions, repeated from other works by the author. What is new in this work, accordingly, is the material which it furnishes for a history of the genesis of the Talmud. The classification of the various forms, in which the traditional teachings have been preserved, and of the prominent teachers or group of teachers who transmitted these teachings, as well as the wealth of material which the author has brought together and grouped systematically under each of the various forms and around each name of a teacher or group of teachers, constitute the main contribution made by this work to the science of the Talmud. And it is a very valuable contribution. The knowledge of all these various forms, used in preserving the traditional teachings, and a chronological list of the teachers and schools who transmitted these teachings, are an indispensable aid to trace the growth and the development of the literature of the Talmud. Unfortunately, however, this work of Bacher's, which aims at giving us this knowledge, fails to meet the two essential requirements which are necessary to make such a work useful and valuable.

The value of such lists of forms and names, with the necessary passages accompanying them as illustrations, depends to a great extent upon the following two conditions. First, each heading on the list must be accompanied by an adequate discussion of its significance and a sufficient indication, at least, of the various questions connected with it. It must be pointed out what principle underlies the formula in question or the peculiar form of grouping or combination of names. It should be indicated what conclusions one can derive from them in regard to the literary history of the traditional law, to what stage in the development they belong, what redactional activity they represent or presuppose, and what, if any, bearing they have upon certain problems in the history of the genesis of the Talmud. Secondly, it is necessary that the material grouped around each rule or formula to furnish its illustrations should be complete, so that
one may be enabled to judge whether the conclusions arrived at in regard to the significance of that form are justified and supported by all, or most, of the passages in which this form is used or that formula occurs. For if the material is not exhaustive, no safe conclusion as to the significance of that form is warranted, since it may be a false generalization from only a few cases.

The work before us does not fulfil either one of these two important conditions. In most cases the author has furnished us merely with material without any accompanying discussion. He takes a certain formula or the name of a certain teacher or group of teachers and puts it as the heading of a chapter which contains nothing but a dry list of references to the passages in which this peculiar formula is used, or which belong to this teacher or group of teachers. But he does not at all comment on the significance of that formula or on the importance of the material transmitted by that teacher or group of teachers. He does not point out the conclusions which might be derived from it, nor does he even suggest the problems connected with it. And in those cases where some comments are made about the significance of the material, mostly in a few brief prefatory remarks, the discussion thus given is very inadequate.

This particular shortcoming of the work might perhaps be explained and excused on the possible supposition that the work, notwithstanding its sub-title, was perhaps primarily intended to furnish only the material necessary for the discussion of all these problems in connexion with the history of the genesis of the Talmud. Perhaps the author contented himself with merely bringing together the material and thus enabling others to study and examine it and draw from it the correct conclusions and base their theories upon them. But then, the other important condition ought to have been fulfilled. The material thus furnished should have been complete, which it is not. In the majority of the cases a very considerable and important part of the material is left out. In one or two instances the author states that the list of the passages furnished by him does not lay claim to completeness. But in all other instances he makes no such statement. And when one would assume, since nothing is said
to the contrary, that the material is complete, a closer examination shows that this is not the case.

In quite a few instances we find further not only that the material is not complete but, what is by far worse, the most important and most significant part of it has been omitted. Striking talmudic passages which illustrate the peculiar characteristics and significance of the formula in question are not cited, while some of the passages which are cited by the author are comparatively insignificant and do not point to the peculiarity of the formula or rule in question. Some of the passages are even incorrectly quoted and misinterpreted. The surprising fact about some of these inadequate illustrations is that they are found in the Talmud in close proximity to passages much more conclusive and suitable for the purpose. And one cannot help wondering why the author should have selected the comparatively unimportant and irrelevant passages and ignored the more cogent ones.

Limited space prevents me from discussing in detail all the various groups of material presented in this work. I can here discuss only a few of the questions treated in this work and cite a few illustrations from it, which will bear out my general criticism, that the work is lacking in the required adequate discussions of the problems with which it deals and is incomplete in the illustrative material which it offers.

Chapter XVII (pp. 171-92) deals with the formula נון אמאד, which is frequently used in the Tannaitic Midrashim to connect halakic teachings and haggadic sayings with the Scriptural passages from which they have been derived by means of a midrashic interpretation. The author gives us a list of all the passages in the Tannaitic Midrashim where the formula is used, and he classifies the halakic teachings thus introduced in three categories: (1) Such as are found in our Mishnah; (2) Such as are found in the Tosefta or in any of the Baraitot scattered in the Talmud; (3) Such as cannot be traced to any of the Tannaitic sources which have been preserved to us. This last category, the author rightly tells us (p. 172), 'deserves special attention'. But he does not give them this deserved special attention. He does not
at all discuss the significance of these quotations of halakic teachings with the formula נון מארס. He does not even suggest the question which might be raised in this connexion, namely, whether the redactors of the Halakic Midrashim referred with this formula, in the case of the first category, to our Mishnah, and, in the case of the third category, to a lost collection of tannaitic teachings, or perhaps in all three categories the redactors of the Tannaitic Midrashim had reference to one larger collection which contained all the sayings cited with נון מארס, even those which are now found in our Mishnah or in our Tosefta (comp. Frankel, Monatsschrift, 1853, pp. 393-4). These considerations are of great importance for the history of the genesis of the Talmud, as they have a distinct bearing upon the question what works or collections preceded the redaction of the works preserved to us. On the other hand, the author gives us (pp. 179-81) an additional list of passages in the Midrash Hagadol, in which the compiler quotes sentences from Maimonides' Mishneh Torah with the formula נון מארס. But this has nothing to do with the Tradition und Tradenten in den Schulen Palästinas und Babyloniens.

Chapters XX and XXI (pp. 222-54) deal with the various collections of Tannaitic traditions cited in the Babylonian Talmud. Among these various collections the one by R. Ḥiyya is first in importance. Apparently to point out the peculiar distinction of Ḥiyya and his collection, the author makes the following remark: 'We are even told of a "Tanna of the School of Ḥiyya" by the name of Aḥai who addressed a question to Ḥiyya himself' (p. 223), and he cites the passage in Berakot 14 a, "בראשית רבה יא, בהא ר' אסי מרא". But there is nothing unusual in the fact that there was a special Tanna in a certain school who would address a question to the head of the school. On the same page in the Talmud (Berakot 14 a) we are also told of a Tanna of the school of R. Ammi by the name of Ashyan, who addressed a question to R. Ammi himself: "בראשית רבה יא, בהא ר' אמי מרא". Yet R. Ammi is not even mentioned by our author in the list of names of the various teachers or heads of schools before whom a Tanna recited Tannaitic traditions (ch. XXIII).
In discussing Levi b. Sisi and his collection (p. 226), the author remarks that it is said in regard to some of the Tannaitic teachings contained in Levi's Baraita collection, that Levi reported them as Tannaitic teachings in his collection, and also expressed the very same teachings as his own opinions or sayings. In support of this statement of his the author cites the passage הל תוחמה אפר in Erubin 10a. But the passage is incorrectly quoted and misinterpreted. The passage in full reads thus: הל תוחמה אפר, and really means: He (i.e. Levi) taught this Tannaitic teachings in his Baraita collection, but, in commenting upon it, said that the accepted Halakah is not like this teaching.

This mistake is repeated by the author on p. 247, where he gives the same misinterpretation of the phrase הל תוחמה אפר as applied to Agra in Hullin 104b (comp. Rashi, ad loc., where it is expressly stated that the phrase הל אפר means 'he interpreted it').

In the list of Amoraim who transmitted Tannaitic teachings, either by simply reporting the saying of a Tanna and introducing it with רמא (chapters IX-X), or by quoting it from a collection of Tannaitic teachings and introducing it with ינא (chapters XXII-XXIII), I miss, especially, reference to the very interesting cases in which an Amora quotes an anonymous Tannaitic teaching, introducing it with the formula אין 'The Tannaim teach'. I know only of two such cases, one in Hagigah 25a, quoted by R. Eleazar, and the other in Niddah 49a, quoted by R. Assi.

The list of the sayings of Palestinian teachers which were brought to Babylon ought to have included also such sayings and teachings as are mentioned as having been sent from Palestine, though it is not stated who brought them, as, for instance, the teaching sent by R. Isaac b. Jacob in the name of R. Johanan (Hullin 104b), and all the sayings introduced with the formula שלוחה בפאת.

Chapters XXXVII-XXXVIII deal with the different versions of the reports about the authorship of certain teachings mentioned in the Babylonian Talmud. The differences between these
versions are merely in the names of the authors to whom certain teachings are ascribed. While the one version mentions the name of one teacher as the author of a certain saying, the other version ascribes the same saying to another teacher. These different versions are introduced either with the formula אַנְאֵי מִלְּעֶשֶׁת ‘And some say it’, or with the phrase אַנְאֵי הָאָדָם ‘And if you wish you may say it’. The author treats these two formulas separately, the אַנְאֵי מִלְּעֶשֶׁת passages in chapter XXXVII and the אַנְאֵי הָאָדָם passages in chapter XXXVIII. The distinction, however, which he makes between the two formulas is not quite distinct. As a matter of fact, there seems to be no difference between these two formulas which are both redactional in character. If a distinction is to be made, I would rather assume that by using the formula אַנְאֵי מִלְּעֶשֶׁת in referring to the second version, the redactor expresses his preference for the first version. While, when using the formula אַנְאֵי הָאָדָם, he indicates that he has no such preference, that they are simply alternative versions, and that both are equally indorsed by him.

As to the passages cited by the author, his remark on p. 530 seems to indicate that the list of the אַנְאֵי מִלְּעֶשֶׁת passages was meant to be complete, but, in fact, it is far from being so. The author classifies the differences between the two versions under different categories, as e.g. where the difference is in the name of the author's father, or in the name of the place where the author came from, &c. The main category, however, where the difference is in the names of the authors themselves, as, for instance, Megillah 16b, where one version has Tanhum and the other Assi; Moed 19a, where one version has Rab and the other Rabbah bar bar Hanah; or Yebamot 45a, where one version has Bar Kappara, and the other ‘The Elders of the South’; this category is altogether ignored by the author. I miss also another category, where the difference between the two versions is that the teacher who in the one version is mentioned as the one who reported or transmitted the saying, is mentioned in the other version as the one to whom the saying had been addressed, as, for instance, Moed 20a, in regard to the saying of R. Johanan, reported by, or addressed to, Hiyya b.
Abba. And even in the categories classified by the author, the list of the passages belonging to each is not complete.

In chapter XLII the author deals with another class of different versions recorded in the Babylonian Talmud, namely, the class pertaining not to the authorship, but to the teachings themselves, their contents, and their arrangements. And here again the treatment is very inadequate. These different versions deserve great attention, for, as the author rightly states on p. 578, they afford us an insight into the genesis and the development of the text of the Talmud. We would, therefore, have appreciated very much a discussion of their significance which, however, the author does not give us. But, aside from this, the material is not only incomplete, but, I regret to say, not even aptly selected. Thus, for example, the author cites the passage Moed katan 8a, as an instance where Mar Zutra is the author of a different version. But this instance is rather irrelevant, for the difference there consists merely in the omission of the name of Rab. On the other hand, the author might have quoted such passages as e.g. Pesahim 120a, where Mar Zutra is the author of a version so different that it presents discrepancies in the very contents of a teaching of Samuel and its attendant discussion. It is such illustrations that deserve our notice, for they point to distinct versions differing from one another in the teachings themselves, their arrangements, and the discussions connected with them.

The same fault is to be found with the author’s selection of the material to illustrate those different versions in the Talmud which are by anonymous teachers, and which are introduced by the phrase אֲמוּן הָמוֹהֵי ‘And there are some who state it’. Here the author cites but a few passages, and these are not even striking illustrations of the character of these different versions, while, on the other hand, very striking illustrations are ignored. Thus, for example, he quotes one such instance from Tractate Makkot 11a. But this instance is not an illustration of the different versions of Amoraic teachings. These different versions are comments upon different readings in the Mishnah which in turn may be rather opposed opinions than different versions. On the other hand, the author could have found in the same
tractate far better illustrations, as e.g. Makkot 4 b and 8 b. The latter, especially, is very important, for it represents a difference in the arrangement of the Amoraic discussions around Tannaitic teachings. Each one of the two versions in connexion with it contains a Mishnah text, the discussion of the same by three Amoraim, and the retracting by one of them of his former statement. Such different versions point to different collections of Amoraic sayings and discussions, or to earlier Gemaras, from which the redactors of our Gemara have drawn their material.

Similar striking illustrations might have been cited from other tractates, as for instance, to mention but one, Ketubbot 12 a, where both versions are of comparatively late origin since they include a saying of Ashi, and a comment upon it by another teacher, and where both versions are followed by a redactional remark about them which is probably from the final réda. But, above all, one cannot understand why the author mentions only such different versions as are introduced with the formula אֶלְכָּתָן דְּרֶמֶּה, and ignores all those different versions which are introduced with other similar formulas, as, for instance, אֶלְכָּתָן דְּרֶמֶּה הַלְּבָא הַשְּׁלֹה יִשְׁרַע Ketubbot 2 a, or אֶלְכָּתָן דְּרֶמֶּה פְּרַר אָגָרִי Makkot 9 a. It is especially surprising to find that the vast number of different versions introduced with the formula אֶלְכָּתָן דְּרֶמֶּה, which are found plentifully in every Tractate of the Talmud, are ignored by the author.

Even more inadequate is the treatment of those different versions found in the Babylonian Talmud which are introduced with the formula לַכְּשֶׁתָן אָדָרְוֵי, 'Another Version'. The author states (p. 589) that the introduction of these different versions belongs to the last and final redaction of the Talmud, by which he can only have reference to the activity of the Saboraim. For the history of the genesis of the Talmud it is of great importance to know the activity of the Saboraim and to what extent they contributed to the present text of the Talmud. We should, accordingly, have expected a complete list of all the tractates in which such לַכְּשֶׁתָן אָדָרְוֵי passages occur, as it is important to know in which tractates we can trace the activity of the Saboraim. At any rate, we certainly should have expected the author to cite
all such instances of the versions which bear out his statement that they belong to the last redaction of the Talmud, or to the activity of the Saboraim. But the material actually furnished by the author does not come up to our expectations. Not all the tractates in which versions occur are mentioned. I miss e.g. reference to tractate Sukkah (14 b) and to tractate Gittin (14 b) where such versions occur. And what is far worse, the instances cited by the author are very inaptly chosen.

The author quotes altogether only ten such versions, of which, however, only five are genuine, the other five being either spurious or at least doubtful. Thus, the one in Niddah 29 a is not found in the Munich MS. And even our editions have it only in parentheses and state in a marginal remark that some editions do not have it, i.e. versions do not have it, and in one of the manuscripts it is missing (see Rabbinovicz, Diḳduḳe Soferim, ad locum). The same is the case with the one in Hullin 119 a, which is also missing in one of the manuscripts (see Rabbinovicz, op. cit.). In Temurah 11 a the words are, according to Rashi, to be omitted (see Shit'ah Meḳubbeṣet, and the translation by R. Elijah Wilna, ad locum). In Temurah 11 b, likewise, the words are to be omitted according to Shit'ah Meḳubbeṣet, ad locum, and are, indeed, missing in the Munich MS. On the other hand, the author could have quoted ten genuine versions from the very first seven pages of the Tractate Temurah alone. Among these he could have pointed out such as are unmistakably of Saboraic origin, as e.g. the one on p. 7 a, which by its very language is marked to be of Saboraic origin (see Z. Frankel, in Monatsschrift, 1861, pp. 262–3).

I miss also in this work a presentation and discussion of those passages in the Babylonian Talmud in which an Amora reports a teaching in the name of the Gemara. The author merely states (on p. 21) that the phrase is used when a teaching is reported on the basis of an undefined tradition, the author of which was not, or could not be, ascertained.
He does not quote any such passage here, but merely refers to his work *Die exegetische Terminologie*, II, pp. 31 ff., where he has attempted to prove that this is the meaning of the term Gemara in the phrase מתחメインו הבנהרא. But in a work about *Tradition und Tradenten*, &c., the Talmudic passages containing such sayings reported מתחメインו הבנהרא ought to have been cited and discussed, for they certainly represent a very interesting and a specific form in which traditional teachings were transmitted by the Amoraim. Furthermore, these passages are of special significance for the history of the genesis of the Talmud. For, notwithstanding the arguments to the contrary, presented by Bacher in his *Terminologie, l. c.*, there is no valid objection to the theory that the term Gemara, in the phrase מתחメインו הבנהרא, refers to an actual collection of Amoraic discussions, that is, to an early Gemara, from which the Amoraim quoted these teachings. Rashi, in Kiddushin 53a, states expressly that the term מתחメインו הבנהרא refers to a definitely fixed earlier Gemara which was familiar to all the students of the academy, מתחメインו הבנהרא הבנהרא הכח על ביה הנביא (comp., however, Rashi, Yebamot 86a). Bacher himself explains the term Gemara in the phrase מתחメインו הבנהרא (Erubin 32b), as used by an Amora of the third generation, to mean such an early Gemara (*Terminologie*, II, p. 32; comp. also his essay on Gemara, in *Hebrew Union College Annual*, 1904, pp. 33-4). Why, then, could not later Amoraim have quoted sayings from that early Gemara? For all the sayings thus mentioned in the Talmud as quoted מתחメインו הבנהרא are reported by teachers not earlier than the fourth generation of Amoraim. Thus in Yoma 14b (33a) it is Abaye who reports such a statement מתחメインו הבנהרא. In Yebamot 86a and Kiddushin 53a, it is Aba the son of Raba. In Pesahim 115a, it is, according to the reading of R. Hananel, Raba, who reports the saying in the name of the Gemara. Our editions, it is true, have the name of Hillel instead of Raba. But this Hillel is certainly not the Patriarch Hillel I, as Bacher seems to assume. The saying quoted there, מתחメインו הבנהרא, contains the remark דרבניא לא דבר שם הוה הראורתיותא. The term בון, which means, the time after the destruction of the temple, would have been impossible in the mouth of Hillel I
If we accept the reading Hillel, it must be Rab Hillel (as is indeed found in one of the manuscripts, see Rabbinovicz, Dikduke Soferim, ad locum), and it is probably the same Rab Hillel who in Yeambot 21 b quotes to R. Ashi from a written collection of Amoraic teachings in regard to the Rabbinical laws about prohibited marriages. This Rab Hillel certainly could have quoted here a saying from an early Gemara, or a collection of Amoraic teachings in regard to the Pesah-ritual. The fact that a legend reports (Baba Kamma 61 a) that David also quoted sayings d'niTc'c'o, does not at all prove, as Bacher assumes (Terminologie, I. c.), that the phrase everywhere refers to an undefined tradition and not to an actual collection of an earlier Gemara. A legend in Berakot 18 b also reports that Benaiah b. Jehoiada read through the whole מֵסֶרַת דֵּבָרְךָ in a short winter day. And, certainly, no one would argue from this that when, in another passage of the Talmud, the מֵסֶרַת דֵּבָרְךָ is mentioned, it does not refer to an actual Tannaitic work by that name.

What has been said by way of criticism may seem ungracious, but it was meant, merely, to point out that the work before us, valuable a contribution as it is, is not complete, but rather an unfinished product. It should be noticed that the faults pointed out are, with very few exceptions, errors of omission rather than of commission. These omissions and mistakes are due to the sad fact that the author was overtaken by death before he could complete and revise his work.

The incompleteness of this work emphasizes, all the more, the great loss which Talmudic science sustained through the death of Bacher. For, had he been granted a few more years of life and activity, he, no doubt, would have so revised and completed his work as to give us an exhaustive presentation of all the material for a history of the genesis of the Talmud.

Jacob Z. Lauterbach.

Hebrew Union College.
STUDIES IN GERSHONIDES

By ISAAC HUSIK, University of Pennsylvania.

42. (L. 24, 2) = (K. 39, 2)

does not mean 'der Inhalt (sc. der Wahrnehmung)'. It means simply the matter, the series. The series begins with the powers residing in the elements, and concludes with the material intellect.

43. (L. 24, 8)

Bei der Seele (sc. an sich) jedoch oder bei einer ihrer Kräfte, die als Träger dieser Entelechie angenommen werden, findet sich keine Verbindung mit der Entelechie, obgleich sie bei einigen Lebewesen existiert (sc. die Seele).

This translation, by not putting the emphasis in the right place and by omitting the word דנה (10), which is essential, obscures the purpose of the passage in question.

The point is this. All agree that rationality is the specific difference, and hence proper form of man. It might appear, therefore, that Themistius’s view is correct that the material intellect is a form. And Alexander’s view is wrong. To this G. answers, in behalf of Alexander, that the proper form of man is not so much the material intellect, which is mere potentiality, as the soul as a whole or some one of its faculties, say the imagination, by virtue of the material intellect which resides in it. And if you object that this cannot be the case, for the soul or imagination is also found in animals, and hence cannot be the specific form of man, the answer is that in them (בهما, i.e. in VOL. VIII.)
lower animals) the soul is not combined with the capacity of receiving *intelligibilia*.

44. (L. 24, 14 ff.) = (K. 39, 25 ff.)

The parenthetical remarks of K. (ll. 28–30, ‘mithin . . . bildet’) make it appear that the paragraph in question is a continuation of the argument in the preceding paragraph based upon the idea of the specific difference (אברה). This is not so. It is a new argument referring back to L. 17, 20 ff. = K. 27, 27 ff.

45. (L. 24, 20) = (K. 40, 3)

_al lä noen העיניים באמה החכמה מתחלק_ does not mean ‘so hindert nichts,’ but ‘so that in our Entelechie folgende Disjunktion Platz greift’. _al lä noen העיניים מתחלק_ means that we cannot get away from the disjunction.

46. (L. 25, 9)

אוכל מוחי שיאמיטו שיווקו.Bean erhalten, ובעינייהו שיפור התחמק מתחמק, הוא הנחיה העיניים, ולפי מה שיראה אתול מה המשתמש, והוא שותה העד התחמקה העד לחמק, ההן לא נוכל בו לה sesión什么东西 על כל פנים, ויהו לא (שלא) תומיס מתחמקנו.

נוכל הנכה הוא شكית נפסד, ובעינייהו אוחד זה.

(K. 41, 11)

Wenn jedoch dadurch die Ansicht des Averroes bestätigt werden kann, dass sich bei der Annahme im Sinne des Themistius eine Absurdität ergibt, indem nämlich die erste Vollkommenheit in uns ewig, während die letzte vergänglich wäre, so wird hierdurch die Ansicht des Themistius nicht unbedingt beseitigt, denn es ergibt sich nicht aus unserer Annahme, dass der erworbene Intellect vergänglich ist,9 wie wir dies nachher erweisen werden.

The reader will notice that the italicized words in the German require the Hebrew text to read as follows: _שלא תומיס מתחמקנו_ ישועת העיניים הוא נכסד. As it is the text is not correct. The solution will be plain if we refer back to L. 18, 15 ff. = K. 29,

38 Italics mine.

39 Italics mine.
I and ff., where the argument here referred to is stated in full. It will be seen that the point of the contention against Themistius is this, that since according to him the *intelligibilia* have genesis, they must also be liable to destruction, on the authority of Aristotle, who says that הוה הנכשה בצל, whatever is subject to generation is also subject to dissolution. The point G. makes here is that the aforesaid argument does not completely refute Themistius for, as he will prove later, it does not follow from our assuming that the acquired intellect is subject to genesis (והוה) that it is also subject to dissolution (וכשה). The text should accordingly be emended to read ישלא והיה הכנה שהשלכ הנכשה והוה שׁיהוּה כֶּסֶר.  

47. (L. 25, 16) = (K. 41, 22)  

כפר והותכסים והותلجו is *περὶ οὐρανοῦ* and not *περὶ κόσμου*. Cp. above No. 32.  

48. (L. 25, ch. 4 beg.)  

והארל שוכבנינו ע)，ועון הקורימיו ע)，ועון השבל שלחובלו בני דאזXHR ושuridad  

המטסנינו היא בצל, רמאי שיתקור בע），ועון ירעת מֶּרְעָה ש），ועון ש），ועון  

ודעתי ערдуך בחל, אם הארל מוכס ואוזהו, ונחהלו החכורה מדעת נב  

ריהר, כי הוה אפר וחברה ש），ועון יורה נתן כפיל ואל ירעה למל  

ש），ועון מוכסני והשלכ שלחובלו בני  

(K. 41, ch. 4 *init.*)  

Nachdem wir nun die Ansichten der früheren Philosophen über das Wesen des Intellekts erwähnt und erwiesen haben, dass die Ansicht des Themistius absurd ist, müssen wir nun die einzeln übrigen Ansichten untersuchen, bis wir die richtige finden, sei es eine von ihnen oder eine andere. Wir beginnen nun unsere Untersuchung mit der Ansicht des Averroes; *denn er ist es, der da meint, die wichtigste dieser Ansichten sei, zu welchem Zwecke von Natur aus der hylische Intellekt existiert.*  

Comment here is unnecessary. I shall simply give the correct meaning of the overlined Hebrew text in question, which  

40 Italics mine.
corresponds to the italicized words in the German. ‘[We shall begin with the opinion of Averroes,] for his opinion seems to be the best of all those that may be found concerning the nature of the material intellect.’

49. (I. 25, 31)

Dass sie jedoch keinen Nutzen für das Leben der Körper haben, ist klar: Denn es ist nicht nur in ihnen kein körperlicher Vorteil, vielmehr haben sie (sc. die Philosophen) das Streben nach ihrem (sc. der Intelligibilia) Besitz — trotzdem sie das Gute (sc. das physische) des Lebens schmälern.\footnote{Italics mine.}

Here, too, it will be sufficient to put the correct translation instead of K.’s. The overlined words in the Hebrew mean simply that the effort made to acquire theoretical knowledge restrains (or narrows) the pleasures of life. There is nothing said so far about the philosophers.

50. (I. 27, 9)

Wäre nun der bylische Intellekt mit dem aktiven identisch — wie dies Averroes meint — so würde sich ergeben, dass auch die anderen Intelligibilia [der Einheit] (sc. תודעה)\footnote{Italics mine.} gleichzeitig potentiell und aktuell in ein und demselben Intellekte wären.

The italicized words in the German make no sense. The reason for this is that the manuscripts used by K. have a corrupt reading here ויתוהם (cp. K. 75, note 1), and the two printed
editions L. and Riva di Trento have another corrupt reading תורחא. But it does not require much ingenuity to see that a slight change of ר to ר in L. gives the correct reading תורחא in the sense of 'same'. המותוכלת תורחא לע ונם means 'the same identical intelligibility', just as השכל תורחא ביעז signifies 'the same identical intellect'. The meaning is now clear. According to Averroes, says G., the absurd conclusion would follow that the same identical intelligibilia are at the same time in potentia and in actu in one and the same intellect. Cp. below Nos. 124 and 125.

51. (L. 27, 29 ff.) = (K. 46, 1 ff.)

The words in question are:

למא יילוםเหมיה ויהשה קקה במרד השכל (31). MS. P 721, used by K. (cp. K. 46, note 1), reads קקה במרד במרד השכל. This K. renders (4 ff.):

'Denn nachdem die Wahrnehmung durch eine als Intellekt definierte Instanz gewonnen wird.'

This is incorrect. The argument is this. According to Averroes the absurd conclusion follows that the same thing has two different definitions. For while it is true that we use the same term מכונה (comprehension) in defining material intellect as well as in defining Active Intellect, it means different things in the two cases. The material intellect comprehends sublunar intelligibilia, whereas the Active Intellect comprehends itself. We have, therefore, two distinct definitions for the same thing, since according to Averroes the material intellect is identical with the Active Intellect.

This will make clear what the words מכונה והשם קקה במרד השכל mean. The word מכונה, according to the reading of MS. P 721, is essential. It is intended to be opposed to מ"פ. The term מכונה (comprehension) as used (השם) in the definition of השכל (intellect) is used to represent its meaning (מכונה), and not merely as a name or term (מכונה). Hence, though verbally the two intellects have the same definition, really they have two. Hence they cannot be identical, as Averroes holds.

43 Italics mine.
52. (L. 28, 5 ff.) = (K. 46, 19 ff.)

The words in question are,

(6) ... which K. (22) renders:

Entweder begreift er sich deshalb überhaupt nicht, weil er ständig mit uns verbunden ist.\(^{44}\)

This is incorrect. \(\text{זך} \) is an Arabism, and means 'as long as'. G. says, in interpreting Averroes, 'Either he means that the Active Intellect does not comprehend itself at all, as long as it is combined with us, or ...'

53. (L. 28, 8 ff.)

... oder er begreift sich ständig, aber er begreift sich nicht von seiten seiner Verbindung mit uns, wohl aber von seiten seiner selbst — dann aber \(^{45}\) ständige denne Meinung auf ein und derselben Stufe mit der Meinung dessen, der da sagt: Wer zu einer bestimmten Zeit ein Haus baut, baut es nicht, insofern er ein Mensch ist, sondern insofern der Bauplan in seiner Seele existiert; "nicht insofern er ein Mensch ist", denn nicht jeder Mensch ist ein Baumeister (sc. der akt. Intellekt wäre dann ebenso einer Veränderung unterworfen, wie sich der gewöhnliche Mensch zum Baumeister verändern kann).\(^{46}\)

The parenthetical lines italicized in the German are uncalled for and serve to obscure G.'s meaning. G. is so far not objecting to Averroes's opinion, he is merely trying to interpret it. Averroes says, 'The Active Intellect does not comprehend itself per accidens, in so far as it is combined with us'. Before criticizing this opinion, G. wants to know precisely what the words mean.

\(^{44}\) Italics mine.  \(^{45}\) Italics mine.  \(^{46}\) Italics mine.
They are capable, he says, of two interpretations. The meaning may be that as long as the Active Intellect is combined with us it does not perceive itself at all (see No. 53). Or Averroes's words may mean that the Active Intellect does indeed perceive itself always, but not qua combined with us. This, G. thinks, may not be clear to the reader, so he gives an illustration. When a man is engaged in building, we say he is building not qua man, for in that case it would follow that every man must be building, which is not true. He is building, we say, qua builder, i.e. in so far as the idea of building is in his mind. So here the Active Intellect when combined with us, does perceive itself, but it does so not qua combined with us, but in so far as it is in its essence the Active Intellect.

This is all that G. says at this point. The criticisms of Averroes's view, on either interpretation, are given in the sequel, and the analogy of the building man is not referred to again. This proves, if any proof were needed, that its introduction is not meant as a reductio ad absurdum, but merely as an illustration of a subtle distinction, which might not otherwise be clear. It follows, therefore, that K.'s rendering of ... \(\text{dann aber}^{47}\) stände diese Meinung ... (26) is incorrect and misleading, because it suggests a criticism, whereas G. is only giving an illustration.

54. (L. 28, 12 ff.) = (K. 47, 1 ff.)
The same error as in No. 53, q.v.

55. (L. 31, 30)
\(\text{wco shewi 6rbc ov ov blltj 6w6, vbcr ov6 6v6 ov6 ov6, ov6 xq6, dlvl} \)

\(\text{shewi blltj 6w6 6w6}. \)

\(47\) Italics mine.
Derartiges aber entsteht nicht, und es wurde ja angenommen, dass ein solches Entstehen verfehlt ist, ich meine dass das nicht-entstandene entstanden ist.

The italicized portion is incorrect. The Hebrew quoted above should be translated as follows:

'What is of this character is not subject to genesis. But we assumed that it is subject to genesis. We are therefore landed in an absurdity (שך ה), namely, that which is not subject to genesis is subject to genesis.'

56. (I. 32, 24)

This translation is meaningless, and does not represent the statement of G. What he says is this, that according to the view of the 'moderns' (חמתיים), it would follow that there is no connexion between the perception of the senses, and the comprehension of the intellect, or rather (to be more literal), that the perception of the senses exercises no impression upon the comprehension, the consequence being (והי ה) that it is just as possible to comprehend things not perceived by us with the senses as things that have been so perceived.

K.'s mistake was that he did not understand that the particle דע (25) denotes logical consequence, and followed the punctuation, or lack of punctuation, of I. too implicitly. There should be a pause after לשה (25), as indicated above.  

48 Italics mine.
Nachdem nun die Annahme als absurd erwiesen ist, dass der Träger der Entelechie ein *Intellekt* ist, müssen wir untersuchen, wie es sich mit ihrem Träger überhaupt verhält, denn die Poten-
tialität ist etwas, das eines Trägers bedarf. Offenbar bleibt nichts anderes übrig, als dass ihr Träger ein *Körper* oder eine *Seele* ist, denn ein viertes Sein gibt es *unter dem Sublunarischen* (K. 63, ch. 5 *init.*).

Unter dem Sublunarischen’ is gratuitous. Sometimes has that meaning, but not always, as K. seems to think. Here the classification of being (כינוי תחתו) under three heads—body (שם), soul (נפש), intellect (שכל)—is not confined to the sublunar world. It embraces all existence. Cp. above No. 30.

... denn es ist nicht die Weise der Formen, dass die einen Träger der anderen sind, *wohl aber entspricht es dem Wesen ihres* functionellen Seins, dass die einen Träger für [die] anderen sind; *denn* die Materie nimmt die einen durch Vermittlung der anderen auf.

The italicized words are incorrect. G. says, ‘Forms cannot be the bearers of other forms. When we ordinarily say that certain forms bear others, we mean (יהיו עוצבים) that the *matter* receives some forms through the mediation of other forms’.

49 Italic mine. 50 Italic mine.
59. (L. *ibid.* 19)

Und da die prima materia (die prima materia) einige Formen unmittelbar (in der Form) bei ihrer Aufnahme der Elementenformen rezipiert ... 

K.'s error here is due to a corrupt reading in the text. Instead of *knbol * read *knbol *. The reception on the part of prime matter of the forms of the elements (knbol *zorot ha-seferoth*) is an example of immediate reception (knbol *zorot ha-seferoth*).

60. (L. *ibid.* 20 f.)

... einige aber mittelbar (ba-seferoth), wie dies bei den Formen der Homoiomeren (de-omerim ha-kelim) der Fall ist, die aus den Elementen zusammengesetzt sind, und bei dem was darauf an Formen folgt, ich meine, auch *hierbei* empfängt sie (sc. die prima materia, der Stoff, die einen durch die anderen ... 

The word ‘auch’ (11) is clearly out of place here, and obscures G.'s meaning. These last instances are examples of mediate reception (knbol *ba-seferoth*), as the reception of the forms of the elements was an example of immediate reception (knbol *zorot ha-seferoth*).

61. (L. *ibid.* 25)

Dass jedoch die Entelechie nicht zu jenen Formen gehört, welche die prima materia unmittelbar aufnimmt, lässt sich aus

\[51 \text{ Italics mine.} \quad 52 \text{ Italics mine.}\]
Folgendem beweisen: *Es entspricht nämlich dem Charakter der Formen (sc. soweit sie Einheit stiften), dass von ihnen kein (sc. einzelner) zusammengesetzter Körper abstrahiert wird.*

What K.'s translation, as italicized, means, I confess I do not know, but it is quite certain that it does not in the least approach the quite simple meaning of G. What the latter says is this. Having divided forms, so far as their relation to prime matter is concerned, into two kinds, those which the prime matter receives immediately and those which it receives meditately (see No. 60), he now tries to prove that the material intellect cannot belong to the first class of forms, for it is the characteristic of *these* forms that no composite body can be free from them. And he gives as an example the forms of the elements, namely the warm, the cold, the wet and the dry. These forms belong to the first class (cp. No. 60), and no composite body is without these four qualities, for it is by means of these that the composite body in question receives its own specific form. Now, then, if the material intellect belonged to this class of forms, all composite bodies would be possessed of a human intellect, which is absurd.

This leads us to consider another error of K. in making an erroneous choice between two variant readings, which we shall treat in the next number.

62. (L. 35, 27)

So kann beispielsweise keiner der zusammengesetzten Körper von den Formen *ihrer (sc. der sie konstituierenden)*\(^{54}\) Elemente, der Hitze und Kälte, der Feuchtigkeit und Trockenheit, abstrahiert werden, weil sie (sc. die zusammengesetzten Körper) die Form, die sie empfangen, durch Vermittlung dieser Formen (sc. der Verbindungsformen) empfangen.

\(^{53}\) Italics mine.  \(^{54}\) Italics mine.
The point is not of great importance, and for want of a better the reading of L. (28) can be kept. But there seems no doubt in my mind that, the reading of MS. P 722 (cp. K. 64, note 2), is the correct one. The reading would be: ... No composite body can be free from the forms of the elements (fire, air, water, earth), which are (שהם) the warm and the cold and the wet and the dry.

63. (L. 36, 2) = (K. 65, 13)

'Perzeption' is evidently a slip for 'Aufnahme', corresponding to the Hebrew קובלו.

64. (L. 37, 11)

Dass jedoch der hylische Intellekt mehr als einen aktiven Intellekt besitzen soll, ist offenbar absurd. Denn das eine Agens, soweit es ein solches ist, kann nicht durch sich selbst Eines sein, sondern nur durch ein (sc. anderes) Agens, und dieses ist Gott. Es müsste denn sein, dass der eine (sc. vermeintliche aktive Intellekt) den andern bedient (sc. dann wäre die Annahme einer Vielheit von a. I. zulässig), wie dies bei einer Hauptarbeit gegenüber den ihr subordinierten Arbeiten der Fall ist. Wenn es sich aber so verhielte, so würde gleichfalls jedes einzelne Agens von dem numerisch einen Agens ressorieren, nämlich von der Hauptarbeit; denn sie ist es, welche die ihr unterstellten Arbeiten zu diesem (sc. Hauptagens) hinleitet.

65 Italics mine.
66 Italics mine.
Here one feels like saying, in the words of Gersonides, begad (בֶּהָדוֹן), this is unpardonable! There are several mistakes here, one as inexcusable as the other. In the first place K. fails to distinguish between בַּעֲלוֹת as a noun (better written בַּעֲלוֹת = work, act, activity, and בַּעֲלוֹת as a participle = agent. And in the second place he mistakes the interjectional use of בָּאַלְאוֹת (= Ltr. בָּאַלְאָל, בָּאַלְלָל) = begad, for a real reference to God. These two mistakes render part of K.'s translation unintelligible.

What G. says is this: That the material intellect should have more than one active intellect influencing it is absurd. For a given unitary activity (רָדְוַתָהוֹת) in so far as it is one thing cannot essentially (וּבָנְנֶנֶנְנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶn) be the result of more than one agent (טָאְרִי). Unless, begad (רָדְוַתָהוֹת), we have a series of acts in which one controls the other, as is the case in the relation of the principal or architectonic art to its subordinate arts (cp. Arist., Nikom. Ethics, i. ch. 1). But it is not really true in this case either that a single act is the result of more than one agent, for here too the entire work really comes from one agent, namely the principal art, for it is the latter that controls and directs the arts which are subordinate to it. And then comes an illustration. The work of cutting beams pertains to the art of carpentry. The making of a ship out of these beams comes under the art of shipbuilding, which is the principal art here. It might appear then that the work of cutting beams is controlled by two agents, the carpenter and the shipbuilder, but this is true only per accidens (כְּמַכָּרָה). Essentially (בָּנְנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶנֶn), there is only one agent, the shipbuilder, though he does his work through the carpenter.

Not to dwell too much on this passage, it will suffice to indicate two other passages in the sequel where K. mistook בַּעֲלוֹת for בַּעֲלוֹת. They are K. 68, 27, 'ein Agens' (= L. 37, 23), and 31, 'die Realisation dieses Agens' (= L. ibid., 25) for וה parametros.
(K. 69, 24)
... während die entgegengesetzte Annahme nicht möglich ist.

MS. O, K. tells us (p. 69, note 3), reads חַלְחוּב instead of חַלַח, and he follows the MS. There is no doubt in my mind that L. has the correct reading, and the meaning is, 'This is an impossible contradiction'. The context supports this translation (cp. below No. 86).

66. (L. 38, 13)

67. (L. 39, 18)

(K. 70, 16)
... oder wie das Verhältnis des sinnlich wahrnehmbaren zu der Form des an

(K. 74, 5)

Wenn es sich aber so verhält, so macht offenbar der aktive Intellekt das potentielle Intelligible in der vorstellenden Form nur dann zu einem aktuellen, wenn er an der vorstellenden

57 Italics mine.
Form die generelle Natur unter den hylischen Attributen hervorhebt. Und da er diese Auswahl trifft, so muss er sie auch begreifen, sonst ware seine Auswahl nur akzidentell. Wäre aber diese seine Auswahl nur akzidentell, so würde in ihnen das Normale nur selten sich realisieren, was offenbar absurd ist. (Teleologisches Motiv: Die Entwicklung des Potentiellen zum Aktuellen, d.h. das Normale, käme nur selten zur Geltung).

The translation of Ἑνόμενον (L. 23) by ‘Normale’ gives, it seems to me, a peculiar biological twist to the argument, which is not there. Ἑνόμενον here means ‘correctness’, the ‘correct selection’, the true view or idea. It is a question here of knowledge pure and simple. The active intellect enables the material intellect to derive general notions from the forms in the imagination (Ῥώμα τῆς ῥηματικῆς = φαντασία or φάντασμα), which are concrete. This the active intellect does by picking out from the concrete φάντασμα its universal features, and presenting them, so to speak, ready-made to the material intellect. Now, says G., the active intellect must know these general notions which it picks out, or its picking out would be purely accidental, and if so it would more often make mistakes than not. It would rarely get the correct notion, and the material intellect would be for the most part harbouring erroneous concepts, ideas, and judgements, which is not true.

68. (L. 39, 25)

וזה כי בהכר יתקנו ששתלץ עליה דבר מודר בישון המר על כה
(K. 74, 18)

Denn die eine Sache kann nur dann vollständig aus der anderen abstrahiert werden, wenn die abstrahierte Sache allein begriffen wird.

This translation is quite incorrect. G. says nothing of the sort. He merely points out, as the sequence of the argument requires and the following illustration shows, that it is quite possible (メント ἤν) to pick out one thing out of another even if one knows only the thing he wants to pick out, and does not know what the thing is out of which he does the picking.

58 Italics mine. 59 Italics mine.
Ferner finden wir, dass der aktive Intellekt Dinge mitteilt, die gar keine vorstellenden Formen, durch welche sie potentiellen Charakter erhalten, besitzen.

The phrase "hier das" is incorrectly rendered. The passage says, "We find that the active intellect also communicates (to the material intellect) things which have no "fantasial" forms in which they reside potentially'.

Und ferner: Das Licht macht die Farben, die potentiell akzidentell sichtbar waren, nur in aktueller Weise sichtbar; denn dies tritt nur ein, wenn es das durchsichtige Mittlere so einrichtet, dass die Farben in ihm in bestimmter Weise aktuell sind . . .

The word "cação" pertains not to "hier das", as K. makes it, but to the verb "sein". The point of the argument is that the active intellect cannot be compared to light, for their actions are different. Light is an agent of visibility per accidens only, whereas the active intellect must be an agent of intelligibility per se (in seyn).

The Hebrew expression corresponding to the Greek το κρυσταλλοκιδίς ἕγγον (= Ar. הלרה לגדתה) is מֵאֶעֶרֶתָה. The Greek for "hier das" is μετατιθεμένος διαφανείς, which does not denote the eye, but the medium between the

60 Italic mine.

71. (L. 41, 4)

K. (77, 18) translates:

Denn er ist den Teilen (sc. den physischen) gleichartig.

οὐσία here as elsewhere denotes the same as the Greek ὅμοιομερῆ (cp. Arist. περὶ ζῴων μορίων, ii. 2, p. 647 b 13), i.e. the homogeneous substances composed of the four primary qualities or of the elements, such as blood, bone, flesh, &c.

The same criticism applies to K. 78, 12, ‘ein den Teilen Gleichartiges’ = L. 41, 15 ἀλλὰ ὡς μαθαίνουσα τὰ κατάλειπον.

72. (L. 41, 23) = (K 78 fin.)

does not qualify μαθαίνουμεν as K. understands it, ‘die zu ihm (sc. dem Seelenwesen) durch Vermittlung der natürlichen Organe in Beziehung steht’, but ἀναφέρεται. G. is speaking of the difference between the intellectual power in question and the power which acts in the body of the living being. The former does its work without a material organ, the latter with one.

73. (L. 42, 19) = (K. 81, 2)

or according to MS. P 722 (K. 81, note 1) ὡς ἀναφέρεται, K. renders ‘aktiven menschlichen Intellekte’, and in a note he adds, ‘Zum Unterschiede von dem göttlichen heisst es hier: ’

All this is not clear to me. What is meant by ‘dem göttlichen’? If it is the heisst es hier: we have been discussing all along, what does K. denote by his ‘aktiven menschlichen Intellekte’? Or does K. perhaps mean by ‘göttlicher’ God? Then ‘aktiver menschlicher Intellekt.’

61 Italics mine.
would indicate the intellect that has all along been called '?
. But then the question arises, why this change of name all
of a sudden? There is no more reason for distinguishing the
active intellect from God here than in all the other places where
the term was used. There is no discussion here about God, and
the term 'is so fixed in its signification that there could
be no doubt about its meaning.

The meaning of ' as I understand it, is the same
here as it is everywhere else in Jewish philosophy, namely, the
'practical intellect', as opposed to 'theoretical or
speculative intellect. We need not go beyond the Cusari of Judah
Halevi to prove this well-known statement. He says that
.. and that ' has always been considered as the
active intellect and the term ' is so fixed in its
signification that there could be no doubt about its meaning.

G. in our passage is giving another example of his state-
ment that an intellect has two activities, one is self-consciousness,
and the other the exerting an influence over a corporeal object.
One illustration was taken from the movers of the heavenly bodies,
and the other from the practical intellect in man.

74. (L. 42, 22)

Und ferner gilt von dem Entstehenden: Wenn wir zugeben,
that es sich durch eine seelische Kraft im Samen vollzieht, so

Chazari, V, 12, p. 319, 11-14, ed. Hirschfeld.
The italicized lines are in each case open to question. In the first passage K. did his best to render the existing text from the context, the language of the Hebrew words just quoted do not very well bear the meaning given them by K. We should expect instead of and where only and the text as it is seems to be corrupt, for we expect a predicate for which is not here. Now it is possible, though K. does not say so, that his manuscripts read differently, but I doubt that they have the reading suggested above. And my reason is the sequence of the argument. As I understand it, G. does not say that the prime matter must go on receiving form after form until it realizes the end of the process of generation, viz. the production of unity. He says something quite different. Since the prime matter receives the different forms not at haphazard and in disconnexion, but receives one form as a preparation for the next

63 Italics mine. 
64 Italics mine.
it follows that the entire process of receiving forms on the part of prime matter from the beginning to the end is *one* process of generation, and not many. But *one* process, in so far as it is one, must come from *one* cause, hence the general agent of all the forms must be one.

If this interpretation is correct, I should emend the text of L. as follows:

The last two words are the predicate of שֶׁשֶׁהָיָה, which is desiderated. If K. had a different reading in his manuscript, I am willing to hazard the opinion that it was the one suggested, or something very close to it.

As to the word "endlichen" (24), K. translates it 'endlich', but does not give his reason for this rendering. Surely here, if anywhere, a note would have been in order. The word is not frequent. The truth of the matter is that "endlichen" has nothing to do with 'endlich', and K.'s misunderstanding of its meaning led him astray, and his translation of the following sentence is wide of the mark.

It is here equivalent to the Aristotelian ὅσ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ = ἀναµένω, that which happens normally and in the majority of cases. It is a familiar idea in Aristotle that that which happens by necessity takes place always (ἀεὶ) or as a general rule (ὅσ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ); whereas that which happens by accident (κατὰ συμβεβηκός) is neither invariable nor frequent, but rare and fortuitous. Thus in the *Metaphysics*, xi. 8, p. 1064 b 32, we read πάντα φανερά εἶναι τὸ μὲν ἄεὶ καὶ εἶς ἀνάγκης . . . τὸ δὲ ὅσ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ, τὸ δὲ οὐθὲ ὅσ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ οὐτ' ἄεὶ καὶ εἶς ἀνάγκης ἀλλ' ὅπως ἐτιχεῖν . . . ἐστὶ δὴ τὸ συμβεβηκός ὃ γέρνεται μὲν, οὐκ ἄεὶ δὲ οὐθ' εἰς ἀνάγκης οὐδ' ὅσ ἐπὶ τὸ πολὺ.

Gersonides makes use of this principle in our case. He says, this unitary agent which we have just proved must have a knowledge of the end for which the various things in our world have come into being. Otherwise the agent's realization of the perfection intended in the life of the world would be accidental. But this is impossible in a world where the process of generation is normal and regular (הָדוֹס בְּלָה יֶאֶשׁ בְּאָמָּה יְאָשׁוּר אִבֵּר הַע); particularly
so since we observe in many cases that the process is the very best possible for the attainment of the purpose intended.

Now "מרא" is not the usual word for the Aristotelian ως ἐπὶ τῷ πολύ. הַן לְעַל הָרָה is the form commonly used, or בַּרְכָּה. Thus in the Hebrew translation of Themistius's commentary on Aristotle's Περὶ Οὐρανοῦ (De Coelo), ed. Landauer, p. 57 ("ם"), 1. 5, we read:

יִדְעֵהוּ יִתְנַהוֹשׁ יָסְדִכִּים ( = ἀπὸ τοῦ αὐτομάτου) (ὁμόνοιο ὁντων) ( = ἀπὸ τῆς ἰδέας) (= ἀπὸ τὸ πολύ) Một về Bőrbő

Nevertheless it will be quite clear that "מרא" here has the same meaning as "עַל הָרָה": if we refer to the בַּרְכָּה of the Karaite Aaron ben Elijah. In the eighty-third chapter of that work he argues in favour of Providence and against the who hold that the world happened by chance. Aristotle, he says in criticism of this view, has refuted this opinion by showing that while particular incidents in our world may be due to chance, the whole cannot, for accidental events are neither invariable (תמייר = ἀεί) nor normal and regular (טמאיר = ως ἐπὶ τῷ πολύ), whereas we observe events which are invariable as well as others which are normal and regular. Examples of invariable events are the heat of the sun and the fall of the stone. An example of regular events is the normal form of the individuals of a given species. Here is the passage in the original Hebrew (p. 108 fin.):

אֵן־מֶה־דוֹחַ הָאָמָר הָאוֹם בֵּיתָו אֵֽזִיר שֶׁאֵֽזִיר פָּרַוֲסָה הָיָֽה נְפָלָא

The term אַרְכּוֹרָה corresponds to the Arabic אַרְכּוֹרָה and is found also in Maimonides, Guide, II, ch. 20, which is no doubt the source of the passage quoted from Aaron b. Elijah. Cp. Munk, Guide, ad loc., also ibid., I, p. 300, note 2.
75. (L. 43, 18)

K. (83, 2) renders this:

'Die Zahl *begreift* in Wahrheit die Seinsarten 65 soweit sie mit der Materie verknüpft sind.'

The true meaning of the Hebrew is, 'Number attaches to (is an attribute (דַּיְוֶה) of) essences in so far as they reside in matter'.

76. (L. 44, 7)

Und ferner: Die Fähigkeit, die der prima materia für die Aufnahme der menschlichen Formen eigen ist, *nämlich ihr Heraustreten zur Aktualität*, 66 charakterisiert sich als die Entstehung einer Einheit, 66 denn sie bedeutet ein Fortschreiten zur Vollendung der Einheit, 66 wie vorausgeschickt wurde. Die Entstehung der Einheit 66 als solcher erfordert unbedingt die Einheit des Agens.

K. puts the phrase 'Die Fähigkeit' in apposition with 'habe Asche Lohn' as if the potentiality or capacity of receiving the human form were the same as its actualization—'Die Fähigkeit . . . namentlich ihr Heraustreten.' This does not make sense, and G. does not say it. He says, the actualization of the capacity constitutes a unitary process of generation (die Entstehung der Einheit). 'Die Entstehung einer Einheit' is not a precise translation of *Entstehung* der Einheit. Nor is Vollendung der Einheit the same as *Vollendung* der Einheit. The latter means, one purpose.

77. (L. 44, 12)

He says, the actualization of the capacity constitutes a unitary process of generation (die Entstehung der Einheit). 'Die Entstehung einer Einheit' is not a precise translation of *Entstehung* der Einheit. Nor is Vollendung der Einheit the same as *Vollendung* der Einheit. The latter means, one purpose.
Offenbar können wir nun nicht annehmen, dass die aus den Sphären emanierte Seele (sc. das Agens für die aussermenschlichen Dinge) den aktiven Intellekt in seiner Tätigkeit unterstützt, denn der active Intellekt bedarf für seine Tätigkeit nicht dieser vermittelnden Funktion, nämlich eines Intellekts; denn in derselben Weise, in der diese Funktion durch den Mittler vollendet wird, wird sie auch von dem aktiven Intellekte perfekt. *Doch* ist dies nur bei solchen Arbeiten möglich, die der Mensch verrichtet, um sich die Last und Mühe zu erleichtern. Aber bei dem separaten Intellekte, dessen Tätigkeit sich überall, wo man *ihn* aufnehmen kann, ohne Mühe und Last realisiert, kann man es sich nicht vorstellen, dass er seine Tätigkeit durch ein Mittleres vollzieht — er müsste denn für diese Tätigkeit ein bestimmtes *Organ zur Vermittlung* nötig haben, *nicht aber ein Primäres* (sc. einen Intellekt, wie dies der Fall wäre, wenn die aus den Sphären emanierte Seele eine Mittlerrolle für den aktiven Intellekt übernehme).* Auf solche Art lässt Gott viele Tätigkeiten durch Vermittlung der Beweger der Himmelskörper verrichten: weil sie als Organe die Sterne besitzen, können durch sie viele solcher Funktionen verrichtet werden. Was jedoch die *hier* in Rede stehenden Intellekte betrifft, so haben diese erwiesenermassen für die Ausübung ihrer Funktion kein anderes Organ als die in

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67 Italics mine. 68 Italics mine.
It was necessary to quote the entire passage in order to make intelligible the remarks which follow. The crucial words are those overlined in the Hebrew, "אֶּלָּמַה הַבַּעַרְךָ הַרַּעְקַת אֵלֶּה מַה הַבַּעַרְךָ הַרַּעְקַת אֵלֶּה מַה הַבַּעַרְךָ הַרַּעְקַת אֵלֶּה מַה הַבַּעַרְךָ הַרַּעְקַת אֵלֶּה מַה הַבַּעַרְךָ הַרַּעְקַת אֵלֶּhé כְּלָל הַבַּעַרְךָ הַרַּעְקַת אֵלֶּhé כְּלָל הַבַּעַרְךָ הַרַּעְקַת אֵלֶּhé כְּלָל הַבַּעַרְךָ הַרַּעְקַת אֵלֶּhé כְּלָל הַבַּעַרְךָ הַרַּעְקַת אֵלֶּhé כְּלָל הַבַּעַרְךָ הַרַּעְקַת אֵלֶּhé כְּלָל H Athletic, which are troublesome, especially the last four words לא מתע ה ואת לא מתע ה ואת לא מתע ה ואת לא מתע ה ואת לא מתע ה ואת לא מתע ה ואת לא מתע ה ואת לא מתע ה ואת לא מתע H Athletic. The meaning given to these words by K. is not warranted by the words themselves and does not make a satisfactory link in G.'s argument. There is no warrant for taking רָאִי in the sense of intellect—none whatever. To contrast רָאִי with רָאִי, as K. understands it, is altogether an unlikely mode of expression for G. Moreover, what does this remark then contribute to the argument? 'An abstract intellect cannot be conceived as doing his work through the medium of something else unless he needs for his work an instrument as a medium, but not an intellect!' This is an ipse dixit for which no reason is given. Nay, it is contradicted by G. himself in the immediate sequel. For he goes on to say that God does make use of the movers of the heavenly bodies in doing his work. Hence God's intellect uses other intellects as intermediate agents. Clearly there is something wrong here. And the peculiar thing is that K. had the solution in manuscript P 722, of which he did not avail himself. I mean the reading לא מתע אֵלֶּה אֵלֶּה לא מתע אֵלֶּה אֵלֶּה instead of לא מתע אֵלֶּה אֵלֶּה אֵלֶּה אֵלֶּה אֵלֶּה אֵלֶּה אֵלֶּה אֵלֶּה. The rest of the reading of that manuscript is clearly corrupt, but the words quoted give us the key to a right understanding of G. He is trying to show that the 'soul emanating from the spheres' (שְׁמוֹ הַבַּעַרְךָ הַרַּעְקַת אֵלֶּה אֵלֶּה אֵלֶּhé כְּלָל H Athletic, which, according to Aristotle, controls plants and animals (L. 41, 1-2; K. 77, 11-14), is identical with the active intellect. He proved before that there cannot be two independent intellects exerting an influence on the sublunar world, for the life processes here are really a single process, and
hence must be due to one principal agent. There is still a possibility that there may be two intellects placed over the sublunar world, the ‘soul’ above mentioned, and the Active Intellect, but that the former is subordinate to the latter, so that the Active Intellect makes use of the ‘soul’. This too is impossible, says G., for the Active Intellect needs no other intellect to assist him. The work the assistant would do, the Active Intellect can do himself. It is different with a human being. He has to exert pain and effort to do his work, hence he often uses another person to help him. But a separate intellect does not exert any effort or toil in doing his work. Whenever and wherever the recipient is ready to receive the influence of the intellect, it comes without any effort. Hence we cannot conceive of an intellect using another intellect to assist him—unless the principal intellect has need of an instrument which the subordinate intellect has and he (the principal) has not (אלא עביד את הרוח נוירון מהoho המה לא אטמציע את ההרשע). In that case it is conceivable that one intellect may use another to do certain work. It is in this way in fact that God makes use of the movers of the heavenly bodies to do certain things because they have the requisite organ, viz. the star, for doing those things. In our case, however, it is clear that the only instrument or organ used by the intellects in question to do their work is the capacity inherent in the temperamental mixture of the thing receiving the influence by means of the stars. But this instrument is just as much at the disposition of one intellect as of the other, for we cannot say that the one intellect does move the heavenly bodies and the other does not. It follows then that there is only one intellect controlling the sublunar world, hence the ‘soul’ and the active intellect are identical.

‘Ihn’ (K. 85, 32) should be changed to ‘sie’. referring to ‘Tätigkeit’, corresponding to the Hebrew הבנול השתייה מעולהה הביאה옵ון שויין בכל אולם אאתה.

78. (L. 44, fin.)

וניאו שם וחונגו שליחוה לאחור ממלא כל, הנה לא יחויי וייחוי אל השכלו ינייה ממسمع. הזכי בבר יברק השכלו מלע בר בפשוע העינוי.
The two words italicized above, 'jeder einzelne', destroy in my mind the entire argument. As I understand it, G. is continuing the argument discussed in the last number (No. 77). There he admitted that one intellect may use another to assist it in its work if the latter has an instrument which the work requires and which the former intellect has not. Now he takes back this admission too. Assuming that one of the two alleged intellects (not 'jeder einzelne') has an instrument which the other has not, it does not follow that we need have two intellects (sc. the principal using the other because of the instrument the latter possesses). For the intellect having the instrument can do all the work himself and there is no need of the other.

79. (L. 45, 3)

Überhaupt geht der Zweckverleih der Zwecke voran, nur hierdurch richtet sich alles Entstehen nach dem Zwecke, und deshalb muss derjenige, welcher den Menschen ins Dasein ruft, auch die übrigen sublunarischen Existenzen entstehen lassen.

69 Italics mine.  
70 Italics mine.
The reading אצרו או התכלתת או ל복지 התכלתת appears to be corrupt. This is not the natural way of saying what K. understands the words to mean. We should expect אצרו או התכלתת או ל복지 התכלתת, or better still אצרו או התכלתת או ל복지 התכלתת. Moreover, if the words should be able to bear this meaning, the idea expressed would be irrelevant. No one has been claiming that the end is prior to that which gives the end, to make this statement necessary; and the conclusion drawn at the end, that the agent which produces man also produces the other inferior beings, has nothing to do with the major premise.

There is little doubt in my mind that some words fell out before the second אצרו, and I would supply the lacuna as follows: אצרו או התכלתת או אצרו או התכלתת או אצרו או התכלתת או אצרו או התכלתת. 'The agent which is the cause of the end or purpose is also the one which produces the existences that come before (and lead to) the end.' Now the rest of the argument is relevant. His purpose is to prove once more that there are not two intellects for the sublunar world, and he does so by arguing that in order that all existence or generation should lead to the one end, it is necessary that the cause of the end shall also be the cause of the means leading to the end. Hence it follows that the same active intellect which produces man (the end of sublunar creation) also produces the lower creatures.

80. (L. 45, 15)

וכי היא נא המקרר אותו בכסאות שיני פעלים ב_CM_ ית blev בתכתיות, ואヘ אlama לא ויהי זה מצר משני פעלים זה פועל אחר בצר כנזה.

(K. 87 fin.)

Denn es ist falsch anzunehmen, dass zwei Agenzien für eine einzige Tätigkeit in Frage kommen, es müsste denn sein, dass die beiden Agenzien in bestimmter Hinsicht einen einzigen Aktus involvieren.

Just as on a former occasion (cp. No. 65) K. mistook עב for עב, so here he mistakes עב for עב. It is clear from the

21 Italics mine.
sequence of the argument that G. wants to prove that the active intellect emanates from the spheres (or rather, as he says, from the movers of the spheres), and hence is identical with Aristotle’s ‘soul emanating from the spheres’, and that Aristotle meant by that expression the active intellect. He proves it in this way: The spheres bestow the mixture (מה), the intellect bestows the form. These two acts are really one act—the act of generation. One act can come only from one agent. Hence the apparently two agents—sphere and intellect—are really one agent, i.e. the active intellect emanates from the sphere. Accordingly, the correct translation of the Hebrew quoted above is, ‘There cannot be two agents producing one work numerically, unless the two agents are in some sense one agent’.

K.’s rendering is devoid of sense. For I cannot distinguish between ‘Tätigkeit’ and ‘Aktus’, and K. himself renders the same word בשגל in one case ‘Tätigkeit’ (88, 1), and in another ‘Aktus’ (87, 21). The above statement of K. amounts therefore to this: ‘We cannot have two agents for one and the same act unless the two agents involve one and the same act!’

81. (L. 45, 24)

This is a libel on Gersonides. No! no one will be found to doubt the truth of the fact that in the acquisition of the intelligibilia on the part of the material intellect there is a passing from potentiality to actuality. And G. does not say so. What he says is that some one may doubt the legitimacy of assuming the existence of the active intellect because of the fact that in the
acquisition of the *intelligibilium* on the part of the material intellect there is a passing from potentiality to actuality.

82. (L. 46, 13)

Und ferner: Verhielte es sich wirklich so, ich meine dass der hylische Intellekt die generellen Naturen von den vorstellenden Formen ohne die mit ihnen vereinigten hylischen Attribute annimmt, weil es seiner Weise entspräche, nur die generellen Naturen zu perzipieren, so könnte der hylische Intellekt das Akzidentelle nicht in seiner Substantialität begreifen (sc. das Akzidentelle an sich), wie ja auch der Geschichtssinn nicht den Grund der Farbe begreift.72 Das aber ist offenbar absurd. Denn viele Irrtümer des hylischen Intellekts entstehen auf diese Weise, und in Wahrheit vollziehen sich seine Irrtümer bei den meisten Dingen auf diese Art.

Here we have an obvious blunder. What G. says is this, that if the reason why the material intellect abstracts the general or universal elements from the material attributes with which they are mixed up in the ‘fantasia’ forms, is because by its very nature the material intellect has no power to perceive anything but the universal, then it would follow that the material intellect cannot mistake an accident for a substance, any more than the sense of sight can mistake a taste for a colour. But this is evidently untrue, for most of the errors of the material intellect are due to this very cause.

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72 Italics mine.
Wird jedoch das Problem so gelöst, wie es dem entspricht, was inbezug auf den aktiven Intellekt von uns erwiesen wurde, so gibt es ein Wissen von einem konstanten Gegenstände, und das Wissen selbst bleibt an sich konstant, ausserhalb des Intellekts, das ist nämlich die in der Seele des aktiven Intellekts verbleibende Ordnung.

It is clear from the Hebrew text that יכין refers toobar and not to יער, which is feminine. K., in the italicized words, makes ‘Wissen’ the subject of ‘bleibt’ instead of ‘Gegenstand’. This obscures the meaning of G. As the argument shows, the difficulty in the problem of knowledge is that knowledge as such must concern itself with what is at the same time real and invariable, whereas in our world what is real (sc. the individual) is not invariable, and what is invariable (sc. the universal) is not real. Hence there is no knowledge, unless with the Platonists we say that the universal is real. Neither solution G. is willing to adopt. His own solution, based upon his idea of the active intellect as possessing within it in unitary form the sublunar world-order, is proof against the above objections. The object of knowledge is not the universal, which is not real, but the world-order in the active intellect, which is both real (because not a universal) and permanent or invariable. It is not the knowledge, but the object of knowledge which is ‘konstant’ and ‘ausserhalb des Intellekts’, i.e. ‘des menschlichen Intellekts’, namely, it is objective and not subjective.

73 Italics mine.
(K. 92, fin.)

Der Universalcharakter jedoch kommt ihm nur insofern zu, als wir uns auf dasjenige stützen, was wir an sinnlich wahrnehmbaren Individuen ausserhalb der Seele (sc. in der transzendenten Welt der Ideen) finden.

Instead of מְסִינוּתיות, MS. P. 722 (cf. K. p. 92, note 2) reads מְסִינוּתיות, which is preferable, though the difference is not very significant. What is mistaken in K. is his reference of ייְמִי לְנָאשׁ (‘ausserhalb der Seele’) to the transcendent world of ideas (‘in der transzendenten Welt der Ideen’). This is incorrect. That phrase can only refer to the sensible individuals in our world. In the world of ideas there are no ‘sensible individuals’, and moreover if the universal character of the objects of our knowledge is due to the world of ideas (which can only mean the active intellect, as G. is not a Platonist), then the order in the active intellect is a universal, and the same difficulty arises again. G. is trying to find an object for our knowledge which is not a universal and yet is permanent. He finds it in the world-order as it exists in the active intellect. At the same time he cannot deny that our intellectual knowledge does have the character of universality. For this he accounts by the relation of our knowledge (or the object of our knowledge) to the sensible individuals of our world. In other words, what he means is this. If our mind could intuit immediately the content of the active intellect, our knowledge would not have the character of universality, i.e. its objects would not be universals. But since we must acquire our knowledge by means of sense data and with constant reference to them, our concepts, though really representing the world-order in the active intellect, take the form for us of something that is common to a number of individuals, hence their appearance as universals.

85. (L. 47, 27) = (K. 93, 23)

 позволяет means ‘is established’, not ‘bleibt konstant’.

74 Italics mine.
86. (L. 49, 13) = (K. 96 fin.)

This means, ‘This is a contradiction, and is impossible’. K.’s translation, ‘so ist das Gegenteil unmöglich’, is incorrect. This passage proves also that the reading above, p. 38, 3 (cp. No. 65), is correct in L and wrong in MS. O.

87. (L. 49, 5–15) = (K. 96, 18–97, 3)

Without reproducing these passages in full, I shall merely indicate that K.’s words ‘denn dasjenige, was, &c.’ (97, 1–2) make G. beg the question; for he makes him assign as a reason the very thing he is trying to prove (96, 20–24). The Hebrew words that prove the contrary (שֶׁזֶה בִּנְיָמִין) are the conclusion of the immediately preceding statement and not a reason for it, as K. makes it in the words quoted above. Instead of ‘denn dasjenige, was, &c.’ the translation should read ‘auch dasjenige, was, &c.’

88. (L. 49, 22)

Denn es zeigt sich doch, dass der aktive Intellekt von den praktischen Handlungen Kenntnis hat. Er hat deshalb dem Menschen Organe verliehen, damit er sie (sc. die praktischen Handlungen) in möglichst vollkommener Art verrichte. Er hat hierin den Menschen gleichsam zu einem Diener gemacht, dem er derartige Anlagen verleiht, dass die untergeordneten Arbeiten die Hauptarbeiten unterstützen.\(^1\)

The italicized words are incorrect, and they destroy G.’s meaning. What G. says is this. The active intellect enables and guides man to perform his various practical activities, the various arts, &c. with which he endowes him, in the same way as

\(^1\) Italics mine.
(על צד מיה) the principal arts control and guide the arts subordinate to them. Hence we may conceive of man as subordinate (םישרה) to the active intellect. In other words, the active intellect takes the place of the principal art, and man of the subordinate art.

Of the variant readings K. again selected the wrong one.

The words of the principal arts control and guide the arts subordinate to them. Hence we may conceive of man as subordinate to the active intellect. In other words, the active intellect takes the place of the principal art, and man of the subordinate art.

Of the variant readings K. again selected the wrong one.

The words K. 97, note 1. The words should be translated as follows: ‘He (the active intellect) makes man his servant in reference to that which he (the active intellect) gives, in the same way as the subordinate arts serve the principal arts’.

89. (L. 49, 29)

From K.’s translation, as italicized above, it would seem that he read instead of , though he does not indicate any variants, except in the statement (97, note 2) that MS. P 722 is corrupt. And yet is no doubt correct, and the meaning is that ‘all these practical arts are for the purpose of realizing the end intended by the active intellect in many of the things which he does’.

90. (L. 50, 18)

And further: Die praktischen Handlungen geschehen doch alle um des Zweckes willen, den offensichtlich der aktive Intellekt in viele von ihm bewirkte Dinge als Anlage hineingesetzt hat.

From K.’s translation, as italicized above, it would seem that he read instead of , though he does not indicate any variants, except in the statement (97, note 2) that MS. P 722 is corrupt. And yet is no doubt correct, and the meaning is that ‘all these practical arts are for the purpose of realizing the end intended by the active intellect in many of the things which he does’.

Italics mine.
Ebenso hat der aktive Intellekt von den Quantitäten Kenntnis, denn er achtet auf die Gestalt der Glieder und bringt sie zu einander in das richtige Verhältnis. Denn diese Verhältnisse sind offenbar von der Natur determiniert, so dass einige von ihnen zu einer Sache ein bestimmtes Verhältnis haben, andere nicht.\footnote{K. evidently read "ואכלב" and translated accordingly, but the words of the text will not bear any such translation. The words should be read "לכלב" and are used here in their mathematical sense, meaning 'rational', as we speak of rational and irrational numbers. So here we have rational and irrational ratios (ם"לוכ) or proportions. Maimonides speaks of rational and irrational lines, Guide, I, ch. 73, proposition 3, Arabic text, ed. Munk, p. 107 a and b (ם"לוכ בע נניסקנא נ"ל נניסקנא) = Heb. דברי מדוותי חום מ"מ ל"וכנירין. Biblical Hebrew, and Gersonides in his arithmetic, ed. Lange, Heb. text, p. 80, sixth line from the bottom, has "דבר" to denote an irrational root.}

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is immortal because neither the material intellect nor the *intelligibilia*, out of the combination of which two the acquired intellect arises, are subject to genesis and decay. יֵּאָּנָּן בֶּכֶם נְבֵר הַוָּדָּה is to be translated accordingly, [There is no reason why the acquired intellect should not be immortal] for there is not here anything subject to genesis that would (according to our view) be immortal, i.e. our view does not lead to the *reductio ad absurdum* that a thing subject to genesis is immortal, since no such thing is involved in the elements of the acquired intellect.

The words בְּשֶׁלֶל הַיוֹלֵאָנָי (26) which are omitted in MSS. O and P (cf. K. 105, note 1) are essential and cannot be the words of a glossator.

93. (K. 107, 12)

The words 'und vergehen' are evidently an oversight. The Hebrew (L. 53, 12) reads יהוה המתחדשים.


The passages are too long to quote, and the reader is referred to the Hebrew text and translation respectively. K.'s translation in a part of it (especially II. 5—11 on p. 110) does not render the text correctly and obscures the argument.

G. is in this paragraph undertaking a defence of Alexander's view that the *intelligibilia* are subject to genesis *per se* (תַּחַדְשָׁתָם וּבְרָכָּתָם). The obvious argument in favour of this view is that there can be no doubt about their genesis, since we all know that there are no *intelligibilia* in the material intellect in infancy and they arise in it gradually as the person matures. In other words, they are first in the material intellect potentially and then they are realized actually. But this is essential genesis. On reflection, however, it will appear that this argument is not conclusive. For, the *intelligibilia* represent external realities; and if these realities are not subject to genesis, then, even though the *intelligibilia* have genesis in the material intellect, this is relative genesis and not absolute (בְּשֶׁלֶל הַיוֹלֵאָנָי), for the *intelligibilia* are the same as the external realities they represent, and if these have no genesis,
the intelligibilia have none, though they are not always in the material intellect.

This objection, says G., would be well enough if the intelligibilia were identical with the external realities they represent, but they are not. For, the external realities are particulars whereas the intelligibilia are universals. Hence it follows that if the intelligibilia have genesis in the material intellect, this is absolute genesis since they have no other existence except in the material intellect.

95. (L. 54, 16)

Drittens. Die Intelligibilia scheinen doch bei ihrer Perzeption der Dinge die hylischen Formen zu begreifen, aus diesem Grunde müssen sie selbst hylischer Natur sein und dürfen nicht ständig in actu existieren, denn sonst wären sie separat und nicht hylisch. Wie sich jedoch erweisen lässt, dass die Intelligibilia bei ihrer Perzeption der Dinge die hylischen Formen in ihrer hylischen Natur begreifen, geht aus meinen nunmehr folgenden Ausführungen hervor: da ja die hylischen Formen begreifen, soweit sie selbst hylisch sind, wie dies Averroes in seinem Kompendium zum Buche der Seele erwähnt, so hängt ihre in einer bestimmten Sache latente Existenz mit der Veränderung substantiell zusammen. So

(italics mine.)
hängt beispielsweise die in der Kraft des perzipierenden Beschauers sich realisierende hyli sche Form mit der Veränderung zusammen, die sich in der Kraft des Beschauers vollzieht, weil die Form in ihr (sc. der Kraft) eine Spur hinterlässt. Würde nämlich nur der Sinn irgendwie affiziert werden (sc. und nicht die Kraft), so würde in ihr die Form nicht zur Entstehung gelangen.

Here we have again some really serious errors, which no translator should allow himself to make. The construction of the mistranslated passages in question is as follows: and the meaning of is 'pertain to as attributes'. The sentence should therefore be translated: 'It appears with reference to these intelligibilia that they have certain properties possessed by material forms'. The same thing applies to the next overlined passage in the Hebrew above. He says, I shall prove that these intelligibilia have properties possessed by material forms, as follows: Among the properties characteristic of material forms as such is that their existence or coming to be in anything is consequent essentially upon a change in that thing. And the example he gives is that the material form arising in the seeing faculty (is an adjective qualifying and not a noun as K. makes it, 'in der Kraft des Beschauers') is consequent upon a change which takes place in the seeing faculty just before the form in question is impressed upon it. For if the sense (= seeing faculty) had not been affected in such a way the form would not arise in it.

This sets the whole matter straight and at the same time indicates to the reader wherein K. erred.

96. (L. 55, 22) = (K. 113, 24)

This involves the same misunderstanding of as in the previous number.

G. says, another characteristic of material forms as such is that they are multiplied with the multiplication of their subjects.

97 Italics mine.

80 I think the reading should be לְכָּלָן, for the change must precede the coming of the material form, as the word לְכָּלָן indicates, and as is clear from the following sentence.
97. (L. 55, second line from bottom) = (K. 114, 12)

K. translates 'Meeradler', and adds, 'offenbar nur vom Hörensagen bekannte Tiere'. The name represents the Arabic َجَرْفًا = griffin or phoenix, which is used by Averroes in his middle commentary on the Περὶ Ἐρυθρείας of Aristotle (cp. Fausto Lasinio, Studii sopra Averroe, Prima Continuazione V, p. 8, l. 10, and 9, l. 9) together with َجِرْفُ = ῥαγέλαφος (Arist. Περὶ Ἐρυθρείας, ch. i, p. 16 a 16) to represent a fabulous animal.

98. (L. 56, 1)

Noch in anderer Weise ergibt sich, dass zwischen den universalen Intelligibilien und den Einzelvorstellungen ihrer Individuen eine bestimmte Beziehung herrscht, durch welche die Universalia existieren; denn das Universale existiert in Wahrheit nur dadurch, dass es das Universale von seiten eines Individuellen (sc. in Hinsicht auf ein Spezielles) bildet, 41 denn beide stehen zu einander in Relation (sc. nicht Correlation), 41 und es ist charakteristisch für die Relationen, dass jede einzelne von ihnen nur insofern Relationsexistenz hat, als sie eine tatsächliche Relation eingeht. 41 Dass nun das Universale eine Relation mit dem Individuellen eingeht, ist klar, denn das Universelle kann keine Sonderexistenz führen, wie Plato meint, hat dies doch Aristoteles in seiner Metaphysik (XII, 4 ff.) erwiesen. Das Universale verbindet sich jedoch mit dem

41 Italics mine.
Individuellen nur insofern, als es ein Universales (sc. für das Individuelle) bildet (sc. nicht in seiner Selbstgenügsamkeit), denn es umfängt und umschliesst es; deshalb kann ohne Individuelles kein Universales existieren, denn die Glieder einer Relation müssen gleichzeitig existieren.

K. has not grasped the meaning of G., especially in the passages italicized above. This is shown, too, by his note (K., p. 114, note 2), 'Dass auch die Individuen nicht ohne Universalia existieren können, scheint Gersonides nicht anzunehmen'. The contrary is true. G. says quite clearly that when a and b are in relation, neither can be without the other in so far as the element of their relation is concerned. Father and son are in relation. And hence father is not father without son, and son is not son without father. This is precisely the meaning of the words, which K. has entirely misunderstood. These words mean, that it is a characteristic of correlatives that each of them acquires its relational existence from the other, relatives exist together. For this implies that neither can exist without the other. To be sure, this idea is not original with Gersonides; it goes back to Aristotle's discussion in the Categories, and each one of the statements quoted from G. can be matched by an equivalent one of Aristotle, who is the source. Thus the last statement, that relatives are together, is thus expressed by Aristotle in the Categories, ch. VII, p. 7 b 15, ὅπειρ ἐὰν τὰ πρὸς τι ἄμα τῇ φύσιν εἶναι. And the consequence is drawn a little farther on, l. 19, καὶ συναισθεί μὲ ταῖται ἄλληλα. μὴ γὰρ ὅτους ὑπελασίων οὐκ ἔστων ἡμῶν, καὶ ἡμῶν ὁποῖος μὴ ὁποῖον οὐκ ἔστω διπλάσιον ὑπαντεῖ τοῖς ἄλλοις ὡσιμα τοιαῦτα. The other statement that each relative gets its relational existence from its correlate is thus stated by Aristotle in his corrected definition of relation, p. 8 a 31, ἐστι τὰ πρὸς τι ὁς τὸ ἐννο παῖνον ἐστι τῷ πρὸς τῷ ἐννο ἐχειν, which means that relatives are those things for which to be is the same thing as to stand in a certain

82 Italics mine.
relation to something else. It is true that with reference to the first statement Aristotle makes a tentative exception. There are some relatives, he says, which do not appear to be together. Thus knowledge is related to knowable, sensation to sensible, and yet the second member in each case is prior to the first and independent of it. Knowables and sensibles exist before knowledge and sensation, and while knowledge cannot exist without the knowable, and sensation cannot exist without the sensible, the latter can exist without the former (ibid., p. 7 b 22 ff.). But this does not seem to represent Aristotle's final view, for he ends up the entire discussion by saying that it is perhaps difficult to make a dogmatic assertion about such matters without repeated reflection (ἴσως δὲ χαλεπῶν ἐπέρ τῶν τοιούτων σφαδρῶς ἀποφαινέσθαι μὴ πολλάκις ἐπεσκεφθέντων, p. 8 b 21). And as a matter of fact a mature point of view is presented in the De Anima, where Aristotle introduces his fundamental ideas of actual and potential. Some have maintained, he tells us, that colour cannot exist without sight, nor flavour without taste. They are right and they are wrong. Sensation as well as sensible are used in two senses, actually and potentially. What they say holds true of the former, not of the latter. That is, an actual sensible implies actual sensation, but an object may exist which is potentially sensible without being actually sensed (ἐπεὶ δὲ μὲν μὲν ἐστιν ἐνέργεια ή τοῦ αἰσθητοῦ καὶ ἡ τοῦ αἰσθητικοῦ, τὸ δ’ εἶναι ἕτερον, ἀνάγκη ἀμα φθείρεσθαι καὶ σώζονται τῷ οὕτῳ λεγομένην ἀκοὴν καὶ ψόφον, καὶ χριμὸν ὃ καὶ γείσαι καὶ τὰ ἄλλα ὁμοίως· τὰ δὲ κατὰ δύναμιν λεγόμενα οὐκ ἀνάγκη, ἀλλ’ οἱ πρῶτοι φυσικοὶ τοῦτο οὐ καλὸς ἔλεγον, οὐθὲν οἱμένου οὕτε λεκκὸν οὔτε μέλαιν εἶναι ἀνεν ὄψεως, οὐδὲ χυμὸν ἀνεν γείσαις. τῇ μὲν γὰρ ἔλεγον ὁρθῶς, τῇ δ’ οὐκ ὁρθῶς· διόχος γὰρ λεγομένης τῆς αἰσθήτους καὶ τῶν αἰσθητοῦ, τῶν μὲν κατὰ δύναμιν τῶν δὲ κατ’ ἐνέργειαν, ἐπὶ τούτων μὲν συμβαίνει τὸ λεχθὲν, ἐπὶ δὲ τῶν ἑτέρων οὐ συμβαίνει. ἀλλ’ ἐκείνοι ἄπλως ἔλεγον περὶ τῶν λεγομένων οὐχ ἄπλως. III, ch. 2, p. 426 a 15 ff.).

Gersonides in our passage is not concerned about these more detailed discussions, for he is merely interested for the moment in defending, as a matter of method, Alexander’s position. Later he
refutes this position (L. 73, 18 ff. = K. 161, 1 ff.). And hence not much can be inferred from this as to G.'s own view in this matter; though it would seem that he accepts the two statements above mentioned about relatives, since he does not controvert them in the last discussion just mentioned (73). His refutation consists in denying that intelligibilia are universals, and granting that they are, he says it does not follow that they multiply with the multiplication of their bearers.

K. makes another statement in the foot-note above referred to (114, note 2), which requires animadversion. ‘Wenn aber die Intelligibilia auf individuelle Substrate zurückgehen, so müssen sie — gemäss der ersten der vier Prämissen — entstehen und vergehen.’ My comment on this is, in the words of Aristotle, την μὲν ὀρθῶν ἔλεγε, τη δὲ οὐκ ὀρθῶσ. The ultimate conclusion, as K. draws it, is correct, but for a proper understanding of G.'s method and course of argumentation the intermediate steps should not have been left out. The inference is as follows: If the intelligibilia are dependent upon the external sensibles, they are multiplied with the multiplication of their subjects. If so, the intelligibilia exhibit the properties of material forms, and hence are themselves material and not always actual, but subject to genesis. Therefore they must also be subject to dissolution and cannot be eternal.

99. (L. 56, 26) = (K. 116, 6)

μὴ γὰρ τὸν χρόνον διαφέρειν does not mean ‘Es leuchtet von selbst ein’. The correct translation is, ‘This is the very thing we are insisting upon’.

100. (L. 58, 26)

Es ergibt sich nämlich in bezug auf die intelligibelen Formen, dass sie bei dem Menschen in einer Weise auftreten, die sich von
der Existenz der hylischen Formen unterscheidet, in welcher jene existieren. 83

The italicized words are incorrect. G. says nothing about the intelligibilia existing in material forms. He says, The existence of the intelligibilia in man is different in mode from the existence of material forms in the things in which they (sc. the material forms) exist.

101. (L. 60, third line from bottom)

שאמש היה אפרפר הוא היהويل שברעלדה.

(K. 130, 27)

Wenn dies nämlich möglich wäre, so müsste das Bewirkte seine Wirkung 84 werden.

הוולא is the effect, הולא is the cause. I should translate it, 'so müsste die Wirkung ihre Ursache werden'.

102. (L. 61, 10)

לאчем שחוא מבואר שהשעטנוגה הרואינגה מאעטנוגה שבחר הפילוסוף

Wenn dies nämlich möglich wäre, so müsste das Bewirkte seine Wirkung 84 werden.

Italics mine.

83 Italics mine.

84 Italics mine.
benen Intelligibilia entstehen, wird tatsächlich bestätigt, dass die
Intelligibilia in ihm entstehen, und dass sie nicht von selbst
entstehen;\textsuperscript{55} das erheilt bestimmt aus dem, was wir bei jenem
Argumente erwähnten. Es lässt sich erweisen, dass sie schon
deshalb\textsuperscript{55} nicht von selbst\textsuperscript{55} entstehen, weil doch\textsuperscript{55} in jenem
Argumente erwiesen wurde, dass die Intelligibilia im hylischen
Intellekte entstehen und ständig\textsuperscript{55} aktuell in ihm verweilen;\textsuperscript{56}
nachdem sie (sc. vorher) potentiell in ihm existierten. Denn
nicht alles, was entsteht, hat ein bestimmtes Verhältnis zu einer aus
sich selbst entstehenden Sache.\textsuperscript{57} So erhält die Sonne beispielsweise
im Sommer eine Nahestellung zu uns, ohne dass diese (sc. die
Nahesteilung) aus sich selbst zu entstehen braucht.\textsuperscript{58} Wenn dem
aber so ist, so kann man offenbar sagen, dass es bei den Intelli-
gibilien, welche ständig aktuell existieren,\textsuperscript{58} vorkommt, dass sie zu
irgend einer Zeit vom hylischen Intellekt empfangen werden,
aber nicht so, dass ihre nunmehrige Existenz (sc. im hylischen
Intellekt) eine andere wäre als jene, die sie an und für sich
besitzen, nämlich so, dass die hylische Perzeption,\textsuperscript{59} das ist die
Perzeption durch den Sinn oder eine ähnliche, anders wäre als
das ausserhalb der Seele existierende sinnliche Substrat.\textsuperscript{57}

The above is not a translation, it is an obscuring of Gerso-
nides’s logical argumentation. Instead of discussing the errors of
K., as indicated in the italicized portions of the above quotation,
I shall simply present the correct translation as I understand it.

\textsuperscript{55} Italics mine. \textsuperscript{56} Italics mine. \textsuperscript{57} Italics mine.
thing a new relation arises to a particular thing, is a case of absolute genesis. For example, the sun comes near to us in the summer (sc. a new relation arises in the sun with respect to the earth). And yet it does not follow from this that there is absolute (essential) genesis of the sun (sc. in the summer). This being so, it is clear that one may say, These *intelligibilia* exist actually always, but it also happens to them that they are received at a given time by the material intellect (sc. their appearance in the material intellect is merely a new relation that arises in them with respect to the material intellect). Not that their existence in it is different from the existence which they (always) have in themselves, as is the case with material perception, like sense perception, &c., where the perception is different from the external material object perceived (for if the existence of the *intelligibile* when it appears in the material intellect were different from its own existence in itself before it comes into the material intellect, then its appearance in the latter would be absolute genesis, and not merely the appearance of a new relation in an already existing object).'

103. (L 61, 28) = (K 131, fin.), and *passim.*

*ח針ים באעשרה* does not mean 'aus sich selbst entstehen', but essential genesis, or absolute or *per se* genesis, i.e. where the whole thing formerly non-existent comes into being. It is opposed to *ח siden באעשרה* which denotes genesis *per accidens*, or relative genesis, as when a thing comes into a new relation or acquires a new quality or any of the other accidental categories (in the Aristotelian sense).

104. (L 62, 24) = (K 133, 16)

See No. 45.

*(To be concluded.)*
EARLY KARAITE CRITICS OF THE MISHNÁH

BY HARTWIG HIRSCHFELD, Jews' College, London.

I

NISSI B. NOAH

Among the Genizah fragments at the British Museum there is one consisting of six small parchment leaves covered with rather large Hebrew square writing. Many of the words are furnished with superlinear vowel signs. The contents are extracts from various sections of the Mishnáh in the following order:

- Megillah I, 2.
- Rosh ha-Shanah I, 5; II, 8, 11.
- Shabbat XVI, 6; XVIII, 1.
- Hullin IV, 9.
- Niddah III, 4; IV, 6.

To almost each paragraph comments of a disparaging nature are attached. These, as a rule, refer to ritual matters, but in one instance to the grammatical construction also.

The fragment is, of course, part of a larger work, and the loss of the bulk is all the more to be regretted, as these few specimens are probably the oldest MS. copy of Mishnáh texts extant. If this be so, the irony of history has so

1 The original order of the leaves was disturbed by the bookbinder, who placed the last leaf in the front. The numbers of paragraphs correspond with those given in The Mishnáh, on which the Palestinian Talmud rests, ed. Lowe, 1883.
willed that the oldest bit of Mishnāh text has been preserved through the exertions of a Karaite. Likewise noteworthy is the zeal shown by the annotator for grammatical exactitude. His brief note on this point, therefore, belongs to the oldest Jewish utterances on grammar. We shall see later on that this learned Karaite, apart from some knowledge of the Mishnāh, also had read the Gemāra to which he alluded by the name of Ḥalākōt.

As to the age of the fragment, the worn appearance of the parchment, the large characters, and the Babylonian vowel-points, all indicate an early date. To determine the approximate age of an undated manuscript is always a hazardous undertaking, but the suggestion just made is based not only on the appearance of the fragment, but on the comparison with other manuscripts all written on paper and bearing the dates 1004, 1019, and 1030. It is only necessary to place all four manuscripts side by side to perceive that our fragment is not only older, but very much older. Likewise indicative of the period of the fragment

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2 Four pages of Mishnāh text with superlinear text, likewise from the Cairo Genizah, were published by I. Markon in Hakedem I, 41 sqq. They are written in a Yemenite hand, and of much later date.

3 As to the use of the term תֹּאֵלֶת for Talmud, see L. Ginzberg, Grōnica, vol. I, p. 118, rem. r. See also Gittin. fol. 60 vo.


5 Or. 2576. ibid., II, p. 180.

6 Or. 5565 E, fol. 15, being the last and greatly damaged page of a work with the following colophon: הַשּׁׁם אֲלֹהֵינוֹ וַאלֹהֵי קָדוֹשִׁינוּ הֲלֹהָהֵי רֵאשׁ וְאֶדֶם הַאֹמֵר יִתְנַּא וְיִקְרַא לֵיהֶן אֲלֹהֵינוֹ הֲלֹהָהֵי רֵאשׁ וְאֶדֶם הַמְּלַצְּקֵינוּ הֲלֹהָהֵי רֵאשׁ וְאֶדֶם מְלַצְּקֵינוּ הֲלֹהָהֵי רֵאשׁ וְאֶדֶם מְלַצְּקֵינוּ הֲלֹהָהֵי רֵאשׁ וְאֶדֶם מְלַצְּקֵינוּ הֲלֹהָהֵי רֵאשׁ וְאֶדֶם מְלַצְּקֵינוּ הֲלֹהָהֵי רֵאשׁ וְאֶדֶם מְלַצְּקֵינוּ Hallowed is the writing, praise be to God the Lord of the worlds. The copy was made in Jerusalem, may God make it inhabited, in [the month of] Dulhijja of the year 421. Written by Khalaf b. 'Olwan for Maušēr b. Hillel.'
are the critical notes given not in Arabic, but in Hebrew, and Anan is the only authority mentioned.  

Several features of the fragment justify the suggestion that it is in the author’s autograph. Passages which had been overlooked are inserted between the lines, and one passage is entirely missing. The number of lines on each page varies from eleven to fourteen. One word (fol. 39, vol. I) is faulty and uncorrected. The manner in which the words לוחות ראשית are jotted down at the bottom of the same page and in the middle of a sentence show so much spontaneousness that they could only have been so inserted by the writer of the fragment. Traces of haste are visible on nearly every page. A copyist would have bestowed more care on the appearance of the pages both as regards accuracy and neatness, and it is most unlikely that he would have left his work unrevised.

Now as regards the person of the author no direct information can be gathered from the fragment itself. There are, however, several clues which deserve being followed up. The first is the mention of Anan which shows that the author must have lived later than the founder of Karaism. This, in connexion with the use of Hebrew throughout the fragment gives the terminus a quo, as it is an established fact that Karaite authors did not write in Arabic prior to the tenth century. As a later period is, for reasons given above, out of the question, there only remains the ninth century.

Through Pinsker we are in possession of the autobiography of the Karaite Nissi b. Noah, which he published

7 Fol. 36 vo.
8 נרודכיניב. see the photograph.
9 Ibid.
10 See Steinschneider, Die arabischLITERATUR der Juden, p. 74.
on the authority of Firkowitz. The latter places Nissi in the eighth century, and this date is adopted by Fürst. The impossibility of this period is obvious, as it would make Nissi a contemporary of Anan. The publication of this autobiography gave rise to a lively discussion. The late Dr. P. Frankl endeavoured to show that Nissi not only lived much later than Fürst assumed, but that his autobiography is a forgery and largely based on chapters from Judah Hadassi's בֵּית הַכְּסֵר, which was written in 1148. Frankl took the trouble to print the related passages side by side in order to expose Nissi's plagiarism. Graetz, who takes the autobiography as genuine, ascribes to Nissi the year 840. The later editors of Graetz, both in the German and Hebrew editions, and notably Harkawy, trustfully follow Frankl, and deprive Nissi of the authorship of the autobiography. Now in the latter there occurs the following sentence: 13 The student (of my book) must first learn ... the vowel signs and accents, defective and full spelling according to the Babylonians (לֹא נָהוֹדֵי) in order to understand the Mishnah and the Talmud and Halakot with the great and small additions. Nearly every word of this sentence is reflected in the fragment. It has Babylonian vowel-signs, it deals with the Mishnah, alludes to the Talmud by the term of Halakot, and all

12 לֹא נָהוֹדֵי, VIII, pp. 29 sqq.
13 Likk., p. 41.
14 בֵּית הַכְּסֵר, also called הָעְלָה הַמַּשְׁלֹלָה הַמַּכְסְלָה.
15 See below.
16 The 'great additions' evidently refer to the Tosephta. The author seems to have taken this word as a plural, viz מַשְׁלָלָה. Saadya also, in his 'Refutation of Ibn Sākwaih' (JQR., XVI, 160), uses the Hebrew form מַשְׁלָלָה. With the 'smaller additions' the author probably means the Baraithas.
17 See below.
the comments are written in Hebrew. It is known that Nissi prides himself on having written in Hebrew. His reputation among Karaites is due not so much to his literary achievements, as to the fact, verified by historical evidence, that he declared it to be 'the duty of the sons of our people to study the Mishnah and the Talmud'.

Frankl cast ridicule on Nissi's statement that he had learnt Greek and Latin, but we can easily credit him with a smattering of these languages. He does not pose as a profound classical scholar. Apart from all this there is another factor to show that Nissi was not the plagiarist, but Hadassi, and it is really surprising that Frankl overlooked it. In his encyclopaedic work Hadassi gives a sketch of Hebrew grammar. The vowel system which he describes is unmistakably the Tiberian one, while he does not mention the superlinear system at all. As he wrote his book in Constantinople he was probably unacquainted with it. Nissi, however, who was reared in the latter system, naturally recommended its use. The special mention he makes of it even permits the conclusion that he rejected the Tiberian system, which he must have seen in use when, later on, he settled in Jerusalem. This much is certain, that if Hadassi is dependent on Nissi, there must have elapsed sufficient time between their lives to make the latter forgotten, and the discovery of the plagiarism

18 Al Hiti, who composed his 'Chronicle of Karaite Doctors' in the fifteenth century (see ed. Margoliouth, p. 3), does not mention Nissi at all, although he has much to say about Joseph b. Noah, who is supposed to have presided over a college in Jerusalem. His name is mentioned by Hadassi, l.c., par. 169.

19 See 'ד תודוב (fol. 9 vo.) on the authority of Aaron b. Joseph in the introduction to his ניב והנפは (fol. 9).

20 Par. 163.
difficult. Hadassi even dared to appropriate one of the titles of Nissi's book. Our fragment and the above quoted passages from his autobiography resemble one another so strongly that no serious objection can be raised against the suggestion that they are to be ascribed to the same person. The conclusion at which I arrive is therefore the following: Although Firkowitz's assertion as to the period during which Nissi lived is unreliable, the authenticity of the autobiography need not be doubted. Frankl's theory is untenable and misled all his followers, including Harkawy, but all the circumstances confirm the date originally suggested by Graetz, viz. about 840. Incidentally we learn that the specimens of superlinear vocalization appearing in the fragment are older than the famous codex of the Later Prophets by about seventy years.

On the basis of the foregoing remarks I venture the suggestion that our fragment is not only the work of Nissi, but actually written by his own hand.

In his selections from the Mishnah the author chose such as, he thought, would bring out the perversity of the Rabbis as clearly as possible. Unfortunately his notes have suffered much by age, and many words are either defective or completely obliterated. This is largely the case with the annotations on the regulations connected with the public reading of the Book of Esther. It is towards the end of this paragraph where the quotation from the Halakah (Talmud, Megillah fol. 12 verso) occurs: 'If a person read the Megillah written amidst other books (of the Hagiographa), he has not fulfilled the duty of

21 שֵׁרֵי.
22 Prophetarum posteriorum codex Babylonicus Petropolitanae, ed. H. Strack, fol. 1816.
public reading'. The concluding passage is unintelligible, because several words are missing in the middle.

To the extracts from Rosh ha-Shanah, ch. ii, the words are added: 'All these are alterations. those that defile it shall surely be put to death (Exod. 31. 14) and also which ye shall proclaim in their seasons (Lev. 23. 8)'. The paragraph dealing with the proclamation of the new moon concludes with the following note: 'We know that they count\(^{23}\) the new moons by calculation (with the help) of the "shiftings". This, of course, refers to the Rabbinic rule of ט' מ' viz. that the first day of Passover must not fall on a Monday, Wednesday, or Friday.

At the end of the paragraph dealing with the blowing of the Shophar the author found an opportunity of showing his superior knowledge of grammar. Supplementing the abrupt marginal note mentioned above, he says: 'is not in accordance with what those learned in the Torah know: The correct word is מ' מ', as is written Exod. 23. 14'.\(^{24}\) This remark has a peculiar interest of its own. The mistake he corrects is not due to the copyist of the MS. used by the author, but seems to have existed in his archetype—as well as in the other MSS. It is found not only in the codex of the Mishnâh preserved in the University Library at Cambridge,\(^{25}\) but also in the MS. of the British Museum Or. 2219 (containing Maimonides' commentary), fol. 15 verso. In the Talmud MS. of the British Museum, Harley 5508 (fol. 18 verso), we

\(^{21}\) Fol. 39 vo, l. 1; see facsimile. The fragment has מ' מ'. The author uses the term מ' מ' probably with a side-glance to Lam. 2. 14.

\(^{22}\) The Bible has here מ' מ', but the author evidently quoted from memory.

\(^{23}\) Ed. Lowe, Cambridge, 1883.
find ש, but a small מ is written above the last letter. The copyist of the last mentioned MS. seems to have been aware of the mistake, but evidently shrank from omitting anything he found in his original. Incidentally this is a striking proof of the faithfulness displayed by copyists, and should serve as a warning against hasty surmises that ancient texts were tampered with freely. Our Karaite author, not satisfied with the correction of the mistake, gives the rule for the gender of Hebrew numerals, albeit incompletely, illustrating it by various examples.

The regulations of the Mishnāh Niddāh 3. 5; 4. 6 are supplemented by what looks like a quotation על naam ל. Such a sentence, of course, does not exist in the Mishnāh or in any of the ancient sources. The author probably intended to say בנא for נאם, and utterances of this kind occur indeed among early Responsa. Without insinuating baser motives to the author, we cannot absolve him from the charge of carelessness. It may have pleased his Karaite zeal to pounce upon an alleged Rabbanite utterance open to severe criticism. Instead of examining his source he simply remarks: ’God did not command this, He is far above wickedness and injustice.’

The fragment concludes as follows: ‘Since we have seen that the firmament was created on the second day, the lights on the fourth, and Adam and Eve on the sixth, and that the first Passover, when God led His people from Egypt, was on the night of the sixth, which is (based upon)

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26 See מתקאת ניאון, Mantua, 1597, fol. 25 vo.; מתקאת ניאון, Leghorn, 1641: מתקאת ניאון (my attention was drawn to these passages by Dr. A. Marmorstein). Anan Harkavy. Studien und Mittheilungen, VIII, p. 41, says לא נאתי בן נרה לוהה אלא בננה וספירה.
(it results) that ה' is alluded to for the purposes of celebrating Passover on any of these days. This is what Anan says in agreement with them (the Rabbanites), viz. not Passover on the seventh (day), nor Sukkoth on the first ...., Passover is not debarred (?) from (being celebrated) on the seventh (day), nor Sukkoth from the first. As for the seventh and the first (days) there exist allusions to the celebration of Passover and Sukkoth on them, because light was created on the first day, and also on account of the glory of the seventh day, the great and holy Sabbath.'

The relics of Anan's Book of Commandments extant do not contain the passage quoted by our author. As it is given not in the Aramaic original, but in Hebrew translation, we do not know if all or how much is intended to be quoted. Apart from this the meaning of the few words saved is not clear, because we should expect 'the sixth' instead of the 'seventh'. The fault probably lies with Nissi, who seems to have mixed up the rule of ה' with that of ה'.

II

JOSEPH AL-BAŞİR

From the preceding specimens we see that Nissi's criticism betrays neither great powers of judgement nor accuracy of detail. There is a conspicuous lack of detail in his remarks. No attempt is made to appreciate the genesis and development of the rabbinic tradition, or to disprove its raisou d'être. His bickerings neither refute nor instruct, yet he showed his brethren the way to combat their opponents by attacking them on their own ground, and they were not slow to follow his example.
'Strife', taught the Grecian philosopher Heraklitos, 'is the father of things.' Well might we apply this doctrine to the struggle between the Rabbanites and Karaites; for it was fruitful in every respect. It produced valiant fighters and an important literature. The only misfortune is that this literature is so scrappy, and thus prevents us from visualising this enormous spiritual movement in its fulness. It is no paradox to say that we owe the life work of Saadya to the Karaites. All his writings, without exception, served the one purpose of defeating the Karaites. About twenty years ago a scholar, speaking of the lost polemical writings of Saadya and his opponents, expressed satisfaction that only 'a few fragments of this class of literature' had been saved.\textsuperscript{27} Since then, many more dealing with both sides of the question have been unearthed. Saadya's polemical writings are not mere recriminations, but scientific treatises of great value, and also the attacks of his critics are important from the theological, historical, linguistic, and generally literary points of view. Every scrap, particularly if produced by one of the older generation of Karaite authors, is worthy of careful study.

The importance of new fragments found can best be measured, if we consider how scant is our knowledge of the literary life of Eastern Jews during the ninth and the earlier half of the tenth centuries. Almost complete silence reigns in the generation after Nissi, but it is scarcely probable that nothing was written on the great question of the day. Of David Almokammas, who must have lived during this period, we do not know whether he was a Karaite or not, although he is claimed by later Karaite

\textsuperscript{27} M. Friedländer in \textit{JQR.}, V, p. 197.
authors as one of their brotherhood.28 We only know that he wrote a polemical treatise against Christianity, and, according to Kirgisini, composed a commentary on Genesis.29 An attack by him on the Rabbinic code is not known. We are equally in the dark as to the attacks on the Mishnah by Ibn Sākweih, another contemporary of Saadya, and would probably know very little about him were it not for the rejoinder of the latter.30

Among Saadya’s writings there is one with a certain title (probably mutilated)31 dealing with Rabbinic tradition. The correct reading of the title I believe to have found quoted by himself in his commentary on Exodus, viz. Refutation of speculation with reference to the traditional law.32 The existence of some such treatise is vouchsafed by his own allusion to it.33 It would have been inconceivable that he should have written a number of pamphlets on legal side issues, whilst omitting the main axiom of Karaite teachings, viz. the speculative method (kiyās). The work was apparently lost, but it is worth trying to see if no trace of it can be found anywhere.

There exists an Arabic fragment in the British Museum containing the bulk of chapters 14 and 15 of a treatise in defence of kiyās. This fragment has been briefly dealt with by Dr. Poznański,34 who ascribes it to Kirgisini,

28 Al Hiti, I. c., p. 5; cp. Harkavy, Abu Yusuf Ya'kub al Kirgisani, St. Petersburg, 1894 (Russian), p. 396.
31 لَا يُؤْتَنِي الْكِيَالِ، Steinschneider, l. c. p. 50.
32 لَا يُؤْتَنِي الْكِيَالِ، JQR., XVIII, p. 600.
33 Ibid.
against the testimony of Moses Bashyāzi. Of this, however, later on. The first of these two chapters consists in the main of quotations from a work of an opponent who, as may be seen from chapter 15, is no other than Saadya. The object of the author of the fragment is to refute Saadya's attack against kiyās. A special feature of the fragment is that it is written in the Arabic language and script, almost devoid of diacritical points, and that even the Hebrew passages occurring therein are so written. This is a peculiarity which deserves some attention. We have seen that in the tenth century Karaite authors exchanged the Hebrew language for Arabic, but used Hebrew square characters for both. This is the case with David b. Almokammas, Salmon b. Jeroḥam, Ḳīrḳiṣānī, and largely with Jepheth. With the last named a change was effected, and we suddenly find a great number of Karaite MSS. in which both the Arabic text and the Hebrew quotations are written in Arabic characters. The oldest MS. so written is, as far as I was able to ascertain, Jepheth's Commentary on Ruth, dated 1004. Some Karaite copyists went even further and left a large number of fragments in Arabic writing of Hebrew texts from various books of the Bible without a single Arabic word. 35 This practice went on for about three centuries. What may have been the reason? The rules of Arab orthography are not appropriate for Hebrew on account of the larger number of vowels in the latter language. The copyists found a way out of the difficulty by adding the Hebrew vowel-signs

35 See Hoerning, Description and Collation of Six Karaite Manuscripts, London, 1889. The author's opinion that they date from the tenth century, also adopted in Margoliouth's Catalogue of the Hebrew and Samaritan Manuscripts in the British Museum, cannot be maintained.
according to the Tiberian system. At any rate I did not find a single instance of Arabic writing with the superlinear system. I thus arrive at the following conclusions. First, Arab writing for Hebrew was practised in Palestine only, and not before the eleventh century. We can take it that from the very outset Jews in Arab-speaking countries wrote Arabic in Hebrew characters even before the ordinary Arabic alphabet had been developed. As for Arab writing, Jews had to learn it from Mohammedans, but as their whole literature was of a religious character, they had no reason to use any other than Hebrew writing. There were probably only few who desired to study works on Mohammedan theology or on secular subjects, and those who mastered the Arab alphabet were the exception rather than the rule. In Palestine the art of reading and writing Arabic was probably practised very little. Secondly, the use of Arabic writing by Karaites is an unmistakable sign of defeat. Their cause was so much damaged by Saadya's slashing attacks that they retired into their own confines. As they could scarcely hope to make converts, they put out all their strength to prevent the loss of adherents and considered the use of Arab script for Arabic and Hebrew as the best means to achieve this end.

Before dealing with the probable author of the work of which the fragment forms a part, it is necessary to take note of its contents. The beginning is, unfortunately, missing. The following is the translation of ch. 14.

'He (Saadya) said: I must mention how these matters were handed down by Moses. They were witnessed by the people in their various aspects just as they were put into practice by Moses. He was told to write the Torah in the fortieth year in the following manner. God said to
Moses, Write \( b'rēshith bārā elōhīm \), dictating word for word, and he wrote from \( berēshith \) to \( w'shama lō ta'bōr \). This contains the brief account of the happenings of 2,488 years. We believe this account of the writing of the Tōrāh to be true, and whoever reads it will find in it satisfactory evidence for the statements and laws which it was meant to contain. From the first year onward Moses taught the people the whole law and statute which God commanded him, for which purpose he appointed "chiefs of thousands, chiefs of hundreds", &c. in order to expound all that he had imparted to them. He would not, e.g., have commanded them to eat unleavened bread without explaining from which kind of grain it was to be taken, nor eschewing uncleanness without expounding the rules concerning persons suffering from running issue, &c. From this it necessarily follows that tradition preceded the writing of the law by forty years. When the Israelites were gathered in the holy land, the King and the High Priest watched and guarded these records, especially during the existence of prophecy. When we went into the first exile and the prophets were removed, the learned feared that traditional knowledge might be forgotten. They therefore collected the sources and codified them. This they called Mishnāh. It was kept in its various divisions in the expectation that they would be retained by means of fixing the sources. And so it happened. These divisions were kept in memory till the second exile. We, then, digested them in a more detailed manner than in the first instance in solicitude for the disciples. They, in their turn, left them unfixed, so that they might be further investigated. This system they styled Talmud. Now if some one asks: How can statements contained in the Mishnāh and the Talmud be
traced back to individual authors? We answer that those who handed them down were a number of people. When they had recorded them, they substantiated them showing that they had not invented them. An instance of this kind in Num. 31. 23, which is ascribed to El'azar, who conveyed the command (to the people) but did not contrive it. Another question is, how is it that a difference arose in the Mishnāh or the Talmud between two traditionists? The reply is that no difference exists as regards the point at issue, but it is like a difference in the initial stages of some matter as it appears to a person who hears it. Here three classes must be distinguished. First, One doctor grasped the subject more clearly than another, and differed from him, and taught it according to his conception. Thus Moses corrected Aaron and his sons when they burned the he-goat (Lev. 10. 10) till they unloaded their minds to him, because he was not sure that they had done so unwittingly. Secondly, It occurred that two things were handed down in the name of Moses, one being lawful, the other unlawful. Some doctors treated on the lawful one first, whilst the other matter should have been taught first. Both pronouncements were equally correct, the matter being lawful from one point of view, but unlawful from another, e.g. Deut. 20. 19; Lev. 22. 12-13. There is no difference between these two principles which must be brought into harmony one with the other. Thirdly, one doctor only heard one part of a subject, but believed that he had learnt the whole of it, whilst the other had it complete. Now, when the former taught his view, the other rejoined: we have learnt the whole of the subject and it contains something which renders your version more distinct. If any one read the law of sha'itūz (Lev. 19. 19)
he might explain it in a general way, but when he reads through the whole Tôrâh and comes to Deut. 22. 11, he will see wool and linen especially mentioned. There are other instances of the same kind. Know that those who reject this doctrine, whenever they are confronted with rabbinical laws of which the details are not to be found in Holy Writ, say that Moses left them in this condition because he meant us to develop them by means of speculation. I re-echo this attack on speculation in order to disclose its mischievousness. He then continues: Some Karaites regard the rejection of tradition by part of the people as the refutation of it. If this be so, say they, then the prohibition to commit it to writing would be tantamount to rejecting it likewise. Some even, says he, consider the difference of opinion in matters of oral tradition as rejection, but in this case any variation in an oral text which has been committed to writing would be an attack on it.'

Thus far Saadya. The bulk of the author's rejoinder deals with that portion of Saadya's treatise which is missing. The main points of the reply are, in abridged translation, the following: The author of the fragment begins his refutation by stating that the harmfulness of Saadya's assertions is quite obvious. Saadya asserts, he says, that Moses never made a command look like a prohibition, supporting this by Deut. 30. 11 and Prov. 8. 9. This, however, is also Karaite doctrine, and confirms the kiyâs. Saadya must surely mean that careful and impartial examination accompanied by the speculative method clearly reveals the meaning of any law. Saadya has set up seven rules which compel us to resort to

36 Gittin 60 b.

37 See Geiger, Wissenschaftliche Zeitschrift, &c., V, p. 313, in the name of
rabbinic tradition. As regards \textit{Ṣīṣīt, Sukkāḥ}, and similar laws, rabbinic teaching differs from the Bible. In Ezra (3. 4) it is stated that the people celebrated the feast of Tabernacles as commanded in the Tōrāh. Rabbanites violate the law of \textit{Ṣīṣīt} by confessing to be ignorant of the nature of \textit{Tekelet}. \textit{Ṣīṣīt}, consequently, should be relinquished entirely at the present time, just as they allowed the rules of purification to lapse in consequence of the want of ‘the water of separation’. This also applies to \textit{Terūmāh}. Although we do not know how to deal with it in our time, we need not do so, since the priest to whom we would have to pay it is an unknown person. If we have to search for evidence, it would result in \textit{kīyās}, as is the case with many other laws not explained in the Tōrāh. On the other hand the prohibition laid on the king not to increase the number of his wives, or his horses, or his wealth, are supplemented by explanations. Saadya further states that the law of \textit{Sabbath} cannot be carried out without rabbinic tradition. With regard to his opinion on work on Sabbath he ought to be ashamed of mentioning it. Rabbanites permit certain work on Sabbath, but actual facts and reason show that they violate it. They permit the sewing of one stitch and the writing of one or even two letters. Sabbath may be violated for children but not for David, king of Israel.\textsuperscript{38} They also permit borrowing articles of food\textsuperscript{39} from a friend. Saadya’s allusion to \textit{vessels} subject

\textsuperscript{38} Shabbat, 151b.

\textsuperscript{39} Ṣālejān, \textit{Mishnāh} Shabbat, XXXIII, 1; see also Nissi’s extracts from the Mishnāh.
to uncleanness the author refutes by alluding to the legend in the Talmud concerning the differences of opinion between R. Eliezer b. Hycanus and the miracles which happened in support of the former. This is a disgrace to Rabbanites. Both Ananites and Karaites hold very strong opinions on the matter, and explain the rules of the uncleanness of vessels. As regards prayers, the Bible lays down our duty in various places, especially Dan. 6. II, viz. three times every day, but the Rabbanites abolished part of it. Saadya's remarks on the calendar as in force from the time of the second Temple to our own time is quite useless, since no damage would accrue if we knew nothing about it. His further observations on the arrival of the Messiah, which, being based on rabbinical tradition, may be referred to the time of the kings, is a mere assertion, because this matter is so clear that no doubt exists about it. But it may be objected: Why do Christians and some Jews assert that the arrival of the Messiah has taken place already? This Christian doctrine is like the other of the Trinity and the abrogation of the Tórāh. Abu Isā Al Ispahāni claimed to be a prophet, and Yudghān styled himself the Messiah—but with these matters the author promises to deal on another occasion, not on the basis of tradition but with the assistance of clear proofs taken from the Bible. The assurances given in the Bible which are to be fulfilled in the days of the Messiah are independent of any given years. Saadya's statement that the Tórāh was written in the fortieth year, and that, when the Israelites were in the holy land, the king and the people guarded it carefully, especially during the period of the prophets, is exactly the same as we Karaites maintain. His further

40 Bab. Mez. 59 b.
remarks about the development of the Mishnāh and Talmud have been disproved in the twelfth chapter of the present book. He further maintains that laws promulgated by one person, such as that attributed to El'āzar—which was, however, only connected with his name, but not contrived by him—have ceased to have any force. This shows that tradition has fallen to the ground. For the difference between various authorities of the Mishnāh and Talmud Saadya gives three reasons—but here the fragment is interrupted.

Our next task is to search for the possible author of the fragment. In the solution of this question we are assisted by the Karaite author Moses Bashyāzi, who lived in the sixteenth century, and who in his work actually quotes a passage from our fragment, ascribing the work to Joseph Al Baṣīr, who flourished in the beginning of the eleventh century. One of his works is a Book of Commandments (Kitāb al-istibṣār).41 Now Dr. Poznański, to whom we owe the extract from Moses Bashyāzi’s book, is of opinion that the latter mixed up Joseph Al Baṣīr with Kirkisāni, whom he considers to be the author of our fragment. He supports this theory by a second quotation from Moses Bashyāzi, which is really to be found in Kirkisāni’s Book of Lights. The authorship of the latter quotation is, however, doubtful for the following reasons. Many of the items mentioned in the rejoinder to Saadya’s attack are already contained in the first section42 of Kirkisāni’s work, which is now known through Harkavy’s

41 For a fragment of this work (in Arabic characters throughout) see Cod. Brit. Mus. Or. 2576.
42 Writing one or two letters, Harkavy, l.c., p. 288; sewing, p. 288; carrying spittle, ibid.; cooking, p. 289; unclean vessels, ibid.
edition. The author of our fragment refers the reader several times to more extensive discussion of points later on, but why should he not refer to expositions given in the earlier part of the work? To this we may add the following: The author of our fragment states that Yudghān styled himself Messiah, whilst Kirkisāni says, at least in two places,\(^43\) that it was his disciples and adherents who gave him this title. Dr. Poznański lays stress on the quotation of the talmudical legend of miracles performed for the sake of Eliezer b. Hyrcanus, but there is no reason to assume that this was not also known to Joseph al Baṣīr. It is even probable that the latter copied it from Kirkisāni, just as he borrowed the second quotation mentioned above, which is not only very short, but of so general a character that several Karaite authors may have used it. Their stock of arguments was so small that one repeated what another had said before him, and even without much fear of discovery, as each author only had a small circle of readers.

There is yet another proof against Kirkisāni's authorship of the fragment, viz. the tone of the discussion. He never indulges in abuse, and Saadya in particular is alluded to with marks of respect. Remarks that Saadya 'ought to have been ashamed of it', and 'This is disgrace to Rabbanites', do not agree with Kirkisāni's style, but rather with a contemporary of Jepheth, who is frequently guilty of abusive expressions. If Dr. Poznański places reliance in Moses Bashyāzi in one instance, why not also in another?

Some additional light is thrown on Joseph al-Baṣīr's treatise by his famous contemporary Jepheth b. Ali. He, too, chafed under Saadya's denunciation of the ḳiyāṣ. Without writing a special pamphlet in its defence, he

\(^{43}\) Harkavy, l.c., p. 284, and my Arabian Chrestomathy, p. 121.
inserted a refutation of Saadya's criticism in his commentary on Exodus (21. 3-4), stating that he could only deal with the matter briefly, because 'this is a commentary'. He, too, quotes salient passages from Saadya's treatise, but he does so in his usual abusive manner. He divides Saadya's arguments into two classes, idle assertions and falsehoods. As little is to be gained from repeating his arguments in full, I refrained from reproducing them. They help us, however, to understand why this treatise of Saadya, as well as most of his polemical writings, are entirely or partially lost. More than ever am I convinced that they were destroyed by Karaites, who only preserved so much of them as they thought they could refute. In this way we owe to these two men the preservation of a few relics of an important work by the powerful opponent of Karaism.

I

Brit. Mus. Or. 5558 B. 13 x 11 cm.

(1) Megillah I, 2.

Fol. 37 ro.

11 Cod. Brit. Mus. Or. 2468, fol. 6 sqq.
נשלות קורת עב וישימו חותמות עליהן
ונאשוו היא עיר נמלת כל שיש
וב עשרה בצלמור חותם מובטח ירי
וכם באלו אבדו מקריבין ולא מעneapolisי
אצל ותן עני התנשא והושע באז התנשה
והקהל נאられין ולא מקריבין אל על פיו
שאלו מקריבין ולא מע啭י תונרש
והיכן ומעינת ובยิ้มהנא לאמני
אומר רבי יהודה_An פנק למקדם שמעון
(בשלי ובתורה שלול תפקוד ישן מברכים)
לא בטוע ואלא תמחיש אין קוריאן א хочה
ב柽יר וטיין לא חכ והראשיו לא רעד
והទון עליה נא אדם התנשה
לא נאנו ובחלת אוף הקדיש בנהנה
הנתנה ביניה התמימים אל זא רי חובה
וראה הצבור תנתנה כבצל לא בר
פורים בעל אל על לא באמר
(2) Rosh ha-Sh. I, 5.

בפרד ראש发行人
הנה שאמורה על שיני הדימים מחללן תא תובה
על טרפ על שזרי לשבח ליגלן וואני
לאריה ובחם מעיקני ולא התなくなנו ובושתה
בם התקרה קם מחללן אלא על בלע เมאני
ם עתרת ביעלה עווי
שהלא נרואה בעלל מחללן עדת התובה
רבי ויהו אוני וא נרואה בעלל עווי מחללן
עלון עד התובה עיני שראה תא תוהה
ואנא ידול לזלול[,] כל הלוחים עא קלח
[ دمشق]
Rosh ha-Sh. II, 8.

If the Karaite critics wish to argue that the Tosefta is a work of the Academy, they move to another point of view. If the Academy itself, or any of its members, wrote any Tosefta, then the Tosefta would have been contained in the Jerusalem Talmud, not in a separate work. But if the Tosefta is not a work of the Academy, then it must be the work of the Rabbis of the Academy, who decided to separate it from the Talmud. Therefore, the Tosefta is not a work of the Academy, but rather a work of the Rabbis of the Academy.

Fol. 39 ro.

Karaite Critics of the Mishnah—Hirschfeld 179
(3) Shabbat XVI, 6.

בשביין נר והשבת用车 נון
וכל אחד ואמר
שבת לא מביא הוא
אך הוא כן וMouseListener utilizado 이
וירא והנה שבתיו אישים כלות
[בכום]
Fol. 39 vo and 40 ro (slightly reduced).
Hullin IV, 3.

(4) Hullin IV, 3.

ushedem at bahmam ovo az b'shollo
Tosha ha'ebelah u'ano
Jabol'mos laa nisom ha'shiva
Ullo miteina la'ela ofo ala
Mor'a b'aloto ulo she'ezavta nefekha
Ezora be'itna pozo hulor
Ovayi hulor habatemikha
Hafele shollu 'unse'yel'kabem
Batzoroshim hakor ein kobar a'ate
Baksheth rayem ovo hulor a'ate baiel
Nafni rabi akharoni
Rabi rabi el avi hachaim u'medint

Hullin IV, 8.

Shehote ato mehurat [rabi] Shimon Shoi, omo
Afela'no b'n tohct ovo ho'or horei bahate hatin ovo
(5) Niddah III, 6.

Fol. 36 ro.

Niddah IV, 6.

Fol. 36 vo.

45 Added by a later hand between the lines.

46 Omitted.
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II


Fol. 44 ro.

قال ونباشي ان اقول كيف دُخلت هذه الامبيه من اثار الرسول فقال ان هذه المئات والكتب والكتب شاهدتها الله ومن فعل الرسول قبل

ان يكتب التوراة برابعين سنة لان السح بدنق على ان التوراة انها

كتب في سنة الاربعين وذلك ان الله قال لرسوله أكتب دربيشيت دارا الوعم

فأطلق على كلمة كنه وهو يكتب من بريشيت الى وشاما لا تاعب فكثر من

أخبار الكهون وربيع ميئة وثمان ستة سنة هذا المغفر وكذا حقيقة ما

نعتقد في امر كهنه التوراة حتى يكون من قطره قد وقف على حمله

مقنعه فما يراد منه من الاخبار والتشريع ومن السنة الأولى فقد علم

الرسول للكلمة جميع الشرع والاحكام التي أمر بها وذلك انه نصب لهم

ساري الهم وساري ميات وتمام لتحملوا بما علمهم ولا تجوز ان يبس

كل ما هو لم يجي للهم من اى خبر الهل ولا بتعزل النجاسات

وهو لم يذكر كم حد الغاب وما ناذرا وما اشتهى ذلك ومن هذه الضرورة يجب

ان يكون يعبر الم NodeList:Karaite Critics of the Mishnah—Hirschfeld

Fol. 44 ro.
لا أعمق في البلد الخاص كان البلاد والأمام تهذب أن هذه الأثار وتشيراتها ولا سيما تحذيرات النبي فإنها بابنا بالبلد الأولى وارتقاء الأنباء مخالف العالماء على العلم التلقيني أن نَّسَنا فهموا إلى عمودًا فائتوبوا وماً مشارًا ودعا بروح ياً أن نتفحص بإثبات تلك العيون فكان كذلك فالم يزل الفروع المبقا محتفظة إلى أن أصلينا الإجابة الثاني فتحت من أكثر من التعزيز الأول مخاطب التلاميذ حيثُي على ما كان قدنا وهم لم يشتبهوا أن يندرسوا إليه فائتوبوا أيضًا فسموه تعلم قال فإن سأل سائل كيف تُسَمِب اقال فيهما أعني المنشآت والتنامود إلى فراد من الناس كلمة إنهم الذين ذكروا بها بناءً فما ذكروها ذكرتها وشهدت بها ليس لأنهم ادعوها كما نسبت التوبة قصة كل دابار آخر يحببنا إلى العزازلا لأنهم ذكرنا لأناه

ببين الناقلين قلتنا ليس هو خالفًا على لقبته وإنما هو كأخلف في أول حال يبدوا للساحم وما حقينته في على ثلاثة اترب الأول منها أن يكون بعض العلماء أظهر للبعض كالأثر خالفًا فشارع حتى علم مقدار ما عنه وذلك كما أظهر ديننا عليه السام موجدةً على هرون وبيئة في إخراجهن سعيه ملاحظات حتى كشفوا لها ما عندهم لأنهم لم يأمن أن يكونها اخزونًا بغير معرفة والثاني أن يكون شر مه من النبي إنها على ضربين احدهما خلال الآخر حرام فسبق بعض العلماء إلى الأذكار بالإخلاص والأمر إلى الذكرا باحترام وما صادقات في القولين جميعا أن ذلك الذي جعل على جهه حرام على جميع أخرى وذلك كما قال في التوبة لو تشكبت أث عيبه راح عيب أقه أدهم تيمك في لا عيب ماهلا هو ونثي تشكبت ووقت ويب كومين في تيهمها لاي لاح زار وفال لتوحيد ويب كومين في كومينها الدار وثال ملحم ابهما توحيد ولا مرة عند الداعيين أن ذكراهمها تبق على السب على وبين أن ذكراهم في الإية ونصرح بعد ذلك والثالث أن يكون أحد العلماء سمع تولا جزيا في نتفه جميع كاتبا والثانيين سمعوا تمام الكلام كما ذكر البعض ما يقوهم روا علية والثاني قد سمعنا تمام القول وفهد ما اخص ما سمعت أنت ومقامه كمن يقر في
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On this page, the text is overlaid with corrections and annotations. The text is from a manuscript, and some parts are marked as to be omitted. The annotations indicate that certain portions are to be read in a different way or are corrections to the original text. The page is part of a larger work discussing Karaites' criticism of the Mishnah.

Overlined in the manuscript, and to be omitted.
المصرف الذي كان في هذا العصر كان من نفيسا الذي بِتِّ تِمِّ مِظِهره معدوما واما قوله في كميه التروحا فهذا وان كنت لا تعرف في هذا العصر فأنا غير معروف معتاجين اليه اذ كان الذي يجب أن يدفع اليه وهو الكهبان غيور موون وافترا lưuنا لو أحتينا اليه وسمعنا عنه لأخرجه لنا القران كما اخرج لنا اشياء كثيرة مما ليس من مشروحة في النص وذلك ما ذكره مما لقيه الملك عدد من الاستكرار من النسا وخيل والمال معنا ان الكتاب قد قرن تكلف احد من هذه الخلافة قولا بدني عن معناه فقال في سبيل ولا يشيب اث هاغام مصاريفنا وانها لم تجر من ذلك الاستكرار الذي ينتج فيه الى رك القوم إلى مصرفنا ان ملك من لخيل ما ملك من غير أن بركة القوم الى مصر لم تحرم ذلك عليه وتؤكد ذلك قصة شاموس وغال في النسا ولا يسور لاباه فاما تحرم من ذلك ما يكون به زوال قلة فلما وقع ذلك في ثلاث او في اثنين تحرم ذلك عليه ولو كن الغنا ولم يتبقى ذلك لم تحرم فاما المال فقال فيه جدا الخلاف ما قاله في الآلهين المتقدمين ووجوز ان يكون رجايا الى ما قاله بعد ذلك وهو قوله لبليتي روم لابابو ميحاو ويجوز ان يكون انا حرم من ذلك ما يكون فيه الاستكرار على اخوته الارسال كاذبا ما كان اذ كان ابنا شاموس قد ملك من المال ما لا يسعى فيلم يهمل على ذلك اذ كان جاهز من غير ان يجد في طإله ولا استكرر ان اخويه عند ما ملكه وجوز ان يكون ابنا اراد ان لا يبذل مجهودا في جميع المال فشيطان بذلك مما ينتج اليه في معرفة الاخلاق وذلك قول ماود اي جذا واما ان جاء من الاموال ما لا يسعى فيغر طلب ولا يدعل مجهود فلم تحرم ذلك عليه فاما قوله في معرفة يوم السبت فهذا لم يريد ان يتعوز الا من جهة لا فين والنقل ولد نظائر وستشرح الانت ذلك فيما بعد وكذلك ما ذكره في حظر القصص في السبت وتجبر على الغيورى ان يستحق من ذكر هذا الباب اذ كان استكمال قيد إطلاقو من الأعمال في السبت ما يشهد له في حاكم الاستكرار من النسا وتنقيه النار مشتغلة مع تحريهم فحس الانهار وصلاح
KARAITÉ CRITICS OF THE MISHNĀH—HIRSCHFELD

Fol. 48 ro.

The Karaite critics of the Mishnāh were influenced by the work of Moses Hirschfeld, who published a critical edition of the Mishnāh. The critique of the Mishnāh focused on a number of issues, including the nature of the halakhic sources and the role of the rabbis in the development of Jewish law. The critique also addressed the relationship between the Mishnāh and the Talmud, as well as the role of the amora'im in the development of Jewish law.

Fol. 48 vo.

In discussing the role of the rabbis in the development of Jewish law, the Karaite critics focused on the nature of the halakhic sources. They argued that the halakhic sources were not revealed by God, but rather were the result of human creativity and interpretation. The critics also emphasized the importance of the amora'im in the development of Jewish law, and argued that their role was to interpret and apply the halakhic sources in a way that was consistent with the principles of Jewish law.

Fol. 49 ra.

The critique of the Mishnāh also addressed the relationship between the Mishnāh and the Talmud. The critics argued that the Talmud was not a direct continuation of the Mishnāh, but rather was a commentary on and interpretation of the Mishnāh. The Talmud was seen as a source of further guidance and clarification, but not as a replacement for the Mishnāh.

Fol. 49 rb.

The critique of the Mishnāh was influenced by the work of Moses Hirschfeld, who published a critical edition of the Mishnāh. The critique focused on a number of issues, including the nature of the halakhic sources and the role of the rabbis in the development of Jewish law. The critique also addressed the relationship between the Mishnāh and the Talmud, as well as the role of the amora'im in the development of Jewish law.
لا من جهة النقل بل من جهة الدلائل الكتابية الواضحة على أن يقال لمن
عارض بذلك فينا رأينا النقل معهم من ادعاء ما ادعنا فلنكن القول كما
زعمتم كان ذلك قد ردهم عن القول بذلك وإنما فإن المواعيد التي أخبر
الكتاب بكونها في أيام المسيحي لم يعلقها بسبيس مذكرة ولا بتأريخ معلوم
فيكون بعلمانا للتاريخ وجب ما أدعتم راما ما أخبرن من كمية النقل وقوله
بان النوار كتب في سنة الأربعين وابن من الكلام وقوله أن بني يعقوب
حتى كانوا في البلد خاص كان الملك والأعمال في بعض النادر في خبران ولا
سيّما عبرة الأنباء فهو قولنا وسنشرده فيما بعد راما ما أدعان من أن
العلماء عمدوا إلى العلم التلقيني فقلّنو وسموت مصتنا وقنو فروع فان
التلميذ دلّنا ما بين من الفروع وسما ذلك تلميعه فقد تقدمنا إسناضنا
لذلك في الأيام شيء وتبيننا ذلك من وجوب عدّة لنتسميت بنا حاجة
إلى علماء راما ما رمّوا من الفضل فيما يلزمهم من الأدلائل التي هي في
المشنا والتميذ ممنوحة إلى قوم بعيانهم وقوله أنهم هم الذين ذكر لمجاعة
وأنهم لما ذكورهم بها ذكروها وشهدوا بها ليس لأنهم اتبعوها واعتماد ذلك
بقول العايز كل دابار إشريابو بديش وأن ذلك إنما نسده إليه لأنه ذكره
لا لأنه لا بد فقوله في ذلك يدل على أن هذه الأدلة المنوهة إلى أولبا
القوم قد كانت لمجاعة بأسها تنسبها وإن كل واحد منهم كان يذكر شيا
وإذا كانت لمجاعة قد تنسب بكل الأدلائل حتى ذكرهم كل واحد شيا ما أم
نامن أن يكونوا يسرهم قد نسوا أشياء لم يذكرها واحد منهم وتطلب (50) وزالت
وجذا مما يوجب أن النقل قد زال فبطل ثم إنه علم ما يلزمنا مما قدمنا
ذكره مما وقع بين اهل المشنا والتميذ عن الخلاف فنعلم أن ذلك ليس
هو على لقيقنا وإنما هو على ثلاثة أضرب على ما شرحناه من قولوا وادل ما
في هذا إليه وكان الأمر على ما قال وانه لم يكن ذلك خلافا على لقيقنا لم
تشتب الامة على خلاف فالم يكن يقع بين تلامذة...
Every student of mediaeval Jewish philosophy will readily acknowledge the debt of gratitude which he owes to Dr. Jacob Guttmann, the well-known Rabbi of Breslau. By his numerous articles and treatises, dealing with the most representative exponents of Jewish rationalism in the Middle Ages, he has paved the way for a constructive study of this most interesting and most important branch of Jewish learning. Already in his early youth he devoted himself to the study of philosophy, and his doctor's thesis, published in 1868, deals with the relation of the philosophic systems of Descartes and Spinoza. This was followed by treatises on the works of the early Jewish philosophers, as Saadia, ibn Daud, Solomon ibn Gabirol, Isaac Israeli, and others. His studies of Maimonides were rather of a comparative character, showing the influence of others on his philosophy and his influence on the philosophy of those that followed him. Guttmann is also at home in the scholastic philosophy of the Middle Ages, and the relationship between this and the philosophy of the Jews is treated by him in several articles and pamphlets. All his works are characterized by a broad knowledge, full and clear comprehension, and originality of thought. While aiming at a truly scientific exposition of the subject under treatment, one cannot miss noticing in all his writings the warm sympathy of the author with everything that is Jewish and his great love for Jewish learning. He always approaches his subject with love and veneration, and this attitude does not detract from the critical value of his studies.
It was but natural that his many disciples and friends should wish to pay homage to his great services to Jewish learning on the occasion of his seventieth birthday anniversary. This homage expresses itself in the form of a number of valuable contributions in the realms of Jewish Philosophy, Jewish Law, Jewish Literature and Jewish History from the pens of eighteen representative Jewish scholars of our day. One of these contributors is the son of the celebrant, Julius Guttmann, who is following in the footsteps of his father and is making a name for himself in the fields of Jewish philosophy, and another is his brother-in-law, Dr. Simonsen of Copenhagen.

The preface to the volume is written by Prof. Martin Philippson, the late President of the 'Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Wissenschaft des Judentums', under whose auspices the volume is published. The writer pays a glowing tribute to the works and achievements of the celebrant, especially mentioning his great services to the society, which has produced a number of valuable works during the past few years. This is followed by a list of Guttmann's works, comprising 75 items, prepared by N. M. Nathan.

The first article is contributed by the Nestor of philosophic studies among the Jews of Germany, Dr. Hermann Cohen. The subject of the article is 'The Holy Spirit', as viewed from the Jewish point of view. He first analyses the meaning of the term 'spirit' in the Bible and shows how its early significance as wind (animus) gradually developed into the notion of holiness and ethical perfection. Spirit stands in direct antithesis to material in general, as well as to the material in life. Still, spirit and matter are united in all living beings, and especially in man. Through this union with the spirit in life comes the union of man with God, because 'the spirit is God'. God created the spirit of man as surely as he created the heavens and the earth. It is the spirit of man, indeed, but this spirit was given to him by God and it will return to God after its material abode is destroyed. What becomes of the spirit after its return to its Maker, this the monotheistic teaching does not reveal.

Holiness in the Jewish understanding of it implies the
spiritualizing of the concepts man and God and presumes the elevation of the service of God and of the conception of God to the highest ideals of mankind. God is holy, 'hallowed through righteousness' (Isa. 5. 16). This holiness, expressed in the term of the highest ideal of morality, becomes the heritage of man. The spirit is the gift of God to man; holiness also is the gift of God to man. 'I, the Lord your God, sanctify you' (Exod. 31. 13) is interpreted by the Rabbis to refer to the holiness coming through the performance of noble deeds מִמְדַדֵּהוּ. On the other hand, man is obliged to attribute holiness to God, i.e. the sanctification of God's name. Moses was punished because he neglected to do this at the time he was ordered to speak to the rock so that it might produce water, while the Jewish messianic ideal carries with it the hope for the complete fulfillment of the great idea of the sanctification of God's name through man.

The term 'holy spirit' occurs only twice in Isaiah and once in Psalms. In Isa. 63. 10, 11, the term used indicates only the fact that the holy spirit is the gift of God to man. In Psalm 51. 13, the true nature of the holy spirit is revealed to us. This is a penitential Psalm, in which the psalmist first prays for forgiveness (vv. 9, 13) and then for the recreation of a new heart and of a new spirit, so that by this renewal of the spirit sin may become annihilated. He then appeals to God not to take away 'His holy spirit' from him, the spirit which is the indestructible character of man, the correlation between man and God. Sin cannot destroy it. Sin becomes destroyed through the renewal of the spirit. Hence inherited sin is impossible, it contradicts the very notion of the holy spirit, which man has in common with God. The holy spirit is neither man nor God, but an attribute, a power common to both. God and man must remain distinct and separate, if they are to be united by means of the holy spirit, otherwise union would be impossible. In Judaism, the idea of the holy spirit rests entirely on the ethical life of the individual, and is common to Jew and non-Jew alike. Cohen introduces a large number of quotations from the Bible and Rabbinic
literature to illustrate the ideas which he endeavours to elucidate.

Dr. J. Cohn presents an illuminating explanation of a difficult passage in the Wisdom of Solomon (11. 18), which refers to the creation of the world. There it is said that God created the world out of 'formless primeval matter' (τὸ ἀμύρφον ἄλης). This expression contradicts the whole tenor of the book, which is written in the spirit of true Jewish tradition. Our author interprets this in the sense given to a similar expression of Gersonides, a most ardent follower of Aristotle, who speaks of the world as 'creatio ex nihilo' only in so far that it was not created out of any substance which has form. This formless substance (הנה נצרה כל) is interpreted as a pure abstraction, an idea that existed in the mind of the Creator.

Hasdai Crescas's criticisms of Aristotle's conceptions of space, time, and infinity form the subject of an exhaustive study by Julius Guttmann, the son of the celebrant. The author first analyses these criticisms, showing their strength and occasionally also their weakness. According to Guttmann, Crescas's discussion of Aristotle's Physics has no other purpose but to establish the entire independence of the proofs for the existence of a God from the Aristotelian conceptions of the world, which has formed the basis for the arguments of many Jewish philosophers who preceded him.

The problem of the attributes of God, which gave rise to so much discussion on the part of the Jewish mediaeval philosophers, also troubled the minds of the Rabbis of the Talmud, according to the opinion of S. Horovitz. The paraphrases of the Targum, which have been adduced as proof of an attempt to solve this problem, refer mainly to anthropomorphic or anthropopathic expressions in the Bible and do not show any consciousness of the difficulty of the problem. Horovitz mentions one citation from the Sifre (Num. section 153), which indicates a faint recognition of the difficulty. Philo declared that God was possessed of no qualities (ἀποκοσμ), but Philo was unknown to mediaeval Jewry. Still there is enough in Talmudic literature to indicate a certain continuity in philosophic speculation. Horovitz, in
a second chapter, shows that the works of Maimonides and his study of God's attributes, while strongly influenced by Arabic philosophy, have exerted no influence on the development of Arabic philosophic thought. He doubts whether the works of the mediaeval Jewish philosophers were even known to the Arabs. He can point to only one passage in Senussi, an Arabic theologian of the fifteenth century, which shows an acquaintance with Maimonides' More. The third chapter of this article is devoted to an interpretation of a few terms used by Maimonides.

Julius Lewkowitz endeavours to establish the true meaning of the relation between God and man, from a modern scientific point of view. The most difficult phase in this relationship is to determine the exact meaning of individual providence. Before this can be determined, however, there are several vital questions, as the conception of God by man and the problem of man's freedom to act under such a relationship, which demand attention. Our author discusses these problems from the Jewish point of view, contrasting the Jewish idea of the inherent goodness of man with the Christian notion of the original depravity of the human nature and showing the proper place of the idea of God's grace in the ethical character of man. God's grace is extended to every individual, for every man is endowed with the possibilities of self-development. It is true that we are unable to explain the differences that exist in the natures of different human beings. We are, however, certain that God's providence and grace are extended alike to all individuals.

What position does religion occupy in the present human culture? Is it possible to find a basis for religious philosophy in modern culture and to harmonize it with the general trend of this scientific age? This is a very difficult problem that Albert Lewkowitz undertook to solve, and his solution will not satisfy the rational thinker of modern days. His analysis of the conception of religion as enunciated by Schleiermacher, who bases it on human emotions, and of Hermann Cohen, who seeks to establish a purely rational basis for it, is clear and convincing, but his own point of view is rather obscure.
While Kant has shown but little sympathy with Jews and with Judaism, Jews have been loyal followers of Kant and his philosophy. Markus Herz, Solomon Maimon, Bendavid, and especially the great modern Jewish philosopher, Hermann Cohen, have been devoted students of Kant and admirers of his philosophy. In order to explain this phenomenon, M. Steckelmacher endeavours to seek some inner harmony between the Kantian philosophy and the teachings of Judaism, of which the Königsberg sage himself was entirely unconscious. Kant's theory of time and space solves many of the difficulties that beset Jewish theologians, while his theory of ethics falls in perfect harmony with the moral law of the Bible and of later Jewish tradition. In a popular style the author lucidly sets forth several of the leading principles of the Kantian philosophy and compares them with similar teachings in Judaism with which they may be brought in accord. This closeness of ideas and relativity of thought, Steckelmacher thinks, accounts for the sympathy that Jewish thinkers felt with the philosophy of Kant to the extent of making them overlook even his ignorance and lack of appreciation of Jewish ideals and conceptions.

The second section of the book, dealing with Talmud and Midrash, is introduced by a contribution entitled 'Rome and the Mystics of the Merkabah', by Philip Bloch. The Sefer Hekalot or Pirke Hekalot, which is the product of the Mystics of the Merkabah (תורת הכרב), contains, besides incantations and names of God and of angels, two historic documents—the story of the Ten Martyrs and the legend about Hananiah ben Tradyon. These our author undertakes to analyse and to determine through them the probable date of the composition of the book. The story of the Ten Martyrs, with its unmistakable signs of a period when Jews imparted knowledge to Christians, and its reference to the curse poured out on Rome, fits in with the period immediately following the accession of Gregory to the papacy, after 590. The legend of R. Hananyah b. Tradyon also points to the same period. A number of suggestive interpretations of the text are thrown out by the author in the course of the article. Although
he admits that his conjecture about the date of the book is only a surmise, not backed by any positive proof, he seems to be reasonably certain that the place of composition was Rome and the time about the middle of the seventh century. He ventures to suggest that the Otiot derabbi Akiba, and possibly also the Sefer Yezirah were composed in Rome, although he refrains from entering into a discussion of these subjects.

The meaning of the obscure term הָבָרִי, which has given rise to many differences of opinion among scholars, is here again reviewed by Jakob Horovitz, in relation to several passages in which the term occurs. Our author is inclined to reject entirely the interpretation of Büchler in his 'Der galiläische Am Haarez', which aims to identify הָבָרִי with regularly established organizations and societies. Our author, however, is undecided between the two earlier definitions of the term, that of R. Hai, which makes it identical with the learned or honoured men of the community, and that attributed to R. Hananel, which translates it as the community as a whole. In several places the latter meaning seems to be the more acceptable, while there are some passages in which the former rendering appears the more fitting. It is doubtful whether many will accept our author's explanation of the term as used in Semahot XI (p. 138). The distinction drawn by him between the שֻׁם הָבָרִי and the מְעֹרָת הָבָרִי (p. 141) appears logical and in agreement with the text, although the suggested, ingenious emendation of הָבָרִי for הָבָרִי may not be accepted.

N. A. Nobel, in a brief contribution, endeavours to draw a comparison between the Talmudic law regarding the commission of several crimes or sins at the same time and the Roman concursus delictorum. The study is short and inadequate and the author promises to give a more detailed presentation of the subject at some future time.

The foremost living authority on the Midrash Rabba, J. Theodor, publishes here three unknown Parashahs of Bereshit Rabbah (95-97) from a Vatican manuscript. In his introduction, Dr. Theodor argues that these Parashahs unmistakably belong
to Bereshit Rabba, as shown both by the diction and by the context. The manuscript was apparently unknown to the various commentators and editors of the Midrash Rabba, with the possible exception of the compilers of the Midrash Haggadot. The text itself is accompanied by many notes by the author.

The third section contains contributions on subjects related to the history of Jewish literature. This begins with an article by the late Leopold Cohn, entitled ‘Pseudo-Philo and Jerahmeel’. In 1898, Cohn called attention in the Jewish Quarterly Review to an almost forgotten work ascribed in the Middle Ages to Philo, which is a kind of Midrash to ancient history, up to the time of King David. Cohn returns here to a consideration of the same work, in connexion with the Chronicles of Jerahmeel, published by M. Gaster in 1899. The main purpose of the author is to disprove Gaster’s theory that the compiler of the Jerahmeel legend had before him a copy of the Hebrew original of the Pseudo-Philo. Cohn tries to prove that Jerahmeel did not see the Hebrew at all, but received his information from the Latin translation. At the end of the article the author expresses doubt whether the compiler of Jerahmeel saw the Pseudo-Philo at all, and whether he had not received all his knowledge from a secondary source altogether.

A splendid résumé of Abraham ibn Daud’s historical works and their value as historical source books, is presented by I. Elbogen. He first gives the general contents of the three treatises and then endeavours to show that they were all ‘Tendenzschriften’, written for special purposes which the author had in mind. The Seder ha-Kabbalah, according to Elbogen, was written for the purpose of refuting the contentions of the Karaite tradition, the History of the Kings to show that the Messiah has not yet appeared, notwithstanding the Karaitic claims, and that only a scion of the house of David can be recognized as the Messiah, and the Roman History to show that the Christian era is not accurate and that the Gospels were composed long after the death of Jesus. Elbogen then proceeds to show the sources
from which ibn Daud drew his information and the manner in which he treated these sources. Ibn Daud was not a critical historian, was given to exaggeration, and frequently referred events to the influence of the supernatural. His style, however, is always clear and attractive. His works were greatly used by all subsequent Jewish historians and were translated into Latin and studied by Christian scholars.

The oft quoted Kabbalistic works לַעֲלוֹת הָגֹאָהוֹת and מִסְפַּדְרֵי מִסְפַּדְרֵי are the works of Paulus de Heredia, who lived in the middle of the fifteenth century, according to A. Freimann. In a little book, now exceedingly rare, Paulus de Heredia propounds eight questions, most of which pertain to the trinity. The questions and answers are put in the mouth of Nehunyah ben Hakkanah, who gives the answers in the name of Rabbenu Hakadosh. It appears that Paulus, or some one else, later translated the same book into Hebrew. The book was passed unnoticed by Jews, although it is frequently quoted by Christian theologians.

D. Simonsen, a brother-in-law of the celebrant, brings together several responsa of Maimonides and of his son Abraham, which have either never been published before or were published in a corrupt form of translation. The first responsum deals with the question of the repetition of the ‘Amidah by the precentor, and the second with the question whether one is obliged to turn to the wall while reciting the ‘Amidah. The third deals with a civil question directed to him by the Dayyan Pincus b. Elijah of Alexandria.

A more lengthy responsum by Abraham Maimonides is given at the end of the article. This deals with an incident of historical importance and throws considerable light on the gentleness and modesty of the son of the great philosopher. The question involved a personal controversy between the Dayyan Joseph b. Gershon of Alexandria, a native of France, and the Nasi Hodyah b. Yishai. This Hodyah was until now unknown to Jewish history.

The fourth section of this volume, devoted to Jewish history, begins with an exceedingly interesting article by M. Brann
relating to the Silesian Jewish community. The purpose of the article is to present a letter written by a certain Solomon Bloch of London to his father Hirsch Bloch of Langendorf, Silesia, dated January 28, 1763. The letter is written in the Yiddish spoken at that time by German Jews, and throws much light on the life of the Jews in Germany in the middle of the eighteenth century and is also of considerable interest to American Jewish history.

The oppressive laws which forbade the marriage of more than one son in a Jewish family drove many young Jews to seek their fortunes in distant lands. This Solomon Bloch settled in London, while another brother, Koppel, emigrated to America and settled for a time in Philadelphia, under the name of Jacob Henry. Both he and his relative Barnard Gratz were first employed in the business of David Franks in Philadelphia. The author, in his notes, shows a familiarity with the early history of the Jews in Philadelphia. He also acknowledges the assistance given to him in this matter by Judge Mayer Sulzberger. This interesting document is preceded by a general résumé of the conditions of Jewish life in Silesia, in which the genealogy of the writer of this letter is traced.

A. Lewinsky, who succeeded Guttmann as Rabbi of Hildesheim, after the latter had occupied that position for eighteen years, presents here a few extracts from the Hildesheimer Relations-Courier of the years 1748–1754, which pertain to the history of the Jews in Germany during that period. It is interesting to note the references made in that journal to the Emden-Eibeschütz controversy in Altona. Most of the other notices deal mainly with local events or with government ordinances affecting Jews.

The volume concludes with an illustrated article on the Hebrew Inscriptions in the Aleppo Synagogue, compiled by M. Sobernheim and E. Mittwoch. The synagogue in Aleppo is one of the oldest synagogues in the world. It was probably first erected in the fifth or sixth century, although Abbé Chagnon is of the opinion that portions of it were erected as early as the fourth century. M. Sobernheim copied some of the inscriptions found on the walls of the several chapels of the synagogue.
and E. Mittwoch provided the commentary. The article is accompanied also by a plan of the structure as well as by several photographs of views of the synagogue.

The first inscription given here is dated 833 and refers to a cupola which was donated by one 'Ali ben Nathan ben Mebasser ben דַּנְיָואל. The last name is rather unusual, but the reading given by Adler (Jewish Encyclopaedia, s.v. Aleppo) is rejected by Mittwoch. He derives it from the Arabic word meaning a servant (حاذم). The second inscription, dated 1414, refers to the erection of six columns, donated by one Eliezer Halevi ben Elijah in memory of his sons Joseph and Ismael, and a daughter, whose name is not given. The third inscription is dated 1407 (in the text the date is given by mistake as 1417) and refers to the donation of an ark by one Abraham ben Jacob Hakohen. The fourth inscription, dated 1404, is more elaborate and refers to the rebuilding of a ceiling, columns and thresholds, donated by one Saadael ben Obadiah.

It is probably due to the present cataclysm in Europe that Jewish scholars living in countries at war with Germany have not sent their contributions to this volume. We miss several prominent names of Jewish scholars residing in Russia, England, or France, who should have contributed to a volume in honour of Jacob Guttmann. It is, however, strange that none of the American Jewish scholars participated in the homage paid here to the scholar and Rabbi. A note explaining this should have appeared in the preface, if there is a plausible explanation for it.

Julius H. Greenstone.

Gratz College.
BOOKS ON JEWISH EDUCATION

The New Education in Religion. By Henry Berkowitz, D.D.

In this book of two small volumes Dr. Berkowitz endeavours, as its title indicates, to apply the principles of the new education to the religious instruction of the Jewish youth. What mainly distinguishes the new education in general from the old is its definition of the function of education in psychological terms as the development of the powers and faculties of the pupil rather than in cultural terms as the perpetuation of certain ideals and standards and the transmission from generation to generation of the highest products of the world's civilization. There can be no denying the value of this psychological point of view. Every generation has its own problems which differ from those of previous generations, and, consequently, each in turn must be given the physical and mental powers to cope with its problems independently. Moreover the mind, even in childhood, is not a tabula rasa and cannot be made to acquire even the knowledge of the past, not to mention the capacity to meet the demands of the future save in accordance with the laws of its own nature. Dr. Berkowitz renders a valuable service therefore to Jewish education by calling attention to this psychological point of view and to the advantages which must accrue as a result of its application to the religious education of the Jew, for it is a fact that but few of our religious schools pay due regard to the physical and psychical needs of our children.

But the aim of the book is not merely to point out the principle but to apply it in the concrete to the problems of curriculum, method of instruction, school organization and management, discipline, &c., so that it may be a practical guide
to parents, teachers, and principals of schools. In this, however, it falls somewhat short of accomplishment because of a defect not peculiar to it, but characteristic rather of the new education in general.

For the value of the psychological definition of the aim of education has led many educators to forget that the older conception of the aim in terms of a traditional culture to be perpetuated has also its value, which must not be lost sight of. Education has a social as well as an individual significance, and as long as the adult generation has to do the world's work and has to do it in accordance with a vision that requires planning for generations yet unborn, so long must it remain the concern of society not merely that the rising generation shall have the power to continue the work but that it shall inherit the plan of work—the ideal. Not merely the development of the potential powers of the child is the goal of education, but their employment in the discharge of the specific obligations and in the service of the specific ideals which the old generation, in order to be true to itself, must bequeath to the new. It follows, therefore, that though the psychological definition of the aim of education is useful in determining educational method, it cannot give us the content of education, which must be determined by the ideals of the adult world. And, if this is true of education in general, it is particularly true of Jewish education. For the Jew in the diaspora, constituting a minority of the population, and living in a non-Jewish environment, has to perpetuate his ideals and institutions in competition with those of the dominant faith, although the latter may perhaps be utilized with equal success as the former in the development of the child's spiritual powers and capacities, or, to use a favourite word of our author's, in the development of 'character'.

Dr. Berkowitz defines the aim of the new education in religion as 'the development of character based on a deep love of the ideals and principles of our religion'. We should be more inclined to define it as the training of the child's character in the service of the ideals and principles of our religion. This may
seem a distinction without a difference, but the following elaboration of his definition shows that the distinction is real. 'The Jewish school', he says, 'is distinct from the schools of other religions in urging these Jewish methods of awakening and deepening the religious life'. From the point of view of the author, the child has a certain natural religiosity, the development of which is the aim of religious education, and the difference between the Jewish school and the Christian is merely one of method, the Jewish method preferring the use of Jewish lesson material. He, therefore, holds that the specific content of Judaism affects the method only, but that the aim is determined by the psychology of the child. Would not the reverse of this, however, appear more reasonable, to let the specific content of Judaism determine the aim of instruction and to let the psychological needs of the child determine the method only?

To illustrate our point by a concrete instance. What place should instruction in Hebrew hold in the curriculum of the Jewish school? Dr. Berkowitz, speaking from the psychological point of view, observes that 'the fact that Hebrew is the language of Jewish worship associates with this language a devout sentiment of incalculable value in fostering a prayerful spirit of reverence' and that 'this deep psychologic value cannot be surrendered without irreparable loss'. He therefore comes to the conclusion that 'so much of Hebrew as is used in the congregational worship' must be taught in every school. Only incidentally does he mention the importance of Hebrew as the key to an understanding of the sources of Judaism and as a bond of union between Jews. Consequently but little emphasis is laid on thorough training in the Hebrew language. Until after confirmation, which, in the opinion of our author, should be about the fifteenth year of a child's life, he is content that 'the study of the sacred tongue' be 'limited to preparation for its use in prayer'. But the great mass of conservative Jews, who regard an adequate knowledge of the Torah in its own language as indispensable to the maintenance of Jewish tradition, and above all the nationalists, who are vitally concerned with keeping alive the national aspirations
of the Jewish people and preserving and adding to its cultural possessions, would not and could not assign so limited a scope to Hebrew instruction even though there be no inherent quality in the child's soul which demands more thorough instruction in Hebrew in order to bring it to maturity.

Dr. Berkowitz is to be commended for his tactful avoidance of all controversial discussion. He desires his book to be of service to schools of Orthodox and Reform tendencies alike, and does not impose on his readers the liberal interpretation of Judaism with which he is known to be identified. At the same time, his book cannot be of much practical use to Orthodox or Conservative Jewish educators because of the sins of omission which, as we have already shown, follow naturally from the author's conception of the aim of Jewish education.


These two volumes apply to the concrete problem of the religious education of early childhood the principles of the new education outlined by Dr. Berkowitz. They show very strikingly the educational advantages which a proper regard for the psychology of childhood affords. Their chief virtue is their insistence in every lesson on some point of contact with the child's daily life. This has the effect of making the child feel the importance of his religious education not merely as necessary to the attainment of some remote goal but in the daily conduct of his life. It tends to make his religion an intimate personal experience, not merely an abstract concept. Typical of some of the suggestions in the book is that which recommends the practice of celebrating the birthdays of the pupils by a religious ceremonial in the class-room, and suggests that this be made the occasion of a gift to charity by the pupil in order that his birthday
and all joyous occasions be associated in his mind with giving and not merely with selfishly receiving gifts.

In her treatment of the Bible stories, Miss Jacobs utilizes them almost exclusively to illustrate moral principles, and she therefore has no scruples about introducing legendary elaborations into the biblical narrative if they can be used to point a moral. Thus she connects the mess of lentils for which Esau sells his birthright to Jacob with the mourning meal on the occasion of Abraham's death in accordance with an ancient 

\textit{Haggadah}, though no such significance is attached to it in the Bible itself. There is danger in such a course in that it tends to destroy the unique position of the Bible as the standard of religious authority for the Jew. This danger inheres in the whole method of teaching the Bible merely as the source-book for edifying stories without any necessary connexion and omitting whatever is not immediately and without difficulty applicable by the child in his daily life. The result of this eclectic way of dealing with biblical history is to make the book of much more value to schools of liberal tendency, which encourage a measure of eclecticism in religion, than to those of more conservative tendency.

Also in discussing methods of teaching religious observances Miss Jacobs seems to have in mind primarily homes where prayers are said mainly in English, if at all, and where there are no scruples about introducing variations from the ancient Hebrew text and traditional ritual. For such, however, as she has in mind, her suggestions are of great service and can help parent and teacher in the cultivation of a spirit of piety and reverence.

\textit{Methods of Teaching Biblical History} (Junior Grade). By \textsc{Edward N. Calisch}, Ph.D. Correspondence School for Religious School Teachers conducted by \textit{The Jewish Chautauqua Society}. Philadelphia, Pa. [1914.] pp. 247.

Dr. Calisch attempts in this book to assist the teacher of biblical history in the Junior Grades as Miss Jacobs does those
in the Primary Grades, but not with equal success. He seems to be beset by the fear of teaching the child doctrine which he may be constrained to reject or revise in later life, and thus in the face of a difficult passage seems inclined to seek refuge in assigning an allegorical or symbolic meaning to it. He states in his introduction that 'the aim of instruction in biblical history is to acquaint the pupil with the history of the Jewish people as portrayed in the Bible and to teach in connexion with it the lessons of that faith which is basic to moral duty and which inspires its followers with pure ideals and high motives of conduct'. But does this not limit too much the aim of such instruction? Why use it merely to teach 'the faith that is basic to moral conduct' and not the rest of Jewish doctrine as well, the specific heritage and distinction of Israel, expressing Israel's unique outlook upon life and concerned not only with our duties as men, but with the special duties which the Jew feels to devolve upon him as Jew, as one of that people whose history Dr. Calisch would help us teach? For the ethical value of teaching a people's history to those who are themselves of that people lies not primarily in the moral judgements which the teacher helps his pupil to derive from the events of history, but in the sense of identification with the high purposes of his people, of pride in its heroes, of love for its institutions and of faith in the rôle it is still to play in history. By begging the question of the historicity of the biblical narrative and treating it merely from the point of view of a story with which it is possible to connect a moral, this advantage is lost, the events of the story appear remote and unreal, the connexion between the Israel of history and the Israel of to-day is obscured, and a thrilling tale is sublimated into an abstract moral with little appeal to the active imagination of childhood.

To be sure, Dr. Calisch in his introduction warns the teacher against making the moral 'too obvious', but he himself repeatedly disregards his own advice in this respect. Thus in his chapter on 'The Birth and Youth of Moses', he has more than two pages of pure moralizing on such themes as are indi-
cated by the following marginal headings to his paragraphs: 'Evil causes evil', 'But also good begets good', 'The appeal of the helpless', 'Kindness to dumb animals'. Again, not content to let the story of how the pillar of cloud and flame guided the wanderings of the Israelites convey to the children its obvious moral of faith in the divine guidance of Israel, he feels called upon to give the child a homiletic elaboration of it in a paragraph telling of how a pilot guides his ship by the compass, and concluding with the words, 'So God has given a compass to us. It is His Holy Law; the teachings which have come to us through the Bible and the inspired teachers of all ages. This Torah, this word of God is our compass. We need only to follow its direction and we will go right and need have no fear. It is God's pillar of cloud by day and His pillar of fire by night for us as well—and for every generation'. These instances, chosen at random, will suffice to show how the author's homiletic trend of mind leads him constantly to disregard his own warning with reference to the didactic treatment of the story.

Like Miss Jacobs, Dr. Calisch lays great stress on the 'point of contact' in teaching and religiously suggests one for each lesson in his book, but an examination of these points of contact will show that our author has a misconception of what is meant by the point of contact in teaching and of the pedagogic function it is to perform. The necessity of a point of contact arises from the psychological principle of apperception. This principle takes cognizance of the fact that the mind, when confronted with a new experience, invariably attempts to relate it to some past experience, and that the ultimate meaning to it of this new experience will be dependent as much upon the mind's previous content as upon its present perceptions. It is said that when the American Indians first saw the ships of the 'Pale-face' on the sea they took them for a new variety of ocean fowl. A white man seeing this sight, though he had never seen those same ships before, would at once have recognized them for what they were, not because his senses would operate differently from those of the Indian, but because his previous mental content would have been
different. If we wish to apply this principle to teaching, it is obvious that we cannot depend on the mere presentation of the lesson to the child in order to convey to him the meaning which the lesson has for us, but we must previously assemble those elements in his knowledge and experience in the light of which he would interpret the new information presented to him as we would have him interpret it. These elements constitute what is known technically as the point of contact. Our author, however, introduces new matter that is both extraneous to the story and no part of the child’s previous knowledge, and calls it ‘point of contact’, because he finds in it some slight analogy to the ideas of the lesson. I shall give but one instance of this, which, however, is typical. The following is suggested as the point of contact for the story of Moses’ appearance before Pharaoh.

‘Let the teacher tell some story like the following, but let him take care not to have the incidental story overshadow the biblical event. Children, have you ever heard the story of Robert of Sicily? He was a very rich and proud king, &c., &c.’

One is inclined to ask the author: ‘If the story of Moses and Pharaoh needs a point of contact in order to tell it effectively, does not the story of Robert of Sicily itself need one as well? And, if the story of Robert of Sicily itself needs a point of contact, how can it serve as the point of contact for the story of Moses and Pharaoh?’

In general this book is more creditable to the author’s homiletic skill in the presentation of the biblical narrative than to his pedagogic ability.

Methods of Teaching Jewish History (Senior Grade). By Edward N. Calisch, Ph.D. Correspondence School for Religious School Teachers conducted by The Jewish Chautauqua Society, Philadelphia, Pa. [1915.] pp. 264.

Dr. Calisch is much more successful in this book than in the previous one. His ethical discussions are more in place in dealing with children of senior grade (i.e. between the ages of
thirteen and fifteen) than in dealing with younger children. Moreover, the biblical narrative of the period covered in this book, viz. from the conquest of Canaan to the division of the kingdom, contains less of the miraculous for Dr. Calisch's scrupulous liberalism to explain by far-fetched allegorical interpretations. Our author's interpretation of the significance of historic periods is very suggestive to the teacher and makes the book of value in the religious school.


This book aims to give a course of instruction in ethics adapted to the needs of the Jewish religious school. The book was originally planned by Miss Richman, who is the author of the first ten chapters. The remaining six were written after her death by Mr. Lehman, who completed the work in accordance with her general plan. The subject-matter is classified under five categories of duties: (1) home duties, (2) school duties, (3) communal duties, (4) civic duties, (5) religious duties. These are each subdivided with a view to the ages of the children, so that in each year of the course, which covers a period of three years and is designed for children between the ages of eleven and fourteen, the children learn some of the duties under each of these categories. Thus, under the category of home duties, the child is taught, in the first year, duties to parents, in the second, duties to brothers, sisters, and relatives, and in the third duties to servants; under that of school duties he is taught, in the first year, duties to teacher; in the second, duties to classmates; in the third, duties to ‘our school’, &c.

The first chapter of the book is introductory and contains Miss Richman's exposition of the guiding principles embodied in the book and a general discussion as to the nature of Jewish
ethics. In this she closely adheres to the views of Lazarus, from whom she quotes the following:

'An investigation of the essence and basis of the moral law reveals that Judaism everywhere clearly advances the thought that not because God has ordained it is a law moral but because it is moral therefore has God ordained it. Not by divine command does the moral become law, but because its content is moral and it would necessarily, even without an ordinance, become law, therefore is it enjoined by God.'

This conception of the autonomy of the moral law in Judaism enables our author, in a measure, to beg the question of religious ethical training. If the moral becomes law 'not by divine command' but 'because its content is moral' then, obviously, that content can be taught quite independently, and Jewish ethics can free itself altogether from any connexion with Jewish theology, with the result that no different method need be employed in teaching ethics in a Jewish school than in a secular school. Miss Richman's book does not go to the logical extreme suggested here. She has as one of the categories of duties, but only as one on a parity with others, duties to our religion. Moreover, the illustrative material which she uses to impress her lessons on the child draws very largely and judiciously on biblical and rabbinic sources. But the reader cannot escape the impression that the authors of this book did not utilize to the full the opportunity of bringing the religious sentiments and convictions of the Jew to bear on the training of the child in moral conduct. The love and fear of God, the dread of sin as alienating us from Him, the passion for holiness that unites us with Him, the deep reverence for God's handiwork in nature that banishes levity and obscenity from association with man's physical functions, the steadfast faith in divine support and the sense of communion with God, which give moral courage and confidence, the inspiration for action which comes from hope for the fulfilment of prophetic visions as yet unrealized—all these are, if not entirely ignored, at least not made to render all the moral value they possess.

But despite this important omission, the book is a useful one.
Particularly those chapters written by Miss Richman herself show an acquaintance with pedagogic method derived not alone from books but also from class-room experience. Her illustrations are apt, her points of contact are real points of contact, and she shows familiarity with the range of a child's interests and facility in bringing the lesson down to the level of the child's comprehension.

The last six chapters, written by Mr. Lehman, do not show this appreciation of the child's psychology to the same extent, and the teacher who would be guided closely by them would find himself frequently speaking over the heads of his pupils. Their author seems to show, however, a somewhat better appreciation of the value of the religious emotions to the moral training, though this may only be due to the circumstance that it was left to him to write the chapter on 'Our Duties to Judaism'.

The strong point of the book is the assistance it gives in developing the moral judgement of the pupils, its weakness is its failure to reach the hidden springs of moral action that lie in the religious sentiment. But to expect a course in ethics to accomplish this is perhaps expecting the impossible. It is at least an open question whether Jewish ethics can be taught to advantage as a separate subject apart from Jewish religious doctrine and Jewish law.

*Methods of Teaching the Jewish Religion in Junior and Senior Grades.* By Julius H. Greenstone, Ph.D. Correspondence School for Religious School Teachers conducted by The Jewish Chautauqua Society. Philadelphia, Pa. [1915.] pp. 349.

In this volume Dr. Greenstone gives not so much a method of teaching the Jewish religion as an exposition of its beliefs and practices for the benefit of religious school teachers. The suggestions with regard to method are introduced, as it were, casually in connexion with the analysis of the subject matter. Thus, though the book is intended both for the teachers of junior
and senior grades, the author does not either divide the subject-matter between these grades or suggest any differences of method for them in accordance with the difference in the respective ages of the children that they represent. Such pedagogic suggestions as the book does contain are, however, of value. Thus Dr. Greenstone is right in advising that instruction in the forms and ceremonies of religion precede any attempt to teach its dogmas and general beliefs, because the natural process of education is one that goes from the concrete to the abstract, from the specific to the general. His recommendation of the more extensive use of concrete objects in teaching the ceremonies and symbols of Judaism is also one that should receive the attention of teachers.

But it is not the value of its pedagogic suggestions that constitutes the merit of this book. From the pedagogic point of view a more detailed treatment of the method of teaching the Jewish religion is still a desideratum. The book has nevertheless a distinct value for Jewish education. For, after all, the success of the teacher of religion is much more dependent on his personal attitude to the subject he is teaching than on class-room devices and methods. Dr. Greenstone's book serves admirably to create that reverent and appreciative attitude toward everything that has had a part in the religious life of Israel which should characterize the teacher's relation to his subject. His exposition of Jewish belief and observance is simple, straightforward, sympathetic and free from polemics, argument or apologetics. One cannot read the book without feeling deeply the sanity and helpfulness of Jewish doctrine and the beauty and poetry of Jewish observance. Many a teacher reading this book will realize, perhaps for the first time, what a consistent and harmonious scheme for the sanctification of human life the Jewish religion affords, and some who may hitherto have been rather inclined to regard the greater part of Jewish observance as a lifeless formalism, destined soon to become obsolete, may well be influenced by a book such as this radically to change their point of view to one more in accord with their position as teachers of Judaism.
Methods of Teaching—Pedagogy applied to Religious Instruction.

Mr. Weglein, in this book, discusses for the benefit of religious school teachers those elementary pedagogic principles which are fundamental to all teaching and which, he rightly maintains, are as applicable to the teaching of religion as to any other branch of instruction. The foundation of all good teaching, Mr. Weglein tells us, rests on (1) knowledge of the subject-matter, (2) knowledge of the child mind, and (3) correct methods. The book presumes the teacher to be in possession of the first of these three prerequisites to good teaching and proceeds to discuss the remaining two. Under the head of knowledge of the child's mind, the author discusses in five chapters attention, sensation and perception, memory and imagination, conception, judgement and reason, the emotions and the will. In connexion with each psychological principle discussed, its application to the art of teaching is given with illustrations drawn mostly from the religious school curriculum. Under the head of method there are three chapters devoted to the method of the recitation, the purpose of the recitation, and the art of questioning.

Mr. Weglein's exposition is concise, clear, and, in the main, convincing. Some educators may, however, be inclined to take issue with him on one or two points. Not all, for example, would agree with him in his condemnation of prizes and other artificial incentives on the one hand and, on the other, of the "discipline of consequences" or punishment as a material consequence of an act, to which he objects on the ground of the 'lack of moral obligation involved'. Inasmuch as children cannot be expected to know the value of the knowledge about to be imparted to them until they are already in possession of that knowledge, and, negatively, inasmuch as they cannot appreciate the evil of conduct that interferes with the acquisition of such knowledge by themselves or the class, may not artificial incentives and appropriate punishments legitimately be employed to ensure
such correct habits of diligent attention and persevering effort as will secure them this knowledge? The appreciation of motive is a later development which will come as the very result of their earlier diligence whatever their motive for such diligence may have been at the time. There is still truth in the talmudic dictum נוהטש לשמה לא_restore ומדמה. 'The performance of a precept, even though with some ulterior end in view, leads to its performance for its own sake'.

Mr. Weglein's book, however, serves its purpose admirably. It is particularly serviceable for principals of religious schools who desire some book on pedagogy as a basis for training the teachers under them to render more efficient service.


This little volume contains a brief sketch of the contribution of the Jewish people to education. This is a theme usually ignored by writers on the history of education, not because this contribution has been insignificant, but, as Dr. Rosenau points out, because the rabbinic literature, which contains the sources for a large and important period in the development of Jewish education, was inaccessible to most writers on the subject. The book is divided into three parts, of which the first and third, dealing respectively with the biblical and the modern era, were written by Dr. Simon, and the second, which treats of the rabbinic period, was written by Dr. Rosenau.

Dr. Simon, in the first part, discusses (1) the general trend of education, (2) the specific purpose of education in the Bible, (3) the standard of general culture in the biblical era, (4) how or by whom such education was imparted, (5) the methods and principles of such education applicable to-day in our religious schools, and (6) the message which the biblical educational ideal
holds for this age. He sums up the ideal of biblical education in the term 'religious culture'. What he means by this religious culture will be suggested by the following quotation from his book:

"Know God in order to live godly", this is the purpose of education in the Bible. Know God, not for the intellectual satisfaction involved, but in order to love Him! Love Him, not for the mere discharge of emotional energy, but that you may live! Live, not for a mere satisfaction of the instinct for existence, but in order that you may consecrate it! In other words, religious culture is the educational ideal of the Bible.

This culture, Dr. Simon tells us, was primarily fostered during the biblical period in the home and by the parents, the home laying especial emphasis on the ideal of obedience. It was advanced also by the priests, who cultivated the religious sentiment through their appeal to tradition, ceremony, and symbol; by the prophets, who laid stress on the conscience and the ethical aspect of religion; by the scribes, who appreciated the educational value of religious literature and thus gave the world its greatest text-book—the Bible; and by the hakamim, who appealed directly to the intelligence and philosophic reason in enforcing the religious ideal.

The consideration of these aspects of the educational ideal of the Bible suggests to Dr. Simon five important principles applicable in religious education to-day. They are:

(1) 'Religious culture is primarily home-made and home-grown.'

(2) 'In the home and in the religious school we need the emphasis upon faith and loyalty . . . but the real purpose of faith and loyalty is for the strengthening of tradition . . . a traditionless home is anaemic.'

(3) 'An excessive harping on this string may produce an ethical discord . . . Thus home and religious school should be especially concerned that religious culture should work conscience into the life of faith.'

(4) 'Oral instruction is not sufficient . . . When the Torah came, education by text-book was Jewishly justified. They [the
home and school] can have no better means for the cultivation of the religious spirit than a ceaseless love for the Bible.'

(5) 'Our religious culture need not fear ... the warm breath of other cultures.'

Dr. Simon also gives us suggestions of method derived from the methods of biblical education, but as they contain none that are not generally recognized, they need not be mentioned here.

In the discussion of the rabbinic period, Dr. Rosenau does not attempt, as does Dr. Simon in treating the biblical period, to formulate the ideal and the underlying principles of the educational system of the rabbis or its message to educators of the present day, but contents himself with showing us the esteem in which education was held by the Jews during this period, the abundance of the schools in which it was fostered, the general character of the curriculum, methods and discipline of the schools, the status of the religious teacher and what were considered the necessary qualifications for teaching. The many quotations from rabbinic literature which he uses to illustrate the thought of the rabbis on these subjects support the contention that 'the Jew had manifested marked pedagogical genius and skill in the course of his career'. It is to be regretted, however, that Dr. Rosenau did not try to summarize the message of the rabbinic period of Jewish education as Dr. Simon did that of the biblical period, though the nature of the sources made such a task extremely difficult. Dr. Rosenau fails to show what was unique or distinctive in Jewish education during this period except that he calls attention to the question and answer method employed in the schools and its effect in the development of the reasoning power. One would assume a priori that a people with a history as unique as that of the Jews must have developed a correspondingly unique system of education. Perhaps Dr. Rosenau's failure to point out the distinctive characteristics of rabbinic education was due to his limiting his subject too closely to the formal education of the schools and ignoring all other educational factors, such as the synagogue, the home, &c.—a limitation which he probably felt that the scope of the work demanded of him.
In the third part of the book Dr. Simon traces briefly the history of Jewish educational endeavour as influenced by Mendelssohn and the emancipation, 'Jewish science', the Reform movement and the Orthodox reaction, the Russian Haskalah, and the renaissance of Hebrew under the influence of nationalistic ideas, concluding with a description of the present status of Jewish education. He is very optimistic with regard to the progress made during this period and, more especially, with regard to the present outlook in the United States, where, he claims, 'religious education has made the speediest and most enduring progress'. But is this roseate view justified by the facts? Tested by the criterion of what, according to Dr. Simon himself, constitutes the aim of Jewish education, namely, religious culture and the sanctification of life, the efficiency of our modern Jewish education may well be called into question. His fallacy is doubtless due to his identifying too much the cause of education with improvement of pedagogic method in the schools. He apparently does not reflect that these improvements were necessitated by the fact that the constant encroachments of the non-Jewish environment upon the social life of the Jewish people weakened the educational influence of the home, the synagogue and the traditional literature of the Jew on Jewish life. That the necessary adjustments to this situation are being sought is indeed encouraging, but we have not yet reached a stage where we can congratulate ourselves on our 'rapid and enduring progress'.


In this book the author endeavours to retell for children the biblical narrative from Creation to the giving of the Law 'in somewhat modified form and in the modern spirit'. In an introduction treating of 'Religious Education—Past and Present', he deplores, on the one hand, the attempt to treat the various episodes of the biblical narrative as separate stories, ignoring the
'connected causation' and, on the other hand, the method of teaching them 'in their entirety and original arrangement without the least consideration as to the child's capacity or comprehension'.

What the author means by teaching in the modern spirit seems primarily to be to teach the child in such a method that the religious point of view taught him will need a minimum of revision when the child attains to a more scientific knowledge of the world. To give a characteristic instance—he would have us teach the story of Creation with the order of creation given in the Bible, but would omit the reference to six days, declaring that, if the six days of creation be mentioned 'the child's faith will be undermined, if not altogether destroyed, when he gets to know anything about the world from the standpoint of evolution'.

That the conflict between the teachings of the Bible and of modern science on many points does constitute a serious problem in the religious education of the adolescent there can be no doubt, but one may very well question whether Dr. Silber's method adds in the slightest degree to its solution. For, to take his treatment of the story of Creation as typical, the child who has been taught this story in the way he suggests will, to be sure, have no difficulty in adjusting what he has subsequently been taught of evolution with what he had previously learned in his religious school about creation. But, it is to be presumed, our pupil will some day, probably during adolescence, acquire a first-hand knowledge of the Bible, a privilege which Dr. Silber would surely not wish to deny him. At once the discrepancies between the Bible itself and both the science and the biblical history that have been taught him become apparent, and he will either be hard put to it to reconcile them or, what is even more likely, will dismiss the Bible from his thought as a book of ancient mythology beneath the serious consideration of our sophisticated modern age. The very care that was taken to exclude from biblical instruction all those parts which conflict with the scientific theories of the day will be construed by him to mean that his teachers felt those parts to be valueless and were not wholly
sincere in the reverence in which they professed to hold the Bible.

Dr. Silber does not then succeed by his attempted rationalizations in saving the pupil from the inevitable Sturm und Drang period of religious adolescence, but he does thereby succeed only too well in spoiling many a good story and robbing it of its charm and fascination for the naïve fancy of childhood. For the Bible stories were originally intended for a naïve people, and one cannot rationalize them without doing violence to them. Again and again our author is led into inconsistencies and absurdities by his attempts at rationalizing. A few examples will suffice. Thus, in his desire to avoid telling of the miraculous way in which, according to the Bible, the people of Sodom, bent on entering Lot's house, were afflicted with a sudden blindness so that they could not find the door, he says that when Lot, after having refused to give up the strangers, returned to his house, 'the people were so angry that they could not find the door which they meant to break'. Would the author have us really believe that a man can be literally blinded by anger so as not to see an object of the size of a door when his attention is fixed on it, because he is determined to break it down? Again, in telling the story of Hagar and Ishmael, he recounts how Hagar, after their supply of water is exhausted, is ready to give up in despair, when a stranger, passing by, shows her where an oasis is to be found near at hand. No mention is made of Hagar's prayer, nor is the sudden appearance of the 'stranger' (he is not an angel in Dr. Silber's version) ascribed to any divine providence. Obviously, the whole point of the story, which is the nearness of God 'to all that call upon Him' is lost, and all that the author tells the pupil is a matter-of-fact incident in no wise worthy of being recorded in the Bible. Finally, to cite but one more instance, in telling the story of Joseph's interpreting the dreams of Pharaoh's butler and baker, he feels compelled by his modern view to tell the children, 'You see in those days, and especially in Egypt, people made much of dreams. Nowadays we do not bother much with dreams. We know that they don't mean anything'. He then proceeds with
the story as told in the Bible. But that story has as a premiss, without which the whole plot is incomprehensible, the idea that dreams have, or at least may have, a meaning. If Dr. Silber thinks that a dangerous belief for the child, he ought to omit the story altogether: he ought not to teach it and introduce it by a statement that destroys the essential premiss which gives significance to the incidents recorded. If dreams may have a meaning, Joseph is a seer, if not, he is a charlatan. The above are but a few of the many contradictions and absurdities into which Dr. Silber's tendency to rationalism leads him. It is the more to be regretted that this fundamental defect mars the book, as it would otherwise be not without merit, the language being much simpler and more comprehensible to children than in most biblical histories.


These books are designed to assist the religious school teacher in teaching biblical history on the basis of the Junior Bible, a translation into simple English of most of the interesting narratives of the Bible. The first chapter, which is introductory, discusses the aim and method of Jewish education, offers various suggestions to teachers as to how they are to plan their work, and concludes with a general bibliography on Judaism, the Bible, and principles of teaching. All subsequent chapters contain an assignment of readings for the teacher in some book on religious pedagogy or on the history of the Jewish religion with questions on the readings assigned, an assignment of readings for the lesson material, a discussion of the aim of the lesson, a suggested point of contact, explanatory notes on the biblical passage to be taught, and illustrations and miscellaneous suggestions to be used in teaching it.
The bibliographies and assigned readings for the teacher serve the laudable purpose of giving the teacher a broader basis of information than could be obtained by studying each day merely the suggestions for teaching the next day's lessons, a practice into which teachers are too prone to fall. The aim of each day's lesson the author endeavours to define in terms of ideals easily applicable in the child's life, even though the biblical narrative might yield other more obvious morals for the adult. In his suggested points of contact, he falls into the same error that we pointed out in our review of Dr. Calisch's book, viz., that of telling one story as a point of contact for another, but the stories which he tells for this purpose are usually interesting in themselves and might be used as illustrations of the biblical moral if not as points of contact.

His explanatory notes on the biblical passages are perhaps the most successful feature of the book and must assist the teacher in developing an appreciation of the ethical content of the Bible. In them the author utilizes his knowledge of biblical geography and archaeology to cast light upon the Bible narrative. The value to the teacher of such side-lights upon the biblical story is too frequently underestimated. They are a great help not only in that they assist the child's intellect to understand the story in its true historic relations, but also because they can be used to help his imagination visualize the story, thus assisting the memory to retain it by making more vivid the first impressions conveyed by the lesson.

In that part of each chapter which Mr. Lehman devotes to 'illustrations and suggestions', he shows considerable resourcefulness. The author begins this section of each chapter with questions based on the moral of the story, often asking the children's judgement on some hypothetical case which might come within their own experience. He then illustrates the moral by some anecdote or story, and, finally, suggests a device by which this can be made to impress itself on the mind of the child. These devices are very ingenious, but it is a question whether their ingenuity does not sometimes militate
against their effectiveness by attracting too much attention to the illustration itself and away from the idea it is intended to illustrate. We quote, as an example, the following suggestion from the author’s chapter on ‘Jacob’s Return’, of which he makes ‘conscience’ the ‘ethical theme’:

‘Place two glasses of water that look exactly alike on the desk; label one Jacob and the other Israel. Before the class assembles put a little nitrate of silver in the Israel glass. Call a pupil to the desk and tell him to drop a pinch of salt in the Jacob glass. Observe that no change occurs. Bid another pupil drop a pinch of salt in the Israel glass and call attention to the formation of a white cloud called a precipitate. Although these two glasses look exactly alike there is an invisible helper in one that gives it a certain power absent in the other. Although Jacob and Israel looked exactly alike there was an invisible helper in Israel, a conscience, that gave him a power lacking in Jacob.’

Among the most valuable of the devices Mr. Lehman suggests are those which work the subject matter of the history lesson into games that the children can play.

In general, the book commends itself for the thoroughness with which it adapts the biblical material to the needs of the child, but it has the defects of its qualities. Its directions to the teacher are so explicit that there is danger of the teacher’s becoming too dependent on the book and failing to exercise her own resourcefulness.

One thing we cannot lightly forgive our author—that he repeatedly speaks of the Bible as the Old Testament. The term Old Testament implies the existence of a New Testament which is on a parity with it, and any sanctity ascribed to, or associated with, the ‘Old Testament’ would attach itself also by implication to the New, a result that the synagogue, which has never accepted the New Testament in its canon, must regard with apprehension.

Eugene Kohn.

Baltimore.
RECENT BOOKS ON COMPARATIVE RELIGIONS AND SOCIOLOGY


Die hippokratische Schrift von der Siebenzahl in ihrer vielfachen Überlieferung zum erstenmal herausgegeben und erläutert. Von W. H. Roscher, Dr. phil. h. c. der Universität Athen. (Studien zur Geschichte und Kultur des Altertums. VI. Band, 3.–4. Heft.) Paderborn: Druck und Verlag von Ferdinand Schöningh, 1913. pp. xii + 175.

'Magic elements in the Old Testament' would be a more informing description of the contents of the first book on the list than its present title. It does not contribute materials to the unknown quantity of a 'folkreligion' of Israel, but attributes
a magical import and background to some passages and episodes in the Old Testament. The author's standpoint is that in the revealed religion of the Old Testament there are still discernible the rudiments of a folk religion in which Israel shared with other peoples the belief in wonder-working objects and actions by which man could achieve results not attainable by natural ways and means. These magical potencies are accordingly represented in the Old Testament (1) as working through concrete objects, viz., the wonder working staff (of Moses, Elijah, Elisha); salt; plants and fruits, especially the almond tree; and (2) as emanating from the human body, due to the 'body-soul' (Körperseele) dwelling in it, namely, the hands, the spittle; sanverim (Gen. 19. 11, 2 Kings 6. 18, explained as a confusion of the eyesight effected by a certain species of spirits); raising of the dead; rain-making; observation of omena; ordeal; ecstatic states derived from running waters, and interpretation of dreams. Professor Jirku seems to have made the exploration of what may be comprised under the general term of animism or occultism in the Old Testament his special field, for two other books on subjects correlated to that of the present work stand to his credit, Die Dämonen und ihre Abwehr im Alten Testament (1912) and Mantik in Altisrael (1913). Now specialists in the still vague fields of anthropology, folk-lore, or comparative religions are liable to become preternaturally sharp-sighted, so that they see the object of their search everywhere and in everything, and succumb to the temptation of making hasty generalizations and indiscriminate application of analogy, unmindful of the saying: Duo cum faciunt (and still more so, cum dicunt) idem non est idem. A few examples may illustrate the author's modus procedendi. The Sumerians, Egyptians, and Arabs attributed to spittle magical forces. Hence the spittle of one who has a 'running issue' causes defilement (Lev. 15. 8), because destructive powers are hidden in it. This is expanded to the theory that the mouth from which the spittle issues can convey supernatural effects, hence kissing may not only transmit the terrible microbes, as the modern bacteriologists warn us, but also transfer spiritual
forces. This was the import of Samuel’s kissing Saul, when he anointed him king (1 Sam. 10. 11). As an instance of miraculous rain-making is quoted 2 Kings 18. 41 ff., in which Elijah is made to take an active part in bringing about the rain, not merely predicting its coming, as the average reader would infer from the text. This feat is then accounted for by the fact that according to Isa. 5, 6: ‘I will command the clouds that they rain not’, the clouds are living beings which God can command, and this is further explained from a Babylonian incantation in which the clouds are conceived as demons rioting about the heavens, which a magician can command, direct and control. If in this instance a metaphorical expression is ‘ridden to the ground’, in the next, which shall be the last referred to here, a word-play is overridden. In Jer. 1. 11 f. the vision of the almond tree is not in order to impress the near approach of the catastrophe by reason of the resemblance of its name to the verb for hasten ( Assyrian) as the text explains, and because this tree ‘hastens’ to sprout and blossom before all other trees, but because it is inhabited by demons. Hence in the allegory Eccles. 12. 5, the white blossoms of the almond tree do not symbolize the hoary hair of old age, but presage terror, and their employment in the making of the menorah (Exod. 25. 33) was not meant for mere decoration, but to inspire fear. Professor Caspari’s brochure offers much more than its title would indicate. It is, in fact, a concise survey of all that relates to the dead: the modes of their disposal, as by burial, cremation, exposing, sinking into the water, dismemberment; the various receptacles for the corpse and tomb structure; the beliefs and rites connected with the removing of the dead; the tombstones, monuments, &c., accompanied with acute and profound philosophical and psychological comments and reflections. Israel, the author observes, by reason of its conception of God and its spirit resulting from its faith, could carry along and tolerate customs and usages foreign to it just because they had no relation to, and therefore did not affect, their innermost life. ‘Because sure of its own spirit Israel could be tolerant.’ Interesting is what
Professor Caspari says in explanation of the modern agitation for cremation. Cremation, he thinks, satisfies in a crude way the desire of both the dying and the surviving for the preservation of a remnant which interment as at present practised ignores. And this desire is connected with the concealed belief that the dead still continue to live in the world of the living and to participate in their lives. The substance of the dead preserved by cremation is therefore craved as a concrete substratum for this belief. Hygienic and economic considerations play but a specious and superficial part in this agitation.

The pamphlet is written in a rather compressed style, so that it is not easy reading; but a careful and close study of it will be amply rewarded.

Dr. Eberharters monograph is a defence of the traditional view of the marriage institution and the family organization of the Hebrews against the various theories of the evolutionists.

In the introduction the author defends the historicity of the patriarchs and the origin of the Hebrew people from one family against the view that it coalesced at the time of David from a conglomerate of scattered clans. The subject proper of the book is treated in six chapters. Chapter I undertakes to prove that there is no causal nexus between promiscuity, polyandry, temple prostitution and matriarchy, and that none of them had been a generally prevailing stage, much less the starting point of social development. Nor did monogamy develop from and succeed to polygamy. Chapter II states that the three forms of contracting marriage: by rape, by purchase, and by consent, do not necessarily mark successive steps; the last may have been the primitive form and the first two later degenerations. In Israel, moreover, purchase was excluded by the high position of the wife. Chapter III treats of the hindrances of marriage, viz.: consanguinity, affinity, and differences of nationality and religion; and Chapter IV of the wooing or selecting of a bride and by whom it was done. In Chapter V, on marriage and divorce, is noticed the absence of reference to the religious character given to marriage and married life in the Old Testament, though the whole conception of the
institution of marriage in the Pentateuch presupposes its existence. Chapter VI finally treats of the legal relations between the family members, namely, between husband and wife, parents and children, and masters and slaves.

The author shows a thorough acquaintance with the extensive literature on the subject, which he discusses on a broad ethnological basis, with especial reference to the parallel customs and laws of the cognate peoples of Arabia and Babylonia. The arguing is throughout fair and objective; the opponents are allowed to state their case fully and freely. As it is in the nature of the subject treated here the conclusion of the argument is often a mere non probatum.

On page 78 read Gen. 21. 10 instead of 22. 6.

Dr. Roscher has placed students interested in the works which pass under the name of Hippocrates under great obligation by bringing out a handy, critical, and complete edition, as far as this is possible at present, of the work on the significance of the number seven (περὶ ἑβδομάδων). The work, though by general consent spurious, is of much interest for the knowledge of the ancient cosmological system and pathological theories. The present edition gives in parallel columns the Greek text of the MS. of the Bibliothèque Nationale of Paris, the two Latin translations of the Codex Ambrosianus and Codex Parisinus respectively, and Harder's German translation of the pseudo-Galen Arabic commentary to chapters 1–17 of the work. In a second part Dr. Roscher has brought together the recently discovered fragments of the Hebdomads, indicating their respective places in the text of the Paris MS., while the third part is devoted to a history of the work and the critical estimates of it by various writers from Plato to the present. An appendix adds the important passages from the more accurate and literal German rendering by Bergsträsser of pseudo-Galen's commentary, and an analytical table of contents and indexes of subjects and quotations brings this editio princeps of the Hebdomads to a close.

Psychology of religion is the investigation and analysis of the data, processes and conditions of religious experiences, or, as the author pithily puts it, 'the study of the human naturalness of religion'. It is comparatively a new science. Professor Coe was one of the pioneers in this most important and fascinating branch of the 'study of man', his first work on the subject, The Spiritual Life, having appeared in 1900. Since then many investigators, Ames, James, King, Leuba, Pratt, Starbuck, Stratton—to name but a few—have entered the field, and quite an extensive literature, discussing the various aspects and phases of religious manifestations on the human side, has grown up. In the present work the subject is discussed in nineteen chapters, viz., (i) Religion as an object of psychological study; (ii) The psychology of mental mechanism and the psychology of persons; (iii) The data, and how they are ascertained; (iv) Preliminary analysis of religious consciousness; (v) Racial beginnings in religion; (vi) The genesis of the idea of God; (vii) Religion and religions; (viii) Religion as group conduct; (ix) Religion as individual conduct; (x) Conversion; (xi) Mental traits of religious leaders; (xii) Religion and the subconscious; (xiii) The religious evaluation of values; (xiv) Religion as discovery; (xv) Religion as social immediacy; (xvi) Mysticism; (xvii) The future life as a psychological problem; (xviii) Prayer; (xix) The religious nature of man.

What now is the fons et origo of the religious experience? Professor Coe disavows any endowment of man with some innate religious instinct or perception. 'There is no evidence that a religious intuition ever occurs. . . There is no religious instinct. . . No specific attitude to the divine or human can be attributed to all individuals' (p. 323). The religious consciousness or attitude is the result of experience and of the way of organizing experience
in terms of ideal values. What then are the values after which the devotee strives? It is the unification, reintegration and completion of his desires and wants in terms of personal-social self-realization. This motif of ethical 'sociality', or of 'social valuations', which finds its culmination and completion in the 'love' taught by Jesus and Paul, is the thread on which all the phenomena and expressions of the religious consciousness are strung. 'Religion organizes life's values and seeks them socially' (p. 91). 'Religion is an impulse to live, to live well, to live a diversified yet organized life, and especially to live socially' (p. 108). 'Religion is a discovery of persons' (p. 240). 'Man is fundamentally social, and religion is, all in all, his most considerable attempt to express this side of his nature' (p. 213). So also prayer 'fulfils the function of self-renewal largely by making one's experience consciously social', and 'has value in that it develops the essentially social form of personal self-realization' (pp. 315, 317). Even the problem of future life 'will have its seat just where the general problem of being a person meets us in the present existence, namely, in social enterprise with its give and take, its self-seeking and self-sacrifice' (p. 292), that is, it is a question of continued social activity between the embodied and disembodied.

It seems to me that the emphasis which Professor Coe in the motivation of the religious consciousness and experience, and in the development of religion, lays on the personal self-realization in society, or ethical sociality, or 'love to his brother whom he has seen' is, to say the least, one-sided, and may be due in part to the suggestive influence of the modern 'humanitarian' movements and agitations with their much worked slogans of 'social service', 'altruism', 'brotherhood of man', in which at present religion is frequently being absorbed or rather evaporated, in part, to his aversion against any kind of 'mysticism'. It is very well to 'look for the center of gravity of religion in the moral will' (Preface, p. xiii f.). But it is here treated in a jejune, one would almost say in a pragmatical manner, untouched by emotion. In fact, the query of the hypothetical objector which the author
adduces (p. 229): 'When you make the essence of this experience, attitude-taking, enterprise, values, you make it appear that the reality of any object—divine beings, for example—is a matter of religious indifference, whereas interest in the objectively real lies at the heart of religion', seems to me not adequately answered. But man seeks and finds in religion something more than personal self-realization as a member of a benevolent fraternity with God as socius or President. Certainly the world around man, the everlasting miracle of the universe, the earth below with its mountains, trees, traversing seas, the sky above with its stars, the rushing clouds, discharging now fire, now rain, combined with man's fragmentariness and transitoriness of life point him to a power above, and impel him to attach his being to an Infinite and Eternal, to the 'Rock of Ages', while the world within man, the longings and passions of the heart, its grave sufferings and noble joys, contribute to develop and ennoble his religious consciousness.

The table of contents and the few extracts quoted above by no means convey an adequate idea of the riches of instructive and stimulating matter contained in the book. Especially illuminating are the chapters of 'Mental traits of religious leaders', 'Religion and the subconscious', 'Mysticism', and 'Prayer'.

A comprehensive index enables the reader to refer to any topic in which he may be particularly interested, and alphabetical and topical bibliographies 'provide convenient apparatus for following up problems, and especially for setting them in a scientific perspective'.

I. M. Casanowicz.

United States National Museum.
STUDIES IN GERSHONIDES

By ISAAC HUSIK, University of Pennsylvania.

105. (L. 62, fifth line from bottom) = (K. 136, 6)

מ.pitch. אדר אום ביבכלום כל תיל means in so far as it is infinite, and not 'weil es eben unendlich ist'. It is equivalent to the Greek τὸ ἀπειρον ἢ ἀπειρον ἀγνωστον, quoted by K. himself in a note (136, note 2).

106. (L. 62, fin.)

אצל שינב בו שלושה מתחלק אל חמה שלושה מתחלק, והזוה אל היה המתחלק (K. 136 fin.)

Wohl aber begreift er die Teilbarkeit als solche (sc. das Prinzip, das Gesetz), und dass es für sie keine Grenze gibt.88

This does not give the precise meaning of the original, though it renders it in a general way. A more precise translation is the following: 'The mind in apprehending an infinitely divisible magnitude does not apprehend it as infinitely divided]; it apprehends merely that it is divisible into parts which are divisible in turn (מתחלק אל חמה שלושה מתחלק), and hence there is no limit to the division'.

107. (L. 63, 19) = (K. 138, 5)

אנו איטה והו should always be translated 'ein beliebiges Individuum', and not 'ein zufälliges', as K. does here and, with an exception or two, passim.

108. (L. 63, 22) = (K. 138, 10)

בהק durée. K. translates, 'Bei eingehender Untersuchung'.

88 Italics mine.

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It is defined as follows in Averroes’s compendium of logic:

It is defined as follows in Averroes’s compendium of logic:

In our case G. first proved that the two notions are not universals by the deductive method. He now proceeds to prove the same thing by the method of induction. That is, he investigates the various kinds of intention and shows that none of them is universal.

The passages are too long to quote in extenso, and the reader is expected to have before him the texts in question. He will then see that the errors of the translator are numerous. The most fundamental error is that K. does not understand the meaning of intention (63, 23; 64, 17), which he renders ‘Wirklichkeit’ (138, 13) and ‘Wirkliches’ (141, 5). This leads him to misunderstand G.’s entire attitude towards the universal (141, note 2).

The contrast between intention and intention is not a difference between idea and reality (‘Vorstellung’ and ‘Wirklichkeit’), and G. does not say that the ideal comes before the real (‘und so geht die Vorstellung dem “Wirklichen” vorauf;’ 141, 7). Both intention and intention are here logical or, if you will, psychological, terms. They are subdivisions of the term intelligible (א impossible, א impossible, א impossible).

The difference is that intention is the single concept (‘Begriff’, or ‘Vorstellung’) whereas intention represents the true judgement (wahres Urteil), especially as it appears in the conclusion of a true syllogism. We shall prove this statement by quoting from Averroes’s compendium of logic (ממלאכת הדינה, ed. Riva di Trento, 1560). P. 2 a we find this statement:

\[\text{Heb. translation, כעל מלאכת הדינה, ed. Riva di Trento, 1560, p. 58 a.} \]
The things we desire to know in all theoretical disciplines consist of two parts—conceptual and verificatory. By concept (רֵצִי) we mean the understanding of a thing through which constitutes, or is thought to constitute, its essence. This is that which usually and primarily answers to the question "What?" (τι ἔστιν;), as for example when we say, What is Nature? What is the Soul? Verification or true conclusion (ἐπανάλημα) is the affirming of a thing or denying it. This again may be of two kinds, (1) absolute, as when we say, A vacuum exists, or (2) conditional, as when we say, Whether the world is created. This investigation is always introduced by the question "Whether" (εἰ ἔστιν). Each of these two must be preceded in the mind of the learner by two elements of knowledge—the efficient and the directive. The directive of the concept is that which is denoted by the single word. The efficient thereof consists of those things which constitute the thing in question, namely, the parts of the definition. As for the directive of a true conclusion, truth is arrived at in the mind of the investigator as a result of two opposite or contrary parts (judgements). The efficient of a "true conclusion" is the syllogism.

It is clear now that רוֹצִי is the concept, i.e. the true understanding of the essence of a thing. We start with a word, say 'man'. We ask, What is man? and the answer is, the definition, namely, 'rational animal'. The parts of the definition, 'rational' and 'animal', constitute the concept (רוֹצִי). We ask next, whether man is mortal or not. We express our problem in the form of two contrary or opposed propositions—man is mortal, man is not mortal. One of these is true, the other is not true. We arrive at the true
opinion (דעת) by means of a syllogism. Our conclusion is, let us say, man is mortal. This true conclusion is דעת.

The 'Categories' in Aristotle's logic deals with דעות primarily, with דעות secondarily only, in so far as דעות presupposes דעות. You cannot have a judgement without a subject and a predicate, and the subject involves דעות. Beginning with the De Interpretatione, we pass over to דעות, for here we are dealing with propositions, dividing them into affirmative and negative, contrary and contradictory, universal and particular, and so on. This is the first step in the direction of verification (דעה), or obtaining a true conclusion (דעה). After we have done this, we proceed to combine propositions in a syllogism, which is the actual efficient or agent in producing the true conclusion. This is treated in the Prior Analytics. Thus we read in the same treatise of Averroes, p. 9a:

The second error of K. is that he renders the word דעות by 'Begriff', which corresponds to דעות. דעות should always be translated 'definition', as K. does in the first part of the paragraph. P. 139, note 2, K. says, 'Hier scheint Gersonides platonische Bahnen im aristotelischen Sinne zu wandeln'. There is no warrant at all for such a statement in the present discussion, and least of all does it apply to the sentence in G. to which it is attached by K. What G. says in that part of the argument is that the definition cannot denote the universal (обще), because if it does, it must refer to it (the universal) either in the sense of the unitary thing embracing all individuals, or in the sense of the sum of all the individuals. In neither case would the definition denote the essence of the individual thing, for the latter is not identical with either of these two senses of universal, and hence could not be covered by the same definition, for different things require different definitions. How any one can see anything Platonic in this argument I fail to understand.

The other mistakes concern the misunderstanding and mis-translation of sentences and expressions of the discussion in
question. Thus L. 63, 27 reads יולו היה חבלת אפישר שתרוקב וב נר. This K. renders (139, 3) 'Deshalb kann bei ihr (sc. der Vorstellung)¹⁰ die Universaldefinition überhaupt nicht Platz greifen'. The correct translation is, 'Therefore the definition of the universal cannot denote it (sc. the individual').

L. 64, 4 reads:

This K. renders (140, 5):

Wir behaupten nun, dass der Begriff anch¹¹ nach der "um- schliessenden, umfassenden" Seite (Vielheitsseite),¹² also nach der Genus- und der "Artseite" hin, kein Universales bildet.

This is not correct, for it is clear not only from the expression itself (בצלמל בלתי אפישר שיתו הנדר בלמל בלתי שיתו בלמל ומוך), but also from the sequence of the argument, that it is not the 'Vielheitsseite' that is now being discussed, but the 'Einheitsseite'. The argument is this (L. 63, 33—64, 4 ff.): The definition must denote unity, for in defining man we do not say 'rational animals', but 'rational animal'. If now we prove that the definition cannot denote the universal on its unitary side, it will follow that the definition cannot denote the universal at all. And in the sequel G. proceeds to give this proof, viz. that the definition cannot denote the universal on its general and embracing side (בצלמל בלתי ומוך), i.e. the unitary side (cf. also L. 63, 26; יב יארט הנדר אתי ולא בלמל ומוך ובנו כנכלות האCartItem הרבים, והאCartItem הרבים, which shows clearly that בלמל ומוך, as contrasted with omn רכוב, signifies unity and not plurality).

The continuation of this argument K. disfigures beyond recognition. The Hebrew reads (L. 64, 5):

The Hebrew reads (L. 64, 5):

* Italics mine.
* Italics mine.
This K. translates as follows (140, 8):

‘Wäre nämlich der *Begriff* ein Universales, also eine Art oder ein Genus, so müsste er dies von seiten der Relation sein, denn gerade die Relation wird durch den Begriff gewonnen, d. h. also die entsprechende Umschliessung, wie wir ja auch unter dem Begriffe „Knecht“ die Beziehung verstehen, die zwischen ihm und dem Herrn besteht, etwas Derartiges aber ist bei den Definitionen nicht möglich.’

G. says nothing of the kind. The correct translation is as follows:

‘If the definition denoted the universal, namely, the genus or the species, it would follow that since it is in this sense a relative (cf. L. 56, 2 ff. = K. 114, 20), this relative aspect should be included in the definition, namely, this aspect of embracing that which it embraces, as we include in the definition of “servant” the relation between him and “master”; but this is impossible in definitions.’

The meaning is that we should define man, for example, as ‘rational animal, embracing all individual men’.

(L. 64, 17)

ואולא האמתה ההו נפ 커進行 שלא ישלה בבלילה  דודה ויש הווה השטר קドラマ (חמות) למען היו נינין בן חה binary התמזה. ויתר ימין בן חה שבכר התמזה עניין תZendin בליל, הנה

K. (141, 5) translates as follows:

Aber auch als *Wirkliches* (sc. *Wahres*) kann es (sc. das Intelligibele) kein Universales sein. Denn das *Wirkliche* ist nur ein Urteil über die Vorstellung, und so geht die Vorstellung dem ‘*Wirklichen*’ vorauf. Wenn es sich aber so verhält und doch erwiesen ist, dass die Vorstellung kein Universales ist, so kann auch das *Wirkliche* kein Universales sein.

92 Italics mine.

93 Italics mine.
To this he adds in a note (141, note 2):

‘Auch diese Anschauung geht auf falsch verstandenen Platonismus zurück, nach welchem die psychische und logisch-technische Organisation des Individuums ein Primäres gegenüber den Dingem bildet.’

As a matter of fact the argument quoted from G. has nothing to do with Platonism, true or otherwise. We should rather say of K.’s note, ‘Diese Anschauung geht auf falsch verstandenen Gersonidismus zurück, nach welchem "Wirklichem” gleich sei’.

We discussed the meaning of הנומא before, and we found that הנומא and ייעוד denote the single concept, to which the terms ‘true’ and ‘false’ do not apply; הנומא denotes a judgement, the result of syllogistic proof, and may be spoken of as ‘true’ or, if one finds fault with the syllogism by which it was arrived at, as ‘false’. הנומא is made up of ייעוד, hence ייעוד comes first.

The translation of the Hebrew quoted above is as follows:

‘[Having divided the intelligible (Doctrine) into concept (נומא), and true conclusion (נומא), and having shown that the former as expressed in the definition (נומא) does not denote the universal], we shall now prove that a true conclusion (נומא) cannot denote the universal either; for the true conclusion is nothing else than a judgement concerning the content of the concept, and hence the concept comes before the true conclusion. This being so, and since we have proved that the concept does not denote the universal, it follows that the true conclusion does not denote the universal either.’

Does any one see any Platonism here? I do not. The entire argument is within the logical sphere, and there is nothing said here as to the relation between the ideal and the real. Accordingly the contradiction of which K. speaks in his excursus, p. 281, does not exist, and needs no solution.

That הנומא is a logical term like ייעוד and the only difference is that given above, namely, the difference between the judgement.

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and the single concept, is also confirmed by the argument immediately following the one just discussed. This new one is also intended to prove that a universal cannot refer to the universal. But instead of the a priori manner in which this was proved in the last argument, G. now uses an illustration. And what is the illustration of a universal?—a universal proposition (הנה הכלל). Here, too, K. commits several mistakes which must be rectified. The Hebrew text reads (L. 64, 20) as follows:

K. (141, 11) renders this as follows:

Und ferner: Aus dem Begriffe des generellen Urteils folgt, 

\[\text{dass es nur insofern das Universale zum Urteilsgegenstande erhebt, als es selbst etwas Einschliessendes und Umfassendes ist, weil doch der Träger, über welchen es urteilt, nicht auf das entsprechende Universale hinweist. Würde nämlich sein Träger auf das Generelle hinweisen, das er umschliesst, so müsste dasjenige als pluralisierbar angenommen werden, was gar nicht pluralisiert werden kann. So weist beispielsweise unser Satz: Alle Menschen reden — auf eine Mehrheit von Menschen hin; deshalb wurde in diesem Urteile das Wort 'alle' gesetzt. Wird aber unter 'dem Menschen' die Art verstanden, so müsste in ihm (sc. dem Urteile) die Art als pluralisierbar gesetzt werden, während doch erwiesenermassen die Art nicht pluralisiert werden kann, und eine numerische Zweilheit nicht existiert. Mithin ist erwiesen, dass in einem generellen (allgemeinen) Urteile das Subjekt nichts Generelles und} \]

\[\text{Italics mine.}\]
Umschliessendes ist (sc. kein Genus und keine Art), und so muss es ein unbestimmtes \( \text{השתמש} \) Urteil sein,\(^5\) denn der Umfang ändert nichts an der Bedeutung des Subjekts, und das ist selbstverständlich.

The italicized passages are in every case incorrect. What G. says is this: It is clear from the nature of a universal proposition that it does not express a judgement concerning the universal as universal and embracing. For the subject concerning which the judgement is expressed does not denote the universal as universal and embracing. For if the subject of the proposition denoted the universal as such (lit. as universal), it would follow that that is multipliable which is not multipliable. Then follows the illustration, which is clear. If we say ‘all man is rational’, the pluralization is expressed by the word ‘all’. If then the subject ‘man’ denotes the species, it would follow that the species ‘man’ may be pluralized, which is absurd. Then he adds, but the same thing is true (read \( \text{תונות בנה} \) instead of \( \text{תונות בנה} \)) of an indefinite proposition [for example, ‘(some) man is rational’]. For the quantitative particle (\( \text{תונות} \)) does not change the meaning of the subject, as is self-evident.

Having discussed all the difficulties of the passage referred to at the beginning of this number, and seeing that K.’s translation is unusually defective, I deem it proper to close this number by giving a correct translation of the entire argument in question.

‘It seems as a result of an inductive investigation that these intelligibilia are not universals. For (1) an intelligibile is either a concept or a true conclusion. Now it is clear that the concept, i.e. the definition, does not denote the universal, for if it did denote the universal, it would have to do this either in the sense in which the universal is one, or in the sense in which it is many. And whichever it be, it would follow that the definition does not denote the essence of the individual thing, for the individual thing is not the universal embracing it, nor is it the many individuals. Therefore the definition of the universal could not be connected

\(^5\) Italics mine.
with it, for different things require different definitions. And in
general, as the definition of house does not pertain to the brick,
and the definition of the number ten does not apply to the number
two, so, according to this hypothesis, the definition could not
apply to the individual, as is evident. But it is clear from the
meaning of definition that it does denote the essence of every one
of the individuals to which the particular definition applies.
Hence it is clear that the definition does not denote the universal.
Again (2), if the definition denoted the universal, it would have to
do so in the sense in which the universal is a unity, for we see no
plurality in the definition. We do not say in defining man, he is
"rational animals", but "rational animal". Hence it appears that
the object of a definition is a unitary definitum. This being so, if
we now prove that the definition cannot denote the universal
in the sense in which it is a unity, it will be clear that the defini-
tion cannot denote the universal at all. We shall now prove that
the definition cannot denote the universal in the sense in which
it is universal and embracing, i.e. the sense in which it is a genus
or a species (sc. the universal as a unity). For if the definition
denoted the universal as genus or species, then, since it (the
universal) is in this sense a relative, it would follow that this aspect
of relation would have to be expressed in the definition, I mean
the fact that it embraces what it does embrace; as we include in
the definition of "slave" the relation between him and "master".
But this cannot be done in definitions. Again, it is clear that
each of the parts of a definition is necessarily predicable of the
thing defined. Now if the definition denotes the universal,
the result would follow that the species is identical with its genus,
which is utterly absurd. For example, as man is "rational
animal", man is "animal", and the species is identical with its
genus. It would result further from this assumption that the last
species is identical with the highest genus. For as man is
"animal" and the definition of animal is "nutritive sensitive",
man would be identical with "nutritive"; and as the definition of
"nutritive" is "growing body", it would follow that man is identical
with "body", and so the matter would go on until the result would
be that "man" which is the last species is identical with the highest genus, which is utterly foolish and absurd.

'But neither can a "true conclusion" refer to the universal. For a conclusion is nothing more than a judgement concerning the object of the concept; and hence the concept is prior to the conclusion. This being so, then, since we have proved that the concept does not denote the universal, it is clear that the conclusion does not denote the universal either. Again, it is clear from the nature of a universal proposition that it does not denote the universal as universal and embracing, because the subject concerning which the judgement is expressed does not denote the universal as universal and embracing. For if the subject denoted the universal \textit{qua} universal, it would follow that that which is not multiplicable is multiplicable. For example, the proposition, "all man is rational" denotes plurality in man. This is the function of the word "all" in this proposition. Now if "man" denotes the species, the species is pluralized in this proposition. But we know that the species cannot be pluralized and cannot be numerically two. Hence it follows that the subject in a universal proposition is not universal and embracing. But the same thing is true of an indefinite proposition, for the quantitative particle ["all"] does not change the meaning of the subject, as is self-evident.'

The paragraphing in the Leipzig edition is wrong, and it seems to have misled K. L. 64, 4 should not begin a new paragraph, neither should line 6 from the bottom of the same page; whereas line 17, beginning "man", should be the beginning of a new paragraph.

110. (L. 65, 22)

'Und ferner: Da doch seine Winkel zwei Rechte betragen, und die Doppelheit der 2 R gleichfalls eine unendliche Zahl (se. von

(K. 144, 2)
The italicized passage is evidently incorrect. What G. says is that if we say that the angles of the infinite triangle are equal to two right angles, they are double the one universal right angle which is also infinite, and then we have one infinite double another infinite, which is absurd. Whether K.'s criticism in his note (144, note 2) will apply now is not clear to me. For G. is not arguing about a theoretical double, but about an actual one. This infinite universal triangle, if its angles are equal to two right angles, does actually contain the double of two universal infinite right angles, hence the absurdity.

111. (L. 66, 4) = (K. 145, 10)

In the text K. has ἦπι Κόσμου, in the note (note 1) De Caelo! Cf. above, No. 32.

112. (L. 66, 6)

Waren die Subjekte und Prädikate in diesen Schlüssen Generalia, wie sich solches aus der Annahme ergibt, so wäre die Prädizierung des Genus für die Spezies falsch, denn die Spezies ist nicht mit ihrem Genus identisch, sondern müssten wir beispielsweise sagen: Der Mensch ist ein lünerisches Lebewesen; das ist aber offenbar absurd.

The italicized passage is incorrect. What G. says is this. If the subjects and the predicates in general propositions denoted universals, we could not predicate a genus of its species, for they are not the same. For example, the proposition, 'man is animal', would be wrong.

Italics mine.
Hebrew sentence quoted is an illustration of the statement just made, and the goes back to the and is not connected with.

113. (L. 66, 26)

Wenn es sich aber so verhält, so trifft das allgemeine Urteil offenbar über das Allgemeine keine Entscheidung, weder nach der Einheits- noch nach der Vielheitsseite hin, obgleich es über sie eine einzige Gesammtentscheidung fällt. Entscheidet deshalb das allgemeine Urteil über das Allgemeine, so trifft es diese Entscheidung nach der Vielheitsseite hin, obgleich es über jedes einzelne Individuum urteilt.

The two phrases beginning with ‘obgleich’ in the above passage are incorrect. ‘Obgleich’ is the wrong word and destroys the meaning of G. Similarly, ‘Trifft deshalb, &c.;, the beginning of the sentence following immediately upon the passage above quoted, is incorrect, and obscures the connexion of the thought; and the wrong use of ‘obgleich’ is again repeated below (147, 15).

It is clear from the Hebrew text and the argument that the possible signification of a universal proposition is classified by G. in the following way: It may express a judgement concerning the universal as (1) a unity embracing all individuals, or it may refer to the universal as (2) a plurality of individuals. This latter mode of signification may again be of two kinds. It may refer to a plurality of individuals (a) collectively, or (b) distributively. The Hebrew expressions for these different modes of reference are as follows:

This latter is again divided into (a) a plurality of individuals (b) and (b) distributively.

97 Italics mine.
98 Italics mine.
Now what G. says in the passage above quoted is this: Summarizing the preceding argument, he says, This being so, it is clear that the universal proposition refers to the universal neither (1) in so far as it is a unit, nor (2 a) in so far as it is a collective plurality. It follows, therefore, if the universal proposition refers to the universal, that (2 b) it refers to it as a distributive plurality. For, he goes on to say, in the passage immediately following upon the one quoted above, a universal proposition has the following possible modes of reference, &c. (giving precisely the classification mentioned above).

114. (L. 67, 2)

Before taking up the meaning of the argument, I wish to say that 'höchste Art' as a translation of 'הר最初 is liable to misunderstanding. One might suppose it meant in our case the highest species, namely, the human species, which is given in the example. Needless to say, it means nothing of the sort. It means literally the last species, i.e. the one which does not in

99 Italic mine.
turn embrace a narrower species. It is equivalent to ד^רכנפ, and means rather the lowest species than the highest.

Now as to the general argument. It is this: G. has come to the conclusion that a universal proposition expresses a judgement concerning a plurality taken distributively. Being a rigorous analyst, he does not at once jump to the conclusion that therefore it refers to the individuals taken distributively. It may conceivably refer to some other unit higher than the individual. No, says G., the unit in the denotation of the universal proposition cannot be anything higher than the individual. This is clear if we take as our universal proposition one in which the subject represents the last species, such as, ‘all man is rational’. What unit can there possibly be here, to the plurality of which taken distributively the proposition can refer? There is not any except the individual. In a proposition having a genus as its subject, such as ‘all animal is mortal’, it is conceivable that the unit may be not the individual but the species, but, as G. says in the sequel, if so, all the absurdities shown above would result here again from this supposition. Hence it is proved that a universal proposition refers to the plurality of individuals taken distributively.

To the credit of K. be it said that he understood the argument correctly, though there are some difficulties in the Hebrew text, which obscure it. There is one sentence in the Hebrew which, as it stands, cannot be rendered so as to give the desiderated meaning. I refer to the following (67, 6):

This can only be translated as follows:

‘[That there cannot be in this plurality any other definite part to which the proposition can refer except the individual, is clear in a proposition whose subject is a last species, for example, all man is rational], for in this case the individual men have no definite organs distinguished from each other, so that we might say that the reference [of the proposition] is to the individual groups of them [sc. the organs].’
But the translation gives very poor sense. It might seem to signify, taken by itself, that G. desires to guard against the possibility that the unit of reference may be something less than an individual,—an organ of an individual. But in the context this cannot be the meaning. K., once more be it said to his credit, felt the correct meaning, and despite the bad text endeavours to get the following translation, italicized above:

‘Denn die menschlichen Individuen unterscheiden sich nicht durch organische Bestimmtheiten derartig von einander, dass über ihre verschiedenen Klassen ein einziges Gesamturteil gefällt werden kann.’

The only difficulty is that the Hebrew will not bear this translation. נחלקים zeigt a corruption of any given individual man, and not to organs of one individual as differing from those of another. And the words כללו כללו חכם and אני חכם similarly must refer to כללו and not to כללו חכם.

The solution, I think, is a very simple one, and moreover one which will be seen to be correct the moment it is mentioned. כללו is a corruption for כללו. The unit of reference in a universal proposition whose subject is a last species cannot be anything higher than the individual, for in the proposition, ‘all man is rational’, there are no groups of individual men distinct from one another to which the proposition may refer in a ‘collective-distributive’ manner (כללו כללו חכם). The meaning of the last phrase is that the group, say Chinese, Japanese, Hindus, &c., or white men, black men, yellow men, &c., be taken collectively, whereas ‘man’ as consisting of these groups be taken distributively as per these groups and not per the individual men.

This is clearly the true solution, and is vouched for, too, by 67, 12:

ויוהי התפלל_related olmadא קריא מאן בוכתל או מאן שומרת על בנים או מאן נהנה ומורכבות.

115. (L. 68, 1)

איחוד קריא והנראה התפללcha שומרת על רגליו כי להוהיה מופרבות.
'Dagegen kommt es vor,'<sup>100</sup> dass im allgemeinen Urteil auf die bestimmte Mehrheit hingewiesen wird, <i>die sich</i><sup>100</sup> in der Zusammen- setzung des Intellekts mit den Sinnen <i>vollzieht</i>.'<sup>100</sup>

'Dagegen' for בלאון in this case is too strongly adversative to be correct. בלאון continues the argument, trying to show wherein the plurality resides in a universal proposition if not in the <i>intelligibile</i> as such. But the more serious error is the translation of <i>טלולא בֵּהַרְבָּה</i> by 'die sich ... vollzieht'. The Hebrew words agree with היה and not היה. The German should read, 'weil es aus dem Intellekt und den Sinnen zusammengesetzt ist'.

116. (L. 68, 19) = (K. 152, 5)
Concerning תותא (K. 'Realität'), see above, number 109.

117. (L. 68, 24)
והנה כפיי תִּשְׁמִיתַל או לא יתי בהמשך שיווה איז איוס חורם,

(K. 152, 13)
'Da nun das Intelligibele nur für das zufällige [better 'beliebige'] Individuum gilt, so gewinnen wir das Intelligibele aus den Sinnen in Verbindung mit den Perzeptionen.'<sup>101</sup>

K. reads תותא, but it seems to me that L. is correct in reading תותאה, repetition. The meaning is that the fact that we acquire the <i>intelligibile</i> as a result of repeated sense perception, and not from a single perception, is another proof that the <i>intelligibile</i> does not denote a definite individual but any individual at all; the idea being that if the <i>intelligibile</i> denoted a definite individual, one perception of an individual should be sufficient to give us the <i>intelligibile</i>. G. probably has in mind Aristotle's statement in the <i>Metaphysics</i>, i, ch. 1, 980 b 29 α' γαρ πολλαὶ μνήμαι τοῦ αὐτοῦ πράγματος μᾶς ἐμπειρίας δύναμιν ἀποτελεῖν. Also <i>ibid</i>. 981 a 5 γίνεται δὲ τέχνη, όταν ἐκ πολλῶν τῆς ἐμπειρίας ἐνοπλατών μία καθόλου γένηται περὶ τῶν ὁμοίων ἐπόλυσιν.

<sup>100</sup> Italics mine.

<sup>101</sup> Italics mine.
118. (L. 68, 25)

Dies geschieht aber so, dass der Intellekt von dem sinnlich wahrnehmbaren Individuum jene von ihm begriffenen\textsuperscript{102} Attribute abstrahiert, um derentwillen sich die Pluralbildung vollzog.

The italicized words form a wrong translation of "השיך". The word means here to pertain to as an attribute, and its subject is "אוחס תועבורות החרבות"

(K. 152, 16)

The correct translation is as follows: [The intelligible is acquired from sense perception by dint of repetition (see last no.),] by the intellect abstracting from the material attributes of the sensible individual, through which attributes multiplicity attaches as an attribute to them (sc. sensible individuals).

119. (L. 69, 5)

Und ferner: Das Universale bildet doch sein Wesen, das Wesen jedoch, das eine Sache zum Träger des Wesens macht, existiert in actu, d. h. man kann deshalb von ihm sagen, dass es aktuell existiert, weil es ihr (sc. der Sache) Wesen bildet.\textsuperscript{103}

The italicized passage is incorrect. The correct translation is as follows: ‘Again, the universal forms its essence (sc. of the individual), and the essence makes the thing possessing the essence an actual existent, I mean that we say it is an actual existent by reason of its essence’. G. is not saying yet that the essence is an actual existent, but that the thing possessing the essence is an actual existent by virtue of its essence. Then he argues in the sequel, that that which makes another an actual

\textsuperscript{102} Italics mine.

\textsuperscript{103} Italics mine.
existent must *a fortiori* be itself an actual existent. According to K.'s translation the rest of the argument in G. would be irrelevant.

In a note (153, note 4), K. attributes to L. the reading *הנה* (69, 11 last word), which would be wrong, and adopts the correct reading *נהנה*, which he attributes to MSS. O and P. He is evidently mistaken, for L. has the correct reading *נהנה*.

120. (L. 69, 18) = (K. 154, 2)

K. translates רוחב a *posteriori*. If a *posteriori* is used in German as it is in English, it is decidedly an inappropriate translation of רוחב. רוחב is here opposed to הלאה, in other cases it is opposed to ה hacen, neither of which means *a priori*. Predication may be of three kinds, synonymous (ה литер), homonymous (הصير), and what for want of a better term may be called analogous (קריך הוא רוחב or רוחב בכיר). The first two Aristotle defines in the beginning of the Categories. If we apply a term to two things homonymously (הומרוים), it signifies that the two things are quite different in essence, but they happen to have the same name. The example Aristotle gives is the word animal (*ζωο*), as applied to a real man and to the picture of a man (*οιον ζωον o τε ανθρωπος και το γεγραμμενον*). A term predicated of two things synonymously has exactly the same definition in the two cases, because the two things to which it is applied have the same essence, generic if not specific. Thus the same word animal (*ζωο*), is predicated synonymously of man and ox (*οιον ζωον o τε ανθρωπος και o βοη*). The third mode of predication Aristotle discusses in the Metaphysics, iv. 2. He calls it προς *ων* as opposed to synonymous predication (*καθ' ων*) on the one hand, and to homonymous predication (*paragus*) on the other. It is intermediate between the two. Thus the term 'existent' (*ων = קיים*) is predicated of substance (*οου = עין*) as well as of the various qualifications and affections of substance (*που, φθοραι, σπερματικς, παιδοτητες, πουρικα, γεννητικα – οου*). In this case the term is applied primarily (*πρωτος = חוץ* or *תומיס* and properly (*קירוס*) to substance (*οου*), secondarily (*רוחב*) to the
other things mentioned above. While the predication is here not synonymous, for the definition of the term existent would not be the same in all these cases, it is not homonymous either, for the things in question involve one and the same nature—substance (τὸ ἄνθρωπον ὑπὸ τὸν ἁμαρτήματος ὁλὸν ἀνθρώπου, ἀλλὰ πρὸς ἐν καὶ μίαν τινὰ φύσιν, καὶ οὐχ ὑμωνύμως . . . οὕτω δὲ καὶ τὸ ἄνθρωπον ἀνθρώπου μὲν, ἀλλ’ ἀπὸ τὸ ἀνθρώπον μὲν ἀρχήν τὰ μὲν γὰρ ὁτι ὁδός, ὁτα λέγεται, τὰ δ’ ὁτι πάθη ὁδός, τὰ δ’ ὁτι ὁδός εἰς ὁδόν, ἡ φθορὰ ἡ στερήσεις ἡ ποιότητας ἡ ποιητικά ἡ γεννητικά ὁδός, ἡ τῶν πρὸς τὴν ὁδόν λεγομένων, ἡ τούτων τινὸς ἀποφάσεις ἡ ὁδός).

This is what G. means in this place, and it is clear at the same time that the reference in G. to Aristotle is not to Metaphysics vii. 3, as K. thinks (153, fin.), but to iv. 2, as just indicated. In vii. 3, the discussion is what is meant by substance (σήμα = ὁδός). Here the question is in what sense the term existent (ὁμ = ὁδός) is applied to substance as well as to the accidents of substance. Aristotle sums up the same thought in vii. i, p. 1028 a, 13–15, especially in the words, τοσοιοσακός δὲ λεγομένου τοῦ ὅτεν οὐσίαν ἀντικροτήν ὃτι τούτων πρῶτον ὃν τὸ τὶ ἔστιν, ὅπερ σημαίνει τὴν ὁδόν.

121. (L. 79, 3)

Τὸ διὰ τὸ ὅτι λέγεται ὅτι οὐσία οὐδὲ ἄλλα ἐν τῇ ὁμοιοτητί τῆς ὑπόλαυσιν, ὁ λόγος ἡ ὅτι γνωστὸ τὸ ὅτι ὁ ὅτος ὁδός ἤναι ὁ διά τῆς ὁμοιοτητὸς τῆς ὁμοιοτητοῦ τοῦ ὅτι αὑτόν ἦν ἔστιν ὁ διὰ τῆς ὁμοιοτητοῦ τῆς ὁμοιοτητοῦ τοῦ ὅτι αὐτόν ἦν ἔστιν, ὅπερ σημαίνει τὴν ὁδόν.

(K. 155, 10)

Und ferner: Geben sie zu, dass dasjenige, was in seiner Existenz mit einer Veränderung akzidentell zusammenhängt, hylisch ist, so kann dieses Hylische nur dadurch ein sich im hylischen Intellekte realisierendes Intelligible werden, dass es der aktive Intellekt perzipiert.105 Nach ihrer Meinung bedarf nämlich

104 Cp. Husik, Judah Messer Leon’s Commentary on the Vetus Legumae, Leyden, 1906, p. 84.
105 Italics mine.
Eine derartige Perzepition für ihre (sc. der Intelligibilia) Existenz der Perzepition solcher\textsuperscript{105} Intelligibilia, die wiederum für ihre Existenz auf eine solche Sache angewiesen sind, die substantiell mit einer Veränderung zusammenhängt.

The passages italicized by the present writer in the above translation are incorrect, and whatever they may mean do not represent what G. desires to say. The correct translation is as follows: 'Besides, if they admit that a thing whose existence depends upon a certain change per accidens, is material, it will follow according to them that the intelligibile which the material intellect acquires when it comprehends the active intellect is also material. For they believe that this comprehension (sc. of the active intellect on the part of the material intellect) requires for its existence the apprehension of these intelligibilia (sc. the sub-lunar intelligibilia), which in turn require for their existence a thing dependent upon a change essentially.'

122. (L. 70, 20)

Und zweitens: Weil die Intelligibilia Universalia sind, die Existenz der Universalia jedoch nach ihrer individuellen Seite hin ausserseelisch ist.\textsuperscript{107}

The italicized words are incorrect. The correct translation is: 'Secondly, because these intelligibilia are universals, and the existence of the universal is dependent upon the particular, existing extra animam.'

123. (L. 71, 9)

\textsuperscript{105} Italics mine.  
\textsuperscript{107} Italics mine.
Ferner: Nach dieser Annahme müssten doch die Intelligibilia gleichzeitig hylisch und nichthylisch sein, das ist jedoch nicht möglich. Wenn nämlich das Intelligible deshalb einer Pluralisierung zugänglich sein soll, weil seine Entstehung auf der Empfindung verschiedenartiger Individuen beruht, so müsste bei einer Vielheit von Menschen das Intelligible eine numerische Einheit bilden, obgleich es bei ihnen durch die Empfindung anderer Individuen entsteht (sc. weil doch die Intelligibilia Identitätscharakter besitzen),

(K. 157, 11)

The trouble with this translation, which follows the Hebrew text, is that the argument is a non sequitur. The assumption of the opponents, which G. is trying to reduce ad absurdum, is that the intelligible is material because like other material forms it is multiplied with the multiplication of the subject, i.e. since the intelligibilia are dependent upon the extra-mental particulars, different extra-mental particulars give rise to different intelligibilia. In other words my idea of man would be different, say, from that of Gersonides, because his was built upon the individual men of his generation, and mine is based upon the individual men of to-day.

Now G. argues from this (according to K. and the Hebrew text as it is) that the intelligibilia of different persons would form a numerical unit, even though these intelligibilia were formed in the minds of the different persons on the basis of the perception of different individual men (i.e. as objects of perception)! And G. gives no reason for such an extraordinary

108 Italics mine.
inference. It is just like saying, if you maintain that \( a \) is \( b \), it follows from your assumption that \( a \) is not \( b \), without giving any reason. Here K. comes to the help of G. by adding in parenthesis, 'sc. weil doch die Intelligibilia Identitätscharakter besitzen'. But surely G. would not have omitted what is so essential to his argument. But this reason is no reason at all. The 'Identitätscharakter' is the very point at issue. The opponents of G. claim that the intelligibilia have no 'Identitätscharakter' because, like other material forms ( materiāla), they are multiplied with the multiplication of their subjects ( materiāla). Cf. L. 54, 16 ff. and especially 55, 22 ff., and above, numbers 95 and 96. The solution of the matter is extremely simple, and the error of K. reminds me of a frequent saying of a teacher of mine when one of his pupils blundered and blamed it upon a mistake in the book. מְשֻׁא הָבָרָנוּ, מְשֻׁא הָבָרָנוּ, he used to say in his quaint way, with emphasis upon הבש and הבש. In our case too there is a מְשֻׁא הבש. The ר in אֲרָה in is a mistake for a ר. The word G. wrote is אֲרָה, which he uses in the sense of 'same'. See above, No. 50.

The meaning is now clear. If the pluralization to which the intelligibilia are subject is due to the difference of the extra-mental individuals they perceive, then it will follow that the intelligibilia of different persons (as subjects) will be one, if they were formed in their minds on the basis of the same extra-mental things. The rest of the argument is now clear and needs not to be repeated.

There is still a word to be said about the words אֲרָה (L. 11). The sequence demands אֲרָה מְשַׁהְוֹז מְשַׁהְוֹז מְשַׁהְוֹז, and it is possible that the ר fell out and the two words read as one מְשַׁהְוֹז. The next copyist threw out the superfluous ר.

124. (L. 72, 24) = (K. 159, 26)

אֲרָה should be אֲרָה, cf. last number. K.'s translation based on the reading אֲרָה makes no sense.

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125. (L. 73, 3) = (K. 160, 14)
In my mind the text as it is is corrupt and makes no sense. The statement, moreover, contradicts the statement at the bottom of the preceding page (72), hence the information in the bottom of the preceding page makes no sense. I should therefore read שיאמה instead of שיאמה. Cf. below, No. 127.

126. (L. 73, 8) = (K. 160, 23)
In my mind the text as it is is corrupt and makes no sense.

Here, too, it seems that a word has fallen out before בָּכָל hence בָּכָל אָפַשׁ שָׁוָה לָנוּ מַעְשֶׁל בַּכּוֹת שָׁוָה כָּנַּנְשָׁג אֵפֹר. The same applies to the similar statement on the preceding page (72, 19). And the translation would be, ‘In general it would be impossible, in reference to a thing which is in one sense possible, in another impossible, to have an intelligibile of that thing in so far as it is possible’.

127. (L. 73, 22)
Here's a note. Nach Riva und Leipzig. PueO haben folgende Lesart: יכ הָוָס אָטְנָמָה לְאִשָּׁה בָּמַעְשֵׁל שָׁוָה כָּנַּנְשָׁג אֵפֹר. Da der Schluss falsch is, so kann nur die Lesart von R. L. richtig sein.'
How K. arrives at this conclusion is a mystery to me. On p. 63, 18, G. says, 

which is not the case, as in every case, man himself is what is intelligible, but the act of knowing is a secondary thing, and this is the reason why on p. 63 we find: "knowing is not the same as seeing, since the latter is a primary action, while the former is a secondary thing, and he who knows is not the same as he who sees.

On p. 67 fin., we read likewise:

On p. 68, 20 we have again:

And similarly, l. 24, we read:

Finally, on p. 72 fin., we read:

It is quite clear from all this that G. is of the opinion that in so far as the intelligible denotes sublunar extra-mental things (his own view is that the primary reference of the intelligible, or at least the cause of it, is the intelligible in the active intellect), it refers not to a definite individual, but to any individual at all. And it is also clear from the passages quoted that in so far as the intelligible refers to any individual at all, no plurality attaches to it by reason of the variety of the individuals. That is, the intelligible of man is one and the same in A and B, yesterday and to-day and to-morrow, just because it does not denote, and hence is not dependent upon, any definite individual. The only statement contradicting this is that on p. 73, 3, which was discussed in No. 125. And we were forced to change א"תב to א"ת. Now in the face of all this, when there is a choice between two readings, one of which is in accordance with good sense and logic, and in conformity with G.'s opinion as expressed elsewhere, and the other the reverse of all this, K. adopts the latter on the
ground that ‘der Schluss falsch ist’! What ‘Schluss’ is ‘falsch’? If we adopt the reading of the MSS. P and O, everything is all right. Moreover, G.’s example in the sequel proves beyond a doubt that the reading of P and O is the only correct one. He uses as an illustration the number ‘three’. If we say the number three is small we are establishing a relation between the number three and all other numbers greater than three. But it does not follow from this that the *intelligibile* ‘small’ as applied to the number three is multiplied with the variety of numbers with which the number three stands in relation. The idea ‘small’ is one and the same whether we compare three with four or with five. And why is this so? Because, says G., when we speak of three as small we are putting it in relation with all numbers greater than three, not as definite numbers, say four or five, but merely as numbers greater than three. In this respect one number will do as well as another provided it is greater than three, and the idea ‘small’ will not change with every new number taken for comparison.

Now whither does this illustration point? Surely to the reading of P and O. The *intelligibile* ‘man’ never changes or multiplies with the introduction of new individual men, because it is not affected by the individual as a *definite* individual. All individuals look alike to the *intelligibile* provided they are men.

To be sure K. misunderstands the illustration also. He adds a long note (167, note 1) on the concept of infinity, which, so far as I can see, has not the least bearing on the question at issue. What G. says in the illustration which he adduces from the number three, does not commit him to any theory on the nature of infinity, and is something that any one might say who never heard of infinity. There are also some errors in K.’s translation of that passage, hence we must examine it more carefully in the next number.

128. (L. 73, 26)
Denn da sich die Relationseinheit mit einer Vielheit von Dingen akzidentell verbindet, so ergibt sich für sie (sc. die Relationseinheit) keine Pluralisierung. Nehmen wir beispielsweise die Drei als Zahleneinheit an. 

*Wird sie nun in ihrer geringen Quantität qualifiziert (sc. durch andere Zahleneinheiten), so verbindet sie sich* 109 akzidentell mit jeder der Zahlen, die größer ist als sie. Daraus aber ergibt sich nicht dass sie sich selbst durch die Zahlen *vergrößert*, zu welchen sie in Beziehung tritt, denn die Relation, die sie *substantiell* kraft dieser Eigenschaft zu der Zahl gewinnt, die grösser ist als sie, hat sie nur insofern, als die Zahl *grösser* ist als sie, nicht insofern sie eine vier oder fünf ist (sc. *Also ist das bereits vorhandene Plus gegenüber der Relationseinheit die Bedingung der Relation, nicht aber bedingt die Relation das Plus. Aus diesem Grunde ist der absolute Wert der grösseren Zahl gleichgültig.*

I admit this translation is absolutely unintelligible to me. I do not know what is meant by ‘Wird sie nun in ihrer geringen Quantität qualifiziert (sc. durch andere Zahleneinheiten)’. I do not know what is meant by ‘Daraus aber ergibt sich nicht dass sie sich selbst durch die Zahlen vergrößert, zu welchen sie in Beziehung tritt’. Does any one claim that the number three is *increased* by its relation to other numbers? Quite the contrary. Any one would say that it is its relation to other numbers that makes it three and nothing else. Nor do I understand the meaning of the last remark in parentheses. And finally, I can see no coherence in the passage as a whole, and, what is more to the point, no resemblance to the meaning of G., which is quite clear to me.

109 Italics mine.
To take up the significant phrases in the Hebrew text first, I understand to mean the following: ‘If we take the number three, for example, and describe it as small, we put it into accidental relation with all numbers greater than it.’ He clearly makes a distinction between essential and accidental relation. Three as three is in essential relation with all numbers greater than three, not as definite quantities, but only as greater than three.

The next statement, "It does not follow (sc. because it is in accidental relation with so many other numbers) that it (the number three as small) is pluralized (not "vergrößert sich") in accordance with the number of things with which it is in relation.” This means, that three as small is one idea, one intelligible, and it does not change its character as small according to the variety of the numbers with which it is compared; because, as he goes on to say, "The relation which the number three bears essentially by reason of this quality (sc. the predicate “small”) is a relation to the number greater than it qua greater than it, and not qua four or five.'

The inference is that if the number three as small bore an essential relation to the numbers greater than it as definite numbers, as four or five or six, &c., the character of the intelligible ‘three as small’ would have as many forms as there are numbers greater than three with which it is compared.

Now what is the point of this whole illustration? It is obviously this: that in every other intelligible, since it concerns not the definite individual as this definite individual (אַלּוֹ מָה), but any individual at all of a given species (אִישׁ קְרָא וּמָה), it is
always the same, no matter how many individuals are actually denoted by it. The bearing of this on the discussion in the preceding number is obvious. Why this harmless passage should have been chosen by K. for a lengthy disquisition on the concept of infinity is more than I can say.

129. (L. 74, 9 and 10) = (K. 171, 6 and 8)

We have here again יִפְעָל, actus, mistaken for יָפִיעָל = agens. Cf. above, No. 64.

130. (L. 75, 17) = (K. 175, 23)

بيبְרָי here is a weight, and means talents, not ‘Brotlaibe’, which would be בְּרֶּיַּם.

131. (L. 77, 1)

שָׁם מְצוֹנֵל יִאֶרֶבָּאֵשׁ הַשְּׁכֹל הַפְּלָשִׁל מִתּוֹנָה הַדָּרוֹמִיתָהּ וּאֹסֶר רָאוּי

(K. 178, 34)

Dass . . . das Intelligibile welches der active Intellekt von der vorstellenden Form gewinnt,110 weit eher unser Intelligibele sein muss als die vorstellende Form.

The words italicized constitute a very serious error. How can any one make G. speak of the active intellect as acquiring his intelligibile from the form in the imagination! Does not K. know that according to G., and in fact generally in the middle ages, the active intellect was regarded as the cause of the sublunar world and not the effect thereof? In particular would any one dream of making anything in the mind of the active intellect dependent upon the imagination in the mind of man? For that is what זָמָה הַדָּרוֹמִיתָהוּ is, the φαντασία in the human faculty of imagination. G. of course does not say this. He speaks of the intelligibile in the mind of the active intellect which corresponds as a prototype or cause to the form in the human imagination.111

110 Italics mine.

111 It is perhaps possible that I am doing injustice to Kellermann, and that his sentence should be construed ‘Dass das Intelligibile von der vorstellenden Form, welches der active Intellekt gewinnt’, &c. But the very word ‘gewinnt’ is inapplicable to the active intellect, which does not acquire his ideas. He has them all the time.
The word 'ihn' is not represented in the Hebrew of L., and K. does not indicate that he has any manuscript authority for it. As a matter of fact such a conclusion as K. draws is an unexpected one. The preceding arguments do not merely not show that we can perceive the active intellect without the sublunar intelligibilia, they do not prove that we can perceive the active intellect at all. The conclusion therefore is a negative one, to be sure, but it is the following if we follow the text of L. 'It has not been proven that the material intellect can perceive anything except these (i. e. the sublunar) intelligibilia.'

The parenthetical remark, 'sc. obgleich sie zu ihnen direkt gelangen k"onnten', is beside the point. Those natural things which attain to their ultimate perfection by means of intermediate stages of lesser perfection cannot do otherwise. And in the material intellect, too, the argument is that the sublunar intelligibilia are not the final stage of its perfection, but only a way-station, so to speak, a 'Nachtasyl', by means of which it will arrive at the Active Intellect.

132. (L. 78, 1)

'Wenn es sich aber so verh"alt, ist hieraus nicht erwiesen, dass ihn (sc. den akt. Intellekt)\textsuperscript{112} der hylische Intellekt ohne\textsuperscript{112} die sublunaren Intelligibilia begreifen kann.'

133. (L. 78, 11-12) = (K. 181, 24-27)

134. (L. 78, 23)

\textsuperscript{112} Italics mine.
(K. 182, 11)

Würde es sich nämlich nicht112 zu einer Vollkommenheit um der anderen Vollkommenheit willen hinbewegen,— und es gibt keine113 Vollkommenheit, die nicht in der Bewegung um einer andern willen stattfindet — so wäre diese Bewegung zwecklos.113

The word 'nicht' has nothing corresponding to it in the Hebrew of L., and K. does not indicate a variant. The introduction of the negative makes the argument a non sequitur. For if every perfection is not for the sake of another perfection, there is an ultimate perfection, which is the 'Zweck', and we cannot draw the conclusion, 'so wäre diese Bewegung zwecklos'. This conclusion can have validity only if we assume that there is no ultimate perfection, that every perfection is for the sake of another perfection. In this case we have indeed an infinite series, and the motion is 'zwecklos'. From this consideration it is clear, too, that the parenthetical passage in K., 'und . . . stattfindet', is also incorrectly rendered, and for the same reason as above. In fact, it is not a parenthesis at all in the original, it is part of the condition. Accordingly we should translate the passage as follows: 'If a thing moves to one perfection for the sake of another perfection and there is no perfection in this motion which is not for the sake of another perfection, then this motion has no end at all.'

135. (L. 79, 33 and 34) = (K. 184, 26 and 27)

דוע and דעה mean here 'opinion' or 'idea' and not 'Kenntnis'.

136. (L. 80, 2) = (K. 184, 33)

לא ימכרה חתולחת means 'it cannot escape division', not 'es ist nicht unmöglich . . . durch folgende Alternative zu erklären'. Cf. above, No. 45.

137. (L. 83, 6)

هو כ מ nearest נפסד הט שט烟囱וות השבל הנך� והשך זכרין יפסד

112 Italics mine.
Denn wenn etwas an der Existenz des erworbenen Intellekts vergänglich ist, so ist es nur von dieser Seite aus (sc. der physischen Perzeptionen); also muss der ererbte Intellekt vergänglich sein.

This translation is incorrect. The correct translation is as follows: 'For if that upon which the existence of the acquired intellect depends is subject to dissolution, the acquired intellect itself necessarily is subject to dissolution'. This agrees with the immediately preceding context.

138. (85, 19)

Und kann er nicht alle Intelligibilia (sc. die einzelnen) begreifen, so kann er sie auch nicht nach ihrer Einheitsseite hin erkennen.

G. says, of course, nothing of the sort. What he does say is this. 'And similarly if he can perceive all sublunar intelligibilia, but cannot comprehend them in their unitary aspect [sc. then also he cannot perceive the active intellect].

139. (L. 87, 26–9) = (K. 206, 8–13)

The parenthetical passage in K., 'sc. also der hyl. Intellekt wertvoller als der aktive', strikes one like a bolt from the blue. One cannot see the motive of it, and one wonders what it has to do with Gersonides's argument, which it gives a stunning blow on the head. For surely a conclusion like the one expressed in the words in question can only be intended as a reductio ad absurdum, whereas G.'s words immediately preceding, Dann aber müsste die Endform (sc. in actu) wertvoller als das Mediale

114 Italics mine.
sein', is not at all a *reductio ad absurdum*. It expresses G.'s own opinion. And the only conclusion to be drawn from it is that there cannot be two co-ordinate forms (ןַהַמָּא בֵּלְהַי אָמֶשׁ שַׁתְּחָתָהוּ—86, 26).

As K.'s words can only be due to a confusion, it will be well to resume briefly G.'s argument in this chapter (12). The question is whether it is possible for man to comprehend the Active Intellect. Two conditions are necessary for such comprehension: (1) The material intellect must have a knowledge of *all* sublunar *intelligibilia*. (2) He must know them not as an aggregate of separate ideas, but as a unitary system. Now G. argues: In the first place it is impossible for man to know all sublunar *intelligibilia*. In the second place, granting that this is possible, he cannot know them as a unitary system. In order to prove the latter, G. tries to show in various ways that all nature, i.e. all the processes in the sublunar world, form one great teleological progress, in which the primitive matter endeavours to attain the highest form, viz. the form of man. Every detail in nature is a link in this one chain. This point he makes clear in his second argument, beginning in the middle of p. 86, where he shows that every single form in nature outside of the first and the last stands between two other forms, one above or antecedent to it, which is matter in relation to it, and the other below or subsequent to it, to which it stands in the relation of matter. *There cannot be two co-ordinate forms.* For, he goes on to say, if there are two co-ordinate forms, we have the following three possibilities. Either (1) they are both final ends of the series, or (2) they are both means, i.e. intermediate terms in the series, or (3) one is an end and the other a mean. He proves the first impossible (we need not go into the argument). He proves the second impossible by showing that the two supposed means must be in one motive process, and hence cannot be co-existent but successive (which is the reverse of the hypothesis). And from this follows the impossibility of no. 3. For if one form is an end and the other a mean in one and the same motive process, it follows as before that the end is superior to the mean, and hence they are not co-existent but
successive, not co-ordinate, but the means is subordinate to the end (which is contrary to hypothesis). This is all that G. has proved so far, namely, that there cannot be two co-ordinate forces. There is not a word said or intimated so far about the relation between the material and the active intellect. His proof is not yet complete. He concludes his argument on p. 88, 6 ff. It is not, he says, in the power of man to understand the relation of every single form in this universal process. He may know in a general way that the inorganic is in the relation of matter to the plant, the plant to the animal, &c. He may even understand the relations of certain subdivisions in these three kingdoms, but he can never know the actual relation of every single *intelligibie* or form, and any knowledge short of this does not enable its possessor to comprehend the active intellect.

140. (L. 87 fin.)

und das dem Dünneren näher, stehende *weit eher den Weg der* Form beschreitet als das dem Dicken näher stehende ...

The italicized words are incorrect. The מ of מָכוּשׁ is not comparative. The expression ... מֶּכֶס תּוּלֶל עַבּוֹר מֶּכֶס, and signifies that one thing is in the relation of a form to another thing: cf. above, No. 21.

So in our passage the meaning is that the mixture which approximates ‘thinness’ bears the relation of form to the mixture which approximates ‘thickness’. That is, the latter is like matter to the former.

141. (L. 88, 10)

Italics mine.
Das unvollkommene Tier auf der Stufe des Hylischen gegenüber der gebückten Gestalt,\textsuperscript{116} die gebückte Gestalt\textsuperscript{116} auf der hylischen Stufe gegenüber der fliegenden, und die fliegende auf der Stufe des Hylischen gegenüber der gehenden.

K. translates "דומא = 'Gestalt', and חנע as if it were חנש or חניא, 'gebückt'. It is clear from the context that חניא means 'having blood', and חנער means 'aquatic', lit. 'swimming', contrasted with חניא, flying = aerial, and חנעד, walking = terrestrial.

142. (L. 90, 22) = (K. 217, 26)

הנהנהה means 'continuously', not 'vollständigt'.

143. (L. 90, 32)

כ מותרות אשר ננכו מנה בחינת מחצלת הלוח נכלל

(K. 218, 20) translates:

Denn die in unserem Leben sich geltend machende Annehmlichkeit ist von jener (sc. nach dem Tode)\textsuperscript{117} weit verschieden.

This does not seem to be correct, I mean especially the parenthetical remark. There would be no particular relevancy in making this statement at this time. What G. means is no doubt that there must be a great difference between the happiness arising from the knowledge of inferior intelligibilia and that caused by intelligibilia of a higher kind—after death, since the difference is so enormously great also in this life. The sequel confirms this interpretation.

144. (L. 91, 5)

ולא ובא לו ישראל כי בתה חק לעולמ הנבר, כ בום עמה שיעזרו אתם והוראת לכם ומושאלוות ואה התשישה הנשלא זכו ומוהו מהם עית אליהם ומכ שמעון יום וגרת היה בישראל ובחר תרכז והנה ואמררש עליה כיミニ והנה מתה טום רביםហוまとめ

\textsuperscript{116} Italics mine. \textsuperscript{117} Italics mine.
(K. 219, 3)

Deshalb sagen sie: Ganz Israel hat Anteil am künftigen Leben. Sie meinen nämlich: Obgleich sie durch die Thora in so ausgezeichneter Weise zum Erwerb der Intelligibilien angeleitet werden, können doch viele von ihnen nur ein kleines oder grösseres Mass von Intelligibilien erwerben. Es steht also ihr Ausdruck 'Ganz (ם) Israel' auf der Stufe von den 'Meisten in Israel'...

K. also adds in a foot-note (219, note 1), 'Das Wort "ganz" soll darauf hinweisen, dass sich nicht jeder in Israel einen Teil von Intelligibilien erworben hat.'

K. gives an entirely wrong impression of G.'s meaning. He makes it appear that G. is trying to show that only a few Israelites and not all will get a share in the world to come, whereas G. says the very opposite; namely, that by reason of the Torah, which exhorts to contemplation and study in so remarkable a manner, a great many Israelites cannot but acquire some measure of intelligibilium, whether it be much or little. To be sure, there are exceptions even in Israel. There are men who do not heed the law and do not acquire any intelligibilia. For this reason G. adds that the word 'all' (ם) need not be taken strictly. It means rather the greater number. This last remark is more or less incidental, and not a conclusion of what precedes. The main contention of G. is positive and not negative. He means to say that many Israelites do have a knowledge of intelligibilia rather than that a great many do not.

145. (L. 91, 21)

לאו כהו מובאר שבעבר יהוב ל"מים ישאטו והו שימשכטלפמנת

(K. 219, fin.)

Also muss der Glaubige offenbar solches mit seinem Glauben in Übereinstimmung bringen. 119

This is not the correct meaning of the Hebrew passage. The proper translation is as follows:

'Therefore it is clear that the person who believes this (sc. that our conclusions are opposed to the 'Torah) should follow his faith

118 Italics mine.

119 Italics mine.
(sc. and reject our theories). The sequel shows also that this translation is the correct one.

Conclusion: Our task is now done. We have examined the more glaring errors and misconceptions and tried to correct them. K. has also a number of lengthy and erudite notes, which we have left out of this discussion. After all, the first duty of a translator is to translate. The next thing incumbent upon him is to add brief explanatory notes wherever the text offers some difficulty, textual, terminological, or logical. Of these there is by far too little in K. The translator’s own philosophical standpoint, and his criticism of his author from that standpoint, is quite a secondary matter. If he has done his duty properly and adequately by the first two requirements, we may be grateful to him for his additional criticism. But to indulge in the latter at the expense of the former is unjustifiable. And this is the charge we make against Keller-Mann. We have examined his translation rather carefully, though not too critically, and found it wanting in a great many more instances than is allowed to a competent translator. A more critical search, and a consideration of the finer points would no doubt reveal a good many more instances open to question. K.’s defects as a translator of Gersonides may be classed under the following heads.

1. He does not seem to be sufficiently familiar with the Hebrew style of the mediaeval Jewish philosophers.

2. He does not in many cases understand the meaning of technical terms (cf. Nos. 74, 90, 91, 95, 96, 97, 101, 108, 109, 118, &c.).

3. He exhibits a lack of imagination in failing to see the point of an argument or the sequence of thought (cf. Nos. 64, 80, 81, 82, 95, 96, 98, 102, 109, 113, &c.).

4. This makes it difficult or impossible for him to see in a number of instances evident corruptions in the text, which call for obvious and simple emendations (cf. Nos. 74, 79, 114, 123, &c.).
5. Even though he had the advantage of several MSS., he failed to draw from them the benefit they were calculated to give, and for reasons stated before (Nos. 3 and 4) allowed in some instances a valuable reading to slip through his hands, the adoption of which made a difficult and obscure argument clear and transparent (cf. Nos. 62, 65, 66, 77, 88, 117, 127, &c.).

Dr. Kellermann intends to proceed with his translation of the Milhamot, of which he has given us so far about one-fifth. He also intimates that he may undertake to edit the Hebrew text on the basis of the MSS. We feel it our duty to advise Kellermann to proceed slowly and with caution in either of these tasks. The reader who has followed us to this point (I fear he is not very numerous) will, I think, agree that the volume here reviewed should have undergone a thorough revision before it was published. May we suggest in all humility and seriousness that in future Kellermann may join with a specialist in this line, and collaborate on the translation as well as on the edition of the text. A translation or an edition of a mediaeval Jewish philosophical text is a rare event in these practical days, hence we must see to it, in the name of Jewish science and its mediaeval heroes, that when they are presented to the modern world (none too favourable to them as it is) it should be in as nearly perfect a form as is humanly possible.
A SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY AUTOBIOGRAPHY

A PICTURE OF JEWISH LIFE IN BOHEMIA AND MORAVIA.
FROM A MANUSCRIPT IN THE JEWISH THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

BY ALEXANDER MARX, Jewish Theological Seminary of America.

Considering the scarcity of autobiographical writings in Jewish literature, the publication of the short text here offered to the reader does not require an apology. The author, who was born in 1668, was a plain man, gifted neither with great scholarship—his style being in many parts very poor—nor with particular brilliancy. His story, which extends over the first seventeen years of his life (1668-85) only, but was written many years later, is on the whole commonplace, but in spite of this it will be found to be of considerable interest as a human document. Our author was undoubtedly a Schlumiehl. This characteristic is probably responsible for the curious fact that while the names of his parents and grandparents, brothers, aunts, and other members of his family are mentioned,1 his own name appears nowhere in his little note-book. He was, however, a fairly good observer, and the value of this short autobiography lies in the typical description of everyday life of the Jewish inhabitants of a Bohemian village, such as we seldom meet in our historical sources because it was considered too trivial. Of particular interest are the facts

1 See the Family Tree of the writer.
we gather about the relations of the Jews to their gentile neighbours, and more especially to the nobility of the villages, about the jealousy existing among themselves as well as about the state of Jewish teachers and Jewish education in general. The author's observations are not limited to the small villages in this respect; he had occasion to gather information in regard to larger Jewish communities like Meseritsch and even Prague, and there, we must say, conditions were decidedly better. His own father had in the course of his eventful life acted for a few years as elementary teacher in the community of Lichtenstadt before he became in turn a distiller, a pedlar in jewellery, an arrendar and 'Hofjude' of a small Count, &c. His experiment in teaching his two sons at the same time, irrespective of the difference in their ages and their knowledge, selecting the treatise of Sotah by which to introduce his younger son into the intricacies of the Talmud, does not give us a very high opinion of his accomplishments as a pedagogue.

The author speaks of only one of his teachers with love, and to him and his wife he indites a touching memorial with the statement that, while he taught the boys Talmud, she inculcated the fear of God and the beauty of a virtuous life.

The description of the ravages of the awful plague which in 1681 devastated Bohemia and in Prague alone had over eighty-three thousand victims,² is really remarkable with its gruesome details.

² See Haeser, *Lehrbuch der Geschichte der Medicin und der epidemicen Krankheiten*, vol. III, p. 415 (Jena, 1882), and P. R. Redlich, *Historia pestis annis 1680 et 1681 Praeae grassaet* (Prague, 1682), quoted by Haeser, which is inaccessible to me. I owe this reference to Dr. Harry Friedenwald.
The great historical events of the time likewise did not pass without leaving their impress upon the life of the little Bohemian villager. The outbreak of the Turkish war, heralded by a comet, drove him home from Meseritsch, just as the Chmielnicki persecutions drove his grandmother from Poland a generation before.

Most of the persons who played a part in the life of our author are entirely unknown, but by a happy coincidence some of the most prominent Rabbis of his country are mentioned in his biography. His grandmother was the sister of the famous Moravian 'Landesrabbiner' R. Menahem Mendel Krochmal. In the house of this Rabbi the mother of our author received her education, and his son, R. Judah Loeb, who in later years filled his father's place, proved in turn a godsend in the life of the father of our author, inasmuch as he generously lent him jewellery and other merchandise, thus enabling him to earn a proper living. His grandmother on his father's side was a granddaughter of the renowned cabbalistic author, R. Eleazar Perels. R. Jacob Backofen, more commonly called

3 The various opinions expressed as to this comet caused Pierre Bayle to publish a famous little book which, in the English translation before me, bears the title: Miscellaneous reflections occasion'd by the comet which appeared in December 1680. Chiefly tending to explode popular superstitions. Written to a Doctor of the Sorbonne by Mr. Bayley [sic]. Translated from the French. In two volumes. London, 1708.

4 See Horodetzki, Hagoren, II, 32-7; D. Kauffmann, ibid., 38 seq.

5 See Kauffmann, ibid., 40-41.


It is not quite clear what our author means by his statement, 'his son was Moses Kuskes'. Kuskes was the family name of R. Eleazar Perels' father-in-law, but hardly of his own son.
Reischer, who died as Rabbi of Metz in 1733, was a very well-known talmudic writer. His Minhät Jakob, which our author mentions, appeared in 1689. Our writer thankfully records the readiness of that great scholar to instruct him in his boyhood, but he adds that his masterful wife, the proud daughter of the Bohemian Landesrabbiner R. (Benjamin) Wolf Spira, did not permit it.

As to Meir, the Shohet of the community of Vienna, the father of our writer's step-mother, some information is to be found in the genealogical letter of his son Moses, published by L. Lazarus. We learn that he was a nephew of the rich Kappel Fraenkel, that after the expulsion from Vienna in 1670 he settled in Meseritsch, where he died, and that he had three more sons in addition to the two mentioned in our account. Several of the family names we come across are known to us, through Hock's valuable work on the Prague families, to have been current there, e.g. Fleckeles, Wagenmacher, and Günzburg. The member of the latter family, who employed our author as a tutor for his sons for a short time, Moses G., might be identical with the R. Mosche Kintzburg who, according to the curious account of the pageant arranged in Prague on May 18, 1716, in honour of the birth of Prince Leopold of Austria, published by Schudt, acted as leader of the

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9 The same lady, after her husband's death in 1733, prevented by her energetic protest the election of R. Jonathan Eibeschütz as his successor in the Metz Rabbinate. See the letter of her grandson Nehemiah Reischer in Emden's ידיעות הנשר, Lemberg, 1877, f. ii b, cp. REJ., VIII, 273.
10 MGWJ. 56, 1912, pp. 352-3.
scribes. Probably he is the Moses ben Loeb Kinzburg who died September 12 of the same year. The difference in the spelling of the name may be due to a slip of memory of the writer who uses the more common spelling.

Some of the identifications of geographical names in the text are due to my revered teacher, Professor Berliner, who many years ago had borrowed my copy of the manuscript and wrote the transliterations of these names on the margin. Polna for פולנה was suggested by Professor Deutsch, who also considers it possible that פולנה, פולנה is the village of Wostrow.

The manuscript from which the following text is taken forms part of a collection presented to the Jewish Theological Seminary by Messrs. Moses and Marks Ottinger. It is briefly described in Catalogue XI of Messrs. Schwager & Fraenkel, Husiatyn, under no. 110. It is an autograph written in a cursive German hand; it measures 13.7 x 9.5 cm. It begins with the title הערת התוגרת, followed by three blank leaves. The autobiography fills fol. i-ii a; between fol. 10 and 11 the author evidently tore out a leaf. The next page has a short note on his travels, which forms a kind of continuation of the text, and is printed here as such, together with a set of good resolutions drawn up at various times, which contain some further biographical material and are characteristic of the writer, but do not seem to require translation. They are found on fol. 34 of the manuscript. Fols. 12-25 contain ethical and philosophical reflections in fifteen paragraphs, interrupted by cabbalistic combinations (15 a) and blank pages (15 b-17 a).

12 Hock, loc. cit., 66; note 2, פולנה is a misprint for פולנה.

13 They mostly do not occur in M. Grünwald's article in his Das Jüdische Centralblatt, VIII, pp. 37-42.
An account of troubles the writer had in Zante some Friday begins fol. 34b, but breaks off in the middle. On fol. 42 we find some dietetic rules to strengthen the memory, including the advice to eat only once a day at noon; on fol. 45a a letter of recommendation of the central academy of Venice for a poor man who had been deprived of his all by robbers during his travels; neither the name of the poor man (our writer?) nor the signatures are reproduced, and the date is incomplete ( perhaps [see Exod. 23. 20] is to be added, making 5479-1719). On fol. 46a, he copies an amulet obtained from the pupils of R. Moses Sacuto; the end of the booklet (52b-53) contains business entries about parchments purchased for and loans received from various persons. The names occurring here are: R. Benjamin Cohen of Reggio, Castel Bolognese, Abraham and Samuel Corinaldi, Esra Cantan, Hananel, Michael Malach, Isaac Rabbino, Eliezer ibn Roi, &c. The rest of the volume is mostly blank.

Although the text offers no difficulties, the following translation was not thought to be superfluous owing to the general interest of the autobiography. Naturally it does not aim at literalness while trying to give a fair reproduction of the writer’s account.

For the convenience of the reader, the writer’s statements about his family are summarized in the following family-tree:

14 As we deal with an autograph, the text is reproduced as it is in the manuscript without any corrections. I have not considered it necessary to draw attention to the numerous inaccuracies of the writer, his serious grammatical mistakes, and so on. They are characteristic of the man, just as the fact that he hardly ever makes a period, and only once a new paragraph in the whole account.
תור הגדולה

לעה להנה מעשור, ולא ידעתי שלמדתי מטנש ועולה כפיה.

וית מי הבת' "ז" עמק ו"ל" אברחים ו"ל" ממקינא ויה בחר מפליגים על כך.

ולעת אשת בק" ממקינא ו"מת" פחת והבת' "ז" ימען והבת' "ז" אברחים של ימינו ו"ל" ממקינא ויה בחר מפליגים.

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ולעת אשת בק" ממקינא ו"מת" פחת ויה בחר מפליגים ע valeurs שערך שתי ಧ ನಮ ಯಾ ಏರ ಫಾರನ್ನು.
A SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY AUTOBIOGRAPHY—MARX 277

...
or so, and why not? A new age has dawned, and with the
thunder of the distant past, the future is being born.

'But what if there is no future, no tomorrow?'

'And what if there is no past, no yesterday?'

'And what if there are no others, only the two of us?'

'We are alone. The world has forgotten us.'

'And what if there are no others, only the two of us?'

'But what if there is no future, no tomorrow?'

'And what if there is no past, no yesterday?'

'And what if there are no others, only the two of us?'

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'And what if there is no past, no yesterday?'

'And what if there are no others, only the two of us?'

'We are alone. The world has forgotten us.'
A SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY AUTOBIOGRAPHY—MARX 279

...the knowledge of the laws of nature has not yet been acquired...
A SEVENTEENTH-CENTURY AUTOBIOGRAPHY—MARX 281

Added between the lines.

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THE JEWISH QUARTERLY REVIEW

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TRANSLATION.

I can trace my family tree for only four generations. I learned from my grandfather Jacob that his father Abraham ha-Levi had come to Bohemia from Poland as a young man possessed of considerable scholarly attainments. He married in Kolin, Bohemia, and died soon after the birth of his son Jacob, my grandfather. As the latter was left an orphan in childhood, he did not know from which city his father had come and to what family he belonged. My grandfather married Lieble, the daughter of Kalman of Bisenz, who was the son-in-law of R. Eliezer Perels, the author of the book *Damesek Eliezer*, a commentary on the *Sefer ha-Kanah*, as well as other works. His son was Moses Kuskes. This whole family lived in Prague. My grandfather had many sons, but they all died early, and only my father, Abraham ha-Levi, and two daughters, Rebekkah and Pessel, were spared. My father devoted himself to the study of the Torah in his youth, being an only son, and he showed acumen and skill in talmudic debates which brought him recognition from prominent men and scholars. They married him to a girl of a very prominent family, Gnendel, the daughter of R. Jehezkel of Chelm, in Little Poland. The latter, my grandfather, died in Poland before the times of the terrible persecutions under Chmielnicki, and my grandmother, Nuhah, remained a widow with three sons and two little daughters. I was told that she was a good, energetic, and clever woman, and supported her family comfortably up to the time of the great uprising throughout Poland, when she fled with them to Nikolsburg, Moravia, to her brother, the famous R. Menahem Mendel Krochmal, the author of the
responsa 'Semah Saddik', who was then Rabbi of that community and of the whole of Moravia. In his house my mother was brought up. When he died his son R. Judah Loeb succeeded him, and he married my mother to my father, and gave her a large dowry as if she had been his own daughter. He arranged the wedding splendidly, and my father then brought her to his house. At the time he lived in Meseritsch, Moravia. My grandfather, Jacob ha-Levi, was then rich and prosperous. My grandmother, his wife, was very pious and charitable, and went every morning and evening to the synagogue; and so was my mother Gnendel even in a higher degree; she was, moreover, a very intelligent woman. My father continued to study the Torah. Three or four years after the wedding, in the winter, the Mohammedans and Tartars swept over Moravia to destroy it, and all fled in confusion and terror to Bohemia. My grandfather, who was a rich man, lost nearly all his property, so that but very little of their fortune remained in their hands. My grandfather, his wife, two daughters, and my father and mother with the rest of the family remained in Bohemia. They finally came to Lichtenstadt, where my father secured a post as an elementary Hebrew teacher. He remained there for a few years, then he returned and found his house entirely empty. My mother then showed her ability in supporting the family by her own efforts, and started to manufacture brandy out of oats in a copper alembic, as was the custom in those parts. This was hard labour, but she succeeded. In the meantime my father pursued his studies. One day a holy man, R. Loeb, the Rabbi of Trebitsch, whose authority extended over Meseritsch, where my father lived, came to our town and stayed in our house.
When he saw the troubles of my mother, his cousin, he had pity on her, and gave my father some gold and silver merchandise, such as rings, to get him used to trade in an honest and intelligent way. My father was successful and did a good business. Incidentally this brought him the acquaintance of the Count who owned the city. The latter liked him, and turned over to him the 'Branntweinhaus' (distillery) in which they were working with seven great kettles, and he gave him servants to do the work and grain to prepare brandy. For this my father paid him at the end of the year a specified amount, in addition to paying a certain percentage of the income in taxes, as was customary. From that time he became prominent. My mother bore him first a daughter who died, then three sons, my rich and prominent brother Kalman, my poor self, and a son Moses, who died during the year after his mother's death.

When my mother was at last able to rest from her hard work, she fell sick in consequence of the heat and the fumes of the brandy, and she died at the age of thirty-four years. There was no one in our town or outside of it who was like her in wisdom, piety, and charity. She died on a Sabbath, the 24th of Iyar 5432 (May 21, 1672). I was then four years old, and my older brother seven. In the course of the next year my father married again a great lady, Freidel, the daughter of R. Meir, the Shohet from Vienna. At the same time he gave his sister Pessel to his brother-in-law Samuel for a wife, so that they made an exchange. The wife of my father was herself still a young child who did not know how to bring us up in cleanliness as is necessary with little boys, nor could she properly care for us when we were sick. We have to thank God
and the help of our grandmother Lieble, and her good
daughters, that we grew up at all. Even so little Moses,
who was only one year old, died.

After my mother's death my father began to strive for
prominence and power, for as long as my mother lived she
kept him back and reproved him as a mother does with
her son. His father also, may God forgive him, was all
his life hot-tempered and quarrelsome, and from him my
father, if I may be forgiven for saying so, had partly in-
herited the same temperament, for he was still young and
had not gone as an exile to foreign countries as I did. But
he found his match, who paid him back in his own coin.
For there arose against him wicked men with whom my
father had quarreled for years, and who had fallen under
his power through his influence with the Count. Now the
Count sold his property after three years and went to war
against the enemies in foreign lands. He left my father
in the hands of another Count who had bought the town;
but the latter was not as favourable to my father as the
former. My father thought it was the other way, and he
relied on a broken reed to combat his enemies. These,
however, were numerous and more cunning and deliberate,
for my father at that time was hasty in all his actions, and
sometimes transacted his business without taking proper
counsel and consideration, and he planned great undertakings
to increase his wealth and honour, but it turned out the other way. His enemies ruined his reputation
with the Count. The latter made charges against him in
connexion with the 'Branntweinhaus' and other business
matters, and put him into prison for two months. Since
the first Count was far away, nothing could be done to
save my father, and he had to give up half his wealth in
order to be released. On this occasion his enemies wreaked their revenge on him, saying, 'when the ox has fallen, sharpen the knife' (Shabbat 32); and they urged the Count to expel my father, together with his old father Jacob, from his property. The Count did so. He expelled my father in Tammuz 5435 (1675), while my grandfather fled in secret, for he owed money to many gentiles and could not pay them. I was at that time seven years old. My father found a temporary shelter in the town of Humpoletz, a town of wool-weavers, and he traded there for a year, while I was cut off from study and good deeds and left to myself. He then went to a village, Wostrow (?), for the Count had in the meantime returned from the military expedition and bought this village, and my father followed him there. As for myself, I was constantly going back in my studies as well as in manners and conduct. After a while my father decided to send me to Prague, which was a day's journey. My older brother was also there; it was winter then, and I was nine years old. There, too, I did nothing, for my father did not know how to arrange matters properly, and in his endeavour to save money he placed me for a small sum in charge of a teacher, who took little care of me, while I needed great attention if I were to be taught with any success. At that time my power of comprehension and my memory were weak as a result of illness. I was full of ulcers, and the meals I ate were very unwholesome for me, for it is the custom in Prague to eat at the midday meal peas and millet with a little butter, which proved very injurious to me. But nobody looked out for me to give me medical treatment. Although my father came several times to Prague he did not notice this. I gratefully remember R. Loeb Fleckeles, who gave
me meals in his house and kept me for about six months for a small sum, my father paying him about six gulden a month. He wished me to be a companion for his son Simon who was then five years old, and I helped him by taking him to school and going over his lessons with him. At that time I was very humble and ready to be a slave to everybody, and to do anything I was ordered. If my father only had left me in this house, I would have become used to good manners and learned a little more than in the village of Wostrow among the country people. My father, however, wished to save money and took me home; my older brother was there at the time also. He thought that he himself would teach us, and my brother, who was thirteen or fourteen years old, actually learned from him haggadic literature, such as Rashi and Midrashim, as well as the laws of Sheḥitah; but I needed a special teacher. My father started to teach me Gemara Sotah once or twice, though I had never before studied Talmud or even Mishnah. Thus a long time passed by without my learning anything, until I became a thorn in my own eyes and even more so in the eyes of my father, because I was a boor brought up in dirt without any cleanliness, for the lack of a mother; and I remember that at the age of eleven I ran around barefooted and without trousers, and no one cared. My father then had many little children, for his wife bore him almost every year a son or a daughter. I am sure that if anybody had announced my death to him at that time he would have thought this good news, for he considered me ignorant and good for nothing, so that my existence was a burden to him. My brother was a strong boy who did hard work in the slaughter-house and made himself otherwise useful, while I was oppressed by all the members
of the house; everybody ordered me around; this continued for two years, 5438–9 (1678–9). In 5440 (1680) a plague broke out in Bohemia, and especially in Prague. From that city the Rabbi, R. Jacob Backofen (Reischer), the author of *Minḥat Jaḥob*, came with his wife Jetel and her sister Freidel, the daughters of the Rabbi, R. Wolf ben Rabbi Simon Spira; and they stayed with us in our house in the village. I still remember the great modesty of that scholar who was willing to take the trouble to teach me like a school teacher. But his wife, who domineered over him, did not permit him to carry out his good intention. In the course of Tammuz I fell sick, and the symptoms of the plague became apparent. For three days and nights I had high fever, and was near death. Then a swelling broke out behind my ear on the neck which burned like fire, and all the members of the family became frightened. The Rabbi and his wife noticed it, and fled from our house to the house of his uncle in Wotitz. The plague was then raging all around our village, and the Count established a ‘lazaretto’, i.e. a small wooden house of two rooms in the midst of a big forest about a mile away from his castle. If some one fell sick in one of the villages he was driven out of his house with all his belongings, and had to go into that forest. The Count had set aside an open space some yards wide all around his castle, which only those living in the castle were permitted to approach. He only kept very few people in his castle, and enclosed himself in there, and never left it with his people. He admitted no outsider except my father, who was clever, and with whom he liked to talk, and he wanted him to appear before him and stay with him most of the day. He had ordered my father to act in the same way, and to forbid his family to leave
the house or to admit strangers. He also told him that
if, God forbid, a member of his own family should fall
sick, he should not conceal it, but of his own accord should
leave the house and go with everything into the forest.
He warned my father that if he were to find out that my
father had concealed such a thing he would permit the
gentiles to burn the house down with all the inmates in it.
When my father now realized that he had the plague
in his house he was very much upset, and did not know
what to do. To carry out the order of the Count and
to go with his family into the forest would involve grave
danger, for the fact would become known to the inhabitants
of the villages, who are mostly wicked men, thieves, and
murderers, lying in wait for the blood and the property of
Jews. Even in the cities they love to oppress and rob them
in their houses, how much greater then was the danger
of their coming to murder us in the forest. He, therefore,
decided to hide me in the garret, asking his father Jacob
ha-Levi to take care of me, which he did, although he was
an old man himself. He tended me so carefully that no
other member of the household needed to come to the room
in which I stayed, hoping that this perhaps might prevent
the plague from attacking others. In this way he stayed
with me about six days. But one day slanderers came
to the Count and reported they had seen my grandfather
with another Jew, a certain Saul Pollack, who lived in our
house with his wife, go together to other villages in which
the plague was raging to trade there. At once the Count
decreed the expulsion of both from his territory at the risk
of jeopardizing their lives if they should be seen there again.
Then my grandfather was compelled to leave me alone
on my sick-bed. for it was dangerous to hide, as they would
have searched for him in all the rooms, and if I had
been discovered it would have involved danger for all.
Therefore both had to leave the territory under the eyes
of the Count. But God took pity on my suffering, seeing
that there was no one to attend to me, and sent me full
recovery, and what was particularly fortunate, the abscess
did not open again when there was no one to take care
of me, but it went down daily by the grace of God. For
there happened to come to us the brother of my father's
wife, R. Samson of Kamnitz, who told my father how to
prepare a plaster from the white of an egg with a little
alum, about the size of a nut. Both of these had to be
stirred quickly and carefully in a little kettle until it turned
solid. He followed this advice. The plaster was handed
to me from a distance and I put it on, although I was only
a boy of twelve and sick, for I had been compelled to
devise ways of how to take proper care of myself. Similarly
they brought my meals to the top of the staircase, and
put them down near the door of the staircase, which they
closed at once. I had to get up from my bed to take
them. I lay there alone day and night, and at that time
I saw apparitions and dreamed dreams. That I remained
alive was against the laws of nature. God in his mercy gave
me strength so that I improved from day to day, the fever
left me, and only the place of the swelling was burning
like fire, and my whole face was red. One day, however,
our gentile neighbours, who noticed my absence, began
to say to one another: 'See what these Jews did; one
of their children evidently died of the plague, and they
have concealed it.' As trusty servants of the Count we
ought to go and tell him, and take our revenge on the
Jews. When this rumour reached the ears of our family,
my father cleverly ordered me to dress, to fold a linen cloth around my neck, and put it on in such a way that the redness could not be seen. He urged me to be courageous, and asked me to go through the garden, over the fields, and to return along the river, passing the houses of the gentiles and the castle. If somebody were to ask me whence I came I should answer that I was coming from school, that I had stayed with a teacher in the village of Menain (?) two miles away, and had felt the desire to come home. I did so and, thank God, I ran and jumped like a young deer, passed the castle and the village, and was seen by many Christians, who were thus put to shame, and their scheme failed. Many of our neighbours came to the store to tell my father: 'Your son whom we thought dead has returned.' He answered them, 'You are dead, but we live for ever'; they almost revealed to him what had been in their minds. My father further showed his cleverness by telling my older brother to put a ladder to our fruit-tree in the garden and ordering me to ascend the tree nearest the street of the village so that all passers-by should see that I was well. He also ordered me to be playful with the village-children, to throw fruits into their faces, and to call at them and jest with them. I obeyed and laughed while my heart felt bitter. Thus it was through God's counsel that the rumours stopped. I repeated this several times, but I could not appear before them often, lest they should notice the change in my appearance, for I never used to go with a neckcloth before, and now it was already some days since I had returned from my journey. Once I saw a gentile going before me with his hand on his cheeks, for he suffered from toothache, and his face looked drawn; I jestingly remarked, 'Woe
unto you, I am afraid you suffer from the plague.' I said this to show how healthy and merry I was, following my father's order. But he answered back, 'You have the plague yourself; remove that cloth from your neck, and the swelling will be seen underneath.' I was frightened and hid myself, but God made the gentiles blind and forgetful.

After a month I came down to the house and mingled with my brothers and sisters as before, participating in the common meals, and no one paid attention to it. I grew stouter and stronger after this. In the year 5441 (1680) in the beginning of the month of Tishri, the plague stopped in Prague, but in the rest of Bohemia it spread to such an extent that people became tired of keeping away from one another. In our village many even among the people of the castle fell sick and died. My sister Leah, who was then six years old, got the swelling characteristic of the plague, but it was not so dangerous, even though it became public, since the Count had become weary of taking precautions, and my father did not come to him. At the end of Kislev the plague stopped, but in Heshvan the plague had raged around our neighbourhood, and many Jews died from it. In some villages all the male population died out, and only a few women were left. No one was there to take charge of the dead, who could not be buried, for it was winter and the earth was as hard as marble, and there was a heavy snowfall in those parts; so they only covered them with snow, and often wolves came and ate the corpses, and sometimes dogs scratched the snow off the bodies. May God have pity on their souls, and may they be bound up in the bundle of life with the other righteous. In our house, thank God, no one died. Only the aforementioned Saul died from the plague two months after
the Count had expelled him, so that even this turned out to our good, for in this way he did not die in our house.

In the winter of 5441 (1680-1), in the month of Kislev, a great column was seen in the sky towards east, which was very high, and remained for a month. Some claimed that it was a natural phenomenon called 'comet', which sometimes appears in a very cold winter, but the astronomers explained it in various ways, and so it happened that in this year a new great world war (the Turkish war) started, which did not end till 5458 (1698).

In this winter my father made great profits, and was successful in all his transactions with various kinds of merchandise. From my own impulse I made up my mind to go to some Jewish community to study Torah. For I was ignorant, and God had shown his great mercy to us. My father promised, but did not keep his word; I often saw guests come (with whom my father went away) and he had promised to take me with him to Moravia, but he changed his mind. This happened several times, and the obstacle was that the necessary clothing for me was not ready, as no one looked upon me with kindness. My father's wife had her hands full with her own little ones. One night before my father was to leave I was awake the whole night sewing for myself sheepskins which are called Pelz, and I made a kind of a long gown for underwear, and something for my feet. I took secretly some shirts so that my father should not notice anything, and before daybreak I went to the place where the sleigh was prepared for my father, and stayed there. When he came it was still dark before daylight, and when he noticed me he thought the house-dog was there, and he wanted to kick him away. I then said. 'Father, this is thy son who
is ready to serve thee on the way which I take in order to study.' There were many strangers present, business men, who had come to buy wool. They saw my good resolve, though I was very young, and urged my father to take me along; they were sure I would become a great scholar and a good man. My father then answered that it was impossible to take me along, for I had no proper clothing and it was very cold. I then showed my cleverness, how I had prepared for myself everything necessary for the journey. He finally agreed and took me along; but the cold was so severe that several times I thought I was going to die; the snow was falling and the wind blew it into our faces, and it caused my father great pain; it was literally like the sacrifice of Isaac when they (he and Abraham) were on the way, and as the Midrash (Tanhuma, Vayyera, § 22, Yalkut) tells us Satan brought them into the water up to their throat, &c. But those who are travelling for the fulfilment of a Misywah suffer no harm (Pesahim 8b), and we reached Herschmanik. I was left there in the house of a teacher, R. Jacob from Gaja, and he started to study with me Rashi, Midrash, other haggadic texts, and the Sayings of the Fathers. He noticed that I could not read properly through the fault of my first teacher, who had not instructed me well. The little I had known I had forgotten, and I was in great trouble, for the new teacher was of an irritable temper, and had neither composure nor common sense. He hit me and put me to shame, but did not make good my deficiency; and only taught me the melodies for the readings from the Torah and the Haftarahs and a little Haggada and the Sayings of the Fathers. I asked questions and searched in the haggadic passages, but as he often laughed at me I stopped. This
was surely a grave mistake, but the teachers are foolish, and do not realize the harm they do.

I remained with him from Adar 1, 5441 (1681) till the middle of Tammuz, boarding in his house. During the first two months, when he had to slaughter calves, he gave me good meals, the spleen and part of the liver, but when the time of slaughtering calves had passed, my meals became worse and worse, for poor though he was, he was rather fastidious, and he and his wife ate the good things themselves and gave me coarse village bread, which caused me severe headaches and stomach trouble. I was there all alone with no relative near; all the townspeople noticed my appearance and questioned me; if I had told them it might have helped a little, but I was very modest and humble and God-fearing, and I thought it would be a sin to rebel against my teacher. In the middle of Tammuz, while the teacher was away from home, my father came in company with his brother-in-law, Samson, and stayed for some time in the town. His brother-in-law had a son Sender, who studied together with me and knew all my troubles. He told my father everything, and although I contradicted him, my father believed Sender and took me away from Herschmanik and brought me to Meseritsch, my birthplace, where all my family on my father's side lived; here my two aunts were married, and I had my meals in the house of my aunt Pessel and her husband Samuel, the brother of my stepmother. There was also there a good and intelligent teacher, Mordecai from Brod. I went to minyan (became Bar-Mišwah) on Sabbath Nahamu; they furnished me with new clothes, and boys of the same age who knew more than I did were jealous of me. They could follow the teacher in the study of Talmud with Tosafot which
I did not know before, and only began for the first time to study here. They were younger and went in torn clothes and rags, as it was usual in those parts. Therefore they annoyed me and tried to disgrace and insult me, so that I became almost weary of my life. The women of the community all praised me because I was modest and treated them with respect; that was another cause of jealousy. Their parents also were jealous of my father and myself; some of them were really bad, one Aaron, the son of Berl Pollack, I am sure is still hated by the people for his wicked deeds, which I had occasion to observe; the other, Jonathan ben Lipman ben David, a big lunatic, is now, I believe, a scholarly man. Sometimes he would be friendly with me. My intentions were to devote myself exclusively to study and good deeds, but there were many obstacles; I suffered from sickness, I had boils on my whole body and headaches, my schoolmates were wild and ill-mannered, and our teacher flattered us and never wanted to exert himself; what I needed was a regular tutor, but he never employed assistants, nor did he take pains himself. He taught me a little part of Kiddushin. At the end of the summer he left the place, and the community engaged in his place the pious R. Lazar of Cracow, who was married to a pious, sensible, intelligent woman, and gifted with all good qualities. He taught us Talmud and Tosafot, she taught us the fear of God and a virtuous life. He took great pains to teach me. May he be praised and rewarded for it. He of all my teachers was the one who gave me the key and taught me more than all those I had before or after, except what I studied for myself. Still the whole situation was far from satisfactory, for he too failed to employ an assistant, and sometimes he fell sick; he was also very irascible, while I suffered from headaches.
during the whole winter. In the summer 5442 (1682) the old teacher returned with his wife Blümele; they had no children, and flattered the pupils and their parents. We learned with him a little of Hullin and small treatises of Moed without Tosafot; moreover, I already began to study a little Talmud for myself. Altogether I stayed in Meseritsch two years and two months. Then many Jews from Moravia came to Meseritsch, Trebitsch, and Polna on account of the war, for the Turks came to besiege Vienna. I then returned to our house at Wostrow, and stayed there the whole winter in greater discomfort than ever. Everybody, including my older brother, ill-treated me; I was still sick and looked bad till the winter had passed. Then, at the age of fifteen, I went to Prague, with no knowledge of the life in a large community. In spite of this I found maintenance in the house of a rich man, Moses Ginzburg, who had two little boys. They really needed a tutor better fitted than I was to guide them in study and understanding. I had never tried this before, and could only stay with them a short time. Then God sent me a happy chance, for the scholarly, acute, and pious R. Mordecai, the son-in-law of the Dayyan R. Perez of Nikolsburg, who taught me without pay, had another pupil, Sinai ben Isaiah Wagenmacher, a boy ten years of age, who knew better how to behave than I did, the only son of rich parents, fondled and spoiled. By the help of God he did not rebel against me. I had only to go over his studies with him. His parents were charitable people; their house was outside of the street (ghetto), on a large pleasant place; there I gained strength and health. I lived with them about two years; I felt as if I dwelt amid roses, and never in my life did I feel as happy as in those two years. But unfortunately no one looked out for me, and
I fell in bad company. They talked to me constantly about women, and led me in their ways. We were a bad set of young men, of different ages, wasting our time with useless things and fooling with girls, as was their habit. I finally came to think that this is the whole aim of life, since during the entire time we never spoke of anything but of following the inclinations of the heart. The greater part of my days I spent with my young friends who lived an immoral life. Among them were some who were over twenty-three years old, and had more Talmudic knowledge and better manners than I. Therefore, with the consent of my father, I joined them and followed in their footsteps, like the blind in the dark, thinking in my simplicity that the purpose of good manners was to find favour in the eyes of the girls, and that this is human happiness in one's youth. Even in the house where I lived the young working men who were employed in building carriages for the noblemen were a bad sort; their ringleader was a certain Abraham Bass, who was boisterous and wild, so that I was under evil influences from all sides. I was more passionate at that time than ever again in my life. How happy should I be now if my father had then given me a wife. I would have raised a large family, no doubt, in my early life, and would now have been in a position to retire from all worldly affairs.

Now, unfortunately, I am devoid of wisdom and intelligence, without sons and spouse. I wish to retire from the affairs of this world, but I do not know whether, after all, it would not be better for me to marry; possibly I might have pious children and a capable wife who would be a help to me. I wait for an answer from God, that he notify me by a sign or a dream or a verse, of which I might think when I wake up, or which a child might
answer when I ask for its lesson. May I be successful according to the wish of God. Amen.

Our author's account stops here, but we gain a few facts of his later life through some of the entries in his little note-book. At the age of seventeen he went, without his father's knowledge, to a city the name of which is not legible. The expense he defrayed with a small sum of money provided by his grandfather. He was in great distress; when twenty he went to Cracow, where he began to repent his mode of life and to study more seriously. But, as he intimates in the autobiography, he went around much farther in the course of his life. From a list of resolutions he had made at various times, beginning with his recovery from the plague, we see that in 1695 he left Corfu for Venice; later he stayed at Pisa, where he vowed to get married in the course of the year if possible; this, he adds, he did after some delay. Again we find him in Zante selling Tefillin and Mezuzot, correcting the Sefer Torah, and delivering a Derashah in the synagogue, but he was the object of raillery on the part of the innkeeper with whom he stayed, until a certain Judah Modona took him into his house. Even then the innkeeper persecuted him and brought him into trouble because he had slaughtered fowl, but at this point the account breaks off. Evidently he had become a Sofer, and therefore also we find the records of the purchase of parchments at the end of the volume.

We do not hear any more about our hero, but his further fate is of no material importance to us. Of course, it would have been interesting to read his impressions of the various communities he visited, but this would hardly equal the quaint account of his younger years.
THE PHILOSOPHY OF DON HASDAI CRESCAS

BY MEYER WAXMAN, New York.

With Hasdai Crescas, the list of Jewish mediaeval thinkers, worthy of the name, closes; but his importance lies rather in his own originality than in his chronological position. He is among the few Jewish philosophers who exhibited originality of thought, critical acumen, and logical sequence, combined with a profound religious feeling. It is rather the irony of fate that this philosopher, who surpasses in depth and power of analysis even Maimonides, should have received rather slight attention at the hands of the historians of Jewish thought. The books and articles dealing with Crescas are few in number. The book by M. Joel, Chasdaï Crescas, is perhaps the largest and best of them; but, with all its merits, it fails to present a comprehensive view of Crescas's thought. It is therefore the hope of the present writer that the attempt in the following pages to present a systematic treatment of the philosophical conceptions of Crescas will be welcomed by students of the history of Jewish thought in particular, and of philosophy in general.

The method adopted in treating the subject is the problematic one; chiefly because it is the most elucidating in dealing with a subject of a philosophico-theological character such as ours, and also because the work of Crescas, Or Adonai, 'The Light of God,' lends itself to such treatment, since it is primarily a book on dogmatics.
and follows the usual division into dogmas. As the main interest of this study lies in the philosophic aspect of Crescas's thinking, only such problems have been included as have a philosophic bearing, while all purely theological questions have been excluded. For this reason, all detailed discussion concerning *creatio ex nihilo*, wherein Crescas opposes Gersonides with great critical ability, are omitted. Broadly speaking, the study is divided into two parts corresponding to the two central ideas around which the problems group themselves, viz. (a) God, (b) God and the world—the problems themselves being treated in the various chapters and subdivisions.

The theses laid down in this study are the following:

§ 1. Crescas holds a prominent place as a critical examiner of some of the important Aristotelian conceptions such as space, time, and the infinite. His criticism is decidedly modern in spirit, and some of his anticipations and theories were later fully corroborated by the founders of modern philosophy and cosmology. These anticipations, together with his revolt against Aristotelianism in an age when it was all-dominating, prove the high character of his work. Moreover, his thoughts on this subject were not entirely restricted to a small circle of readers of Hebrew, but also found their way to the external world. It follows, therefore, that the seeds sown by Crescas are not only valuable in themselves, but have borne fruit, though how this was accomplished is not known. It is extremely difficult to trace the path over which thought travels.

§ 2. The study intends to point out the mental proximity between Crescas and that great Jewish thinker Spinoza. An attempt has been made to draw a sketch of Crescas's positive philosophy, which has been compared at each step
with that of Spinoza's system. Great care was observed in avoiding final decisions in regard to the influence of the former upon the latter. Unfortunately, the term influence is often misunderstood to mean either a direct borrowing or at least a kind of imitation. If influence is to be interpreted in a broad sense, and is to imply the existence of a number of points of contact, and the supply of a certain motive power or impulse in a definite direction by one system upon another, such an influence of Crescas upon Spinoza probably exists. The word probably is used advisedly, for the evidence at hand only justifies us in using the term influence with this qualification.

Crescas, however, is only an indirect critic of Aristotle through his attack on Maimonides' proof of the existence of God and theory of attributes which embody the Aristotelian principles. Hence it is that in order to elucidate Crescas's contribution to Jewish and general philosophy we have to turn to Maimonides first. Maimonides collected twenty-six propositions, which are found scattered through the Physics, Metaphysics, and De Coelo, and on these as a basis he reared his philosophical theology. Crescas reproduces these propositions in full, and even quotes at length their proofs which were omitted by Maimonides, and then launches his criticism not only against Maimonides but against Aristotle himself. It was rather a bold attempt for those times (end of the fourteenth century) to dare to criticize Aristotle, but he pursued it with unflinching persistency. It is necessary, in order to have a full comprehension of Don Hasdai's philosophy, to follow him in all the intricate mazes of Aristotelian physics. We will, therefore, quote the propositions verbatim.
CHAPTER I

MAIMONIDES' PROOFS OF THE EXISTENCE OF GOD.
CRITICISM AND OBJECTION OF CRESCAS.

I. Infinite magnitude does not exist.\(^1\) This proposition is a fourfold one, and the most important of all. It will be discussed in its four aspects, together with the proofs and Crescas's objections. II. The simultaneous existence of an infinite number of bodies of finite magnitude is impossible.\(^2\) This proposition is simply a corollary of the first, for if the existence of such a number of bodies would be possible, the sum of all would give us an infinite magnitude, and this has been proved unreal. III. There is no infinite causal regressus, that is, the series of causes that lead up to the present world of things is not infinite, but must have had a beginning.\(^3\) IV. Change is found in four categories, that of substance, quantity, quality, and that of place; corresponding respectively to the categories, we have generation and corruption (\(\gamma\nu\varepsilon\alpha\varsigma\varsigma\ \kappa\alpha\iota\ \phi\theta\sigma\rho\alpha\)). growth and decay, qualitative change, and locomotion or spatial.\(^4\) V. Motion is a change from the potential to the actual.\(^5\) VI. Movement

\(^1\)_moreh nebukim_ Wilna, 1904. II, first hakdamah; Guide of the Perplexed, Eng. tr. by Friedländer, Part II, i; Physics, III, 5, 7, ed. Prantl. Greek and German, Leipzig. 1854; Metaph., XI, 10.

\(^2\) Guide, ibid., p. 2; Physics, ibid.

\(^3\) Moreh nebukim, Wilna, 1904. II, first hakdamah; Guide of the Perplexed, Eng. tr. by Friedländer, Part II, i; Physics, III, 5, 7, ed. Prantl. Greek and German, Leipzig. 1854; Metaph., XI, 10.

\(^4\) Guide, ibid.; Physics, III, 1; Metaph., XII, 2.

\(^5\) Guide, ibid.; Physics, III, 1; Metaph., XII, 9.
is of four kinds, essential, accidental, forced, and partial. Essential movement means the movement of a body according to its nature and essence. Accidental pertains to the movement of an accident, such as the movement of blackness in a body from one place to another, blackness being only an accident. By the partial is meant the movement of a part of a body when the whole is moved, but with reference to that part, such as the movement of a nail in a ship, which is moved by the movement of the ship as a whole. Partial movement, as different from accidental, refers to such things as are bodies for themselves, but are attached by artificial means to another body. Forced movement includes all kinds of movement which are unnatural. According to Aristotle, each of the elements has a natural place whither it tends. A movement in that direction is natural; thus the natural movement of fire is upwards and of earth downwards; but a movement in the opposite direction is unnatural. The movement of a stone upwards is contrary to nature, and can be accomplished only by the force exerted by the thrower. VII. Whatever changes is divisible, and whatever is not divisible does not move and is no body. Aristotle proves this by explaining that every change is an intermediary state between two opposites, or between a terminus a quo and a terminus ad quem; therefore, a body in the state of change must necessarily be divisible, and since movement is a kind of change, it follows that whatever is moved is divisible, and also the converse. VIII. Whatever moves

6 ἠθοποιία καὶ ἀληθινὸς μεταβολής τὸι ὁμοί, Moreh, II, 3; Physics, VIII. 4.
7 Ἔδη μεταβάλλων ἄπαν ἀνάγκη διαφέρου ὀναί, Physics, VI. 4.
8 Metaph. 1069 b.
accidentally will ultimately rest of necessity. This is based on Aristotle's conception of the accidental which identifies it with the possible. Whatever is possible must of necessity become actual in infinite time. Every possible has two phases, e.g. possible of existence, it is possible for it to exist, and possible not to exist. Both of these two possibilities must be realized in an infinite time, for if not, the thing is either necessarily existing or necessarily non-existing. Likewise, the possible of movement when it does move will ultimately rest, for the opposite must necessarily be realized. IX. A body moving another body is itself moved at the same time. This, however, does not include such things as move others by being an end to which things strive. It was on account of this fact that Aristotle made the unmoved mover the end of existence, for otherwise he could not be a first cause. The mediaeval philosophers, however, had some difficulty with this proposition. The magnet attracting iron and moving it towards itself seemed to form an exception to the rule laid down in the proposition. Various answers were given but are too absurd to reproduce. X. Whatever pertains to body, either the body is the stay of it, e.g. accidents, or it is the stay of the body, as form. XI. Some things that have their stay in the body are divided when the body is divided, as accidents are. Some things that are the stay of the body, e.g. soul, are not divided. XII. Every force pertaining to body is

9 *Physics, V, 3.*

10 *Ibid., VIII, 5.*

11 ובר הקושי על זה אם האדם יمحاولة להימשך עם אחרים במנוחה. Or Adonai, ed. Vienna. p. 9b.

12 אם человека עמידה במעש בักירות, או человека עמידה מעש במעשים, מובא עמו, *Mishnah, Moseh, II, 5; Physics, VIII, 10.*

finite, since body is finite.\textsuperscript{14} XIII. All kinds of changes are not continuous, except spatial motion, and of it only the circular.\textsuperscript{15} XIV. Spatial motion is the first of movements both in nature and in time.\textsuperscript{16} XV. Time is an accident of motion, and both are so related that they exist simultaneously. There is no movement but in time, and whatever has no movement is not in time.\textsuperscript{17} XVI. Whatever is not a body does not fall under the category of number.\textsuperscript{18} XVII. Whatever is moved has a mover, either as an external force or as an internal tendency which is the cause of the movement.\textsuperscript{19} XVIII. Whatever is being realized in passing from the potential to the actual, the cause of the realization is external by necessity.\textsuperscript{20} It could not be inherent in the thing itself, for in that case the thing would never be possible, but always existing. XIX. Whatever has a cause for its existence is possible of existence. XX. The converse, what is necessary of existence has no cause. XXI. Whatever is composite, the composition is its cause of existence, and therefore possible, as evidenced from above. XXII. Body is composed of matter and form by necessity, and is the bearer of some accidents by necessity. XXIII. Whatever is possible, even if the possibility is internal, and the thing does not need any external force for realization, yet it is possible that it should not exist.\textsuperscript{21} XXIV. Whatever is potential is material.

\textsuperscript{14}\textit{Ibid.}  
\textsuperscript{15}\textit{Physics}, VIII, 8.  
\textsuperscript{16}\textit{Ibid.}, VIII, 7.  
\textsuperscript{17}\textit{Ibid.}, IV, 12.  
\textsuperscript{18} \textit{Metaph.}, XII, 8.  
\textsuperscript{19} \textit{Morch}, II, 9; \textit{Physics}, VII, 1.  
\textsuperscript{20} \textit{Metaph.}, XII, 2.  
\textsuperscript{21} In the translation of this proposition I have followed Hasdai Crescas's
XXV. The elements of a composite body are matter and form, and therefore a body is in need of an agent to unite them. XXVI. Time and motion are eternal.

THE LOGICAL CONSEQUENCES OF THE PROPOSITIONS.

In basing his proofs of the existence of God and the theory of attributes, Maimonides does not start from the first proposition, but on the contrary from the twenty-fifth. This proposition, which is in turn based on the twenty-second which states that a body is composite by necessity, and on the fifth which defines the nature of motion as the process of realization, says: Every composite body in order to become needs a mover. Since all bodies in the perceptible world are composite, it is necessary to look for their causes or movers. This series of causes cannot go on to infinity, as has been demonstrated in the third proposition. Again, in regard to movements, we found in proposition IV that there are four kinds, and of these locomotion is the earliest, as shown in proposition XIV, and the circular the most perfect. The movement of the first sphere is then the cause of all movement in this world. However, by the same force of reasoning we are compelled to search for the mover of this sphere. We have seen in proposition XVII that a body may be moved either by an external cause or an interpretation in 'Al Rab, 12b, where he says: הות שיאראהalu וביארא לוכך הממה מהים המקויות בפי מתו כפר. ולח חיווה רבכ רבכ האמפורות היה יהו בצעמו יהו האמפורות שהרב רבכ מוהנ ימת לכב בצעמו כליא לאמור שיארה אתיה בצעמו שיחיה וויוב לוכז והמשרתו יהו האמפורות תחל הבדר והימ מימי כלא האמורו ימשארו יצוהר שרחר חא ויחייאו המקבל עמש ולו. 22 Physics, VIII, 1.
internal one. The cause of movement of the first sphere cannot be inherent in itself, since by proposition XXVI we know that movement is eternal, and thus it is infinite; the moving force of the first sphere then would have to be infinite, but this is impossible. It was shown in proposition I that no infinite body exists; the first sphere then is a finite body. But as such it cannot have any infinite force, for it was proved in proposition XII that no finite body can have an infinite force inherent in it. It follows that the cause of movement of the first sphere is an external one.\textsuperscript{23} We have, then, established the proof of the existence of a prime mover. It must be the prime, for otherwise we shall have an infinite causal series.

The nature and character of the mover can also be deduced from the same propositions. The external prime mover cannot be corporeal, for then, according to the ninth proposition, it would be moved while moving, and necessarily it would require another body as its mover, and thus \textit{ad infinitum}, but this is impossible (prop. III). Again, since it is incorporeal it is also unmoved, for movements are either essential to bodies or accidental, and the prime mover not being a body does not move either essentially or accidentally. Further, since it is unmoved it is also indivisible and unchangeable, for, according to proposition VII, whatever is not divisible does not move and is not a body, the converse of it being equally true. From the force of the same conclusions follows also the unity of the prime mover.

\textsuperscript{23} The word נברל here means not only external but incorporeal. But for the sake of clearness of thought we prefer to treat of the incorporeality in the next paragraph. \textit{Moreh}, II, 13b; \textit{Guide}, p. 16.
mover. There is only one, for in accordance with proposition XVI, whatever is neither a body nor a force inherent in a body does not fall under the category of number. We have then established the existence of God, His incorporeality, indivisibility, immutability, and unity.24

Maimonides quotes also several other proofs borrowed from Aristotle's works, one from the *Metaphysics*. It is the one mentioned above. There must be an unmoved mover, for since we find a moved mover, and we also find a thing moved and not moving, it follows that there must be an unmoved mover; as it is proved that when we find a thing composed of two elements, and then we find one element alone, it follows that the other element must also be found alone. The nature of the first cause is deduced from the fact that it is unmoved, in the same way as above.25 In his third proof, Maimonides follows closely the Aristotelian found in *Metaphysics*, book XII, ch. vi. There must be one substance necessary of existence, otherwise the world of things would be destructible.26 The third proposition is again utilized, for there cannot be an infinite regressus of possibles. Since it is necessary of existence through itself it is incorporeal, for according to proposition XXI, the composition of a body is the cause of its existence. The rest of the qualities follow necessarily. Maimonides quotes also a fourth proof which adds nothing new, but repeats the same argument in a different form. Maimonides

26 אַלּ וּבְחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָא בְּחַיָּבְתָา
produces two more proofs for the oneness of God. Of these two, one is mentioned by Saadia and Bahia. Suppose there were two Gods, there would have to be at least one point of difference between them and some points of similarity in as far as both are Gods. This would involve the existence of two elements in the nature of the Gods, and thus they would be composite. The second proof is from the harmony and uniformity of the sum total of existence. This bears evidence to the oneness of God. If there were two Gods, there ought to be either a division of labour or collaboration, for the interdependence testifies to one plan. But the first is impossible, for then God would not be all-potent, and, consequently, there would be a cause restraining the Divine power; but this is contrary to the concept of God. This argument is also brought by Saadia, but Maimonides gives it a more Aristotelian form.27

In comparing Maimonides' proofs with the proofs of those who went before him, we see that, while he did not contribute much originality to the problem, he at the same time systematized and arranged the proofs in complete logical order, which made them convincing. Most of the antecedent philosophers either omitted some links in the logical chain, such as the impossibility of an infinite causal regressus, or hinted at it without making their thoughts clear. Maimonides, as a careful builder, included everything. In regard to Aristotle, he exhibits himself a faithful follower, without accepting the conclusion at which he arrives.

27 Moreh, II, 16a–b; Guide, p. 23.
Proofs of the Aristotelian Propositions.

Aristotle proves that the infinite does not exist either as a separate independent thing, or as a sensible thing, or as a movable. The infinite, says Aristotle, may be of several kinds, either such that it is not in its nature to be measured or passed through, as the voice is invisible, or such one that cannot be passed through on account of its extent. It is the last kind of infinite that the discussion turns on, for the first kind of infinite cannot be a principle nor an element. There cannot be a separate independent infinite as a thing by itself, for it must be either divisible or indivisible. If it is indivisible, it cannot be infinite except in the same way as the voice is indivisible, which is a quality that does not belong to it by nature; but we speak of an impassable infinite, which implies extent, and thus it is coupled with magnitude. But if it is divisible, it is a quantity and cannot exist by itself. Again, if it is divisible and exists as a substance, every part of it will be infinite, and this is absurd, for there cannot be many infinities in one. It must, therefore, be indivisible, but it is magnitude, and magnitude does not exist by itself. It must, therefore, be an accident, but then it is not a principle, nor a separate.

There cannot be an infinite body: first, it is impossible by the mere definition of a body which describes it to be a thing that has superficies bounded by planes, and this

29 Spinoza, in his Epistola XII, Opera, ed. Van Vloten and Land, Hague, 1882, makes a similar distinction, calling the first infinite, the second indefinite.
30 Phys., III, 5; Metaph., book K, ch. x
already implies finitude. There are, however, more concrete arguments. An infinite body could be neither simple nor composite, for if the elements are finite, one at least must be infinite, and then the others will be destroyed since the infinite element must surely have most potency. If all the elements were infinite, the infinite body would be composed of many infinities, which is absurd. Simple it cannot be, for it is not of the four elements, since they are all finite and there are no other elements beside them. Again, how could anything be created, for becoming implies change from one contrary to another, and infinite has no contraries. It is evident, therefore, that there cannot be a simple infinite body.

Further, if there is an infinite body, it must have weight, whether light or heavy; but this is impossible, for the light moves upwards and the heavy downwards, but the infinite has neither an 'up' nor a 'down'. Again, since every body is in place, infinite body must have infinite place, but there is not any infinite place, since there are six kinds of place, the up and the down, &c. Finally, since body must be in place, and the latter by definition is the limit of the surrounding body, body must be finite.31

It is also impossible that there should exist a moving infinite, whether moving in rectilinear fashion or circular. Every body has a definite place, and the place of the part and the whole is the same. Consequently, an infinite body cannot move rectilinearly, as it is composed either of like parts or unlike parts. If of like parts, no part can move, for the place of the part is the place of the whole and it is infinite. If of unlike parts, the parts must be either finite or infinite; if finite, then at least one is infinite in magnitude,

\[\text{31} \text{Physics, III, 5; Metaph., book K, ch. x.}\]
and this is impossible.\textsuperscript{32} If they are infinite in number, then there are an infinite number of places, but this is impossible.\textsuperscript{33} Again, an infinite body must have infinite weight, and because of it its moving is unthinkable. The heavier a body is the less the time in which it moves. It follows that an infinite body must either move in no time or the 'now', which is the same, or that if we posit for it some time we will find a finite body moving in the same time. The relation of time and weight is a reverse one. Now if we posit some time for the infinite, it is possible to find a finite body of whatever weight moving in the same time. We have then a finite and infinite body moving in the same ratio of time: this is contrary to the principles of motion. Still more, if we multiply the body of finite weight, it will move in less time than the body of infinite weight, but such a supposition is absurd.

Likewise, the circular movement of an infinite body is impossible, for if the circle is infinite, the radii are also infinite and the distance infinite; the circle then would never be completed and the distance never measured through. Again, the time of the revolution of a circle is finite, but the distance in this case is infinite; how then can infinite distance be traversed in finite time?\textsuperscript{34} Finally, it is impossible for the infinite to be either an active agent or a patient. The relation between two bodies, one affecting and the other affected, is the following: Two bodies equally large will both be affected in an equal time; if one is smaller, it is affected in less time. The relation also varies according to the power of the agent, and the

\textsuperscript{32} Cp. above, this section.
\textsuperscript{33} De Coelo, ed. Prantl, I, ch. 7; Physics, III, 5; Metaph., book K, ch. x.
\textsuperscript{34} De Coelo, I, ch. 5.
affection must be accomplished in a certain limited time. It follows, therefore, that the infinite can neither affect nor be affected, for since we must posit for it a certain time, as it cannot be affected nor affect in no time, we can always find a certain finite body that is either affected or affects in a similar amount of time. Moreover, if the finite body is increased in size, it will be affected or affect in a longer or a shorter time respectively than the infinite body. But this is contrary to the principle of action and passion.

These, in short, are the arguments of Aristotle against the infinite, which are very accurately reproduced by Crescas. He shows an extensive acquaintance with Aristotle's works hardly displayed before by any Jewish philosopher. He now launches his criticism against each of the arguments, examining it in detail.

CRESCAS'S REFUTATIONS OF ARISTOTELIAN ARGUMENTS.

Crescas, in attacking Aristotle, follows the latter's arguments in logical order. First, Aristotle argues that there is no separate infinite as a thing in itself, for if it does exist and is divisible, its parts would have to be infinite (cp. above). This, replies Crescas, does not necessarily follow. Since the infinite we are speaking of is a separable, not a corporeal one, why should it be divisible or its parts infinite? Is the mathematical line divisible, and are its parts points? Why can there not be an indivisible infinite?


56 נאמר שɐַּחֲמַמְסַת הוּא הוּא הַבָּשָׂע וְיִנְרָר עַל הָדוֹרֵשׁ שֶׁהַשְּׁפִּיטִית נָדֵּל בּ' אֱמֶר בְּפִיצָאוֹת שִׁוְּרָא נָבָלָל לְוַהֲוַּא נֵלָ לְאָוַהֲוַּא שִׁוְּרָא. וַע 2
totelian argument against the existence of a separate infinite, as Crescas rightly observes, consists in the impossibility of the existence of a separate magnitude not connected with a body (cp. above). A magnitude cannot exist separately, for then space would have to exist separately of the body, but according to the Aristotelian conception of space it is impossible. Outside of the world nothing exists; there is no vacuum stretching beyond its boundaries, and, since whatever is in the world is body, it follows that if we do conceive any magnitude, we must conceive it in bodily form; hence there is no separate magnitude, and, consequently, no separate infinite.

But, says Crescas, this line of reasoning is a *petitio principii*, as the conclusion is still to be established; for should we prove the existence of a vacuum there is a possibility for an infinite to exist. Crescas then proceeds to refute Aristotle's contention of the non-existence of the infinite, attacking the basic principle. There is no vacuum. argues Aristotle, for if there were, movement in it would be impossible. Movement in space is caused by the difference in the natural inclination of things to strive towards certain points. some tending upwards, some downwards; the vacuum has no such places. A body in it would either never move, for why should it move in one direction rather than in the other, or never stop, since

Spinoza, in his Epistola XII, in discussing the infinite, produces the same argument: ‘Quare omnis illa farrago argumentorum quibus substantiam extensam finitam esse, philosophi vulgo molientur sua sponte ruit. Omnia illa substantia corpora ex partibus conflatam supponunt ad eundem etiam modum alii qui postquam sibi persuaserunt, lineam punctis componi multa invenire potuerunt argumenta quibus ostenderunt lineam non esse in infinitam divisibilem.’ *Opera*, II, p. 42.
there is no tendency to a certain place.\(^57\) Again, not only could there not be natural motion, but not even violent motion. Projectiles thrown by a person or instrument continue their motion after the motor ceased to have contact with them, because the particles of the air are moved, and they impart the motion continually to the projectile. But in a vacuum the motion cannot be conveyed; the projectile must therefore stop of necessity.

Further, the rate of motion varies according to the power of the motor and according to the media and their power of resistance. The thinner the medium, the more accelerated is the motion. If a vacuum exists, motion in it would have to take place in no time. Two bodies, \(A\) and \(B\), move in different media, \(C\) and \(D\). If the motors are equal, the rate of time and motion of \(A\) and \(B\) will vary according to \(C\) and \(D\). But if \(D\) is a vacuum, there is no ratio, for what comparison could there be between the motion of \(B\) which is not offered any resistance whatever, and that of \(A\) which has to overcome it in a degree? The movement of \(B\), therefore, will be in no time. But movement must be in time; a vacuum, therefore, does not exist. Finally, if a vacuum exists, it is possible for two bodies to occupy one place. When anything is thrown into water, an amount of water equal to the body is displaced, and a similar process takes place in air. What then will happen to a body in a vacuum? If the vacuum merely recedes then it is nothing; it is just this that we endeavoured to prove. But if the vacuum is something, it must permeate the body;\(^38\) why then should not any body permeate

\(^{57}\) *Physics*, IV, 7.

\(^{38}\) *Physics*, IV, 8. See also Simplicius’s commentary to that chapter, translated by Thomas Taylor in his translation of the *Physics* of Aristotle, London, 1806, p. 228.
another body? The reason that body does not permeate body is not because of its substance or colour but because of its distance or intervals. Now if the intervals of the vacuum may permeate a body, why not any other intervals?

These arguments Crescas attempts to disprove in the following manner. It does not follow, says he, that the existence of a vacuum should prevent motion. It is true that a vacuum does not possess any differences of a spatial nature such as upwards and downwards, but still, as long as the points of natural tendency exist and the elements possess that tendency, they will go on moving though the medium of movement is a vacuum. As for violent motion, it seems that the moment a body is set in motion, it acquires by virtue of its elements and their tendency towards their natural place a propensity to move without any assistance on the part of the medium. Further, argues Crescas, granted that rectilinear motion cannot be in a vacuum, still what is there to prevent the existence of an extra-mundane vacuum, wherein a body can move in a circular fashion, a movement which does not necessitate the possession of the *termini a quo* and *ad quem.* In regard to the second argument of Aristotle, Crescas contends that it is based on a false premise. The argument assumes that the ratio of the motion of one body to the motion of the other is as medium to medium, when

59 אס והו יושיבים (גלזרה ודיבורו) ברוח חיה על תחת הקסמים ומבחין בין הלקחים בין במיתות ומבחין וב륨ות והחפיםår畢יווה באים יושיבים. ולכד אס בנע ציואה התנועה ובнием יושיבים והחפיםår畢יווה באים וברוח חיה שלא יתייצב בה תנועה ומ癖יה ומבחין ברוח חיה שלא יתייצב להו, בנע שלーム חיה הרוחות יאשן ולא בנע שלーム חיה שלא יאשן ל hmac רוחות. Or Adomai, p. 14 b.
media are different in density, but this is untrue. We, asserts Crescas, must grant to every moving body an original motion which was imparted to it by the motor varying according to the strength of the motor. The medium only retards the motion by its resistance, but it cannot accelerate it. The formula, therefore, ought to be: the ratio of retardation of one body to the retardation of another body varies as the media. In a vacuum, therefore, resistance is reduced to zero, but the original motion is preserved, and the body is still moved in a certain time. Finally, the argument of the impenetrability of matter (cp. above) is objected to by Crescas. Aristotle's dictum that body cannot penetrate body on account of its distances and dimensions cannot be true, for a body is impenetrable not on account of its possessing mere distances, but because of the matter filling those distances. Immaterial distances, such as the interval which is called a vacuum, may permeate a body. It is evident, therefore, that a vacuum may exist. Further evidence of its existence is the fact that it is quantitatively conceived, as, for instance, if the air in a vessel is partly pumped out, we say that the vacuum is large or small according to the amount of air pumped out. It is then necessarily a magnitude, and though granting that there is not an infinite body, the existence of a separable infinite magnitude is still more necessitated. Beyond the world there is no body, the vacuum cannot be limited by body, but it surely cannot be limited by a vacuum; it must be infinite.^^

While these objections hardly have any value in the light of modern science, yet according to the spirit of the times they are valid, and greatly testify to the critical

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40 Or Adonai, ibid., 15 a.
ability and analytic acumen of Crescas. They surely form a step in the formation of the right scientific cosmogony. The conceptions of the infinity of the world and of the existence of infinite space were necessary conditions in the generation of the Copernican system and the new cosmological view. Surely, Crescas as well as Aristotle was ignorant of the real laws of motion. It is remarkable that Aristotle, who had a notion of the law of inertia as seen from his arguments against the existence of a vacuum, namely, that if a vacuum exists perpetual motion were possible, for in vacuo a body may move on for ever, and who also recognized the resistance of air as evidenced from his second argument against the existence of a vacuum, should not have discovered the law of inertia and have considered the particles of air as helping motion rather than impeding it, yet in Crescas’s refutation we perceive a glimpse of the law of gravitation. It is not known whether Crescas ever exerted any influence upon Giordano Bruno or not, though another Italian, Franz Pico, quotes his anti-Aristotelian arguments in full, but whatever be the case, it is interesting to observe the similar pulsations of mental activity in different ages, periods, and lands.

Crescas next proceeds to refute Aristotle’s arguments against the existence of an infinite body. The latter’s general argument from the definition (cp. above) of body as a thing that has limited superficials, says Crescas, is only a *petitio principii*. It is just this limitation that we seek to establish. The one who asserts the existence of an infinite body denies the assumed definition. But, says he further, his other arguments are also not proved. The

41 M. Joel in his *Chasidai Crescas*, note iv, Anhang.
42 In Crescas’s words it is termed נישאלה על הרהיה.
infinite, says Aristotle, cannot be a composite, for if it is, 
the elements would have to be infinite, and this is impossible. 
Crescas rejoins, The impossibility of the existence of infinite 
elements is not established; the reason, according to 
Aristotle, for the non-existence is that the infinite cannot 
be conceived; but, asks Crescas, must they be conceived 
in order to exist? The elements qua elements may have 
existence though not exactly known. This objection marks 
a departure from the dominant Aristotelian system which 
ascribed existence only to such things that were supported 
by the evidence of the senses and logical reasoning. Such 
a conception could hardly be grasped by an Aristotelian. 
That a thing in itself, to use the Kantian terminology, may 
exist without being either perceived or logically analysed 
or described, was an impossibility to them.

Further, says Crescas, the objection that if the infinite 
is composite, one element at least must be infinite and then 
it would destroy the rest, can be answered in this way, 
that the infinite may be devoid of qualities just as the 
heavenly spheres are. However, here Crescas seems not 
to understand Aristotle. Aristotle, in *Metaphysics*, book K, 
ch. x, states distinctly that one element must not fall short 
in potency, and whatever is in potency must sometimes be 
realized, so that finally it will destroy the other element. 
Crescas probably thought that it meant the infinite element 
would have stronger actual qualities. Again, Aristotle’s 
argument for the impossibility of the existence of an

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Footnotes:

43 Or *Adonai*, p. 15.
44 Or *Adonai*, p. 15 a.
The infinite body on account of its weight and its tendency to its natural places (cp. above) is not unimpeachable. Why, asks Crescas, must it have weight? Is it not because all sensible bodies in the sublunar sphere have it? But suppose the infinite is different, is not the matter of the heavenly spheres, according to Aristotle, devoid of weight? This is another indictment against the following of the chain of evidence of the senses and logical reasoning.

Finally, Crescas directs his main attack against the arguments from the nature of space. Aristotle defines space as the limit of the containing body, and consequently by its very definition and nature it must be finite and inherently connected with body. Where there is no body there is no space, and, therefore, the world as a whole is not in space though its parts are. This theory, says Crescas, is untenable. The whole conceptual structure of Aristotle of natural places, of upwards and downwards, and the tendency of various elements thereto, is built on false premises. How, asks he, can we assert that air has a natural place, the 'up', near the fiery sphere? What happens then to the middle layers of air? Are they in their natural place? but it was asserted that their natural place is the 'up'. If they are not in their natural place, we have then a phenomenon of variance of places, the place of the part differing from the place of the whole. Again,
the place of the element of earth is the 'down'. But the absolute down is only a point, and a point is not in place. Crescas, therefore, proposes a different definition of place. It is, as we should say, a receptacle of things, qualityless, immovable, and indescribable. It is infinite, for by its very nature it cannot be finite. In the world of things it is occupied, but beyond the world it exists as empty space. The fact that place is immovable answers Aristotle's arguments against defining place as an interval. Such a definition, says Aristotle, would compel us to admit the existence of a place to place, for if we move a vessel full of water, the interval of the vessel is transferred into another interval, and so on. But if we assume with Crescas that place is immovable, the difficulty disappears, for the vessel simply passes from one part of the universal vacuum to another. As for the water in the vessel, it is moved accidentally by the movement of the vessel. Aristotle explains the movement of the water in the same way.

The refutation of Aristotle's assertion of the impossibility for an infinite body to move either in a rectilinear or circular fashion runs in the following manner: Aristotle's first argument that the infinite cannot move rectilinearly, for this movement requires an 'up' and a 'down', and is therefore a limited movement, can be obviated by replying that though kinds of places may be conceptually limited in genus, yet they are not so in species. In other words,

49 De Coelo.  
50 Or Adonai, p. 15 b.

49 De Coelo.  
50 Or Adonai, p. 15 b.  
Again, Or Adonai, p. 14 b; again, ibid., p. 15 b. Cp. above Crescas's arguments about the vacuum.

52 Simplicius ad locum, quoted by Thomas Taylor. The Philosophy of Aristotle.
there is no absolute point where we may say that this is the 'up', but there may be a series of 'ups' ad infinitum; the term 'up' being only our subjective designation. His second argument (cp. above) that if there exists an infinite body it would have infinite weight, and then would move in the 'now' is irrelevant, says Crescas. Since movement of a body must be in time, we shall have to posit a certain minimum for an infinite body. It is true that a finite body may be found that will move in the same time. But what of it? The law of relations of movement to movement, according to the weight, extends only down to a certain point. Of course, Crescas shows here a poor conception of law, but a more accurate conception could hardly be expected in his time.

Crescas also attempts to disprove the Aristotelian arguments against the possibility of an infinite body moving in a circular fashion. Aristotle says that there can be no circular movement, because the distance between two radii would be infinite, and it is impossible to traverse an infinite distance. To this Crescas rejoins that, though the lines may be infinite, yet the distance between them may be finite. The arguments, however, are too obscure and abstruse to reproduce here, and as they affect the subject very little we may omit them. He seems to imply that there is a possibility of an infinite body moving in an incomplete circle, so that parts of it may move a finite distance. But how he could at all conceive of the movement of an infinite body is difficult to see, for granted that there is an infinite space, the infinite body occupies it all by virtue of its own definition. And what meaning has movement, unless we assume the modern conception of

53 Or Adonai, p. 16 a.
a growing infinite, but this is hardly what Crescas means. However, Crescas wrote many things for the sake of argument, simply to show that what Aristotle said can be refuted, just as Aristotle himself multiplied unnecessary arguments. What is important for us is the establishment of the theory of infinite space, and the possibility of an infinitude of magnitudes. This leads, as Crescas well saw, to the possibility of the existence of other worlds besides this one, a conjecture which was later well established. Especially important is his remark against Aristotle's arguments, that if there were many worlds the elements would move from one to the other. Why should they? asks Crescas. Is it not possible that the elements we know exist only in this world, and the other worlds have different elements and different tendencies? We notice here the beginning of the fall of the Aristotelian cosmology, based on the evidence of senses only, an event which was delayed for some time but accomplished in full by such masters as Copernicus, Giordano Bruno, and Galileo.

The second proposition, that it is impossible for an infinite number of finite magnitudes to exist, stands and falls with the first. The criticism of the third proposition, the impossibility of an infinite causal regressus, is interesting. Crescas does not refute it entirely, it being necessary for his proof of the existence of God, as will be shown. He does give it a different interpretation. Why, asks Crescas, can there not be an infinite number of effects which are at the same time causes to each other? It is true that we must posit one prior cause, but that should not prevent

51 הוה shaving the proof of the existence of God, as will be shown. He does give it a different interpretation. Why, asks Crescas, can there not be an infinite number of effects which are at the same time causes to each other? It is true that we must posit one prior cause, but that should not prevent

Or Adonai, p. 17a.
the posterior causes from being infinite. Aristotle's argument that every intermediate term must be preceded by a first, would be well applicable if the causal series were a timely one, namely, that each event in the series must precede the other in time. But the relation of cause and effect is really one of logical priority. Aristotle himself argues for the eternity of the world, and is therefore forced to admit that the first cause is only prior in a logical sense and not in time, as the first sphere is also eternal. Why can we not say that out of the first cause there emanated an infinite number of effects which exist simultaneously, instead of one effect as Aristotle wants us to believe? And since an infinite number of effects is possible, what prevents us from assuming that the effects are also causes to one another, since causal priority does not posit temporal precedence? Of course, in spite of Crescas's criticism, the necessity of a first cause, first in necessity, is well established; but the form is changed, and has an important bearing upon the whole conception of infinity. The manner in which Crescas utilized this proposition for the proof of the existence of God, so very different from the customary peripatetic way, was commended by Spinoza. Aristotle was not entirely ignorant of the weakness of his assertion, and in *Metaphysics*, book XII, ch. vi, he mentions a similar interpretation to that of Crescas, but in his main discussions in *Metaphysics* his language shows the contrary.

The eighth proposition stating that whatever moves accidentally will eventually rest of necessity, which forms

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55 *Metaphysics*, I, a or II.

56 מַהָּ מְשַׁנִּיָּה נ"ך הָעֲלָלָהָה הָבְּבָהּ כָּלֶּהָ הָעַלְתֵּהַ עַלֶּהָ תַּלְבִּרָיָה לְאַלֶּהָ אָלֶּהָ יִתְּרֶה

57 *Opera*, V, 11; *Epistola XII*. 

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a link in the proof of the existence of God, is severely scrutinized by Crescas. Is it not possible, asks he, that accidents exist as long as the substance itself; now if the substance is eternally moved, why not the accidents? Do not the lower spheres move eternally, because of the essential movement of the first sphere, though their own movement is accidental? The crucial point of the Aristotelian argument is, that since a mover while moving another body is moved itself, a power in a body while it moves the body is also moved accidentally, and consequently it will have to rest of necessity. Crescas says, It does not follow necessarily, for as long as the body can be moved eternally, why should the movement of the force ever have to stop since it is connected with the essential movement of the body?58

His criticism of the tenth proposition is interesting though of little importance for the subject. It relates to the famous Aristotelian theory that form is the stay of body. Crescas, after quoting Ibn Roshd, who asserts that body by evidence of sense is really one but logic forces us to admit composition because of its corruptibility, asks, Why can we not conceive matter as having a certain form by itself, the corporeality, for instance, consisting in a kind of general quality such as occupying space? Of course, when we contemplate a particular piece of matter we find it to have a particular form, but this is only the individual form, and while essential yet is not the stay of the body, for the material form is always in existence and is really the bearer of the individual form.59 This remark, though short, is very suggestive. It reminds us of the Cartesian principle that all matter is extension.

58 Or Adonai, 18 a. 59 Ibid., 18 b.
Crescas, in his refutations, attacks also the twelfth proposition, which is of great importance in the Maimonidian proof of the existence of God. The proposition asserts that every force in a finite body is finite. It is based on the assumed relation of motion to force. The rate and time of a moved body varies inversely to the force moving it. The greater the force, the less the time. If there exists an infinite force in a finite body, that body will either be moved in the ‘now’ or a finite force will be equal in moving power to an infinite. (Cp. above, Aristotle’s proof of the impossibility of an actual infinite.) Crescas first refers to his refutation of the above-mentioned argument in regard to the infinite moving in ‘now’, where he contends that since movement must be in time there is a minimum which is necessary even for an infinite. The law of the relation of time to force will be valid only above that minimum. In addition, says Crescas, granted that the relation holds true as regards the strength or celerity of the motion, still since there can be an infinite movement in time, why cannot the force of a finite body, having a definite and limited rate of motion, move a body infinitely, when there is no cause for its ceasing, and no resistance impeding it? Especially such bodies as the heavenly spheres which are of an ethereal substance, and consequently offer no resistance, could be moved eternally even by a finite force. This critical remark displays a quite advanced conception of motion and resistance, more penetrating than that of Aristotle, who related the continuity of motion to the force and employed the assumed relation as a cardinal proof of the existence of a first mover.

למען whatsoever השם האלה ואל הבה ויה복ון ו Arkadaş אע”ם ופומט ומשיר וזריע מפורש והם, Or Adonai, p. 18 b.
Finally, the Aristotelian conception of time is attacked. (This forms proposition XV.) Time, says the Stagyrite, is an accident of motion, and cannot be conceived without it. This statement comprises four premisses. 1. Time is an accident joined to movement; 2. either is not found without the other; 3. and is not conceived without the other; 4. and, finally, whatever has no movement is not in time. But, rejoins Crescas, is not time a measure of rest as well? Do we not measure the state of rest of a body in time, whether it is long or short? The first two premisses then fall. The third, however, may be justified if we define rest as the privation of motion. The conception of time is joined to motion and not conceived without it, though not always found together with motion. Crescas, therefore, proposes a new definition of time. Time is the concept of continuity of a certain state of a body, whether it is movement or rest. It is true that time is an accident, but an accident relating to the soul and not to anything else. This conception of time is quite a modern one, and reminds one of the Kantian concept.

The Proofs of Maimonides Refuted.

After attacking the individual links which make up the Maimonidian proofs of the existence of God, Crescas proceeds to demonstrate the results of the refutations bearing on the proofs. The first proof of Maimonides (cp. above) makes essential use of the first proposition in

Or Adonai, 19 a.
connexion with the twelfth, for if there exists an infinite body it has infinite force, and so it can be self-moved, and there is no need of a first mover. Again, propositions II and III are necessary, for if there is an infinite causal regressus there is no first cause. In the same way, several more propositions are needed. Since these propositions were refuted by Crescas (though proposition III, which is really the basic one, was not refuted, but given an entirely different interpretation), it follows that the proof as a whole is refuted. But, adds Crescas, even granting the truth of all these propositions, yet Maimonides has not established his case. The twelfth proposition stating that a finite body must have a finite force, which is a cardinal point in the proof, does not establish the impossibility of a force in a finite body moving in an infinite time where there is no resistance; though we may grant that the strength of the force is finite (cp. above). This objection alone is sufficient to overthrow the whole structure of the proof. There is no necessity for a first unmoved mover, for the sphere can be moved by its own force infinitely.

Again, Maimonides has not established the unity of God. He proves it by the sixteenth proposition, which asserts that whatever is neither a body nor a force in a body cannot be conceived under number unless it is a cause, and since there can be only one cause of that character to this world, the oneness of this cause follows. But, says Crescas, this argument would be sufficient if we assume that there is only one world. But since it was demonstrated (cp. above) that the existence of several worlds is possible, it is also possible that there should be several Gods, each one being a different cause of a different world in a different
relation, and as such the Gods may be counted. Thus, the numerical unity is not proved.\(^{62}\)

The second proof of Maimonides is based on Aristotle's assertion that if we find a thing composed of two elements, and then one element alone, it follows that the other element must also exist by itself (cp. above for the conclusion). The conclusion is attacked by Crescas, who says that logically it follows only that the separate existence of the other element is possible, but not that it is absolutely necessary. He supports his contention by an illustration drawn from physiology as it was understood in his time. We know that all living beings are also vegetative as far as growth is concerned. We find, though, vegetation without life, but we never find living beings not having the vegetative quality. (It is absurd, of course, from the modern point of view, that vegetation is a living organism.) We see, therefore, that it is not absolutely necessary for the two elements that compose a thing to exist separately, especially if one may act as a perfecting agent. The force of the Maimonidian argument is then broken.\(^{63}\)

The third argument of Maimonides, based on the assertion that all being cannot be perishable, since time and movement are eternal, is answered by Crescas in the following manner: The imperishability of all being does not follow from the eternity of time and movement, for if we supposed that they would all perish at once, the argument would be valid; but why can there not be a continual series of perishable beings, one following another? The premiss, therefore, has not been established.\(^{64}\) He advances also another argument against the proof, but it

\(^{62}\) Or Adonai. 20 a. This subject will be discussed again in this chapter and in chapter II.

\(^{63}\) Ibid., 20 b.

\(^{64}\) Ibid.
really has little force. In general, his refutation of the third proof is more for the sake of argumentation and logical casuistry than for the sake of serious discussion. Crescas himself, as will be evidenced in the second chapter, proves the existence of God through a similar chain of argumentation, though with a different interpretation. Finally, the last arguments of Maimonides are assailed. The arguments centre about unity. Crescas has already shown that Maimonides did not succeed in proving the oneness of the first cause. He now elaborates the subject, and analyses the other arguments of Maimonides. These arguments have often been quoted in Jewish as well as in scholastic philosophy, and run as follows (cp. Introduction): The existence of two Gods is impossible for several reasons:

1. If there were two, there would be a difference between them as well as a similarity; they would, therefore, be composite.
2. The harmony of the world and the interdependence of beings testify to the existence of one God.
3. If there were two Gods, we should have to conclude that either one God created a part of the world and the other another, or that one worked for a certain time and the other for another period, or that they co-operated. All these results are absurd. It would follow that God is a composite, is in time and possible, which consequences are untenable (cp. Introduction, as well as above in the exposition of the Maimonidian theory for elucidation).

But, rejoins Crescas, the conclusion, namely, the oneness of God, is not warranted. First, the Gods must not be composite, for the difference between them need not be material: it may be only a causal one.6

6 Or Adoman, p. 20 b.
we may posit several worlds, we may also posit several Gods, each one having his world. This answers also the other arguments; for besides that the interdependence of this world of things does not prove anything, as there may be a pre-established harmony of plan between the Gods, it vanishes entirely with the assumption of the existence of several worlds, as it is evident. There are also other arguments quoted by Saadia and Bahia that are not affected by this assumption, but these arguments will be discussed in the second chapter together with the Spinozistic view on the subject.

We have reached a boundary line in Crescas's philosophy, namely, the end of his critical exposition of the proofs of the existence of God. The point of view of Crescas has been mentioned before. It will suffice to remark in passing that his endeavour is to show the invalidity of many philosophic arguments concerning theological dogmas, so that necessarily we have to rely upon tradition. However, what has happened to many others has happened to him, that while their aim has not been reached, the very negative side is valuable. He displayed in his criticisms a keen sense of philosophic acumen and originality, and were this book more widely known, its influence on general thought would undoubtedly be greater. His anticipations of modern conceptions have already been noticed. Yet Crescas has value, not only in his negative criticisms but also in his positive conceptions. It will be evident in the future chapters. We thus pass on to the second chapter.

66 Ibid., p. 21 a.

(To be continued.)
THE RESPONSA OF THE BABYLONIAN GEONIM AS A SOURCE OF JEWISH HISTORY*

BY JACOB MANN, Jews' College, London.

APPENDIX TO CHAPTER I

NEW GENIZAH MATERIAL.

The following pages will include a number of hitherto unpublished Genizah fragments which I have found long after the above chapter had been written. With the exception of three fragments in the custody of the British Museum and one from the Bodleian, they all belong to the famous Taylor-Schechter Collection at Cambridge. I am much indebted to the staff of the University Library for their courtesy and ready assistance in my work. The additional information about the Babylonian Geonim and their academies, which these fragments furnish, will be discussed in the first part of the Appendix. The second part will deal with Elhanan b. Ḥushiel of Kairouan, who, both father and son, were in recent years brought to the historical foreground by the well-known Genizah letter published by Dr. Schechter in the eleventh volume of the JQR. (pp. 643–50). The new material given here will again raise the problem of the famous 'Four Captives', and will at the same time indicate a solution on a new line.


** They will be designated here as Or., Bodl., and T.-S. respectively.
1. The Gaon Isaac Šadok of Sura (823).

This well-known Gaon, usually going by the name of Šadok, is sometimes mentioned as Isaac Gaon. Comp. ש"ה, no. 156, שאה, which reads in ת"ר, no. 217, י"כ פ"רכ רב בר בר צורך רואני ק"ן, ed. Buber, § 255, has רב נחשון ינא ז'ל פ"רכ ח"דנהו ת"ק. אמ"ר אינ BlueprintReadOnly מח"ד, R. Nahshon evidently referring to his father Šadok. We further find Ibn Daud (ed. Neub. I, 65, l. 5) writing רב ינא ז'ל לת"ק רבиш when referring to our Gaon Šadok. A variant (ibid., l. 10-11) reads רב נחשון רב ינא instead of R. Nahshon b. Šadok. Rappoport (Introd. to פ"ר, 9 a) was of the opinion that 'Isaac' in Ibn Daud was either a mistake or a synonymous name for Šadok, while Harkavy decides that in all the cited passages the correct reading should be Šadok (פ"ר, 396, see pp. 355–6).

It is now possible to state definitely that the Gaon was the bearer of both names. I have found in T.-S. Box F 4 three detached parchment leaves, very damaged and stained, containing Gaonic responsa; they now bear the press-marks T.-S. 12, 854–56. The fragments are probably of Babylonian provenance, as the parchment and the early handwriting show. The third leaf (12, 856) has on recto, middle, the superscription פ"ר נחשון, containing a responsum by this Gaon with the following interesting heading:

[ה'ד]

עיב ת'א קומתה הזדה ש"ח [ברית]

. . . . . . . . .

רבענו תעקב שלמה רבהăm שים bajo עליה ובר בר [ראבניא] [ע"ו]"כ והיתתא ביהיתא יב שף . . . . . . . . .

םיתתא ביהיתא בר בר [ברית] . . . .

Knife שים לע שўיא ורבנה ורבנה גוזה ומיאליים אֶרֶץ היה_TCP城市群נין בון פָּטָה ר.
The doubtful letters I have marked with dots on the top. The place of residence of the correspondent could not be ascertained. It seems that his letter, enclosing the questions and undoubtedly the customary donations as well, reached the Gaon during the Passover, three years prior to the date of his answer.


When Nehemiah assumed the dignity of Gaon after Aaron b. Sargádo, Sherira and many members of the academy refused him recognition.\(^{39}\) The academy laboured under deplorable conditions, and the Gaon must have had much to contend with during his period of office. The letter written by Nehemiah in 962 (published by Dr. Cowley, *JQR.*, XIX, 105-6)—till now the only one known by him—is ample evidence of the state of affairs in his academy (cp. also Poznański, *ibid.*, 397-401). Above (VII, 467) I have also pointed out that probably the small letter in *Geon.*, II, 87 emanates from him. The ‘sons of Aaron’, the influential grandees of Bagdad, are mentioned in both epistles. They cannot have been the ‘sons of Aaron’ (Sargádo), as Ginzberg, *ibid.*, thinks. They would not have been the supporters of Nchemiah who opposed their late father.\(^{40}\) There can be little doubt that this

\(^{39}\) Sherira's Letter (p. 41): נוח ושביכוכ בחר ראחר有种 חות הוהי ותחום והנה זכר רعون בניהו והנה ליעל והנה ושירה ויהי ולא אשיאי ויהי ולא אולאบท קוליה.

\(^{40}\) Cp. Sherira's Letter (p. 41): הוהי חות בליא אליע מזור (רב) חונתיו. איור ויהי צור ברט רוחים קמייה וימי (רב) איור ויהי צור ברט nearly א opción רבעם קי מזר ברט איור.
Aaron is identical with Aaron b. Abraham b. Aaron who, together with his brother Moses, is so highly spoken of in the letter from the Pumbedita Gaon in \( 953 \) (\( \mathcal{Y}O\mathcal{R.}, \) XVIII, 402). In this epistle the Gaon directs his correspondent in Spain to send his letters through this Aaron (p. 403, l. 21 f. אאות). Next to the Exilarch and Netira, this Aaron seems to have been one of the most influential Jews in Bagdad. After his death, his sons, the בני אatron, were the patrons of the Pumbedita academy, and to these Nehemiah refers in his letters.

The fact that both epistles found their way to the Cairo Genizah tends to show that they were either sent to Egypt or to communities beyond, and were copied at Fustāt in the process of transmission. Of the way how the correspondence between the Geonim in Babylon and the communities of Maghreb and Spain as well as other European countries passed through Fustāt, the leading Egyptian community, more will be said later on. Now, whereas the letter published by Dr. Cowley may have been addressed to a community beyond Egypt (Pozn., \textit{ibid.}, 400, indeed thinks it is not the original), the epistle in \textit{Geonica} could have only been sent to Egypt. The Gaon assures his correspondents that their requests will find influential support at the Caliph’s court in Bagdad through the intervention of the sons of Netira and of Aaron. Till 969, when Jauhar conquered Egypt for the Fātimid

\[ * L. 15 f. : \]
al-Muʿizz, a vestige of authority remained there still with the Abbasid Caliphs of Bagdad. Their suzerainty over North Africa was done away with by the Fātimids several years before. Between 961 and 968 the Jews of Egypt could still obtain some assistance from influential advocacy on their behalf at the court of Bagdad.

The details mentioned in these two letters enable us at once to identify the two fragments printed here as also coming from Nehemiah. The first (A) is very fragmentary and damaged, with beginning and end missing. I have found it in a box of fragments belonging to the Cambridge University Library Collection, and it is to be placed between glass. The brownish paper and ink, as well as the handwriting, at once betray Babylonian origin to one who has seen similar documents from Babylon. The are mentioned in line 12, and it may safely be assumed that the fragment is a part of an original letter from Nehemiah to Egypt. The representative of the academy, Solomon b. ʿAli b. Tabnai, and a son of Aaron of Bagdad, who are mentioned in the letter in ṢQR., XIX, occur here again. It seems that this Solomon b. ʿAli, the רַפֶס, lived in Egypt, where he acted as central representative of the academy for receiving all donations, even from the countries beyond.

As far as the fragment allows reconstruction, Nehemiah writes to a זאר in Egypt who had some quarrel with a גַּל (l. 3), as well as with his own community (l. 5). On that account the Gaon refrained from writing to him till peace should be restored. He now complains that his appeal for the annual support of the academy has been ignored by the אֲדַאָד בֶּנֶּ תְּשׁאָה, most likely the community of the זאר

The class-mark of this fragment is now T.-S 12 851. Verso contains Arabic writing apparently of later date.
to whom the Gaon writes. The disappointment of the members of the academy is great. Nehemiah bitterly complains that his circulars appealing for support, sent out every year, are of no avail (ll. 9–14). It seems that when this letter was written Nehemiah had occupied the Gaonate already for some years. Of similar complaints we read in his letter of 962 (JQR., XIX, ll. 9–11). The Gaon goes on to state in our fragment (ll. 14–15) that he spent much on writing appeals to double the number of people of former years; none that was known to him by name has been left out.

The גן in Egypt, to whom Nehemiah writes, is very likely none else but Elhanan, the father of the well-known Shemariah. Elhanan, his grandson, in a letter to Malij, describes himself as אֲלֹהֵי אֲרָשַׁי נִלְעַע הַמִּשְׁמַרְתָּא מִי לְאֲלֹהֵי אֱוָנְא (T.-S. 16. 134, cited by Worman, JQR., XIX, 729, no. XX). Also T.-S. 12. 193 contains the heading of a letter to Kairovan beginning with אֲלֹהֵי אֲרָשַׁי נִלְעַע הַמִּשְׁמַרְתָּא (1) אֲלֹהֵי אֲרָשַׁי נִלְעַע הַמִּשְׁמַרְתָּא (2) אֲלֹהֵי אֲרָשַׁי נִלְעַע הַמִּשְׁמַרְתָּא (3) אֲלֹהֵי אֲרָשַׁי נִלְעַע הַמִּשְׁמַרְתָּא (4) (5) אֲלֹהֵי אֲרָשַׁי נִלְעַע הַמִּשְׁמַרְתָּא (6) ... . As will be shown further on, Sherira and Hai corresponded with Shemariah in 991, and then Elhanan, his father, was no longer alive. It is therefore quite in accordance with the chronology that between 961–68 Nehemiah should have corresponded with Elhanan the elder. As spiritual leader of the Fustat community, he would have been appealed to for the support of the academy.

Lines 16–17 of our fragment seem to mean that the Gaon sent half the number of his circulars of appeals to

43 Shemariah also signs a document of 1002, as śתורא חדר ברב אֲלֹהֵי אֱוָנְא (JQR., XI, 646, n. 2).
Solomon (b. ‘Ali), the רכש, ‘through the son of Aaron’. Evidently the donations would be sent to this Bagdad grandee, who would supervise their proper distribution. The other batch of circulars were entrusted to X. b. Sa‘id b. דוד (or דוע) ‘through his brother, the Alluf’. It is difficult to ascertain whether this Alluf was a brother of ‘the son of Aaron’, since in the other letters we find בנו mentioned, or a brother of this unknown X. b. Sa‘id, who evidently was a representative of the academy like Solomon b. ‘Ali.

Fragment B (T.-S. 8 J 203) is still more damaged. Therein recur the בר נון and a certain Tob Alluf (l. 9), who is perhaps identical with the Alluf mentioned in fragment A. As to the name בר, I refer to the Ab בית, the son of שמאח b. Paltoi (JQR., XVIII, 402 top). But the clearest proof that our fragment emanates from Nehemiah is the mention of ברננבר, ‘the two boorish young men’ (ll. 5–6), who opposed the Gaon and sent letters to the communities with the purpose of undermining his authority. The Gaon urges upon his correspondents to counteract the possible effect of his opponents’ epistles. These two people are known from the letter of 962 (JQR., XIX, 106, ll. 24–5). As Pozn. (ibid., 401) acutely remarks, ברננבר may be nicknames for ברננבר. Thus Sherira, who refused Nehemiah recognition, may have been the object of the Gaon’s invectives.

The rest of the fragment is again an appeal for donations to be accompanied by questions and requests (l. 7 ברננבר; this suggests the reading of ברננבר in Geon., II, 87 for ברננבר). The representative (ללאו, ll. 10–11) is probably the above-mentioned Solomon b. ‘Ali (cp. JQR., l.c., ll. 25–6).
3. Sherira and Hai.

Above (VII, 467 ff.) it has been pointed out, for the first time I believe, that Sherira, the Gaon of Pumbedita, apparently had his supreme court, the אנה והתחנה, in Bagdad. Probably the Ab Bet-Din resided in Pumbedita, where during the Kallah months the great meetings of the school were held. As the letter in Geonica (II, 87) has been shown above to have most likely been written by Nehemiah, this Gaon also resided in Bagdad. Farther on another letter by an anonymous Gaon from this city will be printed. As evidence for Sherira’s supreme court at Bagdad a few essential lines were cited above from Bodl. 2876. I now subjoin here the whole fragment (A), according to the copy made by Dr. Cowley, who very kindly placed it at my disposal. A few remarks only have to be added as to the locality of the נתיות at Bagdad. Le Strange in his Bagdad during the Abbasid Caliphate, 1900, mentions a Suḵ al-ʿAtīkah (p. 96) in the Sharkiyah Quarter, viz. that portion more on the river bank (of the Tigris) bore the name of an older suburb known as al-ʿAtīkah (see map facing p. 47). On the other hand a (or the) Jewish quarter seems to have been farther west of the city. There existed a Qanṭarah-al-Yahud which crossed the Karkhāya Canal (p. 150). Interesting for the cosmopolitan composition of the Bagdad Jewry is the mention of such names as ʿAli b. David the Palestinian (l. 11) and Naḥum b. Aaron of Baalbek (l. 12).

As regards Hai, the lines from T.-S. 13 J. 13

According to Yakut (see Wüstenfeld, ZDMG., XVIII. 399) the village Sunāyā that stood on the western bank of the Tigris before the erection of Bagdad was afterwards called al-ʿAtīkah.
as showing that Hai resided at Bagdad (above, VII, 467). Pozn. (Babyl. Geonim, p. 90), who printed these lines, was not clear about them, and also doubted Solomon's (b. Judah) authorship of the letter. As will be shown in another connexion, Yahya was a son of Solomon b. Judah who went to Bagdad to study under Hai. The Jerusalem Gaon in this letter to an Egyptian dignitary mentions that an epistle from his son enclosed a letter from Hai. As further evidence of Bagdad having been the place of residence of Hai, I refer to the Genizah book-list, published by Pozn. in ZfHB., XII, 119-20 (No. III). Lines 17-18 read לבר הא תשובות ונבראה ... פ. Pozn. remarks (p. 122), 'Responsen aus Bagdad an Hai, wohl: Responsen auf Anfragen aus Bagdad'. It is very unlikely that such a near community as Bagdad should have sent written questions to be answered by written responsa. As was pointed out above (VII, 461), this procedure was only the case with distant communities such as Basrah, and especially the countries outside Babylon. But now that we know of the Gaon's residence at Bagdad, there is little doubt that the above item in the book-list means 'Responsa (to some unknown community) by Hai (לבר הל) from Bagdad'. The fact that they existed in Fustat shows that they were either addressed to or passed through Egypt.49

Of considerable interest is fragment B, Or. 5561 B, fols. 9-10, parchment, brownish ink, square, very stained and

49 Cp. further Bodl. 287710 containing a letter from סט תיב יוחה תלב to Joseph b. Jacob b. יוחה of Fustat. The correspondent says שלל אליא סרי מי ע'6, קוב לו מה אנה פיה מז זעל בד בים פי וקמה הרשא. The date 1213 is impossible, more likely 1013. The correspondent is perhaps the son of the Kairouan scholar Joseph b. Berachiah (cp. note 59).
damaged. Neubauer published in *JQR*. (VI, 222–3) a fragmentary letter (Bodl. 2668\textsuperscript{10} = MS. Heb. 44, fols. 80–1) which contained the well-known remarks about Shemariah (b. Elhanan), as a former of the academy, and his son Elhanan. Unfortunately the text was not edited with sufficient care. Neubauer failed to point out, in the first instance, that between fols. 80 and 81 there must be a gap, as is evident from the context. This gap is now partially filled up by fragment B, though there is evidently another gap between fols. 9 and 10 of Or. I have convinced myself by comparing the two fragments that they are similar as regards the parchment, size, and handwriting, the only difference being that Bodl. has been very well preserved and is clearly legible, whereas Or. is much damaged. Moreover, the context proves Or. fol. 9 to be a continuation of Bodl. fol. 80, while Bodl. fol. 81 follows Or. fol. 10. In the latter case, especially the verse of Prov. 10. 6, runs on from one page to the other; the dots above the letters are in both fragments. The letter must have been of considerable length; with beginning and end missing and the gap between fols. 9–10—it should be noted that both fragments are joined parchment double-leaves—it must have been double the present size.\textsuperscript{50}

From the continuation it is now clear that the R. Jacob, mentioned at the end of Bodl. fol. 80 b, was not Jacob b. Nissim of Kairouan, as Neubauer, *l. c.*, and Halberstamm, *ibid.*, 596, held for certain. He is the son of Joseph, most likely the same (b. 'Awkal or 'Awbal) whom Sherira and

\textsuperscript{50} It is now hardly necessary to add that the doubts of Halévy (תורא, III, 299) as to the authenticity of the Bodl. Genizah fragment are entirely unwarranted.
Hai eulogize so much in the letter printed by Marx, *JQR.*, N. S., I, 101. He had rendered signal service to the academy during his stay in Babylon, and looked after its interests when residing in Egypt. Our fragment reflects a very depressed spirit of Sherira and Hai. That the letter emanates from them is clear from fol. 9, verso, l. 8, אָמַר אֶל בֵּית לוֹ, i.e. Hai. Sherira and Hai had evidently to encounter some opposition, as fol. 10, recto, shows in particular (cp. l. 4, אָמַר כְּרַד אֵשׁ מַיָה, and l. 15, [אָמַר מַהְוָה]). But who this opponent was is obscure. It is likewise difficult to ascertain who this Alluf was to whom this letter is addressed, and who is called [אֶל מַהוָה רַה הָאָמָא] (fol. 9, verso, l. 7). Eppenstein (*Mschr.*, 1911, 476), who rightly suggested that R. Jacob at the end of Bodl. fol. 80b was Jacob b. Josef (b. 'Awkal), is certain that the Alluf, to whom the letter was sent, was Jacob b. Nissim of Kaïrowan. Fragment B renders this suggestion highly improbable. The Alluf was evidently the representative of the academy to whom all donations were sent. Thus he transmitted the gift of Jacob b. Joseph (b. 'Awkal). He also had legacies for the academy (fol. 10, verso, l. 11 ff.). It is very unlikely that Jacob b. Joseph should have sent his donations from Egypt to Jacob b. Nissim of Kaïrowan. The money would have to be sent back to Egypt for transmission to Babylon. The dangers of travelling in those days render such a procedure hardly likely. This Alluf must have lived in Egypt, where he acted as principal agent for the academy. He had friendly relations with Jacob b. Joseph (b. 'Awkal), Shemariah, and his son Elihanan, and also with Jacob Alluf b. [Nissim, as fol. 10, verso, l. 15, is to be completed] of Kaïrowan. The people who left the legacies for the academy, viz. נְאֶל X. and David b. Joseph, apparently
the Alluf's cousin, are quite unknown. This applies also to Ḥasan b. X. (fol. 9, verso, l. 1). with whom the Alluf corresponded.

We come now to Bodl. fol. 81, wherein Shemariah and Elhanan are mentioned. Besides minor omissions, a curious misreading of Neubauer obscured for so long an interesting and important detail of the inner organization of the academy. The colourless expression ראה ישורו והרהויה נרהיהма! (!) (p. 223, l. 12), reads in the fragment ראה ישורו והרהויה נרהיהמה! We learn thus that the first of the three rows of the Pumbedita academy was called 'the row of the Nehardeans'. This suggests that when the famous school of Nehardea was closed, probably after the destruction of the town by Odenathus in 259, its scholars joined the newly-formed Pumbedita school and were granted the privilege of occupying the first row. In course of time the name remained, though its occupants were no longer scholars exclusively from Nehardea. We see that Shemariah was head of this row and yet he very probably came from Egypt, where his father held the dignity of קד, to Pumbedita for the purpose of study, just as his son Elhanan visited the school after him, and Solomon b. Judah sent his son Yahya to study under Hai.

A suggestion may be ventured here that the 'row of the Nehardeans' was connected with the work of the

51 In JQR., VI, p. 223. read הרהויה נרהיהמה נר הוא (ll. 3-4), ובו יר הגמרא בהמה (l. 23). Several words have Babylonian vowel-signs, while others have Tiberian.

Eastern Massorah. The Massoretic differences between Suranese (สโมสร) and Nehardeans (נדרעים) are well known. R. Nahman, the well-known Amora of Nehardea, is mentioned as a Massorete in the Massorah Magna to Gen. 27:3, cp. Ginsburg, *Massora*, I. 611a and *Introduction*, pp. 213 and 611.

A Massoretic fragment from the Genizah, which will be discussed in another connexion, mentions סיפר רבי וולא. 'The house of Yelta' is probably the Massoretic school of R. Nahman. It was named so in honour of his wife Yalta, the daughter of the Exilarch (cp. Ber. 51b top, Shabb. 54b, Gittin 67b, and Hullin 124a). The work of the Eastern Massorah\(^5\) was hardly completed in Talmudic times. It is more probable that it was continued in the schools during the Gaonic period. Suranese had their academy, but the Massoretic work of the Nehardeans was carried on in the Pumbedita school, in particular by the occupants of the שרהו 너דהו. It should be added that in the only instance in which Judah b. Ezekiel, the famous disciple of Rab and Samuel and founder of the Pumbedita school, is mentioned as a Massorete, he agrees with the Nehardean school. See the item in Ginsburg, *Massora*. I, 713a, which reads in the Genizah fragment mentioned before. ויהי עליה הכתוב באזא ההעדים בראשו אופי הוהי דנין (Deut. 32:6) ויהי הנביא הכתוב עלייתו ו Türkiye יאוץ ולעליו ולעליו, ומוקרא.

To return to Shemariah and his son Elhanan. About their activities in Egypt more will be said elsewhere. Here we are concerned with their relations with the Babylonian Geonim. As till now no responsum by Sherira and Hai to Shemariah was known, it will not be superfluous to cite here

\(^5\) About this Massorah in general see Kahle, *Der Massoretische Text... der Babyl. Juden*, 1902, and *Die Massoretten des Ostens*, 1913.
a few lines from Bodl. MS. Heb. e. 98 (not yet catalogued), fols. 22–3.\textsuperscript{54} They contain the beginning of a pamphlet of Gaonic responsa, much damaged and torn. Fol. 22\textsuperscript{a} reads:

\[\text{[handwritten text]...}\]

Shemariah appears from the context, this reading was new to him. His Talmud copy read in Ber. 3\textsuperscript{b}, bottom (cp. Sanh. 16\textsuperscript{b}) as our texts אזורים אוחסנים בנות יוהוד ויהיו in accordance with 1 Chron. 27. 34 (cp. ת"ר in Tosafot, Ber. 4\textsuperscript{b}, and Sanh., l.c., Dišđuke Soferim, Ber. p. 8, n. 3. Sanh., p. 2, n. 5). On the other hand the Kairawan text involves the difficulty of the Talmud adducing a verse about יוהuda (2 Sam. 20. 23) as an inference for יוהוד. Yet this text was the correct one in accordance with the reading of the Babylonian schools. This we learn from an interesting passage in R. Nissim’s Mafteah on Sanhedrin (as published by Israel Lévi, \textit{ReJ}, XLIV. 294–7, from a Genizah fragment).\textsuperscript{55} For our purpose here

\textsuperscript{54} I am under obligation to Dr. Cowley for facilities granted to me in reading this manuscript.

\textsuperscript{55} P. 296: עם רב צמח ותנואו, כיון ותנואו את המ創新ו יוהuda, וбытינו... שלא ימרcolm את העדה. This passage, in which we find אזראו, is significant. See also: אזרא ותנואו... ותנואו את המ創新ו.
it is of interest to learn that in 991 Sherira and Hai sent responsa to Shemariah. The pamphlet (הדות) of responsa used to be called after the beginning of the first question. See in הדות, No. 314, that Sherira wrote on a statement of Hai in the Geonim, and the indices of responsa in Geon., II, pp. 57 ff. Thus the pamphlet of responsa to Shemariah was called הדות." [ןלי קרויאא.

Neubauer (JQR., VI, 222) writes that Shemariah emigrated to Kairouan. For this there is no evidence whatsoever, and as far as I can see, this has been accepted by no other writer. But about his son Elhanan, it became an accepted opinion that he emigrated to Kairouan. This is a suggestion of Pozn. (REJ., XLVIII, 161, and Geon., no. 11), based on הדות, no. 1 (p. 2, ll. 2-4) which states: "ר' אלעזר בן שמעון בן משה בן ירצה אנות בן ידוק ומזרחי פַּת חֵנוֹרַי". This has been accepted by Eppenstein (Mschr., 1911, 614) while Dr. Davidson (JQR., N.S., 1913-14, 53) calls Elhanan 'the well-known scholar of Kairouan'. All this rests on a very weak foundation. We have only to consider that questions from Spain and North Africa had to pass through Egypt on the way to Babylon, and that these usually enclosed donations for the collection of which the central representative was in Egypt, then there is no ground for Elhanan's supposed stay in Kairouan. When Jacob's...
(b. Patrûn) questions to Sherira and Hai arrived from Kâirowan in Egypt, Elhanan b. Shemariah, who probably arranged their transmission to Babylon, enclosed his own questions to the Geonim.\(^{56}\) This process of transmission has to be kept in mind in order to understand the fact that copies of several epistles from Babylon to North Africa and Spain have been preserved in the Cairo Genizah. Again, the indices of responsa to Meshullam b. Kalonymos, to Fez and other countries (as preserved in Geon., II, and in Wertheimer's הָלָהָ הַשְּׁלֵם) clearly indicate that the responsa were copied by Fustât scholars for their own purposes. Reference is also made to the item in the above-mentioned book-list (l. 13), שאלווה מעוהר רבני איה, which shows that the 'questions from Tahort (in Morocco) to Hai' were copied in Fustât.

In this connexion the following lines (the only ones I could make out) from T.-S. 8 J. 28\(^{12}\), vellum, damaged and torn, will be of some interest, especially as the persons mentioned therein are known from Gaonic responsa.\(^{57}\) The address (on verso) reads:

\(^{56}\) After writing this I have found a Genizah fragment, which will be published in another connexion, containing a letter by Elhanan to Damascus. Herein he states that report reached him of his son-in-law having been drowned in the sea and that his daughter was left behind in Kâirowan. The corresponding lines read: "הנה עלינו שאלווה הכהנים והנול חומメンバー ורב האבות ובנו של צדקת היה מ"ת (הנה) כמו פס בים וול Мыומנו באב והרבנו הוא מעמוי והמשלח והנול חתנו בהנה יקיר.\(^{58}\)_Assuming that Elhanan’s son-in-law was a native of Kâirowan, it is possible that Elhanan visited this city on the marriage of his daughter.

\(^{57}\) This fragment is probably identical with the one cited by Worman, \textit{JQR.}, XIX, 730, no. xxv. The contents of Aram. box 64 have now, I understand, been transferred to bound volumes.
On the recto I read the following lines

(5) "אָליְּנָא אַלְיַרְּדֶרֵת (7) ... מִיְּמֵי אֲדֻמָּה
(8) ... מֵעְשָׁתּוֹת תְּבָאָה וְנְאָבָנָה
(9) ... נִפְאָבָנָה מֵסָאלוּ וְסֶרְעָה
(10) ... לַאֲתָה בִּסְכִּית אֲלָפָאָבָל מִן
(11) ... יִשְׁמֹאֵל מִן אֲלָפָאָבָל לְוִי
(12) ... יְשָׁמַע אֶל הֶלוֹאֵבָּה הַלְאָבָאָה וְלֶלֵּבָּה
(13) ... וַיִּשְׁמַע אֶל הָעֵדְבָּה אֶל הַלְאָבָאָה דּוֹרֵי יְאָבָא אֵז
(14) ... וְלֶלֵּבָּה דּוֹרֵי לְאָבָא
(15) ... וְלֶלֵּבָּה דּוֹרֵי לְאָבָא
(16) ... וְלֶלֵּבָּה דּוֹרֵי לְאָבָא
... The writer of the letter is known from other Gaonic responsa as having corresponded with Sherira and Hai (cf. מ"ע, nos. 331-69, no. 369 ends וְלֶלֵּבָּה דּוֹרֵי לְאָבָא). This Joseph evidently transmitted in return the responsa from the academy to the communities of North Africa and beyond. This representative of the academy is clearly the son of Jacob (b. Joseph b. 'Awbal) who has been

55 The letter was given to a non-Jewish member of the caravan because Sam. b. Abr. had to leave in advance on account of the Sabbath (II. 9, 10).
dealt with above. Continuing his father's tradition, Joseph
looked after the interest of both the Sura and the Pumbe-
dita academies in Egypt. This is evident from the letter of
Samuel b. Hofni (JQR., XIV, 309, cp. 621: אלל מאר יוקם וastery מוענק
לום מאר יוקם וstasy מוענק אלום ..., משכימה הסתרה אלום)
Joseph's sons were called Hillel and Benjamin. These
are referred to in l. 16 of our fragment. In addition to the
few letters addressed to Joseph b. Jacob, as mentioned in
the Bodl. Catalogue (II, Index), the following fragments
are cited here. Or. 5542, fol. 22, contains a letter which
reads on verso: לאישו יושי-employed יוקם וב עובל
החלנו גם כן ונתנה כי יוסי וב עובל נשתך empleשים
ולא יוסי הבנה. Likewise Or. 5563, C. fol. 19, is addressed (on verso)
ושי והשלים יוסי ואלולה את אלולה יוסי וב עובל וב עובל נשתך
כמו חזרות ובצאם יוסי לאים יוסי עובל. Several persons are mentioned in
the letter, among them יוסי של מראות וחר עב נלמא לאלהים
ויסי דיינו به ויסי רותי יוסי השלחנה. Finally in T.-S. 13 J. 2615
Joseph is styled יוסי רותי יוסי השלחנהحال. His sons Hillel and Benjamin are
also mentioned. We thus learn that both he and his father
bore the title of יוסי

59 Bodl. 2877 contains a business letter, in Arabic, from
הרביה to our Joseph b. Jacob. Probably the first of the correspondents is
identical with the Kairawan scholar referred to farther on (under 4). We
shall thus learn that he had a brother called Nissim.

60 This Joseph b. Jacob of Tripoli, who is also the correspondent of the
Bodl. letters, is probably identical with יוסי מראות יוסי אלליא אללי
in the document of 1034 (JQR., XVI, 575-6). This Tripoli is most likely the port on the North-African coast, east of
Kabes (cp. map attached to Wustenfeld, Geschichte der Fatimidem Califehen).

61 Probably identical with the person mentioned in the deed drawn up
at Kairawan in 1050 Bodl. 2805. 23.
RESPONSA OF THE BABYLONIAN GEONIM—MANN 359

A

(recto)

[Text content in Hebrew]

62 Read perhaps שָׁעִי, שָׁאִילָה, shore, coast; cp. Pinsker, פִיןְקֶר, נָהוֹת, שָׁעִי, Shor, coast.
43, note, אלַאָנָבַר, אֶלַאָנָבַר, אֶלַאָנָבַר, אֶלַאָנָבַר; of course Bagdad itself being placed on the river Tigris [דָּרִיָּה].

63 B. Batra 175 a.
B

Bod. 2668\(^9\) (fol. 80 b, bottom) = \textit{JQR.}, VI, 233, ll. 6–8.

and the whole consumes no further, viz.

(Or. 5361 B, fol. 9, recto)

... ויאש낯ו יתב... 11.

and the whole consumes no further, viz.

(Or. 5361 B, fol. 9, verso)

... בותק יתב... 11.

\footnote{Can also be read בותק יתב, which would make no sense. Read בותק יתב, i.e. 'he stopped the oppression which was in our heart', viz. he relieved our cares. Read מאי עיניים ותאצלת התה יתב, which would again give no meaning.}
RESPONSA OF THE BABYLONIAN GEONIM—MANN 361

(fol. 10, recto)

The first letter looks more like ג than י. If ג, then read [ג'א''ג].


66 Isa. 28. 20.
The two small fragments printed here can without difficulty be assigned to Samuel b. Hofni. Fragment A, T.-S. 12. 733, vellum, square, 16 x 16 cm., has a counterpart in the letter from this Gaon, published by the Rev. Margoliouth. JQR., XIV, 308. There the Gaon mentions the agreement entered upon by him and Sherira and Hai that all

69 Ps. 33. 7.

70 Sanh. 103 b; Yoma 9 b; cp. Yalk. Isa. § 436 and Kings § 246. For read וְ.
general donations should be equally divided between both academies of Sura and Pumbedita. Only in case a donor assigned his contribution to any of the Geonim by name, he would be entitled to retain it for himself. The same agreement is spoken of in our fragment (ll. 1–2). After the death of Jacob ניסי (b. Nissim) of Kairouan, Joseph b. Berachiah became his successor in representing the academies (ll. 2–7). In יקר, l.c., he is styled ינשיה. Joseph b. Berachiah is also known from questions addressed to Sherira and Hai (יקר, no. 178). It appears that this Joseph, just as Jacob b. Nissim before him, was the representative of the academies for North Africa (and perhaps also for Spain), receiving the donations as well as the questions addressed to them. These the representative would send from Kairouan to Egypt, where Joseph b. Jacob (b. Awbal) would arrange their transmission to Babylon. From ll. 5–6 of our fragment it is evident thatSON who sent to Hai ( Sinai ) 150 Dirhems ( יקר, XIV, 308) was none else but Jacob b. Nissim.72 The Gaon states that the names and the questions of the correspondents of former times are preserved in the academy (ll. 10–11). The same we read in the letter of 953 ( יקר, XVIII, 401, bottom).

Interesting is Samuel b. Hofni’s reference to his commentaries on the Bible, Mishnah, and Talmud (ll. 12–13). Besides his Bible commentaries and Talmudic compendiums (cp. Harkavy, Studien u. Mitteilungen, 1880, III, 3–4; יקר, XIV, 311; ZfHB., VII, 183, no. 3), only one Talmudic commentary is so far known by Samuel b.

72 Eppenstein (Mschr., 1911, 471, n. 1) is certain that the late scholar was Jacob b. Awbal (there is an obvious confusion in this note of the names Jacob and his son Joseph).
Hofni (cp. the Bookseller's Catalogue (JQR., XIII, 52–6), no. 55, and Pozn., ibid., 326–8).

Fragment B (Or. 5538) is described in the Rev. Margoliouth's Catalogue of British Museum Hebrew and Samaritan MSS., III, 1915, 561. The last line but one is printed there as (!) מָלֵדָה חַפְשּׂוֹת לְבָנָה מַשָּׂא (א)ה, which gives no sense. But the first word really looks more like או than as and thus perfectly restores the meaning. 'And I, Israel son of the Gaon, send many greetings' (משוע צהלא בר עתומא.).

The letter was written in Elul 1315 Sel. = 1004. Israel was then already of an age to collaborate in his father's responsa. Probably he drew up the epistle. He is mentioned as וּסְדֵר יִשְׂרָאֵל in the letter by Samuel b. Hofni to Fez (JQR., XVIII, 404, I. 9: וּסְדֵרָה שֵׂרָאֵל מָכֶּר תֶּשׁוּק = [ם כֶּרָה שִׂרָאֵל שֵׂרָאֵל] [הָיְשֵׁת הֹדוּר נַח = [הָיְשֵׁת הָדָרוֹ הָדוּר נַח = ]). Probably this son of Samuel b. Hofni is identical with 'שֵׂרָאֵל בֵּהוּך' mentioned in Giat, שיש, I, 70 (ורב יטראל בהווכ נזימ זמוי ידה) after Sherira and in 83 (ורב יטראל בהווכ נזימ זמוי ידה). Steinschneider, B. H., IV, 60, wants to alter Israel into Samuel (b. Hofni) because 'der Name Israel scheint überhaupt nicht vorzukommen'. Ginzberg (Geon., I, 179, n. 1) relegates this Israel נב to North Africa. All this is now superfluous.

The fragment does not tell us who these two correspondents were who sent the questions to Samuel b. Hofni (last line וישי ידוהים ישוע). The donor of the contribu-

73 By the by, these very abbreviations, as well as the others occurring in this Genizah-letter, show that it is not the original but a copy made in Fustat when transmitted to Fez. — Marx's suggestion (ibid., p. 771), followed by Pozn., 94, to read מָכֶּר תֶּשׁוּק needs no refutation now. In Ref., LXII, 120-3, Pozn. withdraws this suggestion and gives the correct rendering of this passage. The existence of an Israel Gaon, the son of Samuel b. Hofni, is now beyond doubt. (See also JQR., N. S., VIII, 7.)
tion which their letter enclosed is called Jacob b. Maimon.
The last name points perhaps to Spain.

A  
(recto)

laughter which their letter enclosed is called Jacob b. Maimon.
The last name points perhaps to Spain.

B

74 Ps. 55. 23.  
75 Ps. 21. 4.  
VOL. VIII.
Num. 25. 12, a proper greeting by a priest.

(To be continued.)

CORRIGENDA IN VOL. VII, 457 ff.


P. 471, note 15, ll. 3 and 7.  *For* Charasan, *read* Chorasan.


   *For* p. 465, *read* p. 461.

P. 473, note 17, l. 10.  *For* Geon, *read* Gaon.


P. 478, l. 4.  *For* תחתתלתילון, *read* תחתתלתילון; note 22, l. 4, *for* תְּמִיָּא, *read* תְּמִיָּא; l. 11, *for* הרארה, *read* הרארה.

A FRAGMENT OF THE VISIONS OF EZEKIEL

BY A. MARMORSTEIN, Jews' College, London.

The famous Stichometry of Nicephorus mentions along with the ψευδεπίγραφα of Baruch, Habakkuk, and Daniel, one of Ezekiel also. There was, therefore, known a Pseudepigraph attributed to Ezekiel the prophet. Apparently the traces of such a book are entirely lost. Yet from the references thereto given by the Rabbis we know that as late as the eleventh and twelfth centuries there was a Baraita called Maaseh Merkabah dealing with the Chariot Visions of Ezekiel. In a manuscript of the British Museum I have discovered a fragment (Or. No. 5559, D, p. 18 A and B) which contains, as the title says, the last page of a writing called The Visions of Ezekiel ben Buzzi, the priest.

Unfortunately only thirty-four lines are preserved, nineteen lines on the recto, fifteen (including the postscript) on the verso. The writing is ancient, square Hebrew, of the tenth or the eleventh century. The contents of the fragment leave no room for the slightest doubt that the Visions of Ezekiel belong to the Pseudepigrapha. The question arises whether the book was pre-talmudic, and was conse-

1 See Nicephori Opuscula, Lips., 1880, pp. 132-5; Schürer, Geschichte des jüdischen Volkes, II, 263; Diestel, Geschichte des Alten Testaments in der christlichen Kirche, p. 20; Orientalistische Literatur-Zeitung, XV, 234; and Journal of Theological Studies, XV, 236-9.

quently used as a source by the Rabbis, or belonged to the writings of the mystics of the gaonic period. The description of the various heavens, as the שֵׁרֹבֶת, מְנוּנָה, and of the כְּכַמִּים, their distances and purpose, the functions of the chariot, and the dwelling-place of God, the throne of glory, are all familiar subjects in kindred literature, as we shall see in due course.

I begin by giving the text with a translation. Then I shall proceed to discuss the chief features of the Visions compared with similar subjects in Greek literature, in the O. T. Pseudepigrapha, and in the Rabbinical sources. Before dealing with the last lines of our fragment, we shall have to pay attention to the date of the Kaddish prayer, which shows undoubted resemblances to the expressions used by our author. Finally, we may attempt to settle the date of the composition of the fragment.

Text.

[Or. British Museum, No. 5559, D, p. 18 A.] [recto].

ץ רוכב על חרב שבת רבים: רבים ע"ל חרב וedor נחתהוים
יתוכן מתתל חמש נאות השעה, ונ عالية על
יתוכן מתתל חמש נאות השעה, ומד יד בונה
לע[ז]אורות של אותו הר בחמת ז"עורהוים.

3 2 Sam. 22. 11, cp. Pirke derabbi Eliezer, chap. 4 (according to a Genizah Fragment, copied by the present writer in Cambridge, read : נַשְׂרָה בְּשַׁנְיוֹן רוכב על חרב וedor) נחתהוים.
5 נַשְׂרָה occurs here and in line 11; cp. Job 6. 21.
"According to Pirke derabbi Eliezer, chap. 3: 10

10

According to Pirke derabbi Eliezer, chap. 3: 10

[verse]

According to Pirke derabbi Eliezer, chap. 3: 10
TRANSLATION.

(1) The Chariot of the Cherub whereon He rides and descends to the lower (heavens or regions). (2) And He rode upon the Cherub and did fly. And from the Şekakim (3) to the Makon is a journey of five hundred years, and likewise the dimension of (4) the Makon is a journey of five hundred years. And what is therein? (5) (Therein are) the treasuries of snow, the treasuries of hail, the dread of the punishment (6) of the wicked and the reward of the righteous. (7) From the Makon up to the Arabot is a journey of five (8) hundred years, likewise its dimension is a journey of five hundred years. And what is therein? The treasuries of blessing and the treasuries of snow, the treasuries of peace, and the souls of the righteous and the spirit of the souls which He will bring into existence in the future, and the dread of the punishment of the wicked and the reward of the righteous. And the Chariot is therein. And what is its name? 2y (cloud) is its name, as it is said: The burden of Egypt. Behold, the Lord rideth upon a swift cloud. And from the Arabot up to the throne of Glory there is a journey of five hundred years; its dimension is likewise a journey of five hundred years. And what is there in the Arabot? The hoofs of the living creatures and a part of the wings of the living creatures, as it is said: And under the firmament were the wings straight. And the Chariot (is suspended?) therein. For when the Holy One, blessed be He, will descend in order to judge all the nations, concerning which it is said through Isaiah: For behold the Lord will come with fire, and with his chariots like a whirlwind. And what is its name? The Chariots

11 2 Sam. 22. 11. 12 Isa. 19. 1. 13 Ezek. 1. 23. 14 Isa. 66. 15.
of fire and storm. Higher up are the wings of the living creatures, corresponding to the seven heavens and the seven Cherubim. Higher than these is the Holy One, blessed be He. Blessed be, and praised, and honoured, and exalted, and magnified, and glorified, and extolled, and lauded, and sanctified, and adored the name of the King, of the King of Kings, blessed be He, who exists for ever, Amen and Amen, Nezah, Selah, for ever. Finished are the Visions of Ezekiel, the son of Buzzi, the priest. The memory of the righteous is blessed.\(^\text{15}\)

The fragment deals with the last three of the seven heavens. They are דְּפֵנֶךְ, מִצְמִית, and מַמְיָה; then we have the throne of Glory. In the rabbinical sources the order of the seven heavens is as follows: 1. שם, 2. רַקְעָה, 3. שֶׁחַקָּם, 4. בָוֵל, 5. מַצֵּה, and 7. דָמוּת (b. Hagigah 12b, R. Simon ben Lakish, third century). In the Pirḳe Rabbenu Haḳadosh the order is: יfraredמשיםמשיםמשים. We infer that the order in the Visions must have been different from that mentioned in the talmudic sources. The idea of seven heavens is, of course, current in the rabbinical literature. Even in Greek prayers, we are taught, generally seven heavens are entreated.\(^\text{17}\) The seven heavens are described in 3 Baruch 2 ff. and in Ascensio Isaiæ 6–11.\(^\text{18}\) Paul speaks of three

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15 Prov. 10. 7.

16 See ed. Grünhut, p. 79, VII, 13. Zohar (II, 287) has the order: שם, דָמוּת, רַקְעָה, שֶׁחַקָּם, בָוֵל, מַצֵּה; the same enumeration is to be found in M. Psalms, ed. Buber, p. 471 (R. Eleazar), Aboth of R. Nathan, XXXVII, 9 (R. Meir). A similar order to that in Pirḳe we find in Lev. r. 29. 9; cp. Pesikta, ed. Buber, p. 154 b. The Midrash on the Decalogue shows the order represented by Zohar, M. Psalms, Aboth of R. N.

17 See Fritz Pradel, Griechische Gebete, pp. 66 ff., and the literature given there.

Bousset derives the whole conception from Babylonian ways of thought. In rabbinical sources we find the subject discussed in Genesis rabba 19 c, Num. rabba 3. 8 (R. Levi), Lev. rabba 29. 9, Pesikta Rab, ed. Friedmann, p. 18 b; Pirke de rabbi Eliezer 41; Otiot of R. Akiba (ed. Jellinek, *Beth Hamidrash*, III, p. 46); Bereshit rabbati of R. Moses Hadarshan.

The measures given between the heavens is also to be found in Greek philosophy, in the Pseudepigrapha, and in the rabbinical sources. The teaching that to travel from earth to heaven takes five hundred years is, as Peritz has demonstrated, identical with Plato's reckoning of the world year. The distance from the earth to the heaven is as great as its thickness, says 3 Baruch 2. 5, a point which agrees remarkably with our Visions of Ezekiel and the sayings of the Rabbis to be mentioned hereafter. The Ascension of Isaiah, however, held that the height from the third to the fourth heaven was greater than from the earth to the firmament. Yet the Ascension teaches that the height of the second heaven is the same as from the heaven to the earth. In the Rabbinical literature it is generally assumed that the journey from heaven to earth,
or vice versa, takes five hundred years; likewise from one heaven to another, and the thickness of each heaven has the same size. Rabban Gamaliel held that the journey from the earth to the highest heaven takes 3,750 (500 x 7) years.

We must also consider that the purpose served by the various heavens as mentioned in our text almost agrees with the Talmud. The Makon holds the treasuries of snow and hail, punishment and reward. In the Talmud we read: נטן נבו ואחרות שלג וברד ולוחות אשלים וטיחים לפי מסות וספアイテム והיה של אהבה וтяימה (b. Ḥagigah 13b). We see that the talmudic report adds a few things, and omits the reference to punishment and reward, which is repeated in the fragment, as being preserved in the Arbot also. In the Arbot there are, according to the Visions, besides the two last-mentioned things the treasuries of blessing, the treasuries of snow and peace, the spirits of the souls of the righteous, the souls of the souls of the generations destined to come into existence. The Talmud adds: justice, righteousness, charity, the treasures of life and peace and blessing, the souls of the pious, the spirits of the souls of the future generations, and the dew of resurrection (b. Ḥagigah 13b). Consequently the Talmud has five things more than our fragment. It is strange that נן נןות יתל''ך occur twice. In the Arbot there are the hoofs of the living creatures and parts of the wings.

26 Rabban Johanan ben Zakkai, b. Ḥagigah 13a; b. Pes. 94a; Bacher, Die Agada der Tannaiten, I, p. 41, doubts whether the authorship is genuine; pal. Berakot 2c, line 63. cp. Jalkut II, 337; Gen. rabba, chap. 6, ed. Theodor, p. 45, and parallels; add Midrash Konen 1c and Qalir’s poem מיה הננה מנה מהזיזMahzor to New-Year’, ed. Heidenheim, p. 79a.

27 Jalut II, no. 657; cp. Herzfeld, Geschichte II, p. 420, where 850 is to be corrected accordingly.
Before proceeding to deal with the last words of our fragment, we shall consider the question whether the Visions are dependent on the Talmud, or were the source used by the Rabbis of the third and fourth centuries, who otherwise borrowed these expressions from the Pseudepigrapha. The statements concerning the seven heavens, and their contents, as well as the measures given in the Talmud, make the impression that we have in our text quotations from some other sources, which had more material than is mentioned in our text. That our fragment neither copied nor altered the talmudical source is fairly obvious. One has only to compare it with the Midrash Konen, a product of the Mystics of the gaonic period, where the order of the heavens and their names are of talmudical origin (יעזין, Venice ed., p. 8a). It is not likely that a post-talmudic writer would alter the names and the order of the seven heavens and disagree in such a matter with the talmudic tradition. It is, therefore, likely that the teachers of the Talmud used the Visions. Yet it is another question whether they used it in the form as it is now before us. There are a few points which support the view that the Visions were written in the early gaonic time. The introduction of biblical passages is the first to be considered. Twice we have יִנַּשְׁשׁ (l. 13 and 18). That is the usual way of introducing Bible passages in the Mishnah and in the New Testament (εἰρηναῖον, εἰρηνεύεται, κατὰ τὸ εἰρηνεύον). The second is: וֹלְעַל אֶתְנְא תָּשָּׁיָּהוּ (l. 22). We shall adduce merely a few instances from our collection to show the manner of quotations in the later Midrashim.

28 See Bacher, Terminologie, I, p. 6.
FRAGMENT OF VISIONS OF EZEKIEL—MARMORSTEIN 375

(between 600 and 1000). Tanh. ed. Frankfurt a. Oder, p. 13\textsuperscript{b}, 22\textsuperscript{a} קנב ינורב, p. 3\textsuperscript{b} קנב ינורב, p. 27\textsuperscript{a} דעווהוצי, p. 19 a, 23\textsuperscript{b} דעווהוצי, p. 32\textsuperscript{a} דעווהוצי, p. 23 a שברושחא קנב, p. 38 a קנב מפורש, p. 40 a קנב מפורש, p. 23ב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורb ינורב ינורב ינורב ינורb ינורb ינורb ינורb ינורb ינורb ינורb ינורb ינורb ינורb ינורb ינורb ינורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnорb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnורb יnOR. N. S., III, p. 169. 53 MgwJ., 1893, pp. 262 ff.
the prayers and the heaping up of phrases in the mystic books. D. de Sola Pool comes to the conclusion that we are justified in seeking the original of this paragraph (of the Ḳaddish) among the mystics, most probably among those who followed and carried on the traditions of the Old Essenes, the predecessors of the gaonic Yorde Merkabah.\textsuperscript{23} That is in so far justified, as we see that the piling up of synonyms of praise was on the one hand really practised, as the instances of the talmudic sources prove, and on the other hand was strongly criticized by authorities of the third century. Yet Pool has not removed Bloch’s very serious difficulties, which consist in the fact that notwithstanding R. Johanan’s strong statement the heaping up of synonyms of praise found its place in the prayer book and official service, in the Ḳaddish, in the Nishmat prayer, and in the Al-hakkol. In the Ḳaddish there are 8, in Nishmat, Al-hakkol, and in the Haggadah there are 9, in our fragment 10, and finally in the Hekalot 11 synonyms of praise, the order being, as the present table shows, the following:

\begin{tabular}{llllllllll}
I. & 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10.
II. & 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 6, 8, 10.
III. & 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 1, 8, 10.
IV. & 5, 9, 2, 3, 4, 7, 8–, 6, 10.
V. & 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 1, 8, 10.
VI a & 1, 6, 4, 7, 3, 1, 2, 5, 8, –, 10.
VI b & 1, 6, 1, 2, 8, 5, 9, 4, 3, 7, 10.
\end{tabular}

Only 3 and 5 agree entirely, 1 and 2 would have the same number if we add thefirstvision of the first part of the Kaddish, though the order would be 5, 9, 1, 2, 3, 4, 7, 6, 8, 10. Then, if we substitute לְלַעֲבוּר with בְּלַעֲבוּר and add LETRA in 4, in that case 2 and 4 would be identical and nearest to 1. Our fragment teaches us that all this heaping up of synonyms goes back to one and the same formula; furthermore, we learn that both Bloch and Pool were mistaken in saying that we must not translate these two Itpaels as pure passives (‘may His great name be magnified and sanctified’, *JIG* IY, 1893, p. 264, and Pool, p. 29). for they are exactly like the seven praises בּוֹרָה, as the context presupposes.

All these comparisons show that this method was used by the Mystics, and by their work and agitation these prayers were introduced in the Jewish prayer book. It is, therefore, not improbable that the Visions, in the form as they present themselves to us in the fragment, were

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34 Maseket Soferim XIV, 12.  
35 X, 5.  
36 Ed. Jellinek, p. 103.
written down in the early gaonic period, in the time of the
Yorde Merkabah. This view is supported by a tradition
handed down by the Gaon Amram, who says that the seven
praises of the Kaddish correspond to the seven heavens
המונים, p. 11\textsuperscript{b}).\textsuperscript{37} The original, of course, may have
been the source of the talmudic utterances on the subject
of the Merkabah in the third century.

\textsuperscript{37} אלא עליי ב😷 מר this fact might explain wherefore the Kaddish became the prayer of
mourning.
'THE STORY OF AḤIKAR'


This new edition of The Story of Aḥikar is most welcome on account of the fresh interest in the Oriental sage developed by the Elephantine finds. For much water has flowed under the bridge since the appearance of the first edition in 1898. In addition to the papyri published by Sachau, several monographs of a critical nature had been put forth, most of the results of which, attempting to ascertain the age and original language of the story, have been exploded by the discovery of those documents of the fifth century B.C. Dr. Rendel Harris deserves applause for having in his earlier theories recognized the antiquity of the Aḥikar legend, which is now so fully demonstrated.

The largest part of the book is a reprint of the first edition, with corrections and slight revisions. Its plus consists in the addition of two new literary sources, the Aramaic Elephantine narrative and proverbs in English translation and an old Turkish text, a translation from the Armenian: and also in two new chapters, one dealing briefly with the recently recovered Aramaic text (ch. IX), the other with the editions and studies of Aḥikar which appeared since the first edition (ch. X). The work is rather a reprint with additions than one which proceeds logically from the fresh evidence of the papyri, and this welding together of the older material with the new gives the edition a somewhat illogical aspect. For the argumentation on the antiquity of the story should base primarily on the papyri, not on the Jewish and
Greek traditions. But the editor has thought it best to leave the original edition as unchanged as possible, recognizing probably that the investigation of the story has passed over into oriental fields, to the specialist in the ancient Orient, ultimately to the Assyriologist. The book manifestly does not come from a hand making a new start at the subject. Thus chapter VIII, 'Further Remarks on the Primitive Language and Extent of the Legend of Aḥikar', has been rendered obsolete. On p. lxxxv the editor allows an argument to remain for a hebraic original—a rather precarious argument by the way, for it appeals to the occurrences of the infinitive absolute in the Syriac, whereas this construction is good old Syriac, not a contamination from the Hebrew: it appears constantly, for instance, in Bardesanes' classic, The Laws of the Countries. However, the elder material is all admirably and delightfully treated, and Dr. Harris is supremely the man to follow the clues in the Judaistic, Christian, and Greek sources. It is regrettable that not more has been made of the ancient Aramaic version. It is presented only in translation, and yet as the most important form of the story the original text, even with all its lacunae and puzzles, should have been given. This the more so that we possess no presentation of that text in an English print. Also the treatment of the text in translation is not satisfactory. The editor appears to have relied upon Sachau's editio prima and to have made little or no use of the innumerable studies which have appeared in learned journals throwing light upon difficult passages. With such helps he could have much extended his readings of the proverbs, which appear in a very meagre and broken form. The reviewer might refer to several suggestions of readings which he made in the Orientalistische Literaturzeitung, 1912, 535 f., and so need not repeat here his own improvements. He may add one or two new suggestions. (En courant, the selected proverbs given should have been annotated with their place in the papyri.) Thus we read a proverb torso: 'Do not conceal the word of a king' (Pap. 54. 6), and then a blank. But the first part of the proverb is clear: 'Do not quench (?) a light word of a king', and also the
second part can be made out, for, after a break of a few words, we read 
[...]. Understanding from the Arabic שָׁלָּךְ 'cut in two', and the last word as the dual שֵׁלָךְ (cf. the Hebrew בֵּית), we have: 'Though soft be the word of a king, yet it is sharper and mightier than a two-edged blade'. This further gives an interesting literary precedent (of the kind the editor himself delights in) to Hebrews 4. 12: 'The word of God is living and active and sharper than any two-edged sword, and piercing to the dividing of soul and spirit,' &c.

There is an interesting word that has been so far unnoticed in Pap. 55. 2. It reads: 'I have carried straw and borne bran (read מַשָּׁב, following Margolis's suggestion, not מַשׁ "plough", with Sachau and Harris), and there was nothing lighter than a בְּהַה. ' The editor leaves dots after this word, indicating a lacuna, but there is none in the manuscript. The proverb is to be compared with the Syriac, no. 46 (p. 107 of this edition): 'I have carried iron and removed stones, and they were not heavier on me than a man who settles in the house of his father-in-law.' The Aramaic is more original and certainly wittier. The point of comparison lies in the lightness or despicableness of bran, &c., on the one side, and of the בְּהַה on the other. Further, the Syriac has interpreted correctly the pattern, but specialized it and destroyed its generality. The בְּהַה is simply the man who settles down on another man and lives on him, the parasite, or 'sucker' in good English. And here some light is thrown upon the interesting Jewish expression, the gır tōshāb. We may notice, too, that the word is old Aramaic, and recall its Hebrew equivalent as expressing a kind of dependent, Lev. 22. 10. I may note the dependence of Syriac, no. 8 (p. 104): 'If a house could be built by a loud voice, an ass would build two houses in a day,' upon Pap. 53. 1: 'What is stronger than an ass braying (in a house) ?'

Thus, unfortunately, the edition does not give the full material required for the English-speaking student's study of the relation of the Aramaic to the later versions.

The small errors in the first edition have in general been

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removed. I suggest that on p. 68 of the Syriac text, l. 8, לֹא הָיוֹ הַדָּבָר, should be emended to לֹא הָיוֹ הַדָּבָר, 'did not pluck off my bridle' (root לֹא הָיוֹ הַדָּבָר), which is what the context requires.

James A. Montgomery.

University of Pennsylvania.
HALPERN'S SYNAGOGUE HYMNAL


The need of a synagogue hymnal for religious schools and Jewish homes generally has been greatly felt by rabbis and teachers engaged in instilling a Jewish spirit in the young generation. That music, particularly of the choral pattern, is a potent factor in this direction, is generally admitted: musica ancilla ecclesiae is more true now than it was a millennium ago. Yet while the Christian Church realizes this to its full extent and endeavours to foster choral singing in all its phases, the Jews are wanting in such an effort. Some attempts, it is true, have been made to present our ancient liturgical chants in a popular guise; the bulk of the Jews, however, still neglect choral singing as in days of yore. It is to remove this neglect that Mr. Halpern compiled his hymnal. As a starting-point it is commendable, though it suffers from serious defects. Thus the arrangement of the music is not always well-chosen. There is too much of Halpern, and very little of the real giants of our liturgical song like Sulzer and Lewandowski. Moreover, it is hardly proper to include in a synagogue hymnal choral compositions by Christian composers made expressly for the Christian Church (comp. J. B. Dykes' 'Call Jehovah thy Salvation' and half a dozen others at the end of the book). Music may be universal, as some assert. Nevertheless, there is something in a church hymn, even outside of the words, which is characteristically and inherently ecclesiastical, and as such should not enter an orthodox synagogue.
Another drawback is the transcription of the Hebrew, which is quite antiquated and anything but flawless. Certainly our modern transcription is not only grammatically correct but also musically more fit than the old one.

This book at best supplies the needs of a certain class of Jews. It accentuates the desideratum of a general hymnal for all Jews, whether Spanish or German, on the lines of *Church Hymns and Tunes* (New York, 1906), edited by Herbert Turner and William F. Biddle for Christian congregations of all creeds and faiths.

*Joseph Reider.*

Dropsie College.
THE THREE BOOKS FOUND IN THE TEMPLE AT JERUSALEM

By Jacob Z. Lauterbach, Hebrew Union College.

An ancient tradition, preserved in the talmudic literature, speaks of three certain books which were found in the Temple at Jerusalem. Each one of these three books is mentioned under a special name, by which it was called, and which, no doubt, was meant to designate its peculiar character. The report of this tradition is very brief, and reads as follows: חכשא ספירה טגאה בומחר ספירה מטוען ספירה עמוסי (p. Taanit 68 a, 47 ff.). In Sifre Deut. § 356 (ed. Friedmann, p. 148 b) the wording of this report is slightly different. There it reads thus: חכשא ספירה נצואא בומחר, אמא של מטוען ואמא שלửa אמא אשוד שגא בא מטוע农业大学 ספירה עמוסי 1

There is no reason whatever to question the historic character of this report or doubt the correctness of its statements. Its brief form and concise language mark it as the utterance of a tradition.

1 It should be stated at the outset that these ten words in the Pal. Talmud, or the fifteen words in the Sifre, constitute the complete text of the report. What follows these first ten, resp. fifteen words in the Pal. Talmud and in the Sifre, beginning with נכד רגא, is no more part of the report itself, but later additions which seek to explain the meaning of the old report.

This report is also found in Abot d. R. Nathan, version B, ch. 46, ed. Schechter, p. 65 a, and in tractate Soferim, VI, 4, where it is quoted by R. Simon b. Lakish (or R. Judah b. Lakish (?), see below, note 4). The text of the report, as given in these two last works, shows but a few slight variants, as עונתא instead of עונתא, and (in tractate Soferim נענתא) instead of (in tractate Soferim נענתא).
as a historic document, and not as a mere legendary report.

The date of this report is very old. This is evident from the very language it employs. The terms used in it seem to be archaic; at least, we do not find them used elsewhere in the talmudic literature. The manner and form in which the report is expressed also point to a very early date. The author of this report seems to speak of a contemporaneous fact, or at least of something well known to the people of his time. He seems to take it for granted that the main character and the contents of these books are known to all, and that therefore he need only state their number and mention the specific names which designate the special distinction or peculiar feature of each one of them. For he did not deem it necessary, except by merely giving their names, to describe these books in detail, or to say something more about their contents.

That this report represents an ancient tradition and is of a very early date is further evidenced by the fact that its real contents and their correct meaning were no longer known to the later talmudic teachers, the younger Amoraim. For, as will be shown in the course of this essay, the later talmudic teachers, especially the redactors of the Abot d. R. Nathan and of the Palestinian Talmud, who preserved this report to us with additions and comments of their own, have altogether misconstrued the purport of this report and misunderstood the meaning of its statements. It is hardly possible to assume that these teachers could have made such blunders if they had been discussing and interpreting statements of a contemporary author or even of one near to their own time. Such mistakes in the interpretation of an historical report on the part of the later teachers
can be explained only on the supposition that a long period of time separated the author of the report from the teachers who tried to interpret it. In the course of such a long time, which also brought about radical changes in the conditions of life, it could well have happened that the actual facts to which the report referred, and the conditions which it presupposed, should have become entirely forgotten, so that the correct meaning of the report was no longer known. The later teachers, who found the brief statements of this old report without any comment to it, could only guess at its meaning. They may have considered it from a wrong point of view, in that they looked at it in the light of the conditions of their own time, and thus could easily misunderstand and misinterpret it.

It may, accordingly, be assumed with reasonable certainty that our report originated at a very early date, possibly during the time when the Temple was still in existence; at least, not long after its destruction. At that time the conditions which prevailed in the Temple and the nature of the books which were kept there were still well known to the people. The author of our report, therefore, could well content himself with merely stating the number of these books and designating each by its characteristically significant name.

Now, what are the contents and the real purport of this report? What was the character common to all these three books, found in the Temple? What was the special feature of each one of them, and how is this special feature of each indicated in the distinct name given to it in our report?

In all the four works (Sifre, Abot d. R. Nathan.
Palestinian Talmud, and the tractate Soferim) containing our report, there are also found accompanying it a few additions by later teachers, consisting of explanatory remarks which constitute a sort of a commentary to the original report. From these additions it is evident that

These explanatory remarks are different in the different works and partly contradict one another. In order to be able to show the origin of this Talmudic commentary on our report and trace its changes and gradual developments into its present various forms, which will be attempted at the end of this essay, I will quote here this talmudic commentary as found in the different works. In the Pal. Talmud, loc. cit., the explanatory remarks to our report read as follows: 

It should be noticed that, according to this explanation, the name of the first book ought to have been called, after its peculiar variant, and not as it is found in our first two forms, since neither one of these last two forms was, according to the commentary, found in the text of this book.

In Abot d. R. Nathan, loc. cit., the additions to our report read as follows:

Here we are not told in what form the word מָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָנְתָn

In tractate Soferim the explanatory remarks to our report read as follows:

Neither one of these two explanations, however, is sufficiently clear; see Schechter's remark, note 11.

In tractate Soferim the explanatory remarks to our report read as follows:

Although these passages are found in the Palestinian Talmud, the earlier teachers have added explanatory remarks which constitute a sort of a commentary to the original report.
the authors of these explanatory notes, or, at any rate, the respective redactors of these four talmudic works, who added these notes to our report, understood the latter to have reference to the Books of the Law or Torah scrolls. According to this commentary of the later talmudic teachers, our report tells us about three model Torah scrolls or standard copies of the Pentateuch which were kept in the Temple, and from which a correct text for all other copies of the Torah was established. Each one of these standard copies is said to have been marked by just one special peculiarity in the writing of a certain word. From this characteristic peculiarity, which distinguished it from the two others, each one of these three copies is supposed to have derived its distinct name.

The one copy is described as having contained a peculiar variant of the word מְשֻׁנָא, occurring in Deut. 33. 27, and hence it was called מְשֻׁנָא. The other copy is said to have contained the foreign word וַעֲבוֹדָא instead of the Hebrew word וַעֲבוֹדָא in Exod. 24. 5. For this reason it was called מְשֻׁנָא. The third copy again was distinguished from the others by the peculiarity which it showed in the spelling of the personal pronoun third person feminine. In all the passages where this word occurs—or, according to the other

The Sifre contains but one short comment, explaining the meaning of the name of but one book. It reads as follows: נְמָא רָבָא חֵלֵב מְשֻׁנָא כָּרָם וְהֵשִׁיטָה חֵלֵב מְשֻׁנָא אֲלֹה כָּרָם וְעֵבֶדָה תְּחִלָּה וּמְשֻׁנָא (instead of the should perhaps be read וּמְשֻׁנָא). No explanation is given of the meaning of the other two books.

It should further be noticed that the commentary in its various forms, the short comment of the Sifre included, is based upon the version of our report as given in the Pal. Talmud and not upon the version of the Sifre. מְשֻׁנָא and מְשֻׁנָא can be interpreted to mean, the book containing the variant מְשֻׁנָא or מְשֻׁנָא. But the version מְשֻׁנָא does not permit the possibility of such an interpretation.
version of the commentary, only in eleven (nine) passages—this copy had the correct form אָד instead of the form אַד which the other two copies had. Because of this peculiarity this third copy was called אָד רֵאָשׁ.

Although the three different versions of the commentary on the report differ from one another very much in details and partly conflict with one another, yet in the main question as to the contents of our report they all agree in their interpretation that the books described in it were Torah scrolls. This interpretation of the meaning of our report has also been accepted by all modern scholars. To my knowledge, at least, no one has questioned the correctness of the assumption that our report speaks about Torah scrolls.

This supposition, however, is full of difficulties and obviously untenable. The objections to the report, as understood by the talmudic commentary, are so many and the arguments against its correctness are so strong that one is constrained either to reject the whole report as unreliable and legendary, or to ignore the talmudic glosses altogether, and seek to understand this report and interpret it independently of the commentary given to it by later talmudic teachers.

Professor L. Blau\(^3\) pointed out the many difficulties

\(^3\) Studien zum althebräischen Buchwesen (Budapest, 1902), pp. 102 ff.

To the difficulties involved in the talmudic conception of our report, mentioned by Blau, there is to be added the following main difficulty, namely, that the explanations offered by this talmudic commentary on our report do not explain the report and are altogether out of accord with the statement they are to explain. Thus, according to this commentary, the one book is said to have contained the variant סֵפֶר instead of סֵפֶר, which the other two books had. We would accordingly expect, if the book was called after the peculiarity found in its text, that this book should be called סֵפֶר מְרֵאָשׁ, but this is not the case. No version of the report has this form
inherent in this report, as understood by the talmudic commentary, and he also mentions the strong objections which must be raised against the supposition that our report refers to three Books of the Law or Torah scrolls, found in the Temple at Jerusalem, which differed from one another only in the writing or peculiar spelling of just these three words but otherwise were perfectly alike and had no other peculiarities to distinguish them from one another. On the ground of all these difficulties found in the talmudic conception of our report, Blau has rightly rejected the com-

of the name. The Pal. Talmud has מְלֹעָנִים and the Sifre has מְלֹעָנִים, while the Abot d. R. Nathan and tractate Soferim have the name of this book as מְלֹעָן, according to the form of this word which was correctly written in the two other copies. It is true, the Yalkut to Deuteronomy, § 964, quotes the text of our report as stating that the book was called מְלֹעָנִים, but this is merely a correction in the text of our report made by the Yalkut to harmonize it with the talmudic explanation of the meaning of מְלֹעָן. The same is also to be said about the Midrash Tannaim (ed. Hoffmann, p. 222), where alongside of the form מְלֹעָנִים is also found the corrected reading מְלֹעָן.

In the interpretation of the name of the book מְלֹעָן the different versions of the commentary conflict with one another and none of them explains the name sufficiently. According to the Pal. Talmud, the book so designated contained only nine times the word מְלֹעָן spelled with Yod, while the other two books contained this word in the form spelled with Yod eleven times. The difference between the books, then, was merely in the number of times this peculiarity was found in them. And it is rather strange that a book should be designated after the peculiarity in the spelling of a certain word when it shows this peculiarity in less instances than the other books. Again, according to tractate Soferim the peculiarity of this book was that in eleven instances it contained the word מְלֹעָן in the form spelled with Waw instead of with Yod, while the other books had the word in the same eleven instances in the form מְלֹעָן spelled with Yod. Then we would expect this book to be designated מְלֹעָן after its peculiarity in the spelling of this word. Of the two explanations offered in the Abot d. R. Nathan, the one is apparently identical with the explanation given in tractate Soferim and presents the same difficulty, while the other does not at all state clearly wherein the peculiarity of the מְלֹעָן consisted. See above, note 2.
mentary, given to our report in the talmudic glosses, as incorrect. He substitutes a theory of his own whereby to explain the contents and the meaning of this ancient report. But the theory which he advances and the explanations which he offers for the names of the three books and their origin are, to say the least, not better than the theory and the interpretations contained in the talmudic glosses.

According to Blau, this report is not a very ancient report. It does not represent a record of the time of the existence of the Temple or of the period immediately following it. Perhaps it is not even a Baraita. It did not originate in the tannaitic period. Its date is a late one. It comes originally from the third century (p. 106) and speaks of three Torah scrolls of the third century which it compares with one another and the peculiarities of which it records. These three Torah scrolls were merely believed to have originally come from the Temple in Jerusalem. They may have been found somewhere (where?) by Jews or bought by them from the Roman spoilers who had carried them away from Jerusalem (p. 104).

The designation of these three names are, according to Blau, very aptly chosen. In one case, the designation is after the place where the book was found; in the other it gives the name of the owner of the very valuable copy; and finally, in the third case, it gives a characteristic description of the form and size of the book. Thus, (1) The מַעַכְלֶםֶת מַעְיָטָיו was a Torah scroll which was found and kept in the place Beth Maon, briefly called Maon, which is in the neighbourhood of Tiberias. This Torah copy was perhaps saved from the Temple by exiles from Jerusalem who brought it with them to this place Maon (p. 105). It was accordingly designated after the place in which it had been preserved, 'The Book
of Maon' or 'Maoni-Codex'. (2) The מַיֶּה הָאֲרוֹן או כֵּסֶר הָאֲרוֹן was a Torah copy which was in the possession of a gentleman by the name of He or He-he. It was therefore called after its owner, 'The Book of He' or 'The He-Codex'. (3) The מַאֲנוֹת, finally, was so designated because of its very small size. In the tractate Soferim this name Zatuti is found in the form זָטֻתִּי instead of זָטֻתוֹ. A comparison of this form זָטֻתוֹ with the word זָטֻתִּי, which means 'small', suggests to Blau that the former is a Katlul-form of the latter and means accordingly 'very small'. The book thus designated was, accordingly, very small in size, or its writing was in very small characters (pp. 105–6).

This theory of Blau, however, is merely an unfounded conjecture. In the first place, it is altogether against the plain meaning of the words of our report. For the report distinctly speaks of books which were found in the Temple, and which, already at the time when they were found in the Temple, had been designated by the names קְנֵי עַבְדוֹת and זָטֻתוֹ respectively. It can therefore not be interpreted to have reference to books which merely were believed to have come from the Temple and which were subsequently designated by these names. Besides, this theory represents many difficulties and inconsistencies, and is even contradictory in itself. I shall point out only some of the incredibilities and contradictions contained in this theory of Blau.

On p. 103, Blau correctly distinguishes between the original text of our report and the later additions made to it. He rightly states that the older text of the original report consisted only of the first ten words, closing with the word זָטֻת, as given in the version of the Pal. Talmud Taanit. All the rest which follows this, beginning with
the word שֵׁם, is later addition and forms a commentary to the older original report. But at the same time he also assumes that these later additions, or the commentary which gives the explanations to these three names, originated with the Palestinian Amora Simon b. Lakish or with one of his teachers. If, however, the original report originated in the third century, as Blau assumes on p. 106, and the author of the commentary was the Amora Simon b. Lakish, who lived in the first half of the third century, or one of his teachers who must have lived at a still earlier time, then we are confronted with the preposterous conclusion that the original text of the older report, dealing, as Blau assumes, with Torah copies of the third century, must have been younger than the commentary given to it. At any rate it could not have been older, so that one cannot speak, as Blau himself does, of an earlier report and a later commentary on it.

Furthermore, if the report merely compares three Torah copies of the third century, of which the one existed in Maon near Tiberias, and the other was in the possession of a person named He, and the third was of very small size, how could Simon b. Lakish, who lived in Tiberias, have made such an egregious blunder in the interpretation of this report as to reduce the well-known neighbouring town Maon and the owner of the second copy by the name of He, who must have been not less well known, to mere variants in the spelling of certain words? While we grant that it could have happened, and in fact did happen, that the later Amoraim sometimes misunderstood an older Mishnah or misinterpreted an old traditional report when after the lapse of a long period of time the correct meaning was lost to them, it is almost inconceivable that a prominent
teacher, such as Simon b. Lakish was, should have so utterly misunderstood a contemporary report, describing a well-known copy of the Pentateuch extant in his own time and in a town so very near his own place of residence. This is all the more strange, if we should assume with Blau that another teacher R. Jose (Abot d. R. Nathan, loc. cit.), whom Blau takes to have been an Amora younger than Simon b. Lakish (p. 105, note 3), has known that Sefer Maoni really meant a Torah copy preserved in the town of Beth Maon. How then could this supposedly well-known fact, mentioned by the younger R. Jose, have escaped the notice of the older teacher Simon b. Lakish?

Blau must have realized this difficulty, and it seems that he hesitated somewhat to ascribe to Simon b. Lakish such a blunder in the interpretation of well-known names of persons and places. To account for the possibility of such a mistake on the part of Simon b. Lakish, Blau offers the following explanation according to which Simon b. Lakish's supposed interpretation of our report was after all not entirely wrong; and his alleged mistake perhaps no mistake at all.

In the case of the copy of the man He, Blau suggests that it might have actually had a peculiar way of spelling the word נ"ע, the very word which sounds like the name of the owner. Of course, it may also have had other characteristics and different peculiarities in the spelling of other words, but these were not noticed or at least not commented upon. Blau does not find it strange on the part of ancient writers to thus have ignored all other characteristic peculiarities and to have reported only this one variant. He explains it as follows: 'Since this copy was called by the name of ה נ ב ע ו and the ancient teachers did not consider
names as merely accidental but rather had a special fondness for interpreting them, it can well be understood why they just set out to search after the variants in the writing of the word שָׁבַה and why they reported only these variants' (p. 105)

In the case of the copy supposed to have been found in the town of Beth Maon, Blau seems likewise to assume that by a strange coincidence it also contained the variant מבּ instead of the form מַעְשֶׁה in the passage of Deut. 33. 27. For he remarks on p. 105, 'Whether in this copy the מ of the word מַעְשֶׁה had been originally missing or merely faded away, is not of any importance'.

One might as well add a third miracle by assuming that in the third copy, the one which was of very small size, by a strange coincidence actually had instead of the word מַעְשֶׁה in the passage of Exod. 24. 5 the foreign word אֲנָמוּס, which sounds so much like שָׁבַה 'small', a description which just fits the peculiar characteristic of this copy. In this manner both theories, the one advanced by Blau himself, and the one ascribed by him to the Amora Simon b. Lakish, could well be harmonized.

However, even if one could bring himself to believe in all these miraculous coincidences and accept the far-fetched and forced explanations of the difficulties inherent in both these theories, one would still be compelled, by reasons about to be stated, to reject their commentary on our report. For this commentary is based on an altogether unwarranted supposition which entirely misunderstood the nature of our report and mistook its purport.

To save the reputation of Simon b. Lakish, I wish to state first that he is not guilty of any of the grievous mistakes pointed out above, as he is not responsible for the
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Theory ascribed to him by Blau. He is neither the author of our report nor did the commentary on this report, as given in the talmudic glosses, originate with him or his teacher, as Blau erroneously assumes. If the name of Simon b. Lakish ⁴ is mentioned in the tractate Soferim in connexion with our report, it is not to be interpreted, as Blau does, that Simon b. Lakish was the author of our report, as well as of the explanatory remarks and additions which follow it in the text of the tractate Soferim. Simon b. Lakish is mentioned there merely as one who cited or transmitted the old report. To this old report, cited by Simon b. Lakish, the redactor of the tractate Soferim added the explanatory remarks which he found in the Palestinian Talmud or possibly gathered from other sources.

These explanatory remarks and additions, however, were the work of later teachers who tried to explain the meaning of the old report. We have seen that their interpretations are not satisfactory. It is evident that they merely guessed at its meaning and guessed wrongly. To understand correctly this ancient report we must try to find its real meaning independently of these explanatory remarks of the later teachers. We must even be careful not to allow ourselves to be biased by their guesses in favour of their supposition. The proper way to proceed, then, would be to ignore their commentary altogether and consider only the text of the report itself.

Now, if we consider the text of the report itself we have no reason whatever to assume that it refers to Books of the

⁴ The suggestion of V. Aptowitzer (Hakedem, 1908, p. 103) that in the passage of the tractate Soferim the name of the Tanna R. Judah b. Lakish, a pupil of R. Akiba, should be substituted for the name of the Amora Simon b. Lakish, seems to me to be very plausible.
Law, or Torah scrolls at all. This idea about our report viz. that it speaks of copies of the Torah, was given to us only by the commentary of the later teachers, which commentary we have found to be unsatisfactory. Having rejected their commentary as unsatisfactory, there is no reason why we should still retain the supposition upon which their whole theory was based, as such a supposition is altogether unwarranted by the words of the text of the report. Nay. even more, such a supposition is disproved by the terminology used in the text.

As we have seen above, the text of the report consists of only ten words, and reads as follows: נ"א מָשָׁרִים масло תּוֹרָה. Now, if we consider this report without any preconceptions as to its contents and do not read into it what it does not expressly say, then this report tells us merely about books found in the Temple, but not about sacred books, and certainly not about books of the Pentateuch or Torah scrolls. For to the latter the designation מָשָׁרִים could hardly have been applied by the author of this report. During the Temple times, when our report most probably originated, and even later on throughout the period of the Mishnah, the name used as a designation for the Pentateuch was תּוֹרָה and not מָשָׁרִים or מָשָׁרִים. In contradistinction with the Pentateuch, the other books of holy Scriptures are designated מָשָׁרִים (M. Megillah III, 1). Whether this designation מָשָׁרִים was applied only to prophetical books or was also used to designate the Hagiographa as well, does not concern us here. This much, however, is certain, that the designation מָשָׁרִים could have been applied

\[5\] It is also found in the plural to designate Torah scrolls, as in the passage of the Pesikta d. R. K. 32 (Buber, p. 107 a) has תּוֹרָה מָשָׁרִים, where it means copies of the whole Pentateuch.
only to biblical books outside the Pentateuch—prophetical or both prophetical and hagiographical—but not to the Pentateuch, which had its special name: Torah. Consequently, the author of our report, who certainly was not later than the Mishnah period, in speaking about books, found in the Temple, and using the term sefarim, could not have meant copies of the Pentateuch to which this term was not applied in his time.

It is likewise evident that the author of our report did not mean any of the other sacred books of the Bible outside the Pentateuch. For even though the sacred books of Scripture outside of the Pentateuch were designated by the term מִסְרִים, this latter term had not lost its original simple meaning, denoting books in general. The term מִסְרִים was used both in a broader (general) and in a narrower (technical) sense. When used as a technical term to denote the books of holy Scripture, the books par excellence, no additional phrase or comment was necessary to characterize the books or to describe their contents. When, however, the term was used in its simple meaning and in the broader sense to denote books in general, there was usually added another term, or a phrase to characterize and describe more accurately the nature of the books referred to, what kind of books they were and what they contained. Thus, e.g. when it is said in the Talmud (R. H. 17 b) that on New Year’s Day there are three books opened מִסְרִים נֶפֶתְלִים הָרָאשׁ, there is immediately added a description of these books, to tell us what kind they were and what they contained. namely, מִסְרִים כְּנֶפֶתְלִים כְּוְרוֹתִים וְאֶדְרֹתִים מֵאַדְרֹתִים וְאֶדְרֹתִים מִסְרִים. This is also the case with the statement made in our report. The author of our report does not speak of sacred books. He uses the term מִסְרִים in its broader sense
to denote books in general. After stating that there were three books found in the Temple, he felt the necessity of characterizing and describing these books. He therefore goes on immediately to tell us what kind of books they were and what they contained. The words in our report כַּאֲרֶם בְּנֵעַי נו' 'l3 'ננS, or, as the more correct version in Sifre reads, אֲרֵם של ננינים נו', must therefore not be understood as merely describing certain peculiarities of each book, like the peculiar spelling of a certain word, or the extremely small size of the characters in which it was written, or the name of the owner, or the place where it was kept. For then the most essential thing in the description of these books, namely, what they really were, would be missing. Like the words אֲרֵם של רכשימ ננזורים נו' 'l3 'נננS in the statement about the books that are opened on New Year's Day, the words אֲרֵם של מִשְׁנֵים נו' 'l3 'נננ in our report tell us the main thing about these three books found or kept in the Temple, namely, what kind of books they were and of what their contents consisted. By ascertaining the correct meaning of these words of description in our report and interpreting them without any preconceived notions, we shall be able to find out what books our report has reference to. The first part of this report tells us that these three books were found in the Temple of Jerusalem. This does not mean that these books were accidentally found in the Temple, but it means rather that these books were found in the Temple, because the Temple (i.e. its archives) was the place where these books were always kept and preserved. This gives us a clue to the meaning of these descriptions of the three books. We have only to find out what kind of books were especially preserved and kept in the Temple archives.

Whether there were kept in the Temple such standard
Torah scrolls which served as model copies from which the text of all other Torah copies was corrected, is, to say the least, historically not quite certain. For our purpose a discussion of this question is irrelevant. For, even if we should grant that there were such model copies of the Pentateuch preserved in the Temple, it would not alter the fact that our report does not refer to them. For our report speaks of books סדרת ותור, and not of Books of the Law ותור, or Torah scrolls.

The books which our report has reference to were books of a character altogether different from books of the sacred Scriptures. They were books about which we know with all certainty from other historical sources that they were kept and preserved in the Temple at Jerusalem. These books kept in the Temple and referred to in our report were סדרת ותוס, Books of Genealogies, containing the genealogical lists of various classes of the people, or family records.

In order to be able to prove my thesis that our report speaks about these genealogical books, and to show how these genealogical books are unmistakably mentioned and aptly described in our report, I must first state briefly the character of these family records and what we know about them from other historic sources.

Josephus (Contra Apionem, I, 7) reports the fact that in the archives of the Temple at Jerusalem exact and careful records of the genealogies of the priestly families were kept. When giving his own aristocratic family tree, he emphatically states that he had set down the record of the genealogy of his own family as he had found it described in the public records (Vita, I). These records, of course, contained not only the lists of the families of the
priests but also those of the Levites, the minor priests. This fact is also confirmed by reports found in rabbinic literature. In Mishnah Middot, V, 4, we are told that in the Lishkat ha-gazit (one of the halls in the Temple at Jerusalem) a tribunal of the great Sanhedrin would hold their sessions for the purpose of judging and deciding about the family purity of the priesthood and of the Levites. See Tosafot Yom Tob ad loc. Cp. also Tosefta Hagigah, II, 9 and Tosefta Sanhedrin, VII, 1.

This statement is repeated in the Talmud (b. Kiddushin 76 b), and the members of the tribunal who attended to this work are designated as סנהנים ומנהגלים ליהוה, the examiners of the Genealogies of the Priests and Levites. These judges about the purity of descent of the Priests and Levites must have had before them records in which they could trace the pedigree of each Priest or Levite. This presupposes not only the existence of such records from which proofs for the pure descent of the Priests and Levites could be obtained, but also that such records were kept in the Temple, where this tribunal held its sessions, and where they were at hand for the consultation by the members of this tribunal, holding their session in the Temple.

Besides these records which contained the lists of the families of Priests and Levites, there was also a special register of all the non-priestly Israelitish families of purely Jewish descent, such as could intermarry with the priestly families, also ניירות משפחות ליהוה. This record was likewise kept in the Temple and had frequently to be consulted by the Judges who decided upon the purity of the priests, as, for instance, in the cases of priests whose mothers were Israelitish women, not of priestly family. It was from this
record that they could prove that there was no stain in their family.

Josephus presupposes such records for Israelitish families when he says (Contra Apionem, loc. cit.) that the priest before marrying must examine the character of his wife's family and take her genealogy from the archives, thus to make sure that she is, if not of priestly, at least of pure Jewish descent. Such records are also presupposed by the Mishnah (Kiddushin, IV, 4), where it is prescribed that one need not search [in the genealogies] farther than the altar (in the case of priests) or the Dukan (in the case of Levites), or than membership in the Sanhedrin (in the case of Israelites).6 These genealogies were supposed to have their origin in the book of genealogies, which contained the lists of the families of the returned exiles (Ezra 8. 1-15; Neh. 7. 5 ff.). The, or Books of Genealogies kept in the Temple, which contained the families of Priests, Levites, and Israelites, were probably believed to have been the continuation of the book or register first begun by Ezra. Beside these registers,

א니 בדוקי אל מי הת.componentInstance ולמעלה לא מי יהוים ולמעלה ולא מי

The meaning of this regulation is that in searching the genealogical records to examine the purity of descent of a certain person, we need only establish the fact that one of the progenitors of the person in question held one of these three offices unchallenged. For then we are assured of the purity of descent of that progenitor, for, before admitting him to the office, the authorities of that time must have convinced themselves of his being of legitimate birth and of pure descent. If, therefore, nothing derogatory is found in the record of the genealogies between that ancestor and the person now on trial, the purity of descent of the latter is established. The altar is the test for the priests, the Dukan for the Levites, and membership in the Sanhedrin is the test of the aristocratic Israelites of purely Jewish descent, for only Israelites of blameless families and purely Jewish descent were eligible to an office in the Sanhedrin (see Mishnah Sanhedrin IV, 2, Horayot I, 4, and Talmud Sanhedrin 36 b).
containing all the classes of the Jewish nation, it became necessary, already at a very early time in the history of the restored community, to have another register containing the Proselytes that joined the community and the families which descended from them.

The prohibition against intermarriage, even in its most rigorous interpretation as given by Ezra, could not be so applied as to exclude marriages with proselytes altogether. It certainly did not prevent marriages with sincere proselytes from such nations whose admission into the community of God is expressly permitted in the Law, as e.g. the Egyptians and Edomites of the third generation (Deut. 23, 8). Such marriages no doubt were contracted, more or less frequently, soon after the time of Ezra. Whether this was due to a reaction against Ezra’s rigid reforms, or was not considered to be incompatible even with Ezra’s conception of the Law, is for our purpose irrelevant. Suffice it to say that the fact of such marriages having taken place soon after the time of Ezra cannot be denied. This, of course, made it necessary to keep special records of such proselyte families from which each proselyte could obtain proof as to his or her status and furnish such information as was necessary in order to decide whether or not he or she might be permitted to marry into the Jewish community, as for instance from what nation he was descendant, and in what generation he was. Such information was necessary both for priests, who were not permitted to marry any proselyte of the first generation, as well as for Israelites, who were prohibited from marrying proselytes from certain nations.

Indeed, we have evidence that in the later times of the second Temple such records of proselyte families were kept
and preserved in the Temple at Jerusalem. Eusebius
(Church History, I, ch. vii. 3) reports from an old tradition
that up to the time of Herod there were kept in the
archives of the Temple at Jerusalem genealogical books
in which the families of the Israelites as well as of the
proselytes were recorded, and those descended from pro-
selytes. From the Zadokite fragment published by
Schechter, which, even if it be not a document originating
in Temple times, at least records conditions of Temple times,
we likewise learn that the custom prevailed to record the
people according to four distinct groups, Priests, Levites,
Israelites, and Proselytes, and that the persons or families
belonging to each of these four classes were recorded by
name in their special register. From many passages and
discussions in the Talmud it is likewise evident that there
existed such lists or registers for proselyte families from
which each proselyte could prove his origin, descent, and
status in regard to his admission into the community.

An indication of the existence of such a special register
for the families of the proselytes kept in the Temple is,
in my opinion, found already in the book of Malachi.

7 According to the tradition reported by Eusebius, Herod is said to have
destroyed these registers for the purpose of hiding his own non-Jewish
origin. With no record to prove his descent from Proselytes, he could
claim to come from Jewish ancestors. This tradition has some connexion
with the report in the Talmud (Pesahim 62) about the suffering of the
teachers in connexion with the hiding away of the ספר יהודים. I expect
to treat all the talmudic reports about family records ספר יהודים and
מלכיהם in a special essay.

passage reads as follows: ופר מותב כל המצות פס פר כמל מצמותם
הבחינו לשאשונה בלילה שנין עני ישראלי לכל שחלות מת באורי ובחכמה
בשנותיה של כל אוח ואחות הפניה לשאשונה ולשאשונה בלילה עני עני
ишעון וחיי רחמים.
The rigour with which Ezra and Nehemiah proceeded against intermarriage preventing the neighbouring nations from joining the Jewish community, had frightened away many sincerely pious and God-fearing proselytes. These pious proselytes, even though remaining true to the religion which they had sincerely adopted, were, nevertheless, very much disheartened and discouraged by the treatment accorded them by the Jewish rigorists. They complained very bitterly about the injustice done them by expelling them from the community which they earnestly wished to join and excluding them from the people of God with whom they anxiously sought to be identified. The justice of their complaint was recognized by the more liberal elements in the Jewish community who did not approve of the rigid policy of exclusion. These liberal advocates of universalistic tendencies among the Jews encouraged the proselytes to remain true to their adopted faith, for the God of Israel whom they serve accepts them fully as His own people. We hear the anonymous prophet offering such a comforting message to the despairing proselytes. 'Neither let the son of the stranger that hath joined himself to the Lord speak, saying, the Lord hath utterly separated me from His people. . . . For thus saith the Lord . . . Also the sons of the stranger, that join themselves to the Lord, to serve Him and to love the name of the Lord, to be His servants. . . . Even then will I bring to my holy mountain and make them joyful in my house of prayer . . . for mine house shall be called an house of prayer for all people. The Lord God which gathereth the outcasts of Israel saith, Yet will I gather others to him besides those that are gathered unto him' (Isa. 56. 3, 6-8). A reaction soon set in against the rigid policy of indiscriminately excluding the stranger from the community.
The prophet Malachi (3. 13-15) rebukes those people who, if not in actual words, yet by their conduct and attitude towards the proselytes declare that it is in vain for the stranger to serve God, and that it would not profit them to keep His ordinances, since in spite of their piety they will not be accepted into the community but will be refused the privilege of being registered and have a mention of their names in the lists of the members of the community, while on the other hand wicked and proud people—if they be of Jewish descent—are made happy and set up as acceptable among the members of the community. The prophet recognizes the justice of the complaint of the proselytes who would speak among themselves of this unjust attitude towards the stranger on the part of the Jews. The prophet goes on to say: 'When they [the proselytes] that feared the Lord spoke often one to another [complaining about their being thus unjustly discriminated against] then God hearkened to them and listened and there was written before Him a book of remembrances for them that feared the Lord and that thought upon His name. And they [these strangers] shall be mine saith the Lord of hosts. . . . Then shall ye return and discern [that distinction should be made only] between the righteous and the wicked, between him that serveth God and him that serveth Him not [but not between the born Jew and the proselyte]' (ibid., vers. 16-18). The passage is to be taken in a very plain sense to mean, simply, that a book mentioning the names of the proselytes who fear God, was written and kept before God, not in heaven, but in His sanctuary.9

9 There is no reason for assuming that in this passage of the book of Malachi reference is made to a mystic book in heaven. The term הַנְּצָרִים is used in a very plain sense to mean, simply, a book mentioning the names of the proselytes who fear God.
We have in this passage a statement of the fact that the reaction against the rigid policy of excluding the stranger resulted in the recognition on the part of the official leaders of the community of, at least, the sincerely pious and God-fearing among the proselytes. We are accordingly justified in assuming that already at a very early time in the history of the restored community the re-admission of the truly pious proselytes into the community took place. A special book was then opened for them and kept in the sanctuary, before God, i.e. in the archives of the Temple. In this book all the names of proselytes and their families descended from them were recorded and found mention. By this official recognition the proselytes became an integral part of the community, which now consisted of four distinct groups or classes, viz. Priests, Levites, Israelites, and Proselytes. The latter were called by the name of ירא אדני 'Those who fear the Lord'. Such a division of the community into four distinct classes, of which the proselytes were one, is already found in the Psalms. Here the proselytes, under the name of ירא אדני ' Those who fear the Lord', are mentioned together with the Priests ירא בת, the Levites ירא בתו, and the Israelites ירא בתו הלא (Ps. 135. 12-13).

This division of the community into special classes was also maintained in the books of the genealogical records. Each one of these four classes had a special register of its own. The proselytes had their separate register called 'Before the Lord' means in the Sanctuary, where His presence is especially manifested. Thus, a jar containing an omerful of manna was laid up before the Lord, i.e. in His sanctuary (Exod. 16. 33); Moses laid up the rods before the Lord in the tent of the testimony (Num. 17. 22), and Samuel wrote down the manner of the kingdom in a book and laid it up before the Lord, i.e. in the sanctuary (1 Sam. 10. 25).
The Book of Remembrance for those who fear the Lord', or shortened 'The Book of those who fear the Lord'. The Israelitish families of pure Jewish descent, i.e. the genuine Israel, had their own register, originally called 'The record of the House of Israel'. The lists of this record were traced back to the lists of the families kept already in exilic times, and referred to in Ezek. 13. 9, hence it was called by the name given to this record in Ezekiel. The Priests and Levites, finally, also had their special registers, which, as we have seen, were frequently consulted by the members of the Tribunal sitting in the Lishkat ha-gazit and examining the purity of the descent of the Priests and Levites. There seems, however, to have been a tendency already in early times to consider these two classes, Priests and Levites, as one. Thus in Psalms 115. 12-13 and 118. 2-4, only three classes of the community are mentioned, viz.: Prosclytes, or those who fear the Lord, Israelites, and the House of Aaron, נֵזְרָא בַּיָּם. Here evidently the Levites together with the Priests are included in the House of Aaron. Ezekiel also classes Priests and Levites together (45. 15), as is also done in Deut. 18. 1, and the Talmud speaks of twenty-four passages in the Bible where the Priests are called Levites (Yebamot 86 b). We cannot here enter into a discussion of the relative position of the Priests and Levites, whether they were at one time equals and then distinguished from one another, and then again made equals. But without discussing these mooted questions it may be safely stated that the majority of the Rabbis considered Priests and Levites as in a certain sense one class. It may be reasonably assumed that the registers for Priests
and Levites, even if they were kept separately, were regarded by the Rabbis as one. It is, however, more likely that in later times, when the Levites obtained more recognition of their equality to the Priests, there was actually kept only one register for both Priests and Levites.

After this digression, describing the genealogical records kept in the Temple, we shall now proceed to interpret our report about the three books and we shall have no difficulty at all.

As already stated, the report, in my opinion, speaks about these very genealogical records. I may further add that our report, emanating from a rabbinical source, represents the opinion of the majority of the Rabbis who regard the two priestly classes, Priests and Levites, as one, or considers the two distinct records, if they were kept distinct, as one.

The report tells us first that three such books were found in the Temple. Then it proceeds to give us the character and contents of each one of them. One book, was the Book of the 'Templars', i.e. of those belonging to the Temple or connected with its service. The Temple was called מִיַּם, and those connected with it are called Meonim, or in the shorter form Meone. This מֵסֶר מַעֲנִים then, is the book in which the genealogical records of the Priests and Levites were kept.

The second book was the record of the noble families of pure Jewish descent. This was called מֵסֶר נוֹעֲנוֹת. In Talmud b. Megillah 9a, we are told that the elders who translated the Torah for King Ptolemy used the word נוֹעֲנוֹת for the word נְעִיעָל in Exod. 24. 2. From this we learn that the word נוֹעֲנוֹת, like נְעִיעָל, was understood to mean 'the nobles', 'the distinguished ones'. For this reason these
translators are also said to have used the same word for the word *נער* in Exod. 24. 5, to indicate that those who were sent to sacrifice and officiate were not mere youths *נער* but the nobles, men of high rank.

As has already been said above, this record of the Israelites was originally called by the name מַהֲכָבָה יִשְרָאֵל. However, since this record furnished the proofs for the pure descent and the nobility of the families recorded in it, it was subsequently called מַסֶּר עָמְנוֹת 'The Book of the Nobles or Aristocrats'. This is indicated especially in the version of our report as found in Sifre. There the statement reads מַהֲכָבָה יִשְרָאֵל מַסֶּר עָמְנוֹת 'And one that was called the Book of Zaatutim'. The phrase 'that was called' implies that this was not its original name. It may be that this name was used by the people ironically to indicate by it that the book is of interest and benefit only to the aristocratic families. This also explains the use of the foreign word, Zaatutim, because it was the name given to this book by the people who could well use such a foreign word.10

The third book was the record of the families of the

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10 Whatever this foreign word may have meant, it described the character of the book adequately. If we accept the explanation of Perles (Beitraege zur Rabb. Sprach- und Sagenkunde, p. 5) that it comes from the word *zata* in the Zend language, which means 'born', then Zatutim would simply mean, those born, that is, born of Jewish parents. מַסֶּר עָמְנוֹת עַל יִשְרָאֵל would be like מַהֲכָבָה עַל יִשְרָאֵל, and would designate those born of purely Jewish families. The book may have received this name already in the Persian period instead of the name מַהֲכָבָה יִשְרָאֵל, with which these genealogical lists were designated in the exile. And if we assume that the word מַסֶּר עָמְנוֹת is the Greek *σοφοὶ*, which means, the wise men, or, the searchers, the name מַסֶּר עָמְנוֹת would also adequately describe the character of this book, in which were recorded those people from which alone the wise judges and members of the Sanhedrin could be chosen; see above, note 6.
God-fearing proselytes who, as we have seen, were designated by the name יא אדיאא יא 'Those who fear the Lord'. This record of the proselytes was originally called by the name suggested by the passage in Malachi. In a shorter form it was called יא אדיאא יא. As יא is a compound word, used as a designation for a special class of people, it could well receive the article א.

The record of the proselytes was therefore called יא אדיאא יא. Some people may have called it more explicitly יא אדיאא יא 'The record of the truly God-fearing proselytes'. Abbreviated, this title was written יא אדיאא יא which stands for יא אדיאא יא. The abbreviation marks, if ever such were used in ancient times, were by mistake dropped or ignored. And the abbreviation used in the ancient report for the designation יא אדיאא יא became merely the word יא, which caused

11 The use of the article א before such compound words is not infrequently found, as e.g. Ezek. 45. 16 יא אדיאא יא, and Judges 16. 14 יא אדיאא יא. It is of interest in this connexion to notice that the teacher יא אדיאא יא mentioned in the Talmud (Haggah g b) was, according to tradition, the son of a proselyte; the name, accordingly, also contains the abbreviated form יא for יא אדיאא יא and not as Tossafot, ad loc., explains the same. See Bacher, Agada der Tanaiten, I, p. 11.

12 Such abbreviations are not infrequently found in the Talmud, as e.g. יא אדיאא יא in Megillah 21 b, יא אדיאא יא in Sanhedrin 82 a, and יא אדיאא יא in Yoma 18 a. In the latter passage it is evident that the abbreviations were used in the Baraita already, for the Gemara there explains what each abbreviation means. How such abbreviations could sometimes be misunderstood is best shown in the case of Mishnah Abot IV, 19. Here the phrase יא אדיאא יא is, as Bacher (Agada der Tanaiten, I, p. 370) has shown, the result of an erroneous dissolution of the abbreviation יא אדיאא יא which stood for the phrase יא אדיאא יא, introducing the Scriptural proof (Prov. 24. 17) for the saying of R. Simon b. Eleazar in the preceding paragraph.
a great deal of misunderstanding in the interpretation of our report.

According to this interpretation, our report presents no difficulties at all. It is clear in its statements and plain in its meaning. All the difficulties in our report, caused merely by the false interpretation given to it in the talmudic glosses, disappear in the light of my theory. This in itself is a strong recommendation, and speaks for the correctness of this theory.

The following observation about the position of our report in the context of the Pal. Talmud will further confirm our theory that the report deals with genealogical records and not with Torah scrolls. As already stated, the text of the original report, as given in the Pal. Talmud, consists of the first ten words, beginning with the words שלשה ספרות on line 47, and closing with the word א on l. 48. All that follows, beginning with the word דבר on l. 48 and ending with the word ד on l. 53, is, as we have seen, a later addition and forms a commentary on the original report. Close upon this commentary, right after its last word ד, there follows in the text of the Pal. Talmud a statement by R. Levi about the יד התרש or a scroll containing genealogical lists, which was found in Jerusalem. Now, if we eliminate the commentary on our report which extends from l. 48 to l. 53, as a later addition, or an interpolation, then we have in that passage two statements about the family registers which were kept in the Temple at Jerusalem, the one giving the general information that the three classes or groups were recorded in three separate books, and the other quoting a fragment of such a record which was found in Jerusalem and which probably came from the Temple archives. Although we cannot apply the method
of ססות to the interpretation of the Talmud, yet the close contact of these two statements in the context of the passage strongly suggests also a close relationship between their contents. And we may consider this as a כוכב, an additional support for our theory.

In this connexion I would further state that, as it seems to me, these two sayings belonging to one another and furnishing information about the genealogical records, are both placed in the wrong section of the Pal. Gemara, as we have it now. Such a misplacement of sayings is not infrequently found in the Pal. Talmud (see Frankel, Mebo Hayerushalmi, pp. 39–40). These two intimately connected sayings properly belong to the section of the Gemara, commenting upon paragraph six of the fourth chapter of the Mishnah Taanit, in which there is mentioned a list of many old families who in the respective dates assigned to them brought the wood-offerings. In a collection of Amoraic sayings and explanations to the Mishnah, or, as I would call it, in an early Gemara, which was subsequently made use of by the redactor of our Yerushalmi, the comment to paragraph six of the Mishnah contained these two sayings. In connexion with the names of the families enumerated in the Mishnah reference was given to the sources whence such lists of ancient families could be obtained, or where these families were recorded. So, there was first stated that three books containing such lists of families were found in the Temple at Jerusalem. And then a fragment of such a list was cited in which some of the families referred to in the Mishnah are actually recorded (compare the names of the families וזר בוכ and ב וחרה mentioned in the Mishnah and also given in the fragment of the ודל תובס cited by Levi). This was the point of contact between the
Mishnah and the comment of the Gemara, stating where these families were actually recorded, and incidentally giving us also general information about the three records. At the redaction of the Pal. Talmud, the comment containing these two sayings, viz. the ancient report about the three books and the saying of Levi about the fragment of such records, was erroneously transferred from the Gemara discussion of paragraph six to the one pertaining to paragraph two in the Mishnah. The mention made in the latter paragraph of the Mishnah of the priestly divisions and their corresponding Israelitish divisions suggested to the redactor the idea of connecting with it the comment of the Gemara containing the statement about the three books, in one of which, the Sefer Meoni, the priestly divisions were recorded. This was but a slight mistake of arrangement made by the redactor and is rather pardonable. Of course, he could have placed the report about the three books in the section discussing paragraph two and the saying of Levi in the section discussing paragraph six of the Mishnah. He would have thus maintained in each case the point of contact and the connexion between the Mishnah and the Gemara comment on it. But, as already stated, the two sayings have both been taken over from one source, an earlier Gemara, and were inseparably connected with one another, so that with the transfer of one the other was also transferred.

In this manner the saying of Levi with the quotation from the came into the wrong section of the Gemara, simply because it was so closely connected with the report about the three books. Later on, in the course of time, after the true meaning of this report had been forgotten and its statements misinterpreted, a later inter-
polater inserted the false commentary on the report right next to its text, thus separating the words of the report from the saying of Levi with which it had before been so closely connected. The origin of this later interpolation I shall now discuss briefly.

We have found that the commentary contained in the talmudic glosses on our report altogether misunderstood the purport of the report and gave it a false interpretation. Now, it is true that the later Amoraim sometimes misunderstood old tannaitic statements, especially such as deal with ancient problems, long forgotten, or refer to conditions of earlier times which were no more known to the younger Amoraim. For this reason, we find not infrequently that some of the interpretations given by the later Amoraim to older Mishnahs are not correct. Accordingly, there would be nothing unusual in the supposition that the false interpretations given to our report in the talmudic glosses originated with some of the younger Amoraim. However, I am inclined to think that the false commentary to our report as found in the Pal. Talmud, is not an interpretation of the Amoraim but rather a later interpolation, as we find many such interpolations in the text of the Pal. Talmud (see Frankel, op. cit., p. 38). Furthermore, it may be reasonably assumed as plausible that the false conception of our report as given in this commentary did not originate wholly in one teacher's mind. It is not one mistake made by one individual teacher. It is rather the result of a few minor mistakes and slight misunderstandings made by many different persons. Each one of these minor mistakes is in itself pardonable and can be easily explained. But the repetition and cumulation of these slight misunderstandings gradually led to graver mistakes, and finally resulted in
that altogether false commentary given in these talmudic glosses.

The very fact that there are different, and partly contradictory, versions of this commentary supports such a supposition. For the existence of these conflicting versions of the commentary can be explained only by the supposition that they are modifications and enlargements of an earlier commentary. If we could distinguish in each one of the versions the additional elements to the earlier commentary, and if we could also recognize the slight changes and modifications which each version made in the original commentary, then we might be able, by a process of elimination, to restore the original commentary or earlier interpretation of the report. We could then decide whether the report has been misunderstood by its very first commentator, or its misinterpretation be due to a series of mistakes made by those responsible for the different versions which changed the original commentary beyond recognition.

I believe the latter to be the case, and in the following I shall attempt to trace the various misunderstandings through the whole process which resulted in the different and conflicting versions of the commentary.

I offer the following theory merely as a hypothesis. The original commentary to the report read as follows: נַכַּרְתּ מַלְמַדָּתָהּ מַלְמַדָּתָהּ מַלְמַדָּתָהּ בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵלֵי בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵלֵי בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵלֵי. Using the abbreviation א' for אני אדני, the last sentence read א' וּנְכַרְתּ מַלְמַדָּתָהּ וּנְכַרְתּ מַלְמַדָּתָהּ א'. The term נַכַּרְתּ was used here in the sense of 'was inscribed' or 'was recorded'. This furnished a correct explanation of the meaning of the report, telling us that in each book was registered or recorded a special group or class of families.
which constituted the Jewish community. This commentary probably originated with R. Jose b. Ḥalafta, the reputed author of the Seder Olam, who as an historian correctly understood this ancient report.

This explanation of R. Jose, like so many other teachings and Halakot, was written down by students in their private scrolls or note-books. These private scrolls were not intended for publication, but merely to assist the memory of the student. The students would therefore not always record the sayings or teachings, which they embodied in their note-books, in the exact wording in which they heard them from their teachers. They would very often record the gist of the saying or express it in their own words and add a brief remark of their own. We need therefore not be surprised if some of the students in recording this commentary of R. Jose in their note-books made some slight changes in it or added a short explanation to it, so as to make its idea clearer to themselves. One of the students, in copying the brief explanation to the third book, wrote down in his note-book instead of נָאָה הַחֹבֵּי the words נַאָה הַחֹבֵּי, which is the abbreviation of חֵלֶר הַחֹבֵּי, or נַאָה הַחֹבֵּי, thus indicating to what purpose these lists of families were recorded, namely, to prove them pure without any stain and consequently eligible to be permitted into the community.13 This is a slight change in the wording of the original commentary, but can certainly be excused as it gives a fuller explanation. Another student in copying the commentary into his note-book wrote about the first book מָכָּר וָלֵּין אָבֶּיתָם בְּמֵיסֵי, the book of those who

13 The use of the term נָאָה in the sense of purity of descent is frequently used in the Talmud, as e.g. Kiddushin 72b מִסְמֵרָה וּנְתֵניִ עֵמֶר, and M. Eduyot. V, 7 אֶלître נַאָה אֶלְמַתָּא לֵמַר לְמַר.
are found in or belong to the Temple, thus explaining the term נוֹזִים to mean Priests and Levites who are connected with the Temple service.

The collections of such sayings contained in the notebooks of students were copied and used by later students, and subsequently used by the later compilers or redactors of the talmudic works. In the process of copying these notes many mistakes naturally occurred. It is out of such errors and mistakes, made by later copyists, that the various versions of our commentary gradually grew. A copyist who found in one collection the comment נָאוֹזִים, with an indication that the letters נוֹזִים are an abbreviation, misunderstood the significance of the abbreviation. He erroneously took it to stand for נוֹזִים, i.e. nine times the word נוֹזִים. To avoid any possible mistakes he wished to make the meaning of the expression clear. He therefore wrote down in his own collection, instead of the abbreviated form נוֹזִים, the full words נוֹזִים נוֹזִים נוֹזִים. Another copyist made a similar mistake with the simple statement found in the other collections reading נָאוֹזִים נוֹזִים נוֹזִים, where the abbreviation נוֹזִים stood, as we have seen, for נוֹזִים. The copyist erroneously took the two letters here to stand for their numerical value. Taking נוֹזִים to mean eleven, he accordingly understood the comment to say that in this one book were written eleven. Having in mind the Massoretic notice that there are eleven passages in the Torah in which the word נוֹזִים is written in this form, he associated this comment with the remark about the נוֹזִים נוֹזִים נוֹזִים and explained it to say that this one book was a Torah scroll or Pentateuch copy, which contained this peculiarity eleven times as distinguished from the other copies which had it only nine times, נוֹזִים נוֹזִים נוֹזִים. Thus developed
the false interpretations of this part of the report as referring to Pentateuch copies. Still another later copyist tried to indicate this false interpretation into the very text of the ancient report itself. After the book mentioned in the report had been understood to be the Pentateuch copy with the peculiarity of the א"ה, and finding in an older text of our report the words א"ה ג"ר א"ו with some indication that the letters א"ה are an abbreviation, he took it to mean the book of the eleven and believed that the word א"ה ought to be added to the letters א"ה, standing for eleven, to indicate what is meant, namely, the eleven times of the word א"ה written in this form. In this manner originated the slight change in the text of our report as found in Sifre א"ה ג"ר א"ו, the abbreviation marks over the first א"ה, if such were used, having been dropped.

The same misunderstanding probably took place in regard to the comment about the second book; at least, we can see how easily it could have been made. The phrase נֵעֵומָה בַּי יִשְׂרָאֵל was familiar to the copyist. He remembered the talmudic report that this phrase was used by those who translated the Torah for Ptolemy, as a substitute for נֵעֵו יִשְׂרָאֵל in Exod. 24. 5. When reading this comment that in one of the books were written the נֵעֵומָה בַּי יִשְׂרָאֵל, he could easily make the mistake to believe that this had reference to a Pentateuch copy in which this phrase, supposed to have been used in the translation prepared for Ptolemy, actually occurred in the text itself instead of the word נֵעֵו as written in the others. To the original comment, reading נֵעֵו יִשְׂרָאֵל, he therefore added the explanatory words וְהָא נֵעֵו יִשְׂרָאֵל to indicate plainly in what this copy was distinguished from the other two.
Thus far the mistakes could easily be made. All that was necessary was to start wrongly and give to the word הב ₪ the meaning of ' In the text was written ' instead of ' In it was inscribed or recorded '.

In the case of the first book, it is true, the mistake cannot so easily be explained. However, once the mistake was made to interpret the phrase הב ₪ to mean ' In the text of one was written ' instead of ' In one was recorded ' they necessarily had to interpret the phrase in the same sense also in regard to this case, and take the word Meonim or the shorter form Meoni as a word which was found written in the text of this book, instead of some other word. Having taken the other two books for Torah copies, the first was likewise taken for a Torah copy and the word Meoni as a variant to the passage in Deut. 33. 27, where a similarly sounding word Meonah occurs, which in the mistaken opinion of this compiler could have been the one in regard to which the copies differed, although the supposed reading in the text ₪ does not quite satisfactorily explain the name Meoni. 14

14 It is probably due to such a misunderstanding on the part of a later interpolator that our report was inserted into the Sifre to the very passage, of which one of the three books was supposed to have contained a different reading.

It is, however, more plausible to assume that the text of our report was originally contained in the Sifre. Its presence there can easily be explained. Since the passage ₪ was understood to refer to the Temple in Jerusalem, the compiler thought fit to connect with this passage a report about the three genealogical books, which were kept in that Temple. A later interpolator, however, who had already misunderstood the meaning of our report, added to it the explanatory remark about the meaning of the first book, which he copied from the Pal. Talmud, and by which he meant to account for the presence of the report in the Sifre to the passage ₪. This would explain why no remarks about the other two books are found in the Sifre, as the interpolator did not
This difficulty was felt, and so in looking for a more satisfactory explanation of the name Meoni, one of the versions had preserved the statement found in an older collection as part of R. Jose's explanation and which read מַּסָּר יִשְׂרָאֵל מֵעָנָיו בָּטָשׁוֹן. They took this to be a more satisfactory explanation of the term מַשָּׂא. But the error of considering these books as Torah scrolls was already too well established and could not be abandoned, and this comment, found in an older collection, had also to be adapted to the supposition that the report deals with Pentateuch copies. They accordingly assumed that this comment merely says that Meoni signifies a copy found in Maon or in the Temple, מָּסָּר יַעַּרְבֵה ‘book of the Temple’.

A later glossator, to whom it was perhaps known that Maon is sometimes used as a shorter name for Beth Maon, may have made the same mistake which Prof. Blau made, and imagined that הנע here is not the Temple but the place בֵּית מַעַּי, and he accordingly inserted the word בֵּית. Thus came about the reading והו מסר יַעַרְבֵה בֵּית מַעַּי, which could be explained by Blau, and perhaps also by the glossator, to mean a Torah scroll which was found or preserved in the place Beth Maon.

The above sketch of the possible developments which may have led to the false interpretation of our report is merely a suggestion offered by me to explain how our report could have been so utterly misunderstood and wrongly interpreted.

Whether the mistake came about in the manner described above or in any other way, whether it was
committed by one or more teachers, by Amoraim, or by later interpolators, the fact remains that the interpretation is false and based upon an erroneous conception of our report. Even if this misinterpretation came from the Amoraim, it would nevertheless be wrong, and would in no way affect my main theory that our report deals, not with Torah scrolls, but with genealogical records. This theory, I trust. I have proved satisfactorily.
POETIC FRAGMENTS FROM THE GENIZAH

By Israel Davidson, Jewish Theological Seminary of America.

IX. A PALESTINIAN LITURGY FOR THE NEW YEAR.

By ניימאל דֶּרֶּבֶּי אלפֶּסְתַּל תְּמוּן וְכוֹא.

The three prayers (сталפֶּפת, דֶרֶּפֶּפת, שֹׁפֶּירתה) which characterize the New Year Liturgy since Tannaitic times, if not earlier still, have proven a favourite subject for the early Paitanim to elaborate upon. Thus we have two such poetic compositions in the German ritual, one by Jose b. Jose and the other by Eleazar Kalir, and a similar composition by Solomon ibn Gabirol in the Avignon ritual. In the Genizah text published here we have a fourth composition of this kind, hitherto entirely unknown.

In 1914, while on a visit to London, I had the privilege of rummaging among the rare treasures in the rich collection of Mr. Elkan N. Adler, and among other things which this genial scholar allowed me to copy I found the text (MS. No. 1568) published here for the first time.

The original manuscript is written with no care whatever for form, and as a result all indications of its authorship are obscured. Even the verse structure is not recognizable. It was only after I began to study the text with a view of

1 Cp. R. Hash., IV, 5.
2 לְחַלֵּק נֶאֶבֶּה
3 אָסָיִיבָה
4 פָּרָא
5 אֲנָאָנָא
3a Cp. Ritual Avignon for New Year 35a. beginning לְאֵל וֹז הוֹרָבָא.
clutching it for publication that I recognized the structure of the verses, and their author.

Before treating of our text I shall discuss a number of interesting points peculiar to the three New Year Prayers, and the poems which have clustered around them. As is well known, the Mishnah prescribes the recitation of at least ten Biblical verses with each of the three characteristic New Year prayers. These verses, which must deal with the same themes as those of the Prayers themselves, are, according to later Amoraic interpretation, to be chosen in the following order: three from the Pentateuch, three from the Hagiographa (Psalms), three from the Prophets, and the concluding tenth verse again from the Pentateuch. As a matter of fact, however, neither the number nor the selection of the verses ever remained fixed. Instead of having three verses from each Biblical division, the first of these prayers (תהלים) is followed by seven verses from the Psalms, and the third (משנה) by four, in addition to the whole 150th Psalm, as well as four verses from the Prophets. The Rabbis, of course, gave various explanations for it. As to the selection of verses, those given in our liturgies are not identical with those given in the Talmud.

The divergence became still greater when the piyutim were embodied in the different rites. The piyutim of Jose b. Jose, for instance, as they appear in Minhag Ashkenaz, not only contain Biblical verses different from those embodied in the ‘Silent Prayer’, but have also the additional innovation that these verses are distributed among the last eight stanzas of each piyut, instead of being

5 Ibid., 32b.  
7 Cp. b. R. Hash. 32b.
grouped together, while the three piyutim of Kalir do not embody any Biblical verses. In the Polish Minhag, on the other hand, the compositions of both Jose b. Jose and Kalir do not embody any Biblical verses, but there is this innovation that they precede the characteristic prayers which contain the verses.

From a remark in the *Mahzor Vitry*, however, we learn that formerly the Biblical verses were embodied in Kalir’s piyutim in the same way as in those of Jose b. Jose. For in discussing the question where the poetic compositions should be placed, the codifier says that while the common usage was to insert the first piut (תהלים בברך) after [i.e. before the Biblical verses], R. Isaac Halevi insisted on inserting it after the ten Biblical verses [i.e. before א“א מלבך], because in the piyut the verses did not follow the order prescribed in the Talmud. Pointing out more definitely the place where he wished the piyutim to be inserted, he quotes the endings of the three piyutim of Kalir and the words which are to follow them immediately. This clearly shows that in the Ritual of R. Isaac

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7a Owing to this distribution, the method adopted in quoting the verses was not to bring three quotations from each of the three Biblical divisions together, but to have them in three groups, each group consisting of one quotation from the Pentateuch, one from Psalms, and one from the Prophets, followed by a final quotation from the Pentateuch.

כ鹪וים המחגאת של פוניות, אבל רבני צחק חלוי מ”ב חוק א”ם המובות
מכה עוד החרים ו éléments הם סתוביס, והראים עבור וشعورו והשליפה
עיבר לאפרים ובאפרים פ anale..., והאחשף לבר콛ה בהבמה,
כי ב الجنس המופת של התפיה והתמדה, כמנ”ד ויפלט; "לאחרי
ואלה המותנים מכל על כל עם כוות נו. "לימים ויפלו: "לאחרי
ואלה המותנים אחרוןonds. "מלעדים ויפלו: "לאחרי
ואלה המותנים אחרוןonds. "מלעדים ויפלו: "לאחרי

Halevi, Kalir's piyutim were arranged in the same way as those of Jose b. Jose.\(^a\)

In this connexion, our Genizah poems give internal evidence that their author followed the same plan as Jose b. Jose.\(^b\) The very verse structure is dependent upon this arrangement. For each of the three poems is so constructed that every stanza ends with the word with which

\[\text{The phrases in quotation marks are the closing words of Kalir's three piyutim for the Musaph service of the New Year. Incidentally it may be remarked that the entire passage, cited here in part, is missing in the manuscript of the Mahzor Vitry of the J. Th. S. Library.}\]

\(^a\) For the sake of clearness, it will not be out of place to give here a diagram of the different arrangements into which these piyutim were placed in the various rituals.

\(A. \text{ Mahzor Vitry.}\)

1. Mahzor Vitry. with Biblical verses
2. [with Biblical verses] הַנִּכְסָוָה
4. מַעֲשֶׂה יִלָּחֶם

\(B. \text{ German Ritual.}\)

Second Day. First Day.

1. מַעֲשֶׂה יִלָּחֶם or [without Bib. verses]
2. אָנָבְכָה
3. [Bib. verses]
4. [Bib. verses of ‘Silent Prayer’]

\[^b\] The only difference consists in that the verses are not identical and are distributed among the last ten stanzas instead of the last eight.
the following stanza begins, but where the Biblical verses are inserted these word repetitions do not occur, a clear proof that the author himself, not the scribe, had chosen this arrangement.

Other peculiarities of verse structure are the following. In the first piyut (תהלים) the first lines of each stanza form a quadruple acrostic of the Alphabet, and the second lines a quadruple acrostic of an inverted Alphabet (ה"זח). In the second poem each letter of the Alphabet occurs eight times in the acrostic, while in the third poem each letter occurs six times, and the letters that go to make up the author's name twice in each quatrain.

In addition to these peculiarities the first poem has the word לְלֹא, and the second the word נָבָהו, while the third poem has a series of phrases beginning with לְפָס, prefaced to the second line of each stanza. These phrases are extremely peculiar, since they use the word (לְפָס) 'voice' in the most unusual combinations, such as the 'voice of blood' and the rest of ten plagues, or the 'voice of Nisan' and the rest of the twelve months. Parallel with the twelve months, the twelve tribes are introduced in the closing hemistich of each stanza, thus making the poem a highly complicated piece of literary composition.

As to the author of these liturgical poems, I have not been able to find anything more than the mere name which stands out clearly in the acrostic. The surname לְלֹא is unknown so far as I can ascertain, and the letters נב which follow the name are not a little puzzling. They

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9 For this reason most of the words repeated are given in an abbreviated form in the manuscript.
9a In many instances these catch words are not necessary for the context of the poem.
may be an abbreviation of the epithet טוֹפְּא דְגַנְיָה or טוֹפְּא דַחַי מַהוָּא as Benjamin b. Samuel was accustomed to sign himself (cp. Zunz, Literaturgeschichte, p. 115), but I am inclined to believe that they stand for some euphemism concerning the departed, like the abbreviations בַּל נַתָּנָא (שם טוב) and בַּל נַתָּנָא (שם טוב ההוא).

On the other hand, judging from the highly elaborate form of the verse structure, we may feel certain that these liturgies are post-Kaliric, and from the fact that the first piyut uses the ending נא אֲרָיוֹת תַּלְוִת,10 which is characteristic of the Palestinian New Year liturgy,11 it may be assumed that our author was most likely a Palestinian, or at least a member of a community which followed the Palestinian ritual.

In the subject matter these poems are unlike those of Jose b. Jose and Kalir inasmuch as they take for their theme the Midrashic conception of the Creation and the history of the Patriarchs and other Biblical Worthies, subjects more generally dealt with in the Abodah poems.

In transcribing the text I arranged it in such a manner as to make the verse structure stand out clearly. On the other hand, although I provided the text with vowel points, by which many of the matres lectionis became unnecessary, I, nevertheless, retained the orthography of the MS. In cases where corrections were necessary, I introduced the corrections in the notes and left the text unpointed.

10 See below, end of first poem.
11 Cp. Elbogen, Der jüdische Gottesdienst, § 24. 3 and the notes.
12. So in manuscript, but undoubtedly the sign יכיה was omitted here by the scribe, and the words לאויה לא אLEAR are not to be taken together with רה המלך, but are to be considered as the beginning of the well-known prayer לאויה לא אתמה מני which precedes the יכיה הדתות and the other two poems.

13. Both words signify song, or praise, and the verse may thus be rendered: "I shall sing of Him who is glorified in his sovereignty, I shall place my hope in Him because of the study of the law".


15. In the manuscript this word is indicated by the abbreviation ס from here to nearly the end of the poem.


17. This is to be taken in the sense of ירי, i.e. by himself, not in the sense of ירי ירי, in the first day.

18. Read perhaps ירי נמי, i.e. the earth and its foundation. Cp. b. Sukkah 49a: אם עדכון באילא א¤ך א"ת א¤ך שיר א"ת; ibid. ובירויות לא חקק בריאה נברא נברא.

20 Cp. אֲבָרָהָם, Ps. 104. 3.
22 דְּרִישָׁם הֶבַל מִבְּנֹתָם.
23 Read perhaps דִּכְרֵי, i.e. her cry is, 'give me the wicked'. Cp. Midrash Mishle 30. 15: "לֵבָכָה הַנִּטְעָה לֹא בְּתוֹם לֹא בְּתוֹם..."
24 Cp. Midrash Tanhuma: הבכנה ה.evaluated. The passage may be rendered: 'He paved Hell with its fire'.
25 Cp. Ps. 30. 2.
26 Exod. 2. 19.
27 I cannot find the proper meaning of these two words. For דִּכְרֵי read perhaps דִּכְרֵי, and cp. Nahmanides to Gen. 1. 9: זה וּלְבַךְ וּלְבַךְ וּלְבַךְ וּלְבַךְ. This is difficult to explain in this connexion, there is no doubt that the passage refers to Pirke d. R. Eliezer, V: עַרְבָּר שְׁלֹחָה לֹא בָּכָה וּלְבַךְ וּלְבַךְ וּלְבַךְ (Luria corrects לֵבָכָה שָלַח בָּכָה וּלְבַךְ וּלְבַךְ). Cp. also Lev. R. 11. 1: מָכַּה נִתְנָה, וּמָכַּה נִתְנָה, וּמָכַּה נִתְנָה, וּמָכַּה נִתְנָה; Cp. also b. Sanhedrin 38 a.
28 a Read more correctly דָּרֶךְ, in the sense of Deut. 2. 5. The error probably arose from the דָּרֶךְ in line 14.
29 Cp. על יִנָּה ציִנָּם (Gen. 16. 7). This is likewise refers to Pirke d. R. E., loc. cit.: עַרְבָּר שְׁלֹחָה לֹא בָּכָה וּלְבַךְ וּלְבַךְ וּלְבַךְ, which Luria corrects into מָכַּה נִתְנָה, וּמָכַּה נִתְנָה, וּמָכַּה נִתְנָה, וּמָכַּה נִתְנָה, which is likewise not mentioned.
30 Read דָּרֶךְ, cp. Joel 2. 22.
The manuscript cannot be clearly deciphered here. As far as I could
distinguish the letters, the word, or words, looked like ס י ר, which is
without any meaning.

33 Cp. Pirke d. R. E., IX.
34 Cp. Midrash Konen (Jellinek, Bet ha-Midrash, II, 26):

35 Read ג ו התו, i.e. females. Cp. b. Baba batra 74 b: כל מה שבעבר אשת
Suddenly the mask slipped from her face, and she stood before us...

36 Read perhaps ח ו התו and cp. ibid. 75 a: העונה הפקה עלינו ספירה
לגרידוק מבריחו של לחם, נתנו איכר, זכרו עלי חרב (איכה מ' ל
מדים ולא תמרים הבכש מ') נבז' פררה.
37 נиф. of ℣ לולא ‘to crown’.
38 Cp. Abot d. R. Nathan, cd. Schechter, 3 a: ב' השעיה וה悛 בר
ששת תקנותינה נפלה...

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Read perhaps

refers to cp. Pirke d. R. E., VIII: a hand, 115 and possibly a similar word
in its plural "a" and "b". And see cp. Tanhuma Bereshit 6, where the name is used as a title.

Comp. ibid. 12: "in the sense of midrash ha-Gadol, p. 126: the concept of unity and".

Cp. Zech. 9. 10: "and the liturgical expression".

47 Cp. 1 Chron. 29. 14: "as a symbol of peace and unity".

48 See preceding note.
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49 Meaning of this clause is obscure.

48 Cp. Eccles. 2. 3.


51 Cp. Midrash Shir ha-Shirim (ed. Grünhut) 5. 10: רוח זה הוא גAbr


53 Meaning is obscure.

54 Read *אנו אשמה or *אנו אשמה and cp. Gen. r. 19: וישנה שמא לא הקב"ה או פה בכר הרביעי והоборот, the verse may be rendered: 'For ever was the stature diminished in Adam and Eve and the Serpent'.

55 Read *שלשת ממה, i.e. cp. b. Kiddushin 6a: לשלשת ממה.

56 Read *)findViewById, i.e. when God searched for him in the Garden of Eden. The ו in of the translation is a dittography on account of preceding ב.

57 Cp. b. Baba m. 86a: והיה אדם ברא בבית.


59 Read *אנו אלזר ויהי, i.e. God waited and then spoke to him. Cp. Midrash ha-Gadol, p. 91: כיוון שלח אותם הרשעים והפעים וה שנה עיזו הקב"ה להחרים אותם שלח אותם בסלקנות ועיין הא凱ם והמר עליה והנה מהדק לפני自动驾驶ים הבאים ויתנינו את כ"ה בלא התמסרה אל מרירה והיו.

Cp. also Yalkut, § 743.

60 Manuscript indistinct, but probably the word is בובית.


G g 2
Read, cp. Ps. 107. 39: 62
and Ps. 110. 25: 63

Num. 23. 21. 64

Ps. 41. 20: 65

Ps. 44. 25: 66

Pseudo-Jonathan, Gen. 4. 1: 67

Ps. 109. 10: 68

Sanhedrin, X, 3: 69

Sanhedrin, 108 a: 70

Obad. 1. 21. 71
Read cp. Midrash ha-Gadol, p. 150: דינא"ק רדוי ומעיקרו בא"ר מ"ע היה לפי שבפרר ביש ופי הכותב ד"א מ"ע כי נשבור.

The meaning is perhaps that the generation which perished in the flood denied the supremacy of God, because God gave them an abundance of good. Cp. b. Sanhedrin 108a: "רו"ר והבובול לא נתנו אלו אלא בשطبعה היה היה אלמך י/from nostro עמשת לע"מר.

God destroyed them only after he saw their acts of violence. Cp. ibid.: "וכברניח כי נשבור והבובול ר這一 והבובולдесь על הכל על נמחת עליה נור רמנ ופי השפעה וירוחה ופשר.


Cp. Isa. 57. 15.

Read ס"כ ו/or.

Ps. 22. 29.

The meaning is obscure.

It may be taken as a play upon Job 29. 3: י/from nostro ו/or. על ראשון בעלבא בֶּהוּלַר.

Ps. 55. 23.

Deut. 33. 5.
The meaning is: We shall speak of the place appointed for him and his trials, i.e. where the sacrifice of Isaac was to take place.

In the sense of יונל, cp. Gen. R., § 54: דוד: תקנאותו לארץ קדשה. The meaning is that Abraham chanted the praises of God even at the time when everybody scoffed. Cp. b. Berakot 7b: אֶל יִהְיֶה כְּעֵגוֹן, אֶל יִהְיֶה כְּעֵגוֹן. The meaning is that Abraham chanted the praises of God even at the time when everybody scoffed.

Cp. Gen. r. 30: גם אפר שלחא ל资源配置י יהודים ביהודה ברכו למאמין, יתנא. בך הנשים של资源配置י יהודים ביהודה ברכו למאמין, יתנא.

Cp. ibid. 38, s. 13.

Gen. 17. 5.


Gen. r. 56, s. 5; Pirke d. R. E. 31.

A metaphorical term for the ram. Cp. Lev. R. 29: וה וגם בהר של资源配置י יהודים ביהודה ברכו למאמין, יתנא. כְּעֵגוֹן. The meaning is that Abraham chanted the praises of God even at the time when everybody scoffed.

Cp. b. Pesahim 54a: ישירה דברו נביא ביבר שיבת ובנו השמשות היה ציון והים והים והים והים והים והים והים והים והים והים והים והים והים.


Ps. 24. 7–10.
Onkelos renders מִי יִתְנָה昂贵י מָכָה (Jer. 2. 31) in the sense of wandering. The meaning of the passage being as follows: God disclosed to his beloved (Abraham) the secret of the wandering of the people near unto him, when he said 'know of a surety'.


Refers to the Golden Calf.
Read "םָתְחַה,"

A nominative of לְתֹּה.

Those who come to thee, i.e. thy people.

This is the Palestinian ending instead of מָלֵךְ עַל-כָּל-הָאָרֶץ וּבוֹ.

See introduction.

Cp. Targum Isa. 32. 4: מְחַר לַדְּבִר צָאָה הָלַיְשָׁנָה . .

Cp. Cant. r. 4. 4: מְחַר שֶׁפֹּק הָבוֹ יְהוָה עַל-כָּל-הָאָרֶץ וּבוֹ.

Cp. Eccles. 2. 25: מְחַר וְאִם תַּעִד, i.e. I will show feeling.

Read הביא, cp. Joel 4. 2 and 12.

From here to the end of the poem this word is indicated in the manuscript by בַּ.'

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118 Cp. *ibid*.
121 Read perhaps נֶאָדָה כֵּן וּכְאָא, and cp. Isa. 65. 1: נְאָדָה כֵּן וּכְאָא.
123 Read either הנֶאָדָה כֵּן וּכְאָא, referring to Sarah (Gen. 18. 6) or נֶאָדָה כֵּן וּכְאָא with reference to Gen. 18. 7.
125 Analogous to לִעֹצִּים (2 Sam. 21. 1).
126 Read נְאָדָה כֵּן וּכְאָא.
Read ד"ת, i.e. the Angels who abide in heaven. Cp. b. Hagiga 12b and note 88 above.

128 In this and similar passages we must eliminate the catch-word נوثائق from the context (see above, note 9a).

129 Cp. i Sam. 17. 40; ר"ל וַיִּבְנֵּֽוּ; cp. also Isa. 57. 6, i.e. Jacob called the stones upon which he slept the place of holiness. Cp. Gen. 28. 17:

130 מֵאֵזוּבָּה is a euphemism for Moses, cp. Exod. 2. 3.

131 Read מב, cp. the expression דְּבָּה דְּבָּהוּ (b. Erubin 21a), the יְָהָו of which should be construed with מב, i.e. מב הוּ שֶׁ דְּבָּה.

132名词 is used here as an attribute of the Torah with reference to Ps. 119. 96, i.e. Moses went up to heaven and took the Torah as his booty. See note 134, below.


134 For this entire legend about Moses and the Angels cp. b. Shabbat 88b-89a : בְּתֹּֽעְר הַשָּׁלֹֽמִים מְסִוְּא אֵֽלֶּהוּ מִלְּאָוָי, וַיִּשְׁכְּנוּ וְאָרַבְּאֶֽבֶּתְוָהוּ מָֽלָּכָה.
Another attribute of the Torah, cp. Ps. 119. 72.

A poetic name for the Jewish people.


Read perhaps כַּפֶּל לָאוֹד, i.e. he will make his enemies as helpless as the dead. Cp. Eccles. R. 10. 7: כְּפֶל לָאוֹד.

Cp. Prov. 13. 5.

Has reference to Exod. 32. 27.

Cp. ibid. 30-2.

Has reference to the readiness with which the people contributed towards the building of the Tabernacle, cp. Exod. 35. 21-9.

Has reference to Phineas. On the passage יָרְדֵּנָה בִּינַּר (Num. 25. 7) Midrash rabba remarks: זוֹעָה לֹא יְבַל בָּשָׁם... זוֹעָה לֹא יְבַל בָּשָׁם... עַל כְּפֶל לָאוֹד... כְּפֶל לָאוֹד.

Cp. Num. r., loc. cit. כְּפֶל לָאוֹד בִּינַּר בִּינַּר בִּינַּר בִּינַּר בִּינַּר בִּינַּר בִּינַּר בִּינַּר בִּינַּר בִּינַּר בִּינַּר בִּינַּר בִּינַּר בִּינַּר בִּin.
The sign of abbreviation is in the manuscript, it should perhaps read [6 r.]

148 Has reference to Joshua, cp. Deut. 31. 7.
149 Read תני, cp. Joshua 5. 2.
150 Cp. ibid. 13 et seq.
153 Has reference to the victory over the Philistines through the prayers of Samuel at Mizpah. Cp. 1 Sam. 7. 7-11. Cp. also Midrash Shemuel s. 13. § 3: 'שהשל שלמה ישא דרשא למסת מכת עבשא שחרת לאיש אשיש עבשא לברוח עבשא והיה קרוי.
154 The sign of abbreviation is in the manuscript, it should perhaps read סדרות.
155 Has reference to the Jewish people in general. Cp. Jer. 2. 2 and Rashi ad. loc.
156 Exod. 2. 24.
157 Meaning is obscure, but the passage undoubtedly refers to King David.
158 Read לכו, i.e. all his utterances are for Thy glorification
159 Isa. 63. 11.
A payyhetanic form for 119.

Construe this passage as if it read: לָכַּמְּחַת מִרְבָּה בַּרְבּוֹת נֶאָה לֵא אַלָּא מְחַת בַּל. i.e. at the end of time, when the chosen people will be gathered, they will lay upon him a burden without end, cp. Pesik. R., s. 36

עָבֹדֶשׁ שקַר וּבָא בַּכָּכְאֶס כְוָדַת בַּרְבּוֹת הַגְּלַת, ולָעֵג הָבָא בֵּעָמָס כְוָדַת בַּרְבּוֹת.

162 Read cp. ibid. 161 b: אָמַר לָהֶם הַכּוּבָּה אֲשֶׁר אָמַת מִכְפּוֹטִים. נֹאָה לַעֲלָהוֹת לַעֲלָהוֹת לְבָרְבּוֹת אֶלָּא לָעֵג הָבָא בֵּעָמָס כְוָדַת בַּרְבּוֹת.

163 Used here in the sense of מִכְפּוֹטִים, cp. Abot d. R. Nathan s. 37: שְׁבוֹעָה דְּרַבֵּן דְּרַבֵּן שְׁבוֹעָה דְּרַבֵּן דְּרַבֵּן מִכְפּוֹטִים מִכְפּוֹטִים מִכְפּוֹטִים מִכְפּוֹטִים מִכְפּוֹטִים מִכְפּוֹטִים מִכְפּוֹטִים מִכְפּוֹטִים.

164 Ps. 106. 4.

165 It has, perhaps, reference to Daniel, Hananiah, Mishael, and Azariah, who fared better on herbs and water than all the youths who ate of the king's meat (cp. Dan. 1. 12-15).

166 Cp. ibid. 1. 7: יִשְׁמַע לָהֶם מַעַלְּךָ אַשְׁרֶה בְּשֵׁם יְהוָה. Read קָנֹוֶי.

167 Cp. Cant. 5. 14: בְּשֵׁמֶה מַעַלְּךָ. i.e. in memory of the prayers of the prophets accompanied by the sweet savours and sacrifices.

168 Gen. 8. 1.
Has perhaps reference to Nehemiah.

Jer. 31. 19. Meaning is obscure.

Read עֵשֶׁת referring to the musical instruments of the Temple. Cp. 2 Sam. 6. 5.


So in manuscript; read יָרָה, a post-Biblical form for גָּרָה.

Ps. 105. 8.

Exod. 32. 13.

178 Isa. 63. 7.

179 Cp. b. Sukkah 52b: שֶׁמֶנֶּה שֶׁפְּרָעִים וּפְרָעִים נֶפֶשָׁה אֲדָם ... [Micha 5. 4] והוֹנָא נְגָה שֶׁפְּרָעִים נֶפֶשָׁה אֲדָם: יִשְׂרָאֵל שֶׁפְּרָעִים נֶפֶשָׁה אֲדָם. Cp. also Pirke R. ha-Kadosh, ed. Schönblum, fol. 38a, where a slightly different list is given.

180 Read perhaps "עָרֶנָה", we sang praises to thee.

181Ps. 111. 4.

182 הנב is used here in the sense of יִשְׂרָאֵל (cp. Ps. 80. 16) and has the same meaning as in the expression "יתר ונירב" (b. M. K. 25b).

183 רַעִי = Angels, the meaning is based upon the similes in Ezek. 1. 16 and Dan. 10. 6.

184 Cp. b. Hag. 14a: כל מעה זכרו ונכדינו מלך, והשבה מנהרה ור'.

185 Exod. 6. 5.
In this stanza the poet enumerates various occasions on which the sounding of the Shophar plays an important part, viz. : (a) when rabbinical prohibitions or concessions were announced, cp. b. Abodah Zarah 40a and 57b ; (b) on New Year (תבשישב ייש תבשישב); (c) when the new moon was announced (יומא תבשישב יומא), cp. b. Niddah 38a; (d) when the Messiah will come (תבשישב יומא תבשישב יומא). This and most of the following phrases taken from Jer. 33, 11 and Ps. 29. 3-9 are not to be taken with the rest of the stanzas. They are in most cases prefixed only for the sake of the form.

The use of לוה תב in this connexion is difficult to explain.

Construe the passage as if it read יומא תבשישב יומא תבשישב יומא לוה תבשישב יומא, i.e. O, thou who watchest through the night reveal the angel of redemption unto the exalted city. For רбот cp. Dan. 8. 15 and for יומא תבשישב יומא cp. Ezek. 17. 22.
The three names נין, יידור, and נין (Isa. 21. 11) are used for the peoples that oppressed the Jews. Cp. Zunz, S. P., p. 438.

The meaning of this verse is obscure. Read ד"ה.
Read vb.

More correctly לָבָךְ.

According to this reading the phrase refers to לֵבָךְ, but read perhaps לָבָךְ, referring to מַאֲצֵךְ.

Cp. Exod. 9. 20: ʼהָיוּ מִי בָּרוּךְ . . . אֶרֶץ אֶת בּוֹם.

Read מָקָמָךְ.


Read לָבָךְ. The passage undoubtedly refers to Exod. 10. 19: מַעֲשֶׂה בּוֹם וַתִּרְמֹלְךָ לְעַשֵּׁיתָךְ.
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...the voice of the One who is not heard...


Cp. Exod. 19. 16.

Cp. b. Arak. 10 b: the voice of the One who is not heard...

...the voice of the One who is not heard...

Construe it as הָלֹא נְאָה. Isa. 18. 3.


Refers to the light in the Temple (לְאָדָם וְלְנִכְרֵיהֶן). the expression הָלֹא נְאָה is used in connexion with lighting the lights. cp. b. Shab. 22 b: לְאָדָם וְלְנִכְרֵיהֶן.

Cp. Tamid, VIII. 3: הָלֹא נְאָה לְאָדָם וְלְנִכְרֵיהֶן.

Ps. 81. 2.
Read ע"ד.

Read Read, perhaps, י"א and cp. b. Sota 16a: בנ'Nicotiousהיה עכבה ע'וכב.

The omission of the ה is due to the fact that the next word begins with the same letter.

Manuscript reads י"ר, but this is impossible because the scheme of acrostics demands a word beginning with the letter י"ע. I therefore suggest י"ד, cp. Zeph. 1. 10.


[225] Read י"ה.

[225-7] The allusion is not clear to me.

[226] Isa. 27. 13.

This may perhaps refer to the Talmudic statement [b. Shabbat 104a].

Read י"ו.

This very likely refers to the Golden Calf which Moses ground to powder and strewn upon the water. Cp. Exod. 32. 20: י"ו על פניו הים. Cp. also ibid., verses 26-8.
This refers to the efficacy of Moses' prayer (ibid., verses 31-4). Cp. also Ps. 69, 31-2.

Ps. 81, 4.

Construe the passage as if it read: The term יִבְּרָאֵל is an allegorical name for the people who oppressed the Jews, with reference to Obad. 1, 3 and Jer. 49, 16.

The meaning is: 'They that were brought up in scarlet' (לעֲנָה לְשַׁיָּהוּ לְגַלְגֵּל קָדַשְׁתָּם מִי וְאָנָּה לְעַזְּגֵל Mal. 3, 14).

Read מַרְחָק.

Cp. Lam. 1, 1.

More correctly: רִבְּרָא מַרְחָק.

Cp. Targum on Hab. 3, 4: מַרְחָק נָא נָא וְיִתְכַּחְתָּם שָׁם וַיַּחְדֶּשֶׁהוּ.

Joel 2, 1.

The scheme of acrostics demands the addition of a מַרְחָק.
Read Judges 15. 8. 

The acrostic requires the omission of the 17th. 

Cp. b. Pes. 87 a: "גא נני" והנה וכנם ישראל.

Num. 10. 9-10.
THE PHILosophy of DON HASDAI CRESCAS

By MEYER WAXMAN, New York.

CHAPTER II

The existence of God is proved by Crescas in a very simple manner. The proof runs in the following way: Whether there is a finite or an infinite number of effects, or whether an infinite series of causes is given, but as long as the series is infinite and all things are caused, we do not find in nature a thing that is absolutely necessary of existence. But to conclude thus is impossible, for if all beings are possible there must be some power that calls forth existence, so as to overbalance privation. It follows that there is a being necessary of existence.67 In this proof the force of the argument, as Spinoza well remarks, is not in the impossibility of an infinite act or an infinite causal regressus, but the stress is laid on the absurdity of positing a world of possibilities.68

67 Verum hie obiter adhuc notari velim quod peripatetici recentiores ut quidem puto, male intelleixerint demonstrationem veterum qua ostendere nitebantur dei existentiam. Nam ut ipsam apud ludacum quendam Rab Ghasdai vocatim Ieperio, sic sonat, si dantur progressus causarum in infinitum, crunt omnia quae sunt, etiam causata. Atque nulli quod causatum est competit, vi suae

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Here may be considered the proper place to say a few words about the relation of Crescas to Spinoza. That the latter knew writings of the former and studied them, we know from the passage quoted, where Spinoza mentions Crescas by name, and very accurately explains the latter's proof of the existence of God. The question is whether Crescas really exerted any marked influence upon the formation of Spinoza's system. Joel endeavoured in several of his writings to establish that Spinoza was under the influence of Crescas, and attempted to trace the influence in some of Spinoza's important theories. It will be necessary for us to discuss these points of similarity as they come along. Kuno Fischer (in his Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, V, II, Spinoza) attempts to refute all arguments put forth in favour of influence, and concludes that there is nothing in common between them.⁶⁹

Fischer's arguments, however, do not seem conclusive. I wish to call attention to the first point in Spinoza's system, namely, the existence of substance or God. The way Spinoza, in his Ethics, conceives the existence of a first cause is strikingly similar to that of Crescas. It is true that in the Tractatus Brevis, his first philosophical essay, Spinoza proves that God must exist, in the famous Cartesian way through the conception of the idea of God. But in the Ethics the basic conception of the whole system is that, in looking upon nature, we must come to the conclusion

naturae necessarie existere, ergo nihil est in natura ad eius essentiam pertinet necessario existere. Sed hoc est absurdum; ergo et illud. Quare vis argumenti non in ea sita est, quod impossibile sit dari actu infinitum ant progressus causarum in infinitum; sed tantum in ea quod supponatur res quae sua natura non necessario existunt non determinari ad existendum a re sua natura necessario existent'. Epistola XII, ed. Van Vloten, II, 45

that there must be a cause which is necessary of existence by itself. 'This conception', says Kuno Fischer, 'which is put at the beginning of his philosophy, supports the whole system.'

Taking his first definition, 'By that which is self-caused, I mean that of which the essence involves existence', and his axiom, 'That which exists, exists either in itself or in something else': again, axiom three, 'If no definite cause be granted, it is impossible that an effect can follow', as well as his proofs of proposition XI, we see clearly the underlying thought that in the world of things where there is a multitude of effects there must be something which is a *causa sui*. Placing the words of Crescas, 'Whether there be causes and effects finite or infinite, there is one thing clear, that there must be one cause for all, for if all are effects there would not be anything which is its own cause of existence;' besides this conception, one cannot help feeling the similarity between the initial points of these two philosophers, and the influence of the earlier upon the latter is not improbable. The fact that Crescas and Spinoza are two opposite poles, the one religious to the extreme, the other irreligious, should not deter us. In spite of the fact mentioned, God is the very centre of things to both; and though, according to the latter, God acts in a mathematical way with absolute mechanical necessity, and, according to the former, in a personal way, yet the basic quality of God in both systems is the same, namely, absolute limitlessness; consequently, the philosophers concur in a goodly number of questions.

For this divergence in regard to religion really has nothing to do with the first conception of the existence of God. The conception itself is independent of religion,

70 Ibid., p. 358.
and might as well be taken by Spinoza as the basis of his system. Fischer, as if feeling that in quoting Spinoza's letter where Crescas's proof is cited in such a way as to resemble Spinoza's own, he weakens his case, attempts to strengthen his arguments by alluding to the manner in which Spinoza speaks of Crescas. He names him 'quendam Rab Ghasdai'. Fischer infers that this proves sufficiently that Spinoza hardly knew Crescas and his teachings, and winds up by saying, 'Descartes was not a "quendam" to Spinoza.' Such an argument is hardly conclusive. Spinoza wrote to Lewis Meyer, who surely hardly knew of Crescas, and to whom he was a 'certain'. But if Fischer were acquainted with the difficulty of Crescas's style and its remarkable brevity, he would know that Spinoza could hardly give such a lucid and penetrating summary of Crescas's proof by mere hearsay without having studied his works carefully. Again, his additional remark (in *Ep. XIV*, quoted above), "non in ea sita est quod impossibile sit dari actu infinitum", shows that he read Crescas's whole refutation of the Aristotelian doctrine. The fact that Spinoza calls him a peripatetic, while Crescas combated the Aristotelian doctrines, is not sufficient evidence of his ignorance of Crescas's work. There was still left in Crescas enough of the philosophy of his time to entitle him to that name.

**ESSENCE AND EXISTENCE.**

It was an old debatable question with the mediaeval philosophers, whether existence is identical with the essence of a thing or is something separate. Ibn Sina taught that
existence is an accident of essence. Ibn Roshd, on the other hand, claimed that existence can be nothing else but identical with essence. According to Ibn Roshd and his followers then, in regard to God, since His essence is absolutely different from the essence of the rest of beings, it follows that His existence will also be different in kind, and in positing existence to both God and other beings we do so in an absolutely homonymous way, not denoting any common relation but the name. But also the followers of Ibn Sina agree to this conception, for they concede necessarily that with God existence is not an accident, but identical with essence. And since with other beings it is only accidental, it follows that the name existence in applying it to God and to man is employed in an absolute homonymous way.

Crescas does not agree with either view. In criticizing Ibn Roshd's view, he points out the logical difficulty involved in its assumption. If existence is identical with essence, what then does it add as a predicate? In stating that God exists, the predicate does not add anything; it amounts to saying, God is God: the same is true of any other proposition of the same kind. Again, if, as Ibn Sina says, existence is only an accident, it needs then a subject; but the subject must also exist, hence another subject must precede it, and so on to infinity. Again, since existence is the real form and stay of the subject, for without it it would be not-being, how could we call it accident? This view must necessarily be abandoned. But the other view is untenable also. It must, therefore, be concluded that

72 ויתננ ויתננ מ"ח, Moreh, I.VII (see also Crescas's Commentary); Guide, p. 204.
73 Or Adonai, p. 21 b.
existence, while not identical with essence, is essential to a being. In this way, existence can be predicated of everything, of the essence as well as of accidents, though there will be a difference of degree. The general conception, however, must be understood in a negative way. The thing we predicate existence of is to be understood not non-existing. As a result, when we speak of the existence of God, and the existence of other beings, it must not be absolutely homonymous, but there may be a certain relation, namely, that the negation—for existing equals not non-existing—has a difference of degree. The not non-existence of God is due to himself, while of the other beings to their cause. What Crescas wants to prove by his naming existence essential is that it is one of the expressions of essence, implying that there are more.

Spinoza seems to believe that existence and essence are different in the case of other beings, for essence depends on natural law, but existence on the order of the causal series. In God, however, existence is not distinguished from essence, for by definition, existence belongs to his nature.

Attributes and Unity.

Maimonides' theory of Attributes, which is criticized by Crescas, resembles in its entirety the other theories of the preceding Jewish philosophers, with a strong emphasis on the negativity of their conception. A thing can be described, says he, in four ways; either according to its definition or

1. "Cogitata Metaphysica, Part I, chs. 2, 3."
a part thereof, or by one of its essential qualities, or by relation to some other things, either to time, place, or another body. In regard to God, attributes describing in any of the above-mentioned ways are inapplicable, for since we posit Him simple, and one, and above all categories, it is evident that He cannot be defined, nor can we speak of a part of Him nor of any essential quality in Him. As for relation, there is no relation between Him and place or time, or any other being, for they are all possible of existence and He is necessary. There remains, therefore, a fifth way of describing, namely, according to the actions. Such kind of attributes it is not impossible to apply to God, for they do not imply any plurality, change, or division. This form of attributes is paronymic, after the actions we perceive. There are, however, essential attributes, that is, such as appertain to the essence without having any bearing on the actions. Such by the consensus of religious leaders and philosophers are existent, living, knowing, wise, potent, and willing. It is to be noticed that Maimonides includes will as an attribute just as his peripatetic predecessor Ibn Daud has done, while Saadia and Bahia do not count it (cp. Introduction). How then shall we understand these essential attributes? Of course, it is evident that in applying them to both God and man we employ them in an absolute homonymic manner, for there is no possible relation between God and other beings. These attributes have to be conceived purely negatively, and yet, says Maimonides, they convey to us some positive notion. He proceeds to explain his assertion. The statement that God is existent implies only that He is not non-existing, or the denial of privation;

77 Moreh, 1, 52 (p. 72a); Guide, p. 178.
and when we say that God is living, we only assert that His existence is not like the existence of dead matter. In a similar way, the more difficult attributes are explained; potent means the denial of weakness; wise, the privation of foolishness; willing, the absence of disorder. This, in short, is the Maimonidian theory of attributes.78

Gersonides, the immediate predecessor of Crescas, had already objected to such a theory. He argued against the assumption of absolute homonymity in applying the attributes to both God and man. It is impossible, he says, to assume that there is only a likeness of name in the two applications of the attribute, if it is construed to have a negative meaning. Take, for example, the negative concept of existing, can we say that the denial of non-existence which the concept implies has two absolutely different meanings? We are forced, then, to admit that the difference is only in degree; why then can we not hold the same conception in regard to positive attributes, namely, that they are applied to God and to man in different degrees of perfection?79 We have noticed a similar argument advanced by Crescas in regard to existence. We shall now pass on to Crescas's criticism of Maimonides' theory. Maimonides is loath, says Crescas, to ascribe to God any attributes that will bring Him in relation with something else, for fear that it may imply a privation in His nature,

and yet he allows himself to describe Him with active attributes. But, asks Crescas, does the application of such attributes not imply any defect in God’s perfection? When we say, God created or made, does it not mean that before the act His power was potential and only later became active? Such an implication suggests change in God’s nature.  

Again, Maimonides’ assertion that there is absolutely no relation between God and created beings or time is false. Is not God the cause of all existing being? But if He is, there is already a relation established, or if we assume that time is eternal, there is a relation of likeness between God and time. But Crescas sees as well as Maimonides the danger involved in ascribing to God positive attributes and at the same time asserting that He is simple and one. Yet, he says, there is really no contradiction. The fact that we humans may conceive plurality through attributes does not mean real plurality. His infinite goodness which is His essence unites them. Goodness here should be understood to mean perfection, or in other words, God is infinitely perfect—what Spinoza calls in his writings the absolute perfect, not perfect after its kind. Again, since God is indivisible and simple, and perfection is essential, then why cannot existence or any of the other attributes, as potency or wisdom, be posited as a positive attribute in just the same relation as light

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50 ἀκολουθείαν άναθλητικήν ἄνωθεν κατά ἐστάθμην δηλαδή παντός ἰσχύος, ἀποκριθοῦσαν, καὶ τιτλοῦς τιναῖς τυποῖς. Or Adonai, p. 23a.  
51 Epistola XXXI, Opera, V, 11.
is posited of a luminous body? Let us, following up the analogy, suppose that the first cause is a luminous body; it is consequently necessary of existence. Is its light, though not identical with the essence of the body, less necessary of existence, or can the body not be described by it? The light is not a separate thing, but is an essential quality through which the body may be described. In a similar manner, we can call the attributes of God positive, especially such as eternity, existence, and unity, and yet they do not imply plurality.\(^8^2\) It is true that so far as our conception is concerned we cannot give them a positive content, for that would determine God, and we must use the negative, e.g. as existent, not non-existent, &c., but in regard to God himself they are surely positive, and He can be described by them.\(^8^3\)

Especially precarious is Maimonides' position, says Crescas, when we consider the other attributes such as wisdom and potence. What does he mean by saying that potence means absence of weakness, or knowing, privation of ignorance? He does not remove the positive content from the attribute. There is no *tertium quid* between knowing and not knowing, if not not-knowing; hence it necessarily follows that God is knowing. But if the attribute of knowing has a positive content, what then is that content? It is not identical with essence, for the essence of God is inconceivable in its totality; and surely it cannot

\(^{82}\) לָהֵם עַל דָּרְכֵם מִיָּשָׁר מַעְתַּחְתּוֹב הַמְּצַאֲתוֹ הַלְּעָצוּ וְהַמְּכַנָּה מְכַנָּה

אֲנָוִים מַעְתַּחְתּוֹב מְכַנָּה בְּעֶזְמוֹ הַמְּצַאֲתוֹ אֶזְיֵר לוֹ לָא אֲנָו הָיָה מָכַן עָצָבוֹ

נְבֵלָה מְצַאֲתוֹ מִיָּשָׁר עֲרָיָה לְעַרְבִּיבָהָוֹת מַקְסַמְי אֲבָל הָאֲדוֹנָב מַקְסַמְי שָׁוָא

שָׁוָאָוִים בָּאְלָו הָאֲדוֹנָב מַקְסַמְי שָׁוָא

Or *Adonai*, p. 24 b.

\(^{83}\) *Ibid.*
be an accident, for that is excluded from the conception. It follows, therefore, that positive attributes are essential. Again, he says, if we assume the Maimonidian view, it follows that God will be absolutely qualityless, almost equal to nothing; for, he says, if we deny any essential attributes, it is not that we deny our knowledge of them, but the having itself. God will be then entirely negative, neither potent nor impotent, nor anything, and this is absurd. It is evident, therefore, that positive attributes must be posited of God though we cannot determine their content, and for human purposes may be described negatively.\(^8^4\)

As for unity, Crescas thinks that in a similar manner to existence it is not essence, but essential. If we shall say that it is essence, we shall encounter the same difficulty in predication as in existence. When we say that man is one, we do not state anything new about man, but merely repeat that man is man. It follows, therefore, as has been mentioned, that unity is an essential attribute and a rational mode of conception. It follows also, since unity is really a mode of differentiation, that God who is the most differentiated of all other beings, is one par excellence.\(^8^5\)

Crescas makes here a keen observation, namely, that unity has a double meaning. It means simplicity, that the object is not composite; and it is also to be understood in a numerical sense, that there is only one God. Spinoza

\(^8^4\) *Or Adonai*, p. 25 a-b.

\(^8^5\) *Or Adonai*, p. 22 b.
expresses the latter by *unicum.* As for the first, it was well established, for God is necessary of existence, and everything necessary of existence cannot be composite, as has been discussed. The question remains in regard to the second. Is there only one God? We have shown above that Crescas always considered the arguments substantiating the oneness as insufficient. The interdependence of the world and the harmony of action are counterbalanced by his supposition of the possible existence of two worlds (cp. above). There is, however, one more argument, which says that since we posit the infinite potency of God, the existence of another God is impossible, for they would constrain each other. Yet, says Crescas, these arguments are not convincing, for it is still possible that the other one is not active. He, therefore, concludes that the numerical unity of God is only a subject of revelation.

It must be admitted that Crescas in this point is not only weak, but prejudiced. His polemical nature over-mastered the philosophical. What does he mean by a passive God? Does it not contradict his own conception of God? If God possesses infinite potency, what then is that other being? It is neither active nor potential. It is evident that this absurd argument was only advanced just as a shot at the philosophers, though it fell short of the mark, and Crescas well conceived it.

It is necessary, in conclusion of this part of Crescas's theory, to say a few words concerning his influence on Spinoza, regarding which there is some difference of opinion. Dr. Joel, in his book *Zur Genesis der Lehre Spinozas,*

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86 Cogitata Metaph., II, 2.
87 The same proof has been quoted by Spinoza.
88 Or Adonai, p. 26a.
asserts that Spinoza was greatly influenced by Crescas in the formation of his theory of attributes. He says that Crescas makes a distinction between attributes of an essential nature and such as are rational modes of conception. Again, that this is the same distinction that Spinoza makes between attributes and propria, namely, such qualities which are a part of God's own essence, though they do not affect His simplicity or immutability. It is difficult to agree with Joel, both that such a distinction is made by Crescas and that it is identical with Spinoza's. Crescas calls both kinds of attributes, such as eternity, existence, and unity (rather simplicity), those that Joel would include in the second class, and knowledge or potency, which are, according to Joel, in the first class, by one name, namely, עלאים ואראים, which means essential attributes. It is true that Crescas says that the first-named attributes are less apt to affect the simplicity of God, for their content is only a rational mode with a negative form, as existence, not non-being, &c. But no real distinction is found. He says distinctly, 'It is clear from the foregoing that existent and unity (simplicity), which are predicated of Him, His name be praised, are essential attributes,' or as Dr. Joel would express himself, 'wesenhafter Art.' Where then does Joel get his distinction? Again, Spinoza bases his distinction on the definition that the attributes, according to him, are identical with the essence of God which is

90 Or Adonai, p. 25 a.

91 Korte Verhandeling, Opera, p. 274.

92 Or Adonai, p. 24 b.

93 Ibid., p. 25 a.
conceived through them; of such we know only two, thought and extension. The Propria are such as belong to God, but do not express His essence. Of such a distinction there is no mention in Crescas. On the contrary, Crescas asserts that the essence of God is inconceivable. This is really a fundamental difference between Crescas and Spinoza. Again, we find many of those Propria of Spinoza among the essential attributes, as, for instance, knowledge. How, then, can we say that it is the same distinction? We can nevertheless admit that the idea found in Crescas that there are some attributes which, though predicated of God, do not by all means express His essence, is also found in Spinoza. But to consider it as a source of influence is exaggerating.

I want to direct attention to another point of contact between Crescas and Spinoza, which brings the possible influence into a more favourable light. It is the relation of the attributes to the essence of God. Crescas teaches the infinite perfection of God, and the absolute unity of His essence, in spite of the fact that we predicate essential attributes of Him, for in His infinite essence they are all one. It is true that he does not make clear in what way these essential attributes are to be understood; they do not express His essence, for His essence cannot be conceived by us, but nevertheless are positive and essential. It may be that in his insisting that the essence of God is not conceived by us, he means to say that, while these attributes are essential, yet they are not to be understood as final; but our conception of them is incomplete. For instance, we predicate knowledge as an attribute, but we do not know what kind or what degree of knowledge He possesses.

Similarly, Spinoza teaches the infinite perfection of God, and that He possesses infinite attributes, all of which constitute one being. What Spinoza means by attributes was a matter of great controversy, but the interpretation of Fischer is the correct one. According to it, the infinite attributes are infinite forces of God and not different substances. Since the attributes are infinite, it follows that the human mind will never know all of them, and so the essence of God is not conceived fully. The attributes known by us are thought and extension. We see, therefore, that in spite of the widely separating gulf between the two systems, there is still a marked similarity in the basic conception of the attributes. Both teach infinite perfection, infinite unity in spite of the positive content of the attributes, and the incomplete knowledge of the essence. Of course, I am not blind to the differences of their teachings. Spinoza emphasizes that the attributes of extension and thought express the essence of God as forces, and as such are fully conceived by man. Crescas, on the other hand, would shrink in horror from such a conception. But such differences are due to the different nature of Spinoza's system, which is wholly divergent from that of Crescas, as far as the God of a religious man is from the God of a philosopher. Yet they afford points of similarity, especially at the base of their systems where the variance is at its minimum. It can almost be said that Spinoza's system is only a result of carrying out Crescas's principles to their extreme logical conclusion. It will be best illustrated in the chapters on the relation of God and the world, for it is there that the real divergence is evident.

96 Epistola XL. 97 Def. 6; Ethics, 1.
We see, then, that in spite of Fischer's contention against any possible influence of Crescas on Spinoza there are to be found traces of marked likeness between them. We must not forget that when we say influence we do not mean that the latter actually followed the former, or anything to that effect; what it signifies is a thought impulse and a pointing in a certain direction. That Spinoza read Crescas carefully, and not, as Fischer maintains, was only imperfectly acquainted with him, we have shown above. I wish to remark that Fischer is not entirely just to Crescas by saying of him, 'Denn selbst die Einheit Gottes ist bei ihm kein Object der Erkenntnis, sondern der Offenbarung', and using this fact as an argument to disprove the influence of Crescas on Spinoza. I presume that Fischer means by the words 'die Einheit Gottes' the numerical unity of God, for the essential unity was demonstrated by Crescas as clearly as by Spinoza. But even in regard to the former, it was already mentioned (cp. above) that Crescas's remark in that regard should be taken with reserve, and that it is only a polemic expression. In reality, numerical unity of God is established according to Crescas, since he posits the infinite potence of God. Of course, Spinoza deduces unity with great accuracy from the mere definition of God; but the difference of deduction in the two systems in regard to a certain point does not prove that it is impossible for one system to have influenced the other. It is only religious sufficiency that prevented Crescas from following up his own definition and reaching the same conclusion.

In concluding his theory of attributes Crescas discusses a few emotional qualities which are to be attributed to God. The discussion is interesting, both by the novelty of the
conception, as well as by the interpretations of the emotions. Aristotle teaches the happiness of God, and deduces it in the following manner. We must attribute to God the highest activity which is no higher thing than contemplation, and since we humans feel pleasure and happiness in thought, it follows that God who is eternally active, namely contemplative, and the quality of His contemplation being of the highest and purest kind, must necessarily be always happy.\\(^99\\) Such a conception, says Crescas, is untenable, and is based on a false theory of emotions. Joy and sorrow, or pleasure and pain, are contraries, and consequently fall under the category of action. They really do not depend on knowledge, but on will. Pleasure is only the gratification we derive from the carrying out of our will. Pain, on the other hand, is the feeling we experience when our will is obstructed.\\(^100\\) If we do experience joy in our knowing, it is because there is a will to know, and by attaining knowledge we overcome the obstacle to our will. It will be evident, therefore, that as far as God is concerned we cannot attribute any happiness to Him. His knowledge has no limitations, and there are no obstructions to His will. When we humans experience any pleasure at conceiving a certain thing, it is because that conception was not known to us, and in overcoming the obstacle we experience a sense of pleasure. But in regard to God such a mode is inapplicable: whence, then, His happiness at knowing? Crescas asserts, therefore, that if we do

[^99]: Metaph., XII, 7; Ethics, X.
[^100]: יכ השעמה אנייה וולה ערבות מח辎ות והנגבן והנהנמות ברצון, Or Adonai, p. 27 a. Just to know how modern this theory of emotions is, we have but to compare the views on pleasure and pain of the English psychologist, E. G. Stout, in his Manual of Psychology, chapter on Pain and Pleasure.
attribute happiness to God it is because of His love. God is voluntarily the cause of all being, and since we know that existence is goodness, it follows that in so far as God is voluntarily the cause of being, He is voluntarily good. The continuation of the existence of beings is then the continual emanation of His goodness. It is evident, then, that in so far as God continually emanates His goodness and perfection voluntarily, in so far He loves the emanation of goodness necessarily, and it is this action of emanating permeated with love that is described as joy or happiness. This happiness or joy is essential to God, for, as we have seen, it is inherently connected with His being the cause of things and the continual emanation of His goodness and perfection. We cannot help but express our admiration for such a high ethical conception of the happiness of God, in comparison with which the Aristotelian as well as the Spinozistic (as will be shown) pales as regards the glow of ethical warmth.

In regard to the relations of Crescas and Spinoza on this point of Amor Dei, Joel lays great stress on the influence exerted by the former on the latter. The Amor Dei intellectualis has two meanings: the love of man towards God, and that of God towards man; but we have to defer the former to a later discussion, where the relation of God and man will be discussed, and occupy ourselves at present with the latter. Joel contends that Crescas's love of God is not far from the teaching of Spinoza that God loves Himself with an infinite intellectual love.

101 Or Adonai, I, 27 a-b.
102 Ethics, V, XXXV, Proposition.
It seems to me that Joel exaggerates a little. There is, no doubt, a similarity in language, but the content is quite different. That of Crescas is voluntaristic, that of Spinoza is intellectual in essence. Pleasure, according to Spinoza, is a transition from a lesser to a greater perfection, and since pleasure is a self-conscious feeling, knowledge necessarily accompanies it. Again, perfection itself is only knowledge, for, according to the whole Spinozistic system, true ideas have an adequate object, and whatever is false can surely not be perfection. Love is pleasure accompanied by the idea of an external cause. The external is only necessary as far as human beings are concerned, the idea of cause is the main necessary condition. It follows, then, that since God is absolutely infinite and necessarily possesses infinite perfection, for reality and perfection are synonymous, He rejoices in that perfection. Furthermore, this rejoicing is accompanied by the idea of Himself, for God possesses that idea, which is the idea of His own being as a cause, and this is what is meant by intellectual love. We say, therefore, that God loves Himself. But since in God there is not only the idea of His essence, but also of that which follows necessarily from His essence, and under this all beings, and men especially, are meant. it follows that in so far God loves Himself He loves man.

We have seen the principal features of this Spinozistic love of God, and it is evident that its content is materially different from that of Crescas. On its emotional and

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13 Ethics, Part III, Definition of Emotions II.
104 Ibid., Definition of Emotions II.
15 Ethics, II, Definition VI.
16 Ibid., Proposition III.
17 Ibid., Proposition III.
38 Ethics, V, Proposition XXXV, Corollary.
formal side it approaches Aristotle's view, which also makes the happiness of God consist in thinking, and Himself the subject of His thoughts. But there is essential difference, this is the idea of cause. It is not the act of thought that makes up the rejoicing, but the being a cause and ground of all being. This is the fundamental difference that widely separates the two conceptions. On the other hand, it is this same idea of cause that forms a point of contact with Crescas's view. The latter states that in so far as God is a cause of existence He loves the good, for existence is a continual emanation of good and perfection. But, again, there is a fundamental difference; Crescas excludes all knowledge from that love. On the other hand, according to Crescas's theory of emotions, which by the way is a very true one, pleasure is not connected with knowledge, but with will. And also in regard to God's love or happiness he insists on will. With Spinoza, however, will is entirely omitted; the mechanical or necessary conception takes the ascendancy; knowledge and reality are the principal ingredients in the teaching of Spinoza.

We may, therefore, conclude that while the Crescasian and Spinozistic views on the love of God have a basic point of contact, yet they are totally different in their content; the first is an emotional-voluntaristic, the other a strongly intellectual. There is a possibility that the term love of God, if not directly borrowed from Crescas, is at least influenced by his use of it, as the term love does not precisely describe the idea which Spinoza wishes to convey by it. There are some critics who score Spinoza severely for his introducing the conception of *Amor Dei*, and point to the difficulty involved in speaking of God as self-loving, as if He were composed of subject and object.
They assert that the conception is contradictory to the fundamental Spinozistic doctrines. But this discussion is beyond our point of interest. The real point of gravity of that question is the Amor Dei of man, but this is reserved for the next chapters. In general, I wish to say that I do not intend to minimize the influence of Crescas upon Spinoza. On the contrary, I believe that both systems afford many points of contact, and, furthermore, that their source is really one, except that they run in divergent lines. It is possible to find a goodly number of likenesses, but they are never commensurable. To this point more space will be devoted in the coming chapters.

100 See K. Fischer in his Spinoza, p. 573.

(To be continued.)
The following corrections were received from the author after the article had been sent to press:—

Page 271, n. 3, l. 5, for Mr. Bayley [sic] read Bayle

... 272, line 12, for Kappel read Koppel

... 276, 18, 노르 노르

... 278, 11, כמות לקפורט

... 279, 5, ומקה ומקה

... 276, 26, ולא ולא

... 280, 12, ולא ולא

... 282, 31, ולא ולא

... 283, 16, מחנה מחנה

... 284, 22, מחנה מחנה

... 285, 23, של של

... 286, 8, של של

... 289, 5, 베노 ובנו ובנו
RECENT HEBRAICA AND JUDAICA.


The appearance of the Chapters of Rabbi Eliezer in translation is a matter for congratulation, as only a very small number of rabbinic books has hitherto been translated into English. It is true that there are more important books which may claim preference, but no one will quarrel with the Rev. Gerald Friedlander for having selected this book, in which, owing to its many-sidedness, he takes special interest. In mode of treatment and form of presentation this book stands between the early Midrashim and the later pseudepigraphic writings like the Sefer ha-Yashar. There is a certain uniformity of structure and purpose in this book, and this in itself may furnish us a clue as to the approximate period of its compilation. As is the case with practically all Midrashim, the greater part of the material used by the compiler dates from amoraic times, but the compilation was no doubt made much later. The continuity of narrative maintained in a great number of the chapters would lead one to place this book in the same category as the Midrash Peširat Mosheh, Midrash Yonah, and similar Midrashim. To this group belongs, to my mind, the twenty-sixth section of the Pesikta Rabbati (Friedmann's edition, pp. 128 b–132 a), which is out of harmony with the rest of the book. The very fact that this section does not begin with a biblical verse, as is the case with all other sections, is sufficient to excite suspicion. Then the continuity of narrative, where biblical verses are often not quoted but skilfully interwoven with
the author's own words, would point to the conjecture that this section formed a book by itself which may have been called Midrash Yirmeyahu. It is noteworthy that this section is missing in a manuscript in the possession of Dr. A. Cohen, of London, who kindly put it at my disposal for the preparation of an edition of the Pesikta Rabbati in the 'Jewish Classics Series'; although it must be owned that other apparently authentic sections are not included in that manuscript, to which I hope to devote a special article. On the other hand, the authors or compilers of this group of books still retain the midrashic mode of treatment, and have not reached that stage of the Sefer ha-Yashar where the style of the narrative parts of the Bible is imitated and evenly maintained throughout the book. These considerations appear to me more cogent for determining the approximate age of these books than certain allusions to historical events. These allusions are mostly incidental, and may after all be later interpolations. Mr. Friedlander rightly adopts the current view held by the majority of Jewish scholars that the Chapters were compiled during the first quarter of the ninth century. And this is the period to which the stylistic evidence points.

As to the origin of this book, Müller suggested that the compiler had lived in Palestine. He was led to this view by the religious customs peculiar to this book. This theory finds striking confirmation in the following passage occurring in the book in connexion with the principle of intercalation: 'When Jacob went out of the Holy Land, he attempted to intercalate the year outside the Holy Land. The Holy One, blessed be He, said to him: "Jacob, thou hast no authority to intercalate the year outside the land of Israel"' (p. 54; see also p. 56). It seems to me that such a statement could only have been made by a Palestinian writer, as may be seen from the controversy which took place a century later between the Gaon Saadya in Babylon and Ben Meir in Palestine.

Traditionally this book is ascribed to R. Eliezer the Great, one of the most famous Tannaim. How the tradition arose is one of the numerous literary problems connected with this work.
Did the author or compiler himself hide his identity behind the name of this great personality, or was the authorship of this book ascribed to R. Eliezer by a later generation? At the present stage of our knowledge we have no means of answering this question. The first two chapters pretend to give a biographical sketch of R. Eliezer, and this would apparently furnish the reason why his name was connected with this work. But it is to be observed that in some manuscripts these introductory chapters are missing, and one would be justified in suspecting that these chapters were added after the entire work had been ascribed to R. Eliezer. Mr. Friedlander touches very lightly upon this problem, and, after discussing the various possibilities, he seems to incline to the view that the author deliberately selected the name of this famous Tanna in order to avoid the danger of being placed under the ban for the daring displayed in his book.

A careful analysis of these *Chapters* would prove that the author’s plan was to give amplified accounts of the biblical narratives. It is difficult to assert whether this work has been preserved in its entirety or not, but in its extant form it contains fifty-four chapters, which are in some manuscripts counted as fifty-three, the last two chapters being taken as one. Of these chapters the first two, as has been stated above, are introductory and do not form part of the work proper. Chapters III–XI deal with the work of Creation; XII–XXII tell the stories of Adam and Eve, Cain and Abel; XXIII and XXIV deal with Noah and the Flood; XXV refers to Sodom; XXVI–XXXIII set forth the account of Abraham and Isaac; XXXIV is a short treatise on the resurrection of the dead; XXXV–XXXIX deal with Jacob and Joseph; XL–XLIII tell of Moses, the revelation on mount Sinai, and the exodus (the chapters should undoubtedly be arranged chronologically); XLIV refers to Amalek; XLV–XLVII tell of the golden calf; XLVIII resumes the story of the exodus: XLIX and L treat of Mordecai and Haman; LI is eschatological; LII describes the wonders of old; LIII and LIV give a few incidents of Israel’s wanderings in the wilderness. It is thus obvious that, with the exception of chapter XXXIV, chapters
III-L amplify the narratives of Genesis, Exodus, and the Book of Esther. If one or two chapters are rearranged, it will become apparent that the author followed the biblical order very closely. The remaining few chapters, which are of a miscellaneous character, may be later interpolations, or may have been inserted by the author himself for some reason or another. The author now and again gives a mystical aspect to the narratives, and tries to link them together under certain catchwords. Thus some of the narratives begin with the descents which God made. The author also incorporates into the narratives chapters which, from a modern point of view, would be regarded as irrelevant. In dealing with the creation of the planets the author takes the opportunity to give the principles of intercalation. Nevertheless the uniformity of his plan cannot be ignored. Mr. Friedlander is of opinion that this book is, in all probability, a composite work, consisting of three originally distinct sections. One part described the ten descents made by God, another gave a detailed account of rabbinic mysticism, and another was a Midrash on the Eighteen Benedictions. The untenability of this view may be proved by the circumstance that these component parts cannot be separated from one another without impairing the progress of the various narratives. While it is true, as has been pointed out above, that there are a few chapters which may easily be removed, it is just the chapters dealing with the descents and alluding to the Eighteen Benedictions which form the integral parts of the framework. The author no doubt tried to include everything in his work: mysticism, principles of intercalation, and moral lessons. In telling the story of Abraham’s life it was quite natural to mention the benediction connected with his name: ‘Blessed art Thou, O Lord, the shield of Abraham’ (p. 196). But all this in no way indicates that various books were combined into one. Rabbinic literature teems with examples where various subjects were incorporated into one book. Even codifiers did not think it necessary to keep always to the subject under discussion.

In his introduction Mr. Friedlander has collected a great deal of material, and almost all the important problems connected with
the book have been discussed, although his presentation lacks literary form. Some of the paragraphs really belong to the notes on the translation, while a good many of the notes should have been utilized in the introduction. The greater part of the introduction is devoted to the relation of Pirke de-Rabbi Eliezer to the Talmud, Targum, Midrash, Zohar, and Liturgy, as well as to the Apocrypha and Pseudepigrapha. In this part especially Mr. Friedlander displays a remarkable mastery of the subject and a thorough acquaintance with all the branches of this vast literature. At the same time it must be owned that some of the parallel passages may be accidental, and do not prove the dependence of the author of the Chapters upon the apocryphal and pseudepigraphic works. On the whole, it seems to me that Mr. Friedlander overrates the influence of the Book of Jubilees on our author. The mode of thought, style, and phraseology of the Chapters are midrashic with a distinct tendency toward mysticism. It is quite conceivable that a man imbued with the midrashic spirit could have written these Chapters without having seen any part of the apocryphal and pseudepigraphic literature. There is nothing to gain by comparing such expressions as 'the middle of the earth' (p. xxx), 'since the creation of the world' (p. xxxii), 'remember you for good' (p. xxxiii), which happen to occur in the Book of Enoch and in the Pirke de-Rabbi Eliezer. Even the more striking resemblances do not warrant the conclusions drawn by Mr. Friedlander, as the doctrines of the Book of Jubilees and similar works may have been known by the author of the Chapters from other sources.

The copious notes with which the translation is furnished are of a high scholarly standard. They deal mainly with parallel passages and expressions occurring in rabbinic literature and in apocryphal and pseudepigraphic works. They also elucidate difficult passages in the Hebrew text, and draw attention to the variants in the printed editions as well as in the manuscripts which Mr. Friedlander collated. The foundation is thus laid for a critical edition of the original. Some of the notes, however, are irrelevant and unnecessary. This, however, is an error in
the right direction, and students will certainly be grateful to Mr. Friedlander for his assiduity and conscientious work.

As stated on the title-page, the translation of the *Chapters* is based on the text of the manuscript in the possession of Abraham Epstein, of Vienna. When various manuscripts of a text are extant, critical editors usually adopt one of the two methods: they either base their edition upon one manuscript and give the variants in the notes, or publish an eclectic text, selecting the best readings from all sources. The latter method is naturally more difficult, as the editor must be very cautious not to adopt an inferior reading: but, if successfully carried out, it offers many advantages to the reader. One would, however, question the advisability of basing a translation upon a single manuscript and giving obviously corrupt readings. This is especially unwise in the case of a book like the *Chapters*, which has been repeatedly printed and has enjoyed great popularity. The Epstein MS. has undoubtedly preserved some excellent readings. A very interesting instance may be cited. In ch. xxxvi the printed editions read: 'R. Akiba says: “Anyone who enters a city and meets maidens coming forth, his way will be prosperous . . . And again whence dost thou learn this? From Moses our teacher. Before entering the city he met maidens coming forth, as it is said: Now the priest of Midian had seven daughters, and they came . . . And He prospered his way, and he advanced to kingship.”' The difficulty in this passage is due to the circumstance that the earlier sources do not know of the kingship of Moses. Reference is usually made to Zebalhim 102a. But in that passage the word *king* is used in a loose sense, and simply means leader (of Israel). By no stretch of imagination can one find in the words רבי יוסי בן ממלך an allusion to the elaborate account given in the *Sefer ha-Yashar* of the kingship of Moses, who miraculously defeated the enemy and was anointed king of Cush instead of Kikanus. But the Epstein MS. proves that in the printed editions a paragraph fell out through homoioteleuton. According to that MS. we have to insert, after 'and he was prosperous', the following paragraph: 'and he redeemed Israel. And again
whence dost thou know this? From Saul. Before he entered the city he met maidens coming forth, as it is said: As they went up the ascent to the city, they found young maidens going out. And He prospered his way. Thus the words 'and he advanced to kingship' refer to Saul, not to Moses. Is it possible that an error of this nature gave rise to the legendary narrative of the Sefer ha-Yashar? The origin of legends is veiled in obscurity. The poetic imagination weaves fanciful tales about famous heroes. But it is not unlikely that a slight misunderstanding of an oral or written narrative may set the fancy working. The Koran abounds in examples to illustrate this view.

On the other hand, in a number of cases the Epstein MS. is decidedly corrupt. P. 93: 'He said to her: "All that I have shall be in thy hands, except this house, which is full of scorpions."' The word house, repeated a few times on this page, makes no sense at all. The printed editions have 'cask', which is the only possible reading. It is quite obvious that a copyist mistook a ה for a נ, and read תנה instead of תנה. Such a mistake is perfectly natural, but why should we perpetuate it in a translation? As Mr. Friedlander does not describe the Epstein MS., it is hard to say whether נ and ה are clearly differentiated there. P. 180: 'The Holy One, blessed be He, answered him: "Abraham, by the merit of the righteous (one) will I forgive Sodom. If I find in Sodom fifty righteous, then will I forgive it all its sins."' The last two sentences manifestly contradict each other: at first it is said that one righteous man is sufficient to secure pardon for Sodom, and then fifty righteous ones are required. The printed editions have: 'By the merit of fifty righteous men will I forgive Sodom, as it is said . .' P. 227: 'Isaac said to his father Abraham: "O my father, bind for me my two hands and my two feet, so that I should not curse thee."' It is hard to understand how the binding of his hands and feet would prevent him from cursing. The printed editions have: 'to avoid an accident (מָעַן is correct and not מָעַן as Mr. Friedlander emends it), which would cause me to break the commandment "Honour thy father."' Mr. Friedlander does
not give the Hebrew of this sentence according to the Epstein MS.; but if it is לִפְנֵי, it may be a mistake for לִפְנָיו, the remaining words having fallen out. It is also likely that it was corrupted from לִפְנֵי (I shall be disqualified). P. 280: 'Concerning this Solomon said: "And break in pieces their pillars."' As this verse occurs in Exodus 23. 24, it is obvious that the printed editions have preserved the correct reading: 'Concerning this Moses said...'. P. 320: 'Hence thou mayest learn that the words of the Torah are like coals of fire. Why was it "at His right hand"? Whence do we know (that it was given to them) with expression of love? Because it is said: "The Lord hath sworn by His right hand, and by the arm of His strength."' The quotation does not harmonize with the preceding sentence. The printed editions read correctly: 'Hence thou mayest learn that the words of the Torah are like coals of fire. He gave it to them with an expression of love, as it is said: "His left hand is under my head (and His right hand doth embrace me)"; and with an expression of oath, as it is said: "The Lord hath sworn by His right hand, and by the arm of His strength."'

Mr. Friedlander is not quite consistent in adhering to his manuscript, as he deviates from it in some instances. Thus on p. 319 he correctly translates: 'Thence He sent messengers to all the nations of the world.' But his manuscript has 'And Moses' instead of 'Thence'—that is, בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל for בְּנֵי יִשְׂרָאֵל. But why was it not possible to eliminate all the scribal errors?

From the philological point of view the translation of the Pirke de-Rabbi Eliezer does not offer any serious difficulties. The author's style is fluent and easy, without any mixture of Aramaic, which is frequently found in the earlier Midrashim. Still there are pitfalls, especially in the biblical quotations, which at first sight would appear the easiest task for the translator. It must be borne in mind that a midrashic interpretation sometimes involves a far-fetched and impossible way of construing a biblical verse. One would be misinterpreting the Midrash were one to translate these quotations in accordance with modern philology. Mr. Friedlander is evidently conscious of this fact, though he did
not always successfully avoid these pitfalls. There are other inaccuracies due to his having faultily construed some sentences. In the following remarks attention will be called to some of these errors, which in no way detract from the general merits of the work.

P. 7. ‘He said to them: (R. Jochanan) should not have spoken in that manner, but (in this wise), “Happy am I because he has come forth from my loins.”’ As Hyrkanos was R. Eliezer’s father, the last sentence could not be the direct speech of R. Johanan. Translate: ‘but I am the happy one because . . .’

P. 9. In consequence of a wrong division of sentences, Mr. Friedlander was obliged to supply an object and a complement, and he missed the sense of the original: ‘Not even the ministering angels are able to narrate (the Divine praise). But to investigate a part of His mighty deeds with reference to what He has done, and what He will do in the future (is permissible), so that His name should be exalted among His creatures.’ What the Hebrew original says is: ‘Even the ministering angels are only able to declare a part of His mighty deeds. Nevertheless we should investigate what He has done and what He will do, so that . . .’ It is unlikely that the Epstein MS. differs from the printed texts, as the fact is not stated in the notes.

P. 125. According to the midrashic interpretation, it would be more suitable to render Ps. 49. 13: ‘Adam abideth not in glory over night,’ instead of ‘Man in glory tarrieth not over night.’ In the notes Mr. Friedlander rightly observes: ‘The Hebrew word is “Adam.”’ But the force of the Midrash should have been brought out in the translation.

P. 126. The reason why Psalm 92 was ascribed to Moses is given in Pesiṭa Rabbati (Friedmann’s edition, p. 187a), from which passage it is apparent that the heading נמזור ירה לאומ ת𦒹ת was taken as the acrostic נמיהש.

P. 131. ‘And Israel who (will be) in the land (of Palestine) (will experience) great trouble, but in their troubles they (will be) like a green olive, as it is said, “I am anointed with fresh oil.”’ The biblical quotation does not bear out the statement of the
Midrash. Mr. Friedlander remarks in his notes that the Midrash interprets 'I am anointed' as though it were connected with the root balah, 'to afflict.' Cp. i Chron. 17. 9. Accordingly, the verse should be rendered: 'when I am in distress, I am like fresh oil.' It is to be observed that while in i Chron. 17. 9 הַלֵּחַי stands for הָנָּשָׁך, as in 2 Sam. 7. 10, it is not unlikely that the author of the Chapters knew the Arabic word הָנָּשָׁך a calamity.

See below remark on p. 222.

P. 143. 'Driving out, (i.e.)' and he went forth outside the garden of Eden.' This is rather clumsy. The original has: 'Having been driven out (בִּいたら), he went forth . . .'

P. 152. According to the midrashic interpretation, Ps. 89. 3 should be rendered: 'For I have said: "The world was built up by a shameful thing,"' the reference being to Lev. 20. 17. The Midrash hastens to explain: 'By a shameful thing was the world built up before the Torah had been given.' Mr. Friedlander grasped the purport of the Midrash, as is shown by the notes, and yet he has: 'The world shall be built up by love.' On the same page he omitted the words 'He replied' before 'From these words know . . .?' This statement is obviously the answer of R. Miasha, and cannot be the continuation of R. Simeon's question. The printed editions have בָּנָּךְ, and we are not informed that these words are missing in the Epstein MS.

P. 222. 'Swords' signify only wars.' It seems very likely that the author had the Arabic حرب in mind. Although there is no conclusive evidence that the author of the Chapters was influenced by Arabic literature, he may have had some slight acquaintance with that language. See above remark on p. 131.

P. 224. 'Is it concerning the son lacking circumcision, or the son born for circumcision?' This is unintelligible. The Hebrew means: 'Dost Thou allude to the son born before the law of circumcision had been given or to the son born after that law had been given?' The words הָנָּשָׁך and הָנָּשָׁך refer to Abraham himself and not to Ishmael and Isaac.

P. 232. The Midrash demands that Gen. 6. 3 should be rendered: 'My spirit shall not strive with man for ever on
account of *Beshaggam* (the numerical value of כה is equal to that of נה). But Mr. Friedlander renders it: 'My spirit shall not abide in man for ever in their going astray,' and the entire passage is thereby made obscure.

P. 233. The etymology of the name Josiah according to the Midrash is אָנָּה יִשָּׂעֵי which means: 'he is fit for an offering or gift.' Mr. Friedlander confused אָנָּה with יִשָּׂע, and rendered this phrase: 'he is worthy like a lamb.'

P. 264. The midrashic point is missed in the rendering of 1 Chron. 17. 21: 'a nation that is alone on the earth.' It should be: 'one nation on the earth.'

P. 268 (and elsewhere). The expression לא יתת הים נַחָא should best be rendered: 'Whence dost thou know that it is so?' Mr. Friedlander erroneously divides this phrase into question and answer: 'Whence dost thou know this? Know that it is so.'

P. 281. 'Who stood by the way like a bear bereaved by man.' This reading of the Epstein MS. is superior to that of the printed editions which have: 'Who stood by the way like a bear and came...' There can be no doubt that a copyist had abbreviated יִשָּׂעֵי into יִשָּׂע which was afterwards mistaken for a complete word. See also p. 346, note 1.

P. 311. Isa. 26. 10 is interpreted by the Midrash: 'Let favour be shown to the wicked, because he did not learn righteousness.' Mr. Friedlander follows the Anglican version: 'yet will he not learn righteousness,' which does not suit the context.

P. 340. 'The treasury of the living' is inappropriate; read: 'the treasury of life.'

P. 246. 'Amalek was smiting and slaying.' In note 11 we are told that the Epstein MS. has מָלָתָה. This should be rendered: 'he kept on smiting.' Is it possible that the author had the Arabic meaning of מָלָתָה (perished) in mind?

P. 359. 'It is possible that even thou (Moses) shouldst return.' This is out of harmony with what follows. Moreover in such cases introduces a question. Translate: 'Is one to
assume that even thou shouldst return?" The following sentence negatives this assumption.

P. 377. The name 'Ganon,' one of Ephraim's grandchildren, is undoubtedly borrowed from Isa. xxxi. 5. The printed texts have 'Yignon;' an imperfect formation from the same root. Mr. Friedlander transliterates the former as 'Ganooon' and the latter as 'Jagnoon.' These are impossible forms which obscure the etymology of the names.

P. 422. 'From the day when the heavens and the earth were created no man was ill, (who) sneezed and lived, but in every place where he happened to be, whether on the way or in the market, and (when he) sneezed, his soul went out through his nostrils.' This is an unintelligible passage. The Epstein MS. has a different reading, but it seems that Mr. Friedlander misconstrued it. In note 6 he tells us that the first editions, which differ from the MS., read: 'no man was ill unless he happened to be on the way or in the market-place.' This is again a mistranslation. What the printed texts really have is: 'no man had ever been ill, but wherever he happened to be, on the way or in the market-place, he would sneeze, and his soul would go out through his nostrils.' This is in accordance with Baba me-ssi'a 87 a.

It is to be hoped that Mr. Friedlander will soon issue a critical edition of the Hebrew text of the Pirke de-Rabbi Eliezer, and thus enable his fellow-workers to examine the variants of the manuscripts which he consulted for his translation.


For more than five centuries the Jews were in close contact with the Romans, and their influence over one another must have been of considerable importance. It is true that, owing to the diametrically opposed views of life held by these two nations, no
mutual understanding between them was possible. The Roman despised the Jew for his idealism, and the Jew looked upon the Roman as upon a vile oppressor whose sole aim was to satisfy his lusts and worldly desires. In Roman literature the Jew is ridiculed, and his most sacred religious rites are branded as abominable superstitions. But it is good 'to see ourselves as others see us,' and Jewish historians are utilizing Théodore Reinach's collection of fragments relating to Jews which occur in Greek and Latin books (Textes d'Auteurs Grecs et Romains relatifs au Judaïsme). Similarly it is of service to Greek and Roman history to collect the passages occurring in rabbinic literature in which reference is made, directly or indirectly, to the Greeks and Romans. The historian of the classical world would thus get the two extreme views: the boastfulness of the oppressor and the contempt of the oppressed. It is quite possible that in the cryptic allusions of the Rabbis material would be discovered which is otherwise unknown. There may be some incidental references to Greek and Roman customs and manners which are not found in the classical sources. Unpleasant traits of Roman life would especially be brought out more clearly in Jewish literature. The trustworthiness of these sources cannot be assailed, as an intimate acquaintance with the internal life of the Romans is manifest in the Talmud as well as in almost all the various Midrashim, although due allowance must be made for the bias of a foreign race, and not every detail should be accepted.

The contact of Greek and Jewish civilizations took place during the last centuries of the biblical period, when the literary productivity of the Jews was in abeyance. There are accordingly very few indisputable references to the Greeks in the Bible, and even Cheyne in his Job and Solomon could only point to the influence of Greek thought in one or two books. In rabbinic literature, which arose centuries later, there can only be faint echoes of Greek life. These allusions are mostly based on earlier sources which were not infrequently misunderstood, and are of no historical importance unless we find independent corroboration. But quite different is the case with Roman history. Here rabbinic
literature furnishes contemporary evidence, offering a new point of view which cannot be ignored. The Midrashim and the aggadic portions of the Talmud abound in anecdotes about Roman life. A good many of the passages tell us of the persecutions the Jews suffered at the hand of the Roman emperors, and Rome is designated as מלך רדש (the wicked government) without any further definition. Another favourite name for Rome is Edom, Israel’s enemy in biblical times. The names of Hadrian, Trajan, and Tyrannus Rufus are usually accompanied by curses. Even in cases where an emperor is mentioned anonymously, it is sometimes possible to identify the one the rabbis had in mind.

The value of these passages for historical investigations had long been recognized. As early as 1852, Michael Sachs made ample use of this material, and in 1903 J. Ziegler collected and explained the parables about emperors occurring in the various Midrashim (Die Königsgleichnisse des Midrasch beleuchtet durch die römische Kaiserzeit). These books, however, are devoted to single phases of Roman life. Dr. Krauss’ work is more ambitious and comprehensive, for it includes all phases of Greek and Roman history as illustrated in rabbinic literature. His aim is not to show the relation of the Romans to the Jews, although incidentally this, too, becomes apparent, but to present all the available material pertaining to the classical world. Dr. Krauss is one of the foremost Jewish scholars of our age, and has for many years devoted himself to the systematic study of the Talmud and Midrashim, especially in their relation to the classical literatures. His books on philology, archaeology, and history are monuments of erudition and sound scholarship. He is thus, perhaps more than any other living scholar, qualified to collect all the rabbinic texts and classify them according to their subjects. This is by no means an easy task. There are numerous passages whose real purport would escape the average reader, and it is only a master of classics and rabbinics who can discover historical allusions in them. And after the material has been collected, the systematic classification requires sound judgement. Apart from his scholarly reputation, Dr. Krauss inspires confidence by his mode of treat-
He admits that at present it is neither possible nor desirable to exhaust all the rabbinic texts referring to the Greeks and Romans. His work is by no means final, and a great deal remains to be discovered and explained. At the same time there can be no doubt that the texts thus selected present as complete a picture as can be possibly obtained.

Dr. Krauss classified his texts into nine groups: A. Zur Geographie. B. Die vier Weltreiche. C. Die Griechen. D. Rom und die Völker. E. Kaiser und Feldherren. F. Kaiserverehrung. G. Kaiserrecht. H. Verwaltung. I. Verfall. The passages in each group are divided into suitable sections, and each paragraph has a heading of its own. The reader is thus enabled to see at a glance the purport and value of each paragraph. Not the least meritorious feature of this compilation is the skilful method of excerpting the passages. Some of the historical allusions are interwoven with entirely different subjects, and the difficulty of extricating them from their context must not be underrated. There is always the danger of citing more than necessary and thereby making the point at issue too insignificant to be noticed, or of giving unintelligible fragments. In the present volume only the essential parts have been cited, and yet each paragraph is complete in itself.

According to Dr. Krauss' statement (p. vii), only three of the groups (Zur Geographie, Die Griechen, Kaiser und Feldherren) are exhaustive, while no attempt was made to give anything like a complete collection of passages in the other groups. This is due to the fact that many of the references are too indefinite to be classified, while there are others whose historical value is more than doubtful. As to the judiciousness of the selections, we are obliged to rely on the authority of Dr. Krauss, for without a complete collection at hand one is unable to say whether the most appropriate texts have been included. Still there are passages which, to my mind, should have been incorporated in this volume. A conspicuous instance may be mentioned here. In the section dealing with the theatre and games (group I, section v) we miss the passage from Lamen-
tation rabba 3. 12. where the methods of the clown and mime are described. The ten paragraphs included in this section are of more general character than this one.

Each group is preceded by a brief introduction which draws attention to the outstanding features of the texts, and incidentally a fairly complete bibliography is given. The copious notes, which elucidate each paragraph philologically and historically, are in themselves valuable contributions to rabbinic studies. They are a store-house of learning, and solve many a difficulty in midrashic literature. The hand of a master is discernible everywhere. There are cases in which one may differ from Dr. Krauss, but he is always bold and original, and his explanations deserve the highest consideration. In one difficult passage, however, he seems to have missed the exact force of the midrashic text, although the author of the commentary Matnot Kehunnah, to whom Dr. Krauss does not refer in this instance, had found the right solution. No. 47 (p. 26) cites the following passage from Leviticus rabba 13: 5: "[Ich schaute], und sieh, das zweite, ein anderes Tier, glich einem Bären.—"Bär" steht [mangelhaft] geschrieben: das ist Medien. Das eben ist die Ansicht Rabbi Johanan's; denn also sprach R. Johanan: darum schlug sie der Löwe aus dem Walde (Jer. 5. 6)—das ist Babel: der Wolf der Steppe verwüstet sie—das ist Medien.' In note 2, Dr. Krauss refers to No. 41, where a similar passage is cited from Esther rabba. It is explained in note 1 of that paragraph that the defective writing of בַּר indicates the worthlessness of Media. As R. Johanan's statement was not given in full by the compiler, the inadequacy of the explanation was not apparent. But in No. 47, where the complete text is given, one fails to understand how the anonymous opinion which compares Media to a bear is identical with that of R. Johanan who says that Media is the 'wolf of the desert.' The commentary Matnot Kehunnah on Esther rabba (introduction, § 5) admirably explains that בַּר written defectively may be read as בַּר which means wolf
in Aramaic. The passage should accordingly be rendered: "I saw, and behold another beast, a second, like a bear: it is written: "a wolf," which refers to Media. This is the opinion of R. Johanan, for R. Johanan said: "Wherefore a lion out of the forest doth smite them refers to Babylon; a wolf of the deserts doth spoil them refers to Media." 1. This midrashic interpretation applies to both passages, Nos. 41 and 47.

Dr. Krauss has a long note on the difficult word יי"ח (No. 241, excerpted from Genesis rabba 5. 1) in which he gives his own view as well as that of I. Löw, both of whom take it as a loan-word from Greek or Latin. As neither explanation is satisfactory, it occurs to me that a genuinely Semitic noun may have been preserved here, and that יי"ח is by metathesis identical with Arabic يلُنٌ، tip of the finger. Accordingly, either יי"ח is a gloss, or יי"ח refers to a different part of the finger used for making signs.

Great care was taken to edit the texts as scientifically as possible with the material available for the various books, although Dr. Krauss wisely refrained from giving variants. The vocalization, too, received the most careful attention, and while, as we shall presently see, there are some errors and misprints, this feature of the volume makes an excellent impression. In many instances 'traditional' vocalizations are disregarded, and Dr. Krauss has advanced the study of the various Aramaic dialects to a considerable extent. But it is extremely hard to break away from tradition, and even this volume, which is the work of one of our foremost philologists, still retains traditional errors. A comparison with Syriac and Arabic would prove conclusively that we should vocalize א"ת not א"ת (p. 7 and throughout the book). Instead of א"ת (p. 9) read א"ת. The technical usage of the form א"ת introducing a biblical verse, when a special signification is applied to it, is well known. Its exact force, however, has not hitherto been satisfactorily explained. The traditional pronunciation א"ת is, to my mind, due to the influence of Job 37. 6. In none of the cases does the imperative make any sense. The usual explanation is that א"ת is an eliptical expression, and that
the word רַחֲמָּא is to be supplied. But it is very unlikely that the essential part of an expression should be dropped, while the auxiliary verb alone is retained. Moreover רַחֲמָּא יָוהֵי is used in a different way. Would it not be possible to vocalize it יָוהֵי and consider it as an active participle? It would thus be the translation of id est, which is its actual signification. Dr. Krauss has "יָוהֵי (No. 17 and elsewhere), and correctly translates it by also. Instead of יָוהֵי (No. 19), read יָוהֵי; cp. יָוהֵי (No. 21). יָוהֵי = יָוהֵי (= biblical יָוהֵי), and should be יָוהֵי, not יָוהֵי (No. 22). As no noun יָוהֵי is known, יָוהֵי (No. 24) is impossible; read either יָוהֵי, or יָוהֵי, as in the parallel passages. An unsatisfactory innovation is יָוהֵי (ibid. and elsewhere). Traditional יָוהֵי is incongruous, but יָוהֵי is unknown in the sense required for this phrase. The best solution is to read יָוהֵי. See Monumata Talmudica, Recht, p. 48. Instead of יָוהֵי (No. 27, p. 17) read יָוהֵי, as the root is יָוהֵי. יָוהֵי (No. 34a, p. 18) is unlikely; read יָוהֵי. יָוהֵי (No. 37 b) is no doubt a misprint for יָוהֵי. Instead of יָוהֵי (No. 38, p. 21) vocalize יָוהֵי. In Aramaic יָוהֵי (p. 22) is impossible; read יָוהֵי. For יָוהֵי (No. 39) read יָוהֵי. As יָוהֵי (No. 40 b) is a Pael infinitive, it ought to be יָוהֵי. The vocalization יָוהֵי (No. 42, p. 24 and elsewhere) is indefensible; it should be יָוהֵי. Cp. Dan. 7. 5. For יָוהֵי (p. 26) read יָוהֵי. From a root יָוהֵי or יָוהֵי the forms יָוהֵי and יָוהֵי (No. 48) are impossible; read יָוהֵי and יָוהֵי, respectively. That the Kal is intended may be seen from יָוהֵי in the same paragraph. The vocalization יָוהֵי (ibid.) is traditional and is not impossible, but יָוהֵי is preferable and has the corroboration of Genizah fragments. Instead of יָוהֵי and יָוהֵי (No. 51) read יָוהֵי, יָוהֵי. The combination יָוהֵי יָוהֵי (p. 42) is extremely unlikely. It is to be assumed that the abbreviation sign above יָוהֵי fell out, and that the copyist intended the word to be יָוהֵי. Accordingly, the expression is similar to יָוהֵי. The form יָוהֵי (No. 86) is impossible; read יָוהֵי. For יָוהֵי (No. 91 b) read יָוהֵי. Instead of traditional יָוהֵי (No. 92 b) read יָוהֵי. From biblical Aramaic we know to vocalize יָוהֵי, whatever its etymology, not יָוהֵי (No. 94 a and elsewhere). From the root יָוהֵי (see e.g.
Esther 5. 9) we cannot get the form שִׁיחַ (p. 53): vocalize שִׁיחְיָ. Instead of שִׁיחַ (No. 100, p. 55) it is preferable to read שִׁיחַ. For זִיתִּים and זִיתִּים (No. 108) read זִיתִּים and זִיתִּים, respectively. יִנְשֹּׁויָ (No. 115) is indefensible; read יִנְשֹּׁה. As יִנְשֹּׁה is an Ithpeel, it should be יִנְשֹּׁה, not יִנְשֹּׁו (No. 119 a). For יִנְשֹּׁה (No. 124, p. 66) read יִנְשֹּׁה יִנְשֹּׁה. The Kal יִנְשֹּׁה (No. 148) is unsuitable, as a transitive form is required: read יִנְשֹּׁה יִנְשֹּׁה. Instead of יִנְשֹּׁה (No. 153, p. 77) vocalize יִנְשֹּׁה. For the impossible יִנְשֹּׁה (No. 157) read יִנְשֹּׁה יִנְשֹּׁה. Insert a mappik in the He of יִנְשֹּׁה (No. 180). As the root is שִׁ, we should vocalize שִׁ, not שִׁ (No. 190). Instead of יִנְשֹּׁה (No. 198) read יִנְשֹּׁה or יִנְשֹּׁה; see my remarks in JQR., N. S., VII, p. 406. For יִנְשֹּׁה and יִנְשֹּׁה (No. 198) read יִנְשֹּׁה יִנְשֹּׁה יִנְשֹּׁה. The Kal יִנְשֹּׁה (No. 204, p. 99) does not suit the context; read יִנְשֹּׁה, and cp. No. 314 where the Nifal is correctly used. The vocalization יִנְשֹּׁה (No. 241) does not seem to be satisfactory; on the analogy of יִנְשֹּׁה and יִנְשֹּׁה, both of which are fa'āl forms, we ought to read יִנְשֹּׁה or יִנְשֹּׁה. Syntactically יִנְשֹּׁה יִנְשֹּׁה would be better than יִנְשֹּׁה יִנְשֹּׁה (No. 244). A comparison of Hebrew יִנְשֹּׁה with Arabic יִנְשֹּׁה יִנְשֹּׁה would prove that the correct vocalization is יִנְשֹּׁה, not יִנְשֹּׁה (No. 249). The latter would signify a swordsman. Instead of יִנְשֹּׁה (No. 272 a) read יִנְשֹּׁה. For יִנְשֹּׁה (No. 327, p. 141) read יִנְשֹּׁה, as the Kames cannot be dropped in this case, no matter whether the word stands for יִנְשֹּׁה or is a form like יִנְשֹּׁה (Judges 13. 8). Dr. Krauss is right in considering יִנְשֹּׁה (No. 346) as an interrogative and not as a demonstrative pronoun. But it seems to me that the demonstrative plural is יִנְשֹּׁה, similar to biblical יִנְשֹּׁה, while the interrogative should be יִנְשֹּׁה, like יִנְשֹּׁה. Instead of יִנְשֹּׁה (No. 356) read יִנְשֹּׁה. The form יִנְשֹּׁה (No. 376) is without analogy: read יִנְשֹּׁה. The impersonal use of יִנְשֹּׁה (No. 386) is rather awkward: the Nifal יִנְשֹּׁה is preferable.


As poetry is one of the most fascinating branches of literature, every detail concerning the principles underlying it deserves attention. Writers on this subject often find it difficult to lay down hard and fast rules as to the exact definition of poetic compositions as distinct from prose. In its external features the definition is quite easy: a poetic composition has rhyme or metre, or both together. In every literature there exist numerous treatises on prosody, and this testifies to the great interest taken by scholars and writers in this subject. In classical and modern literatures the problems confronting the student are very few. The principles are rarely, if ever, a matter of dispute, and it is only in very minute details that difference of opinion is likely to exist. In Horace’s Odes, where about seventeen different metres are to be found, one may now and then come across a difficult line, but on the whole the Odes are easily scanned. The same applies to Shakespeare and other poets, who have consciously employed one metre or another. It is true that there is room for investigation into the origin of the various kinds of metres, but thus far this study has hardly made any satisfactory progress. With the poetry of the Bible, however, the case is quite different. Here the principles are still to be discovered. That the Bible contains poetic compositions has been recognized from the earliest times. Even without possessing definite knowledge as to what constitutes a Hebrew poem, students have rarely found it difficult to point out the poetic compositions in the Bible.
Indeed, in many cases the biblical writers themselves designated their compositions as poems. The real difficulty arose when attempts were made to understand the rules governing these compositions. The first question that may be pertinently asked is whether the poets themselves were conscious of any rule at all. The poetic soul pours itself out in rhythmic flow without being bound by any artificial rules. The ear catches the melodious sounds without attempting to analyse them. The success of an investigation of this nature largely depends upon the correct answer to this question. It is obviously futile to attempt to discover and describe definite rules where none exists. And indeed it may be asserted that the Bible contains passages which undoubtedly follow artificial rules of prosody, while there are a good many which are mere poetic outbursts. It is the failure to grasp this fact that is responsible for a number of fanciful theories on this subject. A student stumbles over a group of verses, thinking that he has discovered a new law, and immediately proceeds to make all other poetic passages to conform to that principle. He usually finds that his theory cannot be made to apply to other books, and he blames the masoretic text or our ignorance of the real nature of the vocalic values. Some scholars are bold enough to emend the masoretic text in order to make it conform to the new theories, forgetting that by this process any passage, prose or poetry, can be shown to be based on any given metre. There is probably an element of truth in most of the books on biblical prosody that have recently been published; it is in working out the details that they have practically all failed.

Even the early mediaeval Jewish writers evinced interest in this subject. The poet and critic Moses ibn Ezra (born about 1070) in his Arabic treatise on Hebrew poetry (*Kitab al-Muḥādarah wal-Mudākaraḥ*, a complete manuscript of which has been preserved at the Bodleian Library; the first four chapters were published by Kokovtsov from a Petrograd manuscript), while his aim is avowedly practical, to teach the poet his art, devotes the beginning of the fourth chapter to speculative study. He asserts that the poetic portions of the Bible, like Psalms, Proverbs, and Job,
have neither rhyme nor metre, and they must be regarded as free compositions similar to the Rajaz poems of the Arabs. It is only accidental that a rhyme occurs now and again. He quotes the following examples of rhyme in the Bible:

(1) Job 28. 16

(2) ibid. 33. 17

(3) ibid. 21. 4

As one of the greatest masters of the technique of mediaeval Hebrew poetry, he is more advanced than some modern scholars who try to discover rhymes in the Bible. They usually cite Exod. 15. 23, where the apparent rhyme is undoubtedly due to the unavoidable use of the pronominal suffix.

During the last few centuries the study of this subject has been taken up by Christian theologians, and various theories have been advanced from time to time. Classical scholars like Francis Gomarus (Lyra Davidis, 1637) and Francis Hare (Psalmodium libri in versiculos metrici divisi, 1636) attempted to prove that the Hebrew metre was quantitative, similar to that of Greek and Latin. In this respect they had been anticipated by Josephus, who assumed that there were trimetres, pentametres, and hexametres in the Bible. The Arabist William Jones applied the rules of Arabic prosody to the poetic books of the Bible (Poeoseos Asiaticae commentatorium, 1774). G. Bickell, a Syriac scholar of renown, is of opinion that Hebrew metre is like that of the Syrians (Metrices Biblicae, 1879; Carmina Veteris Metrici, 1882; Dichtungen der Hebräer, 1882-84). In more recent years a vast literature on this subject has sprung up. Sievers, Zapletal, D. H. Müller, Zorell, H. Grimme, and others have published valuable monographs, although their theories can only be accepted with the greatest of caution. There is one fallacy common to them all: their theories involve substantial emendations, in spite of the fact that our knowledge of the metre must necessarily be derived from the
masoretic text. It is for this reason that the rules of prosody can as yet not be used as an aid to textual criticism. Only in one instance have we reliable guidance, and that is in the alphabetic acrostic. Excellent results have been obtained in Nahum 1, where parts of the original text have been restored by this method. Another interesting case is Psalm 37. 28, where the letter y is missing, and there can be no doubt that לֵלֵי must be emended.

As the literature on this subject is growing rapidly, it is desirable that a scholar who can speak with authority should clarify matters and summarize the present state of our knowledge. Prof. König is one of the foremost grammarians and lexicographers of our age. He has contributed to almost every branch of biblical research, and one of his greatest merits is that he has advanced very cautiously, and has discouraged ingenious, but unsubstantiated, innovations. Some years ago (1900) he published a book entitled Stilistik, Rhetorik, Poetik, in which every phase of this subject was minutely and thoroughly discussed. Since that time many monographs have appeared, and in his present volume Prof. König justifies his position, proving the untenability of the theories of some recent writers. There is extremely valuable material collected here, and the criticism of the various books is clear and trenchant. He is only willing to admit that the biblical rhythm consists of accented and unaccented syllables, but refuses to recognize that there are any hard and fast rules as to the intervals when the accented syllables are to occur. It was left to the poet to put the accented syllable wherever he pleased. Prof. König puts it very pithily: the idea dominated the external form. Every branch of prosody is thoroughly discussed in this book, and the most tenable view is adopted.

There is one minor instance where Prof. König is carried away by his own ingenuity. After having pointed out that לֵלֵי in Psalm 45. 2 is identical with Greek πολύς, he observes that Judah ha-Levi, too, employs the word לֵלֵי in that sense. In his philosophic work al-Khazari, chap. 2, § 78, he blames the Hebrew poets for having imitated the forms of alien poetry, and applies to them Psalm 106. 35: 'They mingled themselves with
the nations, and learned their works.' It is hardly necessary to refute this anachronism which credits this great mediaeval poet with the knowledge of an ingenious theory of modern scholars. Judah ha-Levi would have applied this verse to any kind of imitation.

Prof. König is desirous of making this book accessible to those students who are interested in the prosody of the Bible but are not acquainted with the Hebrew language. He has therefore transcribed the examples in Roman characters.

Of a very peculiar character is Mr. Byars's short essay on some phases of ancient Hebrew prosody. The writer purposely divested it of all 'learned' arguments, and merely states the principles as they present themselves to him, without attempting to elaborate or illustrate them. In 1895 he discovered that 'the Homeric poems are based on rhyming staves, with an over- and under-tone of rhyme, relieved by blank pauses, and developed artistically through the syntax of the Greek language' (p. 4). He has since then become convinced that similar laws apply to Hebrew poetry. This essay contains twelve paragraphs, the first ten of which deal with classical literature. He lays great stress on the use of the voice, for it is only through accurate reading and intonation that the melodious force of a poem can be caught by the ear. Few examples are given to illustrate the principles enunciated by Mr. Byars, and hence the average student will certainly miss many a point. As to Hebrew verse of the first period, it 'is certainly quantitative, certainly written to scale, certainly defined in its measures by rhymed as well as blank pauses, and certainly dependent for its melody on the same principles through which the melody of Greek and Latin verse, with art at its highest, develops from the necessary habits of the ear, as acquired in speaking an inflectional language' (p. 12). Mr. Byars tells us of his own experience that 'within two months after recovering the stave-measures of the verse of the Book of Job' he 'had in memory more of the language' than he 'had gained in two years previously. Within two days after its vowel time had been assimilated, it became a language of less difficulty than modern
In their present form Mr. Byars's views are hardly likely to attract attention. Apart from the fact that only a limited number of copies has been issued, the principles are stated in too general and vague a manner to be considered by scholars. It is true that Mr. Byars has evidently no desire to convince the 'learned' world. But the 'unlearned' world will certainly take no interest in so abstruse a subject as the mysteries of ancient Hebrew prosody. The writer owes it to himself, as well as to the advancement of science, to elaborate his theories and to work out every step in detail, in order to ascertain whether they accord with facts or not. Personal convictions must be discounted in scientific research, although they are sometimes of great value as a starting-point.


It would be instructive to compare the two editions of the vocalized text of the Mishnah with German translations that are now being published, the one by a group of the ablest Jewish scholars and the other by Christian theologians. In their external make-up, the volumes that have hitherto appeared under the editorship of Georg Beer and Oscar Holtzmann are much more attractive than the others, while for accuracy of learning and sound scholarship one must turn to the edition which is being prepared by D. Hoffmann, Baneth, A. Samter, M. Petuchowski, and J. Cohn. At present the latter has a serious disadvantage: for one reason or another the publisher does not issue complete volumes at a time, but pamphlets of thirty-two pages each. Very often the pamphlet breaks off in the middle of a sentence, and the reader has to wait a long time before the continuation
appears. The present pamphlet begins with the middle of the last paragraph of Bekorot 4, and ends with the middle of 9. 8.

The text, which is based upon the ordinary editions of the Mishnah, is well edited, though variants from the different editions and manuscripts are inadequately discussed. The copious notes are mainly taken from the Gemara and all the Jewish commentators, mediaeval and modern, and the halakic part is fully explained. This commentary gives an excellent presentation of the traditional interpretation of the Mishnah, but, to my mind, Maimonides was not sufficiently drawn upon. Moreover, no attempt seems to have been made to go beyond these commentators, and the difficult names for diseases and bodily defects occurring in this tractate still remain obscure and vague as before. As characteristic of the neglect of modern philological research the following instance may be cited: In 7. 4 there occur two difficult terms, נַעַע and נַעַע, which require elucidation. But Dr. Cohn reproduces the Hebrew words without translating them, as if they were well-known expressions in German, and in his notes he merely calls attention to the fact that the editions of the Talmud have נַעַע and נַעַע. It seems to me that נַעַע is connected, if not identical, with Arabic أم deaf (Hebrew ח"ע forms are af'al in Arabic). The Mishnah itself tells us that this defect is in connexion with the ear. נַעַע may be remotely connected with נַעַע. In another case the reading of the Hebrew text does not agree with the translation. In 8. 1 we have בֵּית, which can be nothing else than Arabic בֵּית fetus, embryo, while the translation has verschiedenartigen Dingen, which represents בֵּית, a variant found in the Talmud. In the notes, however, the correct meaning of בֵּית is given.

The vocalization is not quite satisfactory, and the following errors may be pointed out. בְּנַפְרֵיָה (5. 6) should be בְּנַפְרֵיָה, as the root is בְּנַפְרֵיָה, not בְּנַפְרֵיָה; cp. e.g. Jonah 1. 4. Instead of יִשְׁמַר (6. 4) read יִשְׁמַר, as may be seen from Aramaic יִשְׁמַר. From 1 Kings 7. 23 we know to vocalize בְּנַפְרֵיָה not בְּנַפְרֵיָה (6. 8). Instead of יִשְׁמַר (7. 4) read יִשְׁמַר. The Yod after the Alef found in some editions and manuscripts may have merely been
reproduced from the singular. It is also possible that this Yod represents the e class of vowels, which includes a shewa whose origin was e. A similar purpose is served by Waw: it stands for the o or u class of vowels, including a shewa which was reduced from an original o or u, as, for instance, דלַגְּף. Instead of לאפ (7. 6) vocalize לאפ, as it undoubtedly is a form like לאפ, לאפ, and others.

B. Halper.

Dropsie College.


We commend this work with unqualified admiration. It comes from the genius of the veteran historical geographer of the Holy Land, Dr. Smith, who with the passing of the great cartographers of Palestine, as Wilson and Kitchener, remains the connecting link with the generation which laid the foundations of the scientific study of the country. To their ability he has added in an unrivalled way the high instinct of historical imagination, which is content, in his fifth decade of active scholarship, to devote itself to the apparently mechanical duty of producing an atlas. But his historical genius and freshness of spirit do not desert him in this tedious work, as is shown in the easy style and attractive exposition of the ‘Introductory Notes to Maps’, which preface the volume. For in addition to the maps he gives these prefatory notes, naming his authorities, reviewing the historical problems and difficulties, and where necessary giving detailed notes. These constitute in themselves a veritable introduction to the Historical Geography of the subject, so that the work is as much a text-book and source-book as an atlas.

Equally high praise is to be given to the technical execution of the maps, the work of Dr. Bartholomew. The primary subject of the work, the physical cartography of the land, is presented in sixteen maps, Nos. 15-30 (apart from maps presenting the economic,
orographical, and geological features and the vegetation areas. Nos. 10-14). These maps are on the scale of a quarter-inch to the mile, and while of course based on the Great Map of the Palestine Exploration Fund (including now so much as has appeared of Schumacher's survey of the Trans-Jordan), far excels it in clearness of presentation. The difficulty of the use of the Fund's maps in consequence of their mass of physical details and finely printed and jostling names is known to all students. These difficulties have been avoided, and while the Great Map must be resorted to for small details, this work will be a handy substitute for most practical purposes. We have the work of the Palestine Exploration Fund simplified and clarified, with the added advantage which time brings of the more recent solution of vexed questions.

But the material is much richer than the title of the book suggests. The first nine maps present the ancient Semitic world and its empires, concluding with one giving the ancient trade routes to Palestine. Following the large-scale maps of Palestine we have under Part III, 'Palestine at Particular Periods in History of Israel,' Nos. 31-50, presenting the political cartography of the land at different epochs. In addition to the more familiar pre-exilic maps, there is a remarkably useful and scholarly series covering in close succession the complicated history of Palestine from the age of the Maccabees, including the epochs of Alexander Jannaeus, Pompey, Antony, Herod the Great, his sons, Agrippa I, the Procurators, Agrippa II. We know of no other work which so thoroughly exhibits to the eye the kaleidoscopic history of that age. The student has had to consult detail maps for the different periods or create his own from his Schürer. This part must have been the most laborious section of the whole work, for it involved the study of a most intricate mass of details and contradictory opinions.

The last two numbers of this part present 'Plans of Jerusalem at Different Periods', in six maps at one-half inch to the mile, and 'Modern Jerusalem' at a scale of twelve inches to the mile. The latter summarizes the latest discoveries; it does not include
the important excavations pursued on the southern Zion Hill on the grounds of the Assumptionists, published by Father Geriner-Durand in the *Revue Biblique*, 1914.

Part IV is devoted to the Christian Era. Of these Nos. 54–57 bear upon Palestine immediately. There is a most useful map, No. 54, of the Palestine of Eusebius and Jerome (and also of the Madeba Mosaic), interesting to both Christian and Jewish scholars; then the maps of the Peutinger Tables and Marinus Sanutus, and finally Syria and Palestine in the time of the Crusades. Any experience with the archaeology of the Holy Land teaches how indispensable this later cartography is, for it is only as we dig down through these later historical strata that we can, following the example of Edward Robinson, work out the identification of Biblical sites. The student will probably be more grateful for these maps of the non-biblical periods than for the stock maps of Palestine which can easily be obtained.

This part also includes maps of particular interest to the student of the New Testament and early Church History. In addition to the usual chart of St. Paul’s voyages, there is a fine orographical map of Asia Minor, which will be useful to others than those who wish to study the position of the Seven Churches. Nos. 53 and 53a present the ‘Church and the Empire’ under Trajan and under Constantine, perhaps not very effectively, as the dispersion of the Christian communities cannot be exhibited on so small a scale. No. 58 gives ‘Europe in the Time of the Crusades’, and 58a ‘The Expansion of Christianity’ in the successive ages. No. 59 offers ‘Present Political Divisions of Palestine’, to which one objection can be offered, that it does not show the delimitedamnment of the Lebanon, up to the present war an autonomous district under the control of the Christian Powers, although the Notes correct this fault with the necessary information. Finally there is a very complete map of the ‘Christian Missions in Palestine’, No. 60. In this connexion it may be noted that No. 10, the Economic Map of Modern Palestine, gives the location of the Jewish agricultural colonies, although without names. In the notes to this map should be
added in the bibliography *Die jüdische Kolonisation Palästinas*, by Dr. Curt Nauratzki.

An interesting bit of map-making we would suggest for those who are concerned as to the future politics of the country, would be an ethnographic sketch in which the predominance of the different religions, Mohammedan, Jewish, and Christian, might be represented—in which for instance Jerusalem would appear as Jewish, Bethlehem as Christian, Hebron as Muslim.

Our principal stricture of the volume would be the small-scale presentation of the maps of Mesopotamia. In such an inclusive volume, and at a time when Assyriology is playing such a large part in biblical science, we miss a detail map of Babylonia and Assyria. This should present the identifications of the ancient sites. (A useful sketch-map of the latter is to be found in either one of Jastrow’s works, his *Aspects of Religious Belief*, or his *Civilisation of Babylonia and Assyria*. The little map of ‘Jewish Babylonia’ on No. 1 is quite insufficient, omitting even Nippur, which, as appears from the cuneiform reference to the neighbouring Chebar, was one of the chief centres of the exiles. Such a map should also give the various centres of the later Babylonian Judaism.

The volume might also have filled up the lack, so troublesome to students, of an adequate map of Northern Syria. The Palestine Exploration Fund surveyed the land as far as Beirut, but the region to the north remains very much of a *terra incognita* to the historical student. The best one we know of is the map published in the series of the American Archaeological Expedition of 1899-1900, based upon a map of Kiepert, published in Oppenheim’s *Vom Mittelmeere zum Persischen Golf*. The geography of Northern Syria while not immediately biblical is of extreme importance for the understanding of the connexions of Palestine with the empires to the north. The survey of this deeply interesting land still awaits execution, a task worthy of the best equipped expedition.

A good map of Arabia, giving the points of historical and archaeological interest, is also a desideratum which the volume
might have filled. But the richness of the work may lead us to expect too much. Among the 'Maps of the Empires of the Ancient World', Nos. 3 and 4, we expect one of the Assyrian Empire at its greatest extent, under Esarhaddon: in its place a map of Nebuchadrezzar's Empire is given.

No. 14, presenting in colours the conditions of the vegetation of Palestine, is very misleading to the layman. A dark green exhibits the 'cultivable lands' and is used for the districts which we generally know of as fertile, like the Hauran, Esdrælon, the Damascus oasis. Most of the rest of the map is coloured light green to exhibit 'limestone hill-lands covered in spring with more or less pasture'. The result would be the idea that by far the greatest part of Palestine and the Lebanon appears as a wilderness fit only for sheep. As such crops as wheat are successfully grown over this hill country, as well as vegetables and especially fruits in great profusion wherever they are cultivated, the map gives an entirely erroneous impression. It is this limestone soil that is Palestine's great agricultural asset, and while the greatest part of it, thanks to the Turk, is to-day a waste, the brilliant patches of cultivation, where the ground is tilled or irrigated, and the remains vouching for the great farming estates that once marked the land, speak for the economic capability of the country. History also shows how the now desert stretches of Eastern Syria and even the volcanic ledges of el-Leja in the Hauran were once seats of a fine culture of the soil. The soil stands there to-day chemically fitted for man's support, often like our own Western lands once marked as desert, waiting only water and the plough to make them blossom as the rose. Strangely enough even Jaffa is put in an area marked 'sandy deserts', whereas it is one of the garden spots of the country. At the present time when the economical development of Palestine is so much in the mind of many, it is unfortunate if an erroneous impression is produced or continued by a map which does not tell the practical conditions. For the economist has to live down the vulgar tradition that Palestine is an unfertile country. If the data be on hand, and probably they could be supplied for many parts by the
Jewish and German colonies and monastic establishments, a map showing the capabilities of the soil would be an extremely valuable asset to the ideas and plans looking towards the economic restoration of the Holy Land.

We conclude with thanking the distinguished compilers of this handsome and scholarly volume for a work which comprehends so much that is vitally necessary to the study of biblical history and its related spheres. It will be for the English-speaking world an indispensable adjunct for the study of the Bible.

JAMES A. MONTGOMERY.

University of Pennsylvania.
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