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FIFTY-EIGHTH YEAR:

THE

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BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

THE ECONOMY OF PAIN.

BY THE REV. HENRY HAYMAN, D. D., ALDINGHAM, ENGLAND.

A GLANCE AT PLEASURE AND PAIN IN GENERAL.

Pleasure and Pain have, since the dawn of ethical inquiry, had a twin place in every moral system. Some have regarded them as opposite extremes, and both as, therefore, evils alike. Some have regarded them as stimulants from opposite sides to the practical principle, and therefore as both necessary alike. Others have regarded them as the one congenial, the other contrary to nature, and have therefore bidden man devote his energies to maximizing the one and minimizing the other. Aristotle, who investigates a definition of pleasure, omits giving any of pain, and apparently devotes an over-large sphere of influence to the former, regarding the latter in his tenth book, which is the seat of the question, only in a fashion supplementary to that former. As regards definition I shall follow his example, and suppose pain with its physical and moral extensions, such as helplessness, prostrate debility, wearying exhaustion, depression of spirits, agonizing anticipation, and the like, sufficiently familiar to
require for my present purpose no definition. If I say, Pain is nature's signal of distress, the figure of speech used prevents this from being a definition; but it may help my argument so to illustrate it. Let us take it as primarily so. My standpoint being pain, and for simplicity's sake, in the first instance, physical pain of the sensitive nerve, I shall refer to pleasure for only illustrative purposes; and, firstly, in a discussion dealing only with the broader aspects of human nature, I may dismiss intellectual pleasure as that of which comparatively few are capable. The capacity for it which education confers, so far as it does confer it, is on that very account a late development, slowly matured. And not only so but, because there being no such thing as intellectual pain, it would have no direct bearing on my subject. Moral pleasures are not usually designated as such. Not that the gratifications which follow particular moral temperaments are less real than those of intellect or of sense, but in any complete scheme of pleasure they must have their place. Thus the good-natured and the malignant or cynical character have each their pleasures which follow their energies. But no such scheme of pleasure is to my present purpose, and, if it were, I should probably only confuse established nomenclature, if I assigned them their due. And now one must, for illustration and contrast, mix the subjects of the pleasure and pain of sense, and present them in juxtaposition.

1 An interesting although brief article in the *Lancet* of August 13, 1887, pp. 333-334, which, being unsigned, may probably be editorial, says: "'Pain is a sensation which more or less rapidly and acutely assails the faculty of endurance. In its commonest forms it is suffering produced by nerve excitation, the elements of the nervous apparatus being either directly or by a transmitted irritation mechanically disturbed [some examples given]. It is not, of course, always the fact that these mechanical injuries to nervous tissue take place at the point to which pain is referred; because, being a sensation, pain is felt at some seat of sensation that is in connection with the sensory apparatus affected, although it may be remote from the point where the impression is produced. In short, pain may be a message sent from some injured part through a chain of nerve elements, as a message of word-symbols is transmitted by a telegraphic wire.'"
CAPACITY FOR PAIN IS DISTINCT FROM ACTUAL PAIN, WHICH HAS, HOWEVER, AN ENORMOUS EMPIRE OVER MAN.

But, first, a distinction is necessary, of capital importance, between the capacity for pain and pain itself as experienced—one sufficiently plain, one would think, but often confused. The capacity is practically unlimited and seems alike in intensity and duration very greatly to exceed in the average human organism that for pleasure. As regards the pleasures of sense, they soon satiate, cease to please, and even repel; whereas, pain endured may be protracted to an extent limited only by the exhaustion of sensibility in unconsciousness or by death. Further, pleasures over-indulged or often indulged are found to procure pains; whereas, pains have no such tendency to procure pleasures, with one exception, apparent rather than real, which I will notice further on. Pain, then, and pleasure are not so merely the reciprocal converse of each that one should drive or be driven out by the other. The more absolute empire of pain is seen in the fact that pleasures are by it, when intense, made blank, and our capacity, or at any rate our appetite for them suspended. You cannot lure a man in an acute fit of gout or neuralgia to seek sensual enjoyment. He is devoted to his suffering while it lasts. By it all, or nearly all, the energies which depend on will are neutralized or rendered difficult—nay it often sweeps away all the resolves of the will, and dictates its own terms to our moral nature. We need not here take account of, but may, in passing, notice certain exalted states of moral or mental emotion or abstraction, in which the action of the nerves seems suspended and their sensitive capacity neutralized. These are, however, pathologically interesting, outside our present purpose. The Indian gymnosophists, who excited the wonder of Alexander the Great and his comrades, and the astounding performances of certain Tunisian Salii (if one may borrow a term of classic antiquity), as following their ecstatic dances, recorded by recent travellers, may be taken as persistent or occasional types of these exalted states.
The Economy of Pain.

4

SINCE PLEASURE TENDS TO DEMORALIZE, OUR CAPACITY FOR IT IS NARROWED.

The above broad facts of human and, so far as we can judge, of all sentient nature, although in different degrees, lead us to reflect that pleasure and pain, however co-related, are natural or are necessary in different degrees and are each under a different law. We may indeed conceive of a natural being so organized as to be capable of either only apart from the other, save that the notion of a being so constituted as to be capable of pain alone seems to contradict the fitness of things. Suppose, then, one so organized as to be capable of pleasure only. In such an one the preservative element which our capacity for pain confers would be wholly wanting. On this safeguard I will say somewhat further on. But pleasure, so far from acting as a safeguard, seems rather to serve as a lure; and an enlarged capacity for it, being followed, as it normally would be, by a larger indulgence, might, even if attended by an enlarged capacity for pain, and much more without this qualification, operate as a blind to precaution, even as an intoxicant. Thus nature has wisely stinted our organism on the side of pleasure. Whereas, man is capable of feeling pain acutely at every thread of the nerve-web diffused all over the body, only in a few limited organs is he capable of a pleasure at all to be compared in intensity with this. To enlarge the pleasurable capacity would demoralize, would, by the opiate so provided for reflection, drag us down to the level of the senses, and might end by stifling all the nobler energies of man. Our margin of voluptuousness is judiciously narrowed, or the moral equilibrium would be fatally disturbed. We hear of a famous Eastern king who advertised a handsome premium for the discovery of a new pleasure, but history does not record that his advertisement was ever answered.

OUR CAPACITY FOR PAIN A MAXIMUM, THAT OUR SUFFERING MAY BE A MINIMUM.

On the contrary, the capacity for pain, enormous as com-
pared with that for pleasure, operates as a salutary caution to a consciousness led by experience and attended by reflection. And if due scope be allowed to these latter, a capacity for pain might be indefinitely enlarged without any corresponding increase of actual pain ensuing. We say, in short, that, normally, although perhaps not invariably, pleasure enjoyed tends to vary directly as our capacity for it, and pain endured to vary inversely as our similar capacity. The consciousness of capacity for pain, suggesting precaution and prompting reflection, stimulates as well the intellect as the moral judgment. And where this is fully developed, any demand for actual pain to rouse its energies ceases. While it is developing, the very slightest puncture of the cuticle acts in combination with our practically indefinite capacity for pain; and its minuteness is in our consciousness, by the aid of imagination, multiplied by that capacity, until its rousing and warning power becomes enormous. Thus a minimum of pain endured suffices because of the maximum of pain possible. Were it not that we are capable of suffering so much, we should in fact suffer much more—an amiable paradox and an admirable economy, worthy of One who "does not willingly afflict."

**WHY WE CANNOT AVERT ALL PAIN.**

But further, if by reflection and precaution, acting on experience, we were able to avert all pain whatever, the tendency would be to absorb an unduly large share of our energies in the study of how to avert it. This, however, is neutralized partly by the opposite inducements of pleasure, partly by there being some kinds and degrees of pain which cannot be so averted, or which to most men would not seem worth the trouble, although there are few which are not open to some degree of alleviation, especially as knowledge advances, which advance, accordingly, the presence of pain in our economy directly tends to promote.

**YET PAIN, WITH SCANTY EXCEPTIONS, IS NEVER NORMAL.**

And yet, with a capacity for pain diffused everywhere in
sentient being, it seems nearly, but not quite, true, that there seems no machinery, so to speak, designed to procure actual pain. In the first place, a capacity for pain which were never realized would remain inoperative, and a statement of its existence and universality would become unintelligible. An experience which should be on this side totally blank would never stimulate reflection. In whatever proportion, therefore, it may be necessary to translate capacity into actuality for this purpose, in that proportion pain may be said to be designed. But this proportion we have seen is exceedingly small. And thus in the vast majority of cases, perhaps with one or two exceptions (to be further noticed), universally, pain, however under certain conditions inevitable, seems, when suffered, to have always the air of an intrusion or a derangement, to be no proper part of humanity nor normal consequence, save in the above attenuated degree, of any known law. On the contrary, the more the laws of our nature and of its surroundings are understood and obeyed, the more we tend to reduce pain to an unappreciable minimum. And this, again, tends surely to stimulate our intelligence in the study of those laws. As regards death-throes, the pains which they indicate are sometimes severe and protracted, but, since other cases show death supervening as a painless sleep, they cannot be deemed normal. And, indeed, what are called the pains of death are really those of the mortal disease, accident, or lesion, which is the proximate cause of death, and therefore fall under the laws of pain caused by such disease, etc., short of the mortal point. And here I may notice as regards disease that the morbid internal states, mostly, if not always, attended by pain, which arise, inexplicably, perhaps, in our present state of knowledge, are really due to the infraction of some natural law by the individual, or to the results of such inherited from his ancestors.

OF CERTAIN EXCEPTIONAL FIXED PAINS IN NATURE.

The exceptions referred to above (p. 5.) as pains fixed in human nature and therefore normal, are those of parturition
and of dentition. It is possible that there may be others which my ignorance of pathology prevents my duly classing with these. The first are limited to one sex, the second to two or, possibly but rarely, three periods of life in both sexes; and the former are shared by the higher domesticated animals, to which fact I will further return. And these two fixed pains seem to me to have a curious analogy, which, however, may be superficial only. They both include the maturing of a germ which forms a part of the organism, attended by a tension of the parts, and, in the gum, a cleavage of the surface. They both include the extrusion of the germ when matured, although not in the tooth carried to a final separation, unless the dropping out of the tooth through decay attacking it in a further stage (which, however, is contingent and not normal) may be deemed such a final separation. Now, are there any fixed objects in human nature which these pains, thus analogical, may serve? The former, unquestionably, react on the mother through the moral sphere in the interests of the offspring, i.e., of the entire race. They form, in short, an element in the intense tenacity of maternal affection, and seem to give it a physical basis. But farther, they have a prolonged action, still in the moral sphere, on the offspring; and thus the most vice-hardened men, although they are lost to all other feeling, are often found to cherish a strong regard for the feelings of a mother. And, indeed, a regard to maternal feelings is sometimes found to prevail where the rigor of law or custom sets aside all other regard of the same kind; and this seems, in part at least, traceable to the same physical basis, or at any rate to be inseparable from its results. And this regard to maternal feeling is probably beneficial to humanity on the whole. Nor can we exclude from the consequences of the same the stronger affection between uterine children by the half-blood, as compared with those who share paternity only. Nor indeed is the suffering of the weaker sex without its effect in cementing more closely conjugal affection, as throwing more evidently on the stronger the duty of a cherishing protection. Thus, since on
maternal, filial, and conjugal attachment the larger proportion of human attachments base themselves, the pains of parturition are a fountain of human affection widely diffused, and as such worthy of a fixed place in nature. Much less can be said on the pains of dentition. They set, indeed, a seal, as do the former, on that charter of pain of which we all are feoffees. And they may further produce a stronger sympathy between the parent, whose experience in cutting his or her own "wisdom-teeth" is recent, and the helpless infant, when the pains of the infantile stage of the former have passed out of memory. And the same fact may spread more widely, and tend to make adults generally more compassionate towards any sufferings of infancy, and thus mitigate that intolerant callousness which adults are apt to feel, especially when not parents themselves, towards a state their own experience of which lies outside memory.

PHYSICAL PAIN IN THE MORAL SPHERE NEEDED AS A DISCIPLINE IN PROPORTION AS THE FUTURE IS OBSCURE.

Thus we find, and I think shall find at every step of this argument, that physical pain has a tendency to react on the moral nature; and that to study, pain, with or without any adequate result, in the physical sphere only, is to mutilate the problem. And thus I shall adduce, as a confirmatory instance, the correction of children by bodily pain, and the development of the ascetic idea, to which I purpose briefly returning at the end of this essay. Leaving individual cases, which may be exceptional, out of sight, it may be said that no system of education will bear the strain of wide experience which excludes that disciplinal use of artificial pain. Young human creatures are in a state of excessive sensation and defective reflection, and discipline accordingly makes use of that fact and wins nature to its side. The same is true of the childish imagination, overdeveloped, as it seems, in comparison with other faculties. But a wise teacher will similarly utilize the fact, and win nature to his side by trading at once on the power which nature has developed rather than on that which
he reserves. But as regards correction by pain, it is the natural attribute of authority and power combined, and as such is naturally understood by childhood, and lies within the scope of its feeble reasoning powers. In proportion as the future is hidden from us, the correction by physical pain, to omit for the present other grounds, seems a moral necessity. Children can have no adequate anticipation of the future, i. e., adequate for the guidance of conduct, until they have amassed some experience, since by the past only is any real key to the future gained. But in proportion as that experience accrues and is turned to account, the resource of artificial pain is superseded. And indeed the above remark has a wide application to human existence. The degree to which a future state is, on natural grounds, open to question, and the unsatisfying character to some minds of the arguments adduced for it, form a measure of the disciplinary necessity of pain in the nature of man. It is probable that if the expectation of a future state rested on as strong a moral certainty as that of sunrise to-morrow, a much less amount of pain might suffice for the education of mankind. To this thought I may have occasion further to return.

PAIN ACTUAL, NOT A DESIGN IN THE SENSE IN WHICH PLEASURE IS.

But I will take another instance of a pain which probably to a superficial observer seems in the fullest sense directly natural—that of hunger. Compare this with the pleasure attending a comfortable repast. This pain, if at once obeyed by fulfilling its tendency, is only perceived by its stimulating effects on appetite. If not so obeyed, the pangs become acute and intense, and may be prolonged into the agonies of starvation. Now, it is not in the same sense a design of nature that that extreme pain, or any acute stage of it, should be reached, as it is that the pleasure of repletion should be enjoyed. A child, again, on its first feet, loses balance and falls with a shock and perhaps a bruise, but learns something from the result. It is not a design of nature that the child should so fall and suffer, in the same sense as it is that it should find re-
pose and comfort, with undefinable sensations of pleasure, in its mother's arms. Analyze it how you will, this difference is fundamental and essential. The craving which precedes the gratification of a natural appetite need never in any particular case become so acute as to be recognized as pain, much less need reach its extreme possible limit; whereas, the pleasure which follows, always tends to reach its proper maximum. Thus the pleasure attending natural functions appears to be designed in a way in which the pain attending their suspension or derangement is not. And thus the capacity for pain and the experience of pleasure are natural to a degree or in a way in which the capacity for pleasure and the experience of pain are not:—paradoxical, perhaps, but true.

PAIN PROVES, TRAINS, AND TEACHES US:—ITS USES IN THE MORAL SPHERE HINTED AT.

We spoke just now of the shock and bruise to a child in falling as that from which he learned something. Indeed, from infancy to old age, and from the infancy to the old age of our species, the shock, slight or severe, which gives him a warning, is beneficial to the individual—it teaches him. If so severe as to be fatal to life, it is still beneficial to the species—it teaches them. Thus, suffering is a condition of learning our relations with nature. It proves to ourselves, as a race, what amount of strain we can endure, what not, and by such endurance trains and teaches us. The proof-charge which tests a gun is partly analogous. It proves the individual handiwork of the founder, it teaches the founder himself. But the gun does not gain strength by resisting the strain. The experiment being in the sphere of dead matter has nothing analogous to the growth of the individual man in endurance or in knowledge by a shock of pain undergone. But as the gun-founder seeks to guarantee the weapon's safety for its owner, so the Maker and Owner of man may have designed to make His work more acceptable to Himself through pain endured, acting thus on the moral sphere through the physical. The moral being is not, we may sup-
pose, destroyed even by a shock which is fatal to natural life, and thus as no founder ever designs to burst his gun, even so we need not ascribe to the Maker of man any design of destruction. If the moral sphere transcends the physical, a moral end served may well be worth an intermediate physical end sacrificed. But I must for the present postpone this consideration of the uses of pain in the moral sphere.

PLEASURE AND PAIN COMPARED AS STIMULATING EFFORT: PAIN THE MORE POWERFUL.

The hope of pleasure may indeed prove a stimulant to intellectual effort of a low order, but we must not confound this hope with that of material wealth, the means, of course, of commanding a supply of pleasure generally, but which has also a much wider range; and the pursuit of which is accordingly a more powerful stimulant, and to effort of a higher order. But the effort to which the hope of pleasure stimulates terminates in the pleasure obtained, and the access of pleasure is a dissuasive rather than a stimulant; whereas, both the apprehension and the access of pain, so far as the latter is not actually disabling, are stimulants alike. Farther, the efforts stimulated by these latter commonly open to us a much wider door into nature than those resulting from the hope of pleasure. And further yet, our capacity for pain being so large, while that for pleasure is so narrow, makes the efforts to which the consciousness of that former capacity stimulates more persistent in proportion, and spreads them over a wider area. From pleasure enjoyed no discipline can be extracted. In proportion as it pervades the sense, it absorbs the attentive faculty and excludes the reflective; and thus, making its subject wholly content with present conditions, shuts out the future, opens no problem, and points no question, but rather bribes all questionings to silence. Thus the discipline in that knowledge on which the well-being of the race depends, seems to depend chiefly upon pain and our capacity for it.
PAIN THE SAFEGUARD OF LIFE—ITS ECONOMY IN OUR ORGANISM.

The usefulness of pain in safeguarding the animal economy is a trite subject. The non-sensitive outer skin neutralizes the surface to actual contact, save those severe collisions which reach to jar the nerve beneath. But for this, existence with even a mere atmospheric environment would be continual torment. But the disposition of the sensitive nerves close beneath the non-sensitive cuticle is a defence more instantaneously serviceable than the shell of the tortoise or the hide of the rhinoceros. Our weakness is a better protection, on the whole, than robur et aes triplex. Our capacity for pain everywhere is our general safeguard against pain anywhere. Outrunning the quickness of thought, antecedent to the possibility of experience or the exercise of reflection, the sting of pain reaches the sensorium and reacts upon the flinching muscle, ringing an instant alarm to the whole system and calling a muster of all its powers to rescue the part assailed. What contrivance could be fuller of moral beauty than thus to turn the tables upon the aggressor, and compel the enemy from which nature most shrinks, to mount guard and stand sentry over the seat of life, keeping thus inviolable from fatal lesion the sanctuary of its great organs? Moreover, special parts of the organism have their appropriate sensitiveness and a capacity of pain relative to their special function. The eye is sensitive even to the near approach of mischief, and resents a hostile demonstration, the quickness of nictitation exceeding even that of vision itself. Tendons and ligaments, ordinarily dull, are sensitive to overtension. The internal organs are sensitive only to their own morbid state, or suspension, or derangement of function. And all these involucra of sensitiveness have their mechanical spontaneity of action wholly independent of our will, on which, if humanity depended for the purpose, a thousand lives would be sooner lost than one is placed even in jeopardy now. But the great or small inward organs which conduct the machinery of life, when normal, have no register or acute sensations. They rest in undemonstrative content-
ment, and make no sign unless provoked as above. To have lodged such facile sensitiveness in them as underlies the whole surface would have been futile. In the same instant that the alarm of pain would have been thereby given, a mortal hurt might have reached home, and the whole economy have been frustrated.

ON THE LIFE-JOY AS ANTECEDENT TO PLEASURE OR PAIN.

And this passiveness of organs until aroused leads one on to notice that human existence, even on its sensuous side, is not made up of pleasures and pains only, to be balanced one against another. Antecedently to any such balance, animal life, including human, is normally a state of placid enjoyment, like the general warmth of tone in a picture, underlying all lights and shadows alike. Given average health with bodily functions corresponding, and there results a deposit of complacency of which we are imperfectly conscious until it is interrupted. Thus, to sleep and wake, take exercise and repose, to draw breath and take in ordinary objects of sight or sound by eye or ear, (wholly apart from the special interest of the objects as such,) are all elements in this calm plenum of enjoyment. In all these the lower animals have their share, and there can be no doubt, that, apart from the excitements of appetite, they enjoy existence, and stamp it with an unanimous verdict of approval, which is rather the more than the less weighty from its being rather sentient than reflective. This is the primary result of harmonized surroundings—a kindly soil, as it were, in which all secondary sensations take root, whether pleasurable or painful; or a general current of life-joy, "without o'erflowing full," in which they float either as pleasures with the stream, or as pains, thwarting and chafing, or even suspending and clogging it. It is not an exalted, much less a rapturous state; but its low level of copiousness pervades the greatest number of hours out of the twenty-four, covering with its ample margin even our sleeping moments, and when it fades from consciousness, as slumber becomes profound, is perhaps negatively existent still.
MORAL REFLECTIONS ON THE LIFE-JOY.

This life-joy, so broad a proof of goodness at work in nature, is mostly skipped in ethical discussion, as if thrown into the shade by the stronger glare of pleasures or of pains. But I cannot afford to omit it here. It shows nature in the physico-sensuous sphere as aiming rather at quantity than at quality, and spreading a protoplasm of equable contentment as a pre-condition of formulated energies. It is that nearly apathetic minimum of individuality—the objective mingling, but not colliding, with the subjective—the back-ground of effort, the whole horizon of quietism, which would be left surviving, even if Stoic or Buddhist should succeed in effacing all the salient excitements and all the special emotions of the soul. It is this—consistent with all theories of life save those which pessimism has leavened—of which Schopenhauer lost sight when he called the world "a penal settlement." It seems to enfold conscious existence in a general sympathy to which all respond, as the luminiferous ether, interfused between orb and orb, binds all in one communion of the light of life.

ON AN EXCEPTIONAL PLEASURE THROUGH RELIEF FROM INTENSE PAIN.

And this leads to the development of a remark offered above (p. 3), that pains do not tend to produce pleasures as these to procure pains. But here one questionable exception is noteworthy. The cessation of pain, intense and prolonged, becomes intensely pleasurable. Why is this? The force of contrast is, I suppose, the popular and ready answer. But if this were all, why should not the cessation of extreme pleasure bring about a result of intense pain, which it is notoriously incapable of doing? I take the truer answer to be, that the life-joy, which has been interrupted by the pain-fit, asserts itself with a cumulative power. The dammed up stream rises until its force-flood pervades every fibre of the whole being. But whether this be the true account or no, the phenomenon is real, and yet, so far from its being a set-
off in the balance against pain on the side of pleasure, is rather a weight in the scale of pain itself. Action and reaction being presumed here, as in mechanics, equal and opposite, how powerful must be the action of pain, in order by reaction from its pressure to bring ecstasy out of a state but one remove from apathy! This special result of pain, therefore, instead of abating its rigor, serves rather to enhance it. Compared with the tendency of pleasure to penalize us by dying out into pain, it is found to have nothing in common with that tendency, and for this reason I called the exception stated above one rather apparent than real.

A SUMMARY OF CERTAIN RESULTS OF THE ARGUMENT.

The pleasure and pain of sense only have here been taken into view, i.e., those which terminate in a sensation. Limited thus, we find pleasure fugitive and treacherous, and our capacity for it wisely narrowed. We find in pain far more of constancy and of a tendency to permanency. As regards the consequences of each to the higher or supra-sensual nature, we find pleasure negative or mischievous, but pain fruitful in far-reaching usefulness. Pleasure is the silly nurse who fondles and spoils the child. Pain is the severe custodian and harsh master, yet in whose keeping we are safe and from whose teaching we feel that we learn. The life-joy is the gentle mother, whose presence makes the home and who keeps it for her children.

THE PLEASURE WHICHfollows THE EXERCISE OF POWER.

Pleasure enlarged would only be safe for beings much nearer perfection than we are; while the need of pain in our economy attests our imperfection and corruption. Pleasure, however, as limited by sense, is directly dangerous or noxious to the individual alone who enjoys or pursues it. But there is another kind of pleasure so dangerous to mankind at large, and so full of mischievous reaction on the enjoyer, that it demands notice. I mean that which follows the consciousness and the exercise of power. And, probably because it is
thus doubly mischievous, only a very few can in the nature of things attain to the greater heights of such power. And, again, one may notice a proof of human imperfection and corruption in the fact of power, and the pleasure annexed to its exercise, being so full of detriment alike physical and moral. For power being in itself neutral, and implying a freedom from restraints to which others are subjected, we see in fact that its neutrality is on the whole far more likely to be warped and wrested to an abuse, and that such freedom from restraints is a privilege with which hardly any one who has enjoyed it is fit to be trusted. And if these facts do not show an innate bias in human nature to the bad side, I know not what can. But some may think I am digressing too far from pain, my proper subject, in these remarks. I will proceed to show their relevancy.

PAIN THE TRIBUTE TO POWER.

The greater part of human history, as the old commonplace has it, is written in blood, and the pains which shock and revolt us most as we study it are those which men inflict upon one another. They stand out as wanton and gratuitous additions to the needful pains which, while they afflict, yet have a preservative and disciplinal efficacy. And, indeed, one of the most sorrowful effects of the dominion of pain over man is the extent to which it tends to place man at the mercy of his fellow. And to have others at their mercy and make them feel that they are so, has been the object pursued in all the ambitious wars which have desolated humanity and in all the tyrannies which make history horrible. When A is at B’s mercy and feels that he is so, B can, by inflicting or threatening pain, make A do practically whatever he pleases. And thus, although the greater heights of power are scaled by few, yet a slave-system in which men are treated nearly as domestic beasts, perhaps better, perhaps worse, has secured, within an area large or small according to wealth, rank, and station, an absolute ascendancy to an entire people by right of conquest over another or many other races enslaved. But apart
from pain inflicted as a means of enforcing useful service to
the superior, pain endured is a direct tribute to power and a
manifest proof of it. For the intense reality of pain enables
the possessor of power to realize it most readily and easily by
inflicting pain; and not only so, but it tends directly to in-
crease the power which it proves, by the wholesale intimida-
tion which it causes. On the other hand, the fugitive and
comparatively precarious nature, as we have seen, of the
pleasures of sense, and much more, perhaps, their expensive-
ness when diffused on a large scale, hinders the efficacy of
their diffusion as a proof of power; while to gratify a few pro-
vokes the envy and discontent of the many, and thus tends
not to extend power but to curb it. Thus the gratification
of a few by a tyrant always needs to be balanced by the in-
timidation of the many; and as no man, or hardly any, can
be such a monster, even when perverted by absolute power,
as to enjoy alone, the object and resource of tyrants in the
popular sense has been to pamper their own creatures and to
terrorize by pain over the rest. As examples of the horrible
barbarities to which absolute power has led even men emi-
nently gifted, we may take Tiberius, Ivan “the Terrible,” of
Russia, several of the popes, and Louis XI. of France. These
and similar characters have various elements. In some, brutal
passions, in some, reason misled by sophistry, but in all such,
the pleasure attending the consciousness and the exercise of
power has exerted a wide influence. Pain is, in short, the
readiest and most widely current coin in which the tribute to
power can be paid; but, save for the debasement and cor-
ruption of human nature, power would not require nor ac-
cept it.

HOW PAIN DOES ITS DIDACTIC WORK IN US.

Given perfectly suitable surroundings from without, or,
short of this, given all laws of nature, physical and moral,
known and observed by man, and pain, save in the fixed and
normal instances named, would either vanish or shrink to an
insignificant minimum. But, being as we are, experience seems to establish that only by the discipline of pain can man effectively for his own protection learn the laws of nature. Thus, for instance, he learns to distinguish poisonous or noxious from wholesome fruits, etc., and venomous snake-bites lead to the study of antidotes. He also learns very early that the forces which those laws govern are not all uniformly constant in the energies which they put forth, that many, indeed, vary through all degrees possible up to the maximum. This leads him to risk and to hope—the two elements which form the spirit of adventure. He constantly presses upon the margin of superiority which he has already secured over nature by learning her secrets; and presumes that the chances (by which name we call the laws of whose combinations and incidences we are ignorant), will be in his favor. By thus staking man's own acquired skill and hardihood against those forces, often with the moral certainty of a large measure of pain as the condition, enormous advantages have been secured to the species, often with deplorable and fatal results to the individual. The records of mining, navigation, aeronautics, and bell-diving are full of illustrations of this. But the condition of possible pain is everywhere present, and in a great number of instances is realized with more or less severity. And although, especially within recent memory, enormous advances have been made, yet this condition seems to abide in its full force, and with every additional advance made, a wider margin of possible accident, loss, wreck, and havoc seems to open. In proportion as we tax the resources of nature we multiply the points of collision with her forces, and sometimes, as in coal-pits, set those forces free to act against us. All this means increased pain. Man's ascendancy over nature confirms the empire of pain over man.

THE AMOUNT OF PAIN FOR THIS PURPOSE IS PROBABLY A MINIMUM.

It is perhaps the condition of progress that this should be so. If the margin of man's average attentiveness and industry could be largely increased, a large measure of it might be
devoted to devising security and cultivating precaution. But
that margin being what it is, the tendency is to spend it so
largely upon adventure that precaution is neglected, and men
prefer rather to take the risk than the trouble of ensuring
against it. Nor as yet is any sign visible of a change of ten-
dencies in human nature on this behalf, although such a
change is not impossible; and while the tendencies continue,
they extend the incidence of pain. Thus it appears that pain
is not only the chief stimulus to learn, but also the condition
of learning. Nor need this last fact be deemed superfluous,
for without it we should certainly never lay the lessons to
heart. Indeed, as it is, by the greater number of mankind
they are imperfectly mastered; and when we pass to the
moral sphere we may certainly say that a great number of
mankind live in defiance of moral laws, although their breach
is constantly avenged by the direst and most obvious physical
consequences. Nor is this defiance of known laws without
example even in the physical sphere. The world then being
in these respects as we know it, the extinction of pain would
mean the outbreak of lawlessness; and the amount of existing
pain is probably a minimum for all the purposes which it
serves.

THE QUESTION REGARDING THE SURPLUS OF PAIN.

We have seen so far that those purposes are chiefly two:
(1) preservative and (2) didactic, and that these two, although
distinct in idea, yet overlap in fact, and that the one is seldom
realized without some measure of the other being promoted.
But I will assume that when both these uses have been served
there remains a surplus of human pain; and the questions
force themselves upon us, Why, when both these demands
have been satisfied, does pain remain often to lay a life-long
burden on the sufferer? Why is relief so slow, precarious,
and remote? Why is that burden often heaviest where no
such uses are presumable or where they are plainly impossi-
ble? Why is the load of agony so often laid on the under-
serving, on the bettermost and more lovable specimens of
humanity? Why is it protracted in cases where the moral
result seems to be mere fretful chafing and vindictive impatience? and Why, when relief comes in the form of death, is the problem broken off rather than solved,—the knot cut, but not untied? Why, in a word, should the formula of "a happy release" be so widely applicable? But notice that through all these queries it is the assumed "surplus of pain" which raises them.

WHAT IF THROUGH LIMITED FACULTIES WE CANNOT ANSWER THEM?

I am not sure that an adequate answer at all points can be given. I will point out what the facts suggest, and then show what considerations must govern us in seeking a more comprehensive solution. But in all such inquiries we should remember the possibility of human ignorance being insuperable through a defect of human faculty. We might as well clamor for a sixth sense or a fourth dimension of space, as for knowledge for which there is in us no subjective receptacle. And this seems certain to be the case wherever the conditions of the future shine dimly through those of our present being, and hardly less certainly so wherever moral and physical conditions interweave themselves in one context.

AN ANSWER AS REGARDS THE PERSISTENCY OF PAIN IN CERTAIN CASES.

I spoke just now of what the facts suggest. Let us take, therefore, actual cases, those, for instance, of crippling accident or clinic disease. In these the pains which were a sign of mischievous lesion or morbid ailment often continue. Nor is this unreasonable, for while derangement continues, the prolongation of pain is an abiding witness to it, as it were a danger-signal kept constantly hoisted. And there is, further, the undoubted fact that the presence of pain tends most powerfully to conciliate sympathy with the sufferer, and to stimulate every utmost resource of watchful skill and loving care. It is certain that no scientific conviction that life was in danger would probably fling the same halo of
moral interest round the sufferer, induce the same self-devotion to sustain the often laborious and repulsive offices necessary, draw forth the same tenderness of invigilation for the patient, or force upon him the same degree of self-watchfulness and compliance, as are secured by the constant presence or apprehension of pain.

TAKING THE HUMAN RACE IN ITS FULL TOTALITY, THERE IS NO APPARENT SURPLUS OF PAIN.

I hinted not far back that the existence of such a surplus of pain as I am discussing is an assumption, and I believe some are prepared to dispute it. Thus I find it urged\(^2\) that "pain never comes where it can serve no good purpose" [where the context shows that by "good," physically useful is intended]. "Pain is eminently merciful, if I may so put it." Of course physiological science enlarges our power of interpreting pain, and many pains that were merely enigmas without an answer fifty years ago have received their solution since, and are now indispensable signs to guide our therapeutics; and so on backward to the very infancy of medical skill; at which period the area of uninterpreted, and therefore practically, as regards the patients who then suffered and died, gratuitous pain, would have been at its maximum. Fifty years hence a similar advance may be scored and the area of practically gratuitous pain be yet further reduced; and so onwards, until, as we may plainly conceive, and so may contemplate as practicable, the reduction of such gratuitous

\(^2\) The quotation is from a paper in the *Lancet* of August 13, 1887, p. 305 sq. on "The Life-saving Value of Pain and Disease, by Cameron Gillics, M. B." In it he goes on to urge, "Say that a man is smashed in a railway accident. If his injuries are such that he cannot recover, he suffers no pain at all. He dies of shock, as the surgeons say. But that, I submit in all humility, is a wrong view of the case, a wrong interpretation of the natural facts. The man dies because vital parts of the organism have been destroyed in the collision, and this condition of shock, this insensibility to useless pain, is the most merciful provision that can be conceived." Still I suppose there are hundreds of clinics in our hospitals, hopeless of cure, yet suffering each more or less of pain.
The Economy of Pain.

pain to an insignificant minimum. There remain, however, the fixed and normal pains of humanity before referred to. Let us suppose it so. Yet still, for the sufferer of pain uninterred and therefore unrelieved in every age and, indeed, for all who witness his sufferings, the pain so endured is as completely in this sense gratuitous as if no remedy were ever possible. We cannot anticipate the knowledge of the next age, and "while the grass grows the horse starves." Yet it seems as certain as experience can make it, that the pains of the present are a condition of the science of the future; that, at whatever point they stop, the clock of human progress will stop or slacken with them; that pains can therefore only cease when all the knowledge to which they stimulate is attained; and thus that the unrelieved pains, in fact, of not only countless individuals, but of ages, are not gratuitous as regards the race. Thus pain is the interest paid on ignorance; only as the principal diminishes can the interest diminish, and only with its extinction be absolutely extinguished. Thus pain tends to bind, in a bond of mysterious sympathy, not only the sufferer and his contemporary witnesses, but extends a solidarity throughout all ages of our race, viewed as acquirers of knowledge, from the dawn of experiment to the last complement of total science. This tends to vertebrate entire humanity, in a spinal column as it were, with a marrow of sensitiveness running throughout the whole.

BUT TAKING EACH AGE SEPARATELY, THAT SURPLUS IS PROBABLY NOT OTIOSE.

And this seems a considerable result to have established; but, if I mistake not, the bond of sympathy is even more pervasive in the moral sphere than in the physical and intellectual. This, however, will be shown later. It remains to notice that there is in every age a surplus of pain beyond what that age can make use of either as a preservative or a didactic stimulant, passed on to the next. Does it follow that that surplus is wholly otiose as regards its own genera-
tion? It cannot surely be taken to have no uses beyond these two. Its economy may include something else, and have other active functions in the present besides being the condition of the knowledge of the future. And as human ignorance is the limit of its present usefulness in the physical sphere; so human ignorance may have even wider relations with the further sphere of activity which we suppose. Meanwhile the surplus of pain is such in reference to the age in which it is felt. Of this I seek to show the moral uses. Those who reject those uses must remember that as regards collective humanity there seems to be no surplus at all.

**Analogy is much in favor of our ignorance being the true account of the difficulty.**

But, further, we have seen reasons for supposing that there is an economy of pain in the physical and intellectual sphere, and that the amount of pain available for preservative and didactic purposes is probably a minimum. This would lead us to suppose that, in respect of the assumed "surplus" unavailable for those purposes, there is a similar economy, rather than a superfluous infliction; and that, if we fail to detect it, the reason is more likely to lie in our feebleness of faculty either to appreciate the end served, or to see how the means serve the end, than in a wanton disbursement of pain without an adequate object. And this probability is enhanced, if the end in view is one which is not and cannot be fully realized in our present state of being. For we should notice that we are able with great fulness to realize, in those former purposes, the preservative and the didactic, both the end itself and how the means serve it. They lie so fully within the reach of our present faculties and the scope of our immediate and conscious needs, that we can be in no doubt about them. Therefore, when we arrive at this doubt about the use of the "surplus" of pain, it becomes highly probable that some end which at present is imperfectly developed, and some relation which is not fully within our grasp, lie at the root of our uncertainty. But making allowance for this, it may still be
possible to show in which direction the balance of argument inclines.

CIVILIZATION INCREASES THE CAPACITY FOR PAIN AND ACTUAL PAIN.

Before attempting the more complex question of the moral aspect of pain, it is worth noticing how the general question is affected by civilization; which seems to me to involve an increase both in man’s capacity for pain, and in the amount of pain at any given moment in the world, I mean in proportion to the numbers of mankind. For as civilization tends to a numerical increase of mankind, of course the greater that number the greater amount of pain, unless some agency were at work to reduce it. Ancient civilization as well as, to a great extent, barbarism rested wholly upon a slave-system, and secured the culture or the leisure of the free classes by shifting the burdens of existence upon those in a servile condition. This, however, is passed away, or so nearly that it may be disregarded. But one feature of it has not and does not tend to pass away. Civilization, ancient or modern, always expands its resources unduly upon the mental and material sides of man’s nature as compared with the moral; witness the Baconian philosophy with its material results. Of course moral progress is made, but not commensurate. The extinction of slavery in Europe is a case in point, but its long tenacity, its slowness to succumb to acknowledged principles, and the extent to which it has vitiated those Latin races who caught from the Roman empire its views most powerfully, show how slow, even in this leading example, moral progress has been. If we ask why no proportionate moral development attends our material progress, the answer must be sought in the corruption of mankind. The connection between that moral inertness of civilization and the tendency of the latter to develop pain, is probably organic; i.e., as the headache of the drunken and the delirium tremens of the drunkard are connected with his moral inertness to resist the dram or break from the habit.
CIVILIZATION IS ALWAYS DEFECTIVE ON THE MORAL SIDE.

The late Mr. Buckle laid it down very broadly that the influence of intellectual laws has been much greater than that of moral laws in advancing civilization, and that, in respect of the opposite evils, "their diminution has been effected not by the moral feelings nor by moral teachings, but solely by the activity of the human intellect and by the inventions and discoveries which have attended it." To whatever extent this view is correct, it confirms what I say. So far as "the activity of the human intellect" plus its "inventions and discoveries" have been predominant factors in civilization, to the overbalance of the influence of "moral feelings and teachings," to that extent our civilization is one-sided, being not so much immoral as non-moral. You cannot "gather grapes of thorns." And thus far civilizations, ancient and modern, stand on similar grounds and labor under the same defect. And this fact alleged by the eminent authority just quoted, so far as it is a fact, is the surest index of that corruption of mankind which in the same chapter, a few pages earlier, he stoutly denies. For since by the corruption of

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4 "Whatever theologians may choose to assert, it is certain that mankind at large has far more virtue than vice, and that in every country good actions are more frequent than bad ones. Indeed, if this were otherwise, the preponderance of evil would long since have destroyed the human race, and not even have left a single man to lament the degeneracy of his species." (Ibid., p. 221). And to this decay unquestionably the old Roman empire was tending when it received Christianity into its bosom, and underwent a re-infusion of vigorous and young races, undrugged by its own lethargy of effete civilization, on whom the Christian energy might work. What would have been the result to mankind, if one of these factors had not been provided to meet the other—if the hope of the world's rejuvenescence had been met solely by that effeteness of corruption—is the most curious and awful of the hypothetical problems which history presents. But, indeed, short of the taint which engenders social decay, there may be an abundance and even an excess of vice. Much vice which corrodes the individual character is not destructive of the social bond, or of individual life. Besides which, in all the examples to which the writer's view extends, the solvent action of vice upon society is kept in check by the persistent moral forces of Christianity, which he studi-
mankind we understand that of their morals, the impotency above ascribed to moral forces is only what we might expect from such a corruption, and but for that corruption would be unaccountable, but, assuming it, is naturally explained. On this I shall have something further to adduce, but I wish first to show how civilization acts upon pain.

CIVILIZATION INCREASES CAPACITY FOR PAIN BY ACCENTUATING SENSITIVENESS.

I have suggested that civilization increases man’s capacity for pain. It does so by accentuating sensitiveness in the physical, and emotion in the moral, sphere of his nature. With the former only I am now directly concerned. The vast increase in nervous diseases of recent years seems to prove this accentuation of sensitiveness. How it operates, this is a complicated pathological problem which I cannot profess to touch with the needle of scientific analysis, and can handle only in the crude way of general remark. It seems to me that mental and animal stimulus, coming more frequently, rings a series of changes where monotony prevailed before. The nerves are constantly called upon for greater exertion, the living telegraphy within us becomes a mass of

ously ignores, or recognizes only to depreciate. But apart from this, it is obvious that he treats the first two of the principal clauses above cited as equivalent to or implying one another, which they are far from being. That “in every country good actions are more frequent than bad ones” can be true only by reckoning as good those which moralists have generally agreed to call indifferent. But that “mankind at large has far more virtue than vice,” unless a very low and base standard of virtue be taken, is probably false.

8 If one seeks a proof of the accentuation of moral emotion in recent life, take those of our novels which try to get as near contemporary life as they can. The fiction of to-day, so far as it is a special reflex of the age, and not common to all, is so mainly in the greater play of emotion in its characters, and the elaborate self-introspection by which that play of emotion is explored. It differs in this respect from the novels of adventure and externality—the large family of which Gil Blas is the type and often the parent—which marked an earlier period. And the same is probably the cause of the increased recent popularity of Shelley among poets.
ever excited conductors, and by this pervading excitement extra sensitiveness is developed. The nerves are somewhat like harp-strings, unequal to the strain which rapid variations of atmospheric condition impose. Only, being contextual parts of a living organism, they do not, like dead wires stretched upon a dead frame, snap and break, but become morbidly affected and extend their morbidity to the organism around them.

CIVILIZATION INCREASES ACTUAL PAIN BY SAVING SICKLY LIFE.

But civilization enlarges the current quantum of actual pain, and perhaps, therefore, ultimately the capacity for pain, by rescuing lives of feeble vitality and sickly constitution, which in a backward stage of human progress would have dropped in infancy. It prolongs such lives to middle age or more, so that they reproduce after their kind. Thus every degree of valetudinarianism may totter on through a struggle of variable length, attended by pains which show death nibbling at his prey, and thus the pain-tax of collective life is heavier in proportion. Indeed, it is owing to its dominantly materialistic side, and to its power in increasing the capacity for pain, as well as actual pain, that civilization has developed modern pessimism, and given it a foothold in human experience which it would not otherwise have found.

That civilization produces many precious compensations for this, but still chiefly on the material and intellectual side, I am not now directly concerned, but it is right to notice it; also that, while it accentuates sensitiveness, it stimulates reflection; and its effect on the emotional side has been already noticed. In all these ways it multiplies and diversifies, alike in their processes and in their results, the energies of which man is capable. But while it thus augments the value of human life on the whole, it makes the strain on that life's powers proportionately greater and more varied; while, probably through a consciousness of that enhanced value, sufferers cling to life more tenaciously, and are sustained in
that tenacity by the more developed sympathies of others around them.

**OTHER DRAWBACKS OF CIVILIZATION. PAIN ITS NEMESIS.**

Owing to the defect in its moral element the advantages of civilization imperfectly penetrate each of the national masses in which mankind are packed, while the pains which it imposes are much more equably diffused. But as regards those advantages, it is rather the acquisition than the enjoyment of them which imparts pleasure. When they have taken their place as normal elements of existence, they pass away into the general life-joy, before mentioned, and are solved in it without perceptibly adding to its maximum, but if suddenly withdrawn from it are felt as a privation; while the prospect of new acquisitions of the like kind sets desire on the stretch to obtain them. Thus the luxuries of one age take their place as necessaries in a later one. But the supply of these depends on a highly complex social fabric, which, owing to the interaction of its many delicate and ramified combinations, is specially liable to unforeseen derangements. Our life is overlaid and interwoven with a web of many skeins, and a strain, a hitch, or a tangle, at any one of a thousand points of interlacing, spreads discomfort which is felt as disaster. Not only do enjoyments suspended leave a sense of craving behind, and make a vacuum of what was a plenum, but they extend into the moral sphere, and by discontent, irritability, and envy intensify the physical or sensuous loss. Of the drawback found in the moral element's defect, take, as an instance, the modern commercial system, resting, as it does necessarily, upon credit. The many pitfalls in which it abounds arise from nothing so much as that the factor of dishonesty remains so far undiminished in human nature, and, with every extension of commerce and therefore of credit, produces disasters more enormous. The same defect makes rivals and antagonists of those who should be partners and helpers, and by keenness of competition between nations, between organizations of industry, and between individuals, intensifies the
action of civilization in the strain which it puts upon human endurance. The same defect causes the mental advantages of civilization to dwindle down in the bulk of mankind into mere astuteness to outwit others in procuring material advantages. Through this defect we are caught in our advantageous surroundings like flies in treacle, and because material advantage so far engrosses our progress in fact, it has come to engross it even in idea. We can by degrees conquer the adverse elements in nature around us, those in ourselves we cannot overcome, and these are before all moral. And thus the pains for which civilization is responsible are the proper nemesis of its non-moral tendency, while the residuum of that pain which, with more or less success, it is ever attacking, blends with those former to reinforce that nemesis. Then both these unite to take advantage of the larger capacity for pain which civilization bestows, and thus keep alive a standing witness to that civilization's defects. Pain then appears as the condition and the consequence of that progress which is natural to man, and conversely the evidence goes to show that the human races least endowed with a capacity for pain, contain fewer rudiments of civilization and decline most rapidly by contact with it. But before further pursuing this at present, let us take a glance at animals.

DOMESTICATION IN ANIMALS PARALLEL TO CIVILIZATION IN MAN.

And here one may turn aside for a moment to notice the lower animals, known to us chiefly through domestication, which seems to produce on them effects analogous to civilization on humanity; but, further, as placing them in a state less natural to them than that in which civilization places us, affects them probably with a larger morbid tendency and a consequently larger pain-tax, wholly distinct from that which our service and often reckless usage force upon them. They fall, as it were, within the penumbra of humanity; and in particular the pains of parturition would seem to be increased, although lack of opportunity to observe them when non-domesticated calls for a cautious reserve in all such state-
ments. These pains of parturition may probably impress the consciousness of the dam in the interests of the offspring. Thus they pass partly under a quasi-moral law and are thereby raised in the scale of being, pain conditioning progress. And similar preservative and didactic uses of pain are traceable in their economy, and probably, when non-domesticated, nearly or quite exhaust it. When domesticated, the interpretation of their pains forms a leading element in the economy of their use. It is noteworthy that there seems no suicidal instinct among them. A stronger wild creature of their own species turns executioner upon the wounded or disabled wild animal—an instinct adapted to diminish pain.

As we have no perfect key to their consciousness, all remarks on the pains of animals are necessarily imperfect, and the subject seems worthy of more attentive research than it has yet received. I thus content myself with a guarded reference to it, chiefly lest critics should think it has been forgotten. The time may come when we may illustrate, through larger knowledge, human pain from animal pain. At present we illustrate, and that partially, animal pain from human, and to all humane persons the dominion of pain over the animal world meanwhile must remain a profound and mysterious source of pity. Probably, comparing their domestic condition with their wild, the entire amount of pain actually endured by animals in the latter is, in proportion to their numbers, inconsiderable as compared with that caused by human cruelty or thoughtlessness in the former. Especially when we add to this the severity with which we tax their toil to save our own.

SINGULAR CONTRAST BETWEEN THESE TWO ON THE MORAL SIDE.

But in the domestication of animals there is this curious contrast with the civilization of man, that the moral element

*I believe in the case of domesticated bees this is denied. When past work, they are said to flee the hive and retire into the wilderness voluntarily to perish, thus ridding the society of the incumbrance of their support. Whether the same is true of wild bees there seems no evidence to show.
there is more proportionately developed than in ourselves. We noticed the one-sidedness of human civilization in this respect. Now the domestication of animals depends at least as largely on the cultivation of their affections, including, of course, their fears, as it does upon that of their faculties. Nay, it would rather seem that the keenness of some of their faculties is rather abated by domestication, whereas that of their affections, especially in the case of dog, horse, and elephant, and many birds, is intensified sometimes on a prodigious scale. Dogs in particular, under human tutelage, show a tenacious constancy of affection not only for their owner but for one another, or even for other animals, which, if we had not experience of it, would seem impossible. This, however, is no proper part of my subject, and only appears as a pendant to the above remarks on the results of civilization in man. How wonderful a confirmation incidentally this seems of man's moral corruption, that that which forms the master-key to his empire over the brutes should, in his own case, be left comparatively uncared for in his own progress!
ARTICLE II.

SOME RELATIONS OF DIVORCE TO SOCIAL MORALITY.

BY THE REV. ALEXANDER R. MERRIAM, GRAND RAPIDS, MICHIGAN.

There is growing up in our communities a direct foe of the home. The Nation is becoming gradually aroused to the danger. I refer to the social and legal abuses of the great sexual bond of marriage. With incidental reference to other disintegrating forces, I shall ask your particular attention to the subject of Divorce.

A few years ago, Renan said in Paris, "Nature cares nothing for the ideas of the New Testament as to the family." "Yes," replied Matthew Arnold, when in America, "It may be that Nature cares nothing for these ideas, but Human Nature cares a great deal," and "Human nature is structurally religious and domestic," adds an eminent American, "and religion and home can never be successfully antagonized, nor be safely ignored."

I am obliged in the limits of this paper to confine myself chiefly to one of three lines of thought: The Historical, or the Exegetical, or the Cotemporary problem.

I. It would be interesting and is important, in view of the growth of the evolution philosophy, to discuss under the historical phase of our subject the different theories as to the origin of the family, represented by Sir Henry Maine and his school on the one side, in defence of the monogamic origin, and Sir John Lubbock and his school on the other, suggesting promiscuity as the early type. But I must omit all of this most interesting phase of our subject, and say nothing about the teachings of Hebrew, Greek, and Roman history.
on our theme, in order to get down to our own cotemporary problem. Suffer, however, a few teachings of the historical survey. A study of the family historically shows that, whatever may have been the habits of prehistoric races, or are the customs of savage tribes to-day, at the dawn of verifiable history the family life existed in the simple bond of monogamy. Again, we see that the earliest conception of marriage in all history is religious, and yet that the later Roman idea of contract, and the Greek idea of individual freedom, opened the way to unlimited grounds for separation, or to an almost universal incontinence. Incidentally we see that the voluntary or legal severing of the marriage bond on easy terms may co-exist, and in historic fact did co-exist in Greece and Rome, with a great increase of licentiousness. We discover, moreover, that, for whatever causes, the family, both in its civil and religious aspects, was nearer utter destruction in the days of the later Roman republic and early empire than before or since in the history of civilized society. We may add one inference more which may be of value in our study, that the material and intellectual grandeur of a nation, like that of classical Greece and republican Rome, may co-exist with a dry rot of social and family immorality; that nations which have given to the world its ideals of law, its most perfect models of government and art, its most stupendous works of architecture, and its most enormous aggregate of wealth, its perfection of literary form, and its incomparable ideals of beauty,—that such nations may achieve all these things, and yet decay to inevitable destruction without the accompaniments of domestic morality. I think we can say, without the least fear of denial, what nearly every cotemporary and subsequent historian abundantly proves, that the one vice of the great civilizations of the past from which we inherit so much that is good and splendid, the one vice which rose high above and dug deep beneath every other, was the sin of impurity—the breaking or denying, by private sin or
public apathy, of the laws which regulate the relations of the sexes.

*Slavery, drunkenness, and impurity:* this is the Triad of the Devil on the pages of history. It was not drunkenness, it was not slavery, but it was impurity, which stands out as the sin of the world nineteen hundred years ago, and which undermined the greatest nations that ever existed. Now, Christianity shows its moral success or failure, as it is able and willing to cope with these three curses of society. The vices of slavery and drunkenness have been and are objects of Christian attack, and strenuous efforts to restrain or eradicate them brighten the course of Christian history. But, mark, neither slavery nor intemperance, as specific vices, is touched by name in the teaching of the great Master of our faith and morals, Jesus Christ; yet his gospel in its sanctions and moral intent made it inevitable that a man, if a Christian, must grapple with them. Christendom has grappled and is grappling with them. And yet we maintain that the sin of personal impurity is the most fundamental of them all. Whatever tends to undermine the sanctity of marriage, fosters this sin. These positions can be maintained,—

1. First, because "sex is the most profound single element of life," all pervasive, natural; everybody, man, woman, or child, is open to its elevating or degrading forces, by the very fact of being alive. Drunkenness is generally acquired, and slavery was never universal; but sex is inherent and everywhere. It is therefore the one indestructible root of good or evil.

2. But it is the most fundamental, secondly, because the family, in its integrity and in its violation alike, never involves one alone, always two or more. A man may get drunk and ruin himself by his indulgence. He generally mars the happiness of his friends, or degrades others beside himself, but not necessarily; and, even if so, he may commit this vice without making another partner of his guilt. But a man or a woman cannot violate the purity or integrity of this fundamental basis of life, without the sin of two. Even in the case
of intemperance, the one point in its enormity most dwelt upon to-day is that it tends to injure the family life; and the greatest curse of slavery in all ages has been the gate it has thrown open to unchecked licentiousness.

3. But mark a third ground for so emphasizing this sin of impurity. Pervasive as the good and evil of sex are, universal as the regulation of the sexes must be, fundamental as domestic purity is to social well-being; yet, yet, there seems to be no place in which this fundamental truth is taught. Our schools do not, and it is a grave question whether they can, discuss it. In the one place where it might be enforced and taught, the home, it is seldom mentioned, from fear or a false delicacy. Whether the reasons be good or bad, the pulpit seldom touches it, on account of the promiscuous nature of church assemblies, or for reasons less creditable. And yet it is the one peril that everybody is exposed to. It is the one evil that Jesus Christ selected to deal with directly, while he left others to be moulded by general principles.

4. And so I give this as a fourth and all-sufficient reason for calling it the fundamental social question; because Christ himself went out of his way to legislate on the family. Christ made a striking exception to protect the family. On two or three occasions he took pains to emphasize what the family was in its intent, and to lay down specific principles in regard to the severance of the marriage bond. There is great force in the fact, that the social peril which Christ singled out for special legislation, the first great social evil which Christ's followers emphasized—following his precepts and forced thereto by the utter decay of social purity in their day—is the one which Christianity is grappling with yet; though intemperance and slavery have occupied and do occupy a more prominent place in the public discussions. And, though so fundamental, so emphasized by Christ, so often alluded to in the Epistles and early church literature, so pervasive and subtle, it yet goes on its sweeping course to-day; partly because, from fear or apathy or a false delicacy, it is seldom touched in public or private, on its moral side, while yet our public
prints are more and more filled with disgusting and demoralizing details of moral leprosy in England and America.

II. But we must next look briefly at the exegetical aspects of our subject. We have alluded to the exceptional specific emphasis which Jesus gave to the family. Three times he touched literally the matter of the social evil by personal contact with three poor, outcast, fallen women. How do men fold their arms, and women gather up their skirts, in presence of a sin Jesus himself touched, with sympathy for the woman and with conscience-scrutiny for the man! But it is with his teachings on the matter of Divorce that we are most interested here. Time prevents our pausing upon exegetical details; but careful study of Christ's words leads us to certain conclusions which can successfully challenge attack. Epitomizing the teachings of Christ in the four passages on this subject (Matt. v, xix; Mark x; and Luke xvi.), we find that Christ allows only one cause for divorce, that of adultery. He asserts, first, the guilt of the man who divorces his wife for other cause; second, imminent danger of adultery for the woman thus put away for any lighter cause; third, the guilt of adultery on the part of any other man who marries such a divorced or repudiated wife; fourth, the guilt of adultery on the part of the husband who divorces his wife on lighter grounds, and marries another; fifth, if the action for divorce originate from the wife, and she put away her husband save for the one cause, she commits adultery. As a matter of pure exegesis, nothing can be more explicit; and taken together the four passages cover nearly all combinations of the problem for man and woman alike. And now on these passages a few observations will be sufficient:

1. That the Roman Catholic Church has always understood, in the passages epitomized, that Christ denies the right of either party to remarriage. On the other hand, the Greek and Protestant churches have nearly always maintained the right of remarriage, in such cases, to the innocent party.

2. Christ's words here have been supposed by some to out-
line an ideal society, and cannot, it is said, be meant to apply strictly to actual life. In reply note

(1) That Christ answers this by distinctly saying that the strict rule he would enforce is historical. He refers to the original institution of marriage, and says: "What God hath joined together, let not man put asunder." In actual practice and in the original intent this was the rule before social degeneracy began.

(2) Moses permitted, not commanded it, because, in ruder and more corrupt days, it could not be enforced. But Christ distinctly implies by his language that it was time for a higher code to reign. Christendom from his day to ours can only evade this by confessing that in matters of social morality, we, after nineteen centuries of Christian light, are yet to be ruled by the lower permissive morality of 3,500 years ago. "Our hardness of heart" is as great as theirs.

(3) This rule of Christ's was put into practice at once in the Christian church of the early centuries—that century so foul and debased that one would hardly dare attempt to describe it. This became one of the burning questions of the early church, and it was against the prevalent laxity of personal and family life that the early Christians set themselves like a rock, even in that day of Rome and Corinth.

But a passage in Paul's seventh chapter of First Corinthians is supposed to modify or antagonize these utterances of our Lord. We find this passage:

If any brother have a wife that believeth not and she be pleased to dwell with him, let him not put her away. And the woman which hath a husband that believeth not, if he be pleased to dwell with her, let her not leave him; but if the unbelieving depart, let him depart. A brother or a sister is not under bondage in such cases, but God hath called us in peace.

This passage is supposed by some to allow divorce for desertion. But, note, (a) Paul is not speaking here of divorce at all, but only of possible separation. (b) He is considering the case only where one or both are heathens. "Under bondage in such cases" must, therefore, refer to those cases; and if divorce ever is allowable in such cases, we have no such cases in
Christendom for our modern legislation. Certainly we seldom hear of religious incompatibility as sundering the marriage bond. (c) Even if we suppose "Not under bondage" to refer to breaking the marriage tie by divorce, is not that word "bondage" strange language for Paul to use of marriage in the face of Christ's high view of the sanctity of marriage, and Paul's own language elsewhere, that a man and woman are bound to each other as long as they live? (d) But, however we regard this passage, that only can be the right interpretation which brings it into harmony with Christ's great law. We have discovered already what that is. Any supplemental legislation of Paul certainly cannot be antagonistic to Christ's plain teaching. (e) A different interpretation of this passage, especially at the time of the Reformation, doubtless as a recoil from the strict Catholic views of marriage, has opened the flood-gates of modern, Protestant divorce. This canon of interpretation extends divorce to all cases of desertion; and from its allowance for this cause of desertion extends it to other causes less, equally, or more heinous. And so the logic of the ages, as time goes on, has increased this one cause to nearly a dozen; and we Protestants to-day, despite the uniform and noble stand of Roman Catholicism all down the centuries, are confronted with a private practice and a public legislation, at the most extreme remove from the New Testament standard.

Doubtless the recoil of the Reformers from the sacramental theory of marriage in the Catholic Church, together with the abuses of celibacy and concubinage; and, later, the recoil of Puritanism from the sacerdotal views of the Church of England, were the controlling influences which have fostered this greater license in our earlier Protestant history. But deeper than these causes is the growth of individualism, intensified by republican forms of government and by industrial changes. Everywhere we hear of rights: rights of labor, rights of capital, rights of woman, rights of universal suffrage, rights to the public crib, rights to the spoils of office, good rights and bad rights alike; one is as logical as
the other, if the individual alone is the basis of society. We need not discuss this, only state it as a manifest fact and tendency. Everywhere, as Sir Henry Maine has said, "The drift is from status to contract, and from the family to the individual." This is the one dominant thought in America; —"Rights." And now hosts of foreigners come to share our rights, and help to make and unmake our free institutions. Of course, then, we cannot be surprised that the right of divorce and the right of sexual freedom should be emphasized with the rest. And yet, some rights are harmless in a simple Puritan society which may be ruinous if indulged in a complex civilization like ours. Suffer only the facts, often stated publicly before. Right out of pure and free New England has come the greatest impulse to break up the home. It is a fact, and a strange one, but fact, nevertheless. In New England and the Western Reserve of Ohio, and wherever New England men and women have gone, frequent divorce has gone. The movement as a marked evil seems to have begun in Connecticut between 1840 and 1850, when the laws on this subject were relaxed. Since then, the license of new settlements, conflicting state laws, a growing demand for social as for political equality, foreign immigration (which, though from nations of stricter rule on the marriage bond, is effective by the very law of repulsions), and the stain of foreign ideas of incontinence (result of travel) have all joined to increase the peril of the family. The morals of sex, moreover, are often treated from the individual rather than the social standpoint. Men seem easily to convince themselves that licentiousness is an individual vice, like drunkenness, and good women who will not touch the harlot with their little fingers, yet suffer the society and the advances of men who make harlots.

But to return to facts. Divorces have doubled in proportion to marriages in the thirty years from 1850 to 1880. In Connecticut it had become in the latter year one divorce to every ten and four-tenths marriages; in Rhode Island one to eleven; in Massachusetts one to twenty-one; in Maine one to ten; in Vermont one to fourteen; for all New England about one
to fourteen. In twenty-nine counties in California in a recent year, an investigator found one divorce to seven and four-tenths marriages. In San Francisco in one year one to five and seven-tenths, and in one solitary county in California, as low as one to three. In Ohio, the number has increased since 1870 ninety-five per cent., while marriages have increased only twenty-nine per cent. and population only thirty per cent. Bishop Gillespie, of Michigan, collected, a few years ago, facts from twenty-four counties, which show about one to thirteen. I have personally obtained from the proper officers in Grand Rapids the fact that, from October, 1884, to October, 1885, one divorce was granted to four and a half marriages, as the record of Kent county. For 1886, from the figures so far collected, it will be about one to six, making Kent county one of the banner counties in the country in its disgraceful record against the home.

But we must consider, also, that out of these averages we must deduct the whole or a very large part of the Catholic population, in which communion no divorce is allowed. This will make the showing even more marked, by increasing the ratios for the Protestant and anti-religious element of our communities.

We must remember, likewise, that in Massachusetts, which has kept the most careful and reliable statistics on all subjects of public morality for many years past, we find that between 1860 and 1880 the population increased forty-five per cent., marriages increased only twenty-five per cent., and divorce one hundred and forty-five per cent. Other New England states have increased in population presumably as fast, and Western states faster than Massachusetts; and if, for the country over, the ratio of divorce to marriages about doubled in thirty years, the same or greater ratio of divorce and marriage to population would probably be true for other states than Massachusetts.

Now we must remember another class of facts, to see the full significance of these figures, viz., that families, especially among the better classes, are smaller than formerly; so that
we have to face the combined force of four facts; viz.,
(1) population is rapidly increasing, and yet (2) there are
fewer marriages in proportion to population; (3) more
divorces in proportion to marriages; (4) smaller families in
marriage.

Once more, we must bear in mind the source of our increase
of population, from the lower classes of Europe, and how
they eagerly avail themselves of our laws; but in so doing
throw off, in the act, the bonds of the Catholic Church, if
Catholic before coming here, and join, not generally the
Protestant, but the anti-religious or non-religious elements in
our midst.

But consider again that, apart from this recruiting to the
forces opposed to the family, yet, after all, the increase in
divorce is chiefly in the native stock of America. If now,
you say that this stock is the lower stratum of society, either
foreign or native, it can be easily answered that however true
that may have been twenty years ago, or may be to-day, yet
our poorer and lower classes in this country, by push and
energy and opportunity, are fast becoming, year by year, our
better classes, and carry with them as they go up in social
life, presumably, the same ideas of home and marriage they
originally had—invariably so, unless the popular sentiment
of the higher classes of Protestant society, into which they
come, is intelligent and firm to Christian principles on this
vital matter. Let me add that lax ideas of divorce are not
confined largely to the lower middle classes in the West, as
Mr. Dike, a few years ago, told the writer they were in New
England; but are often found to permeate our so-called best
society, and frequently exist in our churches unrebuked.

The problem then is: Fewer families formed in proportion
to population; more homes broken up in proportion to those
made; smaller families raised in marriage, especially among
the better classes; ignorance or indifference to this whole
question among our better Protestant citizens; and the lower
classes, with their irreligious and socialistic ideas of the family
life, pushing their way up in a free and unrestricted state and
threatening to dominate legislation of the land on this as on other matters. Here is our problem. Is it not a vital one?

But we must also consider another fact, which complicates this problem here in the United States, viz., that legislation has tried nearly every experiment with the subject. South Carolina allows no divorce at all; New York allows only the one cause. Massachusetts gives nine grounds, and Michigan seven. Other states vary from three or four to ten. Most states place this power only in the hands of the regular courts; one only, Delaware, yet confines it to the legislature, where most of the states originally placed it. Some of the states, after enumerating a long list of grievances which may sunder the bond, add yet an omnibus clause, which places almost unlimited discretion with the judge, as to other causes, which his judgment may allow. Add now the fact that despite high requirements, as in New York, yet nearly all the states acknowledge the validity of any divorce, however lax, procured in accordance with the laws of any other state. Consider also the fact that the states differ materially as to the length of time required to gain a residence long enough to procure the sundering of the bond,—from a few months to several years. Consider also the fact that methods of procedure in the courts vary from strict requirements as to evidence, in some states, to a perfect travesty of evidence, in others; so that often a divorce can be procured almost without the knowledge of the other party. Consider that an elective judiciary cannot be as pure and independent on these vital matters as a more permanent bench might be, and that there is a class of lawyers who make it a special business to see any case through by false evidence, chicanery, and collusion, between parties conniving at the separation. Consider, again, that our laws generally affix no adequate penalties to these cases of cruelty and desertion and non-support and drunkenness, and 'even adultery. If heinous enough to break up homes, they surely should be visited by severe penalties. But who ever hears of an adulterer punished by the state, even if good laws are on the statute-book?
Who punishes the habitual drunkard, who wrecks the peace of the whole family, and then gets for his only punishment the riddance of a wife and children, whom he has abused and never supported? We deal out punishment for cruelty to animals; but though we sunder the bond of a cruel marriage life, we seldom put in jail the man whose cruelty sundered the bond, but let him get at once another victim. Call marriage a contract, if you will, yet were violations of property contracts as lightly dealt with as violations of the marriage contract, property would have no legal stability whatever. And then, again, in most of our states no prohibition of remarriage is placed upon the guilty one. If one state, as New York, forbids an adulterer to remarry there during the life of a former consort; yet he can go off to Michigan or Illinois, and come back, maybe, to live in guilt with his very paramour under the aegis of law. If in some states years must intervene before such remarriage, in others he can at once enter the bonds. The same kind law which so conveniently cuts his bond to one whose home and hopes he has wrecked—the same kind law permits him to wed at once some other victim; and he will easily find magistrates or ministers to bless his iniquity, for a legal fee, or a tempting bonus. I will not go into the details of well-authenticated cases—cases so numerous and notorious, that, after reciting the distressing story, a prominent writer, a few years ago, called it "consecutive polygamy," comparing it with that in Utah, which he called by contrast "cotemporaneous polygamy."

III. Enough has been said to indicate an alarming tendency of our day and our generation. Let us go further, to consider some questions regarding the responsibility for this tendency, and to speak of a few helps in forming a better public sentiment. We might follow a certain school of thinkers on public moral questions, and throw the whole burden upon our laws. Let us not do that. Our laws on these questions are lax and defective, far removed from the specific law of the great Lawgiver for Christendom, and not as good, even, as public sentiment would enforce. In no one respect have our
Some Relations of Divorce to Social Morality.

If some men call a tax or license law, which aims to restrict the free sale of intoxicants, wicked, anti-Christian, and intolerable, though without specific word of Christ on the subject, what might we not say about our divorce laws, so squarely opposed to the simple and unequivocal teaching of Jesus Christ? Surely if Christian sentiment should be roused to the evils of intemperance, and if temperance men have any reason for laying these ills at the doors of legislation, and hope that laws will eradicate the vice, surely, surely, as Christians and citizens, we have far more right and duty to rouse Christian sentiment on this question, backed by such specific requirements of our Lord.

But deeply as we may feel on this matter, let us not lose our judgment. Christ and his followers after him must deal far more with individuals than with laws. Laws are only what the popular sentiment and conscience make them. Why, here in Christendom, for nineteen centuries, upheld essentially before the world, by the oldest communion of the Christian church, the Catholic, has been the high and ideal standard of Jesus Christ's law on the family; and yet it, with the authority of the God-man himself behind it, has not yet controlled the laws of what we call Christendom. What then? Shall we be discouraged in any moral battle, even this one? No. But shall we run tilt with our imperfect laws and demand at once perfect ones? No. For that were manifest folly, and even Christian principles do not work in that magical way. Shall we give up then and wait for public sentiment? No. But if we recognize any truth and any significance in the facts and principles here urged, let us rouse ourselves as Christians and citizens to make a better force back of laws. Laws have much to do in forming sentiment, very, very much. In this matter we are considering, sheer ignorance that Christ ever taught anything different from what our laws allow, is one great cause of this increasing evil. Some people think it all right because the law allows it. Now, grant, for argument's sake, that our laws on this subject are
as good as public sentiment will allow; grant that their intent at least may be good, to protect the happiness, if not the purity, of society,—is the public sentiment right? That is the greater question. Is the intent of the law mistaken in fact? That is the important question. And has the Christian church no mighty mission in forming the sentiment and guiding the intent of the law? We must recognize the fact that though we live in a nominally Christian land, the state is not and cannot be really Christian until the church itself is; and even then only as individuals are willing to exhibit in life the law of Christ.

Now, on this vital matter of the family there are some things that public law can do, even as it now exists.

1. It can shut off some of the lighter causes of divorce; that is possible.

2. It can do what nearly every statute provides for: substitute separation from bed and board for absolute divorce, in a large number of cases; thus facilitating return to the former state. But this provision is almost a dead letter. Bishop Gillespie, of Michigan, is authority for the statement that he found in twenty-four counties of Michigan not a single case of separation, and the clerks of some courts did not know that there was such a thing. This separation in many cases would effect all that divorce does, and is all in those cases that even a lax law should permit, even in a low social tone.

3. It is a flagrant offence against common ideas of justice and public safety that an offence deemed sufficient to break the solemnest bond on earth, civil or divine, should almost never be followed with penalties. We have some penalties attached to our laws on this subject; but they are quite generally not enforced; we ought to have others, too, and enforce them all. Any society, however unchristian and lax, owes this much to common decency and justice.

4. Collusion between dissatisfied parties, even so outrageous a thing as collusion to adultery, exists not in Patagonia, but in the United States, to break up God’s fundamental institution, a home. By the behests of even the laxest law that
can be framed should this be ferreted out. A constable's conscience, to say nothing of a lawyer's, or that of an ermined judge, should denounce this outrage.

5. Swift and careless procedure is as illegal as it is immoral; but it is notorious all over the land how quickly, and on what shallow evidence, and with what artful devices of lawyer and client and witness, this outrage on common law is committed. Tenfold better a bad and quarrelsome home than such denial of the commonest dictates of justice. Even a police court will spend days over the pilfer of pence.

6. The commonest and laxest laws of any state which cares for the home contract as much as it cares for property contracts will at least keep a man or woman guilty of an offence against so sacred a bond, from immediately contracting another marriage. The delay of procedure recently instituted by the laws of Vermont has resulted in a striking diminution of divorces. It is hoped that a similar law recently enacted in Michigan will effect the same good results. Do we let a defaulter or a thief, unpunished, go free at once on society to play his games again? And yet we let an adulterer, or a drunkard, or a deserter, or a cruel brute freely wed at once anybody who will marry him. I cannot find in Judge Jennison's digest of our divorce laws anything to meet this evident evil, although some recent legislation in several states has been in the right direction. "The mind shrinks," he says, "from the attempt to conjecture what must be the near result of such a state of demoralization. It forces the conclusion that disregard of, and contempt for, the obligations of the marriage bond is the dry rot of our society, eating out its life with awful certainty, however strong and prosperous the surface may appear." A judge says this, dealing with actual laws; not a minister, dealing with ideal ones.

7. A seventh suggestion has been made by some who think far more than others do of the advantage of better laws in advance of the sentiment back of them. It is an amendment to the Constitution of the United States to make uniform our state laws on this subject; but even if this would be consti-
tutional, such a law now would inevitably be a low one, nearer down to the common level of lax laws, than up to the higher level of the better ones, and "idle as a painted ship upon a painted ocean," unless, for example, Christian communities and assemblies rise to a demand for laws nearer Christian than the ones we have.

IV. I now pass, fourthly and lastly, to consider two objections to all that has been said, the only two of any weight that I have met in conversation or study. I think I need not guard myself, after what I have said, from the charge of desiring impossibilities, or demanding for our public laws at once an ideal code. I wish, as a Christian, I could make such a demand. I cannot as a citizen; and that principle of difference every wise man must remember, even if he does not wish to. First, it is objected that our laws are humane in intent, and Christian in spirit, if not in letter; for permission of all these grounds in divorce does tend to break up bad homes, and why keep up a cruel and drunken and incongenial home? Why not sever ill-assorted wedlock? Why not in the interest of peace and mercy to sad wives and restless husbands let them go free to greener pastures and more unclouded skies? Certainly, that course has some plausible reasons for it. But we might answer once for all and stop, when writing for communities which recognize the authority of Jesus Christ, that he forbids it, and he was as humane and tender as any court, or husband, or wife; he, more than any other teacher who ever lived, emphasized the rights and duties of the individual; especially has his gospel historically elevated the rights and duties of woman; and woman is more interested in this home problem than any other class. It is this tender Teacher of individualism and women's best Friend who denies the argument in the name of humanity, and God's fundamental institution, the home. But this objection can be met on other, lower grounds: It is fundamental to the stability of all society, that individuals must waive some rights for the public good. It is better that some individuals suffer than that the state be injured. This is an axiom, and yet nothing is more unfelt
and neglected in our social life, with this clamor for individual rights everywhere. Now we all know from what we see that there is infelicity in many married lives; but infelicity is a variable word. It depends upon judgment and temperament and caprice, and mutual crimination oftentimes, as well as sterner evidence of fact. For the greater evils in the present state of society, perhaps law can do no better than it does. But how hard to draw the line, and how easy to aggravate the impossibility of happiness and duty in lighter causes of incompatibility! I have refused at least seven marriages of divorced couples, in this state, during three years, and most of the grounds for separation in the premises were confessedly for no cause but incongeniality. Laws or arguments which encourage such practices would weaken all bonds everywhere. Once establish the principle that humanity on slight grounds demands the annulling of such a sacred bond, and you open wide the gates of universal discord.

Moreover, the very fact of easily sundering such relations encourages the restlessness and unhappiness which might be borne with firmness and principle, if the marriage bond were firmer. Besides, we must consider the effect of such reasoning in encouraging hasty marriages. This is one of the worst features of the whole problem; a bond easily broken is rashly taken. This needs no argument, for hasty marriages are met in every society. Easy divorce works the opposite effect with the more prudent, viz., they will not contract a bond so lightly esteemed by law and custom.

But, again, the atmosphere of any home built on such shifting sands, which the winds of law and custom may blow away, cannot be conducive to the law and order of the family life, its authority, its wide and wise planning for children, its mutual forbearance and serenity, its Christian rectitude, and unselfish aims. But far worse than any other effect of such argument is the temptation it fosters to form other attachments. Once grant the principle that affection is something you cannot control for life, and that its loss is a cause for divorce—what bickerings, what retaliations, what burnings of
hatred and lust, it breeds, when the law sunders lightly two, to wed another two, whose affections are engaged before obtaining a bill of divorcement. This is the worm at the root of many a fair flower of home and children's heritage.

A final but important consideration against this objection must be added, that nearly all the arguments for it may be met by the allowance of separation in such cases as are cited, and not by the provision of total divorce.

But there is a second objection to our arguments in this paper. Easy divorce is said to preserve public purity, and prevent incontinence. This is the great argument of all who uphold manifold divorces. It has some weight and doubtless is true to-day against a perfectly strict and ideal code. It was true as against practices of the Catholic clergy and laity in the middle ages. It is true of some European countries to-day. In the name of public purity, I say, let us not do anything to increase the evil of licentiousness, already so colossal! But, we may reply, the burden of proof that easy or even quite strict divorce does effect this good end must lie with those who affirm it. And right here they must first meet the position that Jesus Christ would not have made such a law as to increase this giant evil: for he not only made it, but his disciples and the early church enforced its high behests in the Christian communities as they went forth into the most licentious age the world ever saw.

But, waive that if you please, though it is an unanswerable position if we accept Christ's morality as ours, yet history certainly does not support such an objection as the one we are considering. What was the result of divorce in Rome? Did it check, or even tend to, licentiousness? Nay, it was the very handmaiden of the evil; if not the cause, yet the close attendant, of it. So surely, the early church by this reasoning should have shrank from Christ's law; but nothing is more demonstrable than that Christ's law, even then, more than any one thing, checked that vice in that pestilential society, and saved our heritage of a pure family. What if its severity met a re-
coil in monastic life, no less than in Luther's Reformation—yet to establish the position, you must show a very high degree of purity in Europe and America to-day against the Catholic past of the middle ages and now. There is an advance. Yes; but nineteen centuries ought to make that on either code of legislation. And yet that our lax divorce laws have done it will require abundant proof, which I have never met. And, moreover, analogy in other civilizations goes to show that the advance has been in spite of it.

But grant that these laws are beneficial in the present hardness of men's hearts. Still, why should the heart be harder in one state than in another, in Connecticut than in New York? Is Canada, where divorce is comparatively unknown, more licentious than across Detroit River in Michigan? There never was a divorce granted in South Carolina, except for some years after the war, by a law speedily repealed. And yet, despite certain evident evils of concubinage, a judge of South Carolina declares that the working of this stern policy has been to the good of the people and the state in every respect. We have seen above how Judge Jennison, of Michigan, calls our system the dry rot of society. Again, it is a well-known fact of history, past and present, that the Irish people are among the chastest in the world. Yet the strict Catholic law under which they have always lived, according to the objection, ought to have opened the flood-gates of impurity. Berlin is counted among the most licentious cities of Europe, rivalling, if not equalling, Paris. Yet the German divorce laws, next to those of Switzerland, are the laxest in Europe. We may look with interest to France, which in 1882 changed her laws to greater leniency. We ought to see, in time, amendment of social morality in France, if the objection is good.

I will only add that while statistics on this subject are rare, yet the most careful ones, those of Massachusetts, show this: Illegitimacy has doubled in Massachusetts in ten years, and so has divorce, while population has only increased one-fourth; and while convicted crimes against purity have increased two-
fold, all other crimes, excepting so-called liquor cases, have increased hardly one-fourth. Take these facts for what they are worth,—not much, perhaps, and explainable on some other grounds; yet they serve to rebut an objection, unless disproved and confronted with other facts.

In conclusion, let us ask ourselves whether we can face the apathy on this subject, even in Christian homes and society, without a word of warning and appeal? We can be full of hope and courage on this great subject, because whole generations have passed in some communities without a public word on this vital issue, and we can be sure that when facts are known with such a clear teaching of Christ behind us, and love of home and purity as allies, these truths will find a lodgment in mind and conscience, if we urge them. It is to Christian men and women that our appeals will come. This is a religious and moral issue, more than a political one. It is loyalty to Christ and his teachings on which we may rely. It is to love of a pure public society that we can address ourselves. Whatever the state can or may do to help, we may wait and pray for it, and do the best we can with the existing laws; but the Christian church, at least, must try to show to the public law a bold and loyal response to Christ’s aims for the home, by knowing his law so clear and strict; by a Christian example on these practices; by personal purity, man no less than woman; by the stigma of social recoil from practices which some men indulge and some women condone. Helping to enforce any existing law, so far as it is not immoral, let us agitate for better ones. But back of all laws, good or bad, ministers, at least, owe to those higher laws of Christ the force of their Christian example not to help contract a marriage, even if legal by state law, from which they would bid their people, in their Christian example, refrain, in accordance with Christ’s requirement. We can all do this much. We owe it to ourselves, our homes, our state, our Lord. We owe it to our sons and our daughters to prepare God’s highway of purity and right, for them, in a stable and Christian family, God’s most fundamental institution on earth.
ARTICLE III.

A NEWLY DISCOVERED KEY TO BIBLICAL CHRONOLOGY.

BY J. SCHWARTZ, LIBRARIAN OF THE APPRENTICES' LIBRARY, NEW YORK CITY.

1. Among the few chronological documents that have been handed down to us from antiquity, Ptolemy's Canon is unquestionably the most valuable. It gives an unbroken series of kings of Babylon, Persia, Egypt (and the emperors of Rome from Augustus to Antoninus), from the accession of Nabonassar, in B. C. 747, to A. D. 160.1 The absolute historical accuracy of these tables is guaranteed by a series of eclipses, recorded in Ptolemy's Almagest, which gives the year and day of each reign in which they occurred. Ptolemy's statements have been verified by modern astronomers. The recently discovered Egibi contract-tables reckon eighty-three years from the accession of Nebuchadnezzar (B. C. 604) to the first of Darius Hystaspes (B. C. 521) in exact agreement with the Canon, and thus effectually dispose of Bosanquet's theory of chronology, in which Nebuchadnezzar's first year is depressed to B. C. 578. The scheme of Franke Parker, proposing to advance all the reigns of the Persian and Babylonian kings before Artaxerxes II. by at least twenty-one years, has been considered and confuted by Dr. Hincks.2 With the exception of these two theories, no other attack, of any importance, has ever been made on the accuracy of Ptolemy's Canon.

1 See Cory's Ancient Fragments, Lond., 1832.
2. Scarcely second in value is the famous Assyrian Eponym Canon, which gives an unbroken series of the officers after whom each year was named for about two hundred and sixty-five years, and also notes the accession of each successive Assyrian king during that time. Down to the assassination of Sargon, the capturer of Samaria and destroyer of the kingdom of Israel, the Eponym Canon counts two hundred and seven years. Now we know from the annals of this king that he reigned seventeen years, and that his first year synchronized with the accession of Merodach Baladan, king of Babylon, which is astronomically fixed to B.C. 721 by Ptolemy's Canon. Hence the Eponym Canon begins B.C. 911.

3. The annals of the Assyrian kings were dated according to the Eponym, or officer, for the year in which the event recorded occurred. We are therefore able to fix, with mathematical certainty, the date of any event in Assyrian history, for which the Eponym is mentioned, from B.C. 911 to 646. Among the most important events thus dated are those which have a bearing on biblical chronology. The following selection is sufficient for our purpose:—

Battle of Karkhar in which Ben-hadad, king of Syria, and his confederates, among whom is Ahaz, king of Israel, are defeated by Salmanassar II., king of Assyria. .................. 854 B.C.
Jehu, king of Israel, pays tribute to the same Salmanassar. .... 841 "
Menahem, king of Israel, pays tribute to Tiglath Pileser II.

between ........................................ 743-740 "

Azariah, king of Judah, wars against the same Tiglath Pileser

between ........................................ 743-740 "
Jehoahaz [Ahaz of the Bible], king of Judah, pays tribute to Tiglath 732 "
Rezon, king of Syria, slain ........................................ 732 "
Pekah, king of Israel, slain and succeeded by Hosea ............. 731-730 "
Salmanassar IV., king of Assyria, .................................. 726 "
Capture of Samaria by Sargon, king of Assyria, in the "beginning " of his reign ............................................. 722 "
Sennacherib, son of Sargon, ascends the throne .................. 705 "
First year of Sennacherib ........................................... 704 "
Sennacherib invades Judea, in reign of Hezekiah, and besieges Jerusalem ............................................. 701 "

4. The Bible offers, apparently, only three methods of ascertaining its chronology for the period covered by these
events. There is, first, the plan of adding up the regnal years assigned to the kings of Judah. These may be naturally divided into three periods, as follows, in which the names of the kings are omitted as unnecessary for our purpose:—

1. From Rehoboam to the death of Ahaziah (with $17 + 3 + 41 + 25 + 8 + 1 = \ldots$) .......................................................... 95 years

2. From the usurpation of Athaliah to the 6th of Hezekiah, and capture of Samaria (with $6 + 40 + 29 + 52 + 16 + 16 + 5 = \ldots$) 164 "

3. From the 6th of Hezekiah to the 4th of Jehoiakim (with $29 - 5 = 24 + 55 + 2 + 31 + 3 = \ldots$) ........................................ 115 "

Total .......................................................... 374 "

The fourth year of Jehoiakim synchronizes (according to Jer. xxv. 1) with the first of Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon. According to Ptolemy’s Canon his first official year was B. C. 604, which proves that his accession was in B. C. 605 (see § 15). Hence the leading dates are:—

Accession of Rehoboam ........................................ 979 B. C.
Usurpation of Athaliah ......................................... 884 "
Capture of Samaria ........................................... 720 "

According to this scheme, which is essentially the same as that of Archbishop Ussher, printed in the King James' version of the Bible, the death of Ahab (which I Kings xxiii. 51 places in the seventeenth of Jehoshaphat) fell in B.C. 902, or forty-eight years before the Assyrian date of the Battle of Karkhar. The accession of Jehu is 884 B.C., or forty-three years too high. If Azariah is the same king as Uzziah, he dies in B.C. 757, or at least fourteen years before the Assyrian date of his war with Tiglath Pileser II. As Menahem, king of Israel, dies in the forty-ninth of Uzziah (2 Kings xv. 23), or B.C. 761, his date is at least eighteen years higher than the cuneiform inscriptions require. The capture of Samaria, on the other hand, is placed two years too low. The invasion of Sennacherib is placed by the Bible in the fourteenth year of Hezekiah, therefore in B.C. 712, which seems to be about eleven years too high. If the Assyrian dates are correct, it is clear that a biblical chronology founded on the above scheme is utterly unreconcilable with it.
5. The second method is to accept the regnal years of the kings of Israel as the basis. These are, according to the Bible, as follows:

1. From Jeroboam I. to the death of Joram, son of Ahab, (with
   \[22 + 2 + 24 + 2 + 12 + 22 + 2 + 12 = \]
   \[98 \text{ years}\]

2. From accession of Jehu to capture of Samaria (with \[28 + 17 +
   \[16 + 41 + 1 + 10 + 2 + 20 + 8 = \]
   \[143 \text{ “}\]
   \[\text{Total} \]
   \[143 + 98 = \]
   \[241 \text{ “}\]

Accepting 720 B.C. as the biblical date of the capture of Samaria, as shown in § 4, we get the following dates:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jeroboam, king of Israel</td>
<td>961 B.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahab succeeded by Ahaziah</td>
<td>877 B.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jehu usurps the throne</td>
<td>863 B.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Menahem king for 10 years</td>
<td>760-750 B.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accession of Pekah, king of Israel,</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>and death of Azariah, king of Judah</td>
<td>748 B.C.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing these dates with the Assyrian records, we find that Ahab is twenty-three years too high, Jehu twenty-two, Menahem at least seven, and Azariah at least five years too high. While the discrepancy between the biblical and the cuneiform dates is somewhat reduced, yet not a single date agrees. It is clear we cannot reconcile the two chronologies by this system.

6. There remains, then, only the third method which, instead of taking each kingdom by itself, accepts the synchronisms between the reigns of each, as recorded in the Bible. The following are the most important:

   Asa, king of Judah, begins to reign in the 20th of Jeroboam, first king of Israel (1 Kings xv. 9).

   Ahab, king of Israel, in 38th of Asa (1 Kings xvi. 29).

   Jehoshaphat, king of Judah, in 4th of Ahab (1 Kings xxii. 41).

   Joram, king of Israel, in 18th of Jehoshaphat, reigns 12 years (2 Kings iii. 1).

   Jehu succeeds Joram as king of Israel (2 Kings ix. 6; compare verse 24).

   Joash, king of Judah, in 7th of Jehu (2 Kings xii. 1).

   Jehoahaz, king of Israel, in 37th of Joash (2 Kings xiii. 10).
Amaziah, King of Judah, in 2d of Jehoahaz (2 Kings xiv. 1).
Jeroboam II., king of Israel, in 15th of Amaziah, reigns 41 years (2 Kings xiv. 23).
Uzziah or Azariah, son of Amaziah, king of Judah in 27th of Jeroboam II., reigns 52 years (2 Kings xv. 1).
Zechariah succeeds Jeroboam II. in 38th of Uzziah (2 Kings xv. 8).
Pekah, king of Israel, in 52d of Uzziah (2 Kings xv. 27).
Jotham succeeds Uzziah in 2d of Pekah (2 Kings xv. 32).
Hoshea succeeds Pekah in 20th of Jotham (2 Kings xv. 30).
Capture of Samaria in 9th of Hoshea (2 King xviii. 10).
Taking 720 B. C. as the date for the last event (§ 4), the foregoing statements produce the following results:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event Description</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jeroboam in Israel, Rehoboam in Judah</td>
<td>937 B. C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asa, king of Judah</td>
<td>918 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahab, king of Israel</td>
<td>881 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahaziah succeeds Ahab</td>
<td>862 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joram succeeds Ahaziah</td>
<td>861 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jehu, king of Israel</td>
<td>849 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Joash, king of Judah</td>
<td>843 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jehoahaz, king of Israel</td>
<td>807 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amaziah, king of Judah, 29 years</td>
<td>806 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeroboam II. associated with his father Jehoahaz</td>
<td>803 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzziah associated with his father Amaziah for 22 years</td>
<td>799 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jeroboam II. alone 30 years</td>
<td>792 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uzziah alone (27th of Jeroboam II.)</td>
<td>777 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zechariah succeeds Jeroboam II. in 38th of Uzziah</td>
<td>762 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Menahem succeeds Zechariah and Shallum</td>
<td>761 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pekah, son of Menahem, king of Israel (50th of Uzziah)</td>
<td>750 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pekah, king of Israel</td>
<td>748 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jotham, king of Judah</td>
<td>747 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahaz, king of Judah, in 17th of Pekah</td>
<td>732 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hoshea, king of Israel</td>
<td>728 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Capture of Samaria</td>
<td>720 &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Comparing this scheme (which is substantially the same as that evolved by Samuel Sharpe in his "Chronology of the Bible") with the Assyrian dates, we find the following differences:—
--- | --- | ---
Ahab dies | 862 B.C. | 854 B.C. (earliest) | 8 years too high.
Jehu king | 849 | 841 | 8
Menahem dies | 759 | 743-740 | 10-7
Azariah dies | 747 | 743-740 | 7-4
Ahaz king | 732 | 732 | 2 years too low.
Hoshea king | 728 | 730 | 2
Capture of Samaria | 720 | 722 | 2

It will be seen, that, of the three methods, the last approaches nearest to the Assyrian records. As Ahab and Jehu are only eight years above the right dates, Brandes,\(^3\) whose scheme agrees, with a few exceptions, with that of Ernest de Bunsen,\(^4\) proposes to bring the synchronistic method into harmony with the true chronology by simply lowering all the dates down to Jotham by eight years, and by making Jotham's first eight years synchronize with the last eight of Uzziah his father, while he was a leper. The death of Menahem and Azariah are thus brought just within the time required by the Assyrian records.

There are, however, some serious objections against admitting this scheme, even as thus modified, as representing the correct view of the Bible as to its own chronology.

1. In the first place, the accession of Pekah, according to the Bible (2 Kings xv. 27) fell in the fifty-second and last year of Uzziah, which is confirmed by the synchronism Jotham=2 Pekah (2 Kings xv. 32). Jotham reigns sixteen years (current) and the accession of his son is placed in the seventeenth year of Pekah (2 Kings xvi. 1). Hence the death of Uzziah and accession of Jotham took place in the sixteenth year before the accession of Ahaz, that is (732+16) 748-747, and not in 741, as this revised scheme requires.

2. If Uzziah dies in B.C. 748, then all the preceding reigns must be left as in our table, if the synchronisms, on which the scheme is founded, are correct.

\(^3\) Abhandlungen, Part ii., 1874.
\(^4\) Biblische Gleichzeitigkeiten, 1875.
(3) The scheme requires Jeroboam II. to reign eleven years with his father Jehoahaz, and Uzziah twenty-two years with his father Amaziah. For the former supposition there is not the shadow of an evidence. So far as Uzziah is concerned, it is quite clear that the revolution which placed him on the throne, and compelled his father to flee to Lachish, could not have happened before the fifteenth year of Amaziah (compare 2 Kings xiv. 17–21).

(4) The harmony between the biblical dates and the Assyrian synchronisms, as brought out by Brandes and de Bunsen, is destroyed if we substitute the correct date of the capture of Samaria, viz., 722 B. c., in place of the biblical date 720 B. c., because each of the dates preceding that event in our table (§ 6) will have to be raised two years.

7. It is therefore evident that none of the preceding three systems agree with the Assyrian records. Consequently either none of these methods is correct, or else the Assyrian records are wrong. Or, one of the three methods is correct and the Eponym Canon, on which all the Assyrian dates are founded, is not continuous.

As the line of Judah shows a difference of more than forty years between its dates for Ahab and Jehu and those based on the Canon, Professor Oppert\(^6\) seeks to harmonize the two schemes by assuming a gap of forty-seven years, just before the accession of Tiglath Pileser II., which all Assyriologists (Oppert included) agree to place in B. c. 744. This break in the Canon is required, Professor Oppert thinks, to make room for Phul, the Assyrian king mentioned in the Bible (2 Kings xv. 19) as taking tribute from Menahem. But the Assyrian records know nothing of a King Phul, and the acts ascribed to him by the Bible are attributed to Tiglath Pileser II., who is, accordingly, assumed to be the same as the biblical Phul by nearly all Assyriologists. As Menahem dies in B. c. 751, according to Oppert, he could not have paid tribute to Tiglath Pileser II., who did not begin to reign until 744. Nor could Azariah, dying in 749, war with the same Tiglath Pile-

\(^{6}\) La Chronologie Biblique, 1868, and Salomon et ses successeurs.
ser in 743–740. Oppert is therefore obliged to *invent* a second Menahem, unknown to the Bible, whom he thrusts into the middle of Pekah's reign. "Azariah of Judah," whom the cuneiform inscriptions represent as warring against Tiglath Pileser, is *assumed* to be the "son of Tabêl" whom Pekah and Rezon tried to place on the throne of Judah in place of Ahaz (Isa. vii. 6).

The wildness of these hypotheses, and their utter want of evidence, are sufficient proofs of the desperate straits to which Professor Oppert was reduced to save the credit of a supposed correct system of biblical chronology. Fortunately, it is unnecessary to go into an elaborate refutation of the absurdities involved in his system, as evidence has been discovered, since that system was published, which establishes, beyond the possibility of a doubt, the continuity of the Eponym Canon, and, per consequence, the absolute accuracy of the dates based upon it.

(1) The Canon records an eclipse in the twentieth year preceding the accession of Tiglath Pileser II. If the Canon was continuous, the eclipse must have occurred in B. C. 763. The astronomer royal, Professor Airy, has carefully calculated this eclipse, and has found that it took place in the exact year mentioned.

(2) An inscription of the twelfth year of Sennacherib (B. C. 693) places the Eponomy of Mannukiassur one hundred and one years before that date, that is in B. C. 794. On turning to the Eponym Canon, we find Mannukiassur given as the officer for that year.

It is therefore certain that the supposed gap of forty-seven years does not exist, and that the dates founded on the Eponym Canon are as absolutely certain as is 1776 for the Declaration of Independence, or 1861 for the Civil War. It is, therefore, equally certain that the Bible chronology of this period, as heretofore understood, is wrong.

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8. Floigl\(^*\) accepts the Assyrian dates as correct, and assumes that the biblical chronology has been corrupted by adding twenty years to Uzziah, and ten years each to his successors, Jotham and Ahaz. He supposes these reigns were originally \(32 + 6 + 6\) in place of the present \(52 + 16 + 16\). In the Kingdom of Israel he thinks the reigns of Jeroboam II. and Pekah have been similarly corrupted by the addition of ten years to each, and that the original figures were \(31\) and \(10\) in place of the present \(41\) and \(20\). By assuming, further, that the biblical years are lunar, he is able to establish a harmony between nearly all the Assyrian dates and the Bible, except the fourteenth year of Hezekiah, which he makes 714 B. C. in place of 701 B. C.

As an argument in favor of his restoration of biblical chronology, Floigl seeks to establish the novel hypothesis that there was an interval of twenty-two years between each generation among the earlier kings of Judah, and one of sixteen years among the later kings. For argument's sake let us assume that this theory is correct, as it conclusively disproves his corrections. For if Uzziah was sixteen years old at his accession (2 Kings xv. 2) and reigned thirty-two years, as Floigl supposes, he must have been forty-eight years old at his death. His son Jotham should have been, according to the theory, \(48 - 16\) thirty-two years old at his accession. But the Bible says (2 Kings xv. 33) he was twenty-five. Further, if Jotham was twenty-five years old at his accession, and reigned only six years, he must have been thirty-one years old when his son Ahaz was twenty (2 Kings xvi. 1), which would make him only eleven years old at his son's birth, in place of the sixteen or twenty-two required by Floigl's hypothesis. Lastly, if Ahaz reigned only six years he was twenty-six when his son Hezekiah was twenty-five (2 Kings xviii. 2), who was therefore born when his father was one year old! Even if we assume, with Floigl, that Hezekiah was Ahaz's brother (which is contrary to 1 Chronicles and St. Matthew) it will not mend matters much as it would place Heze-

\(^*\) Chronologie der Bibel, etc., 1880.
kiah's birth in the twelfth year of Jotham's life. Floigl's corrections are therefore impossible, even according to his own theory, and the true system of Bible chronology still remains to be discovered.

9. The kings of Judah succeed each other in an apparently unbroken series, from father to son, from Rehoboam to Jehoiachin (1 Chron. iii. 10–16). In every case, excepting that of Abia and his son Asa, the age at which each king ascended the throne is recorded. Now it is evident that if there was a fixed interval of years between each generation, as Floigl supposes, and we succeed in discovering what it was, we shall have an infallible key to the chronology of the Bible for a period beginning with Solomon and extending to the accession of Nebuchadnezzar = fourth year of Jehoiakim. For it is clear that, if the ages assigned to the several kings of Judah at their accession are correctly preserved, all we need to do to ascertain the date of any king's reign is to merely subtract his age at accession from the date of his birth.

It is evident that some peculiar principle regulated the choice of a successor in the line of Judah; for, in at least three cases, the heir to the throne was not, as might naturally be expected, the first-born: (1) Solomon was the fourth son of David born in Jerusalem, in addition to which there were six still older sons born in Hebron (1 Chron. iii. 1–5); (2) Abijah was the fourth son of Rehoboam (2 Chron. xi. 18–22); (3) Ahaziah is expressly stated to have been the youngest son of Joram (2 Chron. xxii. 1). What, then, was the principle regulating the choice of a successor? An examination of the reigns from Rehoboam to Amaziah will give the answer.

(1) According to the Bible, the first three kings of Judah reigned as follows: Rehoboam seventeen years, Abijah three years, Asa forty-one years, or apparently sixty-one years if all the years are to be considered as full. But (according to 2 Chron. xiii. 1) Abijah succeeded Rehoboam in the eighteenth year of Jeroboam, and (according to 1 Kings xv. 9) Asa, his son, became king in the twentieth year of Jeroboam, so that Abijah reigned only two years full. Asa was afflicted with
a dangerous disease in the thirty-ninth year of his reign, which finally resulted in his death (2 Chron. xvi. 12-14). It is therefore extremely probable that he was incapacitated from performing his duties as king during his last illness, and that his son Jehoshaphat was associated with him from his thirty-ninth year. Hence the interval from I Rehoboam to I Jehoshaphat was \((17 + 2 + 38 =) 57\) years. According to 2 Chron. xii. 13, Rehoboam was forty-one years old at his accession, and, according to 2 Chron. xx. 31, Jehoshaphat was thirty-five years old when he ascended the throne. From the birth of Rehoboam to the birth of Jehoshaphat there were, therefore, \((57 + 41 - 35 =) 63\) years. As there are three generations (Rehoboam, Abia, Asa) the allowance for each one is twenty-one years.

(2) According to 2 Kings iii. 1, Jehoram, the son of Ahab, became king of Israel in the eighteenth year of Jehoshaphat, and, according to 2 Kings viii. 16, Jehoram, son of Jehoshaphat, succeeded his father in the fifth year of Jehoram, king of Israel, and reigned eight years, being followed by his son Ahaziah, aged twenty-two years (ver. 24). Consequently, from the accession of Jehoshaphat to the accession of Ahaziah there were \((17 + 4 + 8) 29\) years. There are, therefore, for the two generations, Jehoshaphat and Joram, \((29 - 22 + 35 =) 42\) years, or twenty-one years each.

(3) Athaliah probably usurped the throne during the one year assigned to Ahaziah, consequently her six years' usurpation (2 Kings xi. 3) end in what would have been equivalent to the \((22 + 6) 28\) th of Ahaziah's age. As Joash, his son, was seven years old when he began to reign (ver. 21), he must have been born when his father was twenty-one years old.

(4) Joash is said to have reigned forty years in Judah, beginning in the seventh year of Jehu (2 Kings xii. 1). As we shall prove in the course of this paper (§ 15) the years assigned to the kings of Israel must be reduced by one year in every case, hence the 28 and 17 of Jehu and his son Jehoahaz are, from an Israelitish stand-point, 27 and 16. As these
forty-three years end in the thirty-seventh year of Joash (2 Kings xiii. 10) they must have begun \((43 - 36 =)\) 7 years before the seventh year of his age, when he commenced to date his accession. It is therefore probable that the conspiracy against Athaliah began in the seventh year of Jehu, when Joash was six years old. He was therefore \((6 + 40)\) 46 years old at his death, when his son Amaziah was twenty-five years of age (2 Kings xiv. 2), who was therefore born when his father was twenty-one years old.

It seems to be clearly established, by the foregoing facts, that, from the birth of Rehoboam to the birth of Amaziah, there was an interval of exactly twenty-one years between each generation. Hence we conclude that, during this period at least, the heir to the throne was selected from the children born when the king was twenty-one.

10. From Solomon to Amaziah, inclusive, are nine generations. From Uzziah his son to Jehoiachin there appear to be nine also (viz., Uzziah, Jotham, Ahaz, Hezekiah, Manasseh, Amon, Josiah, Jehoiakim, and Jehoiachin) consequently Jehoiachin is the eighteenth from Solomon. According to 1 Chron. iii. 17, Assir was Jehoiachin’s son, and Salathiel was his grandson, so that the latter appears to be the twentieth generation from Solomon. But if we turn to the genealogy of Christ in the Gospel according to St. Luke (iv. 27–31) we find twenty-one generations from Nathan, the brother of Solomon, to this same Salathiel. Therefore, one generation appears to be omitted in the royal genealogy as given in 1 Chron. iii. 10–16. According to the Bible (Zeph. i. 1), the prophet Zephaniah, who was a cotemporary of King Josiah, was the fourth in descent from a person named Hezekiah, who, if not the king of that name, was probably contemporaneous with him. The line of Judah makes Josiah only third in descent from Hezekiah, so that the missing generation must be sought for between Hezekiah and Josiah. Manasseh, son of Hezekiah, begins, at the age of twelve years, a reign of fifty-five years, (2 Chron. xxxiii. 1) and is succeeded by his son Amon, aged twenty-two years, (ver. 21), so that
Amon would seem to have been born when his father was forty-five years old, which is more than double the average found for all the kings from Rehoboam to Amaziah. It is certain that the missing generation belongs here, and that Amon was the grandson of Manasseh, whose fifty-five years sufficiently account for the death of Amon's father.

We have, therefore, a series of eighteen generations from Solomon to Jehoiakim, inclusive. If the same interval of twenty-one years between each generation can be established for the last nine generations, as has already been proved to be the case for the first nine, it would follow that from the birth of Solomon to the birth of Jehoiakim there were \((17 \times 21 =) 357\) years. The fixed starting-point of biblical chronology is the fourth year of Jehoiakim—605 B.C., and accession of Nebuchadnezzar. Therefore the accession of Jehoiakim is clearly 608 B.C. According to 2 Chron. xxxvi. 5, Jehoiakim was twenty-five years old at his accession. Hence he would appear to have been born in B.C. 633. Taking this as a basis, the 357 years begin in 990 B.C., and the seventeen predecessors of Jehoiakim were born in years B.C. as follows:

1. Solomon ............................................................ 990 B.C.
2. Rehoboam ........................................................... 969 "
3. ACHIAH ............................................................... 948 "
4. Asa ................................................................. 927 "
5. Jehoshaphat .......................................................... 906 "
6. Jehoram ............................................................. 885 "
7. Ahaziah .............................................................. 864 "
8. Joash ................................................................. 843 "
9. Amaziah ............................................................. 822 "
10. Uzziah .............................................................. 801 "
11. Jotham ............................................................... 780 "
12. Ahaz ................................................................. 759 "
13. Hezekiah ............................................................ 738 "
14. Manasseh ........................................................... 717 "
15. His son ............................................................... 696 "
16. Amon ................................................................. 675 "
17. Josiah ............................................................... 654 "

II. The present text of the Bible gives (both in 2 Kings as well as in 2 Chronicles) the following series of
kings and years from Jotham to 4 Jehoiakim; viz., Jotham 16 + Ahaz 16 + Hezekiah 29 + Manasseh 55 + Amon 2 + Josiah 31 + Jehoiakim 3. But (according to 2 Kings xvii.) Hoshea's accession as king of Israel was in the 12th of Ahaz, and, (according to 2 Kings xviii. 10) 6 Hezekiah=9 Hoshea, so that only fourteen years are left for the sole reign of Ahaz. Hence the following table will represent the chronology of this period, according to the present text:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>King</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Date</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jotham</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>755 B.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahaz, alone</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>739 B.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hezekiah, assoc</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>725 B.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hezekiah, alone</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>723 B.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manasseh</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>696 B.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amon</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>641 B.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Josiah</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>639 B.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jehoiakim</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>608 B.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accession Nasr</td>
<td></td>
<td>605 B.C.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Jotham's age at his accession was twenty-five (2 Kings xv. 33), and as he reigned sixteen years, and was followed by his son, aged twenty years (2 Kings xvi. 2), Ahaz was born, as our theory requires, when his father was twenty-one years old. But if Ahaz was twenty years old when he began his sixteen years' reign, he could not have had a son aged twenty-five (2 Kings xviii. 2) to succeed him, as the present text seems to say, for in that case Hezekiah must have been born when his father was eleven years old! It is clear that we should read (36-21=) 15 in place of 25. Further, if Hezekiah was fifteen years old at his accession, and reigned twenty-seven years alone, his son Manasseh should have been (42-21) 21 years old in place of the 12 of Scripture (2 Kings xxi. 1) if our theory is correct. It is, however, probable that the tens have changed places, in the ages assigned to the father and son, and that we should read 15 and 22 in place of 25 and 12. With these two corrections of obvious copyist's errors, let us compare the preceding chronology with our birth-table. This gives:—

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According to this table, Hezekiah reigned (723–695) 28 years alone and not 27, and Amon would appear to have (653–646) 7 years in place of the 2 of Scripture (2 Kings xxii. 19). It is therefore probable that Amon, who was Manasseh’s grandson, as we have shown, was associated with his grandfather when he was twenty-two years old, because his son Josiah was then one year old (and the succession, therefore, reasonably assured) and that the reign of Manasseh, according to the birth-table, was (695–646 = 49) 2 = 47 years. If Hezekiah reigned alone twenty-eight years, then Manasseh’s 55 years in System 1 must be corrected to 54 and the two systems stand as follows:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Birth B. C.</th>
<th>King.</th>
<th>Age at Accession.</th>
<th>Reigned B. C.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>780</td>
<td>Jotham</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>759</td>
<td>Ahaz</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>738</td>
<td>Hezekiah</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>717</td>
<td>Manasseh</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>695</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>675</td>
<td>Amon</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>653</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>654</td>
<td>Josiah</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>633</td>
<td>Jehoiakim</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>608</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

First System.  
Jotham .................. 16 years  
Ahaz .................. 16 “  
Hezekiah .............. 28 “  
Manasseh .............. 54 “ — 7 = 47 “  
Amon .................. 2 “  
Josiah ................. 31 “ + 7 = 38 “  
Jehoiakim ............. 3 “  

Total .................. 150 “

Second System.  
.................. 16 years  
.................. 16 “  
.................. 28 “  
.................. 47 “  
.................. 2 “  
.................. 38 “  
.................. 3 “  

Total .................. 150 “

It will be seen that both systems produce exactly the same result, except that the 7 years’ excess in the reign of Manasseh in System 1 are added to the 31 of Josiah in System 2.

12. Now it is certain that Josiah reigned only thirty-one years and not thirty-eight, for Jeremiah (c. xxi. 2, 3), a contemporary, gives the fourth year of Jehoiakim as the twenty-third year from the thirteenth year of Josiah (and 12 + 23 — 4 = 31). If Josiah reigned thirty-one years, then his accession is rightly placed in B. C. 639, according to System 1. As he
was eight years old at his accession (2 Kings xxii. 1), it follows that he was born in B. C. 647, and not in 654, as the birth-table requires, consequently every one of the dates in that table from Jotham to Josiah must be lowered seven years, as follows:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Birth B. C.</th>
<th>King</th>
<th>Age at Accession</th>
<th>Reigned B. C.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>773</td>
<td>Jotham</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>752</td>
<td>Ahaz</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>732</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>731</td>
<td>Hezekiah</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>716</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>710</td>
<td>Manasseh</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>668</td>
<td>Amon</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>646</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>647</td>
<td>Josiah</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>639</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

That this restoration is historically correct is evident from the following facts, which prove, from the Bible itself, that Jotham’s accession was 748, and not 755, B. C.:

1. Hoshea, king of Israel, begins his nine years in (722+8) 730 B. C. His predecessor, Pekah, reigns nineteen Tisri years: he began, therefore, in B. C. 749. Jotham ascends the throne in his second year (2 Kings xv. 33), therefore in B. C. 748.

2. Unless we lower the date of Jotham’s accession to 748, and of Pekah to 749, there will be a gap or interregnum of seven years, between the end of the reign of Pekah, according to System 1, (viz., 756—19—) 737 B. C. and the accession of Hoshea in B. C. 730, which is contrary to Scripture and the cuneiform inscriptions, both of which make Hoshea the immediate successor of Pekah.

3. According to the false chronology, Pekah begins in 756 B. C. His 17th year = 1 Ahaz (2 Kings xvi. 1) and 12 Ahaz is 1 Hoshea (2 Kings xvii. 1), whose accession is therefore (16+11) 27 years after 756, or 729 B. C. In 2 Kings xv. 30 his first year is synchronized with the twentieth year of Jotham, consequently Jotham is 748 B. C.

If Jotham’s accession is 748, then Manasseh reigned, as in System 2, 47 years, and not 54.

13. If Hezekiah began his sole reign of twenty-eight years in 716, then his twenty-nine years’ reign must be dated from B. C. 717. Consequently his fourteenth year was B. C. 704.
That it cannot be placed earlier than that date is clear from the fact that Sennacherib's invasion (which the Bible places in the fourteenth year) could not have been made before he became king in B.C. 704, according to the Eponym Canon. Nor can it be placed any later on account of the embassy from Merodach Baladan, congratulating Hezekiah on his recovery from his dangerous illness. That this embassy took place in the same fourteenth year is evident from 2 Kings xx. 6, in which the prophet Isaiah predicts that Hezekiah (who reigned twenty-nine years) would survive his illness fifteen years. Now, according to Berosus and the cuneiform inscriptions, Merodach Baladan usurped the throne of Babylon, for six months in the first year of Sennacherib. As Sennacherib's first year is placed in B.C. 704 by the Eponym Canon, the embassy of Merodach Baladan and the fourteenth year of Hezekiah are indisputably fixed to that year.

According to the Assyrian inscriptions, the siege of Jerusalem by Sennacherib would seem to be placed in B.C. 701, or three years later than the fourteenth year of Hezekiah. But if we carefully examine the biblical account it is clear that this event occurred at a later date than the payment of tribute (2 Kings xviii. 24). There could have been no motive or pretext for besieging Jerusalem after Hezekiah had acknowledged himself as a vassal of the king of Assyria. It would seem, however (ver. 19-21, 24), that, after the departure of Sennacherib, Hezekiah rebelled and entered into negotiations with the king of Egypt to assist him, whereupon Sennacherib besieged Jerusalem to compel Hezekiah to submission. It is quite clear that at least a year or two must have elapsed between the payment of tribute in the fourteenth year of Hezekiah and his subsequent rebellion and the consequent siege of Jerusalem. Instead of contradicting our date for the fourteenth year the Assyrian record confirms and supplements it.

If Hezekiah began to reign in B.C. 717, then he could not have been king at the time of the capture of Samaria (which is astronomically fixed to B.C. 722) as the synchronisms in 2 Kings xviii. 9, 10 would seem to indicate. Fortunately the
Bible itself shows, in the most positive manner, that the capture of Samaria and the captivity of the ten tribes occurred some years before the accession of Hezekiah.

According to 2 Chron. xxx., the first year of Hezekiah was distinguished by a great religious reformation to which all Israel, "from Beersheba to Dan" (ver. 5) was invited. It is difficult to see how the messengers of Hezekiah could have ventured to travel "throughout all Israel" (ver. 6) if a hostile king, Hoshea, was then reigning. But verses 6–9 show that only a remnant of the people then remained in the land, and that the mass of the population had been carried into captivity by the kings of Assyria, as is narrated more in detail in 2 Kings xvii.

It has been held by several eminent chronologists and commentators that Isa. xxvii. 30 indicates that the fourteenth year of Hezekiah was a sabbatical year and the fifteenth a year of jubilee. As will be shown in § 16, the year 458 B.C. was a jubilee year. As the interval between two jubilee years was forty-nine years, it follows that 703 B.C. was such a year, and consequently 704 B.C. was a sabbatical year. Now these years are respectively the fourteenth and the fifteenth of Hezekiah in our system.

14. It seems certain, therefore, that all the birth-dates from Jotham to Josiah must be lowered seven years. But if Josiah was born in 647 B.C., as we have shown, then the birth-dates of his two successors must have been (647 – 21 =) 626 for Jehoiakim, and (626 – 21 =) 605 for Jehoiachin. That the later date is right is shown by 2 Chron. xxxvi. 9, where Jehoiachin is said to have been eight years old at his accession. As Jehoiachin began in 608 B.C., and reigned eleven years, his successor must be assigned to 597 B.C., and 597 + 8 is 605. It is true that there is a various reading of eighteen years (2 Kings xxiv. 8); but, as that would make his father only eleven years old at his son's birth, it may be safely rejected as corrupt. Moreover, 605 B.C. is conclusively proved to be correct by St. Matthew (i. 11), who says that Jehoiachin was born "about the time they were
carried away to Babylon." The captivity here referred to can be only that of B.C. 605, in the fourth year of Jehoiakim, which ended in the third year of Cyrus (B.C. 536), after a duration of seventy years.

If Jehoiakim was born B.C. 626, then he could not have been twenty-five years old at his accession, as the present text of the Bible says (2 Kings xxiii. 36), for 608 B.C. was only eighteen years after his birth. Hence it is clear that for some reason seven years have been added to his age, thereby causing all the reigns, up to Jotham at least, to be placed seven years too high. What this reason was we shall presently show, but before examining this point it is necessary to explain the form of regnal year underlying the chronology of Judah and Israel.

15. It appears, from various parts of Scripture, that the Jews had two forms of year: one ecclesiastical, beginning with Nisan, and the other civil, beginning in Tisri, six months later. That the former was adopted by the kings of Judah as their official year is evident from 1 Kings vi. 1, where Zif, the month following Nisan, is given as the second month of Solomon's fourth year. According to the cuneiform inscriptions, the Assyrian kings always counted their first regnal year as beginning with the first Nisan after their accession. The time preceding Nisan was reckoned as the completion of the last regnal year of their predecessor and as "the beginning" of their own reign. Hence all the regnal years of an Assyrian king were counted as full from Nisan to Nisan. This practice seems to have obtained in Judah, also, for the first act of Hezekiah is dated in the "first month" (Nisan) of his first year (2 Chron. xxix. 3).

The kings of Israel, on the other hand, seem to have taken the civil year, beginning with Tisri (the seventh month of the ecclesiastical year), as the basis of their official year. Hence an Israelitish official year would fall in two Nisan years, and consequently, from a Judah standpoint, a king of Israel who reigned one year would be credited with two, meaning merely, that his reign fell in two Nisan years. It is only on
this hypothesis that we can explain the discrepancy between the years assigned to the kings of Israel, from Nadab to Omri, as compared with the regnal years of Asa, king of Judah, in which they are said to have begun. For according to

1 Kings xv. 25, Nadab reigns 2 years beginning in 2d of Asa,
" xv. 33, Baasha " 24 " " 3d " "
" xvi. 8, Elah " 2 " " 26th " "
" xvi. 15, Zimri " 7 days " " 27th " "
" xvi. 15, 16, Omri " 12 years " " 27th " "
" xvi. 29, Ahab his son begins " 38th " "

The regnal years add up 40; but, according to the synchronisms, there are from the second to the thirty-eighth of Asa only thirty-six years, showing a difference of exactly one year in each reign (excepting, of course, Zimri), and thus conclusively confirming our theory. Hence it follows that one year must always be subtracted from the number assigned to the Kings of Israel if we wish to reduce them to Tisri years.

16. It appears from Scripture that the Jews made use of at least two cyclical periods, viz., the sabbatical year, which occurred every seventh year, and the year of jubilee, which fell on every fiftieth year, consequently immediately after a sabbatical year. The interval between two jubilee periods was therefore forty-nine years. In addition to these two cycles it appears to us that a third must be added, made up of ten jubilee periods. The only example remaining of its use is the famous seventy weeks' prophecy of Daniel (c. ix. 24–27), but that it was in existence from a remote period is evident from a consideration of the Bible chronology from the Creation to the Exodus. In each of the three versions of the Bible—the Hebrew, the Septuagint, and the Samaritan—the figures reported are a multiple of 490.

(1) The Hebrew version gives

From Adam to birth of Shem.......................... 1556 years.
From birth of Shem to birth of Abram.................. 390 "
From birth of Abram to promise......................... 75 "
From promise to Exodus................................. 430 "

Total................................................. 2451 "

And 2451—1 = 490 × 5.
(2) The Septuagint chronology, if we date the promise in the ninety-ninth year of Abraham (Gen. xvii. 15-24), and place his birth in the 130th of Terah (compare Acts vii. 4 and Gen. xi. 22, with Gen. xii. 4), gives the following result:

From Adam to birth of Shem .......................... 2162 years.
From birth of Shem to birth of Terah .................. 1100 "
From birth of Terah to birth of Abraham (205-75) ... 130 "
From birth of Abraham to promise ....................... 99 "
From promise to Exodus .................................. 430 "

Total .................................................. 3921 "

And 3921 — 1 = 490 \times 8.

(3) The Samaritan version, if we assume that it originally had Cainan and placed Abraham's birth in 130th year of Terah, gives:

From Adam to Deluge .................................... 1307 years.
From Deluge to birth of Abraham ......................... 1130 "
From birth of Abraham to promise ....................... 74 "
From promise to Exodus .................................. 430 "

Total .................................................. 2941 "

And 2941 — 1 = 490 \times 6.

It is therefore clear that all three versions placed the Exodus at the beginning of a cyclical period of 490 years. If, therefore, we can ascertain the date of the beginning of Daniel's period of seventy weeks, we need only to count upward to locate the beginning of each preceding cycle of 490 years, one of which must coincide with the date of the Exodus.

According to Daniel's famous prophecy, the beginning of the seventy weeks was to be marked by the going forth of the commandment to rebuild the temple and city of Jerusalem, and its end would be signalized by the death of Messiah (or Christ) "in the midst" of the last week. Three years and a half, therefore, after the death of Christ would be the terminus ad quem. It is generally conceded that the crucifixion must be placed in A. D. 29. Hence the end of the 490 years' cycle is A. D. 32, and consequently its beginning is B. C. 458. According to Ptolemy's Canon, 458 B. C.
was the seventh of Artaxerxes I., king of Persia, and on turning to Ezra (c. vii.) we find, in that precise year, an official proclamation from that king authorizing the temple to be restored, as the prophecy requires.

17. If 458 B.C. was the beginning of a 490 year cycle then the one preceding it must have commenced in B.C. 948. This coincides, in our birth-table (§ 10) with the birth of Abia. We have shown (§ 14) that Jehoiachin was born B.C. 605. If we assume the same average of twenty-one years to a generation for his descendants, as has been shown to hold good for his predecessors, we shall get the following result (see 1 Chron. iii. 17–22):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Born B.C.</th>
<th>Age at Birth</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jehoiachin</td>
<td>605</td>
<td>584</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Assir</td>
<td>563</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salathiel</td>
<td>542</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zorobabel</td>
<td>521</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hananiah</td>
<td>500</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shecaniah</td>
<td>479</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hattush</td>
<td>458</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

According to this scheme, the beginning of each of the cycles 948 and 458 coincided with the birth of one of the royal line of Judah. But it is only by adopting the reading 25 for Jehoiakim (§ 10), in place of the true reading 18, that this result is attained, with our present birth-table, and it now seems to be clear that the 18 was changed to 25 to produce this synchronism. We have shown that the seven years added to Jehoiakim are historically impossible, hence each of the birth-dates of the kings preceding Jotham must be lowered seven years, thus destroying the synchronism between the birth of Abia and the beginning of the cycle of 948 B.C., or else, as 21 goes into 490 twenty-three times, with a remainder of seven years, that one of the ancestors of Jotham must have selected his heir from among the children born in his twenty-eighth year instead of the customary twenty-first.

18. We have already shown from Scripture itself (§ 9) that from the birth of Rehoboam to the birth of Amaziah there
was no break in the rule of twenty-one years between each generation, and the same result has been proved below from the birth of Jotham to that of Jehoiachin (§ 12–14). If the seven years lacking to complete the 490 years were added anywhere, it must have been to either Amaziah or Uzziah, the only two generations remaining.

In 2 Kings xv. 1 we read that Uzziah reigned fifty-two years, and that Pekah, king of Israel, began to reign in his fifty-second and last year (ver. 27). This is confirmed by ver. 32, in which the first of Jotham, successor of Uzziah, is placed in the second of Pekah. Hence, fifty-two years preceding the second of Pekah must coincide with the accession of Uzziah. The reigns of the kings of Israel contemporary with Uzziah are given in 2 Kings xv., and if we correct an obvious error of one year which has dropped out from the reign of Menahem, (he begins in the thirty-ninth year of Uzziah and his successor in the fiftieth, therefore he reigned eleven years) and reduce the years to Tisri years (see § 15), we shall find that the fifty-second year before Jotham's accession coincides with the accession of Jeroboam II. For

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Reign</th>
<th>Years</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jeroboam II. reigned</td>
<td>40 Tisri years</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zechariah reigned 6 months (included in last of Jeroboam II.)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shallum reigned one month (including in first of Menahem)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Menahem reigned</td>
<td>10 &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pekah reigned</td>
<td>1 &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pekah reigned</td>
<td>1 &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>52 &quot; &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It therefore follows that Jeroboam II. and Uzziah began to reign in the same year. Now the first of Jeroboam II. was the fifteenth of Amaziah (2 Kings xiv. 23), consequently Uzziah must have reigned fifteen years during the lifetime of his father, as Amaziah is expressly said to have lived fifteen years after the fifteenth year of his reign (compare 2 Kings xiv. 17 and ver. 23). If Uzziah reigned fifty-two years, then his sole reign would seem to amount to thirty-seven years.

19. Amaziah was twenty-five years old at his father's death in his fortieth year as king (compare 2 Kings xii. 1 and xiv.
2), but he began to reign in the thirty eighth of Joash (compare 2 Kings xiii. 10 and xiv. 1), hence he was twenty-three years old in the first year of his twenty-nine years' reign. If he was twenty-three in his first year, he must have been (23 + 14) 37 in his fifteenth year, and therefore twenty-one years older than his son Uzziah, who was sixteen years old when he began to reign (2 Kings xvi. 2). The seven years to be added belong, therefore, to Uzziah, whose twenty-eighth year must coincide with the birth of Jotham. As Jotham was twenty-five years old at his accession (2 Kings xv. 33), his father was then (28 + 25) 53, and, as he began to reign when sixteen years old, his entire reign was (53 — 16) 37 years, and not 52. Consequently the fifteen years during which he reigned in his father's lifetime are already included in these thirty-seven. It follows, therefore, that there is an apparent surplus of fifteen years in the reigns assigned to the kings of Israel during this period, or else, that one or more kings reigned contemporaneously for fifteen years.

20. On examining the synchronisms assigned to the kings of Israel, we find that Jeroboam II. could not have reigned forty years. If his first year coincided, as we have shown (§ 18), with the first of Uzziah, then his successor Zechariah should be placed in the fortieth of the same Uzziah; but according to 2 Kings xv. 8, he is placed in his thirty-eighth. Even this synchronism must be raised two years, as it is based on the erroneous date 720 B.C. for the capture of Samaria (§ 4). If we raise this date to B.C. 722, as the Assyrian records require (§ 3), it will have the effect of advancing, by two years, the date of accession of each of the predecessors of Hoshea. Hence the accession of Zechariah (and death of Jeroboam II.) must be placed in the thirty-sixth of Uzziah. As the accession of Jotham was in the second of Pekah, and Uzziah reigned only thirty-seven years, it follows that his thirty-seventh and last year synchronized with the first of Pekah, and also with the accession of Shallum and Menahem, who immediately follow Zechariah, who was slain in Uzziah's thirty-sixth year. Consequently Pekah's first eleven years
synchronize with the ten of Menahem and the one year of his son Pekaiah. That there was a rival candidate to the throne, during the usurpation of Menahem, is sufficiently clear from 2 Kings xv. 16 (compare ver. 19), as has already been pointed out by Brandes. 10 The reigns in both kingdoms, as corrected, stand therefore as follows from the simultaneous accession of Uzziah and Jeroboam II.:—

Uzziah, aged 16 years, is made king in place of his father Amaziah, who flees to Lachish and lives there 15 years. 785 B. C.
Jeroboam II., king of Israel, reigns 36 years. 785 “
Amaziah, king of Judah, dies after a reign of 29 years. 770 “
Jeroboam II. dies and is succeeded by his son Zechariah for 6 months. 750 “
Shallum slays Zechariah and reigns one month. 749 “
Menahem slays Shallum and reigns 10 years. 749 “
Pekah, rival king, reigns 19 years. 749 “
Uzziah dies, after a reign of 37 years, and is succeeded by his son Joatham, who reigns 15 years full, beginning in 2d of Pekah. 748 “
Tiglath Pileser II. (or Phul) invades Israel and confirms the kingdom to Menahem (2 Kings xv. 19). 743 “
Pekaiah succeeds Menahem, and reigns 1 year. 739 “
Pekah slays Pekaiah and reigns alone 8 years. 738 “
Ahaz succeeds his father Joatham in the 17th of Pekah (2 Kings xvi. 1) and counts this year as his “beginning” (§ 15). 733 “
Ahaz’s first year, when he was 20 years old (2 Kings xvi. 2). 732 “
Hoshea slays Pekah in the 12th of Ahaz (2 Kings xvii. 1), his “beginning”. 731 “
Hoshea’s first year. 730 “
Capture of Samaria in the 9th year of Hoshea. 722 “

21. If Uzziah reigned thirty-seven years, as seems to be clear from the foregoing examination, he must have been born in (785 + 16) 801 B. C., or in the precise year indicated in our birth-table (§ 10). Consequently that part of the table preceding Uzziah needs no correction, and it will be more convenient to begin our restoration of the remainder of the chronology of the kings from the commencement of the series instead of working upward.

The first natural division of the reigns extends from the accession of Rehoboam to the death of Ahaziah, which coin-

cides with the simultaneous accession of Jehu, the usurpation of Athaliah, and the death of Joram, king of Israel. According to the birth-table, combined with the notices of age at accession, the chronology of the kingdom of Judah for this period is as follows:—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Birth b. c.</th>
<th>Name</th>
<th>Age at Accession</th>
<th>Date of Accession b. c.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>906</td>
<td>Jehoshaphat</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>871</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>885</td>
<td>Joram</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>853</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>864</td>
<td>Ahaziah</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>842</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Solomon died some time after Nisan b. c. 929, probably before Tisri, as Jeroboam I. dated his first year six months earlier than Rehoboam (see § 15). His eighteenth year is synchronized with the first of Abia (1 Kings xv. 1), that is b. c. 912, hence Rehoboam did not reign seventeen years full, but only current. As Abia's third year and Asa's accession are both placed in the twentieth of Jeroboam (1 Kings xv. 9) the three years of Abia are also incomplete. As Nadab succeeds his father, Jeroboam I., in the second of Asa (1 Kings xv. 25), it is clear that Asa dated his first year from the twenty-first of Jeroboam I., consequently (929—19) 910 was, technically, only his "beginning," and his forty-one years end in (910—41) 869. Jehoshaphat, who begins in b. c. 871, was therefore associated with him for two years.

We have already shown that the reigns from Nadab, son of Jeroboam I., to the accession of Ahab, in the thirty-eighth of Asa (b. c. 872) amount to thirty-six years, but as Jehoshaphat's accession was in the thirty-ninth of Asa and in the fourth of Ahab (1 Kings xxii. 41), it follows that Ahab's first year was in the thirty-sixth of Asa; hence he also must have been associated with his father Omri for two years, and the "thirty-eighth year" must mean the first year of his sole reign. This hypothesis is shown to be correct by simply counting down the years assigned to Ahab and his two sons, for
Ahab reigned 21 Tisri years, beginning in 36th of Asa... (909—35) = 874 B.C.
Ahaziah, his son, reigned one Tisri year........................................... 853 B.C.
Jehoram, his brother, reigned 11 Tisri years.................................... 852 B.C.
Jehu................................................................. 841 B.C.

This chronology is confirmed by the synchronism 17 Jehoshaphat—1 Ahaziah (1 Kings xxii. 51), and 18 Jehoshaphat—1 Jehoram (2 Kings iii. 1). For as Jehoshaphat's sole reign begins 869 B.C., his seventeenth year was 853 B.C., and his eighteenth 852 B.C. It is true we might count these years from his associated reign in B.C. 871, in which case the accessions of Ahab and his two sons would have to be advanced two years each. The former view is, however, shown to be correct by 2 Kings i. 11, in which the accession of Jehoram, king of Israel, (and consequently the eighteenth of Jehoshaphat) is made synchronous with the second year of Joram, king of Judah, (as regent). According to our birth-table, Joram was king (regent) in B.C. 853; consequently his second year was B.C. 852.

If Joram of Israel began in 852 B.C., then the beginning of Joram of Judah's eight years (2 Kings viii. 17,) in B.C. (842 + 8) 850 was in his third year, and not in his fifth (2 Kings viii. 16). The error is probably due to counting Joram of Israel's accession, in eighteenth of Jehoshaphat, from B.C. 871 in place of 869. Moreover, as Joram of Israel's eleventh year is concurrent with Ahaziah's accession in B.C. 842, (2 Kings ix. 29), Joram of Judah cannot be placed later than (8 + 1) 9 years before the death of Joram of Israel, hence in his third year. Adding nine years to Jehoram's fifth would make his reign thirteen years, which contradicts 1 Kings iii. 1.

The death of Jehoram of Israel and Ahaziah of Judah must be placed early in B.C. 842. We have elsewhere shown (§99) that Jehu's "beginning" must be dated in the preceding year B.C. 843, when he was anointed as king. Consequently his twenty-seven years end in the twenty-first of Joash, and not in the twenty-third, as stated in 2 Kings xiii. 1. The latter date was arrived at by counting Jehu's twenty-seven years as beginning from the end of the eleven years of Joram.
in B.C. 841. That the twenty-first of Joash is right is shown by his thirty-seventh being made equal to the first of Jehoash, grandson of Jehu, consequently, the sixteen Tisri years of his father, Jehoahaz, must begin in the (37—16) 21st. This erroneous reading of the twenty-third, in place of the twenty-first, if carried out consistently, will depress each of the succeeding reigns by two years in the kingdom of Israel. This explains why Jeroboam's death is placed in the thirty-eighth of Uzziah, instead of the thirty-sixth, and why the capture of Samaria is depressed by two years to 720 B.C., instead of 722 B.C., the correct date.

The chronology of the two kingdoms from Rehoboam and Jeroboam I. to Uzziah and Jeroboam II. is therefore as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>B.C.</th>
<th>JUDAH</th>
<th>ISRAEL</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>928</td>
<td>Rehoboam reigns 17 years.</td>
<td>Jeroboam reigns 21 years.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>913</td>
<td>Abia reigns 3 years.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>910</td>
<td>3 Abia, Asa's &quot;beginning,&quot; reigns 41 years.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>909</td>
<td>Asa's first year.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>908</td>
<td>2 —</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>907</td>
<td>3 —</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>884</td>
<td>26 —</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>883</td>
<td>27 —</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>874</td>
<td>36 —</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>873</td>
<td>38 —</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>871</td>
<td>Asa diseased in his feet : Jehoshaphat associated, reigns 25 years.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>869</td>
<td>Jehoshaphat alone</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>853</td>
<td>17 Joram, his son, regent, while his father accompanies Ahab to Ramoth Gilead.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>852</td>
<td>18 (2 Jehoram as regent)</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>850</td>
<td>Joram associated, reigns 8 years.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>847</td>
<td>Jehoshaphat dies.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>846</td>
<td>Joram alone.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>843</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>842</td>
<td>Ahabiah reigns one year.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>842</td>
<td>Athaliah usurps the throne 6 years.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>837</td>
<td>Conspiracy usurps against Athaliah, &quot;Beginning&quot; of Joash's 40 years.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>836</td>
<td>Joash's first year.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>816</td>
<td>21 —</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>800</td>
<td>37 —</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>799</td>
<td>38 Amaziah associated, reigns 29 years.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>797</td>
<td>Amaziah alone.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>785</td>
<td>15 Conspiracy against Amaziah.</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Uzziah his son, made king, aged 16 years.
22. In the fifteenth chapter of Second Kings the king to whom fifty-two years are assigned is sometimes called Uzziah, and sometimes Azariah. It has been generally assumed that both names refer to the same king, but as we have shown that Uzziah could not have reigned more than thirty-seven years, the fifty-two which seem to be assigned to him can only designate the joint reign of Uzziah–Azariah. We know from 2 Kings xv. 5, that Jotham reigned during the life of his father while he was a leper, and it is therefore probable that Azariah designates the reign of Jotham while thus associated, which name he afterwards changed to Jotham when he reigned alone. If Uzziah–Azariah’s fifty-two years represent the two reigns Uzziah–Jotham, and Uzziah’s reign is thirty-seven, there must remain fifteen for Jotham; and we have just shown (§ 20) that Jotham’s reign was, in fact, just fifteen years from B. C. 748 to 733.

By comparing various indications of Scripture, it is quite certain that "Jerusha, the daughter of Zadok" (the high priest) the mother of Jotham (2 Kings xv. 33), was the sister of the high priest Azariah (2 Chron. xxvi. 20). That the king and his brother-in-law should both have the same name is somewhat remarkable, but when it is seen that Azariah, the high priest, was the uncle of Jotham, it is natural enough to assume that Jotham was named after him.

That Azariah was only another name for Jotham is rendered certain by the hitherto enigmatical reading (in 2 Kings xv. 1) where the accession of Asariah, king of Judah, is placed in the twenty-seventh of Jeroboam II. The false chronology of the Bible places the accession of Jeroboam in 783, consequently the twenty-seventh year is 757 B. C. Jotham’s reign is lowered to B. C. 755 (§ 11), by cutting off two years from Ahaz, which he is erroneously credited with as joint ruler with his son Hezekiah. Restoring these, we get 757 B. C. for Jotham’s accession. It is therefore clear that the pseudo-biblical chronology confounded the regency of Jotham in B. C. 757 with his accession in B. C. 748. Azariah of Judah is therefore shown to have reigned B. C. 748–733, or
exactly where the Assyrian records require him to be placed.

If Azariah-Jotham commenced his associated reign in 757 B.C., he must have been contemporaneous with Jeroboam II., for (757–749) 8 years. According to 1 Chron. v. 17, Jeroboam and Jotham were, in fact, both reigning at the same time, as here assumed. If Uzziah reigned fifty-two years and Jeroboam died in his thirty-eighth year, such a synchronism, would be impossible.

23. If Rehoboam began in 928 B.C., and Solomon reigned forty years (1 Kings xi. 42), his first year was B.C. 968. Hence his fourth, in which the building of the temple was begun (1 Kings vi. 1), should be B.C. 965. According to the Bible, this was the four hundred and eightieth year after the Exodus, which therefore should be placed in B.C. 1444. But, according to § 16, it is clear that the Exodus coincided with the beginning of a 490 year period. As 948 B.C. is the first year of such a cycle, the one immediately preceding must be dated B.C. 1438. Hence Solomon’s fourth year was B.C. 959, and his forty years must include six years during which he was associated with his father David.

An extended study of various indications of Scripture has convinced the writer that the same system of a fixed number of years between each generation obtained in the period before Solomon as well as after that reign, with this difference, however: the interval was forty-two years in place of twenty-one. The proof cannot be given here, as it would require too much space, but assuming the theory to be established, it would remarkably confirm the assumption that Solomon reigned six years with his father. For, if Solomon was born when his father was forty-two years old, he must have been twenty-eight at David’s death, who lived (30 + 40) 70 years. As Solomon’s son Rehoboam was forty-one at his accession, his father was (41+21) 62, and therefore reigned, from the death of David, (62 + 28) 34 years, and, (as the Bible says he reigned forty years,) consequently the remaining six years he was associated with his father, as just shown. As these
six years will bring us to Solomon’s (28 — 6) 22d year, when his son Rehoboam was one year old, it accounts for his being then named as the successor of David. The reason is the same that moved Manasseh to associate his grandson Amon, when he was twenty-two years old, (§ 11) viz., because the existence of a child one year old, in both instances, would afford a reasonable assurance that the succession would be continued in the same line. That Solomon was associated for some time with his father is evident from 1 Chron. xxix. 22, which says: ‘‘And they made Solomon, the son of David, king the second time.”

24. In the foregoing restoration of biblical chronology no use has been made of the numerous synchronisms with Phœnician, Egyptian, and other chronologies that are mentioned in Scripture. We have relied entirely on internal evidence alone, and have shown that the Bible, rightly understood and freed from one or two corrupt readings, is in exact agreement and harmonizes, date for date, with the Eponym and Ptolemy’s Canon.

It is not our purpose in this paper to show the remarkable confirmation the scheme here evolved from the Bible receives from Egyptian and other chronologies, and from other data furnished by the Bible, and we will conclude by giving only one specimen of such confirmation, reserving for a future paper the consideration of Egyptian and early Oriental chronology and their bearing on the biblical chronology before Solomon.

According to Josephus who professes to quote from the Tyrian annals, there were 155 years 8 months from the accession of Hiram, king of Tyre, to the building of Carthage. The twelfth of Hiram was, according to the Tyrian records, the fourth of Solomon, hence from the building of the temple to the building of Carthage were (155 y. 8 m. =) 156 — 11 = 145 years. The building of Carthage, according to the unanimous testimony of Timæus, Cicero, Aristotle and Velleius

Contra Apion, i. 17, 18 and Antiq. 8, 3, 1.
was in B.C. 814. If so, then the twelfth month of Hiram and building of the temple at Jerusalem, in the fourth of Solomon, was, according to the Tyrian annals, in (814 + 145) 959 B.C. in exact agreement with our restoration of biblical chronology.

ARTICLE IV.

MODERN IDEALISM.

BY THE REV. PROFESSOR AUGUSTUS H. STRONG, D. D., PRESIDENT OF THE ROCHESTER THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

The method of thought which I purpose to consider regards ideas as the only objects of knowledge and denies the independent existence of the external world. It is the development of a principle found as far back as Locke. Locke derived all our knowledge from sensation. If any object to this account of Locke’s system, and insist that he recognized reflection also as a source of knowledge, we reply that this reflection is with Locke only the mind’s putting together of ideas derived from the senses or from its own operations about them. ¹ The mind brings no knowledge with it; has no original power; it is merely the passive recipient and manipulator of ideas received from sensation, finding in its own operations no new material, but only the reflection of what originally came from sense. I do not mean that Locke is always consistent with himself; this he could not be, for, with all his effort to derive knowledge from the senses, there were objects, such as substance and cause, right and God, which persistently refused to be explained in this way. To Locke’s statement “There is nothing in the intellect which was not beforehand in the sense,” Leibnitz well replied: “Nothing but the intellect itself.” But this reply recognized original powers of the mind, and the mind’s cognition, upon occasion of sensation, of realities not perceived by sensation or derived from sensation. Locke’s denial of such original powers and cognitions opened the way to the exclusive sensationalism of the French Condillac and Baron d’Holbach. So his system

¹ Essay, Book ii. chap. xii.
led to utilitarianism in morals and to scepticism in religion; for how could the ideas of right or of God be derived from sense? and, if they did not come from sense, what right had they on this theory to exist at all?

Bishop Berkeley, alarmed at what he thought the necessarily materialistic implications of Locke’s philosophy, attempted to save the idea of spirit by giving up the idea of matter; or, to speak more accurately, by maintaining that we have no evidence that matter exists except in idea. The sensations which lead us to infer the existence of an outer world are themselves the direct objects of our knowledge—why postulate external matter as causing them? They may be caused directly by God, whose omnipresent intelligence and power are capable of producing uniform and consistent impressions in or upon the minds of his creatures. This thought, existence, or ideal existence, Berkeley would say, is the only existence of the outer world worth contending for. An existence like this being assumed, materialism is vanquished, for the cause of ideas is to be found not in matter but in spirit, not in a self-existent nature, but in a living God. No one who has read Berkeley’s “Principles of Human Knowledge” can fail to admire the spirit and aim of its author. That his theory can be held side by side with the profoundest belief in special divine revelation is plain, not only from the fact that Berkeley so held it, regarding his view as a bulwark of religious faith, but from the fact that it was also the philosophy of Jonathan Edwards.

Hume, however, regarded Berkeley’s application of the principle as only a partial one. Berkeley had said that externally we can be sure only of sensations—cannot, therefore, be sure that a world independent of our sensations exists at all. Hume carried the principle further, and held that internally also we cannot be sure of anything but phenomena. We do not know mental substance within, any more than we know material substance without. John Stuart Mill only follows Hume, when he makes sensations the only objects of knowledge; defines matter as “a permanent possibility of sensa-
tion," and mind as "a series of feelings aware of itself." Thomas Huxley follows Hume, when he calls matter "only a name for the unknown cause of states of consciousness." Spencer, Bain, and Tyndall are also Humists. All these regard the material atom as a mere centre of force—the hypothetical cause of sensations. In their view, matter is a manifestation of force; while, to the old materialism, force is as a property of matter. Unlike these later thinkers, Berkeley held most strenuously to the existence of spirit—for of spirit he thought we had direct knowledge in ourselves. The supposition of an unperceivable material substance was inconsistent with common sense; but the recognition of a personal and self-determining ego was a part of our common sense. Yet Berkeley in certain passages verges toward Humism, as, for example, where he says: "The very existence of ideas constitutes the soul. Mind is a congeries of perceptions. Take away perceptions, and you take away mind. Put the perceptions, and you put the mind." All we can say of Hume, therefore, is that he logically and consistently developed a principle which in germ, at least, is found in Berkeley himself. And the agnostic and materialistic idealism of the present day is lineally descended from Locke, through Berkeley. It defines matter and mind alike in terms of sensation, and regards both as opposite sides or manifestations of one underlying and unknowable force. So, as Sydney Smith says, "Bishop Berkeley destroyed the world in one volume octavo, and nothing remained after his time but mind, which experienced a similar fate from the hand of Mr. Hume in 1737."

It is easy to see how mischievous must be the effect of such a system as this. If matter be only a permanent possibility of sensations, then the body through which we experience sensations is itself nothing but a possibility of sensations. If the human spirit be only a series of sensations, then the divine Spirit also can be nothing more than a series of sensations. There

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8 Mansel, Letters, Lectures, and Reviews, p. 382.
is no body to have the sensations; and no spirit, either human or divine, to produce them. Kant, in Germany, revolted from these sceptical conclusions, and sought to reclaim philosophy by an examination of the sources of human knowledge. He went back to Locke, and showed that all sense-perception involves elements not derived from sense, elements rather which are presupposed by sense. "Synthetic conceptions or judgments a priori"—space, time, cause, for example—are the conditions of all our intellectual operations. We cannot cognize the outer or the inner world, without finding these conceptions woven into the fabric of our knowledge. So far Kant did good service to science. He vindicated the intuitions and showed that without them no knowledge is possible. But he erred in not going far enough. He claimed for these intuitions only a subjective existence and validity—they are necessities of our thinking, but they cannot be shown to have objective existence or validity. They are regulative principles merely—whether space, time, cause, substance, God, exist outside of us, mere reason cannot determine. But we reply that when our primitive beliefs are found to be simply regulative they will cease to regulate. The forms of thought are also facts of nature. The mind does not, like the glass of the kaleidoscope,\(^4\) itself furnish the forms; it recognizes these as having an existence external to itself. Kant failed to see that in cognizing the qualities of objects the mind equally cognizes a substance to which the qualities belong; failed to see that the testimony of the reason to the existence of noumena is just as valid as the testimony of sense to the existence of phenomena. Substance is knowable to God and also to man; and in and with our knowing phenomena, substance is actually and equally known.

Just this failure of Kant led Fichte to reduce all knowledge to the knowledge of self; for, if our own ideas are the sole objects of knowledge, it is only by making the outer world a part of ourselves that we can rescue it from the category of

\(^4\) Bishop Temple, Bampton Lectures for 1884, p. 13.
the unknown. Schelling could find no medium between self and the world, or between self and God; hence he assumed a direct intuition of both; it was an intuition, however, which merged the ego in the Absolute, as Fichte had merged the Absolute in the ego; there is identity between them. But, if identity, how can the One ever become the many? Here we have the impulse to the system of Hegel, in which subjective idealism becomes complete. Hegel explains the development of the One into the many by saying simply that the laws of thought require this development, and that thought and being are one. So, without giving any explanation of the origin of these laws, life becomes logic and logic becomes life. The Rational is the Real. All things are but forms of thought, and not only man and the world, but God himself, are made intelligible. If it were not for the fact of sin, and for personal wills that war against the rational and involve themselves in death, the scheme of Hegel would be very attractive. We need only set against it the lines of Wordsworth, which Frazer quotes: 6—

Look up to heaven! the industrious sun
Already half his race hath run;
He cannot halt nor go astray,
But our immortal spirits may.

Thus Hegel revives, and carries to its extremest conclusions, the idealistic principle whose development it was Kant’s purpose to check. As Berkeley had declared that things are only thoughts, Hegel declared that thinking thinks. So there can be thinking without a thinker, thoughts that are not thought. It seems to us that in his system there are two fundamental errors, first, that of assuming a concept without any mind to form it; and, secondly, that of assuming that a concept can work itself out into reality without any will to execute it. Thoughts take the place of things, both as to cause and effect—all resting on the prior assumption that identity is causality, i.e., that the constituent elements of a thought are necessarily the cause of the thing which the thought rep-

6 Frazer’s Berkeley, p. 205.
yet the system of Hegel has had a strong influence upon later philosophy. Its monistic basis gratifies the speculative intellect. Its easy reduction of the facts of the universe to logical order satisfies the aspiring spirit of man. We may even grant that its omniscient idealism has been a valuable counter-weight to the agnostic materialism of our day. Together with the evolutionary hypothesis of the origin of the world, it has found able advocates in Caird, Green, and Seth, in Great Britain, and in Harris, Bowne, and Royce, in America. Unfortunately it requires of its consistent defenders, though fortunately its defenders are generally not consistent, a rejection of the facts of history and of our moral nature. Sin is a necessity of finiteness and progress. Even Jesus, as he was man, must be a sinner. The sense of remorse and the belief in freedom are alike illusions. It can hold no view of God which regards him as a veritable moral personality, or as the author of a supernatural revelation. Conscience with its testimony to the voluntariness and the damnable life of sin, as it is the eternal witness against Pantheism, is also the eternal witness against the Idealism of Hegel. We may believe that the utter inability of Hegelianism to explain or even to recognize the ethical problems of the universe is the chief reason for the recent cry, "Back to Kant!" by which the younger thinkers are summoned to return to the feet of a master who at least recognized a moral law and a God who vindicates it.

As it is these younger thinkers whose position is matter of most present interest, I desire to retrace my steps for a moment, and to go back to England and to those who came after Hume. As Kant in Germany thought to set up a barrier to Hume’s scepticism by pointing out the a priori elements in all knowledge, so Reid in England maintained against Hume the principles of the Philosophy of Common Sense. Reid, though with some inaccuracies of statement, held to the doctrine of Natural Realism, reducing perception to an act of immediate and intuitive cognition. The notion of representative ideas as the object of perception was excluded. The mind comes directly in contact with external things. How
it knows them we do not know, but we know as little how it can perceive itself. The knowledge of the external world is not made explicable, it is rather made inexplicable, by assuming that the direct object of perception is a representative idea, which we have no means of comparing with the object which it represents. Reid did not distinguish between original and acquired perceptions, and he sometimes made sensation the occasion of suggesting, rather than the condition of perceiving, extended externality; yet his services to Natural Realism were great, and philosophy will never cease to be his debtor.

Sir William Hamilton sought to remedy the defects of Reid, and to reduce the doctrine of common sense to a consistent system. He showed the absurdity of the scheme of representative perception, which declares the external world to be real, while yet it makes ideas to be the only objects of which we are conscious. Either we must "abolish any immediate, ideal, subjective object, representing;—or we must abolish any mediate, real, objective object, represented." And yet even Hamilton was not self-consistent. Our knowledge of an external object is made up, he says, of three factors, of which, if the total be represented by the number twelve, the object may be said to furnish six, the body three, and the mind three. Here an ideal element is admitted which may so vitiate the result as to render it impossible to say that we correctly apprehend the object at all. The secondary qualities of matter, such as color, sound, and smell, he grants to be "not objects of perception at all, being only the unknown causes of subjective affection in the percipient, and therefore incapable of being immediately perceived." Even the primary qualities of matter in external objects we do not apprehend directly, but only through "the consciousness that our locomotive energy is resisted, and not resisted by aught in the organism itself. For in the consciousness of

* Dissertations on Reid, Note C, pp. 816, 817.

* Porter, Human Intellect, p. 237.
being thus resisted is involved, as a correlative, the consciousness of a resisting something." Porter also remarks that Hamilton does not explain how, in the necessity of finding for this effect an extra-organic cause, this "correlative," "resisting something" must be shown to be also extended. "The agent, the ego, as a percipient and actor, is not extended; why may not the extra-organic agent and non-ego be non-extended, or why must it be extended?" 8

If we add now to this statement of Hamilton's doctrine the fact that in his view "sensation proper has no object but a subject-object," in other words, an affection of the animated organism, we shall see that his Natural Realism limits itself to a knowledge of primary qualities in our own organism. If we go further and consider his concessions to idealism, we shall be able to narrow down the controversy still more. In that remarkable table of systematic schemes of external perception which he has appended to his edition of the Works of Reid, 9 he has defined idealists as those who view the object of consciousness in perception as ideal, that is, as a phenomenon in or of mind. As denying that this ideal object has any external prototype, they may be styled Absolute Idealists. The chief merit of Hamilton's classification, however, is to be found in his subdivision of Absolute Idealists into two subordinate classes, according as the Idea is, or is not, considered a modification of the percipient mind. We have then the two schemes of Egoistical and Non-egoistical Idealism. The former is, in general, the scheme of the German thinkers; the latter the scheme of the English thinkers, notably of Berkeley. Of the former we have already said all that is needful; with regard to the latter we wish to point out a fact that is not so generally understood, namely, that this form of Idealism regards the Idea not as a mode of the human mind. While it is not a mode of the mind, it may yet be in the mind—infused into it by God; or it may not be in the perceiving mind itself, but in the divine Intelligence, to which

8 Ibid., pp. 184, 185.
9 Note C, page 817.
the perceiving mind is intimately present, and in which the perceiving mind views it. Lotze, of all the Germans, seems to hold to this latter form of Idealism. The world to him is a series of phenomena, without value in itself, and having value only as its meaning is valuable; and the mind of man is "like a spectator who comprehends the aesthetic significance of that which takes place on the stage of a theatre, and would gain nothing essential if he were to see, besides, the machinery by means of which the changes are effected on the stage." 10

Bishop Berkeley in his earlier writings seemed to regard all knowledge as conversant with the affections of the percipient mind. He hardly distinguished between the idea as an object and the idea as an act. The first statements seem, therefore, to be statements of subjective idealism. "Sense-percepts differ from the ideas of the imagination only in degree, not in kind; and both belong to the individual mind." 11 But in later years Berkeley saw what some of his followers have not seen, namely, that things are not mere possible sensations—these would afford no explanation of the permanent existence of real objects. He came, therefore, to regard external things as caused in a regular order by the divine will, and independently of our individual experience. When we look at external things, we look at ideal existences in the divine mind—archetypes—of which sense-experience may be said to be the recognition and realization in our intelligence. So Berkeley's later statements are statements of objective, as distinguished from subjective idealism. The world without has the best guarantee for its reality and permanence in that it is the constant expression of an Omnipresent and Eternal Mind. The non-ego, in fact, is God, manifesting his intelligence and his will. As we live, move, and have our being in God physically, so we live, move, and have our being in God mentally. Even self-consciousness has its basis in God's ideas of us; and memory is only the reading of our past, in God's record-book. The existence of

10 Lotze, Outlines of Metaphysics (Ladd), p. 152.
11 Adamson on Berkeley, in Encyclopædia Britannica.
the inner as well as the outer world in God, while it is an
ideal existence, is yet the most secure and permanent that
can possibly be conceived.

Here then we have an objective idealism which is free from
some of the objections to which the common German Ideal-
ism is exposed. It is interesting to note how gently Sir
William Hamilton treated it. In a footnote to the last-men-
tioned of his Dissertations he says:—

The general approximation of thorough-going Realism and thorough-going
Idealism here given may, at first sight, be startling. On reflection, however,
their radical affinity will prove well-grounded. Both build upon the same
fundamental fact—that the extended object immediately perceived is identi-
cal with the extended object actually existing;—for the truth of this fact,
both can appeal to the common sense of mankind; and to the common sense
of mankind Berkeley did appeal, not less confidently, and perhaps more logi-
cally, than Reid. Natural Realism and Absolute Idealism are the only sys-
tems worthy of a philosopher; for, as they alone have any foundation in con-
sciousness, so they alone have any consistency in themselves.

And in his reply to the Berkeleian, T. Collyns Simon,
Hamilton expressly says: 12—

If Berkeley held that the Deity caused one permanent material universe
(be it supposed apart or not apart from his own essence), which universe, on
coming into relation with our minds through the medium of our bodily organ-
ism, is in certain of its correlative sides or phases, so to speak, external to our
organism, objectively or really perceived (the primary qualities), or deter-
mines in us certain subjective affections of which we are conscious (the sec-
ondary qualities); in that case I must acknowledge Berkeley's theory to be
virtually one of natural realism, the differences being only verbal. But
again, if Berkeley held that the Deity caused no permanent material universe
to exist and to act uniformly as one, but does himself either infuse into our
several minds the phenomena (ideas) perceived and affective, or determines
our several minds to elicit within consciousness such apprehended qualities or
felt affections, in that case I can recognize in Berkeley's theory only a scheme
of theistic idealism,—in fact, only a scheme of perpetual and universal miracle,
against which the law of parcimony is conclusive, if the divine interposition
be not proved necessary to render possible the facts.

Hamilton here seems to grant that Absolute Idealism, if
it be non-egoistical, and if it regard the ideal object as not
in the mind itself, is virtually the same with Natural Realism.
Whether this was the philosophy of Berkeley may be matter

of question; but it is at any rate along this line that our younger thinkers in philosophy are working. A world of ideas, indistinguishable by us from external realities, constituting in fact the only external realities, is open to our minds by virtue of our living, moving, and having our being, in God. In our investigations of nature as well as in our examination of our own consciousness, we are only, as Kepler said, "thinking God's thoughts after him," or rather perceiving the ideal realities of God's being. Such a conception is not necessarily merely logical, like Hegel's: God may be heart, as well as mind; may be conscience and will, as well as intellect. But creation, on this view, is an ideal process; the world, before finite intelligences existed, had only an ideal existence in God's mind, even as it now exists only in the minds of God and of his creatures.

There is a reason for this increasing prevalence of Idealism. Science has resolved the sensible universe into various modes of motion. Smell, sound, color, equally with pleasure and pain, are subjective sensations. The causes of them are not like in nature to the effects—they are only vibrations of some external medium—

What sees is Mind, what hears is Mind;
The ear and eye are deaf and blind.

What is true of the so-called secondary qualities of matter is equally true of the primary. Even extension and impenetrability can be conceived of only in relation to some sentient being which experiences resistance to its locomotive energy or which resists some locomotive energy from without. In fine, "matter can be defined only in terms of sensation; yet without mind sensation is impossible." Hence the idealist concludes that all that we know of matter is ideal. Certain sensations in ourselves comprise the whole of our knowledge. The causes of these sensations are unknown. Vibrations, motions, molecules, atoms, aye, even force itself, are but names for the unknown causes of our subjective states. Here is the refutation of materialism; for matter can have no meaning except in connection with percipient mind. Materialism
can never explain the nature of atoms; they can be conceived of neither as indivisible nor as infinitely divisible. Even the materialistic conception of law involves the idea of mind as ordering the arrangements of the universe. The cause of our sensations does not need to be material—it may be spiritual instead. What we call the world outside of us may be the constant product of a divine activity working upon our own minds; better still, it may be a constant ideal divine presentation to our minds.

There are many considerations once urged against Idealism which we must pronounce invalid against this new form of idealistic doctrine. It has been said that ideas, as given, presuppose an objective reality as cause. The new Idealism accepts the dictum, but declares the world of ideas, as neither in the mind nor a modification of the mind, to be just such an objective reality. In other words, objective idealism declines any longer to be treated as subjective idealism; it regards ideas as something distinct from the cognition of them; it may even hold that these ideas are themselves extended, and that they have all the qualities which we now attribute to the material and external object. May not God suggest ideas to me, which are not in me nor of me? Do we not, by words, suggest such ideas to one another? It may seem strange to hear of ideas which are not of the mind; but the idealist would regard such ideas as actually constituting the objective reality which we perceive. Of such a sort he would regard even the extended matter which we see. It is an ideal object, existing only for intelligence, and as inseparable from intelligence as the pleasure or pain we feel in viewing it. The apple, for example, exists for mind and only for mind; yet it has an objective existence to the mind, and is not a mere mode of the mind. The best illustration of the theory, however, is derived from the mind’s relation to abstract truth. This truth exists by virtue of the minds that perceive it; yet it is neither in nor of the human mind alone. While it is objective to man, it is subjective to God. So, it may be argued, does the universe exist. God’s ideas con-
stitute its reality, its permanence, its stability. It is as little the product of the finite individual mind, as is the law of gravitation, or the existence of space, or the truth that right is obligatory. And yet it exists only in intelligence, and for intelligence; for, whether man is or is not, all things subsist eternally in God.

Here is the theory which claims, equally with natural realism, that objects are perceived directly. The objection has frequently been made to the theory of representative perception, that either in spite of the idea objects remain unknown, or by means of it they become known, in which case there must be a comparison of ideas with their objects—a comparison which can have no meaning or value except upon the hypothesis that the objects are known already. But the theory we are considering is a theory of presentative, and not of representative, Idealism. In this theory the ideas are themselves the objects, and the only objects; as such they are perceived directly, and there can be no talk about comparing them with any reality beyond. Over against this simplest form of Idealism we desire to put the simplest form of Natural Realism, in order that we may compare the merits of the two. This simplest form of Natural Realism holds only that we know something in space and time, something distinguishable from God as well as from ourselves, something which has permanent power to produce sensations in us, something which continues to exist whether we perceive it or not. In short, Natural Realism holds to the existence of a somewhat intermediate between God and the soul, even though this somewhat be nothing more than force. God and the soul are not the only entities. The world exists not only ideally but also substantially, and this substantial world exists in the form of extended externality.

The first consideration which suggests itself in comparing these two opposing views is that Objective Idealism rests upon the exceedingly precarious assumption that the mind is capable of knowing only ideas, while Natural Realism has in its favor the universal belief of mankind that we know things
as well. Certainly the presumption is that the universal belief of mankind is a correct one; and this belief is not to be surrendered until it be shown self-contradictory. To say that things are ideas, is to common sense a yet greater absurdity. Men in general make a perfectly clear distinction between thoughts and external objects, and they cannot be persuaded to confound the one with the other. They may be persuaded to accept a thousand vagaries with regard to the ultimate constitution of matter; they may believe in ultimate atoms and vortex-rings; even the fourth dimension of space may come to seem credible to them; but to dissolve the external world into a dream, even though that dream be a permanent one and the very image of reality, is beyond the utmost stretch of their credulity.

Idealism is inconsistent with itself. It is compelled to admit that in knowing ideas the mind knows self. We cannot know ideas except by projecting them as it were from the mind. Thus we cannot know the non-ego, even in the shape of ideas, without also knowing the ego that has the ideas. Self-consciousness then is a witness to the existence of a permanent somewhat underneath all ideas, and which all ideas presuppose. But this permanent somewhat which manifests itself in mental phenomena and is the subject of them, which in fact is known in and by the same concrete act in which we know our ideas, cannot possibly be conceived in any other way than as an indivisible, identical entity. It cannot itself be an idea, or a combination of ideas, for the very first idea presupposes it. It cannot be a mere succession of feelings, for the mind never knows itself as a succession of feelings—if it could do so, it would know itself as that which was not I. It cannot be simply a relation, for relation is inconceivable unless there are things or ideas to be related, and these things or ideas must go before the relation, whereas self is known not as the product of ideas but as producing ideas. So Idealism is forced to grant the existence of some-

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thing before ideas, and more than ideas, namely, the self. But this permanent somewhat which we call self is just such an entity as we designate by substance; and the concession of the existence of mental substance logically carries with it the concession that material substance may exist also.

Idealism of the objective sort tries in vain to maintain the purely ideal character of the external world, and at the same time to declare that the object perceived is different from the act of perception. But if the object perceived be different from the act of perception—in other words, if objective idealism be not resolved into subjective idealism, if non-egoistic idealism be not resolved into egoistic idealism—then the existence of the object cannot be dependent upon the percipient act, its esse cannot be percipi. Its intellectual existence, if we may so speak, is contingent upon the existence of a perceiving intellect. But this is only to say that it cannot be known without knowledge, cannot be apprehended without mind, cannot fulfil its purpose without being perceived, either by God or man. The error of the theory is in confounding intellectual existence, or the existence of the object as known, with its real existence. As Professor Knight has said: "That the object perceived has a relation of intellectual dependence on the percipient subject is obvious, so far as his cognition extends; but if the object perceived be different from the act of perception, it cannot be in any sense dependent on it, or on a similar act, for its existence." And so we agree with Veitch, when he says that Hamilton granted too much to Berkeley, in saying that a Non-egoistical Idealism is hardly distinguishable from Natural Realism.\(^{14}\)

Idealism gives no proper account of the distinction between the non-ego in the shape of ideas and the non-ego in the shape of our bodily organism; in other words, it ignores the difference between body and the idea of body. Nothing can be plainer to the common mind than that it knows something outside of itself and different from itself, something extended, something in space, something which causes ideas but which

\(^{14}\)Veitch's Hamilton, p. 178.
is not itself ideas. The mind not only distinguishes itself from
the body it inhabits, but it distinguishes its ideas of body
from the body of which it forms ideas. It ascribes to the
body externality and extension. These properties cannot be
conceived as belonging to ideas. The idea of body and the
actual body are no less distinct than are the idea of a house
and the actual house. Body is apprehended as something
permanent and independent of our perception of it; but, more
than this, it is apprehended as existing over against the per-
cipient mind, as capable of measurement by the mind, as
having spatial relations in a way that the mind has not. This
belief in the existence of a real in distinction from a merely
ideal body, a body that is extended and external to the mind,
is the most primary and important fact of sense-perception.
Idealism, by failing to explain this belief, fails at the most
critical point of all. It attempts to confound outness with
distance, whereas distance is only a peculiar degree of out-
ness, and itself presupposes outness. And, as Veitch has well
shown, the externality of the object of sense is no more un-
intelligible than is the externality of one mind to another
mind, or to God.\footnote{15} Here we are persuaded that Natural
Realism has a stronghold from which no speculative Idealism
can ever dislodge it. Reduce the problem to its simplest
terms if you will—put on the one side an objective idealism
of divine ideas independent of our causation and perceived
as something permanent and separate from our perceiving
minds—put on the other side a natural realism, holding that
we perceive an actually extended object in space, at least in
our own organism, whose existence, as real, we distinguish from
any possible ideal existence—and we must decide that the
latter represents the facts of our experience, while the former
contradicts them.

Idealism finds in self the ground of unity for mental phe-
nomena. It should find in material substance the ground of
unity for material phenomena. Not that this knowledge of
mental or material substance, as the case may be, is reached

\textit{Ibid.}, pp.186-188.
in either case by any process of inference or argument. It is the inevitable and universal judgment of the reason, in connection with self-consciousness, on the one hand, and of sense-perception on the other. When we recognize thoughts, we recognize the self as thinking; when we perceive qualities of matter, we perceive that they belong to something which they qualify. The qualities and the substance qualified are known in the same concrete act; though we ascribe to sense the cognition of quality, to reason the cognition of substance. Without this cognition of substance the impressions of sense could have no unity and could give us no knowledge of things. Sensation brings us in contact only with points. These points would be heterogeneous and disconnected if they were not recognized by some power as related to each other. Our knowledge of an object is not a knowledge of these points, but rather of a whole which these points manifest; these points can be related to each other, and fused into a whole, only by the recognition of a somewhat to which they belong and of which they are phenomena. The soul's judgment that there is a material substance, in which material qualities inhere and which gives these qualities their ground of unity, is just as inevitable an act of reason as that other judgment which accompanies the thoughts within and finds for them a ground of unity in the cognition of a mental substance which we call the conscious self.

Idealism confounds the conditions of external knowledge with the objects of knowledge. What is the object of knowledge in sense-perception? This theory replies: "The object of sense-perception is sensations or ideas;" and it propounds the dilemma: "Either the object is unknown and the mind knows only ideas, or ideas are known and there is no need of assuming the existence of any other object whatever." But the same rule should work equally well, or ill, when applied to the world within. We should then be compelled to say: "Either the ego is unknown and the mind knows only ideas, or the ideas are known and there is no need of assuming the existence of any ego at all." The ma
jority of idealists will not say this. Berkeley would have denied it, for he strenuously held to the existence of spirit and to our consciousness of its existence. But it was by an inconsistency in his logic that he so held, and Hume remorselessly exposed this inconsistency. In self-consciousness we have the key to the problem. Mysterious as it might speculatively seem that mind should know self in knowing its own thoughts, it is still a fact that mind does thus know self; and to say that the thoughts are the only objects of knowledge is to confound objects of knowledge with conditions of knowledge. So, in the external world, we cannot know matter except through sensations and ideas; but to make sensations and ideas the only objects of knowledge is here also to confound objects of knowledge with conditions of knowledge. In sense-perception, my ideas and sensations are mere conditions of knowledge. In and through them I cognize that which is beyond, that which produces in me the ideas and sensations, namely, external objects, at least in my own organism, objects which by analysis I see to include both substance and quality. I see the moon in like manner through the telescope; the telescope is the means or condition of my seeing the moon. I may, it is true, turn my attention exclusively to the telescope and make that the object of my thought; yet he who should say that either the moon is unknown and I know only the telescope, or the telescope is known and there is no need of assuming the existence of any moon beyond it. The truth is that I cognize the moon through the telescope; if I choose I can think of both telescope and moon together; but the absurdest of all things is to say that, in looking through the telescope, I see the telescope only and not the moon. So Idealism confounds the conditions of knowledge with the objects of knowledge. That through ideas and sensations we have knowledge of things, is one of the most indubitable facts of consciousness.

The Idealist cannot be consistent without denying the existence of any other intelligent being besides himself. He
claims that the mind can know only ideas. What we call the external world is only a succession or combination of ideas, and hence no material substance can be known. But what we call our fellow-beings—are not they also only successions or combinations of ideas in which by the same rule no mental substance can be known? Self-consciousness compels the Idealist to recognize a self which is the permanent basis and habitat of his own ideas; but why should he recognize the existence of other people? If material things are nothing but ideas, then our fellow-men are nothing but ideas. If my neighbor's body exists only in idea, then his soul must also exist only in idea. The mere fact that the highway robber, when he attacks me, seems to be a conscious personality, must not blind me to the fact that he, like the club which he carries, is but a series or combination of ideas. I shall be a very inconsistent Idealist if I regard that series of ideas as responsible or guilty; for responsibility and guilt imply something more than a series or combination of ideas—they imply a subject, a mind, a permanent self, endowed with conscience and free will. In short, we must become solipsists, believers only in our own existence. But we cannot stop even here. The solipsist cannot long believe even in the existence of himself, if by "himself" he means a permanent, identical, substantial soul. And as a matter of fact the new Psychology in Germany—the psychology of Wundt and Fechner, describes itself as "psychology without a soul."

The new Idealism seeks to avoid the solipsistic conclusion by taking refuge in the consciousness of God, and by making that the guarantee for the objective existence of our fellow-men. It is a vain resource. The same rule which deprives us of all guarantee for the existence of our fellow-men deprives us also of all guarantee for the existence of God. If we know only ideas, in the case of our fellow-men, we can know only ideas in the case of God. And if God is only a series or combination of ideas, what possible meaning is there in the phrase "consciousness of God," the utterance of which seems such a relief to the idealist? A consciousness, with no being
to be conscious; consciousness without a self; universal thinking without a thinker—ah, it is our old Hegelian acquaintance:—"thinking thinks!" Notice how completely this philosophy merges the affectional and the volitional elements of the divine Being in the merely intellectual, and then transmutes even that into the vague phrase "universal consciousness." It is the God without personality or moral character, without love or will, which the purely speculative intellect ever seeks to substitute for the living God, the God of holiness who denounces and punishes sin, the God of love who redeems from sin by his own atoning sacrifice. Did I say that this theory gave us a non-moral God—a stone in place of bread? It does not even give us this—a consistent idealism can give us no God at all, it can give us only the idea of him. If we know only ideas, we can have no more guarantee that God or man objectively exists than we can have for the objective existence of matter.

Idealism is monistic in its whole conception of the universe. It claims to be a "one-substance" theory, although it should in consistency call itself a "no-substance" theory instead. It repudiates the doctrine of two substances, matter and mind, because it cannot understand how mind should ever in that case be able to know matter. Materialism declares that mind knows matter because mind is matter; Idealism declares that mind knows matter because matter is mind. The one is just as much an arbitrary assumption as is the other. Both are argumenta ad ignorantiam. Because we cannot explain how we know that which is other than ourselves, shall we deny that we do know things and beings other than ourselves? It is not essential to knowledge that there be identity or even similarity of nature between the knower and the known. God can know what sin is—aye, only God can fully know the nature of evil. It is just as much a problem how we can know ourselves, as it is how we can know the external world. "The primitive dualism of consciousness" is just as inexplicable as the primitive dualism of substance. "The mental act in which self is known implies, like every other mental
act, a perceiving subject and a perceived object. If then the object perceived is self, what is the subject that perceives? or, if it is the true self which thinks, what other self can it be that is thought of?" But this very consciousness of personality, this very cognition of self of which Herbert Spencer speaks, in the words I have quoted, he declares in the next sentence to be "a fact beyond all others the most certain,"\(^\text{16}\) and in spite of his subsequent attempts to explain it away, we may take his testimony as to the universal fact of its existence. But if man knows a non-ego in his own thoughts, he may know a non-ego in other beings or in the world outside of him; and our inability to explain the mode of this knowledge should not for a moment shake our confidence in the fact.

Idealism is compelled to recognize an action of the will upon matter,—why should it not with equal readiness recognize an action of the intellect upon matter? If I can move something outside myself, why can I not know something outside myself? It seems absurd to suppose that I produce effects only upon an ideal world when I exert my powers of volition,—why is it not equally absurd to suppose that I know only an ideal world when I exert my powers of sense-perception? I come in contact with real things and real beings when I use my will,—what right have I to say that I come in contact only with ideas when I use my mind? And when we rise to the consideration of God's relation to the world, what right have we to say that God's power exhausts itself in mere thinking, or that God is capable of no creation but the creation of ideas? Man can make a thing whose existence continues after his own act upon it has ceased,—cannot God do the same? Man can give his thoughts objective shapes—Phidias and Praxiteles put their ideas into form and make them live forever,—cannot God give substantive expression to his thoughts also? Must God be shut up to an eternal process of thinking, without the power to create substances other than himself which shall in their various degrees

\(^{16}\) First Principles, p. 65.
reflect his wisdom and his love? Berkeley believes that God is himself a spirit, and that he creates finite spirits of a different substance from himself. Why cannot he who has thus in finite spirits disjoined from himself a certain portion of spiritual force and given to it a relative independency,—why cannot he also and just as easily in material substance disjoin from himself a certain portion of physical force and give to it a relative independency?

I have thus far treated Modern Idealism from a philosophical point of view, and I have endeavored to show that even from this point of view it possesses no advantages over the doctrine of Natural Realism. But we are bound to look further, and to judge the new system by its probable influence upon Christian faith. Is it consistent with the things "which have been fully established among us," the accepted teachings of Scripture? I do not now ask whether noted Christian thinkers here and there have or have not held to the idealistic scheme. Here I have to do, not with the actual results, but with the logical tendencies of the system, while at the same time it may be well remembered that in the long run these logical tendencies make themselves practically felt. The first of these tendencies which I notice in the new philosophy is the tendency to merge all things in God. Dr. Krauth\(^\text{17}\) very properly calls it the weakness of idealism that it finds unity not in the harmony of the things that differ, but in the absorption of the one into the other. Instead of tracing all things to one source, it prefers the shorter and easier method of asserting that all things are but forms of one substance. The conception of a God who is all, seems to it preferable to that of a God who creates all. In this, the doctrine runs directly counter to the Scripture teaching that "in the beginning God created the heaven and the earth," and so removes the barrier which God himself set up against a pantheistic confounding of himself with his works. But further than this, idealism destroys all distinction between the possible and the actual. A possible universe, as already in God's thoughts, is already

\(^{17}\) Berkeley's Principles of Knowledge, Krauth's Prolegomena, p. 130.
an actual universe; and, *vice versa*, an actual universe, as only in God’s thoughts, is nothing more than a possible universe. The whole geologic and astronomic history of the universe before man came upon the planet was only a thought-history,—events, aside from God’s thought of them, there were none. Such as they were, they always were; and the universe is as eternal in the past as is God’s thought of it, for God’s thought *is* the universe. And since the future universe exists only in God’s thought it is existent now as much as it will ever be. Preservation is only continuous creation; continuous creation is nothing but God’s thinking; and God’s thinking is from eternity to eternity. Second causes do not exist, for as things are but the ideas of God, all changes in these things are but the direct effects of a divine efficiency. All causal connections between different objects of the universe are at an end. No such things as physical forces exist. Nature becomes a mere phantom, and God is the only cause of all physical events. Science becomes at once, not the study of nature, but the study of God.

I have said that Idealism destroys all distinction between the possible and the actual; I must go further, and say that it destroys all distinction between truth and error. It holds that ideas alone are the objects of knowledge; the world without and the world within are alike ideas; these ideas constitute the world; and the existence of these ideas is due directly to the causative intelligence of God. But if ideas *are* the reality, how can man have false ideas? Is it not beyond dispute that we have ideas which do not correspond to the objective truth? Are *these* realities also? and is God the author of them? Men have selfish, sensual, murderous thoughts; they hate and malign God; they slander and destroy his creatures. Are these lying ideas and representations eternal truths and realities also? Have we not here the proof that the divine ideas must differ from sense-ideas in us, and that our ideas are not the realities but only individual interpretations of reality, born of our wilfulness and moral perversion? Berkeley seems at times aware that there is a difficulty
in identifying our ideas with the divine archetypes; but the fear of recognizing in these divine archetypes a new sort of "things in themselves" seems to have prevented him from making further explanations. Is it not plain that no explanation is possible that identifies the idea with the object? Does not this abolish the distinction between truth and error, and make both our right and our wrong the direct product of the divine will?

Why should not Idealism go further and declare that God is the only cause in the realm of spirit as well as in the realm of matter? If Idealism be not logically self-contradictory it must do this. If my body, so far as it is objective to me, may be a mere idea of God, then my soul, so far as it is objective to me, may be a mere idea of God also. All my ideas are ideas of God, and God causes them. What becomes of my personal identity? What is to prevent Jonathan Edwards, as he does, from basing identity upon the arbitrary decree of God, and from declaring that God, merely by so decreeing, makes Adam's posterity one with their first father and responsible for his sin? What is to prevent the necessitarian from declaring that, since all motives are ideas, and all ideas are due to direct divine causation, the soul has no permanent existence of its own and no freedom that can furnish the slightest basis for responsibility? What we call the moral law is nothing but the presentation of a sublime divine idea; and what we call sin is nothing but the presentation of another divine idea which is given us simply to contrast with, and to emphasize, the first. Both evil and good are purely ideal. Not our wills but our thoughts are to be purged, and that by imparting to us both the good thoughts and the evil thoughts that are in the mind of God. The freedom to choose the good and to refuse the evil—this does not exist, for this would imply the existence of a substance separate from that of God. God is equally the source of evil and of good—the morally pure and the morally impure are both alike to him. What we have usually regarded as the greatest of blasphemies is only simple fact, for God is not only the author, but the sole
author, of sin; he is not only the sum and source of all good, he is also the sum and source of all evil.

All this is to deny the testimony of conscience, and to strike at the roots of all morality. It is easy to see how the whole Christian doctrine of redemption goes by the board, when once sin is regarded as a natural necessity, and ideas are held to be the only real objects of knowledge. It is no longer necessary to believe in an external revelation of God's will. Internal revelation, Christian consciousness, the direct presentation to our minds of new ideas from God, takes the place of outward Scripture, or assumes coördinate importance and authority with it. It is no longer necessary to make a clear distinction between ideal characterization and real history. Jesus Christ, with his resurrection from the dead, his atoning death and ascension to the Father, can now be conceived of after an ideal fashion. These things never were, as they are pictured to be—but that makes little difference—the object is attained—namely, the fostering of an idea in our minds. Historical testimony becomes of little account when it contradicts a preconceived theory—the idea is better than the fact—for the fact itself is only an idea. And if it be suggested that to the man who thus turns God's facts into mere ideas, by denying the record that God gives of his Son, there will come the sure and certain punishment of his unbelief, the reply is easy, that since punishment can come only in idea, and ideas, so far as we know, end with this life, there is little to fear, for since this life is but a dream, immortality is something still less substantial—even the dream of that dream. With the evidence of personal identity the evidence of personal immortality is lost also.

So the Idealism of the present day tends to Solipsism which is mere self-deification on the one hand, or to Pantheism which is the abolition of all moral distinctions on the other. It is the natural recoil from materialism, and yet it contains in itself germs of as great evil as did that foe with which the last generation so stoutly fought. It is the drift of our current philosophy, and the antagonist with which Christianity has
to cope, and which Christianity will surely conquer, in the few decades to come. Sir William Hamilton opposed Idealism simply because he believed that it contradicted our consciousness and so destroyed the foundation of all knowledge and of all faith. And yet I know of no process of mere argument which to an idealistic sceptic will demonstrate that material substance exists. I can tell him that in his very perception of quality he intuitively cognizes substance; but he may deny it. I can tell him that his ideas of the external world require a cause; but he may refer me to God as their cause. I may say, with Aristotle, that "things are not born of concepts," but he may reply that to him this is the most intelligible explanation of the universe. When I come to the results of his doctrines in ethics I may have greater hope of convincing him; but even here I can make little progress, if he has blunted his conscience and schooled himself into a belief in determinism. Practically I know of no better remedy for his disease than the acceptance of the Lord Jesus Christ. It is remarkable how the submission of the will to him as a divine Teacher, Saviour, and Lord, results in a renewal and recreation of the will—how the man who previously regarded himself as a victim of necessity, a mere waif swept upon the current, when once he has received the Saviour into his heart, finds that he is now a free man, and becomes conscious of his substantial manhood. For the first time he knows that he has a soul. And as at the Reformation those who had become sceptical of the existence of objective truth and righteousness, aye, even of the existence of God himself, when they once found by believing in Christ that they had God sure, proceeded to the discovery and recognition of objective realities outside of them and opened the way to the progress of modern science; so now, in the individual heart, again and again, the reception of Christ, giving the first sense of reality within, leads the soul outward to the recognition of a real world and of a real morality outside of it. So Christ is the way and the truth and the life, and he whom the Son makes free becomes free indeed.\(^18\)

*Gunsaulus, Transfiguration of Christ, pp. 18, 19.*
ARTICLE V.

HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF THE LUTHERAN DOCTRINE OF THE LORD'S SUPPER.

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[Continued from Vol. xlii. p. 692.]

D. With these antecedents we are now prepared to advance to the Colloquy of Marburg, October 1–3, 1529, which closes this period of Development.

This Colloquy was brought about by Philip, Landgrave of Hesse, for the purpose of putting an end to the Sacramentarian Controversy, and to the strifes and divisions which it had engendered. It was attended from the one side by Luther, Melanchthon, Jonas, Osiander, Brentz, Agricola; from the other, by Oecolampadius, Zwingli, Bucer, Hedio. The principal subject of dispute was the Lord’s Supper. Zwingli advanced three arguments: 1. John, 6. Christ said the flesh profiteth nothing. Therefore we must not conclude that the flesh of Christ is present in the Sacrament, because fleshly eating profiteth nothing. Luther replied that the words, The flesh profiteth nothing, must not be understood of the flesh of Christ, because he says, ‘My flesh quickeneth;’ but of flesh without the Spirit. It is dreadful to hear that the flesh of Christ profiteth nothing. Moreover these words of Christ do not apply to the Supper. 2. That one body cannot be at the same time in different places. The body of Christ is in heaven. Luther replied that human reason neither can nor ought to judge the omnipotence of God. Zwingli replied that God does not propose to our faith things which we cannot comprehend. Luther replied: ‘The Christian doctrine has articles more incomprehensible
and sublime, as that God became man, that this person Christ, who is true God, died.'

3. Zwingli said that so great things cannot be brought about by wicked priests, as that the body of Christ should be present. Luther replied: It does not depend upon the merit of the priest, but upon the appointment of Christ. "This," says Melanchthon, from whom we have condensed the above arguments and answers, "is, in a word, the sum of the colloquy: Luther persisted in his view that the true body and blood of Christ are present in the Supper. Nor would the other party depart from their opinion."\(^1\)

Fifteen articles of religion were drawn up by Luther and signed by all of both sides who were present. In fourteen of these articles they agreed. In the fifteenth, of the Lord's Supper, they expressed their agreement in the use of both kinds, in the rejection of the Mass as a sacrifice, and in the use of the Supper. They disagreed in regard to the real presence, but prayed that Almighty God would confirm them in the true understanding. 2 Luther could not be shaken


\(^2\) No discussion of the Marburg Colloquy can be complete which omits reference to Luther's refusal of Zwingli's proffered hand. 1. Luther no less than Zwingli was anxious for peace and concord. This is evinced (a) by his prompt acceptance of Philip's invitation (See letter of acceptance, Works, Leipzig, xix. p. 527. In Latin Chytraeus' Hist. Augs. Con. p. 637); (b) by his hearty commendation of the prince's diligence in trying to secure peace and concord; (c) in his declaration that he will not, by the help of God, allow the other side the praise of being more desirous of peace than he is (See letter supra); (d) by the fact that he actually attended the Colloquy; (e) that he said fifteen years afterwards in his Shorter Confession of the Lord's Supper, that for the time he cheerfully overlooked all of Zwingli's harsh and unrecanted sayings, and hastened to the Colloquy; (f') that he actually signed the agreement to drop disputes—an agreement which neither he nor his side was the first to break. 2. Zwingli had not only been very severe in the controversy, but even blasphemous. He had used such phrases against the Lutheran doctrine as "Baked God," "Bread God," "Wine God," "Roasted God;" and such epithets against the Lutherans as "flesh-gormandizers" (fleisch-fresser), "blood-guzzlers" (blutsäuffer), "anthropophagi," "Caper- naites," "Thyestes," and the like—none of which had been retracted, neither
from his opinion, for as he had written to the Landgrave (see letter supra) he was certain in his conscience that they had erred, and in addition that they were not even certain of their doctrine—as the sequel plainly proved. Thus ended the Second Period of Development, that of the Sacramentarian Controversy. For the Lutheran doctrine it had corrected the slight subjectivism into which Luther had fallen during the controversy with the Romanists. But this correction was made not by a surrender of any subjective feature, but by complementing the subjective with its proper objective. Greater emphasis was now laid on the real presence of Christ than had been done in the First Period, because this feature had been the special point of attack by the Sacramentarians. The result, as Lutherans believe, is a doctrine of the Lord's Supper symmetrical and evenly balanced as between the

had he changed his views in regard to the subject which had been the occasion of such abuse of language, but had defended these views at this Colloquy as earnestly as ever before. 3. It was with such antecedents and under such circumstances that he offered Luther his hand, which was declined with the observation: "I am exceedingly astonished that you wish to consider me your brother. It shows clearly that you do not attach much importance to your doctrine." (Chytraeus' Hist. Augs. Con. p. 642.) Here now is the point of difference between the two men. The one held his doctrine dearer than his life, because in Hoc est corpus meum, he saw the very Word of God. The other would sacrifice his doctrine for an external unity, either because he did not believe it to be the truth, or because he did not feel bound in conscience as Luther did (see Luther's Letter to Philip, supra) to stand by and defend the truth. Besides, as Professor Fisher well says (Hist. Reformation, p. 150): "The obnoxious theory .... was associated in Luther's mind with the extreme spiritualism or subjective tendency which undervalued and threatened to sweep away the objective means of grace, the word as well as the sacraments, and to substitute for them a special illumination or inspiration from the Spirit," and which in less than six months led Zwingli to deny that the sacraments are means of grace (see his Ratio Fidei sent to Augsburg). 4. For Luther to have accepted Zwingli's hand and to have recognized him as a brother, as he understood Zwingli to mean that he should do, would have been to acknowledge that Zwingli's error and the principle on which it was based, were pure adiaphora, sentiments which had no value for the Christian system; and the action of Luther here has been powerfully vindicated by the fact that Zwingli's error has found place in no Reformed creed or confession of faith, and that his principles of interpretation led him
objective and the subjective—the objective feature being bread and wine, body and blood, in sacramental union, and, in the completed act of the Supper, administered alike to all. The benefit of the Sacrament depends upon the faith of the recipient. Without faith it works condemnation and death. With faith it works forgiveness of sins and eternal life. This brings us to

THE THIRD OR CONFESSIONAL PERIOD OF DEVELOPMENT.

The articles agreed upon at Marburg and signed by both parties to the controversy, were not wholly satisfactory to the adherents of Luther. As a consequence new articles were submitted at the Schwabach Conference, October 16. These articles,\(^3\) seventeen in number, contain a more positive statement of the Lutheran faith, and are the direct historico-

in less than two years from this Colloquy to declare that such pious heathen as Socrates, the Catos et al., died in the same faith with Adam, Noah and Abraham. It was not that Luther did not desire peace, or that he was obstinate in his opinion, but because he was a glorious prisoner to the Word, and could not betray its plain meaning. Grasping Zwingli's hand would have meant to Luther full fraternization and, as in the Wittenberg Concord, communion in the Lord's Supper,—that which even the Evangelical Alliance could not do in the year of grace 1873 in New York. If it be said to his disparagement that Luther even despaired of Zwingli's salvation, let it be told how earnestly he prayed that God would convert him from his error and show him the truth, and how he groaned in sorrow when he heard of Zwingli's death; and finally let it not be forgotten that Luther's stand at Marburg was in principle identical with that taken by him at Worms. At both places he stood by his conscience and by the Word. Surrender at either place would have brought disaster to the Reformation. For as Dr. Henry J. Van Dyke has written, Presbyterian Review, April, 1887, p. 207, "Zwinglianism is essentially rationalistic in the evil sense of the word. Its chief effort is to explain away or reduce to a minimum the mystery of the Lord's Supper. It assumes that the theory which is most level to our comprehension, which brings the holy Supper nearest to a common meal, where Christians have sweet fellowship together, and makes it agree most with ordinary human experience, is for that reason nearest to the truth." If a Presbyterian theologian of the nineteenth century can discern this rationalistic element in the evil sense of the word, how much more Luther, who had personal contact with it!

\(^3\) Book of Concord (Jacobs), II. 72. Original in Corp. Ref. xxvi. p. 155, VOL. XLV. No. 177.
confessional basis of the doctrinal articles of the Augsburg Confession of June 25, 1530. The article on the Lord’s Supper which agrees in number with that on the same subject in the Augsburg Confession, is as follows: “The Eucharist or Sacrament of the Altar also consists of two parts, viz., that there is truly present in the bread and wine, the true body and blood of Christ, according to the sound of the words: ‘This is my body, this is my blood;’ and that it is not only bread and wine, as even now the other side asserts. These words require and also convey faith, and also exercise it in all those who desire this sacrament, and do not act against it; just as baptism also brings and gives faith, if it be desired.” In the Augsburg Confession, Article X., this is verbally changed only, and in a literal translation from the German reads as follows: “Of the Supper of the Lord it is also taught that the true body and blood of Christ, under the species of bread and wine, are truly present in the Supper and are there administered and received. Therefore the opposite doctrine is rejected.” Henceforth this is the fundamental and universally accepted symbolical statement of the Lutheran doctrine of the Lord’s Supper. On the part of Luther it is the result of twelve years of almost ceaseless thought and study of God’s Word. On the part of Melanchthon it shows the inimitable power of condensation and the felicity of expression which characterized the Preceptor Germaniae. In itself it is clear, positive, and, when read in the light of the foregoing history, unmistakable in meaning.

1. It is antithetical.

1. (a) To the Romish communion under one kind, since it mentions both bread and wine; (b) to the sacrifice of the Mass, since (in the Latin) it speaks of those who eat; (c) to Tran-

4 The originals are: Vom Abenmahl des Herrn wird also gelehret, dass wahrer Leib und Blut Christi wahrhaftiglich unter der Gestalt des Brots und Weins im Abenmahl gegenwärtig sei und da ausgeteilt und genommen wird. Derhalben wird auch die Gegenlehre verworfen. De coena Domini docent, quod corpus et sanguis Christi vere adsint et distribuantur vescentibus in coena Domini; et improbat secus docentes. Müller’s Symbolische Buecher, p. 41.
substantiation, since it speaks of the species of bread and wine. These errors Luther had rejected in the first period of the development of his doctrine, as noted above; and it was no part of the design of the Augsburg Confession to maintain an attitude of indifference to these errors. 5 2. To Zwinglianism

8 Dr. Schaff is greatly in error when he says (Creeds of Christendom, I. p. 232, note): "The wording of the article—quod corpus (German, wahrer Leib) et sanguis Christi vere (wahrhaftiglich) adsint et distribuantur vescentibus in Coena Domini—leaves room for both theories (consubstantiation and transubstantiation).... The Papistical Confutation, while objecting to the articles de utroque specie and de missa in the second part of the Augsburg Confession, was satisfied with Art. X. of the first part, provided only that it be understood as teaching the presence of the whole Christ under the bread as well as wine.... It (the Lutheran church) teaches consubstantiation in the sense of a sacramental conjunction of the two substances effected by consecration." In refutation of the first charge we quote Romish authorities: 1. The Papal Confutation of the Augs. Con. says: "The Tenth Article in words offends nothing, when they confess that in the Eucharist, after consecration legitimately made, the body and blood of Christ are substantially and truly present, provided that they believe, that under each species, the entire Christ is present, so that by concomitance, the blood of Christ is no less under the species of bread than it is under the species of wine, and so of the other. Otherwise in the Eucharist, the body of Christ would be bloodless, contrary to St. Paul that Christ, being raised from the dead, dieth no more. Rom. 6." This is not "satisfaction." But the confutation expressly says further: "One thing is to be added as an Article exceedingly necessary to this Confession, that they shall believe the Church (rather than some who falsely teach otherwise), that by the omnipotent word of God in the consecration of the Eucharist, the substance of the bread is changed into the body of Christ." (Book of Concord, (Jacobs) II. p. 214. Original in Chytraeus' Hist. Augs. Con. p. 179.) But it is very certain, as learned in the foregoing history, that the Tenth Article does not mean to teach that the entire Christ is present under one species. That is the first tyranny denounced by Luther in The Babylonish Captivity. Nor does it mean to teach the change of the substance of the bread into the body—the second tyranny. 2. John Cochlaeus who helped to compose the Romish Confutation, says in the discussion of the Article: "Though that Article be brief, there are many things of which we complain as wanting in it (multa in eo desideramus). Luther frivolously denying transubstantiation, though in words he disputes at large against Zwingli and Oecolampadius, yet in the thing itself, he thinks with them, and is in collusion with them, (cum eis colludit). And Luther's followers have reached such a pitch of madness, that they refuse longer to adore the Eucharist, because Luther has impiously taught that it is safer not to adore, and has openly denied the doctrine of concomitance." From Krauth's Conservative Reformation p. 625. The
which is the "opposite doctrine" rejected in the Article, and which taught that in the Sacrament there is present nothing except bread and wine, that the Lord's body is locally circumscribed in one place and that the sacraments are not means of grace. (See the Ratio Fidei which Zwingli sent to Augsburg, 1530.)

II. The thesis of this Tenth Article teaches and was intended to teach the doctrine of the Real Presence of the body and blood of Christ in the Eucharist, that is, that wherever and whenever the sacramental act is performed, Confutation and its authors hold expressly that the Tenth Article is deficient because it does not teach Transubstantiation. Dr. Schaff, it seems to us, very conveniently omitted here unter der Gestalt des Brots und Weins, from the German.

In the matter of "Consubstantiation in the sense of a sacramental conjunction of the two substances effected by consecration," we ask in what creed and by what Lutheran theologians? We have read every Lutheran creed in existence, but we fail to find it either stated or implied that "the sacramental union is effected by the consecration." We have read nearly all the great Lutheran dogmaticians on this subject, and we find they expressly deny that the sacramental union is effected by consecration.

Heunisch (Epitome Logica p. 260): "God alone effects the sacramental union. Therefore it is not ascribed to the dignity or intention of the Minister, nor to the words of consecration which are spoken by the Minister, nor to the faith of the one who uses the sacrament. It has place in the true use of the Supper, which consists in eating and drinking."

"The true presence of the body and blood in the Sacrament of the Lord's Supper, is not effected by the word or work of any man, whether it be the merit or utterance of the minister, or of the eating and drinking, or the faith of the communicants; but this presence must be ascribed wholly to the almighty power of God and to the Word, institution and ordaining of our Lord Jesus Christ alone." Form of Concord, Art. VII.

Quenstedt: "Christ does not say simply of the consecrated bread that it is the body of Christ, but of the bread broken and given to be eaten." Systema p. 1268. Again: Such a statement is contradicted by the entire Lutheran conception of a sacrament: (a) That nothing has the nature of a sacrament aside from the use of the element in the appointed way; (b) that no change whatever is effected in the bread and wine by consecration; (c) that there is no sacrament apart from the entire sacramental act, which includes blessing, giving, receiving, eating, drinking. Hence until the consecrated bread is eaten there is no sacramental union, so with the blood; and hence should a crumb of the consecrated bread fall to the ground, there is
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(consecratio, distributio, manducatio, bibitio) there the sacramental union takes place, but without any mingling, or commingling, or consubstantiating of the earthly element, the bread and wine, with the heavenly element, the body and blood, or vice versa, but each element remains distinct in its substance and power, the earthly element becoming the divinely appointed medium for communicating the heavenly element, so that both elements truly present, are received in the sacramental act by all who use the Supper.

This relation between the earthly element and the heavenly no sacrilege of the body of Christ; (d) that apart from the completed sacramental act there is not even the unum aliquid, the sacramental complex, which is constituted out of the unchanged bread and the unchanged body, which are never consubstantiated, that is, moulded or mingled into one substance, which has not the nature per se of true bread and true body, as those charged who first used the word consubstantiation against the Lutheran doctrine. Hence the word is not equivalent to Real Presence, for both etymologically and historically it designates a commingling or a fusing together of the two substances, bread and body; and of this Reinhard says: "Our Church has never taught that the emblems become one substance with the body and blood of Jesus, an opinion commonly denounced Consubstantiation. And Buddeus; (1728) "All who understand the doctrines of our Church know that with our whole soul we abhor the doctrine of Consubstantiation. Miscel. II., p. 86.

Dorner Hist. Prot. Theol. I. p. 160: "Even without transubstantiation the real presence of Christ's body and blood is possible, in that bread remains bread but is appropriated by Christ. This view, propounded by Ignatius, Ireneus, Ruprecht Von Deutz and Pierre d'Ailly, received the name of Impanation, also consubstantiation,—with no more right than if one were to regard the utterance of Ignatius, the gospels are the σωτηριαν as a doctrine of incarnation."

Dr. Henry J. Van Dyke, Presbyterian Review, April, 1887, pp. 202-3: "There is a popular impression that the Lutheran differs but little from the Romish doctrine of the sacraments. This impression is due either to ignorance or to prejudice. The Lutheran doctrine is essentially and explicitly protestant in its rejection of transubstantiation and in the errors which logically flow from it. It repudiates and condemns the worship of the consecrated elements, and the idea of the repetition in any sense of Christ's one everlasting sacrifice for sin. The term Consubstantiation, commonly applied to it, is a nickname, which is not found in any of the Lutheran symbols, and the ideas it conveys to ordinary readers are repudiated by Lutherans as strenuously as by ourselves. No intelligent Lutheran believes that the body and blood of Christ are literally mixed up, as Hooker says, with the bread and
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is called *sacramental union*; not, however, for the purpose of describing the *mode* of the presence, for that is incomprehensible; but for the purpose of affirming the *reality* of the presence of body and blood, and of distinguishing *this* union which is peculiar to the sacrament from a *substantial*, or *personal*, or *local*, or *significative* union, each of which unions has its place in the Christian system, but neither of which can be affirmed of the earthly and heavenly elements in the Eucharist. The presence is called *true, real*, to distinguish it from a merely representative, or figurative, or memorial presence. In the Apology and often by the theologians it is called *substantial* presence, in order to distinguish it from a merely efficacious presence of the body and blood of Christ. It is called *myst-

wine, or that they are locally confined to the elements in the sacrament, or that they are received and consumed with the mouth in the same way with the bread and wine. The Formula of Concord and many eminent divines indignant reject the notion of a physical eating with the teeth of Christ’s body as ‘a malignant and blasphemous slander of the sacramentarians.’ Schaff’s Creeds, Vol. I., 317.

The Lutheran doctrine not only repudiates transubstantiation, the worship of the consecrated elements, the repetition of Christ’s sacrifice, and the carnal eating of His body and blood by the mouth of the communicant—all of which gross conceptions are essential to the Romish doctrine—but it rejects also the Romish notion that the sacrament of itself *contains* the grace which it signifies, and that its saving effects are independent of the faith of the recipient. At this point the Lutheran doctrine is a strong protest against the errors of the Church of Rome. How could it be otherwise, since it is Luther’s doctrine? The saving efficacy and the absolute necessity of a personal faith in Christ was with him the very centre and stronghold of Christianity. In the beginning of his conflict with Rome, he declared ‘whatever be the case with the sacrament, faith must retain its rights and honors.’ From this point he never swerved, ‘Non sacramentum sed fides Sacramenti justificat,’ was one of his axioms. He also insisted that faith may receive apart from the sacrament the same thing as in the sacrament. ‘He never doubted, indeed, that the sacrament conveys a blessing, but he stands upon this, that the Almighty God Himself can work nothing good in a man unless he believes.’ Dorner Vol. I., p. 150. Here, then, in its application to the vital question of a sinner’s justification before God, Lutherism is forever divorced from Romanism. This alone is a sufficient answer to the flippant assertion that consubstantiation is the same thing as transubstantiation under another name.” We accept these statements of Dr. Van Dyke, a Calvinist, as discriminating, just and true.
terious, supernatural, incomprehensible presence; because not after any of the modes of this world, but mysteriously, supernaturally, incomprehensibly, the body and blood of Christ are present in the Holy Supper and are there administered to the communicant, "under the species of bread and wine"—"not as if it meant the species, not the reality; but on the contrary, the species or kinds of true bread and true wine, not of the accidents of them," (Krauth, Conservative Ref. p. 620); or, as Melanchthon has explained in the Apology, Art. X., "with those things which are seen, bread and wine." That is, the doctrine of the Confession at this point, is that the visible earthly element in the sacrament is real bread and wine, and the invisible heavenly element is real body and blood, and not the symbols or memorials of them. This relation of the earthly and heavenly elements in the Eucharist is thus described by Carpzov, the greatest of the commentators on the Lutheran Symbolical books:

The sacramental union, which is most firmly based on the words of institution, signifies that the eucharistic bread and the body of Christ, the eucharistic wine and the blood of Christ, are together given in real communication. It denies transubstantiation into one substance; also mixture of bread with body, or of wine with blood, or local inclusion. But there is a true and real uniting, by which, by virtue and power of the words of Christ, the bread and the body of Christ, the wine and the blood of Christ, are so united in the Supper, that the bread becomes the medium for communicating the body of Christ; and by a simultaneous eating the body and blood of Christ with the bread and wine are received by the mouth. The sacramental union takes place only when the sacramental action is performed, and ceases when that action is completed. Isagoge, p. 348.

This explanation, which is the true Lutheran conception, introduces in express terms, eating with the mouth, and, by implication, the reception by the unworthy of bread and body, wine and blood; for both are involved in distribuantur vescentibus. But by "oral manducation" is meant, as explained by Luther and by the standard theologians, simply that the mouth is the organ by which the sacramental complex, the unum aliquid, is received, just as the written word is received by the eye, and the spoken word by the ear, "and no emphasis," says Dorner, (Hist. Prot. Theol. I. p. 161), "i§
to be laid upon the passage where, in order to make sure the real presence, he [Luther] charges Melanchthon, as to his negotiations with Bucer, to maintain that we, in the Holy Supper, *dentibus Christum laceramus.* For that is only said by him *παρὰ συνεκδόχην.* Hence this oral manducation does not take place in any gross or carnal way, or in any way that can be likened to the manducation of earthly substances. This like the Real Presence itself is an inscrutable mystery. It was insisted on so strenuously, because like the Real Presence, it was strenuously denied by "the opposite doctrine." It is sometimes called "spiritual eating," but not in the sense of the Calvinists, viz., that it is performed by the aid of the Holy Spirit, but to distinguish it from *material eating.*

As to the communion of the unworthy, it is based upon the doctrine that the bread is the medium for communicating the body. Whoever in the sacramental act receives the bread, receives the body, "for," says Luther, "what the bread does and suffers, that the body of Christ does and suffers." *De Wette,* IV. 572. But the effect is different. The unworthy eat and drink condemnation, not discerning the Lord’s body.

It may be considered that now with the Augsburg Confession, the Lutheran doctrine of the Lord’s Supper is fixed. Both by the historical circumstances attending its preparation and delivery, and by its own intrinsic merits, this confession has become the fundamental Lutheran symbol. Those who subscribed and presented it, declared that it was their own confession and that of their churches; and by it these confessors and their churches became ecclesiastically distinguished, on the one hand, from the Romanists, who did not receive its explanation of Christian doctrine; and on the other hand,
from the Zwinglians and the four cities who presented their own confessions (*Ratio Fidei* and *Confessio Tetrapolitana*). Henceforth the Lutheran theologians direct their labors to the defence of this confession, and to the elaboration of its system of doctrine—not because it was their confession, but because they were convinced in their consciences that in it they had spoken in accordance with the oracles of God. Hence in the Apology (1531), which is the earliest and most valuable explanation of the Augsburg Confession, Melanchthon states the Tenth Article as follows: "In *cœna Domini* vere et substantialiter adsint corpus et sanguis Christi et vere exhibeantur cum illis rebus, quae videntur pane et vino, his qui sacramentum accipiant."

In the Wittenberg Concord (1536) Luther, says Seckendorf,7 "dropped none of his determination, but demanded a retraction of all those things which taught a figurative interpretation of the words of institution." It is declared in the Concordia that in the Eucharist there are two things, an earthly and a heavenly; that with the bread and wine, the body and blood of Christ are truly and substantially present, given and received; that by the sacramental union the bread is the body of Christ; that the true body and blood of Christ are truly given to and received by the worthy and the unworthy; that the worthy receive unto condemnation, because they dishonor the Sacrament when they receive it without true repentance and faith. They deny transubstantiation and the local inclusion of the body and blood in the bread and wine.8

In 1537 the Smalcald Articles were written by Luther and signed by him and by many other distinguished theologians. Of this article they say: "Of this Sacrament of the Altar, we hold that the bread and wine in the Supper are the true body and blood of Christ, and are given to and received by not only the good and pious, but also to and by the impious and

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7 III. p. 130.
unworthy Christians.” He calls the Mass “the greatest and most terrible abomination,” and denounces transubstantiation as a “subtle sophistry.” There is here a more positive assertion than ever before of the characteristic Lutheran doctrine of the Lord’s Supper. When it is remembered that these Articles were written to be sent to a general council of the Church, it will be the better understood that there was not meant any compromise with Rome, for all the Romish tyrannies are here openly condemned.

But now followed forty years of controversy, in which the subject of the Lord’s Supper played a conspicuous part. The Lutherans were not by any means all agreed on this article; but the main strife was with the Calvinists. The immediate occasion of this controversy according to Buddeus (Isagoge Historico-Theologica, p. 477) was Melanchthon’s change of Luther himself had no controversy with Calvin. In his earlier works at least, as for instance the Institutio of 1536 and the De Coena Domini of 1537, Calvin maintained views very similar to those of Luther. “It has been ob served by learned men,” says Buddeus, Isagoge, p. 1283, “that Calvin at the beginning agreed with our theologians on the doctrine of the Holy Supper; certainly he did not differ much from our doctrine.” In 1539 Calvin wrote of Zwingli: “I remember how profane is his doctrine of the sacraments.” Gieseler, Ec. Hist. IV., p. 415, n. 44. In 1539 Luther wrote: Saluta mihi Sturmiun et Calvinum reverenter, quorum libellos singulari cum voluptate legi. As at this time Luther must have known of the Institutio, it follows from this declaration, that he was at least fairly well pleased with Calvin’s view of the Lord’s Supper. On reading Calvin’s De Sacra Coena in 1545 he exclaimed: “This is certainly a pious and learned man, with whom I could have from the first settled this whole controversy. I confess, for my part, that if the opposition had treated the subject in this way, we would have been agreed from the outset. For had Oecolampadius and Zwingli thus expressed themselves, then we would not have fallen into such endless disputes.” Gieseler IV., p. 414-5, n. 43. Dorner says, Hist. Prot. Theol. I., p. 407: “The new attack made by Luther [against the Sacramentarians] in the Smaller Confession of 1544 in no way applied to Calvin.” These facts leave no doubt that had Calvin been at Marburg instead of Zwingli, Luther would have grasped the proffered hand, as between his own view of the Lord’s Supper and Calvin’s, he did not see difference sufficient for controversy. But it is not to be supposed that Luther would have surrendered his own view to that of Calvin. Luther could distinguish between Zwingli’s Rationalism and a reasonably close adherence to the Word.
of the Latin Augsburg Confession in the Tenth Article, so as to read: "De coena Domini docent, quod cum pane et vino vere exhibeantur corpus et sanguis Christi vescentibus in Coena Domini," instead of: De coena docent, quod corpus et sanguis Christi vere adsint, et distribuantur vescentibus in coena Domini; et improbant secus docentes." The principal change here, and that upon which the controversy hinged, was the use of exhibeantur for distribuantur. This with the changes introduced by Melanchthon into the other articles has given rise to the distinctions Confessio Variata, and Confessio Invariata. But the change in the Tenth Article "was especially grateful," says Buddeus, (ubi supra) "to the Reformed doctors, who contended that in this way the Augsburg Confession was not corrupted but explained and improved." Certain it is that both the Reformed and the Romanists charged that Melanchthon had changed his views on the Lord's Supper, and Dr. Schaff says (Creeds of Christendom I. p. 241, note) that exhibeantur is more indefinite than distribuantur. But it is capable of demonstration that Melanchthon intended no change of view in the Variata, and that exhibeantur as applied to the Lutheran doctrine of the Lord's Supper is not more indefinite than distribuantur, but that on the contrary it more accurately expresses the Lutheran doctrine than does the word which it supplanted.

I. As to Melanchthon's supposed change.

1. The Variata was made in 1540. In that same year at the Colloquy of Worms Melanchthon declared that he still adhered to the Invariata. Buddeus' Is. p. 447.

2. When Eck charged at the Colloquy of Worms that Melanchthon had changed the Confession, the latter replied: "As to the dissimilarity of copies, I answer that the meaning of the things is the same (rerum eandem esse sententiam), although some things here and there, in the later edition, are more free from harshness (mitigata), or are more explicit." Says the learned Krauth, from whom we requote the above (Conservative Ref. p. 247): "If Melanchthon consciously
made a change of meaning in the Confession, it is impossible to defend him from the charge of direct falsehood."

3. At the Diet of Ratisbon, 1541, he signed the Unaltered Augsburg Confession, and again at Worms in 1557, and acknowledged in addition as his Creed, the Apology, and the Smalcald articles, and by name and in writing condemned the Zwinglian doctrine.

4. His Corpus Doctrinarum, to which he wrote a preface, February 16, 1560, only a few weeks before his death, contains inter alia (a) the Tenth Article of the Confession in both forms; (b) The Apology unchanged; (c) The Repetition of the Augsburg Confession, written in 1551 to be sent to the Council of Trent, and signed by Melanchthon and thirty other theologians and pastors. This article contains "In hac communione vere et substantialiter adesse Christum," p. 270; (d) The Examen Ordinandorum in which we find, Quid est Coena Domini? Est Communicatio corporis et sanguinis Domini nostri Jesu Christi, sicut in verbis Evangelii instituta est, in qua sumptione Filii Dei vere et substantialiter adest—in which it is not possible to discover any other than the purest type of Lutheran doctrine. The most that can be said is that Melanchthon, without surrendering his own views, was perfectly willing to tolerate the earlier views of Calvin (not those of Zwingli, see supra) and to fraternize with him as a Christian (as was shown above of Luther), and therefore omitted altogether the clause improbant decus docentes, out of his great desire for peace. In this sense and in no other can it be said that Melanchthon Bucerized.

5. Melanchthon made no change in the German Confession, to which, says Hase, he had given greater care.

6. In the Apology which is regarded as Melanchthon's most positive work, and where in the Tenth Article, he is understood to have asserted the substantial presence of body and blood in the most unqualified terms, he says: "Vere exhibeantur cum illis rebus quae videntur. In his Loci of 1535 he employs the same identical form of expression, also, Panis est communicatio corporis Christi. In the Wittenberg
Concord he uses *Exhibeo*. No one even dreams that up to this time Melanchthon had changed his views; and we here have this form of expression definitely fixed in both the confessional and the dogmatic theology before 1540. Why then did Melanchthon make the change? Simply, as he told Eck, to render the expression more *explicit*. He strove after absolute perfection of style.

II. As to *Exhibeantur* being more indefinite than *Distribuantur*.

1. This contradicts Melanchthon’s express statement of his reason for making the change. He changed the confession in order to make it more *explicit*, not more *indefinite*.

2. The word *Exhibeo* as used by the theological writers of the sixteenth century, means *to present, to give, to deliver*. The very title of the Augsburg Confession is “*Confessio Fidei Exhibita... Carolo v. Caesar*.” No one will dare to say that it does not here describe one of the most *definite* acts known in history. The Confession was *presented* to the Emperor, not merely *tendered*, which might imply that it was not received, as Zwingli *tendered* his hand to Luther who did not receive it. Hence Dr. Jacobs is inconsistent, when in the title (*Book of Concord I. p. 33*), he translates the word *present*, and in the Apology and the Variata, *tendered*, and in the Wittenburg Concord, *offered*.

3. In the Apology Melanchthon used *Exhibeantur* to express exactly what in the Confession he had expressed by *Distribuantur*. It is inconceivable that he should have intended to be more *indefinite* here than in the Confession. The only explanation possible is that given to Eck.

4. The dogmaticians give *emphatic* preference to *Exhibeo* in stating the Lutheran doctrine of the Lord’s Supper. (*a*) Chemnitz in his *Fundamenta Sacrae Cona*, ‘the standard Lutheran dogmatic treatise on the Supper, has for the title of the book and for the heading of Cap. III. “*De Exhibitione et Sumptione Corporis Christi*”, and throughout the treatise he employs *Exhibeo* with *corpus* and *sanguis*, to the almost entire exclusion of every other word, in setting forth the *presenting* or
administering of Christ's body and blood in the Eucharist. (6) In the Saxon Visitation Articles (1592), the most positive confessional exhibition of Lutheran doctrine ever written, in article on the Lord's Supper we have Exhíbeo used three times, as: Quod in sacramento duæ res sunt, quæ exhibentur et simul accipiuntur. Quod haec unio, exhibitio, et sumptio fiat hic inferius in terris. Quod exhibeatur et accipiatur verum et naturale corpus Christi. The corresponding word in the German text is gebeu. (c) Heunisch (Analytical Epitome of Hutter's Compend): Forma S. Coenae consistit partim in dòcei sue exhibitione corporis Christi cum pane...partim in ejusdem ἱήσει sue sumptione. (d) Gerhard repeatedly as in Loci, pp. 134, 159 (Cotta). The fact is, as we are prepared to demonstrate, the dogmaticians use the word Exhíbeo more frequently than all other words put together to state the peculiar Lutheran doctrine that the body and blood of Christ are administered to those who eat in the Sacrament. (e) They often distinguish between distributio panis and exhibitio corporis et sanguinis. Distributio applies more properly to the earthly element which is distributed among the communicants. Distributio, when applied to body and blood, is inelegant and inexplicit. In the Variata the change itself requires exhibeo; since it begins, cum pane et vino corpus et sanguis. The elements are here distinguished, as they were not in the Invariata, with the emphasis upon body and blood, which are to be, not distributed, but given, administered. Therefore the true and proper translation of the Tenth Article in the Variata is, "With the bread and wine are truly administered the body and blood of Christ to those who eat in the Supper." Moreover, since the article retains vescentibus it cannot be construed as favoring the Calvinistic view, which would require credentibus, since Calvin maintained that believers by faith eat the true body and drink the true blood of Christ, or as he has put it in his Institutes: "There is a true and substantial communication of the body and blood of our Lord."

And yet this Variata, though it was frequently quoted and approved by Luther and other stringent Lutherans (see Gies-
Lutheran Doctrine of the Lord's Supper.

1888.

elcr, IV., p. 433, note), was nevertheless the occasion of much controversy on the Lord's Supper after Melanchthon's death, as then it began to be looked upon as favoring the Sacramentarians and the Calvinists. But already for several years a controversy, begun (1549) by Westphal of Hamburg, had been going on between the stricter Lutherans and the Calvinists, on this article of faith. This brought out more definitely the views of Calvin, Peter Martyr and others, who maintained that the words of institution were not to be taken literally, and that Christ's body being located in heaven, could not be present in the Eucharist. To refute this doctrine and to defend and expound the Lutheran doctrine, as contained in the Tenth Article of the Augustana, is the object of Martin Chemnitz's great work, Fundamenta Sacrae Cœnae (1569). Here the main question is not as to the power of God, or as to the mode of presence, but as to the reality of the presence as determined by the words of Christ. "And as is the union, or the presence of the body of Christ in the Supper, so is the eating. But the union or presence is not physical, according to some mode of this world. Therefore we can more easily show what the sacramental eating of the body of Christ is not, than what it is. It is not physical, and does not consist of mastication, deglutition, digestion of the substance which is eaten, because the presence of the body of Christ in the Supper is not natural, after some mode of this world; and yet it is not figurative or imaginary, but true and substantial, although it takes place through a supernatural, heavenly and inscrutable mystery." Cap. V.

To the proposition that the body of Christ cannot at the same time be in heaven and in the Supper, he opposes "the right hand of God," which is everywhere, and which means the glory, majesty, power, excellence and authority of God; and with Luther he rejects all philosophical subtleties, and approves Luther's declaration that even the personal union, without the words of institution, would not suffice for the conclusion that the body of Christ is with the consecrated bread in the Eucharist. "But as by the authority of the
Scripture, on account of the hypostatic union with the divinity, we receive and believe many things of the body of Christ, which greatly exceed the natural or essential properties of our bodies; so because we have the express word about the essential presence of the body and blood of the Lord in the Supper, we must not depart from the native meaning of the words of the testament of Christ, even though it should not agree with the essential or natural properties of a true body."

But the time had now come when in the judgment of many pious and earnest men there was need of a restatement and a reaffirmation of the Lutheran doctrine on many disputed points. The result of this judgment was the *Formula Concordiae*, whose object was to reconcile the conflicting parties in the Lutheran communion, and also to refute various errors in Calvinism. The article on the Lord's Supper has for its immediate object "to repeat the true meaning and proper sense of the words of Christ, and of the Augsburg Confession, concerning this article." Art. VII. It states the position of the Sacramentarians in their own words: "*Abesse Christi, Corpus et sanguinem a signis tanto intervallo dicimus, quanto abest terra ab altissimis calis.*" That is, that bread and wine, the only things received in the Sacrament by the mouth, are here on the earth, and that the body and blood of Christ are in heaven and not on the earth; that the pious receive the body of Christ spiritually by faith, that is, appropriate the benefits of his body. It quotes with approbation the Augsburg Confession, the Wittenburg Concord, the Smalcald Articles, the two Catechisms. It rehearses a part of Luther's Larger Confession and presses his explanation of the words of institution and Paul's words at 1 Cor. x. 16. It reaffirms Luther's fundamental positions: The person of Jesus Christ as perfect God and perfect man; the right hand of God; the certainty and infallibility of the Word; the three modes of being present, the circumscribed, the incomprehensible, the heavenly in which Christ is present in the Eucharist or wherever he promises to be present. It "rejects and condemns" Transubstantiation, the Mass, communion under one
kind and sixteen other errors which are supposed to embody the errors of the Sacramentarians.

In a word, the article contains only a fuller development of the doctrine found in the earlier creeds of the Lutheran Church and in Luther's Larger Confession; but the discussion has been regarded by many Lutherans as too full and elaborate, too argumentative and polemical, too theological and scholastic for a confession, although all intelligent Lutherans agree that the article is an exceedingly valuable commentary on the Augsburg Confession, and is of great dogmatic worth. The same judgment has been passed by many Lutherans on the Formula as a whole. Hence the Formula Concordiae is not a universally accepted Lutheran Symbol.

We have now reached the year 1580, the date of the publication of the Book of Concord (in Latin Concordia), which closes the period of the confessional development, or rather of the confessional statement of the Lutheran doctrine of the Lord's Supper. This book contains a statement of the Lutheran doctrine on this subject in six different forms, as different circumstances and occasions required, but the doctrine itself is one, and each statement is helpful in the interpretation of the other. The one feature which the doctrine brings into greatest prominence is the real presence, after a heavenly and incomprehensible manner, of the true and substantial body and blood of the Lord Jesus Christ, which in the completed act of the Sacrament, in, with and under bread and wine, are administered to those who commune in the Lord's Supper.  

10 "Quite erroneous would be the opinion, that Luther does not conceive of the whole Christ as present, but only His body, on the ground that it is certainly the latter that possesses for him the most immediate significance as a pledge, and that Luther sometimes emphasizes Christ's body apart from his soul." Dorner, Prot. Theol. I. p. 161. "The sacramental predicates, 'This is my body;' 'This is my blood,' ... cannot be better explained than by the particles in, cum, sub, by which the conjunction of the things united, and the conjointed administration, are expressed. Hoc est corpus meum commodissime resolvitur: in, cum, sub, hoc pane exhibeo corpus meum. Gerhard Loci, § 96. (Cotta) X. p. 159.
Other questions, touching the use of the Sacrament, the abuse to which it has been subjected, the necessity of faith, and so forth, are treated in these same confessions under appropriate heads, but they form no proper part of the present discussion, except that it may be important to state in the words of the Apology the use of the Sacrament:

The proper use of the Sacraments requires faith to believe the divine promises, and to receive the promised grace, which is offered through the Sacraments and the Word. . . . As the Sacraments are external signs and seals of the promises, their proper use requires faith; for when we receive the Sacrament of the body and blood of Christ, Christ clearly says: "This cup is the New Testament in my blood," Luke xxii. 20. We should firmly believe then that the grace and remission of sins promised in the New Testament are imparted to us. Art. VII.

THE DOGMATIC AND MODERN PERIOD.

We cannot properly speak of development of this doctrine after the Form of Concord, 1580. During the seventeenth century the subject was treated by the dogmaticians with all that massive learning, skilful exegesis, and subtile logic which characterized the period; but they all adhered rigidly to the confessional doctrine of the church, which had already received its most profound and elaborate dogmatic statement in the Fundamenta Sacrae Cænae of Martin Chemnitz, 1569. We follow Luthardt, (Compend. Der Dogmatik, p. 346) in selecting Hollazius as the representative of this period:

The Eucharist is a holy and solemn action instituted by Christ, in which the true and substantial body of Christ with the consecrated bread, and his true and substantial blood with the consecrated wine, are given to communicating Christians to be eaten and drunk, and both are received by them [Christians], and in an incomprehensible manner eaten and drunk, in commemoration of the death of Christ and for the confirmation of the grace of the Gospel. Τὸῦτο denotes the whole sacramental complex, consisting of bread and the body (wine and the blood) of Christ. Έστι denotes that that which is given in the Supper is truly and really not only bread, but also the body of Christ. The presence of the body and blood is not physical, nor local, nor circumscribed, but supernatural and definitive.

Following the lead of Melanchthon in his Loci of 1535 (Nec addidi inclusionem, aut conjunctionem talem, qua affigeretur τῷ ἄρτῳ τῶνῶμα, aut ferruminaretur, aut misceretur) they in general say with Gerhard, (Haren. Evan. p. 784):
When we profess a true, real, and substantial presence of the body (and blood) of Christ, we by no means set up impanation, or consubstantiation, or incorporation, or physical inclusion, or local presence, or delitescence of particles under the bread, or the essential conversion of the bread into the body, or a permanent affixing of the body to the bread after the use of the Supper, or a personal union of bread and body; but we believe, teach and confess that, according to the institution of Christ, in a manner known to God only, but to us incomprehensible, the body of Christ, truly, really and substantially present, forms a union with the eucharistic bread as a divinely appointed medium, so that by the instrumentality of that bread, we take and eat the true body of Christ in sublime mystery.

It will thus be seen that even during the scholastic and dogmatical period of her history, the Lutheran Church preserved her doctrine of the Lord's Supper free from all gross, carnal, physical, local conceptions. The dogmaticians no more than Luther, attempted to explain, either the mode of the presence of the body and blood, or the nature of the sacramental union, or the manner of the sacramental eating, except that the same mouth which receives the bread, receives the body. And equally with Luther did they insist on faith as necessary in order to the reception of the blessing of the Sacrament, viz., the forgiveness of sins. Nor did Spener, the illustrious father of Pietism, decline from the true Lutheran doctrine. The invisible material of the Sacrament is "the substantial body of Christ, which was given for us, which hung on the cross, the whole body, not certain particles of the body." "Likewise the true blood, the sacrificial blood, propitiatory, the seal of the New Testament." *Catechism*, p. 200.

But when, during the closing decades of the eighteenth century and the former half of the nineteenth, Rationalism had deeply invaded the Lutheran Church, both in this country and in Germany, the Lutheran doctrine of the Lord's Supper had but few advocates or confessors. In this country especially, bald Zwinglianism prevailed generally in the Lutheran pulpits. But during the last twenty-five or thirty years there has been a marked return to the historical faith of the church. Every Lutheran theological professor in the United States is bound by his official oath to conform, his teaching to the Augsburg Confession of 1530 as the very least.
some institutions the professor's oath includes the entire Book of Concord. And, as we have reason to know, the doctrine of the Real Presence is now taught in all Lutheran theological seminaries in this country, and is held by the vast majority of the Lutheran pastors; although it is also true that some of the phraseology peculiar to the controversies of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries is not now used, and the doctrine is carefully guarded from crass expressions. And as Luther's Small Catechism in its pure text is used almost universally in Lutheran congregations as a manual of instruction, the doctrine is taught to the young people who are in preparation for the duties and benefits of church membership. But no effort is spared both in theological and in pastoral instruction to make the impression that the doctrine must be believed on the authority of God's Word—that it cannot be comprehended by the reason, or likened to any modes of bodily presence known on earth.
ARTICLE VI.

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE MISSIONARY SOCIETY AT HERMANNSBURG, NORTH GERMANY.

WRITTEN FOR THE BIBLIOTHECA SACRA BY PASTOR G. HACCIUS, DORFMARK, NEAR HERMANNSBURG, GERMANY.

Translated by Professor Charles Harris, Ph. D., Carbondale, Illinois.

The Hermannsburg missionary work is, to an almost unequalled degree, a personal one. Louis Harms, from whom this river of life flowed forth, was the chosen instrument of God. In his heart it rose by the Spirit of God, by his personality it was directed, and with the peculiar powers of his spiritual life it was filled. Its history, therefore, will not be intelligible without a glance at this man; and the early history of the Hermannsburg missionary work will be essentially his own early history.

Born in the period of Rationalism, on the fifth of May, 1808, at Walsrode, where his father, an earnest and estimable clergyman, was settled, he removed with his father, in 1817, to Hermannsburg, whither the latter had been transferred—a demoralized parish, in the midst of the Lüneburg Heath. Trained to labor and to control himself, to obey and to love the truth, he passed a favored childhood. He was characterized by great reverence, and by love for his home and village, by the fresh, courageous spirit of youth, and a frank, open nature. He studied with great industry, till 1824 at home, till 1827 at the Gymnasium in Celle, and then till 1830 at the University of Göttingen. Here he studied theology. Yet the lectures of the rationalistic professors did not satisfy him. He therefore sought to satisfy himself with philosophy, mathematics, physics, and the study of lan-
guage. Thus he studied Chaldee, Syriac, Sanscrit, etc. But his heart remained empty. Then the Lord stretched out his gracious hand towards him. "My teaching," says the Saviour, "is not mine, but his that sent me. If any man willeth to do his will, he shall know of the teaching, whether it be of God, or whether I speak from myself." So it was with Harms. That was his earnest effort. He strove with all his powers for a life of righteousness and purity; he desired to do God's will. Therefore he was permitted to perceive that, in the Holy Scriptures, he had to do with the divine revelation, which was not given to be criticised by an unbelieving intellect, but to be received by a believing heart. As, one night, he read the seventeenth of John, the divine light shone bright and clear into his soul. He then had inner experience of the truth and the divine power of the gospel. That was the hour of his new birth. He searched the Bible now with renewed earnestness and an enlightened spirit, and, after a brilliant examination, entered, well prepared, upon life. He had acquired rich and varied knowledge, and the conspicuously talented youth had become the thoroughly educated minister. But, above all, he was a true believer, with the glow of the first love in his heart, and he desired nothing so much as to serve his Lord and Saviour and to be found among his true followers. In such a spirit he accepted a position as family tutor in Lauenburg. He labored here with great faithfulness in his calling, but was not satisfied with this. "Can man take fire in his bosom, and his clothes not be burned?" The sacred passion of grateful love to his Redeemer filled his heart, and powerfully urged him on to activity for the kingdom of God. He helped the poor, he visited the prisoners, and, in the time of an epidemic of cholera, he fearlessly attended the sufferers. By advice of Mr. Richter, of Barmen, Inspector of Missions, he began to distribute missionary publications, and to hold missionary meetings. "From this time," writes his brother and biographer, "his whole heart was devoted to the missionary work." When he was indicted for holding "conventicles,"
and even threatened with imprisonment, he was not alarmed, but declared fearlessly that on leaving the prison he should go on immediately with the meetings. Thus he preached by word and deed, and no one despised his youth, but there formed about him a circle which exhibited an exceedingly attractive fellowship of faith and love, far removed from every touch of sentimental Pietism such as was common in so many religious circles at the time, exercising evangelical love, but with genuine Lutheran sobriety and common-sense. His later letters to his friends in Lauenburg give us precious glimpses of this fellowship. The missionary festivals formed occasions of great joy, the first of which was held as early as 1835. Louis Harms gave the missionary report, and it is so significant that we cannot avoid quoting certain fragments of it here:—

If we have a living faith, and if the morning star of salvation has arisen upon our hearts hitherto so poor, we shall no more love the things of this world and its kingdoms, but the great kingdom of our Lord Jesus Christ will become the chief interest of our hearts, and it will be our one burning wish that all lands become full of his glory......We are twice obliged to the heathen who have no Saviour. All the kingdoms are by no means yet become the kingdoms of our Lord, and darkness covers the earth, and thick darkness the peoples. They live and die still in the frightful abominations of sin, and have no means of escape—a bitter reproach for the Christian to whom the Lord has entrusted the extension of his kingdom......We live in a great, powerful time, when the kingdom of God advances with giant strides. Well is it with him who does not linger behind......Therefore, in the name of the Lord Jesus Christ and for his glory, humbly recognizing that all our work is without merit, but in faith looking unto the mighty Lord, to whom alone belongs both to will and to do, and in obedience to his holy word, let us open our hearts to prayer and our hands in gifts for those who are far off as well as those who are nigh. The Lord graciously grant this!

Can we not recognize in these words the beating of the heart of the great missionary leader?

In a similar way he labored in Lüneburg. He finds there many friends, but is also compelled to endure much enmity. Hence at times even the pulpit was refused him. Attention had now been attracted to him even at a distance. In 1842 he was requested by the well-known Wyneken to come to North America as pastor. The missionary Dr. Schmidt
wished to take him to the East Indies. The officers of the Hamburg Missionary Society were the most earnest in their request that he should enter the Seminary of the North German Missionary Society of that place as an instructor, but the Lord had selected him for another post. Michaelmas, 1843, he returned to Hermannsburg in order to take charge of the private school of his father. In November, 1844, he became his father's colleague, and when in 1848 the father died, he was made his successor at the earnest request of the congregation.

Before we pass to the description of this period of his life, we beg permission to premise certain particulars as to the country and its people. The whole surroundings were a scene exactly calculated for the appearance of the man. For that reason the Lord placed him here. Upon the Lüneburg Heath, with its scattered villages and homelike farms, there is, to be sure, little wealth, but universal plenty with the farmer, and even with the cottager. Forty years ago great simplicity prevailed everywhere. The people were content with a little, and avarice was much less common than in richer districts. This has not remained so, we must confess, and yet it is still much better than in other regions. On account of the long journeys which the inhabitants are accustomed to make over field and meadow, through heath and forest, to church and school, they are trained to great activity, and by the quiet life which they lead on the solitary farms a more reflective and pious disposition is cultivated. Above all, there still remained much of the old faith of the fathers. To be sure, Rationalism controlled the pulpit, and a dry morality with extended moral precepts, the school. But in the homes the old prayer-books and the old Lutheran postils were still gladly and frequently used. So, under the ashes of Rationalism, many a coal still glowed. Now came the fresh spiritual breath from Hermannsburg and blew far over the heath. It penetrated to the coals and breathed upon them, and the flames burst forth. Twenty years later the situation would not have been so favorable. It was just the right time when
the Lord gave this servant of his to the church, and the right place where he put him, and we may recognize therein his wisdom and his mercy. Thus everything was ready: the field and the hero.

But how came Louis Harms to found a missionary society? He had within him and preached the living faith, and through his preaching thousands were awakened to a living faith, that is, to that faith which love makes active. Missionary contributions flowed in abundantly, and soon living hearts were willing to offer themselves. Converted youths came to him and tendered their services. He wrote to the existing missionary societies, but there was nowhere room. However, he could not and would not turn these youths away. It happened that, at this time, the Hamburg Missionary Society broke up, was withdrawn to Reformed Bremen, and became more and more Reformed in character. Louis Harms had become thoroughly Lutheran in sentiment. For this reason he could no longer work with this society, to which he had heretofore chiefly devoted his energies. And, when, at this time, there came to him from some of his first missionary friends the request that he would found a missionary society, he did not hesitate. Impelled by the love of Christ, moved by the zeal of his friends, led by the Spirit of God, and knowing clearly that the Lord willed it, he began his work with lively courage and joyful faith. At a missionary festival in Celle he expressed himself thus: "I shall in God's name establish a missionary society in Hermannsburg, and have not a penny for that purpose. With how many students shall I begin? Three or four? No: with twelve; for His is all gold and silver." In this way his missionary society originated.

And what did he intend to do? What were his guiding principles? Above all things he wished to do nothing. His institution was far different from so many human institutions of modern Christendom. He preached the gospel, and out of it everything came of itself. The stream was too strong and too deep to be confined to any existing channel;
therefore it cut for itself a new and unconfined course in its own bed. So when he was driven from within and without to the founding of his own society, he laid firm hold of five principles: 1. His society was to be a Lutheran missionary society. 2. He would not prepare learned missionaries, but, as thoroughly as possible, men of the people. 3. He would send them out along with colonists, that there might be at once at hand a parish as a gathering-point. 4. This parish was to be an organized and self-ruling one. 5. He would unite his missionary society with his Church.

It was not his purpose to transplant the denominational strife at home into heathendom and to enlighten the heathen about doctrinal differences; such foolishness was far from him. But whatever had been given to us in our Lutheran Church by the grace of the Holy Ghost, whatever had been won for us by the struggles and labors of the fathers, was to be made known to the heathen, not in the form of Lutheran dogmatics, but in the simplicity and clearness of the Lutheran catechism and according to the Lutheran liturgy. In his missionary sermon of 1854 he himself said:—

And shall we then bury in the earth the talent which we have, and fail to carry this treasure to the seven hundred millions of heathen who know not of it? We should then not be fit to live. Our Lutheran Church is especially a missionary church, because it has the true word and sacrament; and we should be unworthy to be called Lutherans, if we did not carry on the work of our holy mission with all our might. The Reformed Church is prosecuting its missionary work too, and, in many respects, puts us to shame; therefore we regard the members of the Reformed Church as our brethren, wish them well in their missionary work, and pray for them; but we consider their doctrine wrong in many points, and wish to remain unentangled with it. So much the more ought our Reformed brethren to stir us up to zeal in bringing the glory of our Lutheran Church and of her pure word and sacrament to the heathen.

This point of view is correct and worthy of approval. That development through which the church has passed must remain passed for its converts. And if the church has been led to a well-lighted hill and has settled there, it must teach and rear its children upon that height, and not gather them together at its foot; for, in that case, they would have to travel again that weary way upwards. For that reason the
Lutheran Church must carry on Lutheran missions; and the preaching of the gospel, the teaching of the converts, the administering of the sacraments, and the regulation of the services and of the congregation, must be in accordance with the clearness and truth of the Lutheran confession and of the freedom and restraint of the Lutheran church-discipline. In this Harms went the way upon which the leaders of the Lutheran Church—Petri in Hannover, Harless, Thomasius, Delitzsch, and others—had preceded him, and which had led in the year 1836 to the founding of the Leipzig Missionary Society.

In regard to the qualifications of the missionaries he did not pattern after the sister missionary society, but went his own way. It was the practice of the Leipzig Society to send to the heathen only persons who had been thoroughly trained in theology; but now it too has come down from such a height, and trains its messengers only in a missionary seminary. His practical sense made L. Harms see that it would be better not to set the mark too high, lest little assistance could be had. It is seldom that a German theological student says, "Here am I, send me." For the most part it is the common people who offer themselves, and they are in many respects the better fitted. They can more easily endure physical hardships and overcome external difficulties; they can hew and build, sow and reap, and the missionary must understand all that. And so it seemed best to him to train peasants and mechanics for missionaries. This training was to be thorough, of course, but not burdensome. On that account they were to learn of foreign languages only the necessary one, the English; in addition, however, they were to be thoroughly instructed in the Holy Scriptures and the catechism, in the doctrines and ordinances of the Lutheran Church, in practical theology, in church hymnology, and in music, and were to be brought up to obedience and diligent labor.

Harms had one plan, in particular, in which he agreed with the conduct of missions in the middle ages. In those times a band of monks, priests, and laymen would go out, found
their monasteries and settlements in heathen lands, and from them cultivate and christianize the surrounding regions. In a similar way, Louis Harms wished to send out a small company of missionaries and colonists, who should remain together at first and make settlements in common; the colonists caring for temporal things, and the missionaries devoting themselves entirely to the conversion of the heathen. In 1851 Harms writes:—

The first ones are to remain together in one place and settle there, in order to be strong enough by their common efforts to labor with the heathen and to gain their own living. They are capable of this, inasmuch as they have been trained to agriculture and all the necessary trades and know how to carry them on. This is similar to the procedure of the Anglo-Saxon missionaries, who were the teachers of our German ancestors in both spiritual and temporal things. If a heathen community forms about them, then two or three of them must remain with it, and the others shall move on, not a hundred or ten, but one, two, or three (German) miles, and do the same thing again there. And those who leave here later, will, on their arrival, at once have employment, and can work for their own support, until they have learned the language. Then they too can take possession of suitable situations which lie near, so that in a short time a whole land will be covered with a net of missionary stations, and peoples will be converted and armed with Christian training and customs, so that they can successfully resist the destructive pressure of Europeans and not become a sacrifice to them, as has been the case heretofore almost everywhere.

Harms purposed to save in this way not merely individual souls, but nations. He thought to make this little Christian community an enduring nucleus at which the missionaries who went forth might receive support, about which the communities of converts might gather, and from which they could at once receive definite rules of government. Therefore Harms gave to his first company a constitution. Their patish was to be the mother parish of the mission. One of the missionaries was to be pastor of this parish, and the others were to assist him as deacons. The direction of the affairs of the church in the parish was to belong to the pastor. The missionary council, which was to consist of all the missionaries, had jurisdiction in all things pertaining to the spreading of the church among the heathen. So far as church affairs concerned the civil life of the parish, the latter was to be repre-
sented by two men whom it elected. They were to form the parish vestry under the presidency of the pastor. Within their jurisdiction were to come the church and school buildings, the care of the poor and the sick, and the exercise of church-discipline. The municipal administration and the police were to be in the hands of a magistrate, who was to be chosen by the laity of the parish. The parish-meeting was to be presided over by a chairman, who was likewise to be chosen by the parish. The court was to consist of a judge, appointed by the director of the society, and of two justices, elected by the parish, and was to render its decisions in open session. Above all these, however, was to be the director of the missionary society, as a court of last resort. A report was to be made to him yearly and his regulations were to be obeyed.

In the beginning of the just-mentioned constitution it is said: "The Lutheran company which we now send to Eastern Africa is a part of the Lutheran Church of Hannover." Harms was opposed to the separate existence of missionary societies. He was a man of the church, and therefore it was his dearest wish to unite the missionary society which he had founded with the Established Lutheran Church of Hannover, or rather embody it in it. When the training of the first students was completed, he requested the authorities over him, the Consistory of Hannover, to examine and ordain them, but received a refusal. That was a great mistake. They should have consented at once to this attempt at union and to this desire to receive the sanction of the Church. While the next nearest consistory, the one at Stade, was hesitating, the Consistory of Osnabrück offered to do the desired service. Then the Consistory of Stade declared its willingness, and examined and ordained the students from Hermannsburg, till in 1857 the proper authorities in Hannover took charge of the matter. But Harms had hoped for more; he writes in the year 1854:

I should have liked to see one other wish fulfilled, namely this, to see the Consistory of Stade, which has ordained our missionaries, make the governing body of the church which is to be established in Africa by our missionaries,
with God’s help. That consistory was ready and willing to consent to my wish, but it was not considered proper in higher places, and consequently the Lord’s time for it has probably not yet come.

The then Minister of Public Worship considered it impracticable—why, we do not know. If all had consented to Harms’ request, how differently the crisis of 1878-79 would have resulted! And yet, perhaps, it was well for the mission that it did not come under the direction of the bureaucracy of the authorities of the Established Church. Nevertheless, Harms’ endeavor is worthy of all respect. It is a thoroughly correct idea that the foreign as well as the home missions should bear the stamp of the church, and be not the affair of an individual or of an association, but the concern of the whole church.

Even during Harms’ first activity in Hermannsburg, but especially after the founding of his own missionary society, the mission fund increased continuously. The receipts amounted—

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So rapidly and so high did the gifts run up. And yet there were never debts, but each year a surplus, which is, moreover, not counted among the receipts of the following year. In his report at the missionary festival of 1854, Harms says:—

How then has all this money come together? Did we beg for it? No; the Lord says: There shall be no beggar among you; there is none in this parish; and should I myself then be one? I have not begged, have not asked any one for a gift for our mission. I have begged of only one, of my dear Lord Jesus, have often and loudly knocked there, and he has given the beggar rich gifts.

And thus Harms always did. He never begged for money, either in his missionary paper or in his sermons. He never sent collectors through the country and never arranged for collections. Indeed, the collection-box was not once set out at the missionary festivals in Hermannsburg. He wished to avoid even the slightest appearance of human agency; all should be the fruits of a love born of God. Neither were lists
of the gifts published in the missionary sheet, in order not to encourage vanity. Most of the gifts were brought to his house, and in this way there arose a personal relation between him and the giver. His manner in regard to these gifts impressed the simple minds of the peasants very much, and they came willingly and brought him their savings; laborers their silver, peasants their gold, widows their mites, and children their baptismal presents. There were many among them to whom the saying of our Lord applies, But this one cast in all that she had. Harms tells very delightful stories of such sacrifices. In it all there was a joyfulness and desire to give, which were heart-refreshing and which must have come from a lively interest in missions. And how did he strengthen this interest? Chiefly by his powerful and faithful prayers with his parish and in his closet, and by his mighty sermons.

He was steadfast in prayer. In the public services he prayed often upon his knees. And how his plain and simple spontaneous prayers rose up to heaven! And how often he prayed alone! How faithfully did he make intercession for others! In his closet he often wrestled with the Lord in prayer, and because of his great compassion for the heathen, and in childlike trust in his Saviour, he dared to be bold in asking. The fire thus kindled spread; the people learned to pray from him. And although there was many a mere imitator in his parish, there were also many who prayed earnestly.

And how deeply his sermons took root! He preached much and long. He explained his text simply and plainly, without human wisdom and eloquence, and made clear the way of life thereby. Nor did he ever lose sight of the chief matter; the saving of souls and the bringing up of his parish in Christian ways. He preached at the Sunday and week-day services, in the church and at his house, where he gave on Sunday evening the first Low-German Bible instruction. The missionary festival of two days occurred yearly at the festival of St. John. The first day was celebrated at church, the second at various places outdoors. Then the throng made a
pilgrimage, to the sound of singing and of trumpets, to the shady farm of some peasant or other. Thousands streamed in, and the multitude gathered under mighty oaks at the place of the festival. There was much singing, and servants of God from all lands preached. Louis Harms opened and closed the meeting and looked after everything in his calm, quiet way. Then he often gave free rein to his exquisite humor, but nevertheless always kept himself and the great assembly in the bounds of decorum. Those were days when the people drank joyfully of the water of life. The assembled thousands, touched and moved, went their way and carried the seed into their homes; and there the seed sprang up and bore much fruit. So the interest in missions spread from place to place, and more and more into the neighboring states, and there arose a wide-spread "missionary parish." But he liked also to visit the missionary festivals in other parishes, whenever he was invited. Then he always preached the chief sermon, and did not become tired, although he was overloaded with labor, and demands were made upon him from all sides. He declined only when the journey was so great that he would have to absent himself from his parish longer than three days. He never did that and also never allowed himself a period of relaxation and recreation.

He carried on an extended correspondence, and willingly answered every one who applied to him or sent him gifts. He did not use many words in his letters, but wrote briefly and concisely. But he came in that way into personal intercourse with many, and gained a large list of personal acquaintances, whom he kept in his tenacious memory. He exercised great influence through his writings, especially through his "Sermons from the Gospels and Epistles," which have already appeared in nine editions and are a real treasure of our people. From 1854 on he issued a missionary paper of his own. The most important volumes are the first, which are entirely from his hand, while the later ones are chiefly taken up with the reports of the missionaries.

These sheets went forth among the people like a fresh wind
in spring and fanned the fires of love. He understood thoroughly how to relate incidents and could express himself in a popular way, as could few others. And then he had especially the gift of bringing forth old anecdotes and applying them in a striking way. Under such care the interest in missions grew from year to year, and all the contempt and mockery which were poured out so abundantly upon Hermannsburg could not extinguish it again.

Louis Harms conducted the mission work himself and had pretty much unrestricted sway. This is readily comprehensible, inasmuch as the society was his own work. In the year 1856 the institution was given a legal existence by King George V. Its statutes were revised and approved. In regard to its financial government the institution was placed under the charge of the Consistory of Hannover, to which an abstract of its accounts has to be sent yearly. The conduct of the affairs of the society, both at home and abroad, particularly the determination of the territory of the missions, the appointment of the heads of the families and the teachers, and the reception of students, belong exclusively to the director of the institution. To assist him there is a committee of ten or twelve persons, partly clerical, partly lay, among whom there must be one jurist. In the above-mentioned affairs the committee can only advise, in financial matters its decision is final. Each member of the committee has one vote, and the director of the institution four. Pastor Harms chose the members of the committee and also his own successor. The committee now has the right to make this choice. The first committee consisted of six clergymen, one jurist, and five members of the parish of Hermannsburg. Louis Harms was assisted in the affairs of the mission by his brother Theodore, who acted as inspector of the mission-house. And although they were otherwise quite different, they always agreed with regard to the affairs of the mission. When the mission-house was first opened this faithful brother became inspector and teacher, and remained such until his appointment in the year
1857 as pastor of Müden, which lies not far distant. He devoted himself to the teaching and training of the pupils with great zeal and faithfulness; he not only taught them, but also lived entirely with them. He writes:

Mine was therefore the task of instructing the students in the Scriptures, the creed of the church, and all those subjects which assist in understanding the Scriptures. I had also to adjust the hours of study and of physical labor, so that the students might keep well and be able to take care of themselves among the heathen...... Many shook their heads at it all and said, "What will our stupid peasant boys bring to pass when they are missionaries?" But we did not let ourselves be led astray; we trusted in the living God and knew the peasant youths of Lüneburg....... I found great pleasure in sharing the physical labor of my students. How we argued, recited, and sang at it! My brother felt the greatest satisfaction in this way of doing. To labor with all one's might, to pray with all one's soul—that was his life and his joy, and he rejoiced much because the young people of the mission-house imitated him in so doing. The work went on merrily.

The mission-house is situated near the clear Örtze, which flows through Hermannsburg. An unfinished farm-house with about ten acres of land was bought. This was soon increased by an additional ten acres. The completion of the house and the erection of outbuildings were attended to by the students, and the land was cultivated by them in their spare hours. Afterwards the property of the society was greatly increased. This increase was, however, not the result of any previously made plan. As there was need, the buildings were extended in the plainest manner. As early as 1854 there was added a whole farm which lay near to the mission-house. The farm belonged to a newly married peasant named Behrens. He had wished to enter the missionary service before, but had not obtained the paternal consent, because he was the heir. His father changed his mind upon his death-bed; therefore the son and his family became inmates of the mission-house, and he gave the whole farm to the society. "My brother and I were long opposed to it . . . but he would not be refused . . . and so we took possession of the farm in the name of the Lord, with song, prayer, and the reading of God's word. . . . Inasmuch as we have taken possession of the farm with all its belongings, but also
with all its charges and indebtedness, we shall have increased burdens, expenses, and labor during the first years. On that account we have accepted the present with trembling. In the end, however, we may expect a rich blessing with God's gracious help; for the farm is so large that, when everything has been put in order and the uncultivated parts brought under cultivation, our society will be able to support itself hence, and all our means may be used for the missionary stations in heathen lands. On our part, therefore, it has been nothing but the feeling, that it is our duty not to refuse a gift of the Lord, that has led us to accept it. If then our shoulders, and especially my weak ones, do not break down under the burden and labor caused by our new gift, it is comforting, in view of my perhaps not distant death, to know, that the work will not cease, since it no longer depends upon individuals.

Since the influx of new pupils was constantly greater (in the year 1860 about one hundred young people applied), Harms determined in the same year, after due deliberation, to build a second mission-house. For that purpose he used the surplus of the preceding three years, which amounted to about seven thousand thaler. In the beginning he had received twelve students at the mission-house; in 1858 he had doubled their number. He took twenty-four students at the new house also. The young people had to have the necessary physical and mental capacity and be free from military duty. Before their reception they had generally to pass through a period of probation; that is, they had to remain two years in Hermannsburg and to attend the school for candidates at that place. If they passed through the time of probation satisfactorily they were accepted. After being trained for one year they were examined and ordained by the Consistory of Hannover, and were commissioned and sent forth by the parish at public divine service in the church at Hermannsburg. At first the companies were sent out every four years; after the opening of the new house every two years, since the students at the latter were instructed by their own
inspector in a special course, and the first of them were sent out two years after those who had preceded them from the other house.

The first company was to be sent out in 1853. But how was this to be accomplished? Harms had planned that they should be taken by trading-vessels, but there was no direct traffic with the land of his choice. Then God brought it to pass that in the year 1852 twelve Christian young men from the German marine—some, sailors, some, mechanics—made application at Hermannsburg, and wished to go to Africa and open the way for missions there. They were the cause of the building of a missionary ship. After the attempt to get means of transportation for the missionaries had failed time and again, one of these sailors said to Harms, “Why do you not build a ship yourself?” and showed that the saving in sending out a few companies would amount to about as much as the entire cost of building a ship, and that the ship at other times could be made to pay its own expenses by carrying freight. Harms saw that clearly, but he did not begin the work without consideration. He corresponded exhaustively with regard to the project with his faithful and experienced friends, the merchant Nagel, of Hamburg, and the harbor-master Stürge of Harburg. In the missionary paper (volume for 1854, page 24) he writes:—

At this time I struggled and wrestled with God very often, for no one favored the project, all opposed it. Even my dearest friends and brothers thought that my head was cracked and that I was no longer in my right mind. . . . What was I to do? I had knocked at many doors in order to find another way, but they were closed. The plan was evidently good, and was, moreover, for the glory of God. The short way is the best way. I prayed fervently to the Lord, laid the matter in his hands, and then I arose from my prayer, and at midnight in my quiet room spoke out so loudly, in the fulness of my heart, that I was almost frightened at my own voice: “Now onward, in God’s name.” From that time on there came into my heart no thought of doubting or hesitating.

He writes to Stürge on the tenth of December, 1852:—

At last it has come to acting. I am in my element. The work has been begun with the Lord; it shall be completed in his name. The time for hesitation has passed for me; now boldly to the work. . . . I shall send you
the money as soon as you ask for it. God will surely provide all at the proper time. My dear brother, your burden will be heavy, but I willingly give it to you to bear, for you love the Lord Jesus, and he is with us and with the work. Amen.

In the year 1853, the ship, a neat brig, was ready. The trusty merchant Nagel, of Hamburg, attended to the equipment, and soon all was ready for the departure. The ship was consecrated by L. Harms at a solemn service. It was provided with Christian rules, and under the name of the "Candace," set out to sea and carried the first missionaries over to Africa. The boldness of this undertaking and its surprising success created the greatest sensation far and wide. Without the slightest solicitation, to which, moreover, Harms was opposed, gifts for his ship streamed into the treasury, some even from Russia and America. There is no doubt that Harms and all his "missionary parish" were strengthened and supported by this occurrence. This experience of God's favor was like a fresh wind at sea. "The Lord has been so gracious," he writes in his missionary paper, "that if you were to ask me whether I prayed or gave thanks more in this affair, I should have to say to my own shame, 'I prayed often, but I gave thanks still oftener.'" The ship was not to be insured; "to do so were to act not according to faith but according to reason, to say nothing of the expense." The Candace was insured by the Lord, and under his protection her voyages passed off well. Several times she was mercifully saved from the greatest danger by his wonderful hand. And yet Harms had to suffer because of the Candace. His first captains were a source of bitter experience, until he found in Captain Plaass a capable and trustworthy man, who commanded the Candace until she was sold. It was also discovered that she had been built too short. She was therefore made longer by the insertion of twenty feet, at one of the English ports. Harms' purpose was to use the Candace, as far as possible, for the benefit of all the German missionary societies. He did not wish to use her for trading trips. She was to make the voyage out and back
yearly, in order to be of service to all the German societies, and was to touch at all points where there were German missionaries. "This is our purpose. We commend her to God and wish her to be of service to all the German brethren." It is true that this plan was not realized, but the Candace did assist other societies by taking missionaries out.

Two of the first twelve students had become unfaithful, and two had died; so at Michaelmas, 1853, but eight young men were ready to be sent out. Eight colonists were to go with them. The celebration of their commission on October 20 was solemn. On October 28 the brethren set out to sea bravely and joyfully. "The Lord filled me with unusual joy, so that I myself do not know how it came to pass that my heart rejoiced almost without ceasing when I was leaving," writes Missionary Strube on board the ship. The ship ran into the harbor of Zanzibar on Easter day, 1854. It had always been a favorite thought of Harms to send his missionaries to the Gallas, a wild, vigorous race of Eastern Africa. Land and people had been several times described in a very attractive way. Moreover, the attention of Christian circles in Germany had been directed to this people by a converted Galla girl, who was instructed and baptized at Kornthal. To whom will it seem strange that this vigorous race became of special concern to the vigorous man? His whole soul was filled with the thought of going to the Gallas. The way into their land passes through the territory of the sultan of Zanzibar; therefore the missionaries had to apply to him first. He had ordered that no European should pass through his state. By the aid of his son they received permission to go to Mombas, but were strictly forbidden to step upon the mainland. They met with opposition at Mombas also, although the well-known missionary Rebmann, who was there at the time, interceded for them. The English consul even gave them no support. It was discovered later that merchants of Hamburg were, we regret to say, partly to blame for this refusal. They had fears for their trade, because the missionary society had a ship. Moreover, it is a sad observation to make that Ger-
man traders, as a class, have shown but little interest in missions.

But our Hermannsburg missionaries did not wish to go back without having risked one trial. Three of them, therefore, pressed forward into the interior for several days. They got as far as Rebmann’s station among the Wanikas. But this attempt to go to the Gallas was also in vain. Because they had in this way transgressed the command of the sultan, the Arabian governor was very angry at them, and the ship had to leave the harbor of Mombas on St. John’s day. With heavy hearts the missionaries now decided to go back to Southern Africa. Some of them were indeed of the opinion that they ought to force their way through to the Gallas, even if it cost them their lives; but most of them were prudent enough to see that the door was closed. Two things were decisive for them: the positive advice of the experienced Rebmann to begin their mission among the Kaffirs, and from there to repeat later the attempt to establish the Galla mission, which was now impracticable; and, secondly, the consideration that they were not only to be missionaries, but also colonists, and were to establish themselves at once as a community among the heathen. Consequently they had to do not only with spiritual but also with earthly concerns, and therefore owed obedience to the authority which forbade their settlement. Harms was of a different opinion. It is true that he did not find fault with his missionaries, but gave his approval to their actions, but it was a great grief to him. He would have liked it best if they had not let themselves be frightened away. His strong faith and his energy would have shrunk from no sacrifice, if only he had gone thereby to the Gallas. Therefore he did not rest until he had made a second trial in the year 1858. He chose for it the missionaries Filter, Prigge, and Klassen, together with three colonists. They set out to sea with the song, “Where God doth lead me I will go, and choose not whither.” Missionary Klassen died on the way, and one of the colonists was sick for a long time. They tried to land in the bay of Formosa, to find the mouth
of some river, and so force their way to the Gallas by water or by land—but in vain. At Zanzibar the missionary Rebmann greeted them joyfully. The sultan and the English consul were no longer alive, and he hoped that they had come at a good time. As the Candace had to go back, Filter and Prigge took up their abode in Zanzibar and diligently studied the Suaheli language, which is spoken on the eastern coast of Africa. They tried also to get permission to make a settlement. All endeavors to enlist the favor of the sultan and the new English consul, and also Rebmann’s faithful assistance, were without result. On that account; when the Candace came back, the two missionaries went back to Natal with her. So then this second trial also had failed, and it became clear that men’s thoughts had not been God’s thoughts. It is indeed said, ‘‘Go ye therefore and teach all nations,’’ but the history of missions shows, time and again, that men cannot seek out the nations according to the purposes of their own hearts, but that they must often let themselves be led whither they do not wish to go, for the Lord often closes the way to the place where they would be. He does this, so that no man can be proud in the presence of the Lord, as if his doings were the result of his own purposes. He does this, because He only can understand the development of nations and because He makes all history here on earth. Very often is applicable to a missionary church the saying: ‘‘Woman, what have I to do with thee? mine hour is not yet come.’’ Fortunate is the church if it can then say to its servants, ‘‘Whatsoever He says unto you, do it.’’ Thus it was in this case. His servants did what the Lord had said unto them; they went to the negroes of Southern Africa and filled the water-pots with water, and the Lord has already made much wine therefrom.

On the advice of the Berlin missionary Posselt in New Germany, they tried, with the assistance of the Norwegian missionary Schreuder, who had great influence with the Zulu king Umpanda, to get permission to start a mission in Zulu-land. But this attempt did not succeed for the time being.
Then the missionary Posselt undertook to get, by means of the English government, consent for them to settle in Natal. But the proper official, who was incited to it by the captain of the Candace, refused every place desired. The faithful and untiring Posselt then advised them to buy a place, and arranged the business himself. Near the Zulu boundary he bought a piece of ground of 6,018 acres for 600 pounds sterling. The little community soon settled there. This place became not only a point of departure for the Hermannsburg mission in Southern Africa, but also its centre, and therefore it received from the brethren the name of New Hermannsburg. Posselt wrote to Harms that the only thing possible for them to do was to buy property. It was also for the best, and was approved by him and all right-thinking Englishmen. By this means they were made independent of the authorities, and could do their work according to the plans which might appear most judicious to them. He himself had chosen the place according to his best judgment. They could easily earn their own support there, could reach many of the heathen, and would not come into collision with other missions.

The establishing of the station was at first a source of many difficulties for the brethren, but they carried on their work joyfully and zealously. Then several of them went back to Posselt to continue their study of the language, which they had begun immediately after their arrival. Some of them stayed at a Kaffir kraal for some weeks, in order to become more thoroughly acquainted with the people and their language by living among them. To their great encouragement the English government now kindly intervened in their behalf. Lord Shepstone, who had charge of the affairs of the natives there, wrote to the English official in Umvoti:—

I beg you to grant all assistance in your power to the undertaking of the Hannoverian missionaries, and to visit the missionaries yourself without delay, and assure them of the sincere support of the government in case they carry on their work in a satisfactory manner. Say further to the leading chiefs in your district that they are to use all their influence to induce their people to send their children to the mission-school; and, in order that the chiefs may gain confidence, let them accompany you when you visit the missionaries.
The Dutch government also granted them kindly support when they came into contact with it later.

As early as the following year they had the joy of instructing some of the heathen and of being permitted to baptize four of them. The day on which the baptism took place was a real festival for the little circle. They had not been premature in administering the rite of baptism. They write with regard to that point:—

When we are once thoroughly acquainted with the Kaffir language, we shall not so long delay baptism, as we have done this time. We shall baptize them at their own earnest request, if they have been aroused by our preaching, without demanding so much knowledge of them as these have already acquired. We have indeed learned that instruction must really begin after baptism, as the directions which we brought with us have laid down.

With regard to the baptism of heathen, Harms expressed his principles in the following words:—

With respect to the baptism of the Kaffir mother I remark that for the baptism of adult heathen the following things are necessary: 1. The sincere desire for baptism in order to be saved and not for other considerations. 2. The knowledge of the ten commandments and the consciousness of their violation. 3. The knowledge of the three articles of faith and the fides historica. 4. The certainty that the circumstances give promise that after baptism Christian instruction can be continued, and church and Christian fellowship maintained.

Inasmuch as four other heathen families, who could be baptized, came to Hermannsburg soon after, they began their school-work. With regard to this, Harms had instructed them that they should build up the missions by preaching and not by means of the school, and that the school should be an outgrowth of the church when the latter had been built up by preaching and by baptism.

The brethren lived together as bachelors till in November, 1856, when the Candace brought them their betrothed wives. On the twenty-fifth of November there was a great wedding feast. With reference to the marriage question Harms had applied to Posselt, in order to get the opinion of an experienced missionary. The latter answered:—

As regards the marriage or celibacy of missionaries in general and of your children here in particular, I agree with you entirely. For a missionary who
is sent out to an unknown country and must clear the way, it is certainly better, indeed I might say absolutely necessary, to go without a wife. Failure and death, if such must be, would then be very easy for him. Only unmarried missionaries should have gone to the Gallas in the first place. But here in Natal, where your missionaries have a fixed abode and where they are under the protection of Christian authorities, (and that signifies much,) I beg you to permit every one to marry who will. Life here is so monotonous, the hearts of the heathen so hard, and cold, and inaccessible, the love of even the converted Kaffirs so African in its inertness, that an unmarried missionary must necessarily sink into a condition of friendlessness and joylessness. I do not fail to appreciate the fact that your missionaries have in this respect a great advantage over us and others, because they form a little Christian community of Germans, and that is a very great blessing. But they are nevertheless in a heathen land and surrounded by heathen, and cannot all remain at one place and must soon live singly among the heathen.

Harms found his own views confirmed by this letter. And while he would not permit the betrothal of any of his pupils at the mission-house, he carefully arranged matters so that they could marry after they were sent out.

By the spring of 1856 the missionaries had separated. While Strube and Schröder remained at Hermannsburg, Schütze and Hohls founded the station of Ehlanzeni in the territory of the chief Somakashe, and Cohrs and Meyer the station Etembeni in the territory of Chief Umpakata. They worked at these three stations with great longing for success. But progress was slow, and was almost entirely restricted to the Kaffirs laboring at the stations. This had its cause in the manner of their procedure, and in the character of the people, and the circumstances of the heathen among whom they worked. A brisk trade with the natives began at once, because the missionaries and colonists were expected to make a settlement in common. The whole station had to be laid out on a large scale, large buildings had to be erected, and the cultivation of the land in union with all sorts of mechanical occupations was begun. These business affairs demanded much time and strength. The missionaries complained about it greatly, and this communism was afterwards given up.

On the other hand, the Kaffirs of Natal had but little desire for salvation; and the strong, violent Zulus to whom our
missionaries soon went, still less. They lived in scattered kraals. The government made it a matter of policy to separate them as much as possible. Besides, the heathen often changed their dwelling-place, and it sometimes happened that a station established near a kraal would be entirely isolated after a little while. The missionaries therefore tried to attach as many as possible of the laboring Kaffirs to their stations, and the union of the colonists with the mission helped them to do so, for they had labor for many at the larger stations. These laboring Kaffirs also often changed their place of abode, and there was on the whole only a small permanent population at the stations. Among the Zulus there was in addition this circumstance, that this poor people could come to no quiet development. For years at a time they would be agitated by bloody wars. Yet King Umpanda and, at first, also his son Cetewayo, were not hostilely disposed, so that the missionaries did not have to suffer directly from hostilities at this first period. There could not be, however, much thought of spiritual activity among a people whose passions were constantly being fanned. “If the Zulus do not become Christians, they will become exterminated,” wrote one of the missionaries.

Entrance into the independent part of Zulu-land was open to them from 1858 on. Through the intercession of Missionary Schreuder, through wise and prudent conduct, and through the various services which they had rendered to the king, (they built him houses, for example,) they received permission to establish the station of Emlalazi, which was followed in 1859 by the stations Inyezane and Emonjini. In the same year they were permitted to enter the land of the Bechuanas, which lies somewhat farther north. And so, when the next company of twelve colonists and twelve missionaries came to Africa, the Lord gave them a large field of labor. They were called to the Bechuanas by the Dutch government. The land of this people lies a journey of about thirty days from Hermannsburg, on the other side of the Drakenberg Mountains. Their neighbors are the Dutch Boers, on whom
they are partly dependent. The natives became involved in a bloody war with the Boers, who came off victorious. Since the Dutch supposed that the English missionaries had supplied the Bechuanas with weapons and powder, the latter had to leave the country. But the Boers did not wish to destroy the mission in that way. In 1858 they asked the missionaries at Hermannsburg to revive the mission among the Bechuanas, and, because King Setchele also asked them to come, they consented in God's name. Setchele had already been baptized by Livingstone, who had worked as a missionary at Kolobeng. He had to give up his missionary work at the same time as the other English. In consequence of this, he took his staff in his hand, and became the great discoverer and path-maker for the missions in Africa. It is in this capacity that the pages of history preserve his glorious memory. The first station was established in the territory of Setchele, and it prospered greatly. Soon afterwards, two other stations were established, Linokena in the territory of Chief Moiloe, and Lekoyo in the territory of Chief Sokhome. Missionaries Schröder, Backeberg, Schulenburg, and Zimmermann, and two colonists labored at these three stations. Soon they had the joy of being permitted to baptize the first heathen. The people came freely, and the school which they opened, justified their fairest hopes. The people were filled with a strong desire for salvation, and had great confidence in the missionaries. External relations were very favorable for the work of the mission, since the Bechuanas are not scattered about, but often live together in large districts, to the number of thousands. The people were also naturally impressed by the fact that King Setchele openly supported the missionaries. "He is like a brother to us," is said in one letter. But ah! how often in the spring there comes upon a field a heavy frost, and that not seldom from a quarter from which we have least expected it!

It seemed to Pastor Harms necessary for the African mission to have a local head under whom it might be unified, as it spread more and more, and by whom it might be or-
ganized and directed. Harms saw that an experienced missionary who was also well trained in theology was needed for this work, and called Missionary August Hardeland, who had already worked on the island of Borneo, and who seemed well fitted for the direction of affairs because of his fearless courage and his energy. In the year 1860 he took the superintendency. The missionaries in Natal recognized him as their superior at a conference, and those in Zulu-land by a written declaration. The missionaries to the Bechuanas, however, refused obedience. They said that they wished to be free men. Since all persuasions on the part of the other missionaries and all admonitions of their superiors remained without result, they were removed from their offices. Unfortunately their stations were lost at the same time. Only Limokena could be won back afterwards. Why these stations were not at once supplied with other missionaries and by that means kept, is inexplicable to us. Superintendent Hardeland took up the work of organization with great zeal. On his difficult and dangerous journeys he became acquainted with the territory of the mission; examined the ground; studied the people; came into personal communication with the English officials, with the Dutch government, with Um-panda, Cetewayo, and various under-chiefs; chose proper sites and had new stations erected on them. He tried then to relieve the missionaries, as much as possible, of external labors, and to extend their theological training. Much was accomplished at their conferences. Although some of the missionaries sought to withdraw from his influence, others, and among them Hohls and Wendland, gave open expression to their recognition of Hardeland. Missionary Wendland, who had worked in India in the service of the Leipzig Missionary Society, and whose work in Africa, in the service of the Hermannsburg Missionary Society was rich in blessings, although unfortunately of brief duration, begged Harms not to give credence to the many disagreeable reports about the superintendent. In Wendland's opinion he was the right man, and without him the mission there would have gone to pieces.
Nevertheless, it appears that on the whole, there was no intimate relationship between Hardeiland and the missionaries. Because his health was, moreover, broken down, he gave up his office in 1864, after he had trained Missionary Hohls to be his successor and had made the most capable of the missionaries assistant-superintendents. His work had been a great blessing for the Hermannsburg mission. It was the right time when he came to Africa; but it was perhaps also the right time when he went away again. Karl Hohls took the superintendency after him.

Meanwhile the number of missionaries had increased greatly, and several new stations could be established: in Natal, Műden in 1859, Emlanghane in 1861, Neu-Hannover in 1862 (where German colonists lived), Empangweni and Emakabaleni in 1863; Northern Zulu-land, Enlongane in 1861, Itaka, Emyati, and Ehlohomo in 1862; in Southern Zulu-land, Endlangubo in 1863; and on the Umpongolo, the stations of Entombe and Ekombela, 1862. In the year 1864 the Lord again opened to them in a most unexpected way the door into the country of the Bechuana. And as the missionaries from Hermannsburg came into the country again from another side, God brought their apostate brethren back to them. Schulenburg had turned back before this and had been taken to Hermannsburg by Hardeiland, in order that he might prove his trustworthiness there, and he did prove it. Schröder had died in 1862, Backeberg and Zimmermann gave up their station, made themselves of assistance to the other missionaries, and could soon be used in the service of the Hermannsburg Society. The station Linokena was taken possession of at once. It was a cause of regret that the prosperous station in the territory of Setchele could not be won back. The Hermannsburg missionaries had, it is true, received from President Prätorius the positive declaration that the Dutch government would not allow English missionaries among the Bechuanas; but the king’s brother, Khosilinzi, who had greater influence over the Bakweinas than Setchele himself, and who was still a heathen, made the restoration of
the station impossible. In a great assembly under the leadership of this brother the people declared that they wished to have English missionaries, and those from Hermannsburg were compelled to leave at once. Setchele rode after them and declared that he was much distressed at the occurrence, but was unfortunately not able to keep them against the will of his people. Missionary Behrens, who had been appointed inspector, settled among the Mamagales and founded the station of Bethanien; this became now the heart of the mission among the Bechuanas. A youth of this race had, about thirty years before, been taken captive by the Zulus and afterwards by the Boers, among whom he was instructed by an English missionary and baptized under the name of David. After he was set free, he confessed the name of his Saviour in his home and gathered a little group of believers about him. They had longed greatly for a missionary. Then God led the missionaries from Hermannsburg into their midst. Superintendent Hohls reports:—

We had a day of joy, such as I had not before experienced in all my stay in Africa. The people were hungering and thirsting for God's word, without having ever had a missionary among them. For years they had prayed to God for a missionary, who might make God's word known unto them. It was in the evening twilight when we came to them. Would that I could describe the great rejoicing among them when they heard that Missionary Behrens would come to them, would live among them, and would be their shepherd and pastor. Then they exclaimed aloud, weeping for joy and thankfulness: "See, see, God has remembered us in mercy! O, this happy day!" They exclaimed thus time and again, till it seemed as if they would never cease. Should we have kept back our tears of joy and thankfulness?

Behrens could soon baptize twenty adults and twenty-two children, and thirty-one others were already asking for instruction preparatory to baptism. Their numbers grew rapidly; they separated from the heathen soon and built little houses round about the church, and so there arose a Christian village with neat houses and blooming gardens, which was given the name of Bethanien. In quick succession were established the stations Limao in 1864, Matlara, Pata Letshopa, and Rüstenburg in 1865, where
also the missionaries had similar gracious experiences. If the missions in Natal and Zulu-land were seed among thorns and thistles, and a labor of tears, the reports from the Bechuanas were the cup of joy which the Lord had poured out for his faithful servants, Louis Harms, the missionaries, and all those interested in the missions. Thus the missions in Africa had begun a course of blessed development.

At this time Missionary Grönning wrote to Harms from Rajahmundry in Eastern India, that he had been given up by the Lutheran Missionary Society of America on account of the civil war. He begged, therefore, most earnestly to be permitted to continue at his station under the direction of the Hermannsburg Society. At the same time Harms received a letter from Pastor Mylius, of the Frederikenstift in Hannover, in which the latter placed himself at his disposition for missionary service, and especially for service in India, where he had already worked as a missionary. Harms recognized this coincidence as a sign from the Lord, agreed to it with joy, and sent Pastor Mylius to the Telegus, in whose territory Rajahmundry lay. The needs of the German emigrants in America and Australia lay heavily on the heart of Harms, and he took steps to send missionaries to these countries also. And so to the blossoms of the African mission were added other buds. Then God put an end to the labors of his faithful servant. "Woe is me, if I outlive my strength! I pray only that he may permit me to preach so long as I live." Thus he had spoken once, and thus it came to pass. Even in the greatest bodily pain he had not failed to preach, except on the Sunday before his death. His exhausting labors and the struggles of his latter years against the last revival of Rationalism, and against the power of unbelief, which had shown itself in the opposition to the new catechism introduced by the pious king, George V.—all these had fully consumed his strength. He had stood firm as a hero midst the raging waves, and the faithful had gathered round about him. But other tempests were
threatening—then he was taken away before the calamity came. He died of heart disease and dropsy on November 14, 1865, and was buried on November 17 amidst general sorrow.

Here the history of the first period of the Hermannsburg Missionary Society ends. It was the time of its germination. Its growth proved that it was no human work, but came from on high, that it was born of God. The Father made himself known to his child, and led him His way, which was often not the way of men's thoughts, but was always the way of salvation for Christian and for heathen.

Statement of the condition of the Hermannsburg Missions at the death of Louis Harms.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Station</th>
<th>Year of founding</th>
<th>No. of missionaries</th>
<th>No. of baptized heathen</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I. Natal</td>
<td>Hermannsburg</td>
<td>1854</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>36</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Etembeni</td>
<td>1856</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>45</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Ehlanzeni</td>
<td>1856</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Muden</td>
<td>1859</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>Emlongane</td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neu-Hannover</td>
<td>1862</td>
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<td>13</td>
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<td>Empangwenni</td>
<td>1863</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emakahleni</td>
<td>1863</td>
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<td></td>
</tr>
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<td>II. Northern Zulu-land</td>
<td>Emlongane</td>
<td>1861</td>
<td>2</td>
<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Entombe</td>
<td>1861</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
<td>Itaka</td>
<td>1862</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emyati</td>
<td>1862</td>
<td>2</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
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<td></td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ekombela</td>
<td>1862</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
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<td>Emlalazi</td>
<td>1858</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Inyazane</td>
<td>1859</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Emonjinj</td>
<td>1861</td>
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<td>1</td>
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<td></td>
<td>Endlabu</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>IV. Land of the Bechuanaas</td>
<td>Linokena</td>
<td>1858 (64)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>55</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limao</td>
<td>1864</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Bethanie</td>
<td>1864</td>
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<td>Pata Letschopa</td>
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<tr>
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<td>Matlaara</td>
<td>1865</td>
<td>1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ristenburg</td>
<td>1865</td>
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[To be continued.]
ARTICLE VII.
TWO HISTORIES OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.

BY THE REV. FRANK H. FOSTER, PH. D., PROFESSOR OF CHURCH HISTORY, OBERLIN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

The appearance within the last two years of a new History of Christian Doctrine,¹ and the re-issue from the press in an improved edition of another, which had already made for itself a place and name as one of the greatest works in this department of history,² suggest the propriety of a review, by means of these representatives, of a department in which but little work has been done in our own country, but whose importance will not be denied by any one to whom the study of history seems to have any especial value for the theologian.

The History of Christian Doctrine was founded, as a distinct discipline, by Semler. It was undoubtedly his purpose in tracing the origin of the Christian doctrines, to show that they were all the product of mistake, or party zeal, or other unworthy influences, and so without objective value, or authoritative power in the church. But the efforts that he made, and the sound arguments which he mingled with his fallacies, exhibited the propriety and necessity of such a discipline among theological studies, and thus caused it to be cultivated by others, who did not share his theological point of view. In the last one hundred years, numerous works upon the subject have appeared in Germany, the home of the science, and also a few original productions in this country, as well as translations of one or more German works. Among original American histories, that of Dr. Shedd is best known. Recently there has appeared a history by Professor Sheldon, of Boston University. With the revival of orthodoxy in Germany in the first half of the present century, several histories of doctrine were put forth, the polemical object of which was to show that the Christian doctrines were the product of the divine agency moving in the church, and that they thus possessed an argument in their favor of no mean value, derived from the consent of successive ages under the guidance of one Spirit. Among these, the work

¹ Lehrbuch der Dogmengeschichte von Dr. Adolf Harnack, Ordentlichen Professor der Kirchengeschichte in Giessen. Erster Band, Die Entstehung des kirchlichen Dogmas. Freiburg, 1886.

of Thomasius has been confessedly preeminent. It here appears in its second edition, which adds nothing to the excellencies of the work considered as an exemplification of its author's view of the historical development, though containing many things which bring it more into accord with the demands of the present status of historical study. It remains in general the same that it was in its first edition, and we shall not find it necessary to note especially what another hand has added to the work of the master who produced it.

Thomasius occupied, as already indicated, the position of a believer in the divine character of Christianity. The great body of Christian doctrine as it stood embodied in the symbols of the church of which he was a member, possessed, to Thomasius, the character of divine truth. God had put the church in the world, and had fulfilled his promise to teach it, and the result of the common study of the truth by the church was, in the main, the truth of God. "In the main" it was such, I say, for Thomasius never surrendered his right of private judgment, or denied his Protestant principles by accepting a dogma on the mere authority of the church without intelligent consideration of its claims to be held. But in his mind, the great body of Christian truth was justified before the bar of the best reason. He therefore came to the consideration of any minor point with the reasonable expectation of finding the church right. To reject the general truth of the doctrines of the church was, in Thomasius' mind, to reject the doctrine of the indwelling of the Spirit in the church, and was thus to reject Christianity.

Two results flowed from this view of the matter. On the one hand, Thomasius gained thereby a point of view from which he could easily and accurately judge of the relations of any movement to the progress of the whole church. He conceived of the final result, as it stood embodied in the church system before him, as the divinely intended consummation of the development. However obscure the relation of any writer or doctrinal suggestion might have been to the contemporaries, it was rendered luminous to the historian by the fact that he could look back upon it from the ripened and perfected fruit of the whole series of doctrinal movements. Now, this security and confidence in critical judgment is absolutely essential to the historian. His office is to teach, not merely to record. The annalist is no historian. He must have and express a judgment, and to form this he must have his opinions and his point of view clearly defined. He need not be prejudiced and incapable of an impartial judgment because he has this qualification; but without it, he will be incapable of any judgment whatever.

On the other hand, Thomasius gained the conviction that the course of doctrinal development in the church was something planned for in the divine mind from the first—something which had proceeded according to a natural method, had been essentially involved in Christianity itself, and with whatever mutations and reverses, had, on the whole, moved on steadily to the designed end. His views on this point are stated in the
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1888.]

introduction. The Christian faith begins in the individual. It is a new
and living principle which creates in him, first of all, a new life. He has
now become a Christian. The church is formed of such individuals. It
is the communion of Christian life. Christian doctrine must arise in such
a community by a twofold necessity. The human mind, as such, demands
a systematic statement of the truth in respect to God and the soul. But
this necessity is intensified when men come together in such a community
as the church. Fellowship itself demands it. There must be communica-
tion on the great themes of the faith, and resulting doctrinal state-
ments. The necessity is enhanced by the missionary work of the church.
She is called on to explain and defend her faith before others. Hence Dog-
ma, or the form in which the church definitely, and by common action,
sets forth the essential elements of its common faith, must result.

This position of Thomasius was, undoubtedly, both correct, and, for
the most part, an advantage to him in the formal development of his His-
tory. He is not led anxiously to seek an explanation for the rise and
extension of the Christian system in the operation of foreign elements
upon it. But there are also disadvantages. He is led to view the
course of the development in too formal and a priori a manner. Under
the influence of Hegel, who was one of his teachers in youth, he was in-
duced to conceive the development of doctrine under the scheme of thesis,
antithesis, and synthesis. The whole process of the history is in the
form of a distinct unfolding of the doctrines, one at a time, under the
general thought of a progress from the more fundamental to those built
upon them. Thus the topics are: Trinity, Christology, Anthropology,
etc. Within each of these, there is to be perceived, according to Thom-
iasius, the operation of the Hegelian law. The simple, undeveloped faith
of the church, before distinct theologic reflection has set in, is the thesis.
When discussion opens, views diverge, as, for example, in the doctrine of
the Trinity, the two views appear that (1) God is one; and that (2)
There are distinctions in God. Each member of the antithesis has its
element of truth, and the synthesis discovers this element of truth in
each, to combine it with every other to form a statement which shall ex-
press exactly the original simple faith of the church, but now in the form
of systematic propositions. Thus each stage of the development begins
with thesis and ends with synthesis. And thus we see such strange head-
ing throughout the book as "The Divine and Human Natures in Christ,
Each in its Reality and Totality," "Unity and Distinction of the two Na-
tures in Opposition," "Distinction and Unity of the two Natures in Con-
tradiction," "The Adjustment," etc.

Now, here are certain great advantages for the student of this discipline
in his first attempts to master its puzzling details. There is a clear and
intelligible progress of topics, which is in general true to historic fact. Each
age of the church was engaged on some one topic in the main, and their
chronological order is such as is indicated by Thomasius' scheme—in
general. True, the periods overlap chronologically, but they are suffi-
ciently distinct for the purposes of the learner. It is not true, as one would infer from the total impression left on the mind by this method, (though Thomasius does not intend it,) that the only topic of the several periods was the main one before them. Thomasius provides for this “peripheral” matter by subordinate sections in which he discusses it. But he never treats the thought of any one period as a whole, and so gets at its characteristic features, and thus comprehends each age in and for itself. Hence he runs in danger of missing the significance of certain points. He thus gains eventually, it may be, a true picture of the faith of the church as it finally appears, but he runs in danger of not understanding the exact processes by which it was effected. He does not in the fullest sense become a member of the school of Christ, advancing as the school advances, though he grasps the sum total of what that school learned.

The dangers to which his method exposes Thomasius are more evident in the period before the great contest ending at Nice than afterwards. The fact that there was Ebionism which can be contrasted with Gnosticism, operates as too strong a temptation to view these as the antitheses which are to be overcome by the church. Thomasius seems to forget that the great arena on which the contests of the church were carried on was the Roman empire. The prevalence of Greek philosophy there, and its influence on the thought of the early thinkers, who were some of them brought up in its atmosphere, seem to have escaped him. In the same way, the origin of the Old Catholic Church is not treated with the fulness that is demanded by the present state of discussion. But, on the other hand, Thomasius deserves credit for emphasizing the fact that, all occasional and modifying causes aside, the great reason for the development of the church was the inner tendency of the church thus to express in an outward organization its inward life.

Thomasius’ best work begins with the section on the “Single Central Doctrines.” These are Theology, Christology, and Anthropology. We must sketch his treatment of these themes, at least enough to bring before the reader a clear idea of his method and general results.

In opening the Theology, Thomasius begins with the Thesis, the original, simple faith of the church. While the unscientific form of the utterances of the Apostolic Fathers is fully recognized, it becomes clear that the doctrine of the divinity of the church’s Lord was believed from the first. “The utterances of the Apostolic Fathers cited, were intended to be nothing else than simple expressions of the common consciousness of the church.”

But now the necessity was felt of a closer definition of the faith of the church. The problem was taken up by the Apologists. Thomasius does not regard this as a problem pressed upon the Apologists by any force from without. “The Christian faith itself put this task upon them.” If the church would itself have that clear thought on this subject which the human mind is always seeking, it must form definite
conceptions as to the possibility of harmony between the two thoughts of the One God, and The Divinity of the Son as well as the Father.

Thomasius rests here upon the universal belief of the church, that the idea of the Logos is derived from John, and is a part of the original Christian tradition. From this point of view the forms of expression used by the Fathers are easy of comprehension. Yet with the clear recognition of the divinity of the Son, there are partial and untenable ideas as to the nature of the connection existing between Father and Son. The element of subordination is too much emphasized, and the generation of the Son is even said to be by the free-will of the Father. Two inharmonious ideas are therefore introduced, and it remains for another epoch to reconcile these antitheses. Irenæus closes this period, and, in his simple utterances, stands, in Thomasius' opinion, high above the half-philosophic, tentative efforts of the earlier Apologists.

Now comes the third stage. The attempt to preserve the unity of God in distinction from all twofoldness, takes two courses, in the one of which is Paul of Samosata, who teaches that Christ was a mere man. The other form teaches that the divine in Christ was the Father. In its most distinct form, this Monarchianism becomes Sabellianism, or the doctrine that the Trinity is only the successive forms in which the one divine essence reveals itself.

In its answer to these views, the church passes through quite a long process of development. In various ways the error was rejected, by synods or by the utterances of private persons. But this was not enough. It was necessary to set over against the mistake a statement of the truth, or at least some positive statements which should help the growing knowledge of the truth.

Tertullian begins this work. He introduces for the word Logos, that of Son. His problem as conceived by himself, is to develop the Sonship in its genesis and its relation to the Divine Being. He is somewhat gross in his conceptions, but while he presents the development of one member of the Trinity from another, somewhat after the nature of emanation, this economical Trinity is the expression of an immanent Trinity. The distinction between Father and Son consists in the generation, the unity in the sameness of nature. But Tertullian's ideas are strongly tinged with subordination, and the Trinitarian process is involved in the history of the world and of time. The Word in which God thinks himself and the world, has at first only a purely inner existence, as the thought in God. When God would objectify the immanent word, he said: Let there be light. Hereby the Word entered on an objective, real existence as the principle and mediator of the creation, and so is, or becomes Son. There is then a process in the hypostasization of the Son, or a progressive filiation. This is to emphasize the subordination. Thomasius introduces us here, by means of carefully selected citations, to the mental processes of the great writer as he wrestles with the unutterable thought that is in him, as "the form struggles with the content of the faith." The effort is
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to hold both the unity of nature and the personal distinction. But the subordination gains too great a prominence, and the cause of this is that the personal distinction is not put deeply enough into the very divine nature itself.

The problem is now taken up by Clement of Alexandria. As Tertullian is concerned to maintain the distinction of person, Clement is desirous of exalting the Logos from the sphere of the creature, above all connection with time, and of making his divinity the chief thing. But, because of his somewhat indistinct form of statement, and more by the too great influence on him of the Platonic philosophy, which prevents the specifically Christian elements of the problem from attaining their true place, he is prevented from doing much to forward the solution of the problem.

Origen is the first to give the doctrine a decided impulse in the right direction through his conception of Eternal Generation. He maintains the hypostatic distinction of the Son from the Father, and subordinates Him to the Father, but he considers his derivation from the Father as an eternal, timeless act. He deduces this generation from the eternal nature of the Father. As the absolute fulness of all things, God has the tendency by nature, or rather the necessity, to unfold himself, to reveal himself, to exhibit in another a perfect image of himself. There was no time when the Son was not,—indeed, in all this discussion we must not bring in ideas derived from time, for the generation is in eternity. Thus Origen intends, while maintaining the distinction of person, to derive it from the essence of God himself, or make it as necessary as God himself. This is the great and fruitful accomplishment of Origen for this doctrine, which has remained as a permanent possession in the church from that day to this.

When, then, we look back on the history, we see how for the present this contribution of Origen could bring the course of the doctrine to a satisfying conclusion. But the adjustment which opposing thoughts had found, was only a temporary one. "Eternal generation and the form of the creature, unity of nature and the subordination, are heterogeneous elements. They are maintained in the system of Origen in equilibrium only by the double meaning of the word θεοτης, and by Origen's conception of emanation, which borders on Pantheism. The doctrine cannot therefore remain at this stage, and the church will find that she has not yet obtained an adequate expression for her faith."

We are thus brought to the fourth stage. Upon this we cannot here dwell at so great length as heretofore. The same method is followed as in the portions already reviewed. The personality of Arius gives the starting-point for the history. His system is fully presented, then Athanasius' replies, then the Council of Niceis reviewed, and thus the way opened for those later discussions which really brought the question to the settlement which no council, as such, could give it. At every point of the recital, the exact state of the question is set forth, the precise problem before the church defined, and the precise way in which the writer under
consideration made his contribution exhibited, and the reception of his services in the church detailed. The student is made to see the development unfolding in the story as it did in fact, and to understand the bearing of every part on every other.

The success of Thomasius in this part of his labor arises from his ability to see the deeper meaning that lies under the forms of statement of the Fathers, which is so often scarcely intelligible to the modern reader. It is a question which puzzles the beginner more than almost any other, how he shall so translate the utterances of earlier ages into the language of the nineteenth century as to feel the force of their thoughts as the writers themselves did. When to the antique forms of statement adopted, there is added the difference of horizon and of mental habit which exists between us and the Church Fathers, the task is next to an impossible one for the beginner. Thomasius knows how to help the reader over this difficulty, and make these Fathers speak in the language of our own times. His treatment of Athanasius is particularly fine in this respect. He presents the more direct polemical answers to Arius in intelligible form, and then goes down to the great controlling ideas below them all. He concludes:—"We are not attempting to prove thus that the great church teacher has really overcome all the difficulties with which the doctrine is surrounded. His refutation of the Arians is often more subtle than fit, his arguments often involve many contradictions, as well as contain many repetitions. His Scripture proofs are often not quite fortunate, although we must acknowledge that he has brought together the most important texts, and made them do their work with great effectiveness. But this is his great and immortal service, that he looked down into the heart of Arianism, perceived its entire destructive range, and in opposition to it, without giving up the personal distinction, wrote on his banner the true, essential, eternal deity of the Son, held it immovably fast, and enforced it in connection with the fundamental facts of Christianity. For this, and nothing less, was the question in the great contest. Behind the dogmatic formulæ over which men were contending, was the question as to the absolute significance of Christianity, whether it was the only true religion, and Christ the true Redeemer from sin and death, the only mediator and giver of divine fellowship: all elements of Christianity are concentrated about this question. This Athanasius perceived, and taught his age."

All this skilful and delicate interpretation were impossible, were not Thomasius in thorough sympathy with his subject, as only a genuine believer can be. We feel the glow of his personal Christian character in his words. To be with him, and through his books commune with his great, warm Christian heart, is to have something of the experience of the disciples when they walked to Emmaus, and their hearts burned within them. We hear in his voice the voice of Christ, because Christ dwelt in him. This characteristic of the book will secure its permanent
usefulness, and make it, if we mistake not, a classic interpretation of Christian Doctrine for very many years to come.

We must, however, pause over the following section of Thomasius' History, for here is the scene on which he gained his earliest laurels in the department of Church History, and here the topic which he has done most to advance in Dogmatics. It is the history of Christology, in which Origen, the subject of Thomasius' early studies, plays an important part. After a short section going back to the "thesis," and after mentioning that the church had previously been so engaged in teaching the reality of the bodily nature of Christ as to lay but little emphasis on his real soul, Thomasius shows how the reality of this element was made a part of the common faith of the church under the influence of Origen. Origen also taught the pre-existence of souls, and of that soul which was to be united with the Logos. While all other souls fell away from the truth, this soul alone remained in its ethical and living communion with the Logos, and was so filled with him, so permeated and saturated with him, that it attained the highest degree of union with him. United with this soul, the Logos took upon him human nature, and so became fully man. As the soul was one with the Logos, so through it the Logos became one with humanity in the most intimate conceivable union. By this union the humanity itself is exalted to the highest possible degree, and finally "the Redeemer is exalted so as to be no more man, but just what the Logos is, the same with the Logos." Thus the incarnation rested in Origen's mind upon the ethical union of the soul with the Logos.

But Thomasius' greatness in this department of History is shown most in his interpretation of Cyril of Alexandria. After sketching Athanasius' and the Gregorys' positions, he says: "This form of Christology was consolidated into a system in the later Alexandrian church, with Cyril at the head......This school sets out, like the Council of Nice, from the Divine, regards the Logos as the person-constituting principle, and also conceives the relation of the divine and human in Christ as specifically different from that in which Christ stands to the rest of mankind. It is no indwelling, as in the saints, no mere moral unity......it is rather a real, essential, though incomprehensible and inexplicable unity......The Logos takes the humanity to itself, and, in turn, gives this a participation in its own nature. That which is assumed is nothing external, foreign; it becomes one with the Logos. True, God does not cease to be God, because he has taken on Humanity, and the human nature does not lose its reality and ἡδοτης; both remain what they are, and may ever be separated in conception, but in reality they are no more two, but out of the twofoldness there has come forth a unity: One Person, One Essence, One Nature, μια φύσις λόγου συσσαρκωμένη." This Christology "rests on a deep religious thought. It is the conviction that the redemption, reconciliation, and renewing of man, to effect which Christ came, was only possible when a real unity of the divine and human existed in him,
and when there was a participation of the divine Logos in the human weaknesses and sufferings."

When the Nestorian controversy comes on, Thomasius says: "The question which was first of all in consideration was not whether the Christology of Cyril involved a transmutation of the two natures, or that of Nestorius a division of the one Christ; but in reality, whether God in Christ really became man. This was the exact status controversiae, no mere logomachy, as has often been said, but a question of deep and practical import,—the same which also occupies the present." Or, as Thomasius elsewhere says, the question was whether we are to have a Christ who corresponds to the demands of the Christian's situation as a lost man, and at the same time corresponds to the picture given in the Gospels, to the one man, with one consciousness, which we there see.

But we cannot dwell on these lofty and fascinating discussions. After he has discussed Anthropology, Thomasius passes in the second volume to the church of the middle ages, to Scholasticism, in order to reach through these writers the period of the Reformation. His heart was not fully in this period, and these sections are among the least satisfying of the book. Of the account of the Reformation we will only remark that it is carried out with the same general characteristics as mark the treatment of the early church. Had we such a history of the Reformed Church as is here given of the Lutheran, it would be a treasure which would be indeed priceless. The development of Luther's views is of the greatest interest to all Protestant Christians. The entire theological basis of his work, and the gradual growth of his system, are here pictured with the same masterly method which we have already seen employed. The sympathetic dealing with other bodies of Christians found in this part of the work is the best guarantee of impartiality in other parts.

We have thus passed in review a great Christian, and in the best sense of the word, churchly History of Doctrine. We now pass to a very different work. Harnack phrases his problem as that of the Rise of Christian Doctrine. Thomasius would have solved this problem by saying that Christian doctrine was an intellectual and moral necessity to the thinking church when it became conscious that it was in possession of the truth of God. But Harnack rejects this solution. He says that only one scholar (Ritschl) has considered the problem. The difficulty of it, as we shall afterwards see, arises from Harnack's opinion that doctrine does not belong to Christianity at all. Later volumes are to treat of the development of the Christian dogmas. This is taken up with the fundamental problem of their rise.

The fundamental conceptions of Harnack are evident from the opening paragraphs of his work. In his definition of dogmas he does not differ materially from Thomasius. But his view of the general scheme under which they rise is very different. Dogmas begin with theology. This is dependent on countless factors in the environment of the church, but
especially on the spirit of the age (Geist der Zeit). When the theology has been developed, it is fixed in a form which represents it, and then the form is viewed not as it really is—the exponent of the theology,—but as its basis. The dogma, which has arisen from the theology, now interposes to criticize and restrict the theology. Hence, first of all, a history of doctrine must describe how men have come to form a theology. Here the forms of worship, the constitution of the church, the practical ideals of life, the letter either of the Scriptures, or of a tradition no longer understood, all enter into the determination of the dogmatic result. Theology has had its abode in living men, and so all abstractions like “The Church” are to be avoided. No churchly process can legitimatize a doctrine. We need to return to the fundamental principle that only that is Christian which can justify itself before the tribunal of the gospel.

The very definition of a dogma seems to Harnack to point out its essential nature and origin. Dogmas are “doctrinal statements which are expressed in logical form, constitute a unit among themselves, and express the contents of the Christian religion as the knowledge of God, of the World, and of the sacred history, under the form of a demonstrative presentation of truth.” The terms of this definition alone show that the church in which such a fact as dogma can arise, is already a school of philosophy. Hence, the dogma is a product of the Grecian spirit upon the basis of the gospel. Thus the key-note of all that follows is given,—the work before us is to be an account of the working of the Grecian spirit on Christianity, for the most part to its disfigurement.

After several introductory sections, to which we shall return again, the work is divided into a Book I., “The Preparation,” which treats of such phenomena as the original preaching, Gnosticism, etc., and a Book II., which treats of the foundation of the theology. This part is divided into I. The establishment and gradual secularization of Christianity in the form of a church: and II. The establishment and gradual hellenization of Christianity as a system of doctrine.

The concluding portion of the introduction contains the things presupposed in a history of doctrine (Voraussetzungen). This is in many important respects the key of the whole work. Harnack says in substance: Jesus Christ did not come to introduce a new doctrine but a new life, which he set before men by his example. But he came to the Jews, and so by remaining himself within their religious organization, gave the first impulse to a tendency which afterwards manifested itself, to incorporate the new life into the old web of the thoughts, hopes, and beliefs of the Jews. Hence the Christians, as soon as they became a community, had already in their Jewish Bible a basis for future doctrine. This was interpreted in the light of the new ideas suggested by the person of Jesus, and thus the believers in Jesus as the Christ came to regard themselves as the true Israel, and cast aside as Jewish and heretical all special theories that did not agree with their conceptions. The Old Testament was thus re-constructed, and the church, having in it a great protection
against volatilization in the glow of enthusiasm, and against reversion to the philosophic dreams of the Greeks, obtained an organization and became capable of undertaking a mission to the world. Thus there was formed a Christian communion or church. This is the necessary basis for the development of the system of doctrines, and the necessary pre-supposition of a History of Christian Doctrine. The mere idea that they were a religious society founded on the basis of the Jewish people, did not give the early Christians a Theology. Their earliest form was that of a community of enthusiasts, in which the controlling element was the "Spirit." About the middle of the third century we find a consolidated Society in place of the former scattered communities, an institution for worship, with a New Testament, a formulated faith, priests, a system of divinity,—but no longer the old Christian enthusiasm. How have these institutions arisen? Their material did not exist in the original constitution of Christianity. Consequently, when this separated itself from Judaism, it had to seek the material for its new life in some other quarter, and it selected that by which it was surrounded, viz., the Roman empire, and the Grecian spirit. When the Hebrew spirit left the Christian church, some other must come in, and it was, in actual fact, the Greek. We find this Hellenic spirit strongly represented in the Catholic Church, though only in the faintest degree suggested in the New Testament. When Christianity became a religion for mankind in general, it was compelled to listen to, and provide for the secret wishes of mankind. For this reason the "Catholic-Apostolic" doctrine is not a continuation, or development of the so-called "Biblical Theology" alone, but contains also a very different element, the Greek. The fundamental thoughts of the new Christian system are found "in certain ideas—better motives [i.e. causative intellectual forces]—of the gospel, in the Old Testament, which was capable of every interpretation, and was to be interpreted with constant reference to the evangelical history and to Christ, and in the Grecian spirit." After a long time the formation of a Christian canon gave to certain Christian writings the same influence in deciding Christian doctrines as the Old Testament possessed from the first. Other elements in the answer to the question asked are to be found in the original enthusiasm which constituted the life of the Christian communities. This formed a bond of union between the earliest Jewish communities and those formed upon heathen soil, inasmuch as it produced a similar tone of feeling in both. Judaism, as existing both within and without Palestine, formed another element, since it reacted upon Greek philosophy, and formed a fruitful soil for the sowing of Christian ideas. Hence we have to consider, when attempting to get a view of the rise of Christian doctrine: (1) The gospel of Jesus Christ; (2) The common preaching of Christ in the first generation of his disciples; (3) The interpretation of the Old Testament current at the times, the hopes and speculations of the Jews as to the future; (4) The religious conceptions and philosophy of the Hellenistic Jews; (5) The religious inclinations of the Greeks and
Romans in the first two centuries, and the philosophy of the times. Harnack, in describing these five elements, now proceeds to set forth the "gospel of Jesus Christ." What his idea of this shall be, is determined by his conception of the New Testament. This, as the attentive reader has already seen, differs largely from what is known among us as the evangelical view. The whole traditional view of the church and of Christian doctrine is founded on the prevalent conception of the Scriptures as forming a sacred canon. Take away the idea of canonicity, and you take away the whole churchly interpretation of the Bible to the present day. Now in Harnack's mind the formation of the canon was, indeed, a step necessary for the church, if it would go on developing in the line in which it had started, but it was altogether unjustifiable from the standpoint of the right and legitimate. "The most effective means to the legitimation of the state of the church, as it was, was to constitute a separate period of revelation, and so a classic period of the church's literature, and with it, to create a canon." The Bible stands before us, then, just as any other collection of documents of ancient times, and is to be tested with all the tests of historical criticism, and that with quite destructive results. In Harnack's mind there remains nothing of the Bible as the church has received it. The Christian interpretation of the Old Testament was altogether unjustifiable, and all that is built upon it falls therefore under the same category. The whole New Testament is discussed upon the basis of a critical science, which Harnack does not take the pains to explain, but which is more destructive than any claiming to be in any sense orthodox. Frequent expressions like: "Matt. xxviii. 19 is not an utterance of the Lord," occur. There is a fundamental disagreement between the evangelists as to the proper conception of the person of Christ. John is not to be reckoned in the first century. "The rise of the writings of John is the greatest riddle of the earliest history of Christianity, whether considered from a literary or a dogmatical point of view." Paul's theology agrees neither with the early preaching of the gospel, nor with the later doctrine of the church. The doctrine of inspiration is a result of the formation of the canon, and not vice versa. There is no objective truth in the doctrine.

Now, this is not history. It is dogmatics, and very bad dogmatics too. There is no lack of evidence that the writings known as the New Testament were composed by their reputed authors, under the circumstances commonly ascribed to them. This new criticism, which, after the old had been defeated, came forward and attempted to accomplish the destruction of the Scriptures of the church, has been thoroughly exposed again and again, and shown to rest on the great foundation of all Rationalism, viz., the denial of the supernatural. The process by which Harnack and his contemporaries get their positions is evident. Remove the supernatural from Christianity, and you have nothing but a system of morality left. Declare this to be the original Christianity, and you have an apparent reason for seeking the origin of every suggestion of anything
more in some foreign source, and in some other age. But all this has no claim to be regarded a sound historical method. Upon such a basis history can no more be built up than a house upon a foundation of quicksand. This single fact about Harnack's work, determining, as it does, the plan and execution of the whole, renders it in its main outlines and fundamental ideas utterly valueless, and confines its real worth to the incidental contributions to our knowledge which the author has made, when not under the influence of his historical illusions.

The gospel of Christ himself we may therefore expect to see greatly depotentiated. He proclaims the kingdom of God as near at hand. Repentance is the only condition of admission to this kingdom. Its gifts to men are the forgiveness of sins, righteousness, dominion, and holiness, and to them corresponds the highest command, viz., of love to God and the brethren. Of himself Jesus only claims that he is the Messiah, though hinting at some peculiar relation to the Father, which he does not explain. As to this kingdom, he is its King. He himself expects his own return in the near future, and leads his disciples to expect this. Though he founded no church, yet in the circle of disciples which he gathered around himself, he began a universal church, which was destined to destroy the Jewish particularism, and usher in a universal religion.

Upon the basis of this conception of the Master's preaching, Harnack lays the superstructure of the disciples'. This is obtained from the New Testament as above understood. It is also greatly modified under the strong influence of Ritschl's theology. Harnack thus expresses it: "Jesus of Nazareth is the Messiah promised by the prophets. Jesus glorified after being divinely raised from the dead, and set at the right hand of God, will soon come again, and visibly erect the kingdom. He who believes on Jesus is received into the congregation of the disciples of Jesus), honestly forms a new purpose, invokes the Father, and lives according to the commands of Jesus, is a saint of God, and as such may be sure of the grace of God, and of a share in the future glory, i.e., of redemption."

Here are Ritschl's ideas of the Gemeinde, of the kingdom of God, of Ethics as the sum and substance of Christianity. Harnack also lays great stress on the eschatology of the early believers, which he makes, in fact, their distinguishing peculiarity, and on the "Spirit," by which he means the prophetic phenomena of the early times, and which was the source of their peculiar enthusiasm.

But Harnack proceeds: Emphasis placed on the person of Jesus as the Messiah led soon to doctrinal changes. In the progress of these there were four moments: (1) The extension of the idea of the theocracy beyond the limits of Israel; (2) The ascription of pre-existence to Christ; (3) The significance of the Messiah for the race; (4) The definition of his relations to the Father.

Harnack also emphasizes the idea that the early Christians believed
that they were then in possession of salvation, whereas the later church
looked forward to it after the lapse of a longer or shorter period.

Thus in the original (and by inference the only legitimate) theology,
those truths which constitute Christian doctrine had no existence. The
conception of a "work" of Christ was also lacking. It soon grew up,
however, and was finally chiefly confined to the thought of the death
and resurrection of the Lord.3

We see here the likeness and the radical difference between Harnack
and Thomasius. The order for the development of the doctrines is the same:
the exaltation of the person of Christ, and then the reflection upon the
relations with the Father. But whereas Thomasius conceives all this
under the form of a normal development, arising out of the increasing
knowledge of the truth which the church obtains, Harnack regards it all
as a mistake and leading to fundamental error. It is all illegitimate.
Indeed, the idea of a pre-existent Logos was partly derived from the
mythologies and fancies of the Hebrews, introduced into Christianity.

Under the fourth of the elements mentioned above, Harnack discusses
the contributions of Philo to the rising system of Christian theology.
They may be summed up in the following sentence: "The introduction
of the idea of a philosophy resting on Revelation, and the demonstration
of the fact that the absolute intellectualism of the Greek philosophy
could not satisfy either the intellectual demands, or those arising from the
needs of living men."

The section on the religious tendencies of the Greeks will be of greater
interest, since, as already evident, Harnack is to make so great a use of
these in his work. The period from 100 to 200 A.D., Harnack finds
marked by a constant progress in religious interest among the Greeks
and Romans. In all classes there arose a demand for Monotheism, after
the old form of worship had fallen to pieces. This prevailed not only
among the philosophers, but also among the masses. Religion and
morality were more closely associated in the minds of men. The forms
of religious worship were spiritualized, and it was more clearly seen that
religion should have an influence in ennobling human character. The
thought of repentance and of expiation for sins arose. Men began to
look for a revelation. Asceticism and secret rites were employed to put
man into communication with God. A new desire for immortality was
felt. And if at first the thought had been chiefly to gain a higher degree
of morality, it was modified so as to lay emphasis on the more properly
religious element.

In Stoicism there had been a greater emphasis laid upon natural
religion. The ideas of a revelation, and of redemption, scarcely appear in
this philosophy. Moral ideas rule in the sphere of religion, which, indeed,
can scarcely be said to have any separate validity. But New [Platonism

3 Harnack treats well, and to our minds explodes, the supposition of Baur that
there was a Petrine, and a Pauline type of theology. He finds no less than four dis-
tinct forms of conceiving the relations of law and gospel.
was a deeper religious movement. In the second century we can already see its doctrines plainly. They are the dualistic opposition between the divine and the earthly; the abstract conception of God; the affirmation of the un-knowability of God; scepticism in regard to sensuous experience; distrust of the reliability of our faculties; the demand for the liberation of our souls from sensuality by asceticism; the necessity of authority; faith in higher revelations; and the union of science with religion. Upon this basis there was built up a theosophic philosophy, in which expression was given to many of the characteristic ideas of Christianity, such as love of brethren, forgiveness of injuries, consideration, and patience.

Thus the different elements have been cast into the caldron, and it remains to see what combinations will be made, and what results will come out. Evidently, if Harnack's conception is correct, there are so few points of contact between primitive Christianity and Greek philosophy that only as some radical change takes place in the former, can the latter affect it. Such a change takes place at an early date, in the separation made between two classes in the church, the clergy and the people. Out of this apparently simple cause comes the subsequent secularization of the church in connection with the Roman system. But this is not what Harnack means. This brings Christianity no nearer to Greek philosophy than it had always been. The true connection is the underlying adaptation of Christianity to the human mind, and the fact that Greek philosophy is one of the forms of expressing the demands of that mind. But Harnack's scheme is different. He knows nothing of any "adaptation of Christianity to the human mind!" He says: There was a tendency to view Christianity in two ways: (1) As having its great good in the future, and so regarding all present things as of little comparative importance, or (2) As having its great good in the present, (forgiveness of sins, faith, knowledge, etc.) upon which the future glory would follow as a matter of course. These views were not mutually inconsistent, but it is at once evident that hellenization could take place only in connection with the latter. The first was gradually driven out of existence, and the hellenization was completed by the exclusive emphasis laid on the second.

The germ for the development of a Christian Theology on the stock of an original Christianity which knew nothing of such a thing, has now been prepared. It remains for us to trace Harnack's method of conducting this development in the course of the history as told by him.

The first Book, the "Preparation," now begins. A general view of the first century is followed by a résumé of the things that were common to all the early Christians. Then comes, in Chapter III., an account of the common faith and the beginnings of systematized knowledge among the Heathen-Christians whose little communion of local churches was now commencing its development into the "Catholic Church." The chapter is marked by the inability of the school to which Harnack belongs to ac-
cept the course of events as it has been handed down to us by the past, and by their determination to read into the history their own theories at whatever expense of arbitrary construction and absurd interpretation. An interesting example of this occurs on a point otherwise of little importance. The development of the doctrine of the deity of Christ gives Harnack serious trouble. Beginning with the Ritschlian idea that in the religious relation, Jesus, so far as concerns the gift of salvation, can "take the place of God," Harnack suggests that the original name applied to Jesus (χριστος, σωτηρ, ὁ υἱός τοῦ θεοῦ) would lead immediately to the disposition to regard him as "belonging in the sphere of God, so that Christians must think of him—as we read in the earliest preserved Sermon—'as of God.'" In a note, we have the explanation of this strange suggestion. It runs: "The so-called Second Epistle of Clement begins with the words: 'Αδελφοί, οὖν τεταρτά της θυμίας φρονεῖν περὶ Ἰησοῦ Χριστοῦ, ὡς περὶ θεοῦ, ὡς περὶ χρηστοῦ ζωτίσαι καὶ νεκρῶν. καὶ οὖ δεί ημῶς μετά της εἰρήνης εἰρήνης. ἐν τῷ γὰρ φρονεῖν ημῶς μετὰ περὶ αὐτοῦ, μετὰ καὶ εἰς τοὺς λαβεῖν. This argumentation is very instructive; for it shows how the φρονεῖν περὶ αὐτοῦ ὡς περὶ θεοῦ was justified. H. Schultz remarks very correctly: 'In the Second Epistle of Clement and in the Shepherd, the Christological interest of the writer centres about securing by means of faith in Christ as the King who rules and shall judge the world, the certainty that the church may expect for her ascetic service in this world a corresponding reward in another.'" Thus, according to Harnack and Schultz, hope of a great salvation comes first, and then the conception of a great Saviour to secure this.

But is there anything more in the passage to favor the idea than the mere fact that its words can possibly be thus understood? If so, we have failed to find it. Such language is common enough among Christians who honestly hold to the doctrine of the deity of Christ, and who derive their faith from the Scriptures as we have them to-day. The context makes it perfectly evident that the speaker of the homily is endeavoring to do what it has been necessary to do from the earliest times to the present, viz., bring to the minds of men the greatness of their blessings, which in the course of things in this world they are apt to forget, or fail to realize. "For he had compassion on us, and mercifully saved us, observing the many errors in which we were entangled, as well as the destruction to which we were exposed, and that we had no hope of salvation except as it came from him." Both truths, the deity of Christ, and the greatness of our salvation, need amplification, and both stand in the homily on a level as divine truths. The whole attempt on Harnack's part is absurd, but no more so than multitudes of similar interpretations.

The fourth chapter is entitled "The efforts of the Gnostics to form an Apostolic system of doctrine and a Christian theology; or, The acute
secularization of Christianity." Of the treatment of this there is little to say, since Harnack does not depart essentially from the ordinary mode of viewing the subject. Gnosticism sought to convert Christianity into a Theosopy, or a revealed Metaphysics. While Oriental elements were active in it, it was essentially a product of the Greek mind. And so, if the Catholic Church is, as Harnack thinks, the result of a gradual secularization of the original Christianity, Gnosticism is its acute secularization.

A special chapter is given to Marcion. His effort, as summarized in the heading of the chapter, was to purge Christianity of its Old Testament element, to purify the written tradition, and to reform Christendom on the basis of the system of Paul. Harnack says that he was not a Gnostic in any proper sense. This is evident because (1) He was influenced by no mere philosophic interest, but by a soteriological one; (2) He laid the great emphasis on faith, not, like the other Gnostics, on knowledge; (3) He did not derive his ideas from the cabalistic wisdom of the Orientals, or from Greek philosophy; (4) he made no distinction between an exoteric and an esoteric religion. He conceived that the ruling Christianity was corrupted by being mixed with Jewish elements, and needed a reform. "He could not fail to see that this corruption was of no recent date, but had infected the earliest written tradition. Hence he was led to institute a criticism of the entire written tradition of Christianity." In carrying out this criticism, he was largely influenced by Paul. All that in his view opposed Paul was to be rejected. He referred the antithesis of Paul (between the law and the gospel) to two principles, the righteous God of the Old Testament, and the God of love of the New Testament, who was revealed by Christ, and was unknown before him. The influence of Greek philosophy on Marcion is evident in his feeling of despair as to the prospect of a victory of good over evil, and his consequent advocacy of dualism from this point of view. He did not accept the principle that the creator of this world was an evil being, though he came very near it. The good God was not placed by Marcion on a level with the evil principle, though at first sight this might appear so. It is finally evident that the end of the human race is to be determined by its relation to the good God alone. Also, Marcion taught a strong Docetism. This conflicts with the emphasis laid by Paul on the importance of the death of Christ, and subsequent followers of Marcion felt called on to attempt to remove the inconsistency.

Harnack sums up his conception of Marcion as follows: "The thought of establishing Christianity upon the firm foundation of a definite conception of what was truly Christian, (though not in this case on a theological doctrine,) and of making this conception secure by means of a collection of canonical writings, Marcion was probably the first to form and carry out on any large scale. He was not a systematic thinker, but he was more, viz., not only a religious character, but an extremely talented organizer such as the church has scarcely seen since, the ancient church never saw."
Thus it will be seen that Harnack differs here from the ordinary view ofMarcion in his interpretation rather than in his statement of the facts. The difference of view is suggestive, and will call for a review of the subject by all those who are more especially interested in this period.

The closing chapter of this portion of the book is a very valuable one, though styled an appendix. It treats of Jewish Christianity. After remarking that the use of the phrase just quoted has caused much confusion in Church History, Harnack emphasizes the fact that there is a Jewish element in Christianity itself. The distinction between the eschatology of Papias and that of Origen is not that the former had a Jewish-Christian, and the latter a Gentile-Christian eschatology, but the former a Christian, and the latter a Greek. The term "Jewish Christianity" (Juden-christenthum) is to be used exclusively of those Christians who regarded, in their entire extent or in any noteworthy degree, the national and political forms of Judaism and the observation of the Mosaic law without change, as essential in Christianity, at least in that of born Jews, or who held, if they rejected these forms, that the Jewish people had, as such, a prerogative right in Christianity. The great question now is whether this Jewish Christianity was, as a whole, or in any of its parts, a factor in the development of Christianity into Catholicism? This question Harnack answers in the negative, and thus sets himself against Baur, who attempted to explain the rise of the Catholic Church from the conflict and mutual neutralization of Jewish and Gentile Christianity. "This effort," says Harnack, "operates with two factors of which one had no, and the other only an indirect influence on the formation of the Catholic Church." This proposition is justified with much elaboration, and as we think with great success. It is a valuable contribution to the refutation of Baur, whose influence in the world is by no means yet exhausted.

The second book, as already said, is taken up with describing the laying of the foundations of the ecclesiastical system in the establishment of a "Catholic Church," and the beginning of a formal system of religious doctrine. The first chapter gives us the "Historical Orientation." We have here the key to all that follows. The problem which Harnack undertakes, is to explain the rise of the Catholic Church. This consisted, in the main, in giving to the ideas and customs of the church, as they arose, the title and authority of "apostolicity." This secured their acceptance; and thus arose gradually out of the primitive fellowship of faith, hope, and discipline, a fellowship which rested upon a system of authoritative doctrine like that of the philosophical schools.

The services of the Catholic Church to the world are said by Harnack to have consisted in preserving the two Testaments, thus preventing original Christianity from being entirely lost, and in acting as a conservative power. It broke the power of a multitude of influences operating on it from every side, and preserved a community in which the original gifts of Christianity to the world have ever remained accessible. But on the other hand, it never asked what was really Christian, but only gave out
its own system as Christian. It hid and thus rescued, but it also thus concealed the original gospel, and though it preserved it from complete hellenization, at the same time it secularized it in a greater and greater degree.

There are two converging lines producing Catholic Christianity. (1) The formula of baptism was converted into the "Apostolic Rule of Faith;" the writings read in the churches into apostolic Scripture, which was put on an equality with the Old Testament; the monarchical-episcopal constitution came to be regarded as apostolic, and the character of successors to the apostles was given to the bishops; the worship was remodeled into a celebration of mysteries, which were also referred to the apostles. (2) The fact that educated Greeks who felt in their own case the necessity of an explanation of Christianity, had joined the Christian societies, compelled the Church to set forth a scientific theology.

Christian theology began in the Apologists. The Christianity of these writers is "the idealistic philosophy of the times, confirmed by Revelation, made accessible to all men through the incarnation, and purified from all connection with Greek mythology and gross polytheism." It is Christianity already hellenized.

This hellenization of Christianity began as soon as the thinking Greek began to consider the new religion that he had adopted. He had to seek to obtain the certainty that the view which he had been led to form of the world was the truth. To meet this want is the constant effort of the Apologists. Their object is not to obtain a statement of the Christian system which shall express its peculiar essence. The problem they feel is not one arising within the system itself. So they treat the matter handed down to them in the Christian tradition in such a way as to destroy its effectiveness.

In these statements there is a direct difference between Harnack and Thomasius. Thomasius says, as already stated, that the problem of the Apologists was not one laid upon them from without the church, but was one which "the Christian faith itself put upon them." Both views have their elements of right, and neither is complete, though Thomasius contains the more important truth. It is a problem, as Harnack says, arising in the mind of the thinking Greek reflecting on the religion which he has adopted, but, as Thomasius would say, that Greek is now a Christian, and it is the necessity of his having for himself a clear view of the meaning of the truth that leads him to further study. Thus "the Christian faith itself puts the task upon him." The cause of this is that Christianity is full of great truths. Harnack does not perceive this because he does not see that there were any great doctrinal truths in Christianity till it had become "secularized." Nothing can be more evident, we think, than that the Apologists did precisely what Harnack says they did not do, viz., try to express the peculiar essence of their new faith. The only reason which Harnack has for his view is that they do not try to express that which he thinks was the essence of the system, viz., its non-
Two Histories of Christian Doctrine.

metaphysical morality, and humanitarian Christology. Here again we meet the influence of the dogmatic ideas under which this history is written.

The dogmatic development began, continues Harnack, with the formation of a creed upon the basis of the ancient baptismal confession. In this process the first dogmas arose, though no system of Dogmatics. The great gulf existing between the common Christianity and this developing system, the first writers did not perceive. They thought that the original Christianity, without any essential change, might be expressed in the most elaborate scientific form, and that they were only developing what every Christian believed, though he did not conceive it in formulated propositions. But such was not the case. The new system involved an essential modification of Christianity; and Tertullian and Hippolytus began a revolutionary change when they imposed on the Rule of Faith a philosophical system, by inserting in it the doctrine of the Logos, which is Greek philosophy in nuce. This gulf existing between the common Christian thinking and the Grecian philosophy, was clearly seen, however, by the Alexandrian theologians, though not viewed as a separating gulf, but rather as a problem demanding solution. Origen felt, and did not conceal this idea, that Christianity first gains its correct and adequate expression when it is clothed in scientific form. With these ideas the theologians labored for the extension of the Logos-doctrine, and wherever it gained acceptance the hellenization of Christianity was a foregone conclusion.

Harnack now takes up the first of the two “converging lines” mentioned above, and treats as the first point the development of the Apostolic Formula into a Rule of Faith.

Short formulations were made for the necessities of the missionary work of the church. The first of these defined the Christian faith simply as embracing belief in the Father, Son, and Holy Ghost. To this were added the most important of the simple facts of the history of Jesus. As early as 150 A.D., there had been formed a fixed creed which every baptized person must accept. But the necessities of the church called for more than this. When Christianity came among the heathen, the worship of Jesus seemed to need defence, and also that of a God who as the Creator of the world, as the “speaking” God, and as involved in the course of the world, as well as worshipped by the Jews, appeared to be different from the supreme God, who in his abstract immutability appeared to have no possible connection with any of these things. Hence arose questionings, and hence the necessity, if the church was to go on, and was to form a united body, that there should be a ground upon which Christians could unite. There had been a time in the early “enthusiasm,” when Christians knew that they were Christians because they possessed the “Spirit.” But now they must have something else, since this was already gone. “What was needed was an Apostolic Creed, with a distinct interpretation, for only when interpreted could a creed perform the service required,
and ward off Gnostic speculations, and the Marcionite interpretation of Christianity. Irenæus supplied this want when he proclaimed the baptismal formula, with its definite interpretation as the apostolic "Rule of Faith." The proof of the apostolic origin of this collection of propositions he founded upon the statement that "it contained the faith of the churches founded by the apostles, and that these churches had preserved the apostolic doctrine unaltered."

And now Harnack says: "Historically considered, there lie at the basis of this thesis two unproved assumptions and one confusion. Not proven is (1) The statement that any creed comes from the apostles, and (2) That the churches of the apostles have preserved their doctrine unaltered. Confused is the creed with an explanation of the same. And, finally, the conclusion from the essential agreement of a series of churches in doctrine to the existence of a 'Catholic faith' is unjustifiable." And then he goes on to add: "But the way taken by Irenæus was the only one to rescue what of original Christianity still survived, and that is its historical justification."

Let us examine these marvellous criticisms of Harnack's for a moment. "Not proven is the statement that any creed comes from the apostles." Of course Harnack does not mean to say that no creed as a formal creed, comes from the apostles, since no one, not even Irenæus, pretends that one did. The facts stated in the creed are derived from the apostles. Now to deny this is only to repeat Harnack's old denial of all validity in the Bible as we have it. For this neither he nor any one else brings any satisfactory proof.—"Not proven is the statement that the churches of the apostles have preserved their doctrine unaltered." Irenæus supposes that he proves it, for he says, as a matter of testimony, that all the churches,—those in Germany, Spain, Gaul, the East, Egypt, Africa, and Italy,—held the same doctrine. Harnack remarks: "The transcendental character of the expression shows that a dogmatic theory is at work here." It seems more likely that a dogmatic theory is at work in Harnack's mind which renders him inaccessible to the testimony of writers whom he does not find it convenient to believe. The mistake of Harnack is twofold. He interprets Irenæus too rigidly, for that Father did not intend to set up a Rule of Faith as Harnack understands it. He only meant to testify that the doctrine of the church had from the beginning been so and so. And, on the other hand, Harnack does not keep the exact point in mind, the lack of a recognized formula at any point in the Christian Church does not disprove Irenæus' statement as to the prevalence of the same doctrine. Harnack's proof of the loose and unreliable character of Irenæus' statement is that in Alexandria in the time of Clement, there could have been no "Rule of Faith," since Clement does not allude to any. The argument is entirely negative, and has, according to Harnack's own candid showing, one passage that militates slightly against it. But Harnack has nothing to say against all that Irenæus has in mind, viz., that the doctrine of the church in Egypt was
the same as Irenæus had claimed.—"Confused is the Creed with an explanation of the same." But really Harnack is the one guilty of a confusion, for he confuses a general agreement, expressed naturally in about the same words, with a modern, formal creed.—The "unjustifiable conclusion" is only such, when this mechanical character, which did not exist in the mind of Irenæus, is given to the creed. The "essential agreement of a series of churches" is a catholic faith.

Again, then, Harnack's results are vitiated by his arbitrary method. He occupies the standpoint of absolute scepticism as to the normal character of the Christian history, and so he is continually making theories how it could have become what it is, which have in themselves no substance or worth. If, instead of reconstructing the history, he had been content to tell it as it is, he would have avoided many bad blunders, though of course getting no help for the Ritschian Dogmatics out of the history.

We may be thankful to him for one concession, viz., that "by the middle of the third century there was in the great church which stretched from Spain to the Euphrates, and from Egypt to beyond the Alps, one and the same Confession."

The next point under the first "converging line" is the formation of a canon. After proving that there was no collection of writings in the church as early as 150 A. D., which was regarded as of equal authority with the New Testament, Harnack goes on to show how in his mind the collection of the canon did come to pass. The occasion was the necessity forced on the church by the contest with the Gnostics. The church could not defend itself so long as it acknowledged that there were other writings beside those which it possessed itself, which came from the apostles. It must claim to have everything apostolic itself. This was the "unconscious logic of self-preservation." The church therefore selected those writings already existing in the church, and used for divine service, which she regarded as apostolic. All other writings of the kind were forbidden. Thus the ground was cleared for the new Bible.

Upon the final line of influences leading to the formation of the Catholic Church, the process whereby the episcopal office became an apostolic arrangement, we will not dwell. We pass immediately to the next chapters in which the old Christianity comes in conflict with this new church. This happens in the so-called "Montanistic" and "Novatian" movements. Montanism is confessed by all writers on the church to have a connection with that original state of things when the Spirit was poured out on men in great abundance. But Harnack regards it as the survival of the original "enthusiasm," and as the true Christianity of the period. The Catholic Church crushed it out, but this was an arbitrary act, and was one of the uses to which the new Bible was put. The Montanistic movement and the building up of the Catholic Church are two altogether opposite and mutually exclusive things. We meet here the same method
of treatment of the history with which we have now become familiar, and which we have learned to distrust. One question we would like to put to Harnack. If such be the relation of Montanism and the Catholic Church, how will he explain the fact that Tertullian took part in the building up of the church, and yet was also a Montanist? Indeed when a Montanist, he was hardly less a Catholic than before.

At this point we must pause for the present in our review. Harnack now passes over to the second of the "converging lines," the development of the system of doctrine in the church. We can best view this in connection with the rest of the work, which has just been issued. We shall soon return to the topic. We may expect to find the remaining portions of the work less marked by great faults, and more fruitful in valuable suggestions. Harnack's great polemic purpose has now been accomplished, and he is at liberty to depict the course of history with a more attentive faithfulness to its objective facts. When he has once shown, as he thinks, that the churchly Christian system is fundamentally wrong, he may feel less interest in the attempt to tear it to pieces at each successive individual point. If this shall prove to be so, he will be able to render great service to an understanding of the true course of events. Scarcely any German historian has had so early in life so great a degree of mastery of the facts of history, or has been so completely furnished with the tools which make success in the writing of history a possibility. The two greatest foes of successful historical writing are ignorance and prejudice. Of the latter Harnack has an abnormal development. Of the former no one will accuse him.
ARTICLE VIII.

GERMAN PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

THE "EVANGELISCHER BUND."

The close of the Kulturkampf in Germany has roused a great deal of strong feeling among the Protestants. That which was meant for a peace the Romish party is evidently disposed to employ as an "armed truce." The monastic orders which had been banished from Prussia are returning, and especially the various "Sisters," who are notorious proselyters, are seeking their old haunts, and even new places in localities which are but to a small degree Catholic. Catholic "Diets" are being held, in which the hostile feeling of the Catholic leaders is very evident, and the result is that the increasing strength of the Catholics, and the plain growth of the aggressive spirit among them, have greatly alarmed all who desire the progress of the nation on the basis of Protestant principles, and fear the advance of Rome.

More than a year ago certain church leaders began to consider the situation, and on the fifteenth of January, 1887, a call was issued for the formation of an Evangelical Alliance for the protection of German and Protestant interests. It directed attention to the dangers before the evangelical church and the German Fatherland, if Rome should be able to use her present position, as she always had similar concessions, to her advance and to the damage of Protestantism. While expressing the greatest courage before the enemy, it called attention also to the divided condition of Protestantism, and to the necessity of an united front before a foe which was always so united. In order that an end might be put to all partisan spirit and efforts, it summoned all who loved their Fatherland and their Protestant religion to a common attack upon the common foe. The doctrinal basis of the Alliance was indicated in the following sentence: "The Evangelical Alliance confesses its faith in Jesus Christ, the only begotten Son of God, as the only Mediator of salvation, and adopts the principles of the Reformation." Its line of effort was defined to be that of laboring against the aggressive power of Rome in every possible way, by the spoken word or the printed page, by assisting all movements within the Catholic Church to a true catholicity, as well as by opposing the spirit of indifference and Materialism, and strengthening in every way the evangelical consciousness of the people. This call was signed, among others, by members of the theological faculties in Halle,
Leipzig, Kiel, and Jena, and by the prominent friend of missions, Dr. Warneck, if we are not mistaken. Lipsius, Riehm, and Beyerlag are the names among these professors best known in America. Subsequently the names of many others were published as joining in the signature, including from the liberal faculties, representatives of Strassburg, Giessen, Berlin, Marburg, Bonn, and Tubingen, and from the more conservative, of Rostock and Erlangen. Names like those of the great leaders of the "confessional Lutherans," Luthardt, Frank, etc., like Weiss and Christlieb, and that of the leader of the newest liberal school, Ritschl, (though many or most of his leading followers signed,) were wanting.

The doctrinal basis of the Alliance was so vague that at first it had seemed unlikely that the conservatives would join it. This difficulty had been overcome, and a beginning had been made. Some of the most earnest men of the evangelical school still feared it, and pronounced against it, as for example, the famous court preacher, Stöcker. This gentleman, who is known to many only as the famous Jew-baiter of five years ago, but who is also a very active and effective leader of a certain party who believe in no compromise with the various forms of error in the State or Church, styled it a plan of the Faculty of Jena, which is notoriously free in its tendencies. He saw in it a new form of the struggle which the Protestantenverein, an exceedingly rationalistic society, has long sought to carry on. "The Protestantenverein is more harmful to our church than Rome, and to attempt to combat Rome in its company is an entire impossibility," wrote Stöcker. But in this condemnation Stöcker was not altogether in the right. The original plan for the Alliance had not come forth from Jena, but from Halle, and the first conference had been held under the presidency of the editor of the Studien und Kritiken, Professor Riehm. Stöcker evidently thought that members of the orthodox party were not wanted, but they were early invited to the discussions, and came to some of the preliminary meetings.

The first "constitutive" meeting of the Alliance was finally called at Frankfort, August 15-17, 1887. The invitation embraced also those who were interested in the matter though they had not yet connected themselves with the movement, and the meetings were well attended.

Certain misunderstandings had to be overcome by this meeting, and they were brought before the Alliance at the first meeting of the Committees. Some had gathered from the single article of faith which had been set up that the Alliance meant to go forward to procure a change in the confessions of the various churches. It was therefore proposed to make the Augsburg Confession the standard. This would have been to shut out the Reformed. Some thought that the object of the Alliance would be to put aside the national churches, and substitute a church on the basis of some new and vague confession. In both these respects the Alliance succeeded in quieting the fears of the timorous, and in securing their cooperation.

The report of the Secretary as to the reception with which the pro-
posal of the Alliance had met, was very satisfactory. The original call
had been signed by two hundred and eighty-three men. In six months
the number of members had grown to ten thousand. Of these only
about thirty per cent. were clergymen. Of the laymen, some were pro-
fessors in the universities, others teachers in the schools, others lawyers,
physicians, students, artists, manufacturers, merchants, tradesmen,
women, and one hundred and nine were members of the nobility. The
promoters of the movement might rightly feel that they had touched the
entire German people.

The principal paper for the first day was that of Professor Beyschlag,
of Halle, on the Old Catholic Church. It was very favorable towards
that movement, and saw in the mere fact that it had continued to main-
tain an existence during so many years, reasons for the hope that it
would yet accomplish something for the liberation of Catholic congrega-
tions from the yoke of Rome. Altogether the old Catholic communion
numbers about one hundred and sixty thousand adherents.

On the last day, Professor Fricke, of Leipzig, read a paper on the Pur-
poses and Character of the Alliance. After emphasizing the fact that the
Alliance was not directed against Catholicism as such, or against the
conscientious convictions of any one, but only against that Roman
Catholicism which was in its turn against patriotism, against freedom
of conscience, and was wholly controlled by Ultramontanism, he went
on to show how Protestantism had lost in the past, and to emphasize
the necessity of learning from history. Germany was once seven-tenths
Protestant; Styria was once almost wholly Protestant; the ma-
jority of the French Parliament was at one time Lutheran, and yet
these losses the Roman Church had known how to make good. Now,
over against such a foe, the Protestant Church needs to be one. It can
become such. Let it take as its basis the great common truths of all
Protestant churches,—Faith in the grace of God in Christ, Justification
through faith alone, the Word of God as the only source and rule of
faith, and all Protestants can come together on that platform.

Five resolutions were passed, calling for a suitable furnishing of the
churches with the needed means for carrying on their work, for measures
against the Romish demand that all the children in marriages between
Protestants and Catholics should be educated as Catholics, against open
Catholic processions, against the admission of Catholic orders into
Protestant communities, and in favor of a general celebration of Luther's
birthday. The second of these, touches a great evil. If mixed marriages
occur with any frequency, and if the children are universally educated as
Catholics, a state of things, such as was actually reported from Brauns-
berg in Prussia, may easily arise, where a whole congregation of the
descendants of Protestants may be found in the Catholic Church. In dif-
ferent parts of Germany it has already happened that a Catholic minor-
ity has grown to be a majority in the course of a generation by the opera-
tion of this cause alone! In some cases the advance of the Catholics has
seemed so rapid and so fatal, that Protestants in despair have begun to
go over to that church, fifty or sixty in a year in a single town! The
resolution against the multiplication of establishments of Sisters of
Charity, etc., also meets a great evil. These institutions are not
by any means the simple homes of self-sacrificing goodness that they are
often thought to be. They are institutions for the express purpose of
proselyting to the Church. Their progress in more than one place has
been by regular steps from the most modest beginnings first to a hospital,
in erecting which they always have the help of the medical profession,
and then to schools, both elementary and advanced, especially for girls.
By the latter many young women are won unalterably for Rome, as too
often in this country also.

The meeting was thus a great success. After it had met, the fears of
many were put at rest, and in the subsequent formation of an auxiliary in
Bonn, the conservatives were so fully represented that it seemed that they
were all about to embark in the endeavor. Germany has suffered so
much from the mistaken unwillingness of her churches to unite against a
common foe, that it would seem as if she must now be ready to see eye
to eye, and join all her forces against Rome. Luther's mistaken, how-
ever conscientious, resistance to a league with the Reformed led to the
disasters of the Smalcald War. The disunion of the Protestants at the
time of the Thirty Years' War lost Bohemia, and indeed almost all South-
er Germany. Will they now learn, and join hand in hand for a common
cause against a very crafty foe? Will all the conservatives join with the
more liberal conservatives? Will the party led by Luthardt, the confes-
sional Lutherans, join? This is a very interesting and vital question.

The signs are that they will not. In the issue of the eighth of July,
accordingly, about a month before the Alliance was to meet for its first
session, the Evang.-Lutherische Kirchenzeitung published an article on
the Alliance. Much is found in the plans of the Alliance that is
pleasing to this strong paper, but, on the whole, the party of which
it is the organ cannot find itself justified in cooperating with it.
Such an Alliance cannot replace the church, and really has a right
to be, only as it is called into existence by the church. But, now, this Alli-
ance seems to have very little care for the church. It practically
declares it a failure. It proposes to replace it by something else, viz.,
itself. But Rome must be met by the truth of the gospel, and that is only
to be found in the church. The Alliance emphasizes too much the politi-
cal, patriotic element. This will produce an inner conflict, and cripple
the Alliance. So all such efforts, to be successful, must come back finally
to the gospel and the church, and to that church which has the truth,
which is founded upon the confession which is in accord with the Scrip-
tures. That is to say, it must come back to the church as the "Lutheran"
party understand it! The same theme is continued the following week.
Among the schools of thought represented among the members of the
Alliance, the Kirchenzeitung finds some with whom, as is well known, it
holds no church fellowship. To enter into an evangelical Alliance with such associates, would be, according to the convictions of this paper, to acknowledge that the faith which to it is the evangelical faith, stands upon the same level with any other faith, i. e., to surrender its faith. Here spoke the spirit of Martin Luther. This is Smalcald over again, and it is the mistake of Smalcald too. It does not follow that when two parties join in common alliance, they necessarily acknowledge the faith of one another to be of equal validity. They must, of course, hold common opinions as to the point to be attained. But where both orthodox and unorthodox are united in their opposition to Rome, they can take council with one another and coöperate with one another without any such self-compromise as is here supposed. The article goes on to say that the Alliance has in mind the erection of a new National Church, and to oppose this idea. But, as we have already seen, the Alliance disclaimed such a motive at its first session. The deeper objection of these high Lutherans is, however, brought out in the final passages of the article. They will not seek deliverance by such means as this Alliance. Their trust is not to be in "horses." The still working power of the truth shall deliver them, and it alone can. This antiquated folly, which cost Protestantism all those fine lands of which Professor Fricke afterwards spoke at the Alliance, ought to have been outlived by Lutheranism by this time! It sounds more like Calvinistic fatalism. But no Calvinist was ever so regardless of means as this!

So much for the attitude of the high Lutherans before the Alliance. It is exceedingly to be regretted, as we think. After the meeting there was no essential change. In the number for September 30th, the absence of many representatives of the confessional school is emphasized, and it is declared that the control of the Alliance is to be in the hands of the unconfessional liberals. In such an Alliance the orthodox would appear only their followers. Some who were at the meeting felt this, and so made arrangements that the coming meeting of the General Lutheran Conference should discuss this subject in a churchly spirit. Such a meeting was called for the second week in October.

The full importance of the position of this high Lutheran party to the new effort, and every such effort in Germany, will be seen more clearly when we remember that whatever objections we may have to her attitude now, she is the one great representative of the true gospel in that land. She has the same foes to fight against which we have to contend with here. From her we get our principal help in our own contests. With her goes the cause of the gospel there, and as she rises or falls, sees her opportunities, or is blind to them, will the kingdom advance rapidly or slowly. What the outcome of the Alliance shall be, all interested in the fight against Rome will watch with anxiety to see.
[We have also received the following article from another hand. It traverses in part the ground occupied by the preceding article, but will serve to set the whole in a clearer light.—Eds.]

GERMANY'S BURNING CHURCH QUESTIONS.

Cardinal Manning is reported to have prophesied that the great contest between Roman Catholicism and Protestantism is to be decided on the sands of Berlin, and that Rome will be victorious. However little students of history may fear the victory of error over truth which the sanguine Cardinal hopes for, certain it is, that not since the days of the Reformation and of the Thirty Years' War have the two contending principles stood in such determined and aggressive hostility to each other as they do at present. Recent church developments in the land of Luther have a deeper interest than that of mere curiosity. It is a contest of principles the outcome of which will decide which shall be the controlling factor in the religious life and theology of Germany.

These developments during the past few months have been so remarkable in kind and rapidity as to bewilder those not well acquainted with the government and spirit of the German churches. However, they all hinge on the Kürtzkampf between Germany and Prussia on the one hand and the Catholic Church on the other. This name, which rather accidentally was given to this struggle by the radical representative in the German Parliament, Virchow, the famous medical professor in the Berlin University, really means "the battle of culture," and was by its author intended to characterize the struggle, as a contest between modern culture and ideas, as represented by the liberal party in politics and religious thought, and conservatism and reactionary tendencies, as represented by the Roman Catholic Church and its official utterances in the Syllabus and similar condemnations of all that modern thought regards as its chief achievements. That the government also took this wider view of the contest, and did not understand it merely as a struggle with the Roman Catholic Church, is plain from the movements it made in the course of the battle. Many of the laws that were made to meet the case, such as the secularization in Prussia of the common schools and the making of them entirely non-religious, in regard to both instruction and supervision, were as damaging to the Evangelical Church as they were to the Roman Catholic. Again and again has it been declared, by those in authority, that the German Empire and its leading State did not desire to antagonize the interests of Rome, but that they were fighting against the dangerous tendencies of one element in Roman Catholicism, namely against Ultramontanism, as the embodiment of reactionary principles.

However this may have all turned out to be in the actual contest, it must not be forgotten that the Kürtzkampf was inaugurated not by the Protestants, nor by the new German Empire, but by the leaders of the Catholics themselves. This step was directed by the Catholics, not against the Protestants as such, but rather against the principle of
Protestantism, which, it was feared, would gain the ascendancy in Europe through the political greatness of Prussia and Germany. Although some think it impossible to locate that cloud, of the size of a man's hand, which first made its appearance on the ecclesiastical Heavens of Germany during the memorable year of 1870 and 1871 and which grew into such dangerous proportions, yet there seems to be no reasonable doubt, that the aggressive party were the Catholics themselves. When Cardinal Antonelli, the papal secretary, in July, 1866, heard that Catholic Austria's military and political power had been shattered at Sadowa, by Protestant Prussia, he cried out: "The world is coming to an end!" That the Cardinal Secretary's fears were shared by other Catholic leaders, and that this fear grew into consternation when four years later that same Protestant power crushed France, "the favorite son of the Church," and established as arbiter in European politics a new Empire in Germany with the most powerful Protestant prince at its head, and at the same time the Italians took Rome and made it the capital of Italy, can easily be understood. Even before the close of the Franco-Prussian war, a delegation of German Catholics appealed to the new Emperor to use his power to restore to the Holy Father the eternal city. The refusal to comply with this request, apparently, was the signal for the formation of a political party in Germany with the sole aim of advancing the interests of Roman Catholicism from the standpoint of a pronounced Vaticanism at that time so acceptable to Pius IX. and his Jesuit advisers. At any rate, when the German Parliament met for the first time, there was found a Centre, or Catholic party, numbering about thirty men, which alone of all the representatives seemed to have decided as to their programme and methods. Their persistent opposition to the plans of the government was so pronounced, that in less than one year both the German Parliament and the Prussian Parliament, in self defense, were compelled to take steps to bend or break them. Accordingly legislative measures were taken, aiming at destroying the influence of Roman Catholicism over the political and public life of the country, especially in so far as this influence was the outgrowth of interference and instructions from non-German authorities, and tended toward weakening the bonds connecting the states of Germany into one empire. The measures adopted by the imperial government were directed against using the pulpits for political purposes, and at the expulsion of the Jesuits and allied fraternities from German soil. The principal struggle, was, however, between Prussia and the Vatican, and did not directly effect the other German states, except in so far as these, of their own choice, adopted measures similar to those of Prussia. This was done, in some instances, by Bavaria and Baden.

The anti-Catholic laws of Prussia were principally the famous "May laws" of 1874. It was the object of these laws to bring the education of young priests under influences other than Ultramontanism. In Prussia these young men are educated almost entirely under the direc-
tion of the church authorities. Of the nine Universities in Prussia only two, those at Breslau and at Bonn, have Catholic theological faculties. And even these are poorly attended by Catholic students. While the Protestant theological faculties of Prussia instruct nearly two thousand students the two Catholic faculties have only two hundred and ninety-one students. As yet the number of Catholic students in Prussia preparing for the priesthood is probably not far from one thousand four hundred. The great bulk of these are educated at the diocesan seminaries, established and maintained by the Catholics. Thus the Catholic academy at Münster alone has an attendance of three hundred and forty-four theological students. The German universities all, and particularly those of Prussia, are in their non-theological departments decidedly Protestant in character. In philosophy, history, natural sciences, and other branches in which the confessional differences have a decided effect in accepting or rejecting views of science and research, the Prussian universities are Protestant to the core. Fearing the danger of such atmosphere and surroundings, the Catholic authorities educate their young priests in their own seminaries, where they can import instruction unaffected by non-Catholic influences. The May laws aimed at undermining this state of affairs, by providing, that all candidates for orders in the Catholic Church in Prussia must pass an examination before a commission appointed by the state in the departments of philosophy, history, and German literature; that they must spend three years at a German university, and must be German subjects. Against those in authority in the Church it was decreed that they must make reports of their official acts to the government, which acts were then subject to approval or rejection on the part of the government. This Anzeigepflicht was especially offensive, because it seemed to involve an acceptance of the sovereignty of the state over the Church. Other measures were taken in order to make more effective these leading laws, as e. g. the refusal to pay the priests unless they would obey the laws, imprisoning them and their ecclesiastical superiors for each disobedience, etc.

Almost to a man Catholic Germany, and especially Catholic Prussia, rose up against these measures. The bishops and archbishops fled and tried to govern their dioceses from abroad; hundreds, almost thousands, of parishes were without priests. In Parliament the party which soon grew to one hundred representatives, was well led by Dr. Windthorst, did not who scruple (and indeed does not yet) to form alliances with the Radicals and the Social Democrats to outvote the parties supporting the government. It cannot be said that the Catholics gained numerically or legally or in influence in high places during these fifteen years of struggle, but they did gain immensely in morale. Bismark's expectations that the old Catholic party would prove an entering wedge in the solid phalanx of ultramontanism proved groundless. He had not studied with the eye of an historian the spiritual forces that composed that enterprise. Like all
other purely negative movements, it could not gain aggressive vitality. Only a positive movement, either of truth or error, can give firm ground in history.

Events developed rapidly during the next few years, and the state of politics in Prussia, in Germany, and in Europe became such as to recommend an early agreement with Rome. It is now about eighteen months since the Iron Chancellor declared that the May laws had been only "war measures," and that the time and opportunity for peace had come. He declared himself ready to establish a modus vivendi. And he, who confesses himself an "opportunist" in the extreme, soon found means to effect his end. Negotiations were commenced and the outcome of the matter were the laws adopted by the Prussian Parliament last spring. These measures, which have ignorantly been called a "trip to Canossa" on Bismark's part, abrogate the May laws, but allow some of the minor enactments against the Catholic Church to stand. The Catholic Church in Prussia does not at the present time stand so free in the eyes of the law as before 1871, although the principal rock of offence has been removed, namely the May laws. The Anzeigepflicht still exists in a modified shape, but is henceforth to be understood in a Pickwickian sense by the authorities. None of the imperial laws against the Church have yet been changed. The Jesuits and other orders are still banished from German soil. Not even in Prussia have they been allowed to return although the other orders, who had also been expelled from Prussia, are now returning in great numbers and evincing a marked activity.

That this is a modus vivendi, and not a permanent peace based upon reconciliation, is evident at a glance. None see this plainer than do the Catholics of Germany themselves. If they were offended that these negotiations were carried on, over the heads of the Centre leaders, who had borne the heat and toil of the day, directly between Berlin and Rome, they are even incensed at the conditions of the agreement. The leaders of Catholic Germany, who have the whole Catholic press behind them, maintained that greater concessions could have been secured. And even if the Vatican and those in authority are disposed to rest on the laurels so far gained, the Catholics of Germany are decided that this shall not be the case. The recent Catholic Congress, held at Treves, leaves no ground for doubt on that point. Far from celebrating a victory, the assembly rather prepared for further war. Windthorst declared that the peace was only a "preliminary" one, a "truce" with a "demarcation line;" that the Centre party as a political organization could not consider its mission performed until all the anti-Catholic laws had been wiped from the statute-books of Prussia and Germany, and the Catholics had secured the control of the schools. The Jesuitic maxim, that "he who has the schools has the future," the German Catholics have adopted as their own; and it is openly declared, that the Kulturkampf was less significant and important than the struggle for the possession of the schools
shall be. From all this it is evident that the end is not yet, and that the future in German church life will be tumultuous and warlike.

That such will be its complexion is, however, not to be the result of the action of the Roman Catholics only, but also, and possibly to a greater extent, the outcome of agitation within the Evangelical Church. The Protestants feel it keenly that the Catholics have been allowed to gain so great a moral victory over the leading Protestant State on the Continent. They well see, that the legal restrictions to which Catholics are yet subject are nothing compared with what they have gained. And this, at least outwardly, has proved the occasion of starting a movement among the Protestants of Prussia, with the sympathy and cooperation of the non-Prussian Protestants, that bids fair to revolutionize the present relations existing between state and church, and which is the result of the historical development since the days of the Reformation. Strange as it may sound, it is yet as true as it is strange, that in Prussia the church is virtually controlled by the state. Legally the king is its summus episcopus; its government is conducted through political agents; its laws are made by a political parliament; its synods have only formal, no final, rights. Against this state of affairs the thoughtful Christian men of Prussia are making an earnest protest and inaugurating a crusade for reform. Their demands in this regard have been crystallized in the so-called v. Hammerstein-Kleist resolutions, named after the movers. These ask for two things, namely, (1) Greater freedom from the state authorities in the management of their own affairs, especially in such matters as the election of theological professors, who are now appointed by the State with little or no regard to their doctrinal standing. (2) More means for carrying on church work. Just in what particulars these new privileges and rights under the first head shall consist, is as yet a question not fully agreed upon by those who are pushing the movement. At the Free Conference of these men, held in Berlin, the general sentiment was that there should be no disestablishment, but that as near as possible Cavour’s ideal should be realized, namely, that of a “Free Church within a Free State.” But the Conference was a unit in demanding greater powers for the synods, both provincial and general, particularly in the matter of supervising the education of future pastors and preachers. And as these demands have not been formulated except in general outline, there is as yet no organization proper to push the matter. It has indeed been introduced into the Prussian Parliament by the authors of the programme, but Bismark has pronounced emphatically against it, fearing, as he says, an evangelical hierarchy, and saying, that he has had enough of trouble with that of the Romish Church. Accordingly, the Parliament adjourned without even formally discussing the merits of the question, although it was urged upon their attention by men of influence, such as Stöcker and v. Hammerstein. But the leaders have determined to make this church problem a question of practical politics, and will make its maintenance a matter of party and parliamentary politics. They have
learned the tactics of war from the successes of their Catholic neighbors. The defenders and promoters of this movement are principally men of the confessional and the positive union ranks, i.e., men who are more or less orthodox in their standpoint. They properly expect from the realization of their hopes a greater freedom for the gospel and its pure promulgation. The outspoken opponents to the measures within the Protestant ranks are only the liberal theologians, which means in Germany the radical theologians, at their head the Protestantverein and its destructive theology. These professedly fear that, the "freedom of scientific investigation" (Freiheit der Wissenschaft) at the universities will be endangered in case the theological professors and their teachings are under the watchful eyes of synods and churches that have the interests of God's truth at heart. In reality they fear that the influence of "liberal" theology in high official German church circles will be undermined, where it is now abnormally supreme. What this movement will bring forth, is, of course, as yet unknown; but its principles and animus seem to be the healthiest and most promising among the contending forces in German church life.

In the meanwhile, a movement of another character has been gaining prominence in Protestant Germany, and has already effected an organization of ten thousand members, two thousand of whom are professors, pastors, and other prominent men. It is the Evangelischer Bund, headed by Professor Beyschlag, of Halle. Its work is "war against Rome;" to resist the aggression of Romanism in Germany and German church life. It is not confined to Prussia, as is the other movement for the present, but is spread over all Germany, and certainly shows a remarkable status for a movement only one year old. At first it seemed that only progressives and liberals would join. Since the doctrinal statement of the association seemed to be too general in simply declaring its allegiance to "Christ the Son of God," without explaining further how this and other points in the declaration of faith were to be understood. But this has proved to be a mistake, and a large number of positive men are joining the ranks of the association. At the first meeting, recently held in Frankfurt, the association declared itself to be friendly to the v. Hammerstein-Kleist agitation, and claimed to seek, among other things, virtually the same ends. This is important, for the greatest danger in the whole aggressive policy of German Protestantism is its internal dissensions. If all Evangelicals can unite on what they want, and present an unbroken phalanx, as did the Catholic hosts, there is no doubt that they will secure privileges and rights never before enjoyed by them, and which will be conducive to their best growth and development.

How much an organization of this sort against modern Roman Catholicism in Germany is necessary can be well illustrated by a new "objective historical method" adopted by Janssen and others in reconstructing the Reformation period in the interests of the Roman Catholic Church. Hitherto this church has stood dumfounded before the facts of the period, and,
with the exception of Döllinger, no one had undertaken an answer that could stand examination. Now Janssen, in a work that has grown to five volumes and has appeared in tens of thousands of copies, has attempted to demonstrate that the Reformation was the greatest misfortune that ever befell Europe, and that it did nothing but injure the civilization, culture, and general prosperity of the world which the Roman Catholic régime had brought about. The new reconstruction claims to be the result of scientific historiography. Janssen really does cite authorities in abundance, and almost in superabundance, but always in a mutilated and tattered shape, so as to make them tell quite a different tale from what they actually do. Protestant writers, notably Lenz and Delbrück, have dissected Janssen thoroughly; but this does not prevent the Catholic press and people from boasting loud and long of the thorough manner in which Protestantism has been driven out of its own stronghold. A new "Catholic science" is thus being created, which is intended to counteract the dangerous work of Protestant research. In every way Roman Catholicism is full of self-satisfaction, is flushed with victory, and is becoming aggressive. Church developments in Germany will be interesting and instructive. It is a contest of the principles that were arrayed against each other in the Reformation period, only now they meet under altogether different circumstances. Both parties are deeply in earnest. God speed the day of the victory of truth, which is sure to come, if Protestant Germany, as did Luther of old, fights with the open Bible in its hands.

G. H. S.

INTELLIGENCE.

The first year of Professor Delitzsch's Seminary for the instruction of Missionaries to the Jews has now been completed. The programme for the first Semester lies before us, and we have sketched here the course of study, from which we can gain a good idea of what the work of the Seminary is to be. There were five instructors,—Delitzsch, Faber, Lichtenstein, Cohn, Anacker,—of whom two, Lichtenstein and Cohn, are of Jewish descent, and are familiar with rabbinic learning. The first Semester there were two proper members of the Seminary, and several others who took part in the exercises, and enjoyed its privileges. In the course of study we note the following branches:—The Epistle to the Hebrews with explanations from Jewish Literature; Lectures by Delitzsch on the specifically Jewish Doctrinal and Moral Theology; Kimchi's Commentary on the Psalms; Biblical problems in the Anglo-American Society; History and present condition of Missions; Courses in Isaiah, and the Mishna. Prayers are held every evening, and a Missionary Meeting for a general audience every Sunday.

In this connection it will be well to notice the fact that Delitzsch's Hebrew New Testament has now circulated in 60,000 copies. The Mission to the Jews in Eastern Russia has been widely extended, and it is
planned to establish a station in that region which shall serve as a place of refuge for persecuted converts.

At the recent 150th Anniversary of Göttingen University, efforts were made by the Hannoverian Church authorities to secure a greater degree of sympathy between the University and the Church. This would have come about only by a large degree of change on the part of the aggressive Ritschl school in the University. As this regards itself in the full tide of prosperity, and as Ritschl is a born fighter, it was natural that the modest proposals of the Church should be met by a somewhat cold and hostile reply from Ritschl and Schultz.

Our contributor, Pastor Haecius, was to accompany Director Harms on his journey of inspection of the Missions of the Hermannsburg Society, leaving Germany last September.

Of the 1,326 University Professors in Germany, exclusive of the Theological Faculties, 90 are Jews, i. e., 7½ per cent. Of the 529 Privat-docents, 84 are Jews, i. e., 17½ per cent. The larger proportion of these are in the two Prussian Universities of Berlin, and Breslau.

The New Testament has appeared in the Tartar language at Kazan.

The proposals of Windthorst to re-establish the temporal power of the Pope has stirred up the Italians to utter themselves in no ambiguous terms. The Popolo Romano, a paper of the highest influence in Italy, says in the issue of June 15th last: "So far as the 'Crusade' is concerned, which Windthorst says he will not demand, it is a pitty he has given it up. It was all that was necessary to call back to life the Roman Carnival, an institution which, alas, has fallen somewhat into disuse. As to our yielding to the force of other powers and restoring the States of the Church, so long as Italy has a soldier, or a cannon, or a torpedo-boat, she will resist not only a single great power, but all the great powers united. However, we do not concern ourselves much about this restoration of the Pope. There is one feature of this matter which has a sound basis, and that is the right of these gentlemen to talk as long as they like!"

The second International Congress against the misuse of alcoholic liquors was held in Zurich, September 7-10. A number of interesting papers were read, but it was discovered that the Congress was not entirely agreed as to the desirable policy to recommend, whether it should be total abstinence, or temperance. The German societies are very liberal in this respect, and seek in general only to prevent intoxication, while the Swiss, English, and American demand total abstinence. Switzerland has established a monopoly of the distillation and sale of brandy in the hands of the government, and made the arrangement that each Canton shall receive a definite portion of the profits on the condition that ten per cent. thereof shall be spent in measures against drunkenness. The American plan of teaching the effects of alcohol in the schools was favorably considered, and similar efforts have been made already in Austria.

Signs of a renewal of the cordial relations between the State Churches
and the Hermannsburg Missionary Society are appearing. The Lüneburg Missionary Union has resolved to pay over the portion of its contributions which it had kept on deposit for the Mission, if good relations should be restored at any time. Other missionary societies and churches will probably follow this example, and so the Society resume its old place in the hearts of the German people.

The number of students in the universities in Germany is on the steady increase. The number of theological students shares this upward movement. The largest universities are Berlin, 4,654 students; München, 3,367; Leipzig, 3,054; Halle, 1,529. The theological faculties where the instruction is, in general terms, orthodox are still best frequented.

During the year 1885 there were in Prussia 6,028 cases of suicide, against 5,900 in 1884, and 6,171 in 1883. Of these 4,811 were men, and 1,217 women. In 4,928 the cause of the crime could be determined. Insanity was the cause in 1,582 cases, in 766 anxiety, in 659 vice, in 611 weariness of life, in 477 physical suffering, in 435 shame, remorse, etc.

We give a list of the principal lecturers at the German Universities, which will be of special interest to our readers, during the winter Semester, 1887-88:


Giessen: Müller, Mod. Ch. Hist., Hist. Ch. Missions since the 18th cent., Sem., Tertullian; Schürer, Rom. and Gal., Hist. Jewish People in the time of Christ, N. T. Sem., Import. selections for Biblical Theology; Stade, Isaiah, Introd. O. T., O. T. Sem., Extracts from the Pentat.


We note the following important issues of the German press:—

Lewinsky, A. The Religious and Philosophical Views of Josephus. (Beiträge zur Kenntniss der religionsphilosophischen Anschauungen des Flavius Josephus. Breslau, 1887. iii. 62 S. M 1.80.)


Werner, Dr. Johs. Hegel's Conception of Revelation. (Hegel's Offenbarungsbegriff. Ein religionsphilosophischer Versuch. Leipzig, 1887. 90 S. M 2.)

Kambli, Conr. Wilh. The Social Parties, and our Relations with them. (Die sozialen Parteien und unsere Stellung zu denselben. St. Gallen, 1887. S. viii. 511 S. M 7.)

Horning, Wilh. Dr. John Marbach. (Dr. Johann Marbach, Pfarrer zu St. Nicolai, etc. Beiträge zu dessen Lebensbild mit Bezugnahme auf die Reformatoren Zell, Butzer, Capito, und Hedio. etc. Strassburg, 1887. ii. 252 S. M 3.)


Broder's concordance of the Greek New Testament is just appearing in the fourth edition, the first and second parts having already been issued. M 5—Dr. Müller in Königsberg proposes to issue an "Oriental Bibliography." This will include everything which has reference to the peoples, religion, morals, and customs, language, literature, and history of the Orient, Asia, Africa, and Oceanica—A new edition of Delitzsch's Commentary on Genesis is about to appear—Luthardt is to publish: "The ancient Ethics presented in its historical development and its relation to the history of Christian Ethics."—A new volume of the Works of Calvin, (Corpus Reformatorum,) the 34th, is just out—Pfeiferer, of Berlin, is preparing a "History of the original Christianity."—The second volume of Harnack's "History of Doctrine," noticed in this number of the Bibliotheca Sacra, has come out.
ARTICLE IX.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

HISTORY OF THE CHRISTIAN CHURCH. By George Park Fisher, D. D., L.L. D. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1887. (pp. v. 701. 6½ x 3½.)

The teaching of Church History in Theological Seminaries has long had peculiar and almost insurmountable difficulties with which to contend. The discipline is of comparative little value to the future minister unless he gain that broad acquaintance with it which can come only from the study of a large portion of the field. It is still better if he can gain a knowledge of the whole extent of the history from the beginning down to the present age. To study the history of doctrine, as has sometimes been done in our seminaries, without any study of the external history, is to render the whole not only extremely uninteresting, but to a considerable extent unintelligible, since the external history is often not only the background, but also the condition of the internal. A model course of Church History will therefore include a tolerably thorough view of the principal external events from the beginning to the present time.

But how shall this be gained? Most seminary courses do not allow time enough for it. Or, even when time enough is given, how can the teacher bring before his pupils that clear and consecutive view which shall illumine the individual features, rather than obscure the whole by the mass of details? He will perhaps try the lecture system, and this may prove effective with the best pupils, but under the most favorable circumstances their notes will be imperfect, and the amount of accurate knowledge which can be put into their possession by this method will be too small for the best results. Again and again, therefore, the best teachers have resorted to text-books as the means of instruction, but have found the results still unsatisfactory. The text-books have been drawn from German sources, and have betrayed their source in their very language, or they have been translations which have proved scarcely readable by an unsophisticated American, when not blundering into the exact reverse of the statements of the original. A good text-book of Church History has therefore been up to the present time a great desideratum, to supply which would have been to gain the just fame belonging to a truly great service.

In the work before us we have the supply of this want. Here is a book which traverses the entire field of Church History in the clear and fascinating manner for which its author is so well known, with a judicious selection of
topics, and what is of greater importance for the American student, with a proportionately adequate treatment of the American history,—a thing which no translated book could, from the nature of the case, offer. Constant attention is paid to the secular background of the church history, without which it is unintelligible, but with which no American historian can safely suppose his pupils to be sufficiently familiar to relieve him from all responsibility in this direction. Eight maps and an historical chart accompany the volume.

The usual divisions of the history have been followed, and under each main division the rubrics are, The spread of the Church, and similar external features, The Polity of the Church, Life and Worship, and Christian Doctrine. Of course, these are largely modified in each period according to the prevailing characteristics of the times. Thus in the period which embraces Gregory VII. and Boniface VIII., the polity of the church and its relations to the secular power occupy by far the greatest portion of the space. In that following 1517, the spread of the church assumes the character of a reformation, which therefore fills out the principal portion of the treatment.

We naturally turn first in examining a Church History to the treatment of the rise of the Catholic Church. Here an author's sympathies are most quickly to be seen and his theory of writing Church History to be tested. Professor Fisher remarks in his preface that he has "abstained from recording any results which, as it appears to me, still await satisfactory proof." This claim is borne out. The fanciful theories of writers who rewrite the history for their dogmatic ends have no favor with Professor Fisher. The progress of the church in polity is so sketched that it is evident that all was not, as some claim, a deformation of her true nature, and her doctrine is viewed as a proper development of the truth possessed, not as a colossal, imposing, but erroneous system of philosophy.

One of the most important, if not the most important, topic for the proper understanding of the middle ages is the Papal power. But this cannot be understood except in its genesis, and here a multitude of dogmatic, diplomatic, and personal details need to be distinguished, classified, and arranged so that their logical relations will be seen at once, and their mutual dependence brought out. This is successfully done by Professor Fisher. The great requisite to success here is the power of writing so as not to imply previous knowledge. No matter how high the general level of intelligence, or of historical knowledge in a class may be, it will not be so high as to make it safe in an elementary book to presuppose knowledge which may at any point be wanting to some student. Professor Fisher avoids this mistake. He alludes to a multitude of facts in the briefest manner, but always so as to impart knowledge, not to demand it of those whom he is attempting to teach. Much depends here on the style of sentences. It would seem as if the mental structure of some writers prevented them from stating a simple fact in a simple manner. They begin at the wrong end, and require the reader to know as much as they do themselves in order to understand them. Not so with Professor Fisher. He has the gift of straightforward lucidity. You
may need to know more about a given topic than he has found time to tell
you, but what he has said, you have understood.

With the period of the Reformation, Professor Fisher enters upon the
scene of former and favorite studies. The same characteristics as have
already attracted our attention meet us again here. The work has at this
point a new interest for Americans, in that the relative importance of the
topics is estimated with reference to our national needs, and the space given
to them is accordingly determined. Thus the work is becoming distinctly
an American history of the church. Note the number of pages assigned to
the different topics as indicative of this point. Germany has nineteen pages;
Switzerland, etc., twelve; Calvin and Geneva, twelve; France, eleven; the
Netherlands, five; England and Scotland, thirty-seven. Our mother country,
from which our own religious life receives its determining elements, is exalted
to its true place for the first time in such a history as this. In the same con-
nexion we may mention the space given to America. All told, in a book of
701 pages we have for this topic more than 60 pages, almost one-tenth.
New England Theology in particular receives its first competent sketch, and
the relations of the denominations of America to their sources and to one
another are indicated. Enough has been done for such a work as this, and
enough to excite the strong wish that Professor Fisher would prepare an ex-
tended and philosophical history of the American church in its various
branches. Such a book would be as useful, even in theological instruction,
as the work now before us.

We have thus presented the great and admirable features of this valuable
work. We do not care to indulge in minute criticism. All in all, the book
is as perfect a production as one can expect from imperfect men. We may
add, that though this review has been conducted from the standpoint of a
teacher, the book possesses equal value for all who wish to obtain a rapid
review of Church History, or to find a guide in the investigation of difficult
points. Our only great regret is that this work was not furnished, as the
author's recent Secular History was, with tables of the literature of the sev-
eral topics. This would have greatly increased its value for some students,
and decreased it for none.

The Light of Asia and the Light of the World.—A comparison of the
Legend, the Doctrine and the Ethics of the Buddha with the Story, the Doc-
millan & Co. 1885. (pp. xx. 390. 7½ x 5.)

This book is a needed piece of work, thoroughly done. It is a distinctive
contribution to apologetic literature. It settles the misgivings of uninformed
believers, and answers with even too great consideration the objections of
captious unbelievers, so far as misgivings or objections can have rise in
Buddhism. The author prepares for his discussion by wisely emphasizing in his
preface the difficulties in forming a correct judgment of Buddhism from a
casual reading, on account of the strangeness of the conceptions involved, the
frequent obscurity of the language, and the different meaning to be attached
to many common words and expressions as used in the Buddhist scriptures. Thus the words "lust," "sin," "salvation," "law," "new birth," etc., as used by the Buddhist, denote conceptions totally different from the Christian sense of the same terms. To these sources of error are to be added the common ignorance of the practical workings of non-Christian religious systems, vague ideas as to a universal religion, and the misleading nature of most of the ordinary literature of the subject. Indeed, as its title shows, this book owes its origin to Edwin Arnold's much-talked-of and greatly overpraised poem, "The Light of Asia." The germ of the book was in two articles, called out by the essential misrepresentations of Arnold's poems, and published by Professor Kellogg in the Catholic Presbyterian, and the Presbyterian Review, of July, 1883. The wide reading the poem secured, and the many mistaken notions resulting, may practically justify Professor Kellogg in giving so much space to criticism of Arnold, but such criticism was more appropriate to the magazine than the book, and for the sake of the discussion itself, one might wish there were less of it, though sympathizing heartily with the author in his just and acute strictures upon this "tendency poem."

So many apologetic writers in this field of comparative religion have made it evident that they had no thorough knowledge of the subject or even of the reliable sources of such knowledge, that one is glad to see upon the start that Professor Kellogg's authorities are of the best, and to find that they are judiciously used. After three introductory chapters upon Buddhism and Modern Unbelief, the Comparative Historical Value of the Buddhist and the Christian Scriptures, and the Life and the Legend of the Buddha; the discussion proper is taken up in a comparison upon three points:—the Legend of the Buddha and the Story of Christ, the Doctrine of the Buddha and the Doctrine of Christ, Buddhist Ethics and the Ethics of the Gospel. A concluding chapter summarizes the argument in convincing form. One questions the wisdom of reprinting the introductory chapter on Buddhism and Modern Unbelief from the Catholic Presbyterian. It is in striking contrast with the admirable tone of the preface, and does not lead one to anticipate the careful and dispassionate comparison which is to follow. The chapter would tend rather to repel unbelievers, through the unworthy motives assigned for their interest in Buddhism, and would scarcely help believers. The second chapter makes very plain the utter difference between the authenticity and credibility of the Christian and Buddhist writings. But the very detailed nature of the discussion and especially the bringing of the later legends into the comparison, may be said to dignify beyond their worth any objections upon this point. The later Buddhist legends have no claim for comparison with genuine historical documents. No exception can be taken to the argument. It covers all the points, and is absolutely convincing. But the practically unanimous verdict of all competent scholars should have weight, without such detailed argument. A comparison such that it suggests that the two cases are only somewhat unlike, weakens its force by the very suggestion. A similar criticism might be made upon much of the discussion that follows, excellent as
it is. Seriously to discuss coincidences between the life of Christ and incidents occurring in the Lalita Vistara, for example, is to suggest an historical character in the latter which it does not possess. Here again the argument of Professor Kellogg is perfectly conclusive, and he clearly sets forth all the facts; but a briefer, sharper treatment would have been even more satisfactory.

A part of the summary of the comparison of the doctrine of the Buddha and the doctrine of Christ—a very thorough discussion—may well be quoted: "Christianity teaches that there is a God, who is our Father in heaven; Buddhism denies that there is any such Being... Christianity teaches that man has a soul; Buddhism denies it. As to sin, Christianity teaches that it has to do with man's relation to God; Buddhism that it has to do only with man himself... Buddhism teaches that salvation consists essentially in deliverance from suffering, and finally from individual existence, which ever makes suffering possible; that the ground of this salvation is the man's own merit; and that the author of salvation is also the man himself." The ethics of Buddhism are so closely connected with its doctrines that it is doubtful whether a clearer impression would not have been made by setting forth the entire Buddhist system in order, letting it speak for itself, and summing up the contrasts with Christianity at the close. The real subordination of the ethics of Buddhism in its scheme of deliverance would then appear. But Professor Kellogg has treated ably the Ethics of Buddhism, the most praised part of the Buddhist system. He treats of the postulated law, the motives and the practical workings of the ethics of Christianity and Buddhism; and shows that Buddhist ethics omit all duties to God, and as to duties to man confounds things right and wrong with things morally indifferent, makes wrong some manifest duties; exaggerates some virtues so far as to caricature them, and lays its chief stress not on the keeping of the moral law but of many non-moral precepts; that its motives are really selfish; and that its practical workings disclose its powerlessness to produce right lives. An even larger use of direct proof from the Buddhist scriptures upon these points of doctrine and ethics would have given added value to the book, and made more possible to its readers an independent judgment of Buddhism. There is no lack of direct evidence from the Buddhist canonical authorities, that must forever convince any candid reader that Buddhism is fatally defective both as a system of morals and as a system of religion. This book of Dr. Kellogg's is the best discussion of the subject in print, and will finally settle the honest difficulties of very many.

THE ENDLESS FUTURE: Showing the probable Connection between Human Probation and the endless Universe that is to be. Nashville, Tenn.: Southern Methodist Publishing House. 1885. (pp. 199. 4 3/4 x 2 3/4.)

This book is in certain respects a model for theological treatises. It is written in a compact style, clearly expressed, lets the reader easily into the thought of the writer, does not encumber him with a load of useless discussion, and above all derives its doctrine from the Scriptures by the methods of a reverent and reasonable exegesis.
The distinguishing peculiarity of the work is the theory that the Universe is still in its infancy, and that we, as the pioneer inhabitants of it, occupy a peculiar position of influence. What we do, and what is done with us, will determine much more than our individual fate. Hence much that might seem mysterious, were we alone in the universe, or even in a universe that was substantially complete, is more easily explicable.

This position having been presented and defended from the Scriptures, the future universe is considered. It is to be boundless in extent, endless in duration, forever expanding, and can be protected hereafter only by a moral government. In this ever expanding universe, rebellion will always be a possibility. It must be arrested, and this must be done by an appeal to motives. What motive shall be employed? The two mightiest motives are affection and fear. The former is presented in the cross of Jesus Christ. The latter is employed in the present, past, and future dealings of God with sin. This is the object of punishment, and, as it seems that there is a necessity for such an appeal during all the ages of eternity, it would seem that there was a necessity of an eternal punishment. The full reason of this, in the writer's mind, lies in his opinion that the occasion of sin is in the free-will of responsible beings, and that all moral agents who shall ever be created, must be liable to sin through their very nature.

The second part of the work now begins. Four lines of argument are presented for the proposition that eternal punishment is not unreasonable: (1) Endless suffering is not unreasonable; (2) No punishment less than endless would correspond with the magnitude and enormity of sin; (3) The proper education of the moral universe demands endless penalty for sin; (4) The harmony of the divine administration necessitates endless penalty. A considerable space is now given to the argument with the Restorationists. The chief point is that there is no reason to expect a change of moral character in the future under the operation of other and stronger motives than those now operating on the soul. The chapter on the condition of the Heathen will be of special interest at the present time. The author takes the position strongly that the Heathen have at the present time a probation fair and sufficient. The argument is entirely scriptural, and is tolerably familiar to all who have followed the course of recent debates. At one point, however, the writer makes some addition to the argument. The urgency that the Heathen should have the gospel presented to them, and the thought that this is necessary to the justification of the ways of God with men, rests upon the assumption that if only this were done, the Heathen would be saved. "But this assumption is groundless." Further, to those in Christian lands who neglect it or reject it, as the masses do, it only becomes an additional burden of condemnation. Should the gospel be given to the World in any other way than God is now employing, it might result only in a cold and contemptuous rejection of it, and hence in greater guilt. "We have every reason for believing that God is blessing all efforts made to give the gospel to the world to the full extent that he properly can, and stimulating the church to the utmost to spread the true knowledge of himself among men; and that should he devi-
ate in the least from the plan he has chosen, he would endanger the welfare of his entire administration."

Other chapters which follow answer the arguments of Annihilationists, and present some additional considerations, but the main argument of the book is now complete. We commend it to every one who wishes a fresh, strong, and clear treatment of the whole subject.


This contribution of Professor Morris to the current discussions upon eschatology is one of the most important that have yet been made. In writing it the author has the advantage of maturity of judgment, long familiarity with the subject, and intimate knowledge of the numerous contributions from different points of view elicited by recent events.

Nothing has been more remarkable and misleading than the efforts of those advocating future probation to belittle the importance of the question. In view of these efforts it has been difficult to maintain one's confidence in the sincerity of many of its advocates. As our author truly says: "There is indeed for obvious reasons, no department of Christian doctrine in which the mind is more likely to fall into error or in which erroneous opinion is more seductive or more injurious. In view of such facts, does it not seem idle or illusive to speak of the dogma of probation after death as a mere speculation, a scholarly fancy, something permissible in the school, but of little moment in practice? To every such suggestion, do not the strong affirmations, the peculiar zeal, the passionate ardor exhibited in its advocacy, furnish decisive reply? . . . A new theology seems already to be growing into form on the foundations which it furnishes: the reconstruction of the current theology at the fundamental points is already predicted as certain to follow its acceptance. Its influence upon the great work of the Church in behalf of souls and especially upon the work of missions in pagan lands, is even now a matter of serious and painful concern in many quarters. Nor is he a mere alarmist who, in view of such indications and such possibilities, earnestly solicits the attention of Christian minds everywhere, to the question whether this dogma is in fact entitled to any place among the *credenda* of our holy aith, or shall rather be cast aside as an unscriptural and mischievous error." (pp. 41-42).

In the five succeeding chapters, Professor Morris subjects the whole question of the intermediate state to patient and thorough examination, considering the testimony of particular Scriptures concerning it, the general testimony of Scripture, the witness of Christian symbolism, the witness of Christian theology and the witness of Christian experience, and finds them all bearing decisive evidence against the new departure views upon the subject. We heartily commend the book, and in particular the sentiments in the following excerpts.

"They are not always the strongest disciples who are readiest to ignore these
outward verifications, or to accept as sufficient what Coleridge calls the irresistible evidence of the Spirit. The understanding and the reason, investigation and analysis, logic and demonstration, have their ordained place and value in the commendation of the truth of God to human faith, as truly as the gracious consciousness, whether of the individual believer or of the Church. The ultimate standard of all doctrines, dogmas, opinions, hopes of men, lies in the divine word itself, as carefully studied, analyzed, verified by the human mind working according to its own legitimate and necessary laws.” (p. 209.)

“It is a noticeable fact that in the advocacy and especially in the defense of the dogma under discussion, it has been continually assumed that this change (i.e., the abandonment of the doctrine of the limitation of probation to this life and of the ordinary doctrines connected with it) has already taken place or is now in fact transpiring. With singular boldness it has been affirmed without any adequate historic evidence, that the old formularies of belief are all outgrown at this point, and are substantially laid aside already. A more unwarranted assertion was never made. It is indeed true, for example, that large improvements have been made recently, as in the days of Jonathan Edwards, within the Calvinistic system. But these improvements have been made for the strengthening, not the subversion or impairing of that system; and their admission has in fact immensely enhanced its claim to an honorable place among the accepted systems of evangelical belief.” (p. 214.)


This book stands as one in a series of expositions of the doctrinal basis of the Church of England. It covers the whole ground of the subject with a comprehensive treatment, but is somewhat fragmentary in its historical discussions and does not impress the reader as being very maturely considered in its main portions. The mere heaping together of isolated facts about several writers in church history does not constitute an historical treatment of a subject.

The Reality of Religion. By Henry J. Van Dyke, Jr., D. D., Pastor of the Brick Church, New York. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1884. (pp. xii, 146. 4½ × 2½.)

A book of sermons which powerfully impress on the soul the necessity of a living religion, and show that the strife of opinions, even when tending to the maintenance of the truth, may leave the soul unfed. They treat successively the topics: A Real Religion a Necessity; The Living God; The Living Soul; The Living Word; The Living Sacrifice; The Living Christ.
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ARTICLE I.

THE ILLIBERALITY OF THE DOGMA OF PROBATION AFTER DEATH.

BY THE REV. ALBERT J. LYMAN, BROOKLYN, N. Y.

By "Probation after death" we understand a probation which turns upon a definite, formal presentment to the disembodied soul of the historic Christ, and a conscious, deliberate acceptance or rejection of Christ under such presentation.

Other notions, more vague and rationalistic, drifting at large in the popular mind, imagining some limitless amnesty in the future world, have undoubtedly to some extent usurped the name "probation." But even Andover, not always careful enough to discriminate its views from the popular counterfeit, has desired us to set at once aside all such loose trave-sties upon its position. It is, then, the introduction and accentuation of the factor of the "historic Christ" which alone turns the commonplace, hazy dream of a future probation into anything clear enough to define or weighty enough even to demand a Christian suffrage.

From the standpoint of foreign scholarship especially, this is the only phase of the general notion of probation after
death which emerges into dogmatic distinctness, the only one whose distinct doctrinal weight can be argued from the evangelical position, the only one which invokes or challenges a scriptural exegesis, and the only one which biblical scholars like Dorner in Germany, or Alford in England, avow.

The object of the present paper is to show that this theory, so defined, is yet untenable as a dogma, and so far from being liberal is distinctly, though no doubt unintentionally illiberal.

We even propose in regard to this matter of "liberality" to change the animus of the issue. The notion of future probation, not carefully defined under what is really its inseparable dogmatic accompaniment, viz., the presentation of the historic Christ, has easily in the popular mind identified itself with "liberality." It is confused with rationalism, from which the dogma at many points differs, certainly in the sense in which it is held by the German scholars. It is, however, perhaps a question, whether Dorner's doctrine on this subject of future probation has not got into more rationalistic company in crossing the Atlantic. Dorner presents the picture of a man fighting Rationalism, and so holding Future Probation; Andover, unfortunately, and perhaps unwittingly, has produced the impression of men dallying with Rationalism, and so holding Future Probation. In this way the popular sentiment in this country has identified the new probationary theory with rationalism, from which it should in strictness be discriminated. The dogma of future probation is also confused with Universalism, between which and it a great gulf is logically fixed, certainly in scholarly thought. In these various ways, the doctrine of probation after death has come to be regarded as a phase of the so-called "liberal" faith. On the contrary, we take the ground that this new theory with its "historic" attachment is in fact illiberal. We suspect that it narrows exegesis in the direction of making a virtual plea for a kind of petty, verbal infallibility, by its strained appeal to its few "proof-texts," "preached to the spirits in prison," etc. We suspect that it narrows the om-
nipotence of the divine mercy, by insisting that God's gracious influence upon man shall confine itself to a single psychological path; that it narrows the hope of the salvation of infants, casting a gloom over cradle and casket; that it narrows the efficacy of redemption by its method of identifying redemption itself, subjectively considered, with a definite mental picture of that redemption under its historic forms; that, finally, it even narrows and abridges the broad ethical ground-work upon which natural religion and christology itself must ultimately stand.

We should first, however, studying the utmost justice, define the dogma and discriminate it from other theories. Andover has itself partly to blame if it is misunderstood. What most men most want in connection with this discussion is precisely what they have least had, viz., definition; not only definition inclusive, but definition exclusive. We want to know what the doctrine does not mean, as well as what it means. A certain obscurity in this debate has been produced by special causes. It has been partly due, of course, to prejudice, and to that exaggerated and cloudy conception which prejudice always forms of an antagonist's position, but beside prejudice with its distorted perspective, the real question at issue has been confused with other adjacent but really disconnected questions. For instance, the issue presented by the recent "Andover Trial," so called, is not the question of the truth or falsehood of the doctrine of future probation. The question in the Andover trial was the question whether the Andover professors had the right, under the Andover creed, to teach that doctrine. Now this latter is another question, yet the heat, and doubt, and complexity of argument excited by the latter controversy, have been insensibly carried over, like a cloud of irritating dust, into that calm field of scriptural exegesis and philosophic inquiry where the real question of future probation itself is to be settled, and where alone it can be settled. Another of these heated, practical, confusing side controversies is that which has recently agitated the American Board. The question at Springfield was
not that of the truth or falsehood of the doctrine of future probation. It was the question whether men entertaining that doctrine in any degree should be sent as missionaries; a very different question. Nevertheless, the two issues were confused in the popular mind, and the vehement breath of battle, appropriate enough to a question of practical policy, has invaded what it has no right to invade, the discussion on future probation itself.

For we cannot too emphatically say, that this question of probation after death is a question for candid and kindly scriptural inquiry. We must not be too much in a hurry. We must not misstate things, nor misrepresent men. Polemics are an impertinence in the tremendous shadows of eschatology. The painfully flippant tone of the secular press in dealing with this subject is perhaps in part a natural concomitant of the partisan clamor and clash into which we Christians have been betrayed in treating it. Even Augustine himself, pleading, as he did, for the unmodified doctrine of eternal punishment, and devoting the twenty-first chapter of his great book, "The City of God," to the refutation of the "very many," as he calls them, who held the doctrines of restorationism, refers to them with courteous respect as "our party of pity."

We may adopt the following simple division of the subject:—

I. What does the dogma of probation after death really mean, in the minds of those who accept it?

II. What does it not mean?

III. What are the main arguments for it?

IV. Why is the drift of these arguments illiberal?

I. What is the dogma? It is, as has been said, but as must be said with even repeated emphasis, the doctrine of future probation under the form of a conscious acceptance or rejection of the historic Christ. Dr. Dorner uses the following language: "The absoluteness of Christianity demands that no one be judged before Christianity has been made accessible and brought near him." Certainly, we answer; but
the context shows Dorner's meaning to be, that Christianity shall be made "accessible and brought near" in our way, under our intellectual, concrete, historic forms of apprehension. In this supposition that the "historic" way is the only way, lies the tremendous assumption that vitiates the psychological soundness and the philosophical strength of this "new" doctrine of probation; namely, the assumption that identifies man's probation with the processes of a single mental field,—that limits man's response to the gospel to a conscious intellection of the historic Christ, and limits the gracious and redeeming work of God's Spirit to the creation of the formal antecedents or accompaniments of such intellection.

The theory conceives that all infants and heathen and the imbecile or insane and men of the pre-Christian ages—all souls, in fact, to whom Christ has not been explicitly presented under the forms of the historic incarnation in this life—will have between death and the final judgment the privilege of such presentation. There must ensue in every instance a definite, conscious, formal intellection of the historic Christ, and thus an opportunity of decisive acceptance or rejection of his redemption.

Martensen, the Danish theologian, Bishop of Seeland, while not fully pronounced for this theory, uses the following language: "The kingdom of the dead is a kingdom of calm thought and self-sathoming—a kingdom of remembrance in the full sense of the word." "The manifold voices of this worldly life grow dumb, and the holy voices now sound alone no longer deadened by the tumult of the world." "A morning ray first broke into this kingdom of shades through the descent of Christ into Hades." "Conversion then must still be possible for the unconverted in Hades."

II. Such is the doctrine. Now, what is it not?

1. It is not a "new departure." It is the resuscitation

1 We use the word "new" simply because it is easier to fall in with a short and intelligible popular phrase, even if inaccurate, than to use a more accurate but more lumbering circumlocution.
of an old theory which has been held by some minds in almost every age of the church since the second century of the Christian era. It is new to New England but not to Christendom. It is a new departure only from a provincial standpoint. The Andover bottle may be new, but the wine in it is old.

2. The "new" theory is not the doctrine of purgatory. It is not assumed that any discipline of purifying pain will be applied to the dead heathen, to enforce their decision in favor of Christ. On the contrary, the idea of the present doctrine of future probation seems to be, that substantially the same, and only the same, gracious opportunity as to freedom and motive, shall be given to the heathen after death, as is given to us before death.

3. The doctrine in question does not, when strictly and separately considered, amount to rationalism. Here again, however, we must discriminate. The dogma may be rationalistic in its genesis, and there is some reason to suppose that in this country a rationalistic coloring has been thrown upon it by the general theological environment under which it has been presented. In enunciating the proposition "Probation after Death through the Historic Christ," German scholars have emphasized the last word, "Christ," and so have repudiated a rationalistic accent upon the dogma. Others, on the contrary, seem to have emphasized the first word, "Probation," and so incurred the suspicion of such rationalistic accent. The dogma of future probation as presented at Andover wears a little the air of having been caught up in the sweep of a general theological excursus, in which all fundamental Christian doctrines have been somewhat modified, and a new vague monarch, viz., "Christian consciousness," exalted above Holy Scripture. Under this aspect, the dogma may be considered rationalistic, but as taught by its leading foreign exponents it is not rationalistic, for Dorner, Van Oosterzee, Alford, emphasize the christological element in it. That element is by them made the chief element. It is not "probation after death," so much as it is "Christ after death,"
which they delineate. Moreover, these foreign scholars are well-known foes of rationalism, and they support this dogma by a most microscopic exegesis and by a pronounced application of the doctrine of infallible inspiration to a very few passages of Scripture. What is rationalism? Rationalism is the interpretation of Scripture according to the requirements of a pre-conceived intellectual philosophy, rejecting this passage as a myth, modifying that passage as an exaggeration, toning up the Bible or toning it down, as the case may be, so as to make its statements fit in with an already prepared intellectual fabric.

Little of this attitude of mind or process of thought characterizes the main European advocates of the doctrine of probation after death. Dorner and Lange of Germany, Martensen of Denmark, Alford of England, are not rationalists. They are perhaps more truly mystics than rationalists. They are careful biblical scholars. They base their doctrine explicitly upon what they declare to be the Scripture teaching of "Christ’s descent into Hades," a notion which Rationalism proper rejects as a superstition.

4. The doctrine of probation after death is not Unitarianism. On the contrary, it is the very antithesis of Unitarianism. We should do Andover the justice to admit that its position here is unequivocal. Dorner says, "Modern Theology has eagerly welcomed this article, for it witnesses that even those who were not laid hold of by Christ’s historic manifestation in their earthly life still must and may be brought into relation to him, in order to be able to accept or to reject him. And thus, the universal relation of Christianity to humanity and the absoluteness of the Christian religion are confirmed." In fact, the whole genius and essence of this theory of probation after death in its purer form is intensely christological. The difficulty is that it is a christology in the air, rather than resting, as a realistic and practical christology must rest, on the principles of natural religion, and universal ethics. But at any rate this new theory is at the opposite extreme from Unitarianism.
5. Nor, finally, is the new theory Universalism. One of its American advocates says, "He who would carry hope behind the Judgment, parts company with the historic thought of the church." Dorner says, "Clear is the utterance of the New Testament principle that unbelief is damnation." Dorner rejects restorationism. He rejects also the theory of annihilation, although he seems to favor, as Horace Bushnell did, the notion that the lost soul sinks in the scale of being, until it ceases to be in any full sense of the word, human. The finally lost are "a kind of demented beings," says Dorner, "forever raging in impotent fury." "Spinning along their lengths of mediocrity" is the poetic phrase of Bushnell. But these are anti-Universalist positions. So that while it is undoubtedly true that certain students and theological thinkers of the second and shallower class have used the doctrine of future probation merely as a stepping-stone or half-way house to Universalism, yet it is also true, and very emphatically true, that the great leaders and biblical scholars who have adopted this theory expressly disclaim any such tendency or logical consequence. They say that the final judgment is the beginning of an everlasting retribution. They fully accept the heavily weighted statements of the New Testament as to eternal punishment.

6. But if the doctrine of Probation after Death through the Presentation of the Historic Christ is not purgatory, if it is not rationalism, if it is not Unitarianism, if it is not Universalism, then it is not a cardinal heresy. We associate the charge of heresy with the general notion of a future probation, i.e., an unlimited "chance" in the future. But in proportion as a definite, final presentment of the historic Christ is insisted on, the gravely heretical element in the dogma subsides. In itself considered, and irrespective of its logical consequence, this dogma may be looked upon, from the standpoint of an ecumenical theology, as a minor deflection, not a radical departure, from orthodox standards. It admits to itself a difference from the orthodox teaching mainly in the lesser importance which it gives to the article
of death and to the earthly life, but it claims to make that up in the added importance which it assigns to the intermediate state, to the final judgment, and especially to Christ himself, as having a living relation of grace to the vast kingdom of the dead. What we need, then, is discrimination. To fill the air with outcries against earnest Christian scholars who lean toward this view as being of course essential heretics, is, we submit, illogical and blind. It is the clamor of ignorance. As "conservatives" we shall gain nothing by it, for as soon as the subject is examined, the public will see that we have misrepresented our adversaries, and in our time when the light of public investigation is bright and hot even to fierceness upon all disputed issues, a misrepresentation always reacts against the man or the party that permits it. This much we may concede. At the same time we must insist that certain American advocates of this dogma have laid themselves open to such misunderstanding through their looseness of statement in regard to other and more fundamental articles of Christian doctrine. If the pushing of this particular dogma appears to be a symptom of a general lapse from orthodox standards, then the case is changed in a moment, for so a substantial heresy may be behind the dogma, though not necessarily in it.

III. So much then for the dogma—what it is, and what it is not. But the visionary character of this new hypothesis, under even its most careful statement, its illegitimacy as a dogma, and especially its illiberal drift, become apparent the moment we critically examine the arguments which are adduced to support it. For convenience' sake the discussion of our third and fourth general heads will be conducted together.

1. The Scripture argument. There are three passages of Scripture which are supposed explicitly to favor this view.

(1) The great Delphic passage in 1 Peter iii. 19, where it is said that Christ "preached to the spirits in prison."

(2) Matt. xii. 32, in regard to the "unpardonable sin," where it is argued that the non-forgiveness of this one sin in the other world implies the possible or probable forgiveness
of other sins. This certainly is textual criticism with a vengeance. As well might you conclude, when the governor of New York State declares that he will not pardon a certain notorious criminal in Sing Sing, that he will pardon every other prisoner in the prison. The conclusion is reached only by an arbitrary forcing of language.

(3) The third Scripture passage is 1 Peter iv. 6, where the language is, "For this cause was the gospel preached to them that are dead." The evident answer in this case is that the passage is grammatically equivocal. It may possibly mean "for this cause was the gospel preached [in life] to them who are [now] dead."

And even if it be conceded that the knowledge of the gospel be communicated to the spirits of the departed, this does not prove it to have been graciously pressed upon them, as it is upon men in this life. Such announcement of truth to the dead does not necessarily argue any extension of probation or any practical probability of an ethical change amounting to conversion in Hades. The same line of reply may be adopted with reference to the famous 1 Peter iii. 19, Christ's "descent into Hades," which is regarded on all hands as the exegetical fortress of the theory in question. But it is a fortress whose doors swing either way. For grammatically it may read and mean "preached [in their earthly lifetime] unto the spirits [who are now] in prison," that is to say, Christ, by his invisible Spirit, "preached," or made his truth manifest to the minds of some who lived before the flood, who now are in the waiting-place, or "prison," of Hades. In other words, the meaning of the passage is obscure and doubtful. Even Dorner says rather quaintly, "Dogmatic sobriety enjoins reserve upon this point." But grant that Christ did preach in Hades, there is nothing to show that such preaching was anything more than an announcement to the departed souls of the facts which had taken place, or were to take place in the upper world. There is nothing to show that this preaching was attended with any essential

R. V., "Even to the dead."
moral change in them; nor is any doctrine implied which would contradict the plain teaching of the passage in Corinthians, for example, where it is stated that men shall be judged according to the “deeds done in the body.”

IV. These, then, are the common answers to the three scriptural citations. The argument of the present essay, however, goes further than thus simply to recite these familiar replies to the arguments alleged. It goes so far as to charge upon this whole method of exegetical reasoning the complaint of illiberality.

The illiberality appears as soon as we reflect upon the dogmatic use made of these passages, and the theory of inspiration which underlies that use. Measure these passages,—only three, and they obscure and equivocal, the two stronger of them occurring in the writings of the same man, St. Peter, and not echoed or hinted at in the writings of St. Paul,—and then measure the illiberality of the exegetical insistence upon these few words as being so infallibly and verbally inspired and decisive as to furnish an adequate scriptural foundation for a great Christian dogma! We claim that this is illiberal rather than liberal. It is the attempt to bind the faith of the church upon a dozen unsupported words of Peter. It is of a piece with the ultramontane insistence upon Matt. xvi. 18, “upon this rock I will build my church,” as proving the primacy of the Roman See. The truly liberal evangelical method of interpreting the Bible is different. According to it, inspiration is not sporadic, but organic. True exegesis is not textual so much as documentary. It is the document as a whole, rather than its separate flying buttresses of phraseology, which must be studied. Theology must be biblical, not syllabic. It is the whole book, not the turn of a phrase, which is the liberal canon of truth, and nothing is admissible into the austere and regal domain of dogma which does not command the clear comprehensive support of many passages of God’s word. Even grant that these three texts of Scripture be allowed their full weight, and not a word be said in rebuttal. Can such slender and sparse exegetical planks
support the tremendous weight of a great Christian dogma? But more than this, if we concede that a dogma can be built on three texts alone, we admit a principle of exegesis which logically amounts to theological suicide. For a hundred fantastic doctrines can collate three scattered texts which read alone will support them. The theory of final restoration of all souls can command many more texts than three. So can the doctrine of a literal communism in property. Even the doctrine of celibacy can summon its proof-texts. The only sound and safe exegesis is one which interprets one text by others, which modifies and supplements the meaning of one passage by the meaning of all passages of Holy Scripture. Rationalism, in one sense of the term (though not the technical sense), viz., the truly rational handling of God's word, lies at the basis of Protestantism, and the difficulty with this special exegesis supporting future probation is, that it is not, in this sense, rationalistic enough. It is not thoroughly Protestant. It is at bottom an intensely Old School exegesis, so old, indeed, that it goes back to the fanciful exploits of the Greek Fathers, Origen and Gregory of Nyssa, and their imaginative exegetical structures, for its prototypes. Western, and especially Protestant, thought has built less in the air and more on the earth, less in the next world and more in this, and in this regard no doubt represents the true development of a cosmopolitan Christianity.

2. A striking illustration of the concealed illiberality of this view of probation after death is seen in its relation to the salvation of infants. The case of infants has been summoned to support the dogma. It is said that the commonly received doctrine of the salvation of infants has no valid basis unless we suppose that after death with an advancing maturity they come under the explicit power of Christ's redemption under historic formulas, and so choose it for themselves. But surely here we meet the hard illiberality of the colossal assumption that the only way by which an infant can come under the power of Christ's redemption is
through historic formulas, mentally discriminated and con-
sciously adopted. On the contrary, for aught we know, in-
fants may be under the power of Christ’s redemption, with-
out a necessity for the intervention of any intellectual
recognition of the historic Christ. A mother cares for her
child, and succors it, when the child is very young, before
the child knows the mother by any self-conscious discrimina-
tion. So Christ may care for the infant spirit, and graciously
save it, aside from any self-conscious intellection on the part
of the child. “Faith saves;” very true, but there may be
an implicit as well as an explicit faith, and faith must not be
confined to an adult intellection of the formal and scenic ele-
ments of an historic incarnation. So to confine the definition
of faith is shallow psychology and illiberal theology. And
how darkly illiberal, in contrast with our catholic position,
does this theory in its relation to children appear when we
follow it out to its practical results! For this doctrine of
future probation at once throws uncertainty over the final
destiny of infant children. Perhaps we have not thought
enough of this. One-half the human race dies in infancy.
Aside from all Scripture, which says nothing directly on the
subject, the Protestant world rests in the instinctive verdict
springing from its knowledge of God and its common human
feeling that such a little one is certainly taken at death into
the Father’s home and bosom, saved through Christ, though
not conscious of Christ, and not conscious of sin. I will not
attempt to indicate the immeasurable solace which thus abides
by the innumerable graves of the children. But admit this
theory of a future probation and all is changed. There may
be a probability but no certainty of salvation even for the
youngest child. Life must go on after death until the soul
is mature enough to understand the historic Christ, who will
then be presented before it for acceptance or rejection. If
you say that such a trial will be made so favorable and Christ
presented under terms so constraining as to insure acceptance,
then where is your probation? In such case it is not proba-
tion at all; it is certainty. Then beside, the question would
arise, Where is the justice in presenting Christ to adults who live in this world under terms less constraining? No, the moment we whisper the word "probation"—in any vital sense of that term—after death, we logically make our whisper one of amazement and doubt, and terror often, in regard to the ultimate fate of departed children. Is this liberal?

3. Here is the place to mention two other arguments, ordinarily adduced to support this view of future probation, both of which, however, owe their force to what we must again call an illiberal, i.e., a narrow and merely textual, way of handling the Bible. One of these arguments is that the Old Testament favors the doctrine, in its use of the term "Sheol" as a place for the good and bad alike. The Old Testament, it is claimed, does not teach that men are at once ethically separated after death, but that the good and bad together enter the same "Sheol," which is not represented as a place of retributive discrimination. But plainly this is the inference of a narrowly textual exegesis. The larger and liberal exegesis asserts that the Old Testament says next to nothing upon the subject in any way, that what it does say is entirely vague, non-dogmatic, as though the Spirit of revelation had been content to concentrate its light upon the present life and leave the field of the future without explicit statement, a fact which would itself be improbable if the doctrine of a distinct future probation were true. The second of these two arguments is that if death decides destiny, then nothing of importance remains to the final judgment; that, in fact, it is not a judgment at all, but merely a ceremony, pro forma, a ratification of a sentence already inflicted. Now we meet this proposition at once, in the first place, by the larger and profounder exegesis, identified with truly liberal thought, which detects in the New Testament literature an expectation of Christ’s second coming and the judgment before the expiration of the life of the generation then on the stage. Death was not emphasized because men did not expect to die before Christ came. The judgment was the near, the imminent, and
so the peremptory fact, not death. It is fair, also, to reply to the somewhat formal tone of the reasoning we are opposing, by an argument in kind. We may say, in reference to the future judgment, that such a solemn ratification and public proclamation of judicial sentence and final destiny is of importance enough to warrant all the Scripture language concerning it. So far as public interests are concerned, and generally in human jurisprudence, it is not the moment when the criminal commits his crime, nor even the moment when the judge reaches his judgment on the case, but it is the hour of the public proclamation of the judge's decision which is the prime moment of public consequence, with reference to moral administration.

But what we have to emphasize in this connection is much more than this. We have to call attention to that deeper and more ethical notion of "judgment," by which the liberal evangelical faith interprets the ἁναγοµενος of the New Testament. In the intimate substance of it, ἁναγοµενος is not limited to any "day." It is, with philosophical accuracy, an eternal judgment,—eternal because timeless. It sustains both its individual relations and its race relation. As to the individual it is present; as to the race it is future. In the personal moral nature is the judgment-seat, a kind of outpost of the Great White Throne, compared with whose solemn and incessant verdict physical death is a subordinate incident. This personal adjudication, registered in the present life in a determined ethical character, completes itself, so far as humanity at large is concerned, in a future and final Day of Judgment, in which the race, as a race, shall be fully judged. We emphasize ἁναγοµενος itself, then, rather than the mere chronology of ἁναγοµενος. To identify the thrilling and instant energy of the New Testament treatment of ἁναγοµενος, solely with a formal judicial assize, and a definite date, sometime after death, seems mechanical and perfunctory. The really liberal evangelical thought, here as everywhere, disentangles the essence of the truth from its scenic accessories, steers clear of a narrow chronological eschatology, and admits that
judgment is of more importance than death, because judgment is now, as well as at the "great day,"—now for the individual, as leading up to the "great day" for the race. The writer may perhaps be allowed to quote from an unpublished paper of an eminent American scholar and preacher, whose attitude on these subjects is liberal, while evangelical. He says: "Salvation, like sin, has both its individual and its worldwide aspects. The judgment-throne is in the conscience. But the judgment is both individual and universal. It is a race-process, of which the last day is the terminus, when the books are closed in the ethical account of humanity. There is, what we call in general terms a 'day of salvation,' not conterminous with any one individual life. There is also a 'day of judgment,' at death for the individual, at the advent of Christ for the race."

4. Another curious argument relied upon by Dorner to prove probation after death, is that it has actually occurred, viz., in the instance of the daughter of Jairus, the widow's son at Nain, and Lazarus at Bethany, all of whom after death came again back into life, and presumably into that freedom of moral choice, balance of motive, and opportunity of grace, which constitute probation. The argument is this, that if these miracles occurred, then there is no necessary connection between death and the end of probation; for, if so, then these persons had two probations. If they were first in probation, then out of it, then in probation again, plainly they had two probations, and according to which of the two, then, would they be judged at last? If then this absurd result, so continues the Dorner argument, leads us to conclude, that in these instances probation continued, then death in these cases did not arrest probation, and if it did not for them, why should it for anybody? The plain reply to this ingenious argument is that the argument itself is casuistry—that it involves the sophistry of arguing from an avowed exception to a general law, and this is always illogical. According to good logic we can never reason from the exception to the rule, much less from miraculous
exceptions to customary providential procedures. What God might do with those special cases affords no criterion for what is his ordinary law.

But the matter does not end here. See whither this illiberal and petty casuistry leads. According to the dogma, heathen who "never heard of Christ" are to have a future probation. Who then is such an heathen? Is a native of the Indian hills, for example, who once in his life, when on a visit to Ahmednagar, saw a Bible for sale in a bazaar, or heard a missionary preach,—is he such an heathen or not? How much knowledge of the gospel is necessary to constitute an heathen not an heathen in reference to probation? How about the ignorant populace of our own cities? Will they have their probation in the next life or in this? At what point of fulness in intellectual apprehension of Christianity and the historic Christ does the probationary period suddenly shift from the realms beyond the grave to the life here? Such a point exists. Such a shifting takes place. If the man dies before noon, we will say, he will have his probation after death; if he lives till nightfall, and hears a missionary preach, his probation is before death! Into such intolerable and illiberal pettiness of questioning is Christ's broad gospel logically driven by the attempt to apply practically any definite dogma of probation after death.

5. Finally, the last and greatest argument in favor of the doctrine of probation after death through the presentation of the historic Christ, and the underlying argument of all the other arguments, is the proposition, which, it is claimed, represents the whole trend of the New Testament, that Christianity is absolute and universal, that thus salvation is always connected with conscious, deliberate acceptance of Christ; that condemnation is always in the same way connected with conscious deliberate unbelief and rejection of him; that therefore there must be opportunity for such rejection. Dorner, for example, quotes Mark xvi. 16. It is
not said, "he that heareth not shall be condemned," but "he that believeth not."

Now as to this great argument, we are prompt to concede the profound christological and evangelical sentiment of it. It is an argument which makes Christ central and supreme. So far well. But more than this, it makes him supreme in such a way as that not only the spiritual truth of Christ is essential to salvation, but a certain concrete, historic, formal presentment of Christ, as if in so many words to the mind, becomes equally essential to salvation. In other words, the form of the fact is as important as the fact itself. Now, as Christians, we admire and approve the motive of those who urge this argument, provided they urge it sincerely. It is to honor Christ and his redemption. And yet exactly here we take issue with the argument, and take issue with it on the ground of its illiberality. We admit and agree that Christ is central, that his redemption alone saves, but we utterly deny that any formal, historic presentment of Christ is as essential as Christ himself. We believe that Christ, the Saviour of the whole world, can reach and does reach the human mind through other channels than those of historic knowledge. We believe that he may reach men who never knew of him in the way of conscious intellect. We hold that our modern prophets of a specialized extension of probation are really confining and shutting up Christianity, when they thus assume that a man must have a definite, mental conception of an historic incarnation—we might almost say a materialized incarnation—a cross, a youth hanging thereon, a hill of Calvary, the scenery of the first century, in other words, the "historic Christ"—as the only mental channel by which the truth of Christ can touch the man. We believe that this truth carried by Christ's Spirit can reach men through a hundred channels. The deep doctrine of the solidarity of the race, a doctrine scientific as well as Pauline, goes a great way. The influences of the redemption reach the race as a race. The individualized camera of a conscious historic perspective is not a sine qua
non. The intellectual apprehension of the historic incarnation as we understand those words, by the penitent thief on the cross was probably exceedingly vague, inadequate, and erroneous. It was a state of penitence and faith, per se, which lay back of the intellectual apprehension, to which the welcoming assurance of the dying Saviour's mercy was so promptly given. Patriotism may exist before a man is able to read the constitution of the country he fights for; so substantive Faith, like the Nile, finds its outlet through a mental Delta, including an almost infinite variety of subjective intellectual forms. This is the liberal view and it is evangelical also, for Christ is held to be the Power always. The more knowledge of him the better. The broader the intellectual channels can be opened, the better; the more preaching the better; but Christ can find a way to himself for the faith which he sees existing even though the intellect be sealed. The liberal evangelical view is that the truth of Christ, properly and exactly so called, the truth of the divine law and love and sacrifice and forgiveness and redemption, can reach a child, for example, through its knowledge of its mother, or a woman through her affection for her child. We even believe that the influence of the Redeemer, availing itself thus of incalculable agencies, can reach the Indian courier in the jungle of the Ganges, or the African slave girl far up the Nile, along the channels of their thought, along such channels of knowledge, imagination, sentiment, as are open to them. And thus to broaden the prerogative of the Redeemer's power is the true evangelical liberality. Can we confine ourselves within the proposition that Christ, the eternal Logos, who made the wonderful world, who was crucified "from the foundation of the world," is fettered to an historic picture of himself? Is Christ's influence tied up within the mechanism of a single concretely working mental process in men? Our objection to this theory of a future probation upon the basis of an intellectual conception of the historic Christ is not that it is too liberal, but that it is not liberal enough. It subjects the Lord of glory to the move-
ments of a single, narrow mental mechanism. A thorough psychology is against it. We are not conscious of the learning of half of what we nevertheless learn. Physiologists tell us, that at least one-half our brain processes, half our functions of sensation and cerebration, are unconscious. We grow partly as trees grow. Half our mental nutriment is absorbed unconsciously. We are partly like unconscious infants all our lives. The processes by which power, knowledge, life, come to the soul are not all numerically tabulated. They are not registered according to some formal scheme, but are varied, multiform, infinite. Now shall we hew our faith down to the assertion that the great God, who made all this structure, and intends to redeem it by a marvellous and miraculous redemption, must be shut up to merely one of its many avenues of approach, namely, that of conscious, concrete, historical picturing, in order to reach it? The idea of such an objective necessity is too narrowly definite for a divine redemption. It implies not only a shallow psychology, but also a theory of individualism which is unscientific. We agree with the good brethren of Andover and elsewhere, and with all devout Bible students, in their insistence upon the universality of the gospel. On their behalf we even make haste to repudiate the injustice of certain ignorant common attacks upon them as being heretics. We do not so regard them. We acknowledge the learning and revere the piety of the few great German scholars who have avowed this special theory of continued probation, but when we see that the theory involves a compression of God's redeeming power within the little single avenue of a formal mental picture of the historic Christ, then we must part company with them, and stand off from the doctrine as being not only unscriptural but artificial and illiberal. We stand off not in the name of "conservatism" but in the name of the liberty of a broader and more catholic faith.

We may wade through many pages of laborious reasoning in which this specialized ground is taken, that somehow, somewhere, after death, the baby's soul, for example, or the
soul of the unbaptized savage, is to be put in the audience-box, and a formal presentment of the earthly incarnation made (for this is what the theory amounts to), upon which presentment that infant or savage soul is to decide, under the forms of such mental conception and moral conclusions as obtain among us civilized, adult Christians; but such reasoning, after all, is as unsubstantial as the palace of Kubla Khan seen by Coleridge in his dream. It is the analysis of fancies, the weighing of shadows. A larger and deeper mental philosophy is against it. A larger and deeper exegesis is against it. The natural, ethical substructure of the Bible is against it. It is a numerical, an artificial substitute for true spirituality. It limits man. It limits God.

In what contrast to these over-refined and specialized notions about disembodied preaching and the historic Christ is the tremendous realism of that shattering sentence of Paul, "For as many as have sinned without law shall also perish without law, and as many as have sinned in the law shall be judged by the law." Or that sentence of Peter, thrilling with the new disclosure of a cosmopolitan Christianity, made to him in a vision in the tanner's house in Joppa, by the broad and beckoning sea, "In every nation he that feareth God and worketh righteousness is accepted with him" (Acts x. 35). *

* Note on Acts x. 35.—We can well enough admit with Neander and Meyer, that the notion of doctrinal indifferentism is not taught here. We may agree with Bengel that "not all religions, but all nations, are here placed on the same level." We heartily agree, that even in the case of such a pagan as Cornelius, one who "feareth God and worketh righteousness," salvation takes place for the sake of, and through the application of, Christ's redemption; but we insist that the natural force of Peter's language and of the situation which the case of Cornelius presents, forbid the narrow theory that the influence of this redemption must come upon all men under identical forms and terms of mental apprehension of the historic Christ. The acute article by Dr. Thomas P. Field, in the Andover Review for May, 1887, fails at this essential point, viz., to discriminate between the essential substance and quality of the "Faith which saves," and its form of subjective mental manifestation. That all are saved through Christ, if saved at all, is true; that faith in him is essential to salvation is also true; but the substantive contents of this faith may exist, with varying forms and degrees of con-
In other words, historic Christianity is not the substructure of religion. Christology, essential as it is, yet rests upon the greater granite of universal ethical and spiritual principles. Christology is the shrine and the spire of divine truth, not the whole of it. We may thank God that we are permitted to approach this open shrine, but the broad pavement of the temple stretches away out and on into the outer court, where the wandering heathen, if penitent, or the helpless infant, may be saved, for the sake of the shrine, but not seeing the shrine.

IV. In this rapid review the positive and overwhelming argument from Scripture against this new theory has hardly been touched. We have attended simply to the argument on the other side. And a careful examination of this argument and the new-old hypothesis which it is brought forward to support, convinces us that both in point of exegesis and of philosophy, its "liberalism" is in appearance only, not in fact. In a word, it makes too little of "natural religion," too little of rational ethics. If erected into a dogma it even impairs the moral dignity of the present life, and it does this by the method of making a particular phase of redemption, viz., the concrete, historic phase, the equivalent of redemption itself; and thus to make a part take the place of the whole is essential illiberality. The particular object

sicious historic knowledge of the incarnation, or even with none at all. A state of mind exists, which God accepts and approves, and which will instantly precipitate itself into positive dogmatic forms of faith, the moment Christ is historically presented. Admit what is of course true, that to such persons Christ will be presented in the future life; that is, admit, as a necessity of spiritual life hereafter, that the knowledge of the historic Christ will come to such persons, and that they will instantly and certainly rejoice in and accept it, yet in such case the real probation is within the arena of the earlier period, and the decision there to "fear God and work righteousness" which decides the subsequent acceptance of Christ after death, is the really probationary decision. A subsequent specialized decision in favor of Christ as soon as He is presented is not thus, in strictness, probationary at all, for that decision is already certain, and made certain by the state of mind "acceptable with God" already attained. This is very far from being a future probation.
and scope, then, of the present argument must not be misunderstood. It is not a discussion of the general questions of eschatology. It is an argument levelled against the latent illiberality involved in the recent *dogmatising* on the subject. The further reach of the argument would be to indicate that, upon the field of eschatology, dogmatism beyond the limits set by distinct revelation is illiberality. In regard to what God has not revealed, we may wonder, we may question, we may trust, but we must not dogmatize.

We know, of course, that the advocates of the dogma disclaim any such illiberal spirit or intention; but, unless they more carefully guard their position than they have done, this is the upshot of it. For to identify probation with the single issue of accepting or rejecting the historic Christ is to make other issues and other sins of little consequence, and so degrade the world as a moral arena. Indeed, the ultimate tendency is to dissolve the ethical ground-work of all religion.

The great ethical principle, wide as the Bible and as old as man, on which the Old Testament and the New alike stand, is that the law of God is revealed in the human conscience; that *there* is the essential probation; that the fundamental question of probation is what a man will do as to the simple issue of right and wrong discriminated by his conscience and disclosed from heaven by the "things that are made."* If probation be a supplementary specialty, merely the question of accepting or rejecting the historic Christ, then the heathen have no real probation in this life at all, and to say this discredits all moral distinctions, pours contempt upon that oldest testament, which Paul calls "the witness" of God, which is in men's hearts, and before their eyes in the works

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*This law of God, in its spiritual depth and breadth, may embrace, for aught we know, such a potential incorporation and intimation of the gracious attitude of God, in relation to repentance, as shall amount to an implicit, though non-differentiated Christianity, even as the Old Testament itself contains the ground-work of such a Christianity, in still more approximate relief. Thus probation, under this law, will not then be a mere hard, legal issue, but may be, in a true sense, a probation under grace, though not under the formal knowledge of an historic incarnation for a redemptive end.
of nature, and in the moral judgments of experience and of history. The New Testament rests on the Old; the gospel on the ten commandments, Sinai is assumed before Calvary appears. Probation is complete, guilt is incurred, ruin affected, condemnation pronounced, the ethical vials filled,—all this takes its solemn place as the occasion, ground, and reason of the coming of Christ and the office of redemption. Justice does not command God to give his Son. The ethical factors are intact, if no Christ appears. This is the tremendous verdict of Natural Religion. This also is the reasoning of Paul. Now, to create another issue than this naked and grand one of conscience and right, viz., a specialized issue concerning an historic Christ, and call this latter alone probation, is to blur in a moment the clear edge of these old moral axioms and cast a slur upon the natural human conscience, upon the field it works in, the law it responds to, and the God who made it. For this reason it is illiberal.

The theory of future probation may perhaps be entertained as a speculation, as an hypothesis, as simply one of the phases of that inevitable outreach of the mind in which we seek to press beyond revelation, and beyond the veil of death, and guess as to what God will do with his infant or benighted children in the other life. This theory may be entertained with other theories, in this merely provisional way, without serious harm; but it cannot be made a dogma, nor formulated in scriptural definitions, nor inserted into the fabric of positive faith. Under the instant and imperative accent of gospel appeal with its solemn warnings, we recognize one life, and that is this one; we know one moment, and that is now. We have one probation, and all men have it. Death comes, and after death, judgment. Christ is ours if we will have him. He is ours to preach with immediate and insistent passion to every creature. As for what is not distinctly revealed, we must leave it and trust it with God. His actual dealing with all men will probably be far more tender, as well as more seriously just, than any explicit dogma of a future probation could even be able to conceive.
The simple, final truth to which this whole current of argument leads us is this, that the ecumenical faith is after all the truly and justly liberal faith. A careful, inductive examination of all heresies or quasi-heresies will lead to this conclusion, which we should also affirm as a fair a priori presumption. The ecumenical is the truly liberal. Dogmatism, even when so called "liberal," beyond the limits of clear revelation, involves latent illiberality. What forms of divine mercy may accompany the recoil of actually ignorant wrongdoing, we cannot tell, for we have not been told. We can rest in the Christian axiom, that nothing shall meet with final loss but that which is irreclaimably sinful, and that must; but beyond this not enough is disclosed to warrant any dogma of future probation or salvation with reference to classes and conditions not specified in Scripture.

It is not along this road of precise and specific forecasts, that we are to obtain real and rational relief from the burdens that press upon us in connection with the questions of eschatology. It is a mistake to suppose that the doctrine of probation after death under its recent definition, is a relieving doctrine. It is along another road, far more immediate and solid, the road of understanding more of God as he is now, more of man as he is to-day, that we are to find relief. A true theology, a true psychology, these are the parents of any true "larger hope." We need, however, not be alarmed as to the final outcome of the current discussions. The Bible will be better known, the real faith of the church will be better discriminated from its volatile environment of mere opinion, and a clearer urgency will be put upon the motives that commend and carry abroad the gospel, and that confirm men in the love and service of the true God.
ARTICLE II.

PREMILLENNIALISM: ITS RELATIONS TO DOCTRINE AND PRACTICE.

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The great and increasing interest in eschatology is one of the most conspicuous features of the religious life of our times. It is manifest even in the secular sphere. The various schemes of socialism, communism, and even anarchism, are all essentially eschatologic in their character, in that they all seek to produce an ideally perfect state on earth, the absolute ultimatum of human progress.¹ In the religious sphere the same interest is evinced by the activity of discussion concerning the future of the individual,—conditional immortality, restorationism, future probation, and so on; as also in the increasing study of unfulfilled prophecy regarding the future of the race on earth. Under this last head specially noticeable is the evidently rising interest in the question of the premillennial advent. As on the doctrinal side the question has come up in connection with the interpretation of Scripture by eminent exegetes like Alford, Tregelles, Lange, Ellicott, and others, so it no less naturally emerges on the practical side of Christian life, in connection with the great revival of active interest in the evangelization of the world. For the more that this work demands of men and money, the more urgent it is felt to be that, if possible, the church should be assured beyond doubt as to the Scripture teaching concerning the purpose of the Lord in this work. Hence interest in the controversy steadily increases, and, more and more, men among the ablest in the church are coming out as participants in the discussion on the one side of the

¹See Auberlen, Der Prophet Daniel, u. s. w., p. 213.
question or the other. While there are many by whom premillennialism is, to say the least, exceedingly disliked, and who would that, if it were possible, the present agitation of the subject might die out, yet when the generation has brought forth men such as Alford, Godet, Delitzsch, Birks, Auberlen, Van Oosterzee, and many others of like standing, as advocates of one form or other of premillennialism, it is felt more and more that the subject cannot well be ignored, as if it were merely a fantastic dream of weak-minded and fanatical enthusiasts, or of ill-balanced and ill-educated theologians.

And yet because many have been accustomed all their life to associate in their minds such views with such a class of persons, and have therefore not thought it worth their while to examine into the subject closely,\(^2\) one often has occasion to observe that many otherwise intelligent Christians, and even some learned theologians, labor under the most erroneous impressions as to what those beliefs really are which premillennialists commonly regard as essential to their eschatology, and naturally also entertain no less imperfect or mistaken views as to their bearing on Christian doctrine and practice. It is proposed in the present article to indicate what appear to be the essential elements in the premillennial eschatology, so far as it may be possible to gather these from the teachings of its most competent advocates; then briefly to state the leading arguments which they adduce for their beliefs; and, finally, to point out the apparent doctrinal affinities and practical bearing of this type of eschatology.

I. The propositions which seem to be essential and fundamental to premillennial eschatology, in all its various forms, may, we believe, be stated as follows:—

(1) The Scriptures teach us to expect on the earth a

\(^2\)Even Dr. Charles Hodge in his "Systematic Theology" begins the discussion of the Second Advent by remarking that "the subject cannot be adequately discussed without taking a survey of all the prophetic teachings of the Scriptures," which "cannot be satisfactorily accomplished by any one who has not made the study of the prophecies a specialty;" and then with admirable candor, tells the reader that he himself "has no such qualifications for the work"! *Op. cit.*, Vol. iii. p. 790.
universal triumph of the gospel, and a prolonged supremacy of righteousness and truth.

(2) They also teach that we are to expect a personal, visible return of the risen and ascended Christ, in the glory of his Father.

(3) The teachings of the Scripture forbid us to place the predicted reign of righteousness on this side the personal advent; they therefore compel us to place it on the other side of that event. Whence it follows that we must conclude that—

(4) The purpose of the return of Christ to the earth is to set up and administer the promised kingdom of righteousness, by establishing over the whole earth a theocratic government, vested in the Son of man and his risen and glorified people who shall have believed on him up to the time of his appearing.

Obviously, in the first two of these propositions premillennialists are at one with most evangelical Christians. The controversy centres on the latter two, and primarily on the third. As is well known, there are many other beliefs, more or less closely and universally connected with these, upon some of which there is a difference of opinion among premillennialists themselves. Such are the doctrine concerning the restoration of Israel, and the position of that nation in the expected new order of things; the interpretation of the prophecies concerning the antichrist; the distinction in time between the resurrection of the righteous and that of the wicked, etc. But we believe that none of these, even the last named, is so inseparable from the premillennial system as to be entitled to a place among its fundamental affirmations. On some of these, indeed, many of their opponents have agreed with them.⁸

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⁸ Thus Professor Moses Stuart, of Andover, no millennialist, as everyone knows, in his (preteristic) "Commentary on the Revelation of John," criticises Vitringa and others for regarding Rev. xx. 5 as "doubtful" ground for the doctrine of a literal first resurrection, and thinks any exegesis which would make it teach anything else "incongruous." See Op. cit., Vol. i. pp.
In this connection it will be desirable to advert to certain points upon which one often meets with misconception as to premillennialist beliefs. In the first place, it should be emphasized that it is not involved in the system that a time is fixed for the second advent. This was done by Mr. Miller, among the first in recent times; and to this day, in arguing with premillennialists, reference is often made to the disastrous mistakes of himself and his followers in this matter. But Mr. Miller was not a premillennialist, in the sense in which the term is now commonly used. In common with post-millennialists he expected that the appearing of the Lord would bring the history of the race on earth to an immediate close, which premillennialists, with scarcely an exception, deny. And although here and there individual premillennialists, in direct opposition to Christ's plain words, have ventured to name a year in which the Lord might be expected, it would be difficult to name a man of representative standing who has done so. On the contrary, their testimony against this error has been in general as outspoken as that of their opponents. A bare reference to such names as those of the Bonars, Canons Fausset and Birks, Tregelles, Alford, Godet, and many others, will suffice to show how groundless is the vulgar impression on this matter. It is true, indeed, that not a few, agreeing with the principles of interpretation adopted by Mede, Newton, Faber, and other interpreters of the historical school, both premillennialist and post-millennialist, have believed that the limits of certain dispensational periods were

176, 178, 397; ii. pp. 360, 475–477. More lately, Duesterdieck, in his anti-millennialist Commentary on the same book, also maintains on exegetical grounds the literal sense of Rev. xx. 4–6, as predicting a resurrection of saints before the rest of the dead; but thinks that in his conception of the thousand-years' reign the writer of this book erred, and teaches what is opposed to the analogy of Scripture. See Hand-Book to the Revelation of John, translated by H. E. Jacobs, D. D., pp. 465, 85. In the recent "Symposium on the Second Advent," in The British Weekly, Principal Edwards, arguing against millenarians, also affirms his own belief in the same interpretation of Rev. xx. 5, so far as regards a literal resurrection before the millennium.
revealed in Scripture, after the analogy of Daniel’s prophecy of the seventy weeks in connection with the first advent. But no one, that we are aware, among reputable interpreters of this class, has ventured, even on this hypothesis, to maintain that the beginning, or, by consequence, the end, of such periods could be certainly known to a year; and still less that any such supposed terminal date indicated the year in which the personal advent was without doubt to be expected.

The belief of premillennialist interpreters of this school is no more than this; that such chronological data indicate “the approaching end of the age.” A large part, however, of modern premillennialists are of the futurist school of interpretation, and insist that we have no chronological data in Scripture which indicate even the approach of the end.

Again, it is important to understand that modern premillennialists do not believe that the second advent of Christ will immediately end the existence of men in the flesh upon the earth. While others believe that the present dispensation is final, and that its end will be the end of history and of the progress of the race upon the earth, premillennialists, with the exception of a small School of the “Adventists,” deny this, and agree that for at least a long time after the advent and the resurrection of “the church of the first-born,” human life on earth will continue. Through a failure to understand their belief in this respect, the objection is often made to what is imagined to be premillennialism, that it is incredible that with the resources of the earth yet scarcely touched, and human progress, as it would seem, scarcely begun, the second advent

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4 Such is, e. g., the position of Mr. Grattan Guinness in his recent work so named; in which he says:—“According to the testimony of the sure word of prophecy, the end is near, but none can say how near, or determine its actual epoch.” The Approaching End of the Age, p. 471. To the same effect write Professor Birks, of Cambridge University, in Thoughts on Sacred Prophecy, pp. 105, 119; Elliott, Horæ Apocalypticæ, 5th ed., pp. 238, 239, et passim; and many others.

6 Heb. xii. 22.

* See, e. g., Birks, Four Prophetic Empires, pp. 310–326; and his Commentary on the Book of Isaiah, pp. 317–319.
should occur, and the world and all upon it be destroyed, possibly in the near future. To this, it is sufficient to reply that premillennialists generally have no expectation that the advent will put an immediate end to the progress and development of the human race on earth, but only that it will place that progress under new conditions, and those far more favorable than the present.\(^7\) The appearing of Christ, in their belief, marks the end indeed of the *aion*, or “age,” but not of the *kosmos*, or “world.” It is true that we read of a destruction of the world by fire in “the day of the Lord;” but premillennialists understand that phrase to denote a prolonged period of time, after the analogy, for instance, of the “days” of the creation; nor do they believe that the Scripture language is such as to compel us to believe that even the fiery catastrophe predicted as to occur in “the day of the Lord,” must occur at its very beginning, or shall of necessity destroy the planet, though it shall issue in the appearing of “a new earth.”\(^8\)

From this it follows, and is of consequence to observe, that the most of modern premillennialists believe that the coming age which the second advent shall introduce, will be marked by a twofold order of humanity: (1st) The saints of the first resurrection, to whom, jointly with the Son of man, the government of the race shall then be committed; and (2d) The nations in the flesh,—the then converted remnant of Israel and the Gentiles,—who shall be the subjects, as the former class shall be the rulers, in the coming kingdom. Through a failure to apprehend this distinction, beliefs have

\(^7\) So, e. g., Professor Godet says that after the Parousia “all will go on as it did before; only the mind of humanity will have been transformed by this divine manifestation…. Then will begin what is called in the Revelation the reign of a thousand years. This reign will be the great period of Christian civilization.” “Symposium on the Second Advent,” in the *British Weekly*, July 15, 1887. See also, Lange’s Commentary on the Revelation, Am. ed., “Excursus on The New Jerusalem” by the Am. Editor, Rev. E. R. Craven, D. D., p. 391; Ebrard, Christliche Dogmatik, pp. 748, 749; Luthardt, Lehre von den Letzten Dingen, pp. 34, 35.

\(^8\) 2 Pet. iii. 13.
been imputed to premillennialists which they utterly repudiate. It is, for instance, a great mistake to represent them as believing that in the resurrection the saints ‘‘shall rise and reign in the flesh.’’ In opposition to such a gross imagination they agree with all Christians in maintaining the obvious sense of those words of our Lord, that the sons of the resurrection neither ‘‘marry nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God.’’

It should be further said that it is not even essential to the premillennial eschatology that one shall maintain the continued and local presence of the Lord and of his saints in resurrection life at any particular place on earth during the millennial period; nor do we know of any reputable authority who would insist that because Christ and the risen saints shall in that age administer the government of the world, therefore they must mingle with men in the flesh after the manner in which we mingle with one another now. In reference to this question, premillennialists often refer to the relation which the risen Lord sustained to his disciples still in the fleshly life, during the forty days before his public ascension, as very possibly a suggestion of the state of things which may exist in the days of the coming kingdom. However opinion may vary on this matter, we believe that most intelligent premillennialists would regard no more as essential to their eschatology than simply the personal return of the Lord and

8 Even the late Professor A. A. Hodge, D. D., strangely fell into this misapprehension. See his Outlines of Theology, rev. ed., p. 571.

10 Matt. xxii. 30.

11 Professor Godet’s words deserve to be noted here. He says, after affirming that the Parousia will be premillennial, ‘‘There will be no mingling here below of immortal risen ones with sinners who have still to die—an opinion which Professor Beet wrongly ascribes to millennarians. The living may perhaps be able to hold more free communion with them than is now possible between the dwellers in earth and heaven. But neither in the Epistles of Paul nor in the Revelation, is there the least indication of the visible and permanent presence of the Lord and his elect on earth during all that period.’’ The British Weekly, July 15, 1887, p. 162.

12 So, e. g., Ebrard, Christliche Dogmatik, Vol. ii. p. 737.
the resurrection of the righteous at the beginning of the new age, and the establishment therewith of theocratic rule over the whole world in the place of present earthly polities.

Recent controversy on this subject makes it necessary to add that, however here and there some premillennarians may have expressed themselves in a way that may have justly laid them open to misapprehension, it is nevertheless not true, as some have supposed, that the premillennial eschatology involves the denial of the present exaltation of the Lord Jesus Christ on the mediatorial throne. No stronger declarations of this vital truth can be found than we meet in the writings of the strongest premillennialists.18

II. After this brief exposition of what appear to be the most essential and fundamental elements in the premillennial eschatology, we have now to indicate, briefly, the general line of argument upon which its advocates depend for its support.

Of the first and second of the above four fundamental propositions, there is no need here to give the proof. They belong to the general belief of all evangelical Christians, and the Scripture testimony both as to the final subjection of the world to Christ and the future personal second advent, is familiar to all. As for the proof of the remaining two propositions, which embody what belongs distinctively to premillennialist belief, it should be premised that premillennialists would not generally admit the correctness of the frequent statement that the truth or falsity of the whole system turns on the interpretation of the famous passage concerning the "thousand years" in Rev. xx. One and all would claim that however strong the argument, in their opinion, from that passage, especially as regards the length of interval be-

18 Illustrations of this fact may be found on every hand. See, e. g., Van Oosterzee, Christian Dogmatics, Sec. cxiii., and especially the admirable chapter in The Image of Christ, on "The God-Man in the World;" also, Delitzsch, Commentary on the Epistle to the Hebrews, Vol. i. p. 109; Ebrard, Christliche Dogmatik, pp. 291-294.
tween the resurrections, yet the truth of the system as embodied in propositions (3) and (4) above, would not be affected though it were to be dropped out of the Scripture. No more is the frequent statement justified by facts, that the proof of premillennialism turns on the interpretation of the symbolical rather than the plain and literal portions of the Scriptures.

Of propositions (3) and (4), as given above, it will be observed that the former refers to the chronological relation of the second advent to the expected triumph of the kingdom of Christ; and the latter to the purpose of that advent. In opposition to so-called post-millennialists of every variety, premillennialists affirm that the advent precedes the promised earthly triumph of the gospel. This proposition they support by a great variety of Scripture proof, the most of which may be summed up in the comprehensive affirmation that the representation which the Scriptures of the New Testament give of the character and history of the period between the first and the second advents is such as to exclude the possibility within its limits of any such happy state of things as the Old Testament prophets predict in connection with Messiah's reign. They urge that whereas the Old Testament predictions of the kingdom of Christ are universalistic in their character, the New Testament representations of the period before the second advent are the opposite of this; that where the former tell us of "all nations" serving and obeying the Christ of God,14 the New Testament tells us that whereas "many are called, few are chosen," and represents this state of things as continuing through the dispensation till the marriage feast is set.15 Again, they call attention to the fact, that, while the Old and New Testament prophecies agree in predicting the national repentance of Israel as the event which shall be as "life from the dead"16 to the sinful world, and so usher in the final triumph of

14 Ps. lxxii. 11.
15 Matt. xxii. 2-14.
16 Rom. xi. 15.
the kingdom of Christ, it appears, from a comparison of
the versions of the Olivet discourse in Matt. xxiv. and Luke
xxi., that our Lord represents the tribulation upon Israel as
continuing until "the times of the Gentiles" are ended, and
the signs appear which usher in the glorious epiphany of the
"Son of man coming in the clouds of heaven." It is further
noted, as strictly accordant with this, that Peter urges his
nation to repent by this very consideration, that so God
"may send the Christ appointed for them, even Jesus."17

It is thus argued that if the triumph of Christ's kingdom
on earth only begins when Israel repents, and if, according to
our Lord, Israel's apostasy spans the whole period from the
crucifixion to the coming of the Son of man in the clouds of
heaven, then, obviously, the predicted period of earthly
blessing lies the other side the advent.

Another argument of analogous character is derived from
the prediction of "the apostasy" and the appearing of "the
man of sin" as given by Paul in 2 Thess. ii., where premil-
ennialists affirm that the development and history of the
apostasy is made to cover the whole time from the date of
that Epistle until "the manifestation of Christ's presence,"
—words which the apostle, both in this Epistle and elsewhere,
uses only of a visible personal advent. Obviously, they say,
this steady growth of the apostasy is incompatible with the
assumption that during any part of the period so occupied,
Christ's kingdom will obtain any such universal ascendancy
as the Old Testament prophets predict.

The premillennialist school urge in addition that their under-
standing of these passages is confirmed not only by the
silence of our Lord and his apostles as to any such blessed
period to be expected this side his second coming, but by the
additional fact that whenever they have occasion to give any
formal description of the state of things in the world as the
advent draws near, they depict it in very dark colors. Not,
indeed, that they see nothing good in those last days; they

17 Acts iii. 20, Greek and R. V.
all agree in representing them as marked by a universal dissemination of the gospel: but none the less it is said that the last days shall be characterized by a prevalence of the "form of godliness" without its power,¹⁸ and by the clamor of a scepticism denying the advent altogether, on the ground of the observed uniformity of natural law.¹⁹

Yet further, premillennialists point to the fact, that, in contrast with many in these days, our Lord and his apostles never, in connection with the duty of the universal preaching of the gospel, hold up the predicted conversion of the world as an event to be attained by this means before his own return; but that, on the contrary, our Lord said that when the gospel should be preached in all nations sufficiently to serve the purpose in the divine mind of "a witness," then should come that "end of the age" of which his apostles had asked him.²⁰

Not to go further into the detail of their argument from Scripture, it should be added that they affirm that the common anticipation of centuries of universal righteousness as yet certainly to intervene before the second advent, makes it impossible to maintain that attitude of constant watchfulness for Christ's appearing which he repeatedly enjoined; and that such a view thus stands in practical contradiction to the declaration of our Lord, that his disciples knew not but that he might come even "in the first watch" of the night.²¹

While properly resting the weight of their argument on what they understand to be the teaching of Scripture regarding the time of the advent, premillennialists are wont to lay no little stress on the extra-scriptural fact that, as is commonly admitted by the best modern church historians, no trace can be found in the writings of any Christian Father of the first two centuries, of that expectation of a conversion of the world

¹⁸ 2 Tim. iii. 1-5.
¹⁹ 2 Pet. iii. 3, 4.
²¹ Mark xiii. 35.
before the advent, which has now become so common; but that, on the contrary, a number of the most eminent among them formally avow premillennial beliefs.

From such arguments as these, and many others of like character, premillennialists draw the conclusion that the Scriptures leave no place for the interposition of the expected age of universal righteousness anywhere on this side of the second coming; and thus feel that they are shut up to the belief that the numerous predictions of that blessed time must have their fulfilment only after and in connection with the Lord's glorious return. Thus they are led to affirm proposition (4), as above given; namely, the word of God teaches that the purpose of the return of Christ to the earth is to set up and administer the promised kingdom of righteousness. They all agree that, according to the Scriptures, he will do this by setting up over the whole earth a theocratic government, which shall be vested in the Son of man and the persons of his saints, who shall be raised from the dead, or, if living, changed and translated at his coming. According to this view, the triumph of the kingdom of Christ in the world will not consist merely in an improvement of such forms of government and social organization as now exist, through the moral and spiritual influence of the gospel, but will instead be brought about through their judgment and destruction, and by the transfer of the ruling power on earth from the hands of fallen men to the Christ of God, acting with and through the risen and glorified Church, as the executive of his will.

The line of argument which brings premillennialists to this conclusion, as one may gather it from their most representative writers, is, in general, as follows:—

In the first place, such a conclusion seems to be an almost necessary corollary from the previous proposition respecting the predicted order of events, if that be granted to have Scripture warrant. Again, it is said that the analogy of past fulfilments of Messianic prophecy, if we will be consistent in interpretation, compels us to expect an earthly manifes-
tation of Christ in his kingly glory, no less literal, and local, and visible, than his former manifestation in humiliation. Premillennarians remind us of the minute literality of the fulfilment of predictions concerning the suffering Christ;—a literality which, even when a priori such a fulfilment might have seemed impossible, has been such as to fill us with wonder that the Jews cannot see in Jesus of Nazareth the Messiah predicted in their Scriptures.

He was, for example, to be born of a virgin in Bethlehem Ephratah; should "not strive nor cry;" should be "a man of sorrows and acquainted with grief," "despised and rejected of men," "having no beauty that men should desire him;" he was to be "numbered with the transgressors," his hands and his feet should be "pierced;" he should receive "gall and vinegar to drink;" men should "part his garments among them, and for his vesture cast lots;" he should "make his grave with the wicked, and be with the rich in his death;" and still, though he should thus die, yet he should live forever, and "the pleasure of the Lord should prosper in his hand." No evangelical Christian disputes either the fact of these predictions and many others like them, or the fact of their most literal fulfilment. On the literality of this fulfilment the missionary to the Jews everywhere rests his argument for the Messiahship of Jesus.

But, argues the premillennialist, the Old Testament contains another class of prophecies concerning the Messiah, often occurring in the closest textual connection with these others; prophecies which speak of Messiah's kingly glory, and represent it as manifested, not in heaven, but on earth, and, like his sufferings, in special connection with the people and land of Israel.

It is said, for instance, that of the increase of the government and peace of Messiah's kingdom "there shall be no end upon the throne of David;" 22 that "he shall reign over the house of Jacob forever;" 28 that in the day when the

22 Isa. ix. 7.
28 Luke i. 33.
Premillennialism.

Lord shall become King over the whole earth, he will come "with all his saints" and "his feet shall stand upon the Mount of Olives, which is before Jerusalem on the east," amid terrific convulsions of surrounding nature, etc. Now the premillennialist asks, What sufficient reason can be shown why such predictions as these should be interpreted on different principles from those which have been exemplified in the fulfilment of the predictions of Messiah's humiliation? He asks how we can blame the orthodox Jew for his interpretation of the latter, if we adopt a similar method in our interpretation of the former. If one point to unanswerable difficulties which arise if we assume the literal fulfilment of the predictions touching Messiah's kingly glory, the premillennialist admits them, but replies that there are no such difficulties greater than many which, antecedent to fulfilment, must have appeared in the literal understanding of the predictions concerning the first coming. If you point to the extreme improbability of any such kingly manifestation of the Son of God on earth as the literal interpretation of these passages leads one to expect, he answers, that, great as it may be, it certainly cannot be regarded as a priori more improbable than was the literal fulfilment of many prophecies touching the first advent, involving, as they did, the incarnation of the Godhead in human nature, and—more astounding still—the crucifixion, death, and burial of the Incarnate One.

Probably most premillennarians would be inclined to assign to this line of argument a primary position in its bearing on the question debated. Much emphasis, however, is laid, by writers like Professor Birks, of Cambridge, Elliott, and other representative men, on the teaching of the visions recorded in Dan. ii. and vii. concerning the four great world-powers, which are represented as following one another in chronological succession till the triumphant establishment on

earth of Messiah's kingdom. For reasons fully given by Pusey, Birks, and others, most premillennialists strenuously insist, in opposition to many modern interpreters, though in full agreement with the ordinary Christian and Jewish interpretation throughout the centuries since Christ, that the fourth predicted world-power is the Roman, represented as including both the earlier undivided empire and the smaller states succeeding to the dominion of the Roman territory. They differ indeed as to whether that particular tenfold division predicted in Dan. vii. has already appeared or is still in the future; but this does not affect the general argument which they base on these prophecies, namely, that, whereas the view of their opponents regards the kingdom of Christ as reaching its final victory on earth by means of the christianization of the now existing forms of political power, and therefore contemporaneously with their dominion, Daniel represents Messiah's kingdom as coming to supremacy by means of a destruction of the political world-power, and as succeeding in time to the last form of that power precisely as each political power had succeeded in time to its predecessor. And they note, further, that in the second of these two visions this triumph of the kingdom of God is represented as connected with an event which is described as a coming of one like unto the Son of man in the clouds of heaven,—words which (as is commonly agreed) our Lord appropriated to describe his future second visible appearing. The premillennialist is unable to see how, by any legitimate exegesis, the symbols and their inspired interpretation can be made to signify anything else than the establishment on earth of a theocratic kingdom, to be introduced by the destruction of then existing forms of political power, for which it becomes the substitute.

26 As, e.g., Principal Edwards, in the "Symposium on the Second Advent," British Weekly, July 8, 1887, p. 146.

They further argue that this view is confirmed by the fact that, although, in consequence of these prophecies, the Jews in the time of Christ all cherished the expectation of such a theocratic kingdom, as to be established by Messiah, yet our Lord, who corrected their views respecting it in several particulars,—especially as regards the conditions on which it was to be inherited,—never intimated that they were wrong as regards the expectation itself. Nor, when, after his ascension, the disciples asked him whether he would at that time restore the kingdom to Israel (in the theocratic sense of that phrase), did he intimate that they were wrong in expecting this, but only answered that "the times and the seasons" were not for them to know;—which language, it is argued, assumes the correctness of their expectation of such a restoration. Premillennialists point further to the fact that both our Lord and his apostles habitually connect his second advent with the establishment of the kingdom. We are reminded how Christ described his advent as a time when he, the Son of man, should "sit on the throne of his glory;" a throne which he elsewhere distinguishes from that mediatiorial throne of the Father which he at present occupies; and defines the time when he should reward his faithful servants and destroy his enemies as the time when he should return, "having received the kingdom;" in strict accord with which Paul connects the advent and kingdom of Christ together as concomitant, and John represents the time when the kingdom of this world becomes the kingdom of our Lord and of his Christ, as the time of the dead when they shall be judged and the ancient prophets rewarded.

In harmony with all this, as premillennialists think, is the additional fact that promises were repeatedly made by our

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87 Acts i. 6, 7.  
88 Matt. xxv. 31.  
90 Luke xix. 15.  
91 2 Tim. iv. 1.  
92 Rev. xi. 15-18.
Lord to his disciples of governmental powers over the nations, which they have never exercised, and which, having long since departed this life, they cannot exercise except it be in resurrection at his second coming. Notable among such passages to which they appeal is that to the believers of Thyatira, "He that overcometh, . . . to him will I give authority over the nations, . . . even as I received of my Father;" \(^{88}\) to which may be added the special promises made to the apostles, of governmental powers to be exercised by them "in the regeneration, when the Son of man shall sit on the throne of his glory."\(^{84}\) It seems to premillennialists that such representations as these and others could only have had the effect of confirming the admitted belief of those who first heard them, that it was the destiny of the Messiah to set up a theocratic kingdom, in which his servants should with him have dominion.

As is well known, premillennialists all agree with Dean Alford, and many others of equal eminence as expositors, that the same doctrine is taught in the famous passage in Rev. xx. concerning the first resurrection and the thousand-years' reign of the saints; though, as already remarked, they do not regard this passage as essential to proof, but as amplifying teaching already given regarding the resurrection and kingdom of Christ.

It is also often further argued that if we but read the New Testament passages which speak of the future "judgment" of the world by Christ in the light of those Messianic prophecies of the Old Testament which furnish the original of the phraseology, they will forbid us to limit the content of this term in all places to the mere rendition of judicial decisions touching the destiny of individuals. For they observe, with Delitzsch, that the LXX. often "uses the Greek term \(\text{\textit{xpivein}}\)" of "just, impartial government" as in Psalm lxxii. 2, (cited by Delitzsch);\(^{36}\) as also Ps. xcvi. 10; lxvii. 4, etc., where

\(^{88}\)Rev. ii. 26, 27.
\(^{84}\)Matt. xix. 28.
the parallelism indicates this broader sense of the word. Now it is said that when Christ's contemporaries heard him claim these functions of "judging" for himself, familiar as they were with these Messianic promises, they must have understood him (apart from explanations, which were not given) as assuming the correctness of their anticipations in this particular. And it is added that this broader interpretation is even demanded in those passages in which the saints are represented as being hereafter associated with Christ in judging, all which must be read in the light of such promises to the saints as we find in Dan. vii. 27 and elsewhere.

Premillennialists also appeal to the numerous passages in which we read of the "day of the Lord," which is yet to come. Accepting as undoubted teaching of Scripture the catholic doctrine concerning that day, that therein "the quick and the dead" shall be judged and rewarded, they insist that if we will regard the passages of the Old Testament from which the phrase was derived, we cannot restrict its duration to a short period, nor the events which shall occupy it, as is commonly done, to a general assize of humanity. They point to the fact that in the Old Testament "the day of the Lord" is represented as a prolonged period which is marked by a universal reign of Jehovah, following upon tremendous judgments by which it is introduced. The prophecy of "the day of the Lord" which is found in Zech. xiv. is often referred to as a cardinal example of this class of passages. It is said that the destruction of Jerusalem which is predicted in this chapter corresponds to no such overthrow in the past, and must therefore still await its fulfilment. Attention is called to the declarations that "in that day" the feet of the Lord "shall stand upon the Mount of Olives," and that "the Lord God will come, and all his saints with him;" language, which, we are reminded, is referred by Paul to the future personal advent of Christ, in that day of the Lord of which he warns the Thessalonians. 88

88 1 Thess. iii. 13.
Further it is urged that Zechariah represents that day as marked not only (in accord with 2 Pet. iii.) by terrible convulsions of physical nature, connected with this "coming of the Lord," but also, as the result of this epiphany, by the universal subjection of the world to Him;—"the Lord shall be King over all the earth; in that day the Lord shall be one and his name one." That there are difficulties and obscurities in this, as in many other prophecies of the last times, every candid premillennialist will admit; but they insist that these are not such as can warrant us in refusing to recognize it as a fact that it is in "the day of the Lord," introduced by "the coming of the Lord with all his saints," that the Old Testament prophets place that universal reign of Christ which all expect.

From all this it is plain to what exegetical school premillennialists belong. Whether their conclusions be right or wrong, their arguments evidently depend on the rigid application of the grammatico-historical, inductive method of interpretation, which Bengel in the last century did so much to introduce, and which, it is not too much to say, has secured the adhesion of the chief part of the most eminent exegetes of our day. Premillennialists, therefore, are everywhere marked by the most emphatic rejection and repudiation alike of the allegorical, the dogmatic, and the so-called rational systems of interpretation, as also of the eschatological conclusions which the application of one or other of these methods has led men to adopt.

III. We have now to indicate what appear to be the doctrinal affinities of the premillennial eschatology. As regards their doctrinal position, it is indeed quite true that

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So, for example, Oehler, referring to this prophecy of Zechariah, tells us that it is "in this consummation of redemption" that "the theocratic relation in which Jehovah in Old Testament times stood to all Israel, is transferred to all mankind," and "the Lord has become the king of all nations." Theology of the Old Testament. Translated by Professor Day. Funk and Wagnalls, N. Y., 1883, p. 517. In this connection, the whole of pp. 499-520, in this valuable work, may be most profitably studied.
premillennialists may be found among men of widely differing, or even antagonistic, theological beliefs; and this admission should be borne in mind in its bearing on what follows. But in general, we think, it may be rightly said that the logical relations of premillennialism connect it more closely with the Augustinian than with any other theological system. This seems to be evidenced in part by the theological position of a large proportion of those known to be premillennialists. No doubt, among these are some whose tendencies would appear to be more or less distinctly Arminian; but such seem to be exceptions to the general rule. Among the larger denominations, the largest proportion seems to be found in the Anglican Church, in which it is said that the majority of the evangelical Low-Church party are on the pre-millennialist side. The Reformed Episcopalians have incorporated the premillennial advent into their articles of faith, as also the Free Church of Italy. A further illustration of the state of the case is furnished by the Premillennial Conference in New York in 1878, which may be presumed to have been a fairly representative body. In the list of those who signed the call for that Conference, excluding those whose theological position is not known to the present writer, the remaining one hundred and eight are distributed as follows:—

Pysonerians .................. 31 Reformed Episcopalians .... 10
United Presbyterians ........ 10 Congregationalists .... 10
Reformed (Dutch) ............. 3 Methodists ................ 6
Episcopalian ................. 10 Adventists ............... 5
Baptists ...................... 22 Lutheran ................... 1

From these figures it appears that fifty-six per cent. of the signers to the call were adherents either of the Westminster or Heidelberg Standards, or of the Thirty-nine Articles of the Church of England; to which must be added twenty-two per cent. from the Baptists, known to be strongly Calvinistic; making seventy-eight per cent. of the total number, who are known to hold to an Augustinian theology. But to these we should probably add also the ten Congregationalists, which will make the proportion of Augustinians in the whole to be
eighty-eight per cent. The significance of this is emphasized by the contrasted fact that the Methodists, although one of the largest denominations of Christians in the country, were represented by only six names. The writer's observation would lead him to believe that analyses of similar gatherings since held on both sides of the Atlantic, would yield a similar result. Such facts can hardly be accidental. That they are the outward expression of a degree of logical affinity between premillennial eschatology and the Augustinian type of theology, can, we think, easily be shown.

It may be observed, as preliminary, that premillennialism, held as a creed, is vitally related to those strict views of the supreme and infallible authority of the Holy Scriptures on which Augustinians have always strongly insisted. The connection is evident. For premillennialism is at the opposite pole of thought from rationalism. The premillennialist eschatology is certainly not one which any person would think of establishing on merely rational grounds. Those who receive it, in the nature of the case, can be found only among those who have so high a regard for the authority of Scripture as to be willing to rest their belief wholly upon it, even when its declarations, taken in their normal and most obvious sense, might seem to discountenance the anticipations of reason, or contradict the traditions of the dogmaticians, or the imaginings of the "Christian consciousness." The premillennialism of our day may therefore be truly said to represent the most extreme form of protest in the church against all tendencies to exalt any human authority, whether it be of the reason, tradition, or Christian consciousness, above the supreme authority of the word of God; and, especially, against current doubts as to the possibility or the probability of supernatural intervention in the history of mankind.

Premillennialism logically presupposes an anthropology essentially Augustinian. The ordinary Calvinism affirms the absolute helplessness of the individual for self-regeneration and self-redemption. Premillennialism proceeds to insist that the same must be affirmed also as no less true of that corporate
humanity which is made up of such individuals. It may make this matter clearer if we observe the affinity which the different prevailing types of eschatological expectation have with the three familiar types of anthropology which divide the theologians. At the one extreme of these we have, of course, Pelagianism, with its affirmation of the plenary ability of the sinful individual to save himself; at the other, Augustinianism, denying the native goodness of man and his competency for self-redemption in toto; while between the two we have those various types of doctrine, of which semi-Pelagianism, Arminianism, Wesleyanism, etc., are various modifications, which, recognizing man's need of divine grace, insist that he has still a degree of ability, natural or gracious, sufficient to enable him to cooperate efficiently with God in his own salvation. Current eschatological anticipations with regard to the earthly future of the race may be readily classified with reference to their logical affinities with one or other of these three types of anthropology. At the one extreme we have all naturalistic theories, of such as maintain that we are to expect a gradual perfecting of the race, solely in virtue of the laws of its being, through a process of evolution, eliminating by slow degrees the elements of evil, and issuing in the final supremacy of those moral elements which are fittest to survive. Such theories evidently presuppose a Pelagian anthropology; they can scarcely claim to be called Christian, though they are involved in much of political and social theory and practice in modern Christendom. Again, we have a class of eschatologies which, recognizing man's sinful condition and need of divine grace, yet anticipate that the expected triumph of the kingdom of God on earth, and the redemption of the race in its organic unity, will be brought about simply by the cooperation of man with the work of the Holy Ghost, in the use of existing material, moral, and spiritual agencies. Although such expectations and theories are held by many who regard themselves as, Calvinists, yet they seem to be logically cognate rather with various synergistic types of belief, resting on an
anthropology which affirms the necessity of divine grace, but also asserts the competency of the individual, thus assisted, to work out his own salvation. But while such eschatological anticipations are cherished by many good men, yet we apprehend that most thoughtful premillennarians would regard them as out of harmony with what they believe to be Scripture teaching as to the natural condition and salvation of the individual. For they understand the Scriptures to teach that, even with divine grace being given, the triumph of the kingdom of God in the individual is not to be expected through any use, however diligent, of existing agencies in this present order of things, but only through his translation from the present to a higher order, by the destruction of the flesh, and resurrection from the dead. If this be true as respects the individual, it would seem that the analogy should hold as regards the race; and so, in fact, it is, if we mistake not, that, consciously or unconsciously, the premillennialist goes on to apply to organic humanity what the ordinary Augustinianism affirms only of the individual. As the triumph of the kingdom of God in no single member of the race is to be expected in the present order, even by any blessing of the Spirit on existing agencies, so neither, as the premillennialist believes, shall we see such a triumph in the race as a corporate unity, so long as the present order lasts. It affirms a supernatural intervention of divine power, in connection with a resurrection from the dead, and the introduction of humanity into a new order, to be no less necessary in the one case than in the other.

In a word, we may say that premillennialists simply affirm of the macrocosm what the common Augustinianism affirms only of the microcosm. In this, premillennialists believe, as we have seen, that they are sustained by what seem to them most explicit predictions of the word of God, foretelling the ultimate failure of all arrangements and institutions, political or ecclesiastical, to effect a social regeneration, bring in the kingdom of God, and therewith deliver the world from the dominance of evil in the present age. They
understand the same Scriptures to teach that it is the purpose of God to bring about this blessed issue only through the introduction of a new dispensation, in connection with the return of the glorified Son of man to cast out Satan, put all enemies under his feet, and establish at last the everlasting kingdom.

It is thus evident that the anthropological presuppositions on which premillennialism seems to rest, must carry with them a corresponding soteriology. This may be further illustrated in many ways. It is natural, for example, that we should find, as we do, that premillennialists are eminent, even among evangelical Christians, for the emphasis which they place upon the divine person and work of Christ as the Incarnate Son of God. For believing in such a total ruin, not only of individual men, but also and no less of the race which they jointly constitute, and yet at the same time believing in a predicted final "restoration of all things" to their original perfection, it is plain that they must exalt in the highest degree the person and work of the Son of God. The salvation of even a single human person from the death and doom of sin, and his perfect restoration to the image of God, is regarded by all evangelical Christians as a work of such magnitude as to require the incarnation, atonement, and resurrection of the co-equal Son of God, in order to its accomplishment. But when beyond this we look, not merely for the salvation of an aggregate of individuals out of the race, but also at last of the race itself in its organic unity,—a salvation involving the complete mastery of all the complex social forces of humanity, and even a profound change in the physical conditions of the earth as its material abode,—this necessity becomes, if possible, still more absolute and momentous. It is logically inevitable that those who expect that Christ will really accomplish a work of such colossal magnitude, should hold the most exalted ideas conceivable of his person and glory. In comparison with their beliefs and anticipations, fashionable,
modern schemes for the regeneration of the race under existing conditions, by moral suasion, ethical reform, universal suffrage, and democratic rule, and such like, seem to them but trifling devices,—a mere playing with the surface of things; and that such reformers should too frequently offer humanity only a human Christ as the Ideal Man, our perfect example, appears only logically consistent.

On the other hand, it may be further remarked that premillennialists seem to be everywhere distinguished by the emphasis which, in full consistency with their eschatology, they also place upon the doctrine of our Lord's humanity as a permanent and everlasting fact. Many in our day so explain the resurrection and ascension of our Lord as to explain them away, making the resurrection a practical nullity, and in effect denying the veritable reality of his glorified corporeity. And yet, strangest of all, such seem to be conscious of no loss to faith and hope, but rather imagine advantage! But that the risen Son of God exists to-day in human nature and is manifested in the highest heaven in a substantial and material body, even that body which hung upon the cross and rose again, this with all premillennialists takes the place of a vital truth. If others also affirm it, they greatly magnify it, and, according to what they believe to be divinely revealed eschatological truth, they could not do otherwise. For, as we have seen, they believe it to be revealed that Christ's redemption is to reach not only the spiritual, but the material also; both our material bodies and also this material world, which is their environment. From this point of view, the fact of our Lord's continued existence in a glorified body must appear as of primary importance and of prophetic significance. It can no longer be left as a matter merely for curious speculation, on which men may be permitted almost any vagaries of thought.

When we consider the question of the application of redemption, the Augustinian affinity of the premillennialist eschatology becomes still more manifest. For nothing is more marked than the emphasis with which premillennialists
constantly insist that, as regards the application of salvation, the present dispensation is strictly elective. They all maintain, most strenuously, that, according to the Scripture, the immediate object of the present dispensation is not the salvation of the world or of the race, but only the salvation of an election out of the world, to reign with Christ in the age which is to come. Herein they regard the present as contrasted with the future dispensation which they expect,—which shall really have as its objective point that which current modern opinions regard as the object of the present dispensation; namely, the redemption of the nations, and, at last, of all humanity in its collective organic unity, as existing on the earth. The place which they assign to election appears especially in the prominence which many of them give to the Scripture representations of the church of the present age, as "the church of the first-born," or as "the bride of the Lamb," chosen of God in Christ Jesus, not merely to obtain the salvation which is in Christ but to obtain it "with eternal glory," in co-regency with the Son of God in the age to come. So much stress is laid by premillennialists upon conceptions of this kind, that it is difficult to see how any but an Augustinian can really accept the system. In the light of this fact alone, one can easily see a reason for the statistics given at the beginning of this article.

There is special reason for calling attention to the fact that in the premillennialist conception both of the present and the future dispensation of grace, great stress is laid upon the person and work of the Holy Spirit. That this should be so is a logical necessity. It is therefore all the more singular, to any one familiar with the actual facts, that one of the most common objections to premillennialism is that it dishonors and depreciates the work of the Holy Ghost! So far is it from being true that the actual tendency of premillennialism is in that direction, that it would be difficult to find a class of Christians who more strenuously maintain the evangelical doctrine on this subject. If the above exposition of their anthropology and soteriology
be correct, it should be plain that in this premillennialists are not only scriptural, but thoroughly consistent with their own system. How could those who so insist on the total ruin of man, his absolute impotence for self-redemption, whether personal or social and governmental, and who place the doctrine of a divine election in the very foreground of their system, do otherwise than magnify to the utmost the dignity and office of the Holy Spirit in redemption?

But it is none the less often insisted by their opponents, that, inasmuch as they teach that the world will not be turned to God by the Holy Ghost as the result of his operation through present agencies, and apart from the visible appearing of the Son of man, therefore they in fact do derogate from the power and glory of the adorable Spirit. If the objection were sustained by facts, it would certainly be exceedingly grave; and we do not wonder that, sincerely believing this, many excellent men find in this supposed fact sufficient reason for even declining to give premillennialism the slightest consideration. But the objection proceeds from a total misapprehension of what premillennialists believe. In the first place, the objection is often pressed as if premillennialists believed that from the time of the return of the Lord, it would thenceforward be not the Holy Spirit, but the Son, who by his visible appearing, would effect the regeneration of men. Nothing could well be more foreign to the belief of intelligent premillennialists than this. They all believe, as much as their opponents, that in the economy of redemption, the Regenerator in all dispensations, is, not the Son, but the Holy Spirit. They believe that no means whatever, however potent, have any efficiency apart from his working, and that not even the appearing of the Son of man in his glory will furnish any exception to the principle. Saul of Tarsus was converted (instrumentally) by the visible appearing of the Lord Jesus in glory; but is there anything in that fact which even seems to any Christian to derogate aught from the dignity of the Holy Spirit? Was he not regenerated by the Holy Spirit, even as others
who are brought to believe by ordinary means? Premillennialists simply believe that what took place in a single instance, in the case of Saul, shall be repeated, much more extensively, in connection with our Saviour's second advent. Whether they are right or wrong, it is difficult to see how there is derogation from the glory of the Holy Spirit any more in the one case than in the other.

The objection is again sometimes stated, as if premillennialism denied, by implication at least, the ability of the Holy Ghost to convert all nations apart from the appearing of Christ. But this is no less a strange misapprehension of their belief. It is not, in their minds, a question of the ability of the Holy Spirit, which no Christian can doubt: it is simply a question of His purpose and intention. A premillennialist answers that on the same principle a perfectionist might argue that those who deny that any man will attain to perfect sinlessness in this life, thereby derogate from the glory of the Holy Ghost as Sanctifier; to which it would be fairly replied that it was not a question of the ability of the Spirit to sanctify a man perfectly in this life, but only of His revealed purpose. Or it might fairly be asked whether, if we accept the statement of Scripture that Saul was converted by the visible appearing of Christ on the road to Damascus, we are therefore compelled to conclude that the Holy Spirit was unable to convert him by the preaching of Stephen or the apostles?

There is, then, no foundation for this common misapprehension as to premillennialist belief regarding the office and work of the Holy Spirit. The question between them and their opponents is not as to the agent in the regeneration of our race, but only as to the predicted instrumentality by which this shall be brought about. In their position on this point they are in strict logical consistence with their general Augustinian theological creed, as in agreement with all evangelical Christians.\(^8\)

The Augustinian affinity of the premillennialist escha-

\(^8\) On this point see an excellent paper by Rev. E. R. Craven, D. D., in Premillennial Essays, pp. 463-466.
tology will perhaps appear still more clearly if we consider the implications of their system with the question of the logical order of the divine decrees, so fundamental to theological thought. On this the present writer cannot indeed claim to speak with authority; he is not aware that any formal attempt has been made to deal with this difficult theological problem from a premillennialist standpoint. We should presume, however, that most premillennarians would hesitate to accept the representations of the subject given by theologians of either the supralapsarian, infralapsarian, Arminian, or the modified Calvinism of the Saumurian school, as satisfying fully the demands of Scripture. That the Arminian theory would be ruled out seems a logical necessity from what has been already set forth as premillennial doctrine. As for the other theories named, we should judge that most premillennarians would be inclined to object to the first two that in making the redemptive decree to have respect only to the salvation of certain elect persons in the present age, due force was not allowed to that large class of universalistic expressions wherein the Scriptures affirm the object of Christ's work to have been the redemption of the world. Many, certainly, would feel that such universal expressions of purpose as, e.g., ἵνα σώσω τὸν κόσμον, "that I might save the world," are as distinct declarations of purpose,—and, as all Augustinians would agree, of a purpose which could not be defeated,—as the narrower declarations of purpose, on which many Calvinists chiefly or exclusively insist.

Yet the attempt of the French theologians of Saumur to make out a scheme which should find a place for both classes of passages, and so, while retaining the doctrine of unconditional election, concede full force to the universalistic declarations of Scripture, can hardly be regarded as a success. The order suggested by these theologians, as the reader will remember, stood as follows: (1) The purpose to permit the fall; (2) The purpose to send Christ for the salvation of all men; (3) The purpose, based on the divine foresight that
none would of themselves accept the redemption provided, to elect some to everlasting life and effectually apply to them the purchased salvation. But, as has been often urged, it seems difficult, if not impossible, to reconcile this schema of the order of the divine purposes either with the Calvinistic doctrine on other points, or with the perfections of God. For it certainly seems to sacrifice to the maintenance of the universalism the doctrine of the certain efficiency of the divine purposes; assuming that God had a purpose in sending Christ (viz., of saving all) which he failed to carry out; or else that God proposed what he foreknew would be a nullity. For such reasons it has seemed to many that this well-intended attempt to reconcile particularism and universalism must be judged a failure; and, from a premillennialist point of view, it would be very difficult to see how it could be anything else. For it is self-limited by the assumption that the present dispensation is final, and that therefore the ultimate outcome of redemption, and hence God's ultimate purpose regarding the creature, must be sought within its bounds.

But whether the difficulty which the universalistic statements of Scripture present to the Augustinian system can be resolved or not, that it exists is patent to all, and the premillennialist cannot well shut his eyes to it. To this it might be added that premillennialists generally would doubtless find a further defect in all these schemes alike, in that they none of them give any logical place for the teaching of the Word regarding the redemption of the material creation from the effects of sin, as comprehended also in the purpose of Christ's death.

While we have found no formulated expression of doctrine on this subject, from any premillennialist theologian, it appears to us from the teachings of representative authorities among them, that their eschatology would, logically at least, imply some such schema of the divine purposes as the following:

After the purpose to permit the fall and all its consequences
in man and nature, first, in logical order, would come the divine purpose to effect the complete redemption of the world, or, as the Scripture phrase is, "the restoration of all things." Second, would come the purpose ordaining the means to this end, namely, the incarnation, death, resurrection, and second coming of the Son of God, securing the redemption of a people elected from the present age, to cooperate with him in the age to come in resurrection life, in bringing in, and by theocratic rule maintaining, that redemption of the race and of the habitable world which was the final object, as regards the creature, of the mission of the Son of God.

Thus the electing purpose of God takes its place as included in the broader purpose to save the world by means of a people chosen unto this high destiny through salvation out of the present evil age. Subsidiary to this purpose of the salvation of the election, again, would be the declared purpose on God's part that the gospel of this kingdom should be preached throughout all the world, not merely "for a witness" to the unbelieving,—as is often unjustly represented,—but that by this means the chosen people may be gathered out from among all nations to God's name, to be joint heirs with Jesus Christ to the coming kingdom, and reign with him in glory.

If some such scheme as this, is logically presupposed in the premillennial eschatology, then we may remark upon it, first, that it would be at least quite consistent with Augustinianism, in that it refers the salvation of men out of the present age, to the electing purpose of God. It seems to be of necessity involved, moreover, that this election must be sovereign and absolute. For, however any might argue that salvation, considered merely as a radical change of character, cannot be referred wholly to the sovereignty of God, but to the free choice of the agent, surely when the question is of the occupation of certain high positions in the kingdom, election unto this dignity must be referred wholly to the sovereign pleasure of the appointing God; according to the

*Acts iii. 21.*
Saviour's express word in Matt. xx. 23. But while we
describe premillennialism as logically Augustinian, it is, on
the other hand, broader than the common Calvinism, in that
it makes the term "election," or "the church," as used in
the New Testament, to have a (technical) reference only to
the saved out of the present age, and denies that the salva-
tion of this "election" in the present dispensation exhausts
the revealed purpose of God in redemption. For, while it
maintains, no less strenuously than the old Calvinism, that
we must give full force to the elective and particularistic ele-
ment in the New Testament representations of the divine
purpose in redemption as very precious truth, it also insists
that, in some way, place shall also be given to the no less
explicit universalistic statements of the holy word. To these
very many, even among Augustinians, have felt that many
theologians have not always been inclined to do full justice;
or, if they have sought to do so, it has been, as in the case of the
theologians of Saumur, at the expense of logical consistency,
and an unintended derogation from the divine glory.

It would thus appear that premillennialism may be regarded
as the result of an attempt to give full and equal rec-
ognition to both these elements in revelation, and exhibit
their true relation to each other. The premillennialist, if we
understand their position aright, believes that he discovers
that relation in what he understands to be the Scripture
teaching that the particular election from the present dispen-
sation, is not, as other schools of theology have taught, the
ultimate end of redemption, but a means to a more compre-
hensive end, and that universalistic; namely, a "restoration
of all things"—i.e., the human race on the earth, and there-
with the material creation—to more than pristine perfection
and glory. In other words, what the Scripture terms the
"election" has reference to the present dispensation; its
universal statements look beyond the present to the dispen-
sation of the kingdom which is coming. And thus evangeli-
cal premillennialists believe that full force may be allowed to
both classes of statements, without, on the other hand, going
the length of restorationists like, e. g., Mr. Jukes, who make the election from the present age the intended means to the salvation, in the ages to come, of every individual sinful being.

It will be further observed, that if this premillennialist scheme be established as scriptural, it fully meets and nullifies not only this objection against Calvinism as dealing unfairly with the universalistic element in Scripture, but also the common practical objection, that making, as it does, the salvation of a certain number of elect persons the total object, as regards sinful men, of Christ's redemption, it tends to beget in a certain class of minds a pious selfishness, preoccupying the mind with the question of the personal salvation in a degree disproportioned to the yet vaster interests included in redemption. It is a great principle, admitted by all Christians, that where there is an election, it is always that those chosen may in their turn become the means of blessing to others; in the premillennialist system, this principle takes a place essential and fundamental.

This consideration very naturally leads us to consider the actual practical bearings of the premillennialist eschatology. It should be very plain, one would think, that the system, whether true or not, if believed, ought to intensify in a high degree the interest of the believer in the redemption of the world. The system is indeed differentiated from others in nothing more than in this, that it places the redemption of the whole world, the restoration of all things, in the very forefront of the divine purpose regarding fallen man. The work of Christ has not only made this issue possible, but certain; and everything has been arranged and preordained by God to this end. The practical bearing of such a view as this is evident. Certainly the man who believes something like this to be a true exhibit of the revealed plan of God, the key to history, and the ultimate object of his individual salvation, just in proportion to the strength of this conviction, must be a man who forgets self in the work of redemption. Believing that he has been called, not
merely to be saved, but that hereafter, in resurrection life, he may cooperate with Christ in carrying on the redemption of the world to its full completion, it were natural that he should almost instinctively seek to qualify himself for the high position to which he is called, by using himself to the practice of such part of the work of saving men as the Lord has assigned to his church in the present dispensation. This being so, it is truly strange to hear the charge from time to time repeated that a belief in the premillennial eschatology "cuts the nerve of missionary effort," and to hear it even compared in this respect with future probation theories in its pernicious effect upon the evangelistic spirit! It might rather be termed, by way of eminence, a missionary eschatology. And yet it is argued, that if a man believes that the preaching of the gospel in the present age is not designed to effect the conversion of the world, he must then lose heart and interest in the missionary work. But the objection has its basis, if we mistake not, in an almost total misunderstanding of the premillennialist position. This is exemplified in an article by Professor Curtis, of McCormick Theological Seminary, Chicago, in The Old Testament Student for November, 1887, where, referring to those who fail to see in the New Testament the promise of a world-conversion antecedent to the event, he describes what he imagines to be the view of such, as "the blessing of having the gospel preached, witnessed, to save the few and harden the many, making their damnation the greater!"

If this be meant as a statement of the whole scope of the purpose of God, as understood by premillennialists, it can only be called a caricature of their view, such as could only arise from a radical misunderstanding. Yet such representations are often made, no doubt in perfect good faith, by most excellent and true men. A striking instance of the same kind was given a few years ago in a sermon preached before the General Assembly of the Presbyterian Church, North, by Moderator Jessup. We may truly say that if there

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were to be found anywhere a man who would recognize the above as a correct representation of his belief regarding the object of the preaching of the gospel and result of Christ's redemption, he would probably be a man whose activities were thereby paralyzed for Christian work. But such a man we have never met. It ought to be understood, once for all, that there is no difference between those on the two sides of this controversy, as regards the meaning of the numerous promises in the Old and New Testaments of the universal subjection of the world to Christ; no difference of belief as to the Scripture teaching that God has appointed the preaching of the gospel among all nations in this dispensation as at least a necessary antecedent condition of this issue. The only question is whether according to the Scriptures the issue shall be attained in the present dispensation, or in another to succeed this, which shall be introduced, at least, by a personal appearing of the Son of man in judicial power. In either case alike, the number of the saved, at the last, will, according to the belief of all reputable premillennarians, immeasurably outnumber that of the lost. Not only a few elect in the present age, but a host no man can number, will be the fruit of Christ's redemption, and so the world, the whole world, shall be redeemed, and to that end it is ordained that the gospel must first be preached among all nations. This matter needs to be better understood; it would preclude this very common objection. The writings of representative premillennials like Dean Alford, Bishop Ellicott, Canon Birks, Professors Van Oosterzee, Godet, Delitzsch, Auberlen, the Bonars, Bickersteths, and many others of like standing, will abundantly show how far from the real beliefs of premillennarians are representations such as those of which the above citation is a single example. Whether they are right or not, we do not argue; but it may at least justly be said that the beliefs and anticipations of such men are naturally adapted, in a high degree, to quicken hope and enthusiasm in the evangelization of the world. All the most glowing pictures which post-millennialists have drawn of the future kingdom
of God triumphant on the earth among men in the flesh, the premillennialist expects to see realized, and more! He believes that not only shall the kingdom come, and humanity on earth for happy ages rejoice in God’s salvation; but that with the coming of that kingdom “the blessed hope” of the believer shall be fulfilled in the coming of the Lord and the resurrection into glory of those who till then shall have believed. But all this he believes is explicitly conditioned by the previous preaching of the gospel among all nations, and the gathering out by this means of “a multitude no man can number” to be “a first-fruits unto God and the Lamb,” and to reign with Christ in his kingdom. It is not easy to see how any man could from the heart believe all this, and be less than an enthusiast in missions.

It should be further observed, as bearing on the practical influence of the premillennialist doctrine, that for the man who holds it, it is a complete answer to the common objection to missions from the smallness of result.

Objections are made, for instance, and discouragement is occasioned to some by the fact brought out recently by the Rev. James Johnston, of China, that the natural increase of the heathen and Mohammedan world is much greater than the total annual increase of converts. But the premillennialist is, of all others, the one man whose faith and hope cannot be touched by these or any facts of the kind. He answers objections based upon such representations by simply pointing out that this only accords with the teaching of Scripture that the work of the church in the present age is simply the gathering out of an election; and that the gathering of the nations into Christ’s kingdom, in any true sense of that phrase, belongs to another age and order, for which the present is preparing.

For these and other reasons the truth is this, that, instead of premillennialism discouraging missionary activity, it would be impossible to find a class of Christians who, as a whole, are more active and enthusiastic in evangelistic work, than

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61 In his stirring pamphlet, A Century of Missions.
those who are looking for the personal advent of the Lord as premillennial. The facts which justify this affirmation are so numerous and so conspicuous that it is difficult to understand how any one can be found longer to insist that premillennialism is fatal to the missionary spirit.

The feeling of premillennialists generally on this subject had an impressive visible illustration in the premillennial conference held in the church of the Holy Trinity, New York, in 1878, when the great assembly at its closing meeting, rising to their feet, passed with great enthusiasm the following resolution: "That the doctrine of our Lord's premillennial advent, instead of paralyzing evangelistic and missionary effort, is one of the mightiest incentives to earnestness in preaching the gospel to every creature till he comes." Nor is this a matter with them of mere words, but of happy and fruitful experience. If the writer may speak from his own observation, the doctrine stands in this respect in striking contrast with the doctrine of a future probation, with which in this regard it has been sought to compare it. Advocates of Hadean preaching for the heathen are not uncommon in the church at home; but they are exceedingly scarce in our missionary force. Personally in our eleven years in India, in an extensive acquaintance with missionaries of every name, we never met with an advocate of a post-mortem preaching of the gospel. On the other hand, while, as every one knows, premillennialists are comparatively very few in the ministry at home, at least in the United States and Canada, they are greatly more numerous in the foreign field; in several missions, to the knowledge of this writer, they form a large majority of the workers. We know of no theological training school in America, comparable for its missionary spirit with the Missionary Training Institute under the care of Mr. H. Grattan Guinness, in London, England. It has sent one hundred missionaries to Africa alone within the last year, and within the last fourteen years no less than five hundred missionaries! At the present time one hundred of the students in training there expect to go
as foreign missionaries, and, on the average, a missionary is sent out every week in the year. But the instruction in the institute is exclusively premillennial. Another institution of a similar character, and under similar doctrinal teaching, is the St. Crischona Theological Institute, near Basle, Switzerland, under the Rev. M. Rappart, a son-in-law of the late Bishop Gobat, of Jerusalem. The results, as regards the sending forth of workers to the mission field, are similar to those in the London Institute. The Mildmay Mission to the Jews under the superintendence of Rev. Mr. Wilkinson, whose enthusiastic activity is familiar to all who have looked into the missionary work centring in London, is, again, premillennial throughout.

It is, or should be, well known that the China Inland Mission, which is now about the largest and most rapidly increasing missionary agency in the Chinese empire, owes its existence, under God, to Mr. Hudson Taylor, the present superintendent of the mission, an earnest advocate of the premillennial doctrine; while those who have charge of its work at home and nearly all its representatives in China—as we are told on the best authority—share the views of the founder on this subject. The princely gifts to missions by Mr. Robert Arthington, of Leeds, England, are everywhere known; it may not be as widely known that he is an enthusiastic believer in the premillennial advent.

The emphatic chiliasm of Professor Delitzsch, of Leipzig, is well known to all who read his commentaries; it deserves to be as well known that, like Professor Christlieb, of Bonn, also a premillennialist, he is profoundly and actively interested in evangelistic work. Of the Missionary Instituta Judaica, formed in nine or ten of the German universities, for the preaching of the gospel to the Jews, he is said to be the inspiring spirit.

If we will look at those engaged in the work of home evangelization, we meet similar facts. Not only, as is well known. Mr. Moody, but nearly all of those devoted to similar evangelistic work on both sides of the Atlantic, are emphatic
premillennialists. The names of such as Pentecost, Whittle, Hammond, Munhall, Lord Radstock, Varley, George Müller of Bristol, Haslam, Aitken, Guinness, Von Schluembach, and many others will at once occur as illustrations to any one familiar with the facts.

But we need not further amplify. The facts of this kind are so numerous and so well known, that the common platform representation of premillennialists as a body of enthusiasts waiting for the Lord in ascension robes, hopeless pessimists with neither faith nor interest in the redemption of the nations or in that practical part of the work which the Lord has committed to his church in the present time, ought to be abandoned forever. 43

Many would add to what has been said as to the practical influence of this belief, that they have found it peculiarly blessed and helpful in the daily spiritual life. We would not for a moment seem to intimate a disparaging thought as to the spirituality and saintly life of many who are not able to see that premillennialism is according to the word of God. Many such there are whom we might all well seek to imitate. They love their Lord's appearing, and though they see not with their brethren in some things that pertain to it, they shall in no wise lose the promised reward. So also it is true, on the other hand, that a man may be a very earnest premillennialist, and yet in many things show a spirit little like his Master. And yet we think that the most will admit that, on the

43In place here are the words of the post-millennialian, Rev. Dr. R. M. Patterson, of Philadelphia, words as true as they are creditable to his impartiality and candor in controversy. He says of premillennialism: "One charge which is made against it is unjust—that it must cut the nerve of preaching and of missionary effort. Calvinists certainly cannot endorse that unless they dignify an Arminian slander; for premillennarians hold that an elect people are to be gathered out from the nations through the preaching of the truth. Remember the peroration of Dr. Griffin's sermon on 'The Kingdom of Christ,' about 'conversion of a single pagan,' and abandon that charge. For ourselves we confess that among our personal friends who hold this error are the most spiritually-minded of Christians, and the most earnest and successful of pastors and preachers."—The Princeton Review, March, 1879, p. 434.
whole, whatever be the reason, premillennialism tends to draw upon the most earnest classes and most unworldly element in our churches. The modern easy living, card-playing, theatre-going, dancing type of Christian, is very rarely found to be one who has learned to look for his Lord's premillennial advent. We leave our readers to reflect as to the causes of this. Perhaps the words of Professor Harnack may point in the right direction: "A genuine and living revival of chiliastic hopes is always a sign that the church at large has become secularized to such a degree that tender consciences can no longer feel sure of their faith within her."

But premillennialism is not popular, nor do we think it is immediately likely to become so. For no type of Christian belief is so intensely opposed to certain of the most pronounced tendencies of our time. The age, for example, inclines to rationalize, spiritualize, and as far as possible explain away the supernatural element in human history, whether in the past, present, or future. To this tendency premillennialism squarely refuses to yield one iota, and in its counter-affirmations goes so far as even to displease many who could hardly be called rationalists. So again, the age tends greatly to exalt man. The astonishing advance in every department of human knowledge and activity predisposes men to form the most exalted conceptions of the possibilities of the race, even in its present fallen condition. In particular, it is one of the ruling ideas of the century that man is fully capable of self-government, and that he is sure yet to work out—at least with the beneficent aid of Christianity—the great problem of government by the people for the people's good. To this confident anticipation of our democratic age premillennialism everywhere opposes the distasteful declaration that, according to the Scripture, all these hopes are doomed to disappointment; and that already, in the counsels of God, Mene, Tekel, Upharsin, is written concerning modern democracies no less than concerning
BABYLON OF OLD. IT IS ONLY NATURAL THAT THE MOST OF MEN SHOULD DISLIKE THIS PROPHECY OF EVIL EXCEEDINGLY, AND EVEN FEEL A DEGREE OF IRRITATION THAT SUCH VIEWS SHOULD BE SOBERLY HELD FORTH AS DIVINE TRUTH. WE THEREFORE THINK IT NOTHING STRANGE THAT IN THIS AGE OF TRIUMPHING AND EXULTING DEMOCRACY, AND MOST OF ALL IN A LAND LIKE THE UNITED STATES, WHERE PEOPLE ARE THE MOST SANGUINE OF BEING ABLE TO WORK OUT A SATISFACTORY SOLUTION OF THE PROBLEM OF SELF-GOVERNMENT, PREMILLENNIALISM SHOULD BE UNPOPULAR.

ARTICLE III.

A SHORT HISTORY OF THE MISSIONARY SOCIETY AT HERMANNsburg, NORTH GERMANY.

WRITTEN FOR THE BIBLIOTECA SACRA BY PASTOR G. HACCIUS, DORFMARK, NEAR HERMANNsburg, GERMANY.

Translated by Professor Charles Harris, Ph. D., Carbondale, Illinois.

[CONTINUED FROM PAGE 162.]


THEODORE HARMS WAS THE NATURAL SUCCESSOR OF HIS BROTHER. HE HAD HELPED TO BEGIN THE WORK; HE KNEW ALL THE MISSIONARIES PERSONALLY AND WAS ACQUAINTED WITH ALL THE NECESSARY DETAILS. WITH A JUST ESTIMATION OF THIS STATE OF AFFAIRS, THE CONSISTORY APPOINTED HIM PASTOR OF HERMANNsburg. IT DID SO, HOWEVER, WITH THE CONDITION THAT HE PERMIT THE APPOINTMENT OF A COLLABORATOR, IN ORDER THAT NEITHER HIS WORK AS PASTOR NOR HIS WORK AS DIRECTOR OF MISSIONS MIGHT SUFFER. HARMS
consented the more willingly, as the mission-inspector, Drewes, who stood in personal relationship to him, was appointed to the position. In consideration of the great prominence of his brother and predecessor, it was with hesitation that Theodore Harms accepted the double office, but, trusting in the power of divine grace, he did it joyfully. He knew that his brother had not been the leader and director of the mission, but God only. He promised to yield entire obedience to Him and to keep the missionary society purely Lutheran, as he had received it. His appointment was received everywhere with joyful approval, and the missionaries especially showed great confidence in him.

In order to keep his brother's memory alive, and to offer thanksgiving to God for the grace which he had shown them through this his servant, Harms instituted—but only in Hermannsburg—a memorial celebration on the anniversary of his death; and in other ways also he preserved his memory reverently. He conducted the Hermannsburg parish entirely after the manner of his departed brother. The public worship, the missionary festivals, everything, passed off essentially as before. He too recognized the great importance of Christian discipline and customs. He inculcated them from the pulpit, and insisted that the missionaries should do the same among the heathen. "It is our glory," he said in one of his addresses when commissioning missionaries, "that we consider Christian observances of great worth. There are many Christians who do not value them; we will not imitate them in that respect. It will do no harm, though we are thought to be encouraging a legal spirit in the church. But woe be to the man who wishes to earn eternal bliss by means of Christian observances and customs! We have learned that Christian observances are good and useful, and therefore I beg you to carry them with you to Africa, America, India, and Australia. . . . The overvaluing of Christian practices is evil, but their rejection is not less so."

During the period of his administration fell that griev-
ous, fateful year 1866. He was faithful to his king, and adhered at heart to the banished royal house. He accepted Prussia's annexation of Hannover as a fact which God had permitted to be. He had nothing to do with party politics, but he expressed his own opinions openly, decisively, and without fear. He was therefore regarded with much suspicion, and brought down upon himself the enmity of the Prussian adherents. He went his own way quietly and discreetly in the years 1870 and 1871, when the waves of politics ran so high. Because of these political changes the danger of union\(^1\) drew nearer and nearer to his native church. But he stood by the Lutheran Church firmly and faithfully, and tried to establish his parish and his missionaries so much the more in Lutheran doctrines. While his brother had a character like Abraham's, his own was more like Isaac's. But the dangers grew more threatening, and the quiet teacher and pastor became more and more a combatant, and, because of the position of Hermannsburg, a leader. His sermons were often of a polemic nature, and he treated the exciting questions of the times in them and in his missionary paper. In this way he was the leader of his parish, and impressed his own views upon the missionary society, so that it retained that personal stamp which it had had under Louis Harms, though not to quite the same extent as in the time of the latter, for the child had become a man.

The more the work of the society grew, the more desirable it became that Harms should travel over the territory of the missions, as other inspectors do, and become acquainted with it; but his pastorate kept him at home. The attempt has been made twice since then—in 1875 and in 1884—to send another pastor on a tour of inspection to Africa, but it has unfortunately not been successful. There is, indeed, no necessity for such a visitation in India, because of the excellent

\(^1\) Viz., with the Reformed Church, as is the case in Prussia proper. Strong Lutherans still hold Luther's position as to the wrongfulness of such church union.—Eds.
management of Provost Mylius, because of the concentration of the missions there, and because of the personal contact maintained with the missionaries who have almost all been back to their home for their health's sake. But such a visitation would have been very desirable for Africa, because the territory of the mission was so great, and the superintendents there had risen from the ranks of the missionaries. Perhaps the subsequent painful crisis would then have been avoided.

The "missionary parish" was faithful to its society, as before, and to Harms, and the storms of the times did not make it disloyal. The fire of love for missions still burned brightly. The missionary festivals were as largely attended as ever, and became more numerous throughout the country. Even after the subsequent separation they did not decrease, but increased. Gifts came in rapidly. The receipts were:

- 122,152 marks in 1866.
- 150,279 marks in 1869.
- 281,028 marks in 1876.
- 356,783 marks in 1883.

There was some fluctuation from one year to another, but the receipts increased steadily, on the whole. Until 1869 there was always a surplus; but we find a small deficit from 1870 to 1873 which was nevertheless met by the large surpluses of the following years. Since Harms was as unwilling as his brother to invest funds, these surpluses were, however, expended, and we find a by no means trifling debt from 1879 on. The financial affairs were under the charge of the Consistory of Hannover until that year, when they were turned over to the authorities of Lüneburg. In 1873 the printing-establishment was enlarged, and in 1874 the bookbindery and bookstore were added. The sale of books was large, and a considerable profit was put into the treasury of the society yearly.

The Candace had faithfully continued her voyages until 1875. In 1872 she had a dangerous collision with a French

*A mark is about $0.24.—Eds.*
ship in the English Channel, and had consequently to be repaired. It soon became evident, however, that she was no longer seaworthy. She was therefore sold for 15,000 marks. She had been a blessing to the society for more than two decades of years; but owing to the increased facilities for transportation, the building of a new ship was unnecessary. From that time on the missionaries were sent out by German and English vessels.

The territory of the missions increased greatly during this period. This increase did not come from any impulse given by Theodore Harms. For the most part he only completed what his brother began. In the missionary paper of 1866 he writes this about him:

He was often reproached with flying too high, with overdoing the matter, but he paid no attention to such things. There glowed in his soul the holy fire of love to God and to the poor heathen who had never heard of such a Lord, and of the faith which removes mountains, and these made him strong to dare all things in the name of his Saviour. Was he wrong in that? Can any one in the kingdom of God fly too high, if he has the wings of faith? If one is born an eagle, ought he to fly like a sparrow? . . . . Shall his work now fold its wings? Far from it! With the wings which God has given it, it must continue its flight along the path which God has marked out for it. My brother did not live to see fulfilled on earth his dearest wish, that our mission should possess all the ends of the earth; but up yonder in heaven he has learned that through God’s mysterious providence the desire of his heart was fulfilled last Easter.

The territory of the missions embraced the following in 1866: Natal, Zulu-land, and the country of the Bechuanas in Africa; the southern part of the land of the Telugus in Eastern India; the first missionaries had been sent out to America, and the mission in Australia had been begun.

A council was appointed, as had been previously planned, to assist the superintendent in Africa from that time on. It consisted of three clerical and two lay members. Experienced men were chosen, who were a great help to Hohls. The latter enjoyed in great degree the confidence of all the missionaries and of the director. Twice—in 1869 and in 1878—Harms called him home for consultation, in order that they might settle upon a method of government which
should be as uniform as possible. About this time the ranks of the missionaries were much thinned by death. Almost all the veterans, and among them Superintendent Hohls, ended their course. A younger generation took their places. Because occasional secessions took place, Harms decreed that from that time on, every missionary who resigned, unless because of some matter of conscience, should pay 550 thalers, and every colonist 150 thalers. This was done in order to repay the society, in part, for the cost of their training and passage. The morals of the missionaries were gratifying. Coarse excesses and sins did not occur. Only once did the missionary paper report that a missionary had to be removed by reason of misconduct. They stood firmly and faithfully by the Lutheran Church without getting into difficulty with other missionary societies. They stood in friendly relation with the Norwegian and Berlin missionary societies, and were on terms of hospitality with the English missionaries, whenever there was opportunity. It was only with the liberal Bishop Colenso and his disciples that they wished to have nothing to do. In 1876 Superintendent Hohls took part in a general missionary meeting at Moritzburg, from which Colenso was excluded, however. In the invitation to this meeting the following was given as its purpose: "A union of all Protestants who recognize the whole Bible as the word of God and our Lord Jesus as the Son of God, for the purpose of praying in common that God will give us grace and strength to battle against the ungodliness around about us." Hohls took an active part in the transactions, but declared that, as a member of the Lutheran Church, he could not take part in the common celebration of the communion. This did not disturb the brotherly unity, but on the other hand Hohls stated that he was treated in a still more friendly way after this expression of his Lutheranism. Although our missionaries worked together in brotherly unity with the other missionaries, they were full of complaints of the hinderances which were caused by other Europeans. In one report is said: "The
kingdom of God would be more advanced, if the white people did not exercise such a destructive influence upon the Kaffirs. The traders, who go through the country, are for the most part godless trash, who do not consider it beneath their dignity to guzzle with the Kaffirs, to fornicate, and to cheat. And so we have to do here with the descendants of Ham who know not God, and the godless descendants of Japheth." The heathen, who are the sufferers, therefore hate the whites, and the missionaries have to suffer along with the others. If they oppose these traders, then it is said, "The missionaries are a calamity to the colony." Among the European population there, in general, the English and American missionaries enjoy greater consideration. It is everywhere the way of the world to make respect depend on wealth. The Hermannsburg missionaries drew only a small salary. They had to appear without show, and often had to get along with the closest economy, and were not ashamed of the labor of their hands. But we hear no complaints from the missionaries themselves. We must rather recognize their unselfishness and contentment. There are cases enough where missionaries, who could keep themselves by raising cattle or by agriculture, have given up their salary in whole or in part for the benefit of the mission. And when some parishes began to bring in contributions, the amount was deducted from the salary of the missionary.

A missionary in the heathen world has to suffer severe trials. The brethren experienced many such. Missionary Fröhling says:—

It came into the Devil's mind that he was being attacked in his own stronghold; then he stormed and raved and raged. Woe to him who is attacked! Woe to the missionaries. They are most exposed to his grim teeth and his fiery arrows. He aims at their bodily and spiritual life. It is true that we are so harassed beyond measure that we have often to give up our spiritual life for lost. Yes, we are often anxious for our spiritual life; then it is that we must not put our trust in ourselves, but in God who has raised the dead. Yes, if God did not intervene especially for us, if his

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* Pastor Haccius was probably not aware that the American missionaries are generally university men.—Eds.
grace did not come to our help, we were ruined. Being ourselves spiritually dead, we could not aid the heathen to come to life.

The dangers for the physical life are often great. Death is around about them in many forms—in hardships, in poisonous serpents, or wild animals, and in the rage of the heathen. The dagger was raised against many a brother, and one of them died thereby a bloody death. How grievous the life of a missionary is for the family, for the wife and the children! The latter must be guarded with the greatest care lest they be undone by the example of the heathen children. It is therefore best to send the children away and bring them up in Christian surroundings; but how hard that is for a father’s or a mother’s heart! So their trials are great, and hang like leaden weights upon their feet. The missionaries have therefore especial need of the intercessions of those interested in missions, and often ask for them in their letters. But they were not turned from their duty by all their difficulties and distress, which was often great, especially in Zululand. They tried to come near to the heathen in all possible ways, in order to induce them to hear the gospel. It was their practice, on the one hand, to invite the people personally, time and again, to visit the services, and, on the other hand, to carry the word of God to them in their kraals. Their labor was not in vain; they achieved greater or less results. But then there arose the new difficulty of deciding how to proceed with those who had been baptized. They considered this question at their conferences very earnestly, and acted, as much as possible, according to a common principle. As regards polygamy, they demanded that their converts should give up all but the first wife, and then they consecrated the marriage with this one. The husband was to support the other wives, so far as he could, until they were otherwise cared for. They further considered whether they should separate their converts from the heathen. The missionaries differed greatly in their views in regard to this point. The prevailing practice of the Hermannsburg mission seems to have been to let the converts remain, as much as possible,
among the heathen. This was certainly according to the
principles of the greatest of missionaries, St. Paul, for the new
Christians could not otherwise be salt and light for the
heathen. They were nevertheless often obliged to receive
their converts at the stations for the sake of the children and
because of the hatred and persecutions which they experi-
enced. They even let the heathen live there on condition
that they obeyed the regulations of the station. As regarded
the instruction of their converts they proceeded thus: They
began baptismal instruction as soon as there were any appli-
cants, giving this instruction according to the principle ex-
pressed by Louis Harms, and insisting that the young peo-
ple should learn to read as well as possible, because they
were apt to neglect it after baptism. The instruction pre-
paratory to the communion was begun immediately after
baptism. As is the case with our instruction preparatory to
confirmation, they used this opportunity not only to prepare
for confession and communion, but also for a thorough repe-
tition of the baptismal instruction. They established schools,
as soon as a parish, no matter how small, was formed, and
then tried to get compulsory attendance by a decree of the
parish. At this period they founded a seminary in Natal,
and one in the country of the Bechuanas, for the purpose of
training native assistants and teachers. In order to get the
necessary means of instruction the brethren went to work
industriously to translate the catechism and compile a hymn-
book.

But what about the colonists and their communism? In
1866 Harms still expressed himself in favor of retaining the
same, because the colonists set a good example for the
heathen, and because communism involved the least cost. But
the permanent continuance of the former state of affairs was
impossible, especially in Hermannsburg. The more separate
families were formed, and the larger they became, the more
did the family-feeling and the desire for independence
increase; and it became clearly necessary to give up this
close community of life and goods, so that every one might
have his own hearth-stone. The committee in Germany found it difficult to come to this conclusion. They did not consent to it till 1869. Their consent was really a result of the journey of Superintendent Hohls to Germany, and of his personal representations. All the colonists were released from the too close bonds of the society. Ten families remained at Hermannsburg and paid the mission rent for the property on which they lived. Some joined the community at Neu-Hannover, and the others founded a new settlement, which they called Lüneburg. Both communities were still supplied with pastors from Hermannsburg. Since then the influx of German colonists has not ceased, but the Hermannsburg Missionary Society sends out only missionaries. Time has taught that this is now the right thing to do. This is not saying that the original mode of proceeding was wrong, but rather that everything happened at the right time. It was quite right that the colonists should be a part of the mission at the beginning. It was also right that this union should be given up, when the rapid growth of the mission made it unnecessary.

Hermannsburg had meanwhile become a village of some size, and was governed by its own chief, who was one of the baptized heathen. In 1868 the stately Gothic church of St. Peter and St. Paul was built and was soon supplied with a fine organ, the gift of its builder. The real estate of the mission now amounts to 6,400 acres. Two or three missionaries besides the superintendent are stationed here; so much assistance is necessary to take care of the German community, the converted heathen, the heathen, and the extensive system of schools. The parish grew rapidly. In 1866 it consisted of 89 Europeans and 36 baptized heathen; in 1884 the number of the latter had increased to 313. A school for the children of the missionaries was established in addition to the school for Kaffir children, and it was soon enlarged so as to become an English school. There was a real necessity for doing this. The school system in Natal was under the control of Bishop Colenso. On that account the devout
English disliked to send their children to the schools there, and turned to Superintendent Hohls with the request that he would receive their children into his school. He could not refuse this request, and the school was soon attended by about forty English children. "By this means the school has become so prosperous," reports Hohls, "that it not only supports itself and pays the salary of the teachers, but also offers free tuition to the children of the missionaries." Progress was slower at the other stations in Natal. Only remnants of tribes live there, who have taken refuge under the protection of the English. To gather them together and keep them through the process of conversion to Christianity is the task of the mission in Natal. Many of them have no fixed dwelling-place, and the condition of this migratory class is very sad. They go begging through the world and come begging to the missionaries. Many of them would let themselves be baptized for the sake of support. The missionaries have therefore to exercise great care with regard to them. When Theodore Harms had taken charge of the mission, there were eight stations in Natal, which were increased, during his directorship, by the following: Bethesda, Nazareth, Hebron, and Endumeni in Natal; Ebenezer, Marburg, and Elim in the district of Alfredia; and Goede hoop, Ekombela, and Emtombe on the Umpongolo. In 1879 a seminary with a four years' course was established at Ehlanzeni and is prospering. The course agreed upon in the first place has been approved; and it is to be hoped that the more the number of native teachers grows, the more the blessed influence of the mission upon the whole people will increase.

Zulu-land became at this period the child of sorrow in the African mission. "The Lord cannot venture to favor us everywhere as he did among the Bechuanas," remarked Theodore Harms with regard to this. The people are enthralled by their superstition, their lust, and their pride. If some are found who wish to free themselves, they do not dare to do it on account of the enmity of the others, which has more than once led to murder. "Would you not like
to become a Christian?" a missionary once asked a girl who showed some interest. "I should like to, but I am afraid of my people," was the sad answer. Missionary Filter writes:

The Lord has in so far given us an open door here that the mission is known in the land and we dare declare the word of the cross.... But the doors of men's hearts are barred.

Nevertheless there were a few at most of the stations who could be baptized, but thus the missionaries often came into conflict with the heathen chiefs. It was on such grounds that Filter and Prigge, who were the directors of both the Zulu districts, were obliged to leave the land. The former writes sadly:

I have labored for nine years among the Zulus, and have at last baptized nine heathen. My reward is, that I must leave the land as a criminal. May the Lord not impute unto the people their sin, for the most of them know not what they do.

But in the midst of all their severe labors the missionaries did not let their courage fail. One of them writes in 1870:

God be praised that it is not our work, and that the Lord has observed his own time, which is always the right time.... No one has the right to dispute our hope, if against all probability we yet hope and believe that the seed which we sow will bring forth rich fruit in time.

But it was destined to become worse. In the year 1871, the enmity of the Zulus was shown by violence at the stations Emonjini and Inyezane. In 1877 these demonstrations were repeated at the latter, and ended in the murder of the converted heathen Joseph. When the old King Umpanda had died in his sins, Cetewayo succeeded in gaining the mastery by cunning and deceit, and was crowned as king by the English in 1873. At first it appeared as if the existence of all the missions in Zulu-land, the Norwegian as well as the Hermannsburg, was put in question. Cetewayo had already threatened to make all the missionaries leave the land. He was goaded on by his adviser John Dunn, an Englishman who had become a heathen. But the danger was fortunately averted through the exertions of the English governor, Shepstone. But when war broke out between the English and the Zulus in 1877, the heretofore restrained passions were let
loose. The missionaries had to flee and their stations were partly burned and destroyed. Harms writes in 1879:—

My heart bleeds when I think of it; but I thank our Lord God that our brethren have at least saved their lives; and I hope to God that the twelve stations which have been burned and destroyed, may yet become twelve flourishing parishes. The old saying—God blesses fire and sword—will also be true here; that is to say, the Lord turns calamities to useful ends. I lie in the dust before God and kiss his hand, but may he forgive me, if my burning tears fall upon it. We can say here also: "O thou afflicted, tossed with tempest, be comforted, be comforted."

The war ended with the victory of the English and the capture of Cetewayo. A request for indemnity, which Superintendent Hohls made of the victors, was refused; but that could be borne. The incomprehensible policy of the English caused them greater injury. Zulu-land was divided into thirteen districts, each under a chief, and among these was the infamous John Dunn. Each chief was left entirely free to decide whether he would have missionaries in his territories. John Dunn immediately forbade the missionaries his land; only the Norwegians, for whom their consul at Durban vigorously interceded, afterwards regained their places. He refused to restore their stations to the Hermannsburg missionaries, who were too near to him and therefore too much in his way, whose land he wished to have for himself, and whom he hated, because one of them had once remonstrated with him on account of his heathen life. The other chiefs, however, called them back, and they began at once thankfully to rebuild their destroyed stations. In spiritual matters also they had to begin anew, for not only their stations, but also their little parishes, were entirely destroyed. But their cup of sorrow was not yet full. The regulations, which had been made by the English, were an inducement to constant excitement and continual insurrection against the newly-appointed chiefs. Cetewayo still had many adherents; therefore the English tried to put an end to this unendurable state of affairs by his restoration in 1883. Then the flames of war blazed again fiercely between Cetewayo and his brother Ham and the Chief Usipepu, who did not wish to submit to
him. The stations were again partly destroyed; the young missionary Schröder was murdered at his station; the brethren were hard pressed, so that some of them had to be delivered by the Dutch. On June 21, 1883, Cetewayo was completely beaten by Usipepu at his kraal Undini, and soon after died of his wounds. The English quietly let all this take place and did not mix in the affair. Then the Boers assisted the Zulus. On May 21, 1884, Cetewayo’s son Dinizulu was crowned king. The missionaries could at last proceed quietly with the rebuilding of their stations. Thus the mission to the Zulus has been begun for the third time in the name of the Lord, who died for the Zulus also. And we will hope, that these fearful, bloody wars have been the iron ploughshare with which our Lord God has turned over the Zulu soil and made it ready to receive his word of grace. In any event, the pride of the Zulus has been greatly humbled. They have seen that their belief in their invincibility was an idle delusion, and also that their gods could not prevent their overthrow.

Now we come out from the dark valley of the mission to the Zulus upon the well-lighted hill of the mission to the Bechuanas. “Among the Bechuanas our mission has received God’s full blessing,” reports Harms in 1866. “With what joy they receive our missionaries! How gladly they hear God’s word! There is ground for the hope that the whole nation will enter into the kingdom of God.” The people fairly crowded forward for baptism. When, for example, Missionary Kayser had baptized fifteen adults on July 15, 1866, at Matlare, he thought that he would put off the renewal of baptismal instruction for a few weeks and complete his house before the rainy season; but the people so beset him with requests to begin the instruction again without delay, that he could not refuse. He had at once twenty-one more catechumens. When the director of this district made his tour of inspection in 1868, he reported many delightful things about the examinations of the candidates for baptism and about their zeal. “The dear people of Cuane could
have almost torn me to pieces; they all wanted to have Bibles and hymn-books, and followed me on that account, wherever I went.” But, it was among the Bechuanas as it is everywhere; the kingdom of God consists of the poor and humble. Only a few of the princes of the people have turned to Christ. “A king of the Bechuanas may only half learn—this has already become proverbial among the people. He must have a missionary at his capital—that is now a necessary part of court-state; he may also learn to read and write; but the affair must go no further,” writes Behrens. Nevertheless the princes were very friendly to the missionaries. Among those who were in earnest about Christianity is to be named, before all others, Joseph Mokoke, the chief of the Phalanes, who received holy baptism in 1876. Beginning with 1869, several years of drought and famine came over the land, but the progress of God’s kingdom was not hindered thereby. The desire for salvation increased greatly. More and more missionaries came into the land, and station after station could be established. Of course, the work of the mission did not proceed without some vexations even here. Although the attitude of the Dutch government was favorable, the missionaries often had cause to complain of the conduct of many of the under-officials and Boers, who tried to defraud the mission when it bought land. Indeed, at some places, for example Matlare, they had to give up their station on that account and remove to other places. The landed property of the mission was bought partly by the Bechuanas and partly by the missionaries themselves. This gave rise to an uncertain condition of affairs. In 1871 Superintendent Hohls therefore made a journey into the country of the Bechuanas, in order to get as much as possible of the property in the name of the mission. He was partially successful.

A serious danger for the young parishes arose from the nearness of the diamond-fields. Thither streamed blacks and whites from all sides, and since all were filled with the desire to become rich, and lust and godlessness reigned
among them, the missionaries were full of anxiety for their people. They energetically opposed this desire to go to the diamond-fields, and they succeeded in keeping back the most. In general, the parishes were easily and willingly guided by them. They tried to train them, as soon as possible, to be independent and to support the church and schools. The parishes could, for the most part, develop quietly. They were little disturbed by the various wars. For a short time the English took possession of the country, but again yielded the supremacy to the Dutch. The prosperity of the parishes was increased by industrious cultivation of the soil and by improvement in the raising of cattle. In time of war they had many opportunities of making good profits by wagoning and by the sale of supplies. The Christians built themselves neat, pleasant villages, and the blessings of Christian civilization were already manifest in their outward relations. Theodore Harms took charge of the mission to the Bechuanas when it numbered five stations. In 1885 it had grown to twenty-four stations with twenty-seven missionaries and 9,198 baptized heathen. Bethanien was and still is the pearl of the parishes. In 1885 it already had 1,438 baptized persons. As early as 1867 a newly come missionary writes: "I had heard much of Bethanien, but what I have heard and seen here, surpasses all that had been told me before." And in 1868 Behrens could testify: "Heathenism has no more support; it has lived out its time among this race." He had great joy in his school for converts and in the attentiveness of his hearers at divine service. The church was built in 1867, but had to be enlarged as early as 1876. The whole parish assisted in building the church; even the children took pleasure in carrying stones. The school system developed in a satisfactory way. The parish itself enforced compulsory attendance of the children. The number of the latter increased rapidly. In 1872 Behrens established a second school and in 1883 a third. The attendance was good and the children showed great zeal. Before the vacation was at an end,
many of them would come again and beg their teacher with tears to begin instruction. Behrens enjoyed great love in the whole parish as well as among the children. And since he acted as a father towards all, grown persons and children alike submitted willingly to his guidance. He sought to fill their whole life with the word of God. He held daily morning and evening devotions at the church besides the regular Sunday and weekly services. With great energy he brought in Christian practices and ways, and tried by means of strict church discipline to make and keep the life of the parish as pure as possible. Moreover, he was fearless and recognized no human consideration. Thus, several sons of the king, who had been dabbling in witchcraft, were shut out from the communion and congregation, and had to take their seat at church publicly upon the mourner's bench. He held the Christians strictly to work, and himself set them a good example. He helped them build their houses, and planned their dwellings and gardens. To make them as independent as possible, and to increase their prosperity, he bought a piece of land and then sold it in smaller parts to his Christians. Here the people built, so that a large village arose gradually. It contained ninety homes as early as 1880. He had great joy in watching the development and expansion of his parish. The Christian life took deeper and deeper root, and, although the dark side was seen often, the light side was seen still oftener. He writes with regard to this point:

One's first love does not bring him to heaven at once, and therefore it is no cause for wonder that now and then some one becomes lukewarm and idle. But it is well, if this lukewarmness and idleness are shown for only a time. Thus it is here.—I can testify that most of the members of the parish are zealous Christians.

This was shown not only by their conduct and their industrious labor in times of peace, but also by their patience and submission in times of need. In the heavy years of famine they bowed humbly beneath God's hand. But they did not languidly and dejectedly yield to distress and death after the manner of the heathen, but, without being too solicitous,
they did what they could, to lessen the worst distress; and consequently not a single member of the parish died of hunger.—This Bethanien is indeed an unusual missionary field and full of blossom and of fruit. Missionary Behrens, who in the beginning had given his farm to the mission at Hermannsburg, has there richly experienced the promise, "Every one who hath forsaken houses, or brethren, or sisters . . . . or lands for my name's sake, shall receive a hundredfold."

Let us now turn to India. When Pastor Mylius came to Missionary Grönning at Rajahmundry, the latter's American missionary society had again taken up the work. The Hermannsburg Society could therefore not take possession of this mission, and Mylius crossed over Madras into the southern part of the country of the Telugus. So the ways of God in Eastern India also were other than they had thought at Hermannsburg. Mylius had got a firm foothold in India in 1866, and at the death of Theodore Harms the Hermannsburg mission there had increased to ten stations with eleven missionaries. A mission to India is a grave undertaking on account of the importance of the country, and is beset with greater difficulties than the mission to Africa, because of the long-continued and partly destructive influence of the Europeans, and because of the system of caste which stands like a great wall across the path of the missionaries. No missionary can pass by the system of caste with indifference. Therefore the Hermannsburg Missionary Society was soon involved in the controversy about it. Should they tolerate different castes in their Christian parishes, and leave it to the power of Christianity to overcome them from within, as the Leipzig missionaries wished to do? Or, should they make the giving up of caste from the beginning a prerequisite for baptism? All the other missionary societies follow the latter practice; the Leipzig Society stands alone. Should the Hermannsburg Society join with it? If they did not, a controversy between the two Lutheran missionary societies was unavoidable. Theodore Harms, who agreed with his sainted brother in this, and Mylius took from the beginning a de-
cided stand against caste. At the positive desire of the latter, Harms enlarged the statutes of the Hermannsburg Society in 1872 by adding:—

(a) Every grown person must be informed before baptism of our views with regard to caste. (b) Our mission servants especially must be required to eat with every child of God of the lower castes, if God gives opportunity. (c) Members of the parish, who are weak in this respect, are not to be treated with severity at once, but with patience and forbearance, and only when they remain obstinate, are they to be shut out from the holy communion.

An article appeared soon after in the Leipzig missionary paper, which was unfortunately not without personal attacks. Harms felt himself necessitated to declare that he had had no desire to oppose the Leipzig Society in his utterances about caste, but had only stated what was to be observed in the Hermannsburg Society. "We willingly recognize and honor the Leipzig Society as our older sister. With regard to caste Leipzig and Hermannsburg differ greatly. Hermannsburg will still insist on not permitting caste anywhere in the church, least of all at the holy communion." Harms and Mylius felt themselves bound in this matter by God's word. "God has taught me in his word," writes the latter, "that I should be disobedient to him and a deceiver of this people, if I should allow here in our mission that uncharitable system of caste, which divides the people, dishonors the lowly, and is directly opposed to real Christianity." The controversy lasted through several years. In the February number of the missionary paper for 1877 Harms closed the controversy, and at the same time expressed the wish of his own heart, that this controversy between Leipzig and Hermannsburg might come to an end, and that the societies might go their own way in this matter, having peacefully agreed to disagree. The controversy scarcely made its way into the parishes. It had not been called forth by actual experience but was theoretical in nature. Unfortunately it demanded one painful sacrifice from the circle of our missionaries, inasmuch as the zealous and excellent brother Dahl agreed with the Leipzig Society in its views, and had therefore to be recalled from India, in order that there might be no strife within our own mission. With
this we leave this question of principle and turn to the his-
tory of the Hermannsburg mission in India.

Mylius first made a journey through the country in search
of information and soon found fit situations for stations by
the aid of a Mr. Jackmann of Naidupett and Collector Bos-
well. When the missionaries Brunotte, Dahl, and Thomas
Petersen arrived at the end of the year, they could at
once establish the three stations, Naidupett, Sulurpett, and
Gudur. Mylius determined to occupy with missions a region
of about seventy English miles in length and fifty in breadth
in southern Telugu-land, and tried to gain in this way a defi-
nite territory. In this region are over two thousand thickly
populated communities, mostly of peasants. In the north,
however, there are two cities, Kalastry and Venkatagiri,
where the king resides. By Boswell's aid Mylius easily got
land for laying out stations. He therefore made use of this
favorable opportunity, and, when, in 1869, the missionaries
Böttcher, Scriba, Wahl, and Wörrlein came to India, sta-
tions were established rapidly. Brunotte built, in 1869, a
mission-house at Sriharikota on a little cape between Pulicat Lake and the ocean. Dahl established a station at Ven-
katagiri, where the Rajah treated him in a very friendly way.
As they had only a very small house at Sulurpett, Scriba
erected a larger building there. Wörrlein established a little
health-resort at Duraspatam on the ocean, and founded the
beautiful station of Vakadu in 1871. In 1873 stations could
be established at Kalastry and Rapurr, and in 1877 at Tir-
upaty. The last of their stations was added in 1883 at
Kodur. It was established by Wörrlein and is supported by
some missionary organizations in Bremen. Tirupaty is like-
wise supported by friends of the mission in Northern Sles-
wick. Mylius was appointed provost of this mission in 1867,
and took up his residence at Naidupett, which is the natural
central point for the work. Under his wise guidance the
brethren are bound together in unity. This harmony has
been broken only by the recall of Dahl and the separation of
Brunotte and Otto, who left the Hermannsburg Missionary
Society in 1875 on external grounds. Unfortunately there is much sickness in India. Several of the brethren have had to return home for a time; Wahl has had to give up his work entirely; and the missionaries Böttcher, Meyer, Kiehne, and Shepman have already died from their labors. They trained native assistants, who caused them much trouble at first; but when they had established a seminary with a course of six years at Naidupett, and the pupils who had been, for the most part, baptized and trained by them, took up the work, they had excellent assistance. At first there was one assistant at each station. Afterwards the number was increased to three, and at Naidupett to four. There were twenty-seven of them altogether in 1884. They helped in preaching to the heathen and in the schools. There were small schools at each station. Boarding-schools, at which the children were entirely supported and brought up, were established at Naidupett, at Gudur, and at Tirupaty. The missionaries preached to the heathen with great diligence, especially after the completion of their buildings, but they met with much distressing indifference. There is much inquiry in India whether Christianity is the only true religion, but it is mostly an inquiry of the reason and not of the heart. Even the Rajah of Venkatagiri liked to discuss that question with the missionaries, but it went no farther, for the Brahmans, who surrounded him, prevented it. The latter did what they could to prevent any one’s going over to Christianity. In Calcutta and Benares their influence is, indeed, already lessened and heathenism undermined. But, as is always the case, peasants cling most strongly to the old and yield less rapidly to the influence of the new, and the mostly rural population among the Telugus had, therefore, been little touched by the new spirit. The Brahmans and the old religion still had great influence there, and it was exceedingly difficult to free souls from their fetters. But God’s word showed its power even among the Telugus. On February 11, 1866, Mylius baptized his first convert, Johannes, at Sulurpett. At first the candidates for baptism were very
few. Whenever any individual wished to be converted, his relatives would try to hold him back. But what is at first a hinderance often becomes a help afterwards. If the first converts remained firm, they soon drew their relatives after them. But few of the Brahmans and Sudras would be baptized. The converts were mostly pariahs. But that is the universal experience in missionary work. God has chosen the humble and despised of earth, as St. Paul says. The number of baptized persons, nevertheless, gradually increased quite considerably. At the end of six years there were over 200, after ten years over 400, and at the end of our period 1,123. They had much difficulty with these baptized persons on account of caste prejudices with regard to marriage; “but we have had good results even in this,” Mylius could testify. With regard to the conduct of the converts he writes, “So far as our converts are concerned, I hope that it is sufficient for me to say that they are children.” And in another place, “they were all poor sinners and are such still; but when I consider that I have not yet proceeded farther than to my daily Kyrie eleison, I have great patience with them.” The missionaries boast of the attendance at church, and express their satisfaction with the desire of the members of the parish to live a Christian life. They can tell many edifying things about the earnest Christian life and blissful death of some of their converts. The young parishes remained steadfast in those fearful years of hunger and famine and typhus from 1876 to 1879, and their example led many a heathen to imitate them. Among the converts are many false priests. The worship of idols centres at Kalastry, and particularly at Tirupaty, one of the most important of the places of pilgrimage in Southern India. Thousands repair thither yearly to worship Venkatesveruda, as Vishnu is called there. Both places are headquarters of the Brahmans, but even there the missionaries were permitted to have the most refreshing experiences. When they built a chapel at Kalastry in 1873, an Englishman gave them a gift for it with the wish that the chapel might soon become too small. And as
early as 1879 a larger church had to be built. In Tirupaty also there stands a stately church on the route of the pilgrims to the temple of the idol, which preaches constantly to all the poor, inquiring pilgrims about Him, in whom alone peace is found. The work progressed slowest at the stations Rapur, where the missions were much plagued with sickness, and the hearts of the heathen are hardest, and at Srisiharikota, where no missionary could be stationed for many years on account of the fearful elephantiasis so prevalent there. The station is now cared for from Sulurpett. Provost Mylius is especially industrious in making translations into the Telugu tongue. A hymn-book, the Hannoverian catechism of 1862, and Zahn's Bible history are now ready, and in 1884 a liturgy and collection of postils were in preparation. The more such books are spread abroad among the people, and the more also the newly arrived missionaries become acquainted with the people and their language, and the more the number of the native assistants increases, so much the more will Christianity spread there; and we believe that the blessed labor of the Hermannsburg mission has a good future among the Telugus.

[To be continued.]
ARTICLE IV.

THE DATE OF THE APOCALYPSE.

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In the case of many books of Scripture the question of date is not one of mere historic interest, but is intimately related to the larger questions of authenticity and interpretation. It is obvious, for example, what a changed aspect the Pentateuch and the prophecy of Daniel would wear, if critical research should compel us to refer them to a period long subsequent to the days of the Exodus and the Captivity.

The authorship of the Apocalypse is not determined by the time of its composition, for the dates that divide the suffrages of the learned world fall alike within the life of John the apostle, by whom it was certainly written, as the voice of antiquity attests. But it is maintained that the date furnishes the key to the meaning of the book. It must be interpreted from the standpoint of the seer, and cannot be understood unless we rightly apprehend the circumstances under which it was given to the church. To see as John saw we must take our stand where John stood. The vision is intelligible from no other point of view. The question of time, therefore, is one of first importance, as it determines the exposition of the book.

Two dates only need concern us, for between them our choice must be made.

A. Tradition assigns the Apocalypse to the close of the reign of Domitian (95 or 96 A. D.). This date was generally accepted down to the present century, and is still maintained by many critics, as Trench, Alford, Milligan, Lee, Elliott, Hengstenberg, Lange, Godet, Ebrard, Warfield, and generally in Smith's Bible Dictionary.

B. The majority of scholars now assign it to a period shortly before the destruction of Jerusalem, in the reign of Nero, Galba, or Vespasian (68–70). This is declared to be one of the most certain results of modern criticism, and is maintained by Weiss, Gebhardt, Luthardt, Olshausen, Stier, Gieseler, Westcott, Lightfoot, Salmon, Farrar, Plumptre, Schaff, Stuart, Reuss, Meyer, Ewald, Bleek, De Wette, Davidson, Düsterdieck, of whom the seven last named hold that the Apocalypse was not written by John the apostle, or at least that the fourth Gospel and the Apocalypse are not from the same hand.

It is the purpose of this article to advocate a return to the earlier view, which refers the book to the close of the first century, and in the course of the argument to present the objections to current schemes of interpretation.

The evidence is of two kinds: 1st. External—the witness of the early church; 2d. Internal—the witness of the book itself. Of these let us treat in order.

THE EXTERNAL EVIDENCE.

The most important witness is Irenaeus. In commenting upon Rev. xiii. 18, he says: "For if it were necessary that the name of him [antichrist] should be distinctly revealed in this present time, it would have been told by him who saw the apocalyptic vision (δ' ἐκείνου δὲ ἔρρεθη τοῦ καὶ τὴν ἀποκάλυψιν ἐκφάντω). For it was seen no long time ago, but almost in our generation, toward the end of Domitian's reign (οὖν γὰρ πρὸ πολλῶν χρόνων ἐκφάνθη, ἀλλὰ σχέδια ἐπὶ τῆς ἑμετέρας γενεᾶς, πρὸς τῷ τέλει τῆς δομετιανοῦ ἀρχῆς)."

Three attempts have been made to break the force of these words.

1st. It is said that the Latin translation of the third or fourth century renders ἐκφάνθη by visum est, indicating a neuter subject, the beast, and not ἡ ἀποκάλυψις.

2d. It is urged that δομετιανοῦ is an adjective, referring to Domitius Nero.

3d. It is argued that not the Apocalypse, but he, that is John, is the subject of ἐωραίων. The use of ἐωρακτρος immediately before, however, makes the reference to the Apocalypse clear. Moreover, if John were the subject, as it is the object of Irenæus to bring the matter as near his own time as possible, he would not have said that John was seen toward the close of Domitian's reign, but in the reign of Trajan, which Irenæus knew that he reached. 8

It is a sufficient answer to all these forced interpretations, that the early church always understood the words of Irenæus in their plain and obvious meaning, nor would any other have been suggested if his testimony had not been a stumbling-block in the way of modern exposition. That Irenæus refers the Apocalypse to the reign of Domitian is generally admitted by scholars of all shades of opinion.

Certainly Irenæus might be mistaken. He tells us, with an appeal to those who had seen John and the other apostles, that Christ reached the age of nearly fifty years, 4 a statement clearly erroneous. But upon this point Irenæus was not likely to mistake. He gives us a pleasant picture of his intercourse with Polycarp, the pupil of John:—

For I have a more vivid recollection of what occurred at that time than of recent events. . . . So that I can even describe the place where the blessed Polycarp used to sit and discourse, his going out, too, and his coming in, his general mode of life and personal appearance, together with the discourses which he delivered to the people; also how he would speak of his familiar intercourse with John, and with the rest of those who had seen the Lord; and how he would call their words to remembrance. whatsoever things he had heard from them respecting the Lord, both with regard to his miracles and his teaching, Polycarp having thus received [information] from the eye-witnesses of the Word of life, would recount them all in harmony with the Scriptures. These things, through God's mercy which was upon me, I then listened to attentively, and treasured them up not on paper, but in my heart; and I am continually, by God's grace, revolving these things accurately in my mind. 8

*Ibid., Book iii. chap. iii. sect. 4.*

*Ibid., Book ii. chap. xxii. sects. 5, 6.*

*Ep. to Florinus, H. E., Book v. chap. xx.*
His great work "Against Heresies," from which the passage under discussion is taken, was written between 180 and 190. Regarding his position and trustworthiness it is sufficient to quote the words of Canon Westcott: "He stood forth to maintain no novelties, but to vindicate what had been believed of old. . . . The great work of Irenæus . . . is the sole considerable monument of the literature of the churches of Asia Minor from the time of Polycarp to that of Gregory of Neo-Cæsarea or even of Basil." And the words of Dr. Schaff: "Irenæus is the leading representative of Catholic Christianity in the last quarter of the second century, the champion of orthodoxy against Gnostic heresy, and the mediator between the Eastern and Western churches. He united a learned Greek education and philosophical penetration with practical wisdom and moderation. He is neither very original nor brilliant, but eminently sound and judicious. . . . . . . He is perfectly at home in the Greek Bible and in the early Christian writers. . . . . . . His position gives him additional weight, for he is linked by two long lives, that of his teacher and grand teacher, to the fountain-head of Christianity." In this estimate of his character there is general agreement. Note further that Irenæus had made some special study of the Apocalypse, as is shown by his reference to different manuscripts that had come under his notice, and by his exposition of various passages: and his evidence is seen to be very weighty.

But we do not rest upon the word of Irenæus alone. Let us summon the remaining witnesses in order.

Clement of Alexandria (150-220) says only, that, upon the death of the tyrant, John returned from Patmos to Ephesus. Eusebius understood that by the tyrant, Clement meant

*Canon of the New Testament, pp. 341, 381.
*Quis dives, chap. xliii.
Domitian, and cites him with Irenæus as a witness to that effect.\footnote{10} Tertullian, contemporary with Clement, gives no certain testimony; though he speaks of persecutions under both Nero and Domitian. He says: "Domitian, too, a man of Nero's type in cruelty, tried his hand at persecution; but as he had something of the human in him, he soon put an end to what he had begun, even restoring again those whom he had banished."\footnote{11} Eusebius quotes these words, and adds: "But after Domitian had reigned fifteen years, and Nero succeeded to the government, the Roman senate decreed that the honors of Domitian should be revoked, and that those who had been unjustly expelled should return to their homes, and have their goods restored." "This is the statement of the historians of the day," says Eusebius. "It was then, also, that the apostle John returned from his banishment in Patmos, and took up his abode at Ephesus, according to an ancient tradition of the church."\footnote{12} It is plain that Eusebius understood Tertullian in harmony with the prevailing tradition, which placed the exile and the Apocalypse in the reign of Domitian.

Again, Tertullian says, "How happy is its church [the church in Rome], on which apostles poured forth all their doctrine along with their blood! where Peter endures a passion like his Lord's! where Paul wins his crown in a death like John's [i.e., John the Baptist]! where the apostle John was first plunged, unhurt, into boiling oil, and thence remitted to his island-exile!"\footnote{13} The words obviously contain no indication that the martyrdom of Peter and Paul and the persecution of John occurred at the same time, but only that they occurred in the same place.

Jerome, indeed, in citing this passage refers it to the

\footnote{10} H. E., Book iii. chap. xxiii.
\footnote{11} Apology, chap. v.
\footnote{12} H. E., Book iii. chap. xx.
\footnote{13} De Præscript. Hær., chap. xxxvi.
time of Nero\textsuperscript{14}. But (1) The words of Tertullian contain no note of time; (2) Eusebius understands Tertullian to refer the exile of John to the reign of Domitian; (3) Jerome himself in the same paragraph places the exile under Domitian; (4) The legend of the oil-bath is itself apocryphal. It is evident that, in quoting Tertullian, Jerome did not associate the oil-bath with the exile.

The Muratorian Canon, which probably dates from about 170, says that "Paul, following the rule of his predecessor John, writes to no more than seven churches by name." If this means, as some assert, that John's letters to the seven churches were written before Paul wrote to the churches under his care, then the Apocalypse must have been earlier at least than the last epistle Paul addressed to a church, the Epistle to the Philippians, written in the year 62 or 63. But that is impossible, for the persecution under Nero did not break out until the year 64. It is obvious, as Westcott notes,\textsuperscript{18} that John may be called the predecessor of Paul simply because he was an apostle before him.

Origen (185–253), in commenting upon Matt. xvi. 6, uses these words: "And the King of the Romans, as tradition teaches, condemned John, bearing witness for the sake of the word of truth, to the island of Patmos. And John teaches concerning his witness, not saying who condemned him." Origen contrasts tradition with Scripture. The tradition to which he alludes must have been that handed down from Irenæus, for up to this time there is no trace of any other in the church.

The first commentator on the Apocalypse of whom we have knowledge is Victorinus, Bishop of Petavium, who suffered martyrdom under Diocletian, 303. Commenting upon the eleventh verse of chapter x., he remarks: "He says this, because when John said these things he was in the island of Patmos, condemned to the labor of the mines by

\textsuperscript{14} Adv. Jov., Book i. chap. xxvi.

\textsuperscript{18} Canon of the New Testament. Appendix C.
Caesar Domitian. There, therefore, he saw the Apocalypse." And upon xvii. 10, "The time must be understood in which the written Apocalypse was published, since then reigned Caesar Domitian; but before him had been Titus, his brother, and Vespasian, Otho, Vitellius, and Galba. These are the five who have fallen. One remains, under whom the Apocalypse was written—Domitian, to wit." The work of Victorinus has been interpolated, but his witness upon this point is not in doubt.

Eusebius (260-340), "to whose zeal we owe most of what is known of the history of the New Testament," 16 the father of church history, several times expressly refers the Apocalypse to the reign of Domitian. 17 The witness of Eusebius is of great weight, for he "had almost all the Christian literature of the first century at command." 18 Evidently he knew of no other tradition than that which assigned the Apocalypse to the time of Domitian.

It is true that Eusebius was in doubt whether the Apocalypse was the work of John the apostle; but his doubt rested apparently upon internal grounds alone, and does not impair the fidelity with which he preserved the traditions of the church.

The first break in the prevailing tradition is made by Epiphanius, who was chosen Bishop of Salamis in 367. Twice he asserts that John was banished under Claudius, who died in the year 54. 19 And he declares that at that time John was ninety years of age, and then wrote his Gospel. Epiphanius was notoriously inaccurate; and his statement is so widely at variance with all tradition besides, that, with the notable exception of Grotius, scarcely any scholar has been found to accept it.

Jerome (340-419) says: "In the fourteenth year, therefore, Domitian setting in motion the second persecution after

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16 Ibid., p. 119.
18 Luthardt, John, Author of the Fourth Gospel, p. 37.
19 Haer., chap. li. sect. xii—chap. xxxiii.
Nero, John, banished to the island of Patmos, wrote the Apocalypse, which Justin Martyr and Irenæus interpret." The apocryphal acts of John, of uncertain date, and Orosius and Sulpicius Severus, early in the fifth century, follow the tradition, which remains unbroken, but for the blunder of Epiphanius, for three hundred years.

Andreas, Bishop of Caesarea in Cappadocia, probably toward the close of the fifth century, from whom we have the first continuous commentary on the Apocalypse, remarks that some refer vi. 12 and vii. 1 to the destruction of Jerusalem, but he refers them to the time of antichrist.

Arethas, whom some reckon of the sixth century, but others, as Dr. Schaff, following Otto and Harnack, of the tenth, in commenting upon i. 9, quotes the passage already noted from the Chronicle of Eusebius, without expressing his own opinion. Upon vi. 12, he remarks that some refer the earthquake to the time of Vespasian, but most interpreters to the time of antichrist. Upon vii. 4, he says that the destruction wrought by the Romans had not yet overtaken the Jews, when the evangelist prophesied these things. Arethas appears to have been in some confusion regarding the date, but the last quotation is the clearest expression of his own belief.

It is well known that the Peshito, the oldest Syriac version of the New Testament, does not contain the Apocalypse. But the title-page of a Syriac version of the Apocalypse in the sixth century declares that it was written by John in Patmos, whither he was banished by Nero. If we assign

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De Vir. Ill., chap. ix.

In face of the fact that Victorinus expressly and repeatedly ascribes the Apocalypse to the reign of Domitian, and that Andreas gives no opinion regarding its date, Canon Farrar says, "The earliest apocalyptic commentators, as well as the Syriac and Theophylact, all place the writing of the Apocalypse in the reign of Nero." (Early Days of Christianity, chap. xxvii. sect. 1, p. 408.) His whole treatment of the external evidence is inaccurate and misleading. Professor Salmon notes a striking instance (Introduction to New Testament, sect. 14, p. 294 note).

History of the Christian Church, Vol. i. p. 825.
Arethas to the tenth century, this is the first unequivocal witness, except Epiphanius, to the early date of the book.

Theophylact, in the preface to his commentary on the Gospel of John, says that John, being an exile in the island of Patmos, wrote his Gospel thirty-two years after the ascension of Christ, thus placing the exile in the reign of Nero. Much stress is laid upon this evidence by certain advocates of the early date, yet it is of little value. For (1) Theophylact belonged to the eleventh century; (2) he is not speaking of the Apocalypse, but of the Gospel, and the Gospel was certainly not written at the time he indicates; (3) Theophylact himself, in commenting upon Matt. xx. 23, says that John was condemned by Trajan. This is the testimony—so late, so contradictory, so demonstrably untrue—that we are asked to set against the word of Irenæus.

These are all the witnesses of any weight whatever that testify to the early date. It is proposed to set aside the testimony of Irenæus, Victorinus, Eusebius, and Jerome, in favor of the Syriac version, Arethas, and Theophylact. The simple truth is, there is no respectable evidence for the early date. When witnesses are summoned from the tenth and eleventh centuries, the case is plainly hopeless.

But it is alleged that the tradition rests upon the testimony of Irenæus alone, so that we have not many witnesses, but one. If that were true, the single word of Irenæus would far outweigh all the contrary evidence that is adduced. There is no man in the early church upon whose word we should more confidently rest than upon the word of Irenæus, no one better qualified to speak with authority here. But there is other witness. Eusebius must be our guide, and he appeals to Clement of Alexandria with Irenæus to prove that John returned from Patmos after the death of Domitian, and to "an ancient tradition of the church." Eusebius found the tradition wide-spread and

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23 H. E., Book iii. chap. xxiii.
24 Ibid., chap. xx.

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generally entertained in the church, and he does not refer it to Irenæus alone, though his witness was the most weighty.

It may be added, by way of corroborative evidence, that banishment was a common sentence under Domitian, while, under Nero, John would probably have suffered death with Paul and Peter, if we admit that the persecution under Nero extended to the provinces.

Such is the evidence—so weighty, so widely distributed—which ascribes the Apocalypse to the reign of Domitian. It is possible that tradition may be in error, but that tradition favors the later date is simply indisputable. This is admitted by many scholars who yet hold the early date on internal grounds. Thus Dr. Schaff says: "The prevailing, we may say the only distinct, tradition, beginning with so respectable a witness as Irenæus, about 170, assigns the exile to the end of the reign of Domitian, who ruled from 81 to 96."

We proceed to examine—

THE INTERNAL EVIDENCE.

This is of two kinds: I.—The evidence drawn from specific passages; II.—The evidence drawn from the general style and character of the book.

I.—The evidence drawn from specific passages. Stress is laid upon the word shortly (ἐν τῇχε) in i. 1. It must refer to events immediately at hand,—the fall of Jerusalem, the fortunes of the Roman empire under Nero and his successors. But certainly the word cannot be literally applied to the theme of the book, the second coming of Christ, and it is satisfied by a general reference to the Empire, of which the future is disclosed. That it is not inconsistent with a considerable lapse of time is plain from Luke xviii., where ἐν τῇχε of verse 8 must allow room for μακροθυμαί of verse 7. And further, the application of the term to the second advent is in harmony with the teaching of Scripture. The

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26 Ibid., chap. xvii., xviii.; Tac. Agric. 45.
26 History of the Christian Church, Vol. i. p. 427.
early church regarded the coming of Christ as always imminent, though they knew not the day and hour of His appearing. The apostles constantly appealed to it as a motive to patience, to courage, to endurance. Were the apostles mistaken? Whatever their personal hope or expectation, their teaching was in accord with the truth. For (1) they claim to have no definite knowledge of the time. Only as the Lord taught them they look upon his coming as always impending. (2) There are many comings of Christ, all pointing forward to his glorious advent. Death is to the individual soul what that advent shall be to the world—the time of judgment. Every display of divine wrath is the shadow that the great judgment-day casts before. Predictions fulfilled only in that day find a secondary accomplishment in events that are typical of the end. (3) Scripture gives us the divine standard by which to measure time—"One day is with the Lord as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day" (2 Peter iii. 8). God does not reckon time by the clock.

We may then apply this word shortly in the literal sense to the future of the Roman empire, as here foreshadowed; or we may take a wider view, and apply it to the whole contents of the book down to the second advent, according to principles (2) and (3) laid down above.

Appeal is made to the words, "the things which are" (i. 19). But here, again, the phrase is amply satisfied by a reference to the Roman empire, or to the epistles to the seven churches.

These, however, are minor arguments. It is urged, with the utmost confidence, that in the eleventh chapter the temple in Jerusalem is represented as still standing. Hence the book was written before the city was destroyed.

But even if it be the literal temple that appears, does the conclusion follow? If the vision of the temple proves that the book was written before the destruction of Jerusalem, does

27 Phil. iv. 5; James v. 8; 1 Peter iv. 7; 1 John ii. 18.
the vision of the woman and the child in chapter xii. prove that it was written before the birth of Christ? Evidently the seer is looking backward in the one instance; why not in the other? By what right is it assumed that the date of any particular vision gives the date of the book?

But passing by this point to enter upon the question of interpretation, we discover that this is not the literal temple. The measuring of the worshippers indicates at once that the whole is symbolic. Moreover, upon this theory, what explanation can be given of the command to measure the temple, the altar, and the worshippers, but to leave out the court, and measure it not? Whether the measuring denotes preservation or destruction, a clear distinction is drawn. Part is to be preserved, and part destroyed. But at the capture of the city the whole was involved in indiscriminate ruin. We must believe that John was ignorant or forgetful of the prediction of the Lord (Mark xiii. 2), and proved himself a false prophet. So Bleek declares, "A destruction of the city and of the temple itself is not spoken of here; it is even signified unmistakably that they shall be placed under God's immediate protection.... Rather is the hope expressed... that even the temple may remain safe, without being profaned by heathens." 28 Yet this book, containing a prediction so soon and so signally falsified, was received by the church as true, authoritative, and inspired. Credulity could go no further.

And again, upon this theory what is made of the two witnesses? The greater part of the chapter is devoted to them. They are the prominent actors in the whole scene. Do we find any trace of them in the siege of Jerusalem? Josephus has given us a detailed account of it, yet there is not the faintest indication of anything resembling what is here portrayed. The witnesses wrought great miracles; after they were slain, from among the peoples and tribes and tongues and nations men looked upon their dead bodies three days and a half; they that dwelt on the earth rejoiced

because they were rid of their tormentors; after the three days and a half they stood upon their feet, and ascended to heaven in a cloud, and their enemies beheld them. This is not a mere episode. The witnesses are the central figures of the scene. Yet no historical research or exegetical skill can find or frame an explanation of the passage upon the supposition that the seer is predicting the capture of Jerusalem.

The theory that the literal temple is represented, halts at the first verse, breaks down at the second, and confesses its utter inability to go further at the third.

But it is said that if John wrote after the destruction of Jerusalem, he must have referred to it. A similar argument has been urged to prove that John could not have written the first Epistle that bears his name. John does not mention the capture of the city, because there was no occasion; but we may believe that it furnished, in part at least, the terrible imagery in which the downfall of Babylon is portrayed.

By a large number of critics the stress of the argument for the early date is laid upon the identification of the beast with the emperor Nero. This is declared to be conclusive. The key of the book, long lost, has been recovered.

That the beast is Nero is the prevailing opinion among German scholars, and is endorsed by the recent edition of Grimm's New Testament Lexicon, edited by Professor Thayer (see ἄναχρισμένος).

The passages mainly relied upon are three.

And I saw a beast coming up out of the sea, having ten horns and seven heads, and on his horns ten diadems, and upon his heads names of blasphemy. And the beast which I saw was like unto a leopard, and his feet were as the feet of a bear, and his mouth as the mouth of a lion: and the dragon gave him his power, and his throne, and great authority. And I saw one of his heads as though it had been smitten unto death; and his death stroke was healed: and the whole earth wondered after the beast (xiii. 1-3 Rev. Ver.).

In close connection with this passage stands xvii. 8-11:—

29 Lücke, Commentary on Eps. of John, Introd., chap. i.
The beast that thou sawest was, and is not; and is about to come up out of the abyss, and to go into perdition. And they that dwell on the earth shall wonder, they whose name hath not been written in the book of life from the foundation of the world, when they behold the beast, how that he was, and is not, and shall come. Here is the mind which hath wisdom. The seven heads are seven mountains, on which the woman sitteth: and they are seven kings; the five are fallen, the one is, the other is not yet come; and when he cometh, he must continue a little while. And the beast that was, and is not, is himself also an eighth, and is of the seven; and he goeth into perdition.

Who or what is represented by the beast? The leading interpretations are: 1. The world power in general, as in the vision of Nebuchadnezzar (Dan. ii.), embodied in successive kingdoms denoted by the seven heads. 2. The Roman empire, which appeared to receive a mortal wound in the death of Nero, but was restored by Vespasian. 3. The papacy. 4. Most modern German scholars, with many followers in England and America, identify the beast with the emperor Nero.

With this last opinion we are now concerned, because of its bearing upon the time of the composition of the book. We shall not stop to ask again whether the date of the writing may be drawn from the date of the vision, but proceed at once to the question of interpretation.

The characteristic marks of the beast are two, and these, it is affirmed, point unmistakably to the Roman empire and to Nero.

(1) The enigmatic utterance regarding the wound and recovery of the beast is explained by the popular belief that Nero should rise from the dead and resume the empire. That such a superstition was at one time wide-spread among Christians and heathen alike is certain. The original form of it seems to have been, not that Nero was dead and should rise again, but that he had escaped the hands of his enemies, and taken refuge in Earthia, whence he should return to wreak vengeance upon Rome. But we may admit that the correspondence between the prevalent belief and the vision of John is close enough to furnish adequate foundation for the theory.
(2) The seven heads are seven kings; five are fallen, one is, one is yet to come. This, we are told, points to the very emperor in whose reign the book was written.

The indication is not precise enough indeed to point all critics of the same school to the same conclusion. Some, following Suetonius and Josephus, begin with Julius Cæsar, and reckon Nero the sixth, under whom John wrote. The majority begin with Augustus, and make Galba the sixth; while others, omitting Galba, Otho, and Vitellius as usurpers, give the sixth place to Vespasian. Yet there is no great difference of time involved, for only about eighteen months intervened between Nero and Vespasian, and the composition of the book in any case, therefore, is placed shortly before the destruction of Jerusalem.

The theory is, then, that Nero is the beast, mortally wounded but restored to life, about to return after the seven kings have finished their course.

There are two insuperable objections.

(1) The theory ascribes to John a false prophecy based upon a silly superstition. Nero is to ascend the throne as the eighth king. Nothing could be further from the truth. Galba, Otho, and Vitellius followed in quick succession, and Vespasian, Titus, and Domitian left no place for Nero. Many expositions of the Apocalypse once held in high esteem are now forgotten, or remembered only as monuments of folly, because their predictions have not come to pass; but the Apocalypse itself, though this prophecy and that of chapter xi. were proved false within the lifetime of the author, even within a few months after they were uttered, was yet received by the churches as true, authoritative, and inspired. Either they attached to it another meaning, or they were sadly indifferent to the truth. There is no escape from the conclusion that, if by the beast John meant Nero, he was mistaken. So we are told, "The author must have erred when he expected that in a short time Nero, as the antichrist, would return from Hades, and that his ap-
pearance would bring the end." A sentence perfectly correct if only we may substitute *if* for *when*. Plainly the early church did not consider John a false prophet.

(2) This theory confounds the beast with the head that was smitten, though John clearly distinguishes them. If the seven heads are literal kings, the beast must be the Roman empire. But, according to this view, Nero is now the head, and now the beast. "The proposed interpretation, by which the healing of the deadly wound is supposed to refer to the return of the dead Nero, is exegetically untenable, because a distinction is made in the most definite way between the beast, which, as with Daniel, represents a collective idea, and his heads, which symbolize individual kings; while for the first time (xvii. 11), the personification of the beast as such is indicated in an eighth ruler (and this did not occur under the heads) . . . . Similarly a distinction is made in the most definite way between the slaying of the one head, *i.e.*, the death of the one ruler, and the deadly wound which the beast has thereby received."  

Upon the assumption that the heads are literal kings, Nero cannot be identified with the beast. We shall see presently that there is grave reason to doubt whether that assumption be itself correct. If the heads are kingdoms, Nero disappears at once from sight. In no case can he be denoted by the beast.

An attempt is made to preserve the theory, and yet save the credit of the prophet, by representing Domitian as the eighth king, who came in the spirit and power of Nero, and may therefore bear his name, as John the Baptist was called Elijah (Matt. xi. 14). The prediction was fulfilled, though not in the letter. Domitian was Nero revived.

To this form of the theory there are two fatal objections, the one historical, the other exegetical.

(a) Domitian was not the eighth king. Here it is convenient to insert the list of emperors from the beginning of

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the empire to the close of the first century. If, in order to give the view we are combating every possible advantage, we omit Julius Cæsar, we have—

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emperor</th>
<th>Year</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1—Augustus</td>
<td>30 B.C.—14 A.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2—Tiberius</td>
<td>14 A.D.—37 A.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3—Caligula</td>
<td>37 A.D.—41 A.D.</td>
</tr>
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<td>4—Claudius</td>
<td>41 A.D.—54 A.D.</td>
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<tr>
<td>5—Nero</td>
<td>54 A.D.—68 A.D.</td>
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<tr>
<td>6—Galba</td>
<td>June, 68 A.D.—January, 69 A.D.</td>
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<tr>
<td>7—Otho</td>
<td>January—April, 69 A.D.</td>
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<tr>
<td>8—Vitellius</td>
<td>April—December, 69 A.D.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9—Vespasian</td>
<td>69 A.D.—79 A.D.</td>
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<td>10—Titus</td>
<td>79 A.D.—81 A.D.</td>
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<tr>
<td>11—Domitian</td>
<td>81 A.D.—96 A.D.</td>
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<tr>
<td>12—Nerva</td>
<td>96 A.D.—98 A.D.</td>
</tr>
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<td>13—Trajan</td>
<td>98 A.D.—117 A.D.</td>
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It is proposed to make Domitian the eighth by omitting Galba, Otho, and Vitellius, as usurpers, whose tenure of power was brief. Appeal is made to the words of Suetonius, who begins his life of Vespasian—"Rebellione trium principum et caede, incertum diu et quasi vagum imperium, suscipit firmavitque tandem gens Flavia." The question at issue is simply, Were they commonly reckoned among the emperors? The evidence is overwhelming. Suetonius himself includes them in the Lives of the Cæsars. Tacitus calls them all principes, and associates them with Domitian under this title. Josephus speaks of them all as emperors. Eusebius says: "After Nero had held the government about thirteen years, Galba and Otho reigned about a year and six months." Theophilus of Antioch (died about 181) gives a list of the emperors, and includes Julius Cæsar, Galba, Otho, and Vitellius. Clement of Alexandria gives two lists. In the former, which he prefers, he includes Galba only of the three; in the latter he includes them all. They

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82 Hist., i. 2.
84 H. E., Book iii. chap. v.
85 Ad Antol., iii. 27.
86 Strom., Book i. chap. xxi.
are all numbered by Tertullian, and by Victorinus.

It is purely arbitrary to omit these names from the list of emperors. Canon Farrar regards Galba as the sixth emperor, under whom the book was written: "This is, indeed, the all but certain date of the book," but omits him subsequently with Otho and Vitellius, in order to make Domitian the eighth. By altering the list of emperors at will, and even omitting at one time those who are included at another, it is possible to bring about any desired result; but we have no reason to attribute such manipulation to the apostle.

(8) The book teaches that after seven kings have fallen, the beast is himself an eighth, and goeth into perdition (xvii. 11). The beast is incarnate in the eighth, and in the eighth perishes. With the eighth the series closes, and the end comes. The beast and the false prophet are cast alive into the lake of fire at the coming of the Lord (xix. 20). The destruction of the beast is linked with the end, whether it be the end of the Roman empire or the end of the world. This is generally recognized by expositors of all schools.

In what sense was this true of Domitian? How does he occupy a place of so great importance? If it be only the end of the Roman empire that is indicated, the theory is widely at fault, for the empire endured for centuries after eight emperors had fallen. The embodiment of the beast in the eighth marks a crisis which had no place in the reign of Domitian.

The conclusion is inevitable. If the theory is correct, John was mistaken. There are those who do not shrink from the logical result of their interpretation. Identifying the beast, that is, Nero, with antichrist, Bleek remarks: "So far as the appearing of Christ is connected with that of antichrist, we must say that the Apocalypse has sought to determine about

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98 Comm. on xvii. 10.
99 Early Days of Christianity, chap. xxvii. sect. 1, p. 413.
100 Ibid., chap. xxviii. sect. 6, p. 482.
the future of the Lord and the complete manifestation of his kingdom, both times and circumstances, in opposition to the declaration of the Lord, according to which the Father has reserved this to himself. Hence it is natural to think that the Apocalypse, apart from its other significance, can have no normative authority for us in these particulars." ¹¹ Gebhardt affirms that the seer expected Nero risen from the dead to march against Rome and destroy it. ¹² So Düsterdieck: "This eighth emperor [Domitian] John considers not only as the individual personification of the Roman antichrist, but also as the last possessor of the Roman dominion over the world; as in his person this finds its complete fulfilment, with him it also perishes." ¹³ And again, "John erred in the expectation that, with Domitian, the Roman empire would perish. The singular error proves, of course, a certain imperfection of prophetic character in the writer of the Apocalypse, yet by no means entirely annihilates it" (Ibid., on xvii. 8–11). To most readers, applying the principle laid down in Deut. xviii. 22, the remnant of "prophetic character" is hardly visible.

Every form of the Nero-hypothesis is shattered against this fact, that the end comes with the eighth. So also is the theory which discovers in the beast the Roman empire, and in the seven heads the emperors. If that theory is correct, it is impossible to resist the conclusion of Weiss. "With the expiry of the series of seven-headed rulers, the development appointed for the Roman empire is now finished; the eighth, which then yet comes, can be but the final incarnation of antichristianity (e). Along with his royal helpers he will destroy even the chief city of the world, and will then be destroyed in the struggle with the returning Messiah (d)." ¹⁴ He says further that Domitian is the eighth; that with the provincial governors, symbolized by the ten horns (xiii. 1–

¹¹ Lects. on Apoc., chap. iii. p. 105.
¹³ Com. on Apoc., Intr., sect. 3.
xvii. 3), he will destroy Rome with fire; that then Christ shall come forth against him, and annihilate forever the power of the empire. If the beast is the Roman empire, and the heads are emperors, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion.

Again we must ask, Is it possible that the early church held this understanding of the book, and yet gave it a place among their sacred writings? This is not a question of the nature and extent of inspiration, it is a simple question of historical probability. Can we believe that a prophecy proved to be false before the century expired was accepted by the church as the word of God? It is plain that in the judgment of the Christians of the first and second centuries John was not a false prophet.

The third passage relied upon to prove that the beast is Nero is xiii. 18: "He that hath understanding, let him count the number of the beast: for it is the number of a man; and his number is Six hundred and sixty and six" (Rev. Ver.). These words have exercised the ingenuity of critics in every age of the church. Expositions fall into three classes:—

1. The number denotes the years of the beast. This was maintained by Bengel, who drew out an elaborate chronology of the book, identified the beast with the papacy, and foretold that the end would come in 1836.

2. The number is symbolical. The most common form of this view is that which sees in six the figure of human weakness and failure in contrast with the divine perfection, which is denoted by seven.

3. The number is the sum of the letters that compose the name of the beast. This is the prevailing mode of interpretation. It begins with Irenæus, who suggests Tcitan, which he prefers, Evanthes, and Lateinos, the letters of each of which, according to their numerical value in the Greek, yield 666.48 It is not possible even to mention the names that have since been discovered in this mystic number, which has been for centuries the arsenal of personal and sectarian

hatred. About fifty years ago the discovery was made simultaneously by several scholars that Neron Kæsar in the Hebrew yields the result 666. Moreover, Irenæus says that certain copies of the Apocalypse in his day read not 666, but 616, and this variation gives Nero Kæsar. This solution has met with wide favor, and is urged with a degree of confidence which is by no means warranted by the facts.

For (1) it is a serious objection to this interpretation that it resorts to the Hebrew alphabet. The book was written in Greek, for Greek readers. It employs the Greek letters elsewhere as symbols (i. 8; xxii. 6; xxii. 13). Hebrew words are especially noted (ix. 11; xvi. 16). The early Christian writers never thought of seeking a solution in any other language than the Greek.

But it is said that Hebrew letters were employed for the sake of concealment. It was dangerous to pronounce the name of Nero, therefore John hid it beneath a disguise which would easily be penetrated by the believing Jew. But were there no unbelieving Jews? In this very region of Asia Minor the Jews played a prominent part in the martyrdom of Polycarp so late as the middle of the second century. The early disciples had no keener antagonists, and it is difficult to see why the solution should not have been as easy to a Jew without, as to a Jew within, the church. At any rate it must have been conveyed by the believing Jews to their Gentile brethren, and thus have become the common property of the congregation.

Yet again, Why this necessity of concealment after the death of Nero? If Nero is the beast, then beyond question the destruction of Rome is indicated in the plainest possible manner in chapter xvii. If John could thus predict the downfall of the imperial city, he might have ventured to name the dead emperor.

46 Ibid., sect. 1.
47 Ibid., sect. 3; Hippol. on Christ and Antichrist, chap. 1. Vict., Com. on xiii. 18.
(2) A second objection has been already suggested. This interpretation is a novelty. There is not a trace of it to be found in the early church. If John's purpose was concealment, certainly he succeeded admirably, for his meaning was hidden not only from the enemies of the church, but from the church itself, for eighteen hundred years. It is simply incredible that if this solution is so simple, and if it was ever known to the church, it should have been absolutely forgotten until our time. The consolation supposed to have been designed for the Christians of the first century seems to have been reserved for the critics of the nineteenth.

We proceed to consider—

II.—The evidence drawn from the general style and character of the book.

The difference in style between the fourth Gospel and the Apocalypse is obvious to every reader. It was noted so long ago as the third century by Dionysius of Alexandria:—

We may also notice how the phraseology of the Gospel and the Epistle differs from the Apocalypse. For the former are written not only irreprehensibly, as it regards the Greek language, but are most elegant in diction, in the arguments and the whole structure of the style. It would require much to discover any barbarism or solecism, or any odd peculiarity of expression at all in them. For, as it is to be presumed, he was endued with all the requisites for his discourse; the Lord having granted him both that of knowledge and that of expression and style. That the latter, however, saw a revelation, and received knowledge and prophecy, I do not deny. But I perceive that his dialect and language is not very accurate Greek; but that he uses barbarous idioms, and in some places solecisms, which it is now unnecessary to select; for neither would I have any one suppose that I am saying these things by way of derision, but only with the view to point out the great difference between the writings of these men. 49

From this difference of style many modern critics argue with Dionysius that the Gospel and the Apocalypse must be referred to different authors. But we are now concerned with those who ascribe both writings to John, and find in this difference an argument for the early date of the Apocalypse. The style of the Gospel is more elegant, we are told, because it was written ten or twenty years, or even more, after

49 Ibid., Book vii. chap. xxv.
the prophecy, years which John had spent in Ephesus among a Greek-speaking people. Naturally he acquired greater fluency and correctness in the use of the Greek tongue.

To this it must be answered, in the first place, that the difference, though considerable, is often exaggerated. On the one hand the Gospel is good Greek because it is simple Greek. The vocabulary is limited, and the construction is of the simplest character. Canon Westcott says truly, after speaking of the sameness of phraseology which prevails throughout the Gospel, "This emphatic monotony is still more observable in the form and in the combination of the sentences. The constructions are habitually reduced to the simplest elements. To speak of St. John's Gospel as 'written in very pure Greek,' is altogether misleading. It is free from solecisms, because it avoids all idiomatic expressions. The grammar is that which is common to almost all language. Directness, circumstantiality, repetition, and personality are the characteristic marks of the separate sentences. And the sentences and thoughts are grouped together in a corresponding manner. They are coördinated and not subordinated. The sequence of the reasoning is not wrought out, but left for sympathetic interpretation."50

And on the other hand the solecisms of the Apocalypse are not the result of ignorance. If it were possible to examine them in detail, we should find that in many cases the writer now follows and now forsakes the common usage; that his deviations, sometimes at least, are clearly intentional; and that his free handling of the Greek language indicates rather the familiarity of long acquaintance than the rude attempts of a novice.51

But however great the difference between the Gospel and the Apocalypse, it cannot be accounted for by lapse of time. If the Apocalypse was written before the destruction of Jerusalem, John must have been at least sixty years of age. He had probably been familiar with the Greek from

50 Com. on Gospel of John, Introd., part ii. sect. 5.
his earliest years, for it was in common use in Palestine. His brother-disciples wrote it fluently and correctly, and there is no reason to suppose that his knowledge was inferior to theirs. We have no right to assume that he was incapable of using the Greek language with propriety at the earliest date that may be assigned. "The pure Greek of the Gospel was at one time thought not likely to have been used by the fisherman of the Lake of Gennesaret. No one doubts now that the lower classes in Galilee, coming as they did into daily contact with the Greek influence which surrounded them, and which had already penetrated the peculiar people, may have had a thorough knowledge of the Greek language." ¹²

And Professor Hadley says, "In view of these proofs, the conclusion seems unavoidable that, as a general fact, the Palestine Jews of the first century were acquainted with both languages, Greek and Aramaic." ¹³

The differences between Apocalypse and Gospel may not be easily explained, but the explanation must be psychological, not chronological. John wrote his visions in the Spirit, and after the model of Old Testament prophecy.

As little will the difference between the Gospel and the Revelation trouble us. It can no more be said that the language of each excludes that of the other, than that there is a progress from the confined speech of the Gospel to the free, arbitrary use of the same in the Revelation; or the reverse, that the Gospel shows greater correctness and purity in its Greek, gained by longer residence among Greeks. The difference lies in the subject, and in the thoroughly different psychological frame of the writer.¹⁴

The difficulty will be relieved, at least in part, if we may suppose that John made use of an amanuensis in the composition of the Gospel, while he wrote the Apocalypse with his own hand.¹⁵

¹² Weiss, Life of Christ, Book i. chap. vi.; also Luthardt, Com. on Gospel of John, Introd. II. 4 (1). "Hence the disciples must be considered, as by birth, speakers of two languages."
¹⁴ Luthardt, Com. on Gospel of John, Introd. II. 4 (1).
It is urged that an old man could not have written the fiery pages of the Apocalypse. But if John wrote his Gospel in old age, there is no reason why he should not have written the Apocalypse at the same period of life. The Gospel gives no evidence that the fire and vigor of the "Son of thunder" were spent. Advancing years do not always bring decay of mental power. Moses and Isaiah witness to the contrary. Our own time has seen the veteran Ranke beginning a History of the World at the age of eighty-three. How precarious is this argument, Macaulay illustrates in his Essay on Lord Bacon:

It rarely happens that the fancy and the judgment grow together. It happens still more rarely that the judgment grows faster than the fancy. This seems, however, to have been the case with Bacon. But in eloquence, in sweetness and variety of expression, and in richness of illustration, his later writings are far superior to those of his youth. In this respect the history of his mind bears some resemblance to the history of the mind of Burke. The treatise on "The Sublime and Beautiful," though written on a subject which the coldest metaphysician could hardly treat without being occasionally betrayed into florid writing, is the most unadorned of all Burke's works. It appeared when he was twenty-five or twenty-six. At fifty his rhetoric was quite as rich as good taste would permit; and when he died, at almost seventy, it had become ungracefully gorgeous. It is strange that the essay on "The Sublime and Beautiful," and the "Letter to a Noble Lord," should be the productions of one man. But it is far more strange that the essay should have been a production of his youth, and the letter of his old age.

The hand of age may sometimes wield the pen of youth.

It may be briefly noted that a marked dissimilarity in style between the Epistles of Peter is often urged against the genuineness of the Second Epistle. "The main difference is that the language of the First Epistle is somewhat rough and Hebraizing, while that of the second is more elegant and better Greek; the style of the second is more periodic, while in the first the connection of sentences is simple, and even clumsy." 56

Yet it is generally agreed by those who accept both

Epistles as the work of Peter, that no considerable space of
time could have elapsed between them—probably not more
than four or five years. And here, too, the suggestion that
the difference is due to the amanuensis is as old as Jerome.

It is further urged that the temper and spirit of the book
are Jewish throughout, in strong contrast to the breadth and
catholicity of the Gospel. And the reason is, that it was
written before the destruction of Jerusalem marked the close
of the old economy, and gave the apostles a clearer view of
the world-wide nature of their mission.

The argument is based upon simple misapprehension. Of
necessity the Apocalypse is Jewish in form, for it employs the
imagery of the Old Testament; but it is broadly catholic in
spirit. Only by a literal interpretation of the symbols em-
ployed, which the whole character of the book forbids, can
it be set at variance with the Gospel. The temple in chapter
xi. is not the structure of Herod, nor are the Jews of chapter
vii. the lineal descendants of Abraham. Jewish symbols are
employed in the Christian sense. John speaks of the
heavenly city as the new Jerusalem: so does Paul (Gal. iv.
26). John represents the New Testament church of God
as the children of Israel: so does Paul (Gal. iii. 29). There
is no distinction between Jew and Gentile. The multi-
tude of the redeemed is gathered out of every nation,
and of all tribes and peoples and tongues (vii. 9). In heaven
there is no temple, for God and the Lamb are the temple
thereof (xxi. 22). Seven Gentile churches are addressed in
the opening chapters as representative of the church uni-
versal. The Apocalypse is one in spirit with the Gospel.
Like the Master, it wears the garb of the Jew, but the heart
is the heart of the Son of man.

Again it is affirmed that in order of thought the Apoca-
lypse precedes the Gospel. The argument is ably presented
by Canon Westcott:—

The Apocalypse is doctrinally the uniting link between the Synoptists
and the fourth Gospel. It offers the characteristic thoughts of the fourth
Gospel in that form of development which belongs to the earliest apostolic
The Date of the Apocalypse.

age....The most striking contrast lies in the treatment of the doctrine of Christ's coming in the two books. This is the main subject of the Apocalypse, while it falls into the background in the Gospel and in the Epistles of John. In the Apocalypse the thought is of an outward coming for the open judgment of men: in the Gospel of a judgment which is spiritual and self-executing. In the Apocalypse the scene of the consummation is a renovated world: in the Gospel "the Father's house." In the former the victory and the transformation are from without, by might, and the "future" is painted under historic imagery: in the latter the victory and the transformation are from within, by a spiritual influence, and the "future" is present and eternal....Of the two books the Apocalypse is the earlier. It is less developed both in thought and style. The material imagery in which it is composed includes the idea of progress in interpretation. The symbols are living. On the other hand, to go back from the teaching of the Gospel to that of the Apocalypse, to clothe clear thought in figures, to reduce the full expression of truth to its rudimentary beginnings, seems to involve a moral miracle, which would introduce confusion into life....The Apocalypse is after the close of St. Paul's work. It shows in its mode of dealing with Old Testament figures a close connection with the Epistle to the Hebrews (2 Peter, Jude). And on the other hand it is before the destruction of Jerusalem.

The crisis of the fall of Jerusalem explains the relation of the Apocalypse to the Gospel. In the Apocalypse that "coming" of Christ was expected, and painted in figures: in the Gospel the coming is interpreted.97

This argument is not easily answered in set terms, because it appeals with very different force to different minds. Professor Milligan, for example, one of the latest and ablest writers upon the book, says: "Let it once be granted that the key to the Apocalypse lies, where we have endeavored to find it, in the Gospel of St. John, and it will not be easy to suppose that the former appeared more than thirty years before the latter."98 "The Apocalypse may without impropriety be spoken of as the complement of the fourth Gospel. It stands to it in a relation similar to that of the Acts of the Apostles to the Gospel of St. Luke, or of the Epistle to the Ephesians to that to the Colossians."99

It must suffice to say that the Gospel deals in plain language because it treats of the historic past; the Apocalypse in figures because it treats of the prophetic future. If the

97 Com. on Gospel of John—Introd. IV. 2.
98 Lectures on Revelation, Appendix III.
99 Ibid., lect. ii.
one obeys the laws of historic, and the other of prophetic composition, the argument is reduced to the statement that the same author cannot write history first and prophecy afterward. A careful examination will show that the immaturity of the Apocalypse attaches only to the symbolic form of expression, and not to the substance of doctrine. The essential teaching of the Gospel and of the Apocalypse is the same, and there is no warrant here for the supposition that a considerable interval of time lay between them. Both are properly referred to the closing years of John's life.

It must be further borne in mind that the Gospel was preached long before it was committed to writing. So Eusebius tells us, and so critics of to-day affirm. "There is every reason to believe that the fourth Gospel was shaped by the apostle in oral teaching long before it was published or committed to writing."

The substance, though not the form, of the Gospel, preceded the earliest date that can be assigned to the Apocalypse. The order of thought corresponds to the order of event—first the fellowship with Christ in the flesh, then the vision of Christ in glory.

So inconclusive are the arguments drawn from the book in favor of the early date.

It is possible only to indicate very briefly the internal evidence in favor of the later date.

John was evidently on terms of long and familiar acquaintance with the seven churches. On the supposition that the book was written before the destruction of Jerusalem, it is difficult to find room for the growth of this intimate relation. It is natural to suppose that in accordance with the word of the Lord (Luke xxii. 20, 21) John would remain in the holy city until its doom drew near. Vespasian led his army into Palestine early in the year 67. Titus began the siege of the city in the spring of 70. We must then compress the jour-

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60 H. E., Book iii. chap. xxiv.

61 Westcott on Epistle of John, Introd. IV.; compare his Commentary on Gospel of John, Introd. II. 2.
ney from Jerusalem, the abode in Ephesus, and the exile in Patmos within the space of two or three years.

But we are not left wholly to conjecture. We have evidence drawn from other portions of the Scriptures. It is generally agreed that John could not have made his home in Ephesus before Paul wrote to Timothy, who was bishop in that city, for no reference is made to him in either Epistle. Now if with Godet, Lange, Farrar, Ellicott, Alford, and Conybeare and Howson, following the indications of Eusebius, the Muratorian Canon, and Clement of Rome (Ep. c. 5), we assign Second Timothy to the year 66, 67, or 68, we must confine John's acquaintance with these churches within very narrow limits. Especially is this true if, with most critics who advocate the early date, we should fix the composition of the Apocalypse under Galba (June, 68-January, 69). Certainly these considerations are not decisive, for we know too little of John's life after the ascension to speak with confidence; but probability here is strongly in favor of the later date.

The condition of the seven churches as described in the opening chapters points in the same direction. Though we may discover in Paul's Epistles to the Colossians and the Ephesians the germs of the evils portrayed in the seven epistles, yet time is required for such development as is here attained—the lamentable growth of heresy which appears throughout; the loss of the first love in the church in Ephesus (ii. 4), and the threat of extinction (ii. 5); the rise of the sect of the Nicolaitans (ii. 6-15); the church in Sardis having "a name that thou livest, and art dead" (iii. 1); the church in Laodicea lukewarm, and about to be spued out of the mouth of God (iii. 16). Again, the argument is not decisive. So great a change might have been wrought in the course of a few years, but it is far more natural to suppose a considerable interval of time, the rise of a new generation. Thus we read in the Old Testament that "the people served the Lord all the days of Joshua, and all the days of the elders

63 H. E., Book ii. chap. xxii.
that outlived Joshua, who had seen all the great work of the Lord that he had wrought for Israel. . . . And also all that generation were gathered unto their fathers: and there arose another generation after them, which knew not the Lord, nor yet the work which he had wrought for Israel. And the children of Israel did that which was evil in the sight of the Lord, and served the Baalim” (Judges ii. 7-11). It is probable that John addressed a different generation from that to which Paul wrote.

We cannot lay much stress upon arguments drawn from ecclesiastical terms and usages, for great obscurity hangs over the history of the church during the latter half of the century. Professor Godet urges (1) the ecclesiastical organization presupposed by the Apocalypse. The angel is the bishop. “The Apocalypse brings before us the period of transition from the primitive presbyterian constitution to the monarchic organization which is universally admitted to have prevailed in the second century.” (2) “This custom [of public reading and hearing—i. 3] did not exist, as a received form, before the destruction of Jerusalem in the year 70, and consequently the Apocalypse, which implies the use of this custom, cannot have been composed in the year 68.” (3) “The expression, the Lord’s day (i. 10), is of purely Christian origin, belonging to the ecclesiastical and technical language of the later times of the apostolic age, when the church had broken off all connection with the synagogue. Accordingly we find it only in the writings of the second century. The date indicated by Irenæus is the only one compatible with the use of this expression.” (4) “Again the name given to the Jews in the Apocalypse will not allow us to suppose that this book was written before the great judgment of God upon Jerusalem. They are called (ii. 9 and iii. 9) the synagogue of Satan. What Christian author—especially what Judæo-Christian writer, such as the author of the Apocalypse must have been—would have allowed himself to brand with such a name the chosen people, before God had finally broken with them? . . . No, nothing but
an event of so decisive a nature as the destruction of Jerusalem and of the Jewish nation can explain so novel a manner of speech with respect to the ancient people of God." 68 While we cannot attach decisive weight to these considerations, yet for the most part at least they lend additional probability to the view we advocate.

Many matters of great interest and importance, preëminently the relation of this book to the prophecy of Daniel and to the discourses of our Lord concerning the last days, we must pass by without a word, and proceed to sum up the results of our investigation.

We are led by our survey of the evidence to this conclusion—the book contains no clear indication of the date at which it was composed. We are driven back upon the testimony of the early church, and that, as we have seen, pronounces clearly and strongly in favor of the reign of Domitian. We will not abandon this solid ground to follow the vagaries of modern criticism, which professes to furnish the historic setting of the prophetic picture by forsaking the only historic evidence we possess. A sober exegesis will take its departure from the standpoint of well attested and trustworthy tradition.

"The writings of John form a trilogy. The Gospel, the Epistles, and the Apocalypse, represent the evangelic founding, the organic shaping, and the eternal future of the church; Christ who was, and is, and is to come." 64 John "has bequeathed to the world three works, in which he has exalted to their sublime perfection those three supreme intuitions in the Christian life:—that of the person of Christ, in the Gospel; that of the individual believer, in the first Epistle; and that of the church, in the Apocalypse. Under three aspects, the same theme—the divine life realized in man, eternity filling time." 66 Bernard has shown with admirable clear-

64 Lange's Com. on Gospel of John, Introd. sect. 2.
66 Godet, Com. on Gospel of John, Introd., Book i. vi.
ness that the Apocalypse "is the consummation of the sure word of prophecy which pervades the Bible as a whole," and also that the doctrine of the church "is not perfected in the Epistles, but demands such a continuance and such a close as it receives in the Apocalypse." 66 Wisely the church has placed the Apocalypse at the close of the sacred canon. There it properly belongs, perhaps in order of time, certainly in order of thought. The New Testament, like the Old, closes with prophecy. Scripture is always pointing forward.

We must seek a more spiritual understanding of this book, and must recognize in it not the fortunes of individuals, of sects, or even of nations, so much as the conflict of eternal principles, the strife of the kingdom of God with all ungodly power. Bengel said of the Apocalypse: "Without tears it was not written; without tears it cannot be understood." With yet greater truth may we say, It was written in the Spirit; in the Spirit it must be interpreted.

66 Prog. of Doct., sect. viii.
ARTICLE V.

THE DIVINE IMMANENCY.

BY THE REV. JAMES DOUGLAS, D. D., FULASKI, N. Y.

The allegation is so often made, either that there is no distinction between the doctrine of the divine immanency and that of pantheism, or that the doctrine of the divine immanency tends to pantheism, that it seems necessary at the outset to state with some elaborateness the distinction that exists between them. The analysis of the words themselves, "pantheism" and "immanence," so different in their origin and significance, it might well seem should be sufficient. The unlikeness of these words is by no means to be accounted for on the ground that one is derived from the Greek and the other from the Latin. Their original signification is entirely different. One affirms that the totality of existence, not merely has its origin in God, but is itself God, and that the Deity has no separable existence apart from the material universe; that God and matter are one, inseparable and indivisible: the all is God.

The other affirms only a single quality or mode of the divine existence: not by any means limiting the divine existence to that mode or condition, but affirming the fact of such existence that God is immanent in nature or matter, as its inner energizing force—the life of all life, the force of all force—which is, as all scientists now affirm, the substratum of matter.

The doctrine of the divine immanency stands opposed to that of the existence of the material universe apart from God, although a doctrine calling itself Christian, and even orthodox, because held and transmitted to us by the early
Christian Fathers, whose conceptions of Deity were the result of the culture and training of the heathen religion in which they were reared. In fact, it is almost impossible for those who have not had a philosophic culture, and have not been accustomed to the conception of invisible forces as realities, to have a clear idea of the existence of omnipresent spirit, as a real although an invisible power, a veritable entity and true substance. For those who have always associated the idea of valid real existence with visible and tangible forms, it is difficult to gain the conception of an invisible, omnipresent spirit. In metaphysical exactness we correctly affirm that such a conception is impossible. We can only have the idea of such existence.

The doctrine of the divine immanency really affirms only one of the conditions of the existence of the Omnipresent Being. If He is not within as well as without the particles of matter, He is not omnipresent. Again, if He is not the force and the life within the cell building up all organisms; if He is not the force within the atom that gives it its power of attraction and repulsion,—then He is not omnipotent, as well as not omnipresent. The doctrine of the divine immanency does not limit God to this mode of existence: it does not by any means deny his transcendency, that God is "over all," but with the Apostle affirms, that He is also "through all and in all." It seems passing strange that this doctrine, so plainly apostolic and scriptural, could, even by fingers perfumed with mediaeval lore, be manipulated into a theological bugbear, and arrayed in the garb of Pantheism, to frighten the would-be-orthodox from all approach to its examination and its reception. And yet it is often affirmed to be the very pantheism of Spinoza, because the doctrine of the divine immanency is involved in his doctrine of God as the Universal Substance. So also is that of the divine omnipresence and omnipotence.

A distinguished theologian once remarked, "There are some minds which seem to lack all power of discrimination, and so far from being able to split hairs they are not able to
split saw-logs.” This remark might well apply to some theological criticisms that exhibit an incapacity to discriminate between this doctrine of the divine immanency and that of pantheism. The doctrine of the divine immanency recognizes Deity as the supernatural—yet not separated from the natural. It contradicts the doctrine that nature exists separate from God, and that its processes are independent of Him. It stands opposed to the old doctrine of second causes which science in our day has thoroughly exploded, and is no less opposed to that theory of creation which affirms that God created the universe of matter, as something distinct and separate from himself, incorporating into it certain inherent forces, such as gravity, chemical affinity, electricity, etc., and then left it to the action of these forces, only occasionally intervening in order to change or modify those processes by special acts,—a theory which Carlyle, with characteristic sarcasm, calls the “clock-maker theory of the universe.”

The doctrine of the divine immanency is not a doctrine of negation, but of affirmation; not of limitation, but of extension. It does not deny the transcendency of God, but does affirm his immanency. It does not limit God to an interior or inner existence in the universe he has created, or in matter as its inner potency; but it does affirm such inner existence and energy. It does not deny his presence or existence above the stars; but it does affirm his presence and existence on this earth, and in the most interior organization of every form of life and of every molecule and atom of matter. It affirms the omnipotence of God as the immediate source of all power and energy. It affirms the omnipresence of God, in that there is no point in the infinite of space, no atom of matter, from which he is excluded. The doctrine of the divine immanency gives us the true doctrine of uniformity: not of mechanical uniformity as a fixed and unchangeable mode of action, but uniformity of cause as an inner, generating, formative power, working with all the freedom of the divine will. The principle upon which modern science has made its great-
The Divine Immanency.

This is the principle upon which Lyell based his system of geology; the principle or, if you please, the assumption that the same causes are now in operation which were in former ages—the very same, notwithstanding the great seeming diversity in their modes of operation, as well as results.¹

This doctrine of the divine immanency stands opposed to dualism in all its forms, whether religious or philosophical. The doctrine of dualism, as it is or has been ordinarily held, partakes of both characteristics, and may be commonly regarded as a religio-philosophical system. There are very few religions that do not explicitly or implicitly contain it. We find it in all ancient and heathen religions that affirm the existence of a Good and Evil principle, as separate, antagonistic, and original powers in the universe. It appears in the recognition of mind and matter as two distinct and independent entities. It also reveals itself in not a few of those philosophic systems that assume, as their chief object, to prove the unity of the universe. A striking illustration of this fact is given us in the philosophic system of Hegel, commonly interpreted as absolute idealism. Although the philosophy of Hegel is a transformation and development of Schelling's System of Identity, affirming the unity of the subjective and objective, yet he introduces in his theory of Andere sein ("otherness"), in the form of nature as well as in the separation of pure thought from its empirical basis, the doctrine of dualism.²

The doctrine of the divine immanency also stands opposed to Gnosticism. The various theories and phases of Gnosticism had their most complete development in the Christian

¹ The term "immanent" is not to be construed rigidly as meaning "remaining in," as "a dead, or inbiding Cause," as is done by Professor Bowen in his work on "Modern Philosophy" (p. 30), but simply as a cause ever present within and acting within, yet "transcendent," going forth beyond its source.

² For the confirmation of this view, see Ueberweg's "History of Philosophy."
era, and were attempts, of a philosophical character, to explain the existence of good and evil in the world,—how a world so imperfect as this, could proceed from a supremely perfect God. The Oriental notion of matter as being utterly corrupt, prevades all the various systems of Gnosticism, and gives them a common character. They agree, also, in this respect, that this world of matter did not proceed immediately from the Supreme Being, but that a vast gulf intervenes, occupied by a series of emanations, through which the infinite passes into life and activity, and becomes capable of representation. All the various philosophical systems of Gnosticism unite in the doctrine of emanation. Their differences lie in the various modes in which the passage by emanations, called aeons and demiurges, is effected: some regarding the process as a mere continued degeneracy from the original Supreme Being by successive emanations; others making the dualistic theory prominent, corresponding to the ancient Zarathustrian doctrine of a good and evil principle. Manicheism, which held the doctrine that matter is essentially evil, although called by Kessler a gnostis, was thoroughly dualistic in its character, affirming the existence of two beings originally quite separate from each other,—light and darkness,—each to be thought of according to the analogy of a kingdom. Notwithstanding that this doctrine was pronounced a heresy by the Roman Catholic Church, its tenets have continued a modified existence in various theories and forms of asceticism, in which not merely the abuse or wrong use of worldly things is denounced and forbidden, but all earthly things are reprobed as essentially evil. Kindred to the Gnostic doctrine of emanation is Arianism, which holds that Christ was not co-eternal with the Father. Arius postulated a remote Deity, and saw in Christ merely a delegate or ambassador; however highly exalted in rank above human beings, yet still below God, and not of the same essence with the Father, but one that proceeded forth from the Father as an emanation of the Father.

It is the view of God as an extra-mundane Being that has
led to papal hierarchy, and developed the whole system of priestly ritualism. For if God be postulated in thought as at a distance from the world; and if Christ came into this world, and then departed to sit on his judgment throne,—it is not unreasonable to believe that some vicar is appointed to represent absent Deity or Christ the Mediator, himself a subordinate mediator, with delegated rights and authority, appointed to rule the church in His stead. Out of this idea of a distant God—whether held by pagans or those calling themselves Christians—a system of mediators is sure to arise, reaching down to the level of the lowliest humanity, giving us a series of priestly functionaries for the work of human redemption, whose sacraments are the conduits through which the divine gifts and graces are transmitted to men.

Gnosticism is commonly spoken of as an ancient and exploded heresy; but its essential ideas of a distant God, separated from matter, which contains an inherent principle of evil, still prevail in some modern systems of theology.

Again, the doctrine of the divine immanency is also opposed to anthropomorphism. This doctrine of anthropomorphism—which is that the Creator of the universe possesses the form (morphos) of a man, or is in the likeness of a man; that he has created the universe of matter as a man constructs a machine,—has been the special object of assault and ridicule by the scientist. The relation which the creative power of the universe holds to the universe is necessarily so dissimilar from that which a man as artificer holds to a machine, as to lead not a few scientists to the sweeping denial of any resemblance even in the spiritual nature,—the denial that there is any element, even the mind-element, in common between them, by which man can know aught of God;—so that they have been led to postulate Him as the Unknown and Unknowable. Many also fail to discriminate between the knowledge of a thing as a fact of existence and a knowledge of the nature of the thing. By virtue of the intelligence man possesses, limited although it is, we may be able to know of God as cause, and yet do not and cannot know his nature as
cause. The finite cannot comprehend the infinite; and yet man as finite can know the **fact that the infinite must be.**

There are three phases of the doctrine of anthropomorphism, to two of which, especially, the doctrine of the divine immanency is opposed.

The first is that of materialistic anthropomorphism. It might not seem strange that heathen nations, through the influence of idolatry, should have the conception of the existence of God in a material human form; and yet, with all the teachings of the Bible, especially of the New Testament, we find such a conception of God existing to some extent among those who profess the Christian faith. It exists more especially in reference to the person of Christ himself. Our Christian psalmody makes reference to Christ as being "now clothed in a body like our own," in a manner which can hardly be regarded as simply meaning, in poetic figure, that he has sympathy with us in our human experiences,—so far have the materialistic conceptions of heathen idolatry reached down the centuries to corrupt the true spiritual worship of Christianity, though its founder taught that "God is spirit."

Another form of anthropomorphism in which science in former years participated, is that the Creator is separated from the universe which he has created and flung into existence, and which is carried on by the operation of what are called "second causes;" that He stands either as an idle spectator of its operations, or as an engineer with his hand on the throttle-valve or the lever, controlling and directing, more or less, at pleasure its operations.

Another phase of anthropomorphism is that God acts under the control and influence of feelings similar to those possessed by man. While there is somewhat that is true in this view of God, because of likeness of spiritual nature, there are mingled with it the gravest and most debasing errors. These are especially, but not alone, the errors of heathenism.

The materialistic anthropomorphism of heathenism which invests their deities, whatever may be their grade or relation,—whether the superior or inferior gods,—with human
passions, appetites, and desires, as well as with human forms, gives rise to a worship in which the main object is to propitiate their good will, by ministering in some way to the gratification or satisfaction of these animal appetites and malignant passions. In this principle we find the origin of abominable rites, bloody and cruel sacrifices, and costly offerings. Revenge, bloodthirstiness, lust, sensuality, and avarice are all to be placated and appeased. The gods are to them what they conceive men would be, if endowed with like power, and with no authority over them to restrain their malignant and undisciplined passions. Hence it is we are not to search among the religions of the heathen, least of all among the rites of their worship, to learn their ideas of morality. Their worship had nothing to do with such ideas. It had for its sole object the propitiation of gods whom they believed possessed of human passions. To believe in their gods was to believe them possessed of such human passions, because of their likeness to men. And this it is that explains the mystery so often referred to by the classic scholar—that a chaste Lucretia should worship an unchaste Venus. The religious duty of the worshipper consisted in winning the favor of the gods, or depreciating their resentment. Whatever, therefore, was done in the service of religion lay outside the sphere of morality. The ethical principles which they applied to their daily lives, to regulate their relations and intercourse with each other, ceased to exist in the temple, in the worship of its gods.

The more the idea of God is separated from anthropomorphism, or the conception of Him as possessing likeness to a human being, and the purer our idea of God as spirit, the higher and purer is our conception of his moral attributes, righteousness, truth, and justice; and the clearer our apprehension of his immanency in nature and humanity, the profounder is our view of his mercy, compassion, and love.

The teachings of Christ, that God is spirit, present us with a spiritual philosophy of God which frees the Creator from
The degradation of anthropomorphism, and also delivers us from a mechanical theory of the universe. And yet, despite the theological antagonism to materialism and naturalism, the recent attempt to explain spirit by matter, reversing their true relations, has met with no little popular applause from the superficial class of thinkers; but in the last resort, as the profoundest scientists now affirm, nature is only to be explained by spirit.

RELATION TO PROVIDENCES.

As the doctrine of the divine immanency dispels the falsity and confusion that exists in the theory of second causes as related to a first cause, so it also rectifies the error that exists in the doctrine of a universal and special Providence,—a doctrine which represents God as a person standing aloof from the creation he has made, overseeing its operations, and occasionally interrupting its regular or ordinary operations by special acts of divine interference.

In contrast with this anthropomorphic theory of a distant God occasionally drawing near and intervening in the regular flow of events, like a human finger stopping for a moment the swing of the pendulum, or giving for a moment accelerated motion,—opposed to this, stands the doctrine of divine providence, of an ever-present, ever-acting deity, given us by Christ himself, that not a sparrow falls to the ground without our Father (Matt. x. 29).

RELATIONS TO TELEOLOGY.

This doctrine of the divine immanency also gives us the true theory of teleology, or final cause,—cause acting for an end. The erroneous theory of teleology which has provoked the criticisms of scientists is that which presents the Creator as an external architect, forming contingently determined designs, with an external composition of parts instead of an inner formative power and development; and instead of recognizing an inner capacity of adaptation to varying...
external circumstances as an original endowment, gives us these adaptive results of changes and modifications of structures as something designed by an external power that has wrought out these modifications by special acts. It is this original capacity or power of adaptation to different environments that constitutes that "wider teleology" of which Huxley speaks and which he recognizes.

True efficient cause, as distinguished from what are called "second causes," can be predicated only of will, the only conceivable source of force or energy; so that true efficient cause and final cause must always go together, for both originate in mind.

RELATION TO THE DIVINE INCARNATION.

Again, the doctrine of the divine immanence gives a philosophical basis for that of the divine incarnation. Once admit the fact that the divine is in the human,—not only as the power of life or existence, but also as the spiritual or moral life of the human,—and there must also be admitted the possibility of such indwelling in all the fulness of the divine moral perfections. This principle corresponds to the explicit statement in the inspired record concerning Christ (Col. ii. 9), "for in him dwelleth all the fulness [πᾶν τὸ πλήρωμα] of the Godhead bodily," or "really," as Grotius, Schöttgen, and Wolf translated it.

This doctrine of the divine immanence also gives the true and evident solution of that long- vexed question concerning the nature of Christ which divided the early creed-makers into "homoousians" and "homoiousians," that is, those who believed that Christ possessed the same nature as God, and those who believed he possessed a like nature as God. This doctrine of the divine immanence, in accordance with the Nicene Creed, affirms Christ to be "God of very God," possessing the same essential nature. The divine immanence in humanity is also the ground and pledge of the fulfilment of that transcendent promise that we shall be "filled with all the fulness of God" (Eph. iii. 19).
The Divine Immanency.

THE BIBLE TEACHING.

Let us consider, as first and most important of all, the Bible teaching of the doctrine of the divine immanence, beginning with the Old Testament.

This doctrine of the divine immanence was the distinctive and peculiar teaching of Mosaism which both distinguished and separated it from the teachings of all other religions concerning the being and nature of God. While some of these taught the doctrine of the existence of a Supreme Deity, superior to all others, they yet taught the independent existence of other divine beings, holding the same relation to the superior Deity which a subject holds to his sovereign,—sometimes obedient and sometimes rebellious,—such relation as one man holds to another who is superior in strength,—overcome by the stronger when conflict ensues, but still and ever capable of an independent existence and action.

In one view these systems of religions may be regarded as monotheistic so far as they taught the supremacy of One Being, but polytheistic so far as they taught the existence of other divine beings. They were all essentially anthropomorphic, with the exception of the pantheistic speculations of Brahmanism, which practically is one of the grossest of all the polytheistic systems of religion. For if nature is God, then every object of nature may be regarded as God and all its forces; so that pantheism becomes a most prolific source of polytheism.

But the Hebrew Yahwe was not a local Deity, but "the God of the heavens and the earth," "the creator of all things," "upholding all things by the word of his power"—that is, the outcome of his power. In the very construction of the tabernacle and the temple, the divine immanency was symbolized by the Holy of Holies; the special place of the divine revelation being located in the most interior portion of the temple. It was always and everywhere taught in the Old Testament that He was an invisible power of existence, the life of all life, the inner sustaining power of all being, as
described by the Apostle with his Old Testament culture and Jewish training, the Being "in whom we live and have our being," the God who is not only "over all," but "through all and in all," "the indwelling life." It is in this view of God as the indwelling power of life that we have the explanation not only of the teaching of the Old Testament that all the phenomena of nature were the direct resultant or outcome of the divine energy or power, but also the thoughts, purposes, and actions of men,—hardening Pharaoh's heart and putting a lying spirit in the mouth of the prophets (2 Chron. xviii. 22). He is also, for the same reason, spoken of as a present power of reward and punishment. It is the comparative exclusiveness of this teaching of Mosaism, of a present God in nature and in Providence, which distinguished it from other religions that inculcated belief in a God sometimes distant and inattentive, yet one who at some time in the future would judge and award, which has been construed by not a few critics into an ignoring yet not a denial of future existence, rewards, and punishments. It was not necessary to enforce the truths already inculcated and universally believed. It was necessary to teach that ancient people the doctrine of an ever-present God, because denied by the nations around them. The recent investigations of such archeologists as Professor Sayce should set forever at rest the long-contrived question concerning the belief of the ancient Hebrews in a future state of existence. The cuneiform inscriptions have given us detailed information as to what the Accadians, instructors of the Semites, of the Assyrians, and Phoenicians, thought of the world to come. As in the Old Testament, so too among the Accadians, the realm of death was a Sheol or Sual, the land from which there was no return; but beyond Sheol there lay another world, "the land of the silver sky," where the accepted and justified, received to the company of the gods, feasted with them at banquets that knew no end, and under the light of everlasting sunshine. But Mosaism had a higher mission than to repeat these dreams of the future; rather to inspire belief in
a God who was with Jacob in the solitary wilderness, with Joseph in the pit and the prison, with the Israelites in their desert wanderings, dwelling in the humble and contrite spirit, and "a present help in every time of trouble."

It is this doctrine of the divine immanency in man, as well as in nature, that explains the mode or manner in which the Old Testament represents God as speaking to men: not by material or human organs of speech, in words audible to the ear of sense, but as a voice within, in the spiritual consciousness, by inspiration, by conscience, by utterance and voices audible to the soul, as we are ourselves accustomed to speak of conscience as "the voice of God within us." Thus all revelations of God to the soul of what was felt, known, and recognized by the spiritual nature to be true—true beyond all question or doubt—was also recognized as divine truth, a revelation from God. The affirmation of Christ that "every one that is of the truth heareth my voice," applies to all ages, as well as to the brief period of the divine incarnation; to Christ in the spirit, as well as to Christ in the flesh.

This phase of the doctrine of the divine immanency which relates to inward teaching and spiritual communication is most distinctly and emphatically affirmed by the apostle Paul in his Epistle to the Romans, "because that which may be known of God is manifest in them, for God hath shewed it unto them."

In fact, throughout the New Testament, the doctrine of the divine immanency is of such frequency of repetition, either direct or implied, as well as so plain in statement, as not to need citation of proof-texts even to the ordinary reader, were it not for the fact that there are so many educated in the idea that existence in form or shape is necessary to personality, a term never applied to the brute—but a condition that can be predicated only of spiritual intelligence and free-will. It is to be feared not a few, even in Christian lands, have not attained to the high conception, or rather idea, of God as spirit. For to-day we have the melancholy spectacle of a great religious controversy concerning the
necessity of a second probation, in order to vindicate the justice and love of God, because they fail to recognize the truth that the incarnate Christ and the spiritual Christ, "the light that lighteth every man that cometh into the world," are one; that wherever there is spiritual light there is Christ revealed; and the rejection of the spiritual Christ carries with it the same significance and guilt as the rejection of the incarnate Christ,—in fact it is only the acceptance of the spiritual Christ that fulfils the conditions of salvation.

We find in the New Testament that Christ constantly speaks of himself as being the inner, immanent life of his disciples, "I in them." He illustrates and enforces this relation by analogies and similes taken from nature and its processes—"I am the vine, ye are the branches;" "without me," or severed from me, "ye can do nothing;" "I am the living bread;" "he that eateth me, even he shall live by me;" "he that eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, dwelleth in me, and I in him;" "it is the Spirit that quickeneth, the flesh profiteth nothing." The spiritual, indwelling, quickening, and consciously divine life which he imparts to his disciples is something more than the immanent, sustaining, substantive life of Yahwé, the source of all being, but superinduced upon this, a quickening, indwelling, conscious life in his disciples—"At that day ye shall know that I am in my Father, and ye in me, and I in you." Of the Comforter, the Spirit, Christ affirms, "He dwelleth with you, and shall be in you." And the apostle Paul constantly speaks of God as working "all in all," of "filling all in all," of working "in us to will and to do," as the "one God who is above all, and through all, and in all," as properly given by the revised version.

THE TEACHINGS OF SCIENCE.

Says Fairbairn, in his discussion on "Theism and Scientific Speculation," "He who can evolve a conception of the universe that shall satisfy both science and religion will be the greatest prophet of the Eternal, modern times has
known.” This antagonism that has so long existed between science and religion can be reconciled only by the theologian discarding the dualism that places matter over against mind in unreconcilable antithesis, and adopting the doctrine of the divine immanence, which perfectly harmonizes the conflict and restores unity to the universe. No other theory of theism but that which involves the recognition of the divine immanence can be accepted by the scientist as satisfying the conditions which modern investigations into the nature of matter reveal to him. Let us briefly consider this fact as exhibited in the modern, as contrasted with the ancient, theory or theories of atoms. Of the older theories there are two of great antiquity: one is that of Democritus, the other that of Aristotle. The theory of Democritus is the materialistic theory, that atoms are the ultimate material of all things, uncaused, having existed from all eternity, invisible but extended, heavy and impenetrable. Their motion, like the atoms themselves, Democritus held to be eternal and vortical. Kindred to this, but of a far more modern date, was the theory of Sir Isaac Newton, who held matter to be inert, and that force lies outside of the atoms of which matter is composed, and acts upon them externally, and that this force exists in an ether which surrounds matter. When this force is active and communicates its action to bodies, it is *vis viva*, “living force;” but when passive, it is “dead force,” *vis mortua*. According to his theory, matter is itself inert, yet has a positive power of being, and so is *vis insita*, and the power of resisting action is its *vis inertia*, which he defined to be “that innate force of matter by which it resists any change, and endeavors to preserve its present state of motion.” Observe even here we have the recognition of an inherent force corresponding to what scientists now call the “power of repulsion,” as they now postulate two forces in the atom—the power of attraction and also the power of repulsion. Of late years, although the term inertia of matter is still used, yet it may be regarded as a relic of a period of philosophical speculation when scholars were ignorant of the
true nature and relations of matter and force. It is now conceded that no such dead thing or principle as inert vis exists in matter. No molecule or atom of any element exists without force in itself, or so interwoven with its minutest imaginable essence as not only to enable, but also to compel it to exert action and be acted upon by the internal forces of other particles or masses of particles. Says Winslow, an eminent writer on "Force and Nature," "In the present state of physical knowledge, matter cannot be demonstrated nor imagined to exist independent of immanent active force." Again, he says, "We cannot even conjecture any thing or principle in nature to be devoid of positive innate energy."

This modern scientific view of the nature of the atom, partly at least, conforms to the theory of Aristotle, who affirmed that in every particle of matter there is inherent a sort of mind—the φύσις and ἀπερ φυσή, the "nature" and "as it were the soul" of matter, which he called a sort of elemental mind—which is the cause of all its motions and changes. Leibnitz accepted this doctrine, and extended it systematically, supposing every particle of matter, not only to be active, but also "to have individuality, and a sort of perception of its situation in the universe and its relations to every part of the universe." This atom thus endowed he called a monad. He affirmed that particles of matter are continually active, and continually changing their situation in virtue of this principle of innate indefinable perception.

This theory of atoms applies to crystallography and also to chemical affinity.

The very fact that crystals spontaneously take on geometrical forms, is suggestive and significant of the truth that some intelligent power is immanent in the atom of which these crystals are composed, being builded up in accordance with some preconceived mental conception, as the architect forms and shapes the material of which the edifice is composed, in accordance with a plan mentally elaborated and defined. Says Clerk Maxwell, an elaborate writer on Atoms and Molecules, "Atoms have the appearance of being manu-
factured articles.” The very term universally used by scientists, that of “Elective Affinity,” to denote the mysterious force that unites atoms together, and invariably, in definite, mathematical proportions, into molecules, and in the same manner combines molecules together to form still larger masses of matter, implies a choice, election, the action of the will; so that the scientist, even though he may deny the presence and agency of mind, still uses and accepts of terms which necessarily involve the action and presence of mind.

This final principle, the vis formatrix, being demonstratively co-extensive with matter and force, and still more subtle, is in every sense universal and infinite. This principle being universal, which must be regarded as a power of intelligence, embraces, controls, and pervades all matter and force, so far as they are traceable, and is admitted by the profoundest thinkers among scientists to exhibit in this manner the highest type of mind and thought. Says Romanes, a distinguished evolutionist, in his Rede Lecture, 1885, “The advance of natural science is now steadily leading us to the conclusion that there is no motion without mind, and that there is no being without knowing”—so that “with Bruno we may infer that it is in the medium of mind and in the medium of knowledge we live, and move, and have our being.”

The fundamental relation of matter to force, so that matter is only a manifestation of force,—a truth universally accepted by that class of scientists now specially called “physicists,”—is asserted in the very definition given by Boscovich and Faraday to atoms, that “an atom is a mere centre of force.” Says Winslow, in his large and elaborate treatise on “Nature and Force,” “The fundamental nature of atoms is, to possess and hold forces. By their dynamical collisions, combinations, and disintegrations, they impress sense and consciousness by their multifarious capabilities and developments, and connect finite mind, the crowning elaboration, with the eternal principle which originated, exists in,
and controls all things, and which is indeed Absolute mind itself, filling space and eternity, and in comparison with the vastness of which all else is nothing."

Says Leibnitz, "Everything in the phenomenal world takes place at the same time mechanically and metaphysically, but the source of the mechanical is the metaphysical." How evidently the "beautiful contrivances," as Mr. Darwin calls them in his book on the "Fertilization of Orchids," indicate, as his own words imply, purpose and design! They involve what Huxley calls that "wider teleology" which, he says, "is not touched by the doctrine of evolution, but is actually based upon its fundamental proposition."

"The 'marvellous adjustments,' as Darwin calls them, between the plants and their environments, speak to me," says Lilly, an eminent evolutionist, "of a cause inherent in them which is one of the attributes of life itself. Nor when I rise from its perusal is there room left in me for doubt of the intelligence of these wonderful plant-organisms, of their consciousness, however dim, of their surroundings, of their possession in their measure of the self-same endowment which in man we call mind. Mr. Darwin's facts point us clearly to a psychic basis of life as to directive intelligence, and so they lend themselves to the deepest spiritual teaching, and receive from it their only legitimate explanation. They lead us to think, with Wordsworth, 'of life and soul to every mode of being inseparably linked,' to conceive of matter not as the base thing of sensualistic philosophy, but as substance in its dynamic condition, pregnant with the potentiality of personality; to regard its laws as modes of the divine agency, its properties as effects of the divine indwelling."

Descartes represents creation, not as one act begun and ended at a definite time, but as a continuous putting forth of energy, a constant manifestation of divine power, so that, if it should cease for a moment its energizings, the universe would lapse instantly back into the nothingness whence it was drawn.
Sir Isaac Newton writes, in his "Principia," that "gravity must be caused by an agent acting constantly according to certain laws." "That one body may act upon another, at a distance, through a vacuum, without the mediation of anything else by and through which their power and force may be conveyed from one to another, is to me so great an absurdity that I believe no man who has in philosophical matters a competent faculty of thinking can ever fall into it."

Says Sir William Hamilton, in his "Lectures on Metaphysics" (Appendix): "Creation is the existing subsequently in act of what previously existed in power; annihilation, on the contrary, is the subsequent existence in power of what previously existed in act. Every other agency is only an effect." Similar in philosophical view is this, which Professor Bowen writes: "Second causes are no causes at all, and exist only in thought. A cause in the proper sense of the word, that is, an efficient cause, as original and direct in its action, must be a first cause: that through which its action is transmitted is not a cause, but a portion of the effect, since it does not act, but is only acted upon. At most it is only the instrumental cause."4

Says Mr. Grove, in his celebrated Essay on "Correlation of Physical Forces," "Light, heat, electricity, magnetism, and chemical affinity are all convertible material affections. Cause and effect, therefore, in their abstract relation to these forces, are words simply of convenience, and we most humbly refer their causation to one omnipresent influence." Again, he says, "Causation is the will creation of the act of God."

Says Agassiz, the renowned opponent of the doctrine of evolution, "I regard the divine power not only as the source of creation, but the working force in nature herself."

Thus it is we have all classes of scientists—physical and metaphysical, evolutionists and opponents of evolution—uniting in the acceptance, if not formally yet really, of the doctrine of the divine immanence as the only principle that can explain the existence of matter as the manifestation of

force, that can account for motion, or constitute efficient cause.

RELATION TO BIOLOGY.

But it is in the investigations of the science of biology that the doctrine of the divine immanency receives its strongest confirmation. Those who call themselves evolutionists, and yet possess true scientific culture, are well acquainted with the fact, that the theory of evolution is wholly discarded by biologists in our day, and the antagonistic theory of epigen

esis is universally accepted, and yet they persist in the use of the word "evolution," and seek to combine these irreconcilable terms by using the phrase "evolution by epigenesis." But by the theory of epigenesis, a higher organization is superinduced upon a lower, not evolved or developed from it.

It is a remarkable fact that the theory of evolution was almost universally accepted by physiologists previous to the nineteenth century, and was especially acceptable to a large class of theologians, both because it seemed to favor the doctrine that—

In Adam's fall
We sinned all,

as the whole human race according to this theory were "in the loins of Adam," and also because it confirmed the doctrine that the Divine Creator had fully completed the work of creation, and as an active force had retired from Nature, and left it to the action of what were called either "Second Causes" or "Natural Causes," excluding what were called supernatural causes, except as they appeared in miracles and special providences. The theory of evolution affirms that no really new formation takes place in the evolution of each individual organism of plant or animal, including man, that there is only a growth or an unfolding of parts, all of which have been present and preformed and complete, though only very minute and preformed and represented in their subsequent form, position,
and connection, and the entire course of the evolution of the individual, or the ontogenetic process, is nothing but an evolution in the most exact meaning of the word, that is, an unwrapping, or evolving, of wrapped-up parts already formed.

This theory, applied to the human race, maintained that as an infant resembles an adult in most respects, save that of size, the original germ of the infant must also be a minute copy of the infant itself; that from the germ to the adult man there was no increase of complexity, only an increase in dimensions. As a necessary consequence, the germs of each generation were contained within the germs of the preceding generations; so that in mother Eve, according to the evolutionists called "Ovulists," were contained the miniature originals of the entire human race, completely shaped in every feature, and shut up one within another like a series of Chinese boxes. This was called the theory of encasement, that is, that "every species of animal or plant . . . contained encased within itself the germs of all the other individuals of its species which have ever lived or will live." Leibnitz, who adopted the ancient theory of evolution, applied it to the formation and development of souls, as well as of bodies. In one of his works entitled "Theodicee" he says: "I think that souls which will some day be human souls, as in the case of those of other species, preexisted . . . in our ancestors as far back as Adam, therefore since the beginning of things, always in the form of organized bodies." 6

The theory of epigenesis first advocated by Aristotle, but not generally accepted by physiologists until our own time, affirms that every new organism is an entirely new formation, beginning in a simple cell; that all the tissues and parts of all living organisms, plants and animals, are composed or built up by cells; that nowhere do we find in the egg or cell any preformed parts, but that every living organism, both plant and animal, is an entirely new formation; by this pro-

6 Haeckel, Evolution of Man, Vol. i. p. 35.
6 Ibid., p. 39.
cess of cell-building, new cells being formed by the segmentation or division of other cells. According to this theory, now universally accepted by all physiologists, the cell is the beginning of the formation of every organism, however complex it may be, or however much its various parts may differ in chemical constitution. But in every fully developed organism, both of the plant and the animal, we have a work of complexity, both of structural arrangement and of chemical ingredients and combinations, for which no power or skill but that of a divine artificer and chemist is adequate. Describing the simplest part of this work, that of segmentation or the multiplication of cells by the dividing of simple cells, says Huxley, "The plastic matter of the cell undergoes changes so rapid, and yet so steady and purpose-like in their succession, that one can compare them only to those operated by a skilful modeller upon a formless lump of clay. As with an invisible trowel the mass is divided."

Going on to describe the formation of the embryo, he adds, "And then it is as if a delicate finger traced out the line to be occupied by the spinal column, and moulded the contour of the body."

The illustration here given by Huxley of the process of segmentation and cell-multiplication, beautiful and impressive as it is, in some respects fails to accurately represent the inner workings of that mysterious power which builds up cell by cell the wonderfully complex structure of organisms, both in the animal and vegetable kingdom. It is within the very centre of the cell, although sometimes so minute as to elude the search of the most powerful microscope, that this invisible hand and trowel does its work of division and cell-multiplication. Within the cell is first formed a nucleus, and within that nucleus a nucleolus, or still smaller and more minute nucleus; and it is here the work of division begins that extends outward until the complete work by the formation of new cells is consummated. And what is still more mysterious and wonderful in this process of cell-multiplication is, that it is not merely two new cells that are formed
by such division, but that within the nucleus arise sometimes numerous points which separate from each other and become, by this same process of segmentation, new cells, thus multiplying growth in a quadruple and even higher ratio of cell-multiplication.

Superadded to this, is another process, to which divine creative as well as formative power is alone adequate, which is thus described by Herbert Spencer in what he calls the differentiation of the homogeneous germ. He first describes it as it relates to plants: "In plants the albuminous and amylaceous matters, which form the substance of the embryo, give origin in one place to chlorophyl, and in another place to a preponderance of cellulose, constituting the woody tissue of plants. Over the parts that are becoming leaf surfaces certain of the materials are metamorphosed into wax. In this place starch passes into one of its isomeric equivalents, sugar, and in that place into another of its isomeric equivalents, gum. By secondary change some of the cellulose is modified into wood, while some of it is modified into the allied substance which in large masses we distinguish as cork. And the most numerous compounds thus gradually arising initiate further unlikenesses by mingling in unlike ratios."

"So also the animal ovum or egg, the components of which, being at first evenly diffused among one another, are chemically transformed in like manner. Its protein, its fats, its salts become dissimilarly proportioned in different localities, and multiplication of isomeric forms leads to further mixtures and combinations, that constitute many minor distinctions of parts. Here, a mass, darkening by accumulation of hæmatine, presently dissolves into blood. There, fatty and albuminous matter, uniting, compose nerve-tissue. At this spot, the nitrogenous substance takes on the character of cartilage, and at that, calcareous salts, gathering together in the cartilage, lay the foundation of bone. All these chemical changes slowly and insensibly become more marked and multiplied, forming the process known among scientists as that of differentiation."
Now observe that all these processes so complicated, both chemical and structural, take place within the body in its formation and growth. In the first place is a process of secretion and transformation within each cell, which no laboratory of chemist can in any respect equal. Out of the nutrient material presented to the cell, it selects those chemical ingredients which are needed for its purpose: here, to form bone, there, to construct tissue—here, again, to organize brain, there to build up muscle, each part and organ thus formed having its own peculiar chemical constitution, as well as mechanical construction. And what is still more mysterious in the power that works these transformations, no chemist is able to detect in the nutrient material those chemical constituents which he finds in the formed material or complete organism. Within each cell is an alembic, a transmuting power which scientists call bioplasm, that more than fulfils the dream of the ancient alchemist, for he sought only to transmute one metal into another, but this mysterious power transmutes dead matter into living matter, the inorganic into the organic. Take up a clod of earth in one hand and the simplest flower in the other, and ask the chemist to transmute the lifeless clod into the living flower, with its reticulated tissue, so minute, so complex, which no loom of human skill can weave; ask him to evolve the chlorophyll of the green leaf,—where by the action of the sunbeam is developed a chemical process in the separation of carbonic acid gas into its original elements, carbon and oxygen, setting free pure oxygen,—and he will tell you, that even this comparatively simple process, the setting free pure oxygen, no laboratory of earth can achieve—no human skill can form or tint those delicate petals. He confesses all this to be the work of superhuman skill, a work begun and extending outward from the very centre of each minutest cell. If all these wonderful organisms that abound in such varieties of manifestation and structure in the animal and vegetable kingdoms, do not reveal the presence of a divine power working within, then nowhere is that power and pres-
ence manifested or required in the vast universe. And when the theologian tells the scientist, that God is not the immanent formative power within that vegetable and animal organism, that it is the work of nature and its forces, or that it is natural law, the scientist can but reply, Then is nature and natural law the only God which is required to explain the mysteries of the universe. If God is not there, in the very centre of that cell, doing that work of superhuman skill and power, then is He nowhere in all the realms of matter—either near or far away in infinite space.

But, again, there is another department in biology, that of embryology, in which the workings of a power within, in the process called embryological development, but which is not development, nor is it the evolution, or unfolding, or enlargement of a preformed germ, but is an epigenetic formation, the superinducing or building up of a higher and more complex organism upon a simpler or lower one.

All embryonic growth begins in a simple cell, and is continued or carried on by a process of cell-division and multiplication which we have already described. The human embryo, in an early period of its growth, cannot be distinguished from that of a fish, the lowest organism in that class of the vertebrates to which they both belong. As an embryo it passes up through the whole series of organisms that belong to this class until it reaches that highest complexity which is to be found in the human organism. This transformation is effected by the process of epigenetic formation, in which the higher is superinduced upon a lower organism. It is as if a cottage were transformed into a mansion, and the mansion then transformed into a palace, without any disintegration of the original structure, a transformation not only impossible to human power, but almost inconceivable to the human imagination.

It is here, in this process of embryonic growth, or, more properly, of epigenetic formation, that the mystery of new varieties among species and the origin of species is resolved.
Here is the cell forming new cells, and adding cell to cell, in such new forms as may be pleasing to itself. The divine power working within creates new organisms and fashions new forms, not limited to any precise pattern, for every new individual in every genus or species is an entirely new formation and more or less dissimilar to every previous formation, for no two blades of grass even are precisely alike. The power that works within, in the formation of each new organism, constructs, differentiates, and shapes according to its own pleasure. "For his pleasure they are and were created." This divine power working within prescribes its own limitations, chooses its own patterns, moulds its own forms. The law of uniformity is to be found in its own wisdom and will, which are divine.

Now let it be remembered that this mysterious transfiguration is wrought in the secret recesses of each minutest cell. Here, within, is the place where the invisible chemist and architect does his work. If the power that does this work is not a divine power, then is the scientist, who knows the facts of these inner workings, justifiable in affirming that there is no divine power anywhere in the universe of matter and of life, that there is no God.

Professor Tyndall was right in affirming that the potency of matter is inherent or within. The theologians that made haste to charge him with atheism revealed their own real disbelief in the omnipresence and omnipotence of God. If God is not present in matter, then He is not an omnipresent God. If the divine energy is not the potency of the atom, neither is he the omnipotent One. Modern historians have expressed the opinion, which has been repeated until it has become as familiar as a truism, that French infidelity, culminating in the terrors and chaos of the French Revolution, had its origin in the popular revolt against the superstitions and corruptions of the Romish Church. No less true is it that the atheism, if such it is, of the scientific class, has its origin in the expositions of those theologians who hold to the idea, derived from Greek and Roman mythology and
from mediaeval theology, of a distant God dwelling aloft in some Olympian heaven. Under such teaching the Christian religion is in danger of being scornfully pushed aside into the common receptacle of oblivion, where other religions of superstition and materialism are fast being consigned. What we most need to arrest the progress of infidelity, is such enlightened expositions of the Bible as will reveal the harmony that really exists between the Book of Nature and the Book of Inspiration, both, alike, revelations of that Divine Being who is the author of both. The interpretation of the one in the hands of the ignorant and bigoted theologian is quite as liable to be false, as the interpretation of the other in the hands of the crude and conceited scientist. *The harmony of these books lies in their correct interpretation.* A knowledge of both is needful for the full and correct comprehension of the nature, being, and modes of the divine existence. And such comprehension includes the recognition of the divine immanency, as well as transcendency, not merely that God is "over all," but also "through all and in all."

This subject of the divine immanency will be further considered, in another article, in its relations to materialism, to miracles, to inspiration, to regeneration, and to prayer.

*[To be continued.]*
ARTICLE VI.

THE COSMOGONY OF GENESIS.

PROFESSOR DRIVER’S CRITIQUE OF PROFESSOR DANA.

In the Bibliotheca Sacra for April, 1885, Professor Dana published an article, on the Cosmogony of Genesis, which has attracted wide attention. Twice, since, Mr. Gladstone has occupied the last page of The Nineteenth Century with special communications calling attention to the weighty truths set forth in this article. And now, after two years, the Regius Professor of Hebrew in the university of Oxford, England, feels called upon, in the Andover Review, to attempt a rebuttal of the numerous points in it which conflict with his own article in the Expositor, published about the same time.

We are glad to see that Dr. Driver is not inclined to take undue advantage of his own superior acquaintance with Hebrew, and so to shield himself behind a barricade of technical knowledge, but is ready to admit that the question at issue lies so near the surface that an ordinary British jurymen can hope to decide intelligently between the opposing specialists. Without, therefore, presupposing any more knowledge in ourselves than in the average British jurymen, we are permitted by Dr. Driver to come into the field and give our impressions of the weight of argument as presented by these two eminent authorities. We feel constrained, however, to make one further preliminary remark as to the spirit of the disputants.

We confess to no little surprise that Dr. Driver should accuse Professor Dana of misrepresenting facts for the sake of a theory, and of deflecting the sense which the text of Genesis legitimately expresses, in order to gain his point. But the exact language used by the Hebrew professor (italics, punctuation, and all) is as follows: "Thus the facts, though revealed, are misrepresented [by Professor Dana], for the sake of a theory!" (P. 647.) And again, "Professor Dana is too sound and genuine a scientist to deflect the facts of science, even by a hair's-breadth, for the sake of harmonizing them with the book of Genesis; he does not hesitate, in order to gain the same object, to deflect the sense which the text of Genesis legitimately expresses" (p. 648). Far be it from us to retort with similar charges; but the way is certainly opened for us to speak with plainness.

Professor Driver is probably correct in his unwillingness to allow Professor

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1 January, 1886, p. 176; August, 1886, p. 304.
2 December, 1887, pp. 639–649.
Dana to take advantage, in his scheme for harmonizing Genesis and geology, of a difference among commentators as to the interpretation of Hebrew words and phrases, since it is the truth itself, and not the opinions of commentators, with which we have to do, and the geologist cannot evade his own responsibility of deciding as to which of the commentators he will follow as most trustworthy. Dr. Driver, however, himself attempts to take such advantage in case of disagreement among scientific authorities. But in attempting to set Professor Huxley and Professor Pritchard in the scientific field over against Sir J. W. Dawson and Professor Dana, he has fallen into a curious misconception as to the character of the field in which these scientific men are found contending; since it seems, on examination, that in respect to the cosmogony of Genesis these worthy champions are not contending in the scientific arena at all, but in the exegetical. We happen to know that Professor Dana's summary in the Bibliotheca Sacra of the facts bearing on the question in hand has been accepted by Professor Huxley as correct. Mr. Huxley's forte in the discussion seems then to consist largely in sneering at the elasticity of a literary document like the first chapter of Genesis which can be accommodated to so vast and complicated a scheme of development as is brought to view by modern science. Where Professor Huxley sneers, we find Professors Dana, Guyot, and Dawson adoring the Providence that has kept this important literary document from being cast in such form that it should be in continual conflict with the physical discoveries of later ages. Professors Dana and Huxley differ, therefore, not about science, but in their appreciation of a most important piece of sacred literature.

It appears, also, from Professor Driver's own quotations, that Professor Pritchard's disagreement with Professor Dana is not at all upon scientific points, but upon questions of the interpretation of Genesis. Dr. Driver's quotation from Professor Pritchard is as follows: "That it (the Proem of Genesis) could not originally have been intended to give a scientific account of creation in its precise order, or method, or limitation of time, I am convinced, when I read of (1) the existence of waters before the appearance of the sun: (2) the clothing of the earth with fruit-trees and grass, each bearing its fruit, before the creation of the sun: (3) the successive orders or stages of creation, occupying each one single day" (p. 640).

Upon this quotation in general it is pertinent to remark that Professor Dana does not claim, or need to claim, that the first chapter of Genesis is a "scientific account of creation" in the technical sense of that word. The cosmogony of Genesis has, throughout, the sustained sublimity of Hebrew poetry. But even poetry may reveal the author's familiarity or unfamiliarity with the scientific truths underlying the representation. A chief merit of Professor Dana is that he approaches the first chapter of Genesis with due appreciation of its literary and rhetorical character, and knows the difference between a detailed scientific account and an attempt to summarize, in a few sublime utterances, at the beginning of a long series of revelations, the
salient facts concerning the origin and development of that material universe which was to be the scene of man's tragic fall and glorious redemption.

But let us notice Dr. Pritchard's statements more particularly. He cannot believe that the Proem of Genesis was originally intended to give a "scientific" account of creation, because he reads in it (1) "of the existence of waters before the appearance of the sun." But, it will be observed, the whole difference between him and Professor Dana turns upon the interpretation to be given, in such a piece of literature, to the word "waters." That "waters" is not the scientific term which would be applied, at the present time, to the nebulous matter out of which the universe in its present order has been developed, is freely admitted and expressly stated by Professor Dana. But what Professor Dana claims, is, that, in the state of knowledge, or rather of prevailing ignorance, at the time of the composition of this Proem, we are not sure that any better word than that translated "waters" could have been chosen for the figurative representation of the chaotic state of the universe which is affirmed by the writer originally to have existed. Here, then, it is not a question of science, but of exegetical judgment, which separates the two scientific authorities.

A similar result is arrived at from an examination of Dr. Pritchard's second point. He says that he cannot believe the Proem of Genesis could have been intended to give a "scientific" account of creation, because (2) the representation of "the clothing of the earth with fruit-trees and grass, each bearing its fruit, before the creation of the sun," is unscientific. But here, too, it is a case of rhetoric, and not of science, which is in dispute. Professor Dana does not affirm that vegetables were created before the sun, but he contends that the record of the fourth day's work may legitimately refer to something else than the original formation of the sun and moon, namely, to their first appearance through the phosphorescent swaddling-band of cloud which must for long ages have enveloped the earth, and when first they began to assume their appropriate offices of dividing the day from the night, and of serving for signs and seasons, and for days and for years. It should be noticed that creation is not the only word used in describing the events of the fourth day. The account of that day opens with the phrase "Let there be lights in the firmament," and then follows the expressions "Let them be for signs," etc., and "Let them be for lights...to give light upon the earth," etc., and the account closes with the affirmation that God made two great lights, and set them in the firmament to give light upon the earth, and to rule over the day and the night. Professor Dana can justly claim that this sustained description of the work of the fourth day is to be considered as a whole, and is to be interpreted under those limitations to the exact literalism of the words with which the characteristic Hebrew poetic parallelisms make us familiar. And in respect to the creation of fruit-trees and grass upon the third day, Professor Dana may also justly contend that the creation of the germs out of which the higher vegetation has ultimately developed may be properly regarded as the creation of the whole; that the essential thing in this description is a proper definition of the vegetable
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kingdom, as having its seed in itself. Otherwise, as Mr. Gladstone has said, a man might contend, that as, according to the sacred writer, "Every winged fowl" was produced on the fourth day of the Hexaëmeron, therefore the birth of new fowls continually is a contradiction to the text of Genesis." And on this principle, also, Professor Bowen's objection to the derivative origin of species would be valid, namely, that, since according to his metaphysical theory every individual is a fresh creation, it is absurd to speak of species as derived. It will be seen, a little later, that both Professor Driver and the scientific authorities with whom he allies himself are led into their attitude of opposition to Professor Dana, not so much by their science or their exegesis, as by their metaphysics. Professor Dana would not contend that fruit-trees and grass were created on the third day, any more than that Shakespeare and Milton were created in the Garden of Eden, and yet, doubtless, he would freely speak of the human race, with all its possibilities of development, as created at that time. The initial point of the creation is that to which, in summary language, attention is fittingly directed, and around which the skilful writer will cluster the salient features of the future developments of that creation.

Again, Professor Pritchard asserts that he cannot believe the Proem of Genesis could "originally have been intended to give a scientific account of creation," because he reads there (3) of "the successive orders or stages of creation, occupying each one single day." Here, again, it will be observed that it is not a question of science at all on which he differs from Professor Dana, but it is wholly a question of exegesis, namely, the latitude which in such a piece of literature may legitimately be given to the word "day;" and this is a point upon which Dr. Driver disagrees with Pritchard and agrees with Dana, using in this very article the following words: "Professor Dana's interpretation of 'day' as period, I am ready to accept. I do not indeed feel sure that it is right; but (as I have stated elsewhere), I think it reasonable to allow that it may have been used consciously by the writer in a figurative sense, as a part 'not of the reality, but of the representation;' and I am not prepared to recede from this position" (p. 643). Thus Dr. Driver himself discredits the third position of Professor Pritchard.

Another point worthy of remark is suggested by what Dr. Driver says concerning the statements of Guyot and Dana, respecting the original creation of the universe. Here the distinguished professor of Hebrew carries the war into Africa, and boldly ventures into the field of science himself to combat these eminent men on their own ground; but examination shows that the Hebrew scholar is armed for the encounter neither with scientific nor with exegetical facts, but only with bad metaphysics.

Dr. Driver makes light of Guyot and Dana for making reference to "inert" matter (pp. 642-643), and says that Professor Dana does not state what he considers to have been "the condition of 'inert' matter," and asks, with apparent triumph (italicizing the whole question), "Is it a fact that the matter of which a gas is composed is inert?" This question is followed by a

quotation from Professor Tait calling attention to the enormous activity of hydrogen gas, stating that every particle in a mass of hydrogen has, on an average, "17,700,000,000 collisions per second with other particles," which, he well says, does not look like "inertness." He complains, also, that "Professor Dana offers no definition of the properties or appearance of inert matter,—of matter prior to its endowment with heat and other molecular activities" (from which it would appear that Dr. Driver does not know what "inert" matter is), adding "A competent British scientist, intimately acquainted with astronomical physics, to whom I have submitted this part of the present article, permits me to say that, in his judgment, 'inert' matter is inconceivable, and unthinkable."

These remarks are somewhat curious, and we may be permitted to show their nature by asking a few questions ourselves. And, in the first place, we should like to know if Dr. Driver rejects every fact which any competent British scientist considers to be "inconceivable and unthinkable." Does he suppose that the universe can be measured by, or God's work can be limited to, the realm of reality which his friend is able to comprehend? If so, he will find himself with a very meagre equipment of beliefs. Does Dr. Driver believe in the eternity of matter, or in its creation? He will find either of these alternatives (one of which must be true), quite beyond the powers of conception possessed by his scientific friend. Again, when Dr. Driver, on Tait's authority, refers to one particle of hydrogen colliding with another particle, what is it that collides? Are those ultimate particles inert or not? or does this motion belong to their essential nature? Does Dr. Driver deny to matter the property of inertia?

It is pertinent to remark, further, that we gladly avail ourselves of some of the principles of interpretation endorsed by Dr. Driver, as, for example, when he grants (p. 64) the correctness of Professor Dana's statement, that man's comprehension of any idea communicated to him by another is conditioned by the amount and character of the knowledge and beliefs already possessed by him, though insisting that the accommodation which this principle implies must be restricted within "reasonable limits." And again (p. 646), speaking of the classification of plants in Genesis, Dr. Driver says, that it "is evidently borrowed from popular use, and it would be unfair to limit each particular with scientific rigor. But the terms must be interpreted with reasonable fidelity." We have italicized the word "reasonable" in these two cases, for on the meaning of that word the whole discussion turns. What are the reasonable limits of elasticity or of accommodation which may properly be assigned to a word in such a passage of literature as we find prefacing the divine revelation of the Bible? Upon this point Dr. Driver says (p. 642), "Our only means of learning what the nature of a communicated idea is, is the language used by the recipient for the purpose of expressing it; and if the idea has been transformed in his mind in the manner supposed, there is no revelation or communication of truth whatever. If that which the recipient expresses stands in no intelligible relation to the reality which
it is the purpose of the revelation to communicate, the reality remains unknown."

This position will not bear investigation, since it unwarrantably limits the meaning of the teacher by the present capacity of the pupil; whereas it is a true and familiar principle that a superior genius is permitted to use words (as God uses the phenomena of nature) in a pregnant sense—that is, to use language which will be more and more fruitful of meaning as the recipient advances in experience and powers of comprehension. The whole Old Testament economy is full of such divinely chosen words and symbols; whose deepest meaning could only appear to those who had enjoyed the light of the Christian dispensation. Many of the words of Christ remained enigmas until after his resurrection. "Destroy this temple," he says, "and in three days I will raise it up," referring to his body and to his resurrection. But there is no more resemblance between his body and the temple than there is between Guyot's gaseous atmosphere and the original meaning of the Hebrew word mayim. And so, repeatedly, the sayings of Christ are said to have been incomprehensible until the later experiences shed upon them their backward rays of light. Indeed, he said it was his purpose to speak to them in parables, that they might misunderstand if they would. The reward of knowledge, both in the study of the facts of nature and of grace, is bestowed only upon those who earnestly seek and patiently wait. "What I do," says Christ, "thou knowest not now, but thou shalt know hereafter." We challenge, therefore, this whole position upon which Dr. Driver and others like him plant themselves, when they assume that the language of the Old Testament had no deeper meaning than the dull minds of the original recipients were able to get out of it. It is the misleading principle of rationalism, and is contrary to the whole teaching of the New Testament concerning the Old. From beginning to end, the law and the prophets spoke of Christ, but in language whose meaning was to a great degree hidden to the original speakers and auditors.

The true principle of accommodation, as applied to the passage under consideration, may be stated thus: If the cosmogony of Genesis is true, there is necessarily an altogether unique difficulty in interpreting its language—a difficulty which pertains to no other portion of the Bible and to no other ancient document. In the first place, the scientific facts are presented in language strictly popular. This is the case for the double reason that when the account was written, scientific language had not yet been invented, and that even if it had been at command it would have been permanently unintelligible to the mass of men. But the use of popular language by no means always creates a serious difficulty in apprehending the facts which an author aims to state. If we are already otherwise familiar with the true nature of the phenomena, and with the fixed popular usage of language regarding them, we interpret such language as readily and as accurately as the strict phraseology of science. Thus the expression, "the sun rises," although only popular and, strictly taken, false, is yet used with such uniformity of a well-known daily phenomenon that even savants avail them-
selves of it as convenient and unambiguous. This is perhaps the simplest
illustration that could be selected. Where the facts are less common, and
popularly less often observed and spoken of, the sense of popular statements
becomes more difficult to determine; and this difficulty increases exactly as
the rarity of observation and report. Still the interpreter's duty is plainly
the same in all cases, namely, to study the nature of the facts in themselves
and the uniformities of such usage of language as exists. But the difficulty
of interpreting popular language reaches its climax, and becomes unique,
when the phenomena have never been but once observed, and cannot be
observed again, and have never been but once stated, so that there is
an absolute absence of usage. What language shaped to express the facts of
this late day must be understood to mean when applied to the phenomena of
an inchoate world, it is hard to say. Obviously many words must lose part
of their common connotation. After our best efforts, an uncertainty must
attach to all the details of the interpretation of the cosmogony of Genesis,—
such as belongs to no other chapter of the Bible,—and jests at the elasticity
of the Hebrew language will always find apparent justification in the hesita-
tion of conscientious exegetes.

The value of the cosmogony is not therefore destroyed. In spite of the
almost insuperable difficulties of translating popular language, so used, into
its precise scientific equivalents, we may yet derive from it such right im-
pressions of the order and method of creation as shall deliver us from super-
stition, and enlighten us as to the true relations of God and man and nature.

Coming, now, to the main question, and assuming only the privileges
allowed by Dr. Driver to the "humblest layman," who "lacks all special
knowledge" of the technicalities submitted to him, we also will take upon
ourselves "to decide whether the sequence taught in a scientific manual
agrees or not with the sequence of Genesis, and whether the advocacy of
Professor Huxley and Professor Pritchard on the one side, or of Professor
Dana and Sir J. W. Dawson on the other, is the more logical and conclu-
sive" (p. 641).

Fortunately, we have a statement of the two important systems to be
harmonized in small compass and accepted by both parties. The translation
of the cosmogony of Genesis incorporated into Professor Dana's article in the
BIBLIOTHECA SACRA, is endorsed by Dr. Driver (p. 641) as one with which
he has "no fault to find except in one not very important particular." This
translation, though appearing before the revised version of the Old Testa-
ment, substantially agrees with it in nearly every point, and exactly agrees
with it in the point to which Dr. Driver would take some exception,
Professor Ballantine and the revisers translating a phrase in the twentieth
verse "in the open firmament" where Dr. Driver would translate "In
front of the firmament." At the same time, also, as already remarked,
the condensed statement of scientific facts bearing upon the question given
by Professor Dana in the same number of the BIBLIOTHECA SACRA, we know
to have been read and assented to by Professor Huxley, the chief counsel on
the other side.
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In approaching the subject, we do not, however, profess to be entirely unbiased. We have long been familiar with the whole Bible—perhaps more familiar with it than with science. And we have learned to find the Bible very full of meaning. Indeed, by long familiarity we have come to be more and more deeply impressed with the pregnant character of its utterances, and with the majestic proportions of its system of doctrines, and with the frequency with which new light breaks forth from it when fresh combinations of its numerous elements are made, or when it comes into fresh contact with new facts in history or physical science. Doing, however, the best we can to divest ourselves of undue prejudice, and bearing in mind the charge of the judge, who, in this case, is none other than Dr. Driver himself, to be content with a reasonable amount of evidence, we will state in a few words how the matters at issue strike us.

As the conceptions of modern science have unfolded, during the past half-century, the parallelism between them and the cosmogony of Genesis has certainly been very striking; and, strange to say, it has not grown less as science has extended its knowledge of nature. The lines of science, we grant, are not continuous; but at so many points is their parallelism with Genesis visible that we are not disturbed at there being certain places where the harmony is not yet seen. In the first place, it is surprising that in the unscientific age in which the book of Genesis was written, the creation of light should have been spoken of so long before the creation of the sun and the moon and stars. But this corresponds with the theory of the nebular hypothesis now pretty generally accepted, since light is the result of chemical action, and must have been one of the earliest accompaniments of the creative process. We do not see that there is anything in the nature of the case to have suggested this order in the creation of light. We might, indeed, suppose it to have been a happy guess if it stood alone. But it does not stand alone. And where a number of happy guesses follow each other in close succession, they cease to be guesses, and reveal an intelligent Designer as the producing cause.

Again, the second stage as mentioned by Genesis speaks in remarkable terms of the formation of the firmament subsequent to the formation of light and previous to the appearance of dry land,—a firmament separating the waters below from the waters above. It would be difficult to choose a brief statement which should more happily express in phenomenal language that stage of creation brought into view by modern science, in which the nebulous matter became localized and segregated into revolving systems such as the astronomer now delights to study. But, according to the writer of Genesis, as well as according to the dicta of science, all this was preliminary to those physical conditions which would render possible the existence of organic life.

Again, according to Genesis, the third stage of progress was marked by the formation of dry land. Upon the third day, also, close upon the appearance of dry land, occurred the beginning of vegetable life, in which the characteristics by which a living species are distinguished from an inor-
ganic substance are most clearly stated. Inorganic substances have no power of reproduction. But the writer of Genesis describes the species of the vegetable kingdom as those whose seed is in itself, yielding seed after its kind. This definition of plants is good for all ages.

If it is objected to this account of the creation of the vegetable kingdom upon the third day, that it describes the higher species of plants, which were introduced only at a much later period, namely, the grass and the fruit-trees, whereas the earliest plants belong to a much lower order of the vegetable kingdom, the same objection might be urged to the account of the creation of the dry land, since that has been going on ever since—new land being formed even at the present day. But we submit that, in so summary an account as this must be on account of its brevity, it is sufficient that the writer, in the words of an eminent Hebrew professor (Professor E. P. Barrows, Bib. Sac., Vol. xiv. p. 91), "describes the establishment of the vegetable kingdom in its laws and general forms which are valid for all the subsequent geological eras. The grand fact revealed is that on the third day the vegetable world was brought into being under the immutable principles which now regulate its operations....The two things made prominent in this account are law, as expressed in the formula 'after its kind,' and general forms,—grass, herb, fruit-trees yielding fruit, whose seed is in itself.'" Does not "the equity of common sense" admit of such an interpretation, and so affirm a substantial agreement between the two records of geology and Scripture in their account of the third stage in the creation of the world?

The fourth grand stage in the creative process, as described by the writer of Genesis, relates to the establishment of days and seasons upon the earth, through its relation to the sun and moon. They are then set in the firmament to give light upon the earth, and to rule over the day and over the night, and to divide the light from the darkness. Up to this point, we infer, from scientific data, that there was no darkness upon the earth; that though the earth was surrounded by clouds, they were luminous clouds, everywhere shining, like the aurora of the north, from the electrical disturbances which then must have been so abundant. The plants of the coal period were not necessarily dependent upon either the light or the heat of the sun. It is only the higher forms of plants and animals that are specially adapted to this periodicity in the return of both heat and light which characterizes the present order of things. When the earth's swaddling-band of clouds was all one blaze of electric light, the sun did not divide between the darkness and the light, and the moon and the stars did not rule over the night. This description of the sun and moon—as created not only after the creation of light, but subsequent to the creation of plants, both of which are to the common understanding dependent upon the sun—seems to us more than a happy guess, and a thing most unlikely to have occurred as the result of any ordinary motives under which authors write. We have already remarked upon the ground upon which Professor Dana is authorized to regard the description as that of the appearance rather than of the reality.
The fifth grand stage marks, according to Genesis, the introduction of animal life, being confined to fish and fowl; and here, too, the general correspondence with scientific inferences is marked, though we need not be compelled to suppose that every class of winged fowl, and every class of sea-monsters, was actually brought into existence during that period, since, as in the previous cases, the equity of common sense would permit, in so brief an account, some things of the same class genetically connected together to be mentioned by anticipation.

The sixth stage, according to the writer in Genesis, brings us to the introduction of those forms of life most closely connected with man, namely, the cattle and beasts of the earth. Here, also, was the appropriate place to mention the creeping things; since the age of reptiles is joined so closely to that of the mammalian forms of animal life. For brevity's sake and completeness, as Gladstone suggests, they are naturally referred to by retrospect, in order, so to speak, to glean the field, as the higher forms of fish are referred to by anticipation in the account of the fifth day.

This completes the parallel, and, with Mr. Gladstone, we may well ask in astonishment, "How came the Mosaic writer to place the fish and the men in their true relative positions not only to one another, and not only to the rest of the animal succession, but in a definite and that a true relation of time to the origin of the first plant life, and to the colossal operations by which the earth was fitted for them all?" "The five origins, or first appearances of plants, fishes, birds, mammals, and man, are given to us in Genesis in the order of succession, in which they are also given by the latest geological authorities" (p. 14).

In view of all these facts, we cannot believe that this extent of parallelisms between the cosmogony of Genesis and the cosmogony of modern science is the result of a series of happy guesses. Certainly no other ancient cosmogony presents any such parallelisms, or could endure any such comparison with modern science. It is true the evidence is not demonstrative, and the harmony is not so complete but that some objection may be urged to it, and some doubt be entertained concerning its reality at all points. But in the main the theory of reconciliation advocated by Professor Dana seems to have been proved beyond reasonable doubt, and to be as far proved in its main features as to shed much light even upon the interpretation of the obscurer portions of the record in Genesis. Our conclusion therefore is, as between these scientific experts whom Professor Driver brings forward as the representatives of the rival views concerning the harmony of Genesis and science, that Mr. Huxley's sneers are unworthy of him, and betray in his education an excess of physical and a lack of literary study; that Professor Pritchard's appreciation of the literary and rhetorical elements of the first chapter of Genesis is inadequate; while the views of Professor Dana and Guyot, though perhaps not perfect in every respect, combine that knowledge of science, that familiarity with literature, and that reverence for the grand scheme of revelation unfolded in the Bible, which must commend them more and more to the favorable consideration of the serious and thoughtful Christian public.

* The Nineteenth Century, January, 1886, p. 11.
ARTICLE VII.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.


To one at all interested in the scientific movements of the last half-century, the "Life and Letters of Charles Darwin" are two of the most interesting and instructive volumes that have appeared in recent times. This interest is due to several causes, some of which are obvious, while others appear only on reading the work itself.

1. In the first place, the extent of Darwin's influence commands attention to everything which reveals its secret. Natural history has been almost as completely revolutionized by Mr. Darwin as astronomy was by Copernicus, and by very much the same processes. Thirty years ago, the independent creation and finity of species was scarcely questioned by any botanist or zoologist; whereas, at the present time, the continuity of species and their derivative origin is scarcely questioned by any, though there are different theories for accounting for the variations, in which most believe. But there is probably less objection to Mr. Darwin's theory of natural selection at the present time than there was to Newton's theory of gravitation after it had been before the public for the same period.

2. The interest in the volumes is maintained, in the second place, by the insight which is given in them into the lives, the methods of work, and the habits of thought, of the leading scientific men of the period. Though the letters are nearly all from Mr. Darwin's own pen, they were written in reply to letters expressing the views of Mr. Darwin's eminent cotemporaries, and are largely given to discussing, in a friendly way, the mooted points in their several specialties. In this way the reader obtains a very clear conception of the work, in geology, of Sedgwick, Murcheson, and Sir Charles Lyell; and, in botany, of Henslow, Brown, Asa Gray, and Sir Joseph Hooker, to say nothing of some less known names.

3. In the third place, Darwin's literary style is of the highest order for its purposes. His letters are written with the utmost freedom, and reveal a most lovable, genial, and considerate friend, who is generous in his feelings towards all, and more than ready to recognize the merits of his competitors.

In Mr. Darwin's own view, his education was very defective, and ill calculated to prepare the way for his subsequent career: he studied in the ordinary
classical school of sixty years ago, learning little but Latin and Greek, the most of which he forgot in the interval of two years between his preparatory school and his entrance upon the course at Cambridge; and at Cambridge he went but a little way in algebra, learned no modern language, had no instruction in drawing, and paid little attention to geology and botany, although those sciences were taught by able professors. The things which Darwin studied with most success and satisfaction, while at Cambridge, were Paley’s “Evidences of Christianity” and “Natural Theology.” These he both enjoyed and mastered, and, if we mistake not, the impress of those great works is seen in the singularly clear and felicitous style of Mr. Darwin’s various books.

It probably is not best to accept Mr. Darwin’s own estimate of the value of his preliminary education. Indeed, we are rather inclined to think his success may be largely due to that education. Like several other scientific men, he got a training for the ministry. If he had had less of Paley and more of German, it is not improbable that his style would have been so influenced that he never would have reached the ear of the English public. If he had had less of Greek and more of drawing, it is by no means certain that he would have been able to carry on those long-continued trains of thought which secured to him pre-eminence in unravelling the complicated web of organic life. As man is limited in his powers, the force he spends in one direction must diminish that expended in other directions. For Mr. Darwin to have wasted his strength in such details as drawing might have been fatal to his whole success. Others could draw for him, but no one else could do his thinking.

The special preparation of Mr. Darwin for his subsequent work was made during the voyage of the Beagle, from 1832-37. With little previous preparation he undertook to act as naturalist on that expedition, which had in view the circumnavigation of the globe in the southern hemisphere. Thus his scientific education was obtained alone, and by direct study of nature, there being no other scientific man in the company with him. The scientific results of this voyage were slowly worked out, and published during the first few years subsequent to his return, and at once attracted the interest of leading scientific men; though it was not till some years later, when republished by themselves, that they attracted popular attention. But his narrative of the voyage of the Beagle has remained, from that day to this, one of the most popular and instructive books of travel ever written, and his works upon the “Geology of South America” and upon “Coral Reefs” have not been superseded by anything later.

As Mr. Darwin was in possession of an independent fortune, he was enabled to devote his whole time to scientific pursuits, though ill health always rendered his progress in writing slow, and several years were spent in preparing an elaborate work upon the Cirripedia; so that the opinion to which a member of the French Academy gave currency, that Mr. Darwin was principally a theorizer, and had not done a sufficient amount of original work to give him the highest standing, is far from the truth.
Mr. Darwin's theory of the derivative origin of species was one of slow
growth, and owes its origin to a perusal, in 1838, of Malthus on Population.
Just previous to this he had opened a note-book on the subject, which had
grown, in 1844, into a manuscript of 230 pages. In 1856 he began, under
the advice of Lyell and others,—among them Professor Asa Gray,—to write
out his views more fully, and was then contemplating a book, upon the
origin of species, about four times as extensive as that which he afterwards
published. Upon this he kept at work until 1858, when his whole plan of
publication was suddenly changed, as a consequence of his receiving for
publication a communication from Mr. Alfred R. Wallace, which embodied
almost exactly his own ideas as they had been submitted to his scientific
friends in the sketch of 1844. Upon consultation with Sir Charles Lyell and
Sir Joseph Hooker, it was decided that justice to both parties would be
secured by publishing a joint paper, consisting of Mr. Wallace's communica-
tion, and of extracts from Mr. Darwin's sketch written in 1844, and from a
letter written in 1857 to Professor Asa Gray detailing to that naturalist the
main features of his theory. This joint paper was read before the Linnean
Society, July 1st, 1858. Mr. Darwin thereupon abandoned the preparation of
his greater work, and set himself to prepare the smaller volume, now known
as "The Origin of Species," which was published in 1859.

The greater work contemplated by Mr. Darwin was never completed,
though much of the material went into the volumes published ten years
later, upon "The Domestication of Animals" and "The Descent of Man."
His work upon "Orchids," on "Climbing Plants," "Insectivorous Plants,
"Power of Movement in Plants," "Different Forms of Flowers on Plants of
the Same Species," and on "Vegetable Mould and Earthworms," were each
the completion of long-cherished plans, and are more or less closely related
to his main theory.

Mr. Darwin's theory of the origin of species by natural selection is still so
often misapprehended that it is important to get before the general public
such light as is shed upon it from his correspondence. In the first place, it
should be noted that natural selection is only one of the modes by which a
derivative origin of species may be conceived to have been brought about;
so that the doctrine of evolution might still be true, even if natural selection
were found to have been much exaggerated in its operation by Mr. Darwin,
or even if it should be found to be wholly inoperative. The argument,
therefore, for the continuity of species is much stronger than that for the
origin of species by means of natural selection. Professors Owen, Mivart,
Hyatt, and Cope, all believe in the derivative origin of species, while none
of them regard natural selection as sufficient explanation of the process
through which the origination of new species takes place. This Mr. Darwin
always recognized, and his son truly says: "It comes out very clearly that in
the case of such publications as Dr. Gray's, my father did not rejoice over
the success of his special view of evolution, viz., that modification was mainly
due to natural selection; on the contrary, he felt strongly that the really
important point was that the doctrine of descent should be accepted.
Thus he wrote to Professor Gray (May 11, 1863), with reference to Lyell's 'Antiquity of Man':—

"'You speak of Lyell as a judge; now what I complain of is that he declines to be a judge. ... I have sometimes almost wished that Lyell had pronounced against me. When I say 'me,' I only mean change of species by descent. That seems to me the turning-point. Personally, of course, I care much about natural selection; but that seems to me utterly unimportant, compared to the question of creation or modification"" (vol. ii. pp. 163–164).

In the second place, the principle of natural selection was never supposed by Mr. Darwin to be a force in itself, acting independently of physiological conditions. Natural selection is merely a figurative statement of the action of all the external conditions upon organisms endowed with an indefinite amount of physiological variability. The distinction between living matter and dead matter is recognized, and its tendency to vary in the process of propagation is a fundamental principle in Mr. Darwin's theory. The question is, as to the breadth of this tendency. It is as when the end of a climbing plant moves around in a complete circle until it strikes some object to which it may cling, and its future course is afterwards determined by its chance contact with this supporting object. The general circular motion would have been useless but for the interruption. Now the design of the motion of any particular plant was, not to find the particular stem around which it finally twined, for there was no conscious aim in its movements; but the design was for the plant to follow up any stem which should come in its way. God's design appears therefore in the adjustment of selecting conditions. Now natural selection is the sum of all the action of those natural forces which isolate the individuals whose variations are adapted to the conditions of existence. This isolation is brought about largely by the extermination of unfitted forms, and produces an effect analogous to that of the selection exercised by man in procuring improved varieties of plants or animals. The gardener improves his variety of vegetables by selecting for propagation the peculiarities most suitable to his purposes, and destroying the inferior individuals, so that they shall not interfere with the growth of the selected varieties. That this process goes on in nature to some extent is evident to all. The merit of Mr. Darwin's thought upon the subject is that he has shown that this principle is capable of operating to an extent indefinitely greater than was before supposed. The question is whether this principle may go on perpetuating and increasing the divergence between groups of favored individuals propagating among themselves, until they become so far separated as to constitute what are called species.

The sources of evidence upon this point are thus stated in a letter to Mr. Benthem in 1863: "'In fact, the belief in natural selection must at present be grounded entirely on general considerations. (1) On its being a vera causa, from the struggle for existence; and the certain geological fact that species do somehow change. (2) From the analogy of change under domestication by man's selection. (3) And chiefly from this view connecting

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under an intelligible point of view a host of facts. When we descend to
details, we can prove that no one species has changed [i.e., we cannot prove
that a single species has changed]; nor can we prove that the supposed
changes are beneficial, which is the ground-work of the theory. Nor can
we explain why some species have changed and others have not” (vol. ii.

This method of proof is strictly inductive, and, so, in contrast with a
priori theories of evolution. So long as writers keep this fact in view, there
is no danger of disturbing the foundations of other established truths or con-
clusions. From the nature of the case, also, it becomes more and more diffi-
cult to prove the competency of natural selection to produce results, when we
recede from the present into the realm where positive evidence becomes less.
This, Mr. Darwin always acknowledged. Thus, in writing to F. Watkins
regarding his theory, in 1860, Darwin says, “With respect to your question
I think the arguments are valid showing that all animals are descended from
four or five primordial forms; and that analogy and weak reasons go to
show that all have descended from some single prototype.”

In regard to Mr. Darwin’s theological position, it is important to distin-
guish between his personal belief and the views which logically follow from
his scientific positions. The latter point the reader will find discussed most
fully and satisfactorily in the writings of the late Professor Asa Gray. In
noting Mr. Darwin’s personal attitude to religion, his reticence and modesty
must have a prominent place in tempering our judgment. He frankly con-
fesses that the firm belief he had in his younger days in the Bible as a re-
velation from God, and in the immortality of the soul, was given up in his
later years; nor could he steadily hold on to the doctrine of design in
nature. Yet he speaks with the greatest hesitation, and is by no means
willing to be reckoned as an atheist, and is far from claiming any special
value for his opinion upon such points. Indeed, he expressly and repeatedly
disclaims any worth to his own opinions upon metaphysical questions. We
should be the more ready to accept Darwin’s judgment as to the value of
his opinions upon such questions, because of certain other and analogous
changes through which his mind passed with advancing years. As a young
man, Mr. Darwin loved poetry, was fond of music, and delighted in art;
as an old man, he lost all his relish for these things, and Shakespeare was so
void of interest to him that the reading of it fairly “nauseated” him. This,
Mr. Darwin regretted, writing in his Autobiography (vol. i. p. 81): “A
man with a mind more highly organized or better constituted than mine,
would not, I suppose, have thus suffered; and if I had to live my life again,
I would have made a rule to read some poetry and listen to some music at
least once every week; for perhaps the parts of my brain now atrophied
would thus have been kept active through use. The loss of these tastes is
the loss of happiness, and may possibly be injurious to the intellect, and
more probably to the moral character, by enfeebling the emotional part of
our nature.”

There is nothing in Mr. Darwin’s life to make one doubt the sincerity of
his statements respecting his belief that his scientific speculations were in no ways inconsistent with a sound religious faith. Among the most important of these statements is the one found in a letter written, in 1878, to Mr. C. Ridley in answer to some points suggested by a recent sermon of Dr. Pusey, in which he says: "Dr. Pusey was mistaken in imagining that I wrote the 'Origin' with any relation whatever to theology. I should have thought that this would have been evident to any one who had taken the trouble to read the book, more especially as in the opening lines of the introduction I specify how the subject arose in my mind. This answer disposes of your two other questions; but I may add that many years ago, when I was collecting facts for the 'Origin,' my belief in what is called a personal God was as firm as that of Dr. Pusey himself, and as to the eternity of matter, I have never troubled myself about such insoluble questions" (vol. ii. p. 412).

A more extended statement was made several years before, in a letter to Mrs. Boole (vol. ii. p. 246), who had put to him the following questions: "Do you consider the holding of your theory of natural selection, in its fullest and most unreserved sense, to be inconsistent—I do not say with any particular scheme of theological doctrine—but with the following belief, namely, [1] That knowledge is given to man by the direct inspiration of the Spirit of God; [2] That God is a personal and infinitely good Being; [3] That the effect of the action of the Spirit of God on the brain of man is especially a moral effect; [4] And that each individual man has, within certain limits, a power of choice as to how far he will yield to his hereditary animal impulses, and how far he will rather follow the guidance of the Spirit, who is educating him into a power of resisting those impulses in obedience to moral motives?"

To this, Mr. Darwin replied: "It would have gratified me much if I could have sent satisfactory answers to your questions, or, indeed, answers of any kind. But I cannot see how the belief that all organic beings, including man, have been genetically derived from some simple being, instead of having been separately created, bears on your difficulties. These, as it seems to me, can be answered only by widely different evidence from science, or by the so-called 'inner consciousness.' My opinion is not worth more than that of any other man who has thought on such subjects, and it would be folly in me to give it. I may, however, remark that it has always appeared to me more satisfactory to look at the immense amount of pain and suffering in this world as the inevitable result of the natural sequence of events, i.e., general laws, rather than from the direct intervention of God, though I am aware this is not logical with reference to a omniscient Deity. Your last question seems to resolve itself into the problem of free-will and necessity, which has been found by most persons insoluble. I sincerely wish that this note had not been as utterly valueless as it is. I would have sent full answers, though I have little time or strength to spare, had it been in my power... I am grieved that my views should incidentally have caused trouble to your mind, but I thank you for your judgment, and honor you for it, that theology and science should each run its own course, and that in the
present case I am not responsible if their meeting-point should still be far off."

Some other letters, drawn out from Mr. Darwin, in the later portion of his life, indicate that his power of metaphysical reasoning had suffered as complete atrophy as he himself testifies had happened to his aesthetical tastes and judgments. Yet he stoutly resisted being classed with atheists, though on one or two occasions he confessed himself an agnostic; always remarking, however, that he could not place much confidence in his judgment in such matters. At times he seemed to accept the reasoning of Professor Asa Gray and the Duke of Argyll concerning the enforcement which his own investigations gave to the doctrine of design in nature, and then he would seem to lose sight of that truth; but his closest associations, to the day of his death, were with clergymen and other men of religious belief,—among them Professor Asa Gray,—and he was a regular and generous contributor, in his later days, to the Society for the promotion of Christian missions in Patagonia. Some aspects of his views could best be discussed in connection with the life and work of Asa Gray, whose recent death calls attention anew to the great service he rendered natural theology in forestalling the atheistic direction which many were inclined to give to their inferences from some of Mr. Darwin's premises.

**The Teaching of the Apostles (ΔΙΑΔΑΧΗ ΤΩΝ ΑΠΟΣΤΟΛΩΝ).**

Newly edited, with Facsimile Text and a Commentary, for the Johns Hopkins University, Baltimore, from the MS. of the Holy Sepulchre (Convent of the Greek Church), Jerusalem, by J. Rendel Harris, formerly Fellow of Clare College, Cambridge, Professor of Biblical Languages and Literature in Haverford College, Pennsylvania. Baltimore: Publication Agency of the Johns Hopkins University; London: C. J. Clay and Sons, 1887. (pp. vi. 107. 7 1/2 x 5 in.)

Since the first publication of the Didache by Bryennios a great multitude of editions, commentaries, articles, etc., have been written upon it, until it has itself a literature something like that of one of the books of the New Testament. The original edition of Bryennios will always remain the most interesting in many respects. It covered the ground exceedingly well, and as it is written in Greek which does not differ essentially from that of the New Testament, it is accessible to ordinary scholars. Two principal editions previous to that which is now before us, have been published in this country, that of Hitchcock and Brown, and that of Professor Schaff. The latter is, on the whole, the best book yet issued to give the reader a general view of the field, and bring before him the principal documents which constitute the environment of the Didache, and furnish the material for the solution of the problems created by it. Schaff discusses the MS., its discovery and discoverer; its general contents, theology, and ritual; the light shed by it upon the government and life of the early church; baptism; the Scripture quotations, authorship, etc., of the Didache. He gives also the text, and adds a very good commentary.

The edition before us, while not superseding such a work as Schaff’s,
carries the discussion of the treatise, in certain particulars, far beyond all former attempts, and on account of the beauty of its execution, and in particular the fac-simile reproduction of carefully taken photographs of the MS., takes its position fairly at the head of all that has yet been done for the elucidation of this earliest specimen of uninspired Christian literature.

After a careful transcription of the text, which accords line for line with the fac-simile, and to which are attached the various readings of the principal other editors, Professor Harris advances to his commentary. We shall notice only those particulars in which he adds essentially to the understanding of the Didache, premising that there are a multitude of auxiliary matters which time will forbid us to touch.

But two errors of Bryennios in the deciphering of the MS. have been discovered which are of moment. The word ἔαθησα, for which Harnack, Hilgenfeld, and Zahn at least have proposed to read ἔαθισα, is shown to be ἔαθησα, which needs no emendation or explanation. The new and strange word Χριστόπλανος is found to read Χριστοπλανής, a form not less new. After some further discussion of proposed emendations to the text, Harris says: "With slight exceptions the attempts to emend the text have not been very successful. The most difficult passages have yielded to interpretative skill, where they have failed under any other treatment, and this should assure us that any alterations in the text must not be more than moderate if they are to be in any degree acceptable."

Passing now to the relations of the Didache to the parallel documents, Harris finds twenty-seven such, adding to the list of Dr. Schaff, the Epistle of Jude, the Ascension of Isaiah, Theophilus of Antioch (a doubtful case), Dionysius of Alexandria (doubtful), the Sibyline Books and Pseudo-Phocylides, Pseudo-Athanasius, Lactantius, Dorotheus, Joannes Climacus, Severinus, and Boniface of Mainz. This is a considerable list, but its value does not lie in the number of the names added, so much as in the character of the quotations made. The whole treatment of this portion of the subject is marked by much greater fulness than anything that has yet appeared, and thus much interesting matter is brought before the reader, though often of a somewhat doubtful character. E.g., in the discussion of Barnabas, a number of new quotations are added to those cited in Schaff, but they afford in themselves no clear evidence of acquaintance with other chapters of the Didache than the first five. They are interesting, and to a certain extent confirmatory of the evidence given by Schaff's quotation from Barn. iv., but the author seems to forget here, as elsewhere, that a general similarity of phrase does not prove dependence of documents on one another in an age when a new language had been invented for the new religion, and was employed freely by all classes in the Christian community. Harris comes to the conclusion, which is now generally accepted, that the Didache is older than Barnabas. Under the Apostolical Canons, the passages are given which show the dependence of the Canons on Barnabas. The text follows, and is succeeded by that of the Apostolical Constitutions. Here it would have been better if such phenomena as the inversion of 3, 3 and 3, 4 in chap. vi. had
been noted, and the omission of ἐν ἔκκλησιᾳ in chap. xiv., and the still larger omissions in chap. xxii., xxvii., and xxviii.

In treating of Clement, II Cor., it is Professor Harris's purpose to show that "the writer...was acquainted with the whole of the teaching in a form not very different, if it differed at all, from our text." We are compelled to confess that we are not convinced by his showing. The most striking thing that he adduces is the case of the word πανθαμαρτωλός, for which, however, the Didache itself reads πανθαμάρτητος. All the other arguments brought forward seem to leave out of account the fact that the New Testament was certainly known to Ps-Clement.

A more important case is that of the Sibylline Oracles. It was at this point that Professor Harris's studies in this field began. His tract on the relation of the Didache to these books has been before the learned world now for some time, and has not convinced, among others, Dr. Funk, as Harris states. A careful examination of the passages quoted by Harris compels us to agree with Funk rather than with him. Possibly the examples lettered θ, ε, ζ, αα may contain traces of use of the Didache, but they are very doubtful. In the other cases we do not see evidence of anything more than a similar treatment of the same topics. The case ξα is a case of common quotation of the New Testament. The one indisputable connection between the two books is the common use of the term "Two Ways," which, however, is no evidence that one book is in any sense drawn from the other. The idea of the Two Ways permeates the whole period of the early church, and this is the sole fact brought out here. In the same manner, to say that the Sermon of Boniface "shews the use of the Didache from beginning to end," is in our mind to forget the existence of the New Testament.

We gladly turn from these topics, where we are constrained to think that Professor Harris's love of thoroughness and scholarly zeal have led him astray, to the consideration of points which illustrate the value of a new branch of study among Christians, that of the Jewish literature of the time of Christ, and at the same time show how this little, and to the uninformed reader, insignificant book has served as a key to unlock many mysteries, and promises to shed a flood of light on all the obscure theme of the rise of Christian forms of thought, as well as of the earliest forms of Christian service. We begin with the explanation given of the difficult passages of the Didache. The first of these is that in xvi. 5, which Professor Harris translates: "But they that endure in their faith shall be saved by the very curse." A considerable discussion follows of the Jewish thought of the "Salvation by similars," as Harris puts it, i.e., the thought that the very form of the curse should be the form of the blessing, that as the living serpent destroyed, the brazen serpent should heal, etc.,—the thought of the Recapitulation, as Irenaeus calls it. This was the thought in Paul's mind when he spoke of Christ's "being made a curse for us," and which now leads the writer of the Didache boldly to call Christ "the curse."

In these studies Professor Harris confesses his indebtedness to Dr. Taylor's Lectures on the Teaching, the serviceableness of which, by Professor Harris's
further studies, is considerably enhanced. The next passage examined is that in i. 6, which is now thought to be correctly translated: "Let thine alms sweet in thy hands," etc. The connection between labor and alms as a kind of payment for sin in the Jewish way of thinking, the identification of sweat with labor, according to the passage in Genesis, give a meaning which may be brought out by the paraphrase: Let thine alms, which thou hast gained by the sweat of thine hands, remain in those hands until thou knowest, etc. Under the same method of study the passage as to the "cosmic mystery," xi. 11, is made to give up its meaning. Cosmic mysteries are those "wrought upon the stage of this world to illustrate what was doing or to be done on a higher plane." The word ἐκπέτασις, which has caused so much perplexity to the commentators, is also resolved by this method. "The word ἐκπέτασις is in its first idea the spreading abroad of a bird's wings, then it is used of the attitude of a man in prayer with his arms outstretched, and finally of a human form stretched on a cross." And hence, it must mean in this passage "the sign of a cross spread out in heaven."

The interest of this edition culminates, in our mind, in the chapter discussing the "Hebraisms of the Teaching." It is found to be "Hebraistic from cover to cover." Its very title is Hebraistic, it is a Talmud (Teaching). The Targum on Deut. xxx. 13, gives the main idea of the whole,—the "two ways." So, much of the development of the law of love, and even the negative form of the golden rule are Hebraistic. The phrase "And of these words, this is the Teaching," i. 3, points to the fact that what precedes is Torah, and what follows, Targum. It has also "fences" to its laws, as at the beginning of chapter iii.: "My child, flee from all evil and all that is like to it." Dr. Taylor has shown that this proceeds on the Hebrew principle whereby a man was often forbidden to do certain things in themselves innocent, because they might lead to a transgression of a positive law. E.g., being forbidden by the law to eat a festival egg, the Jew was also forbidden to look at it. So also in the Talmud we find the direction: "Flee from the filthy and all that is like the filthy." This is almost the prohibition of our text. "It will be seen, in passing," says Professor Harris, "that the foregoing considerations do not lend much support to the Revised rendering 'every form of evil' in Thess. v. 22."—So again, the passage: "My child, be not a liar, for lying leads to theft," suggests the Hebrew gnosis on the ten commandments. The Jews supposed that the commandments were arranged on two tables, and faced each other so that significant relations existed between the commandments of each pair of opposites. As thus arranged, the commandment: Thou shalt not take the name, etc., stood over against the one: Thou shalt not steal. Thus by the supposed material relation between the pairs, lying would be viewed as joined by the divine mind with theft, and thus "lying leads to theft." The list of vices and wrong-doers, also, reminds one of the Jewish Vidui. We know that on the great day of Atonement the Jews were accustomed to stand and confess their sins, and that they did this in a list, formed on the scheme of the alphabet, and numbering 24 particulars. Now, this list in the
Didache numbers just 24 sins! Paul's list of sins in Rom. i. 29 also numbers 24 when ἀπόθυμον is inserted, as some MSS. direct, and πορνεία after πορνεία is omitted. Taking, now, the list of a modern Vidui, that of the Didache, and that of Paul, and putting them side by side for the purpose of comparison, striking similarities are to be noted. And when Delitzsch's renderings for many of Paul's list are compared with the Vidui, the resemblance is startling. Here, no doubt, are the traces of Paul's Hebrew education, but also of the dependence of the Didache on the forms of worship of the Jewish Church. But still further, the rules for testing the prophets are Jewish. The laws for fastings are also of Jewish origin, and even the order of the celebration of the communion follows the order of the Paschal service. The eschatology also is Judaic in manner and matter. From these facts Harris would derive the strongest argument for the integrity of the "Teaching," since it is of one origin from beginning to end. We note, in passing, that he finds the genealogy of the text of the Didache proposed by Professor Warfield in the Bibliotheca Sacra for January, 1886, to sustain further examination better than that of Harnack.

We present but one point more. We have noted that Professor Harris reckons the Epistle of Jude among the parallel documents of the Didache. There are three passages which seem to him to be quotations from the Didache. In the first, ver. 22, 23, the text of Jude must be read, as according to some MSS., καὶ οὐς μὲν ἐλέγχετε διαχρονομένους . . . . . . οὐς δὲ ἐλεήσεις. Which will correspond to the Didache as read after the model of the Apostolical Canons. οὐς μὲν ἐλέγχεις, οὐς δὲ ἐλεήσεις. If this is a quotation on Jude's part from the Didache, then the passage Jude 12 is more explicable. "These are the hidden rocks in your love-feast when they feast with you" is to be understood from 2 Peter ii. 13, "revelling in their love-feasts while they feast with you." The reason they should not do this is the prohibition in Did. xi. 9, "And no prophet that orders a table in the Spirit eats of it himself, unless he is a false prophet." That this was the prohibition in the mind of Jude, Harris thinks pretty certain from the next succeeding phrase: "Shepherds that without fear feed themselves." The context of the Didache shows that the thing to be guarded against there was just this danger, that prophets would take advantage of their office to enrich themselves. Professor Harris concludes, therefore, that the comparison of Jude and the Didache tends to "raise the date of the 'Teaching,' and even more to depress that of Jude." Or, in other words, since Jude was probably written near the close of the apostolic age, the "Teaching" must have been written considerably earlier than 100 A. D., —a possibility which Dr. Schaff was careful to state. That Jude quoted from this uninspired book need not astonish us, Professor Harris thinks, for he certainly did from the Book of Enoch, and, we might add in the same line, all the writers of the Bible got facts and forms of statement from uninspired sources.

This edition will serve to bring before American readers more clearly than has been done before, the importance which attaches to this little book, the Didache. And it will show by one more conclusive proof the truth of
Harnack's declaration that Baur's hypothesis of a controversy in the early Christian church between Jewish Christianity and Gentile Christianity is an unfounded imagination. Harnack says that much that has been called "Jewish Christianity" was merely Christianity without any qualification. We see here with new clearness how entirely true it is that Christianity is Jewish in its ideas, and even in its forms. The Didache will assist in finally destroying, root and branch, the Tübingen hypothesis.


The last ten years have witnessed a remarkable and wide-spread attention to the subject of Comparative Religion. The store-houses of ancient lore are being unlocked by the keys of comparative philology. The combinations of the safes of mythology, of history, of early science, and of religion are yielding to the thorough investigating processes of the present age. We are just beginning to know how men once thought, acted, and worshipped. We are now, for the first time, cognizant, in some degree, of our indebtedness to these pioneers, of our relation to things they held dear. Our interpretation of the present is necessarily built on that of the past, upon the foundations laid centuries ago. If we are ignorant of these bottom facts, we can never be sure of our interpretations of the present.

Our religion had its birth in the East, probably not far from Babylon, at Ur of the Chaldees. It was surrounded by worshippers. These worshippers possessed numerous objects of worship. Their objects of adoration existed alongside of the Old Testament Jehovah down to the destruction of Babylon, and a little later. But what was the character of this worship? Why did Israel so often become such a ready victim to its snares? Does it contain any likenesses to the Old Testament faith? These and many other similar questions can never be answered until we have a thorough treatment of the Babylonian religion.

In the past we have had very little information on the subject. Among the chief contributors may be mentioned Rawlinson, Tiele, Lenormant, and Hommel. Several nice points in worship have been brought out by the study of early seals. Chief among such scholars might be mentioned Dr. William Hayes Ward, and Mons. Joachim Menant. We have waited thus far in vain for a fair treatment of Babylonian religion.

The work at hand is that of a specialist. Professor Sayce's position and attainments put him in the vantage-ground for the production of a comprehensive and complete treatment of any topic in his department. But he is a specialist who attempts to be altogether too broad. No one man in our day can be an authority on Cypriote, Hittite, Babylonian-Assyrian, and Phoenician history and literature. If the attempt be made, we may anticipate superficiality and crudeness of judgment, unripe decisions, and rash statements. Many of these qualities appear in the Hibbert Lectures for last
year. Professor Sayce gives us a good plain English. His imagination is very vivid, often leading him entirely astray. His identifications we should often call questionable.

Six lectures and six appendices constitute the work before us. The first lecture is the introduction to the whole. It scans in outline the topics which will command a popular hearing, and also lays the foundation for all that follows. Beyond this first lecture, the work will be of interest to specialists only.

The first lecture emphasizes the basis upon which Professor Sayce as well as the majority of Assyrian scholars, now build up Semitic faith, civilization, and language. The Babylonian language and religion as it appeared 600 B.C., or even earlier, was not original with the Babylonians. More than 2000 B.C. the Semites superseded an earlier civilization, that of the Accadians. The first Semitic king was Sargon I., who very early established his capital at Accad, near Sippar. Soon after this a Kosseran from Elam, Hammurabi (Khammurogos according to Professor Sayce), succeeds him, with his capital at Babylon. But all this time the Babylonian religion was becoming perfected, complete. It was an emanation, an outgrowth from the religion of the Accadian primitive peoples, whose religion was originally, like that of the Siberians, Shamanistic. The state-religion found in Babylon at that time, controlled by a priesthood, was simply a compound of Semitic and Accadian religions, convictions, and ideas.

Upon this as a working hypothesis Professor Sayce proceeds. But, this hypothesis is a very questionable basis to start from. Some of the leading scholars of to-day in the department of Assyriological inquiry deny this supposed fact. And the number of such is constantly increasing. It is asserted, and with pretty secure grounds, that there never were such peoples as the Sumerian and Accadian, and that no such language as the Sumerian and Accadian exists. However, as Professor Sayce proceeds upon this hypothesis, questionable as it is, let us follow on further.

As soon as the foundation is laid, the earliest possible date is located. Upon the authority of Nabonidus, Sargon I. is set at 3750 B.C. This date is questionable for several reasons. We possess no complete and continuous list of kings of these early times, nor do we approximate one. Those who make such a claim cannot substantiate it.

If Sargon I. was 3750 B.C., the inscriptions of De Sarzec must have been the product of a still earlier age. Right here appears the reason of the assumption of such great antiquity. The action and reaction of the Semites and Accadians upon each other so as to produce the type of religion found in later Babylonia, would demand a long stretch of time. The early and peaceful incursions of the Semites from the north, introduced a foreign element into Accadian culture and religion, which readily absorbed


2 See further The Independent, Jan. 12, 1888, p. 17.
the latter and freely mingled with it. This mixture, compound, conglomerate, yields the Babylonian religion of historical times.

To the Bible student Professor Sayce comes with especial interest in the latter part of the first lecture. The main interest in the investigations is to determine as far as possible Babylonia’s influence on Israel. Many names of sites in and near Palestine are rightly traced to early names of divinities, prominent in Babylonia. Also, even the kings of Israel, Saul, David, and Solomon, are made debtors for their names to Babylonian divinities. Several pages are taken up in the discussion of these names, adducing all manner of arguments. But, the liberties taken with the text, especially in the discussion of David’s other supposed name, throw the reader out of all sympathy with the author.

In the second lecture, the author takes up Bel Merodach at the fall of Babylon, and attempts to trace him back to an original Accadian deity (pp. 106, 107). But this first attempt seems to be nothing less than a failure. In fact, the original Accadian gods are in this lecture entirely displaced by the Semitic deities, which he later attempts to derive from them.

The Gods of Babylonia is the subject of his third lecture. Here he begins at the basis or hypothesis upon which he constructs his theories. The ancient civilization of Babylonia was sui generis, unborrowed. Coexistent with this growing civilization was the development of the whole pantheon from Ea—abyss—and Dav-kina—the earth. Each city, each community had its own deity. So that the pantheon was, so to speak, local. However, there were centres of worship at this early time—Eridu in the south, and Nipua in the north.

The fourth lecture takes up and examines Tammuz, Istar, and Totemism. The identifications of Tammuz satisfy one. Much light is thrown on the references in the Bible and contemporary history by this discussion. But Istar—Old Testament Ashtoreth—is a more confused character after than before reading the discussion. As is well said, “As a goddess she masquerades in the garb of a god.” The remnants of Totemism are few. Several ideograms represent the bull god, Dapara, the antelope, the serpent, the gazelle, pig, dog, and bird.

The Sacred Books of Babylonia as seen in the magical and hymnal texts constitute the subject of the fifth lecture. The acme of the Accadian religion was the existence of innumerable spirits. Now, these magical texts,—older than the hymnal,—were the products of Shamanism, were employed in driving off these spirits. In later productions we find these magical texts inserted in their hymnal. The latter part of this lecture is little more than a repetition of statements already made on Babylonian theology.

The last lecture deals with Cosmogonies and Astro-Theology. The earth owes its existence to the abyss. The gods are derived from the watery abyss. The Babylonian, Phœnician, and Greek cosmogonies find their source in Ea of Eridu. Sabaism originated in Babylonia, and leads one back to one

* Cf. similar instances in *Hebraica*, Oct. 1887.
thousand years earlier than Sargon I., into the totemistic age. Here the zodiacal signs first find their names. In conclusion, the Babylonian religion was local in character, hybrid in origin.

Professor Sayce is at his best in the first appendix, where he reviews the whole Sumero-Accadian question, and settles down, he says,—though the reader of the preceding six lectures could scarcely discover it—to the conclusion that the Sumerian was the older, and ancient language of Southern Babylonia, and Accadian the younger, and the language of Northern Babylonia. The last four appendices are simply translations of (1) Magical Texts, (2) Hymns to the Gods, (3) Penitential Psalms, (4) Litanies to the Gods. These translations bear too many evidences of superficial work, of guesses, where the reader must take it as fact, as no mark or sign says, "doubtful."

We have before us, then, a work which is not a unit. Though in general it has one theme, its discussions are scattering. All specialists will be especially grateful for the large number of valuable foot-notes. Also the full indices at the close of the book add very materially to its value. In spite of Professor Sayce's frequent indulgence in speculation (as on pages 116, 117, 240-244, 260-262), and his questionable identifications, he has given us a mine of suggestion, such as will be heartily greeted by all students of Comparative Religions, Assyriology, and the Bible.

IRA M. PRICE.


It is difficult to say whether Professor Currier is more fortunate in his subject or Dr. Goodell in his biographer. At any rate, as a result of the combination, we have in the present volume one of the most interesting and instructive Christian biographies that has been published for a long time. Many a young man will be stimulated by its perusal to follow in the footsteps of the lamented St. Louis pastor, and many a theological student and minister will find the record of this life a most helpful guide in his pastoral plans and labor. The career of Dr. Goodell illustrates anew the importance of maintaining the small country churches. The same feeble church in Vermont that furnished the subject of this biography, also sent into the Lord's vineyard Dr. N. G. Clark, Secretary of the American Board, and Professor I. E. Dwinell, of the Pacific Theological Seminary. From the number of such instances coming to notice, the most fitting answer to the question, How shall we evangelize the cities? is, Look after the country communities, which feed the cities, and from which come the youth fitted in body and in mind to exert a dominant influence in all the great centres of our civilization.
THE PIONEER PREACHER. Incidents of Interest and Experiences in the Author's Life. By Rev. S. Bristol, San Buena Ventura, Cal. Illustrated by Isabelle Blood. Chicago and New York: Fleming H. Revell. 1887. (pp. viii. 322. 5½ x 3½.)

This is one of the most thrilling books of Memoirs which we have ever read; and illustrates anew the proverb that "truth is stranger than fiction." The author's life was most eventful; and we see, anew, how, after all, there is a providence that shapes our lives, rough-hew them as we will. Young men struggling to prepare themselves for the ministry, will find much in it to encourage them.

PSYCHOLOGY. By John Dewey, Ph. D., Assistant Professor of Philosophy in Michigan University. New York: Harper and Brothers. 1887. (pp. xii. 427. 6 x 3½.)

This is a thoroughly modern book by a thoroughly trained and able scholar. Its main characteristics are, that it abandons the traditional classification of the Scottish School, which has been the prevailing one among American psychologists heretofore, and, while not surrendering any of the established results of such forms of study, views the mind preeminently as a unit in its action. Thus, the old division of the operations of the mind into those of Intellect, Sensibility (here styled "Feeling"), and Will is retained, but great pains are taken to show how at every step the whole mind operates, the will being as necessary to the intellect as the intellect is to the will. The book is also fully abreast of the best and most recent thought in its department, and has incorporated the principal results of the studies of the physiological psychologists, for example, in a comprehensive way, without thereby sacrificing clearness of style. The style of the book, clear, simple, straightforward, precise, and compact, ought also to be mentioned among these more general characteristics of it. It will make an excellent classroom book, and forms a most agreeable contrast to some popular and much used books of recent years.

After some introductory chapters, the work begins with the discussion of Knowledge. Sensation is defined, then stimulus, and then the student is carried from the first affection of the nerve up to the brain. Yet there is still "no sensation." A sensation is psychical; it is a consciousness; it not only exists, but it exists for the self." Consciousness is thus introduced, sensation distinguished from knowledge, and the classification of sensations begun.

With the discussion of the special senses, the most novel part of the book is introduced. Such problems as the amount of physical stimulus necessary to produce any sensation, the ratio of increment required to produce a consciousness of the increment, the modifications in such a sense as touch by the difference of the locality to which the stimulus is applied, in sight by quantity and quality, are discussed, and reduced to mathematical expressions. We have examined this portion of the work with considerable minuteness, and as a result we are able to say that Dr. Dewey has embodied every one
of the more important results of Wundt's great work, Physiologische Psychologie, in a manner clear and untechnical and easily intelligible.

Among the processes of knowledge great space is given to the treatment of the subject of association. We have failed to find that valuable idea of Herbart's, that an intellectual whole consists of series of simple ideas, and that association consists in the welding of different wholes by means of the common simple elements in each.—With as-sociation is joined in the discussion dis-sociation, which is the pre-eminently active, voluntary operation of the mind.

The other topics of this part of the subject present less occasion for remark, though all original and valuable. The usual points,—Perception, Memory, Imagination, Thinking,—are developed in their order. The subject of Intuition is fresher. Every process of analysis results in a synthesis. The lower process when it has led to the higher itself receives contributions from that higher. We see the particular ever more and more in the light of the universal, and hence every concrete result is an intuition, or knowledge of an individual. There are therefore stages of such intuition,—of the World, of Self, of God,—but ultimately, intuition embraces that which is self-related. The intuition of the World gives us successively the ideas of Substance, Cause and Effect, Law, and Necessity. Over against this world we get the idea of Self by successive steps. It is first the ideal as opposed to the thing. It gives the meaning to the thing. As, now, we recognize more and more what is involved in the simplest acts of knowledge, we perceive more clearly how our own activity is that which gives them their meaning, and hence we come to see ourselves as free. But we have thus known the World because we have idealized it, and the Self because we have realized it,—both because we have viewed them in relation to another. This all involves the unity of the real and ideal, or God. The intuition of truth as the complete unity underlying all, is the intuition of God.

The sketch of the treatment of Knowledge now given brings out all the great characteristics of the book. In the Feeling, the discussion begins again with the physical element, considering Sensuous Feeling. Then follows "formal feeling," and thus the edifice is carried up till it ends in the "personal feeling." Of Conscience Dr. Dewey says: It "is not to be conceived as a special faculty of the mind. As feeling, it is the emotion of rightness and obligation, together with the consequent remorse or approbation flowing from a feeling of conformity or non-conformity to the obligation. As intellectual, it is the apprehension of the content of those feelings; the apprehension of the quality of moral acts measured by the ideal of personality."

The Will also is begun in a discussion of the sensuous side, the Sensuous Impulses. The development of volition is always through the stages of desire, choice, motive, and the realization of motive. In choice, desires do not conflict with one another, the man is himself both the battle ground, and the two contestants in one. The Will advances through Physical Control,
Prudential Control, and Moral Control. On the vexed question of the freedom of the will Dr. Dewey says: Why a man "chooses a good at all rather than a wrong finds its answer only in the will of the man himself. He will have himself good. The reason that he will is, that he will. Only the ideal of himself as good will satisfy him. If we ask why this ideal alone is satisfactory, we can get no other answer than this: he wills to be satisfied in that and in that alone. It is willed because it is satisfactory; it is satisfactory because it is willed as that the man would be. In other words, we have reached an ultimate fact in the psychological constitution of man. He has the power of determining himself."

Inadequate as this review is, we have said enough, we believe, to make it evident how fresh and valuable this new work is, and to commend it to all teachers who are in search of the best materials for the introduction of their pupils to the full current of modern psychological thought.

BOOKS RECEIVED.


THE LORD'S SUPPER historically considered. By the Rev. G. A. Jacob, D. D., formerly Head Master of Christ's Hospital, Author of "The Ecclesiastical Polity of the New Testament," etc. London: Henry Frowde. (pp. 82. 6¾ x 3½.)

A DAY IN CAPERNAUM. By Dr. Franz Delitzsch, Professor in the University of Leipzig. Translated from the Third German Edition, by Rev. George H. Schodde, Ph. D., Professor in Capital University, Columbus, O. New York: Funk & Wagnalls. 1887. (pp. v. 166. 5 x 3½.)

The Epistle to the Ephesians. With Introduction and Notes. By the Rev. H. C. G. Moule, M. A., Principal of Ridley Hall, and late Fellow of Trinity College, Cambridge. Edited for the Syndics of the University Press. Cambridge: At the University Press. 1886. (pp. 175. 5½ x 3¾.)

The Book of Revelation: an Exposition based on the Principles of Professor Stuart's Commentary, and designed to familiarize those Principles to the Minds of Non-professional Readers. By Israel P. Warren, D. D., Funk & Wagnalls. 1886. (pp. 300. 5¼ x 3¾.) $1.00.


The Two Books of Nature and Revelation collated. By George D. Armstrong, D. D., Pastor of the First Presbyterian Church, of Norfolk, Va., and formally Professor of Chemistry and Geology in Washington and Lee University, Lexington, Va. Funk & Wagnalls. 1886. (pp. vi. 213. 6 x 3¾.) $1.00.


[We have received from Mr. E. H. House a letter stating that the article entitled "Japanese Treaty-Revision," by Professor James King Newton, which appeared in the Bibliotheca Sacra for January, 1887, was indebted largely for its facts, and even for its phraseology, to a paper contributed by Mr. House to the Atlantic Monthly for May, 1881, while containing no acknowledgment of that fact by Professor Newton.

We find that comparison of the articles justifies the complaint of Mr. House, and that the matter to the extent of several pages is substantially identical in both.

We beg leave to assure Mr. House of our sincere regret for the injury he has suffered. We have been as much surprised as he to learn the relation of Professor Newton's article to his. The brilliant author of the "Martyrdom of an Empire" has fairly earned all the credit which attaches to generous sympathies, patient industry in collecting facts, and eloquence in pleading the cause of a wronged people.—Editors Bibliotheca Sacra.]
SUMMER SCHOOLS, 1888.
PRELIMINARY ANNOUNCEMENTS.

I. TIME AND PLACE.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location</th>
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<tr>
<td>Newton Centre, Mass</td>
<td>May 2-12</td>
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<tr>
<td>Philadelphia (Protestant Episcopal Divinity School)</td>
<td>June 15-July 3</td>
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<tr>
<td>Chicago (Evanson)</td>
<td>August 16-September 5</td>
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Remark 1. There will be held two schools at Chautauqua, N. Y., the first July 5, July 25; the second, July 26-Aug. 15.

Remark 2. Each School will continue this summer three full weeks; this makes it possible to avoid overlapping; it also enables men who so desire to attend two or even more schools. Several have already indicated their purpose to attend five of the six schools.

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- S. Burnham, D. D., Hamilton, N. Y.
- Geo. S. Burroughs, Ph. D., Amherst, Mass.
- James A. Craig, Ph. D., Cincinnati, O.
- C. E. Chandall, M. A., New Haven, Ct. (Va.
- Wm. R. Harper, Ph. D., New Haven, Conn.
- Hermann V. Hilferdt, Ph. D., Phila., Pa.
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Remark 2. Professor Harper appreciates, very keenly, the difficulty and the delicacy of the service which he has consented to perform in the discussion. He ventures, however, to express the hope that, in stating "views" against which there is naturally so strong and bitter a feeling, he may have no reason to feel that, under all the circumstances, he is doing anything to which even those would object who with himself see the possibly dangerous consequences of the general maintenance of such views.

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THE

BIBLIOTHECA SACRA.

ARTICLE I.

THE CALL OF THE PRISON TO MINISTERS.

BY THE REV. WILLIAM J. BATT, MORAL INSTRUCTOR IN THE MASSACHUSETTS REFORMATORY AT CONCORD.

The general opinion among pastors has probably been that the acceptance of a chaplaincy in a penal institution is not a forward step in a ministerial career. There are few paths out of the pastorate that a minister can follow to-day without some loss of caste among his associates. A chaplaincy in the army or the navy of the United States, or even a prison chaplaincy, probably is not one of the few. A pastor may accept a college presidency, or even a first-class professorship, or possibly even in some instances an editorial chair, and be cheered on his way with very hearty and even admiring congratulations. But the church pastor who becomes a prison chaplain is often considered to have taken a step backward. Although his friends may speak very kindly to him about the change he has made, and even fortify their praises with generalizations, pious or profound, there is, nevertheless, a lack of fire in the phrases which often change speedily into the style of a condolence such as smoothes the path of decline.

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The purpose of this article is not to lessen any man's estimate of the privilege or the honor of a pastor's position. Let us yield everything that can be asked upon that point. Let it be admitted that no life on earth is more sweet, more dignified, more full of splendid compensations, more consonant with the true health of the body, the mind, and the soul, than that of the pastor. Nevertheless we cannot all of us have an unqualified liberty of choice in this matter. Not every man, not every minister, not every good and successful minister, can have for his field of labor even an approximation to the ideal parish and the ideal church. The Lord of the vineyard has a great variety of places to be filled. Although the prison chaplaincy in the estimation of a man of good taste and well-balanced judgment and correct ambition may be less desirable than some other work, it may yet be very much underestimated by the world and by the ministry. It is undoubtedly true that few men ever taste the vital, ever-new joys of a pastor's life, and then go into a different work however exalted in the opinion of the world, without oftentimes looking back with longing to the occupations of the days gone by, and without many hopes, cherished even beyond reason, cherished in the secret places of the heart long after they have ceased to be openly mentioned, that some time the exile will return. Still there is no service under the Master's call but somewhere conceals, even though it be under an external appearance most unpromising, a charm peculiar to itself, a charm too wonderful for an angel to tell.

The rewards of the Lord's work among prisoners are underestimated. Why should they not be? Why should we expect that religious work in penal institutions would be rightly regarded, when so little has been said to call attention to the claims of the prisoner class upon the endeavors of Christian people? There are in Massachusetts, for instance, at the present time, probably fifty thousand persons who have been under arrest within a year for some offence which they have committed. Associated with them is another
large army of people who are sure to suffer with the offender. They are the dependent families and the immediate friends of prisoners, who in some sense of the word are arrested with the prisoner and go to prison with him. The shame and the taint of imprisonment partly fall upon them. All these are not easily estimated as to their numbers, but must be kept in view in any thorough study of the prison question.

Now how much has been said in time past to call the attention of Christian workers to this large and needy class of people? Striking and notable utterances have been made, no doubt, at times, utterances that ought to have had more effect upon those that heard them. But as regards systematic effort to impress the duty and the privilege of Christian care for these people, efforts to arouse men not only to the performance of their duty but to hope and joy and enthusiasm in the work, far too little has been said or done.

In our theological seminaries, for instance, many of the young men have their thoughts occupied with the prospects of a busy life in our prosperous churches here at home. Others of them have the trials and the rewards of a home missionary life held up before them. Others are being stimulated to offer themselves for the sacrifices of a mission in heathen and far-off lands. But how often has the fact been presented before the students in our seminaries that a large and increasing class of their fellow-men are lifting up their hands in the prison and asking for the gospel, and that the man of Macedonia to-day is standing inside the prison walls? Some of our seminaries have sent promising young men abroad to study correlated problems under peculiar advantages, and have perhaps made some special lectures on such subjects a part of their provision for their students. Perhaps some have done even more. But still we may ask with regret, How often have good men pressed it home upon these undergraduates, that if they were faithful enough in their seminary preparation they might hope to fit themselves for usefulness in our jails and reformatorys? Seminary students take very sweet counsel together in their
meetings, or in their rooms, or as they walk by the way together, concerning the time when they shall lift up their voice for Christ in India or Japan, or concerning the experiences they will share when they shall have been settled in thriving parishes. But who ever heard of seminary students holding special meetings to compare views of the measures they would use, and the peculiar and high joys they would find, when they should really get at their work in the prison or the penitentiary?

And yet what authority has any man to say that Christ does not give to the disciple who ministers to him in the prison as generous a reward as to those who do his will in other ways? There is a romance in going to foreign lands, there is an enchantment which distance lends to the view. But Christ in a far-off country and Christ in prison here are the same Saviour, and his smile and his welcome are the same, and he knows how to make his reward abundant everywhere. Certainly, then, enthusiasm in his service is as reasonable and as becoming in ministering to those in prison as in carrying the message to his poor, his ignorant, or his helpless ones anywhere else.

This evil of a too slight appreciation of the privilege as well as the duty of this work which has been perpetuated thus far is liable to perpetuate itself still further. For while it is hardly to be expected that theological students and young ministers will easily disregard the judgment of honored and older men as to what work is more promising or less, it is also true that the charm, unknown before, of almost any department of Christian work, is rarely discovered and brought out until that work is entered by young men. The new era of foreign missions, as far as our country is concerned, commenced with the consecration of young men to that work. The dignity, the sublimity of home missionary work in our new states and territories, was first illustrated by Iowa bands, and Kansas bands, and other workers before them, full of young blood and of all the enthusiasm of young life.
But in these days the prison chaplain is not commonly a young man. The prison surgeon is sometimes young, but the chaplain is generally older, and the office he holds is not his first love. Experience is often argued to be indispensable to such prison service, but why is it so any more than the enthusiasm of early consecration to the work? If the chaplain had to contend with the indifference or the opposition of an unsympathetic and unspiritual administration, this plea might be more weighty. But that necessity ought not to exist, nor will it in the prison of the future. Some prisons are already so administered (there may be many such) that an inexperienced but discreet minister would be fully as safe there from serious mistakes as in the average parish. Nevertheless the freshness of youth is rarely found in a prison pulpit.

Many years ago a chaplain was wanted for a vacancy in the navy. It was said that there were a thousand applications, new or on file, for that one place. If it were said also that among the whole thousand there were but few young ministers of the highest standing and of really bright promise, in any leading denomination, what reader would be very much surprised? The man who was appointed to the place desired it for the necessities of his health, although he did excellent service for many years. But disappointed men, or men who seek now first of all to live, or to have their reproach taken away, are not the men to reflect the honor and true dignity of any work whatsoever. When our theological students, instead of thinking of a chaplaincy as a last refuge in case they should find themselves broken down or stranded, or as a benevolent provision of a kind providence in behalf of needy ministers, shall begin to explore this field as they would any accredited spiritual placer; when they shall begin to count up its great privileges; when they shall really invite Christ to walk along the echoing corridors and through the wards of the prison with them,—the prison parish will be better appreciated than now. Then seminary students will begin to look forward to prison work as a reward of
preparation worthy of Christ to give, and of men of large
talent to receive.

If it has thus far escaped the notice of bright young men,
it will not do so much longer, that a new and wide interest
has been awakened in the broad science of penology.
Prisons and prisoners, prison discipline, and the true aim of
a prison, might already be described as a subject that is
"in the air." The Elmira application of the Crofton system,
and improvement upon it, has challenged thought very widely.
Massachusetts has at once sent out her discoverers to see
what can be learned in the interest of her prisoners. So
has Ohio; other states are doing the same. The demand
has already been made, and is now well under consideration,
that the United States shall build a prison, and care for her
prisoners in her own institution, instead of boarding them in
local prisons as now. When this demand is met, and a
model reformatory is to be put before all the states by the Na-
tion, an additional impulse is almost certain to be given to
public discussion of the whole problem of the prisoner class.

Prison experts are already a well-organized profession.
They hold their conventions and congresses on a large scale.
In many of the states there are isolated organizations of the
philanthropic and Christian sentiment on this theme. But
there is also, wider than these, the national meeting of
the Conference of Charities and Corrections annually.
There is also the American Prison Association, which holds
a congress every year. There is also a large association of
chaplains organized by themselves. There is also an inter-
national congress, whose last meeting, held in Rome, was
attended by representative American delegates. The Amer-
ican citizen who has illustrated very happily indeed how a
president may retire to private life with a dignity worthy
of the august position he has occupied, Ex-President
Hayes, is the president of the American Prison Association,
evidently without fear of the one term, or the two terms
principle. The discussions of these bodies are carefully
published and widely circulated, and already form an ex-
tensive and valuable literature on this topic. And all this is one of the signs of the near twentieth century. The noblest young men have joined reforms no more sacred than this, in periods when they were weaker, and have never regretted it.

Some persons find it quite hard to reckon the advantages of prison work fairly, because their minds are unduly occupied with certain of its difficulties. For instance, prison life is unnatural and must be. We were not intended by the Creator to live in prisons. Prison populations are usually all men or all women. We were made to live where the sexes mingle, and where men, women, and children meet one another. In prison, families are separated. It was intended that families should come together to the house of God. All such peculiarities of prison life are not according to the great original scheme, and they tend, as do some other things, to load the chaplain’s work with unnatural conditions. But outside of the prison, town life, city life, or village life even, is not wholly fashioned according to the plan shown us in the Mount. How many caste customs, how many artificial conditions, there are everywhere, that hinder a pastor’s best work! He must not expect anywhere to escape them all.

But notwithstanding everything adverse that can be said, the prison pastor does have some advantages peculiar to his place and work. For instance: in a well-conducted prison, the audience are in a mood to hear the gospel. Not every audience will listen to real preaching as prisoners will. In point of intelligence they will compare with outside congregations much more favorably than is often supposed. And they are not surfeited with prosperity, nor with sympathy. They are heart-hungry. Some of their circumstances are peculiarly favorable to the preacher. They went to bed at a reasonable hour on Saturday evening. They have had good plain food this Sunday morning. The Sunday newspaper has not preoccupied their minds. The pew question, they have forgotten all about. There is no foolish
aristocracy, either of dress or of sittings, among them. There are no tardy worshippers. The room may be supposed to be well filled. The service may be called compulsory, but as a fact few of the men leave their rooms for this service against their will, or would prefer to remain locked up rather than come to church. Indeed, it may well be doubted whether, from the preacher's point of view, the compulsory feature is either needful or desirable, although it may be expedient as an administrative measure. The odium of it therefore, if there should be any, does not need to rest upon the pulpit. The preacher rises to speak. The witness of those whose observation or experience qualifies them to judge would undoubtedly be, that they have not generally found audiences elsewhere more glad to hear the gospel.

Of course all this is said on the supposition that the prison preacher declares the gospel, as being himself a sinner saved by grace divine. Prisoners need not be told from the pulpit, nor do they like to be, that they are convicts. They have been sufficiently assured of that by the court. Nor have they much patience with patronizing discourse of any kind. They know, and often feel deeply and with utter humiliation of spirit, that they are sinners. But although the world may regard them as sinners above all others, they are not sure that the All-seeing One so regards them. Indeed, they do not suppose themselves arrested because they have broken God's law; but because they have broken man's law. It seems to them that many break God's law, not only with entire immunity from arrest, but often without loss of respectability even in church society, provided they know how to do it without breaking human law. Man's law seems righteous enough to them as far as it goes, but clumsy; often putting the less sinner in a cell and leaving the greater unharmed. A sorrowful man in prison for drunkenness thought bitterly of his little girl a dozen years old. Death had taken all the rest. She alone was left him. He was now sober. His mind was as clear as it ever was.
Perhaps he was not especially bright, but he was of the honest sort, even if a little dull and slow. And he was sensitive enough to feel it very keenly when he thought himself wronged. And at last, under a bitter sense of injury, he ventured to stop the chaplain in the yard one afternoon, and having spoken of his daughter, added with much contrition and humility, as if the trouble might be after all with his halting faculties, that he could not see how it was right for the State to sell men, for money, the power to set traps everywhere for poor men "the likes of him," and then, when he fell into one of these traps, "to shove him into prison for it."

But while the prisoners may not always believe themselves to be altogether and utterly different from other men, they are not behind other men in being ready to admit themselves such as the gospel comes to save. And any man who feels it to be a real privilege to preach the gospel, and who is called of God to do so, surely ought to be a happy man when the Sabbath morning finds him in a prison pulpit.

In pastoral work, too, a chaplain has some peculiar advantages. He has as many parishioners, it is safe to say, as most other pastors, who really want to see him, not upon any frivolous errand, but upon some errand that is sacred to them. It ought to be easy for most chaplains to see their parishioners. There are many hours of the day when prisoners are quite sure to be at home. And when they are at home they are generally very willing to talk. It may be the chaplain sees them in his own room, or in some other used for the purpose. But a very easy way in many prisons is to go, as he ought to be free to do, to the room door. Conversation there in a natural tone is only intelligible to themselves and is reasonably private. The pastor can make the call as brief or as long as he chooses. And no time is lost in going to the next house. The amount of profitable pastoral work which a chaplain can do in a prison is literally without limit.

Many church pastors have some anxiety about keeping
their congregation together; and not infrequently they feel compelled to enter upon some lines of effort for this end which involve important sacrifices. The prison pastor, however, escapes all such evils and temptations.

Some of our readers, it may be, have often wished they could work among the Roman Catholic population. I do not refer now to such as may cherish a propagandist spirit, but to those—and I am sure there are such—who have been specially drawn to the Catholic people, just as perhaps some Catholic workers have cherished a feeling of special affection for Protestants, and wanted to communicate to them some good thing. There are persons who have for some reason felt so drawn towards the Catholic people that, without any sectarian or bigoted feeling moving them in this matter, they would almost be willing to become Catholics for better reaching the hearts of Catholics.

Any one who has this desire may find one of the best opportunities to gratify it in our prisons. A large part of those held as prisoners are nominally Catholics. The proportion sometimes ranges between one-half and two-thirds. And while a chaplain might fare hard, and he would deserve to do so, who took advantage of his office to win any of these wards of the State away from their chosen church connection, the wise chaplain will find this class of men entirely open, as a rule, to receive any Christian kindness he may bestow. The Catholics take far better care, in some respects, of the children of their church than other Christians do. But the greater prominence which their priests give to the church and the priesthood enables a chaplain who is thinking less of the church, and almost altogether of the individual soul, to do a great many helpful things which the prisoner appreciates highly, without coming into any rivalry with the prisoner's chosen and preferred pastor.

A very great privilege of a chaplain's position is the naturalness and the intimacy of the intercourse which it favors with Christians of every name. Denominational organization undoubtedly has many great advantages, and probably
the clergy of most sects greatly enjoy their special associations together. But, nevertheless, is it owing to the limitations of our humanity that each denomination lives to such an extent within itself. But when one becomes a chaplain, he has not only an excuse, but a cause, for a more promiscuous acquaintance than he had before, with Christians in different communions. Barriers between different parts of the Lord’s great household, which, perhaps, he had always wished might be pierced here and there with commodious gateways, so far as he is concerned, in some places are almost thrown down. He need not leave his own denomination. It is to be hoped that former ties will always remain as dear as before. But he at once finds himself in new relations to the great Christian hosts of other names. New realms of Christian experience are opened to him, and new wealth of Christian feeling is brought near to him. The whole effect upon him might naturally be expected to be broadening and liberalizing, like that of travel in foreign lands, or like a transfer from one’s present field into new and distant regions of Christian activity.

Peculiar facilities for interpreting the Scripture are, in these days, considered worthy of purchase even at a dear price. But probably not a few parts of the Scripture yield a meaning to a man familiar with the prison which they yield to no one else so freely. A great deal in both Testaments has to do with the prison. Our Lord was taken from prison, and his humiliation consisted in part in his being under arrest in circumstances quite destitute of any respectability in human eyes. One must be in prison to know how the song of Paul and Silas sounded in such a place. As for the story of Joseph, one may study it everywhere else, in history, in art, in tableaux and panoramas; but he will never know it until he has lived in a prison. The way character sometimes stands out in a prison is marvellous. The man who is only technically guilty, or unjustly sentenced, of sterling character, of noble mien, of incorruptible integrity, of heroic mould,—how surely such a man comes to the front in a prison popu-
lation! How he looms up in his superiority, and commands respect! Many an officer, even, may have no such position as he! And where it is said that Joseph found favor in the sight of the keeper of the prison, how peculiarly graphic is this touch of the description to one who knows a prison! How vividly he reads between the lines a score of liberties substantially implied by these few words! In a flash they annihilate thirty-six hundred years. One smiles as he reaches out his hand while he reads, so to speak, to shake hands with Joseph as he first availed himself of his growing privileges. Far be it from us to depreciate Oriental travel, but a man might live a long time under the pyramids and not see that in the story of Joseph which is revealed even to a prison chaplain here at home.

It would be impossible to make here any complete catalogue of the advantages of a chaplain’s position, provided he be possessed of judgment to appreciate them, and the ability to magnify his office. What has already been said, however, surely constitutes no mean array of attractions to any earnest young minister who will look at them. And yet we must stop to add at least one more, namely, the peculiar privilege of helping a fellow-man at the moment when he is crushed, and perhaps of saving him when he is at the door of despair. Probably one must know this privilege by using it, in order to know it at all. But there was a somewhat conspicuous illustration of it in a large American city within a few years. A man always reputed wealthy, and moving in the very highest social walks of the metropolis, was suddenly exposed in a grievous wrong. The whole city was shocked; we might rather say, the whole region. This wrong was a state-prison offence of many years. Very tender and sacred associations—associations public and private, domestic and churchly—dignified the life of this man, and combined to heighten the dramatic effect of his downfall. One of the notable circumstances of his trial was the presence of his pastor in the court-room. This pastor, a man of national reputation, had loved this parishioner and his family very
devotedly; at least so the report was. A minister can easily see how, notwithstanding his own unutterable sorrow, it may have been one of the great privileges of this pastor's entire life to stand by that fallen friend in this hour of agony.

But so far as human distress is concerned, these are just the circumstances in which a prison chaplain is constantly meeting his new parishioners. Not all prisoners are truly penitent or worthy when they bid good-bye to the world; but not a few are, and even if their history lack the striking features and the peculiarly touching sorrow of the instance just referred to, yet the heart is the same, and human nature is the same, in all conditions of life. Hence a chaplain in a large prison is all the time seeing great sorrow which has a noble side to it. Perhaps the prisoner is strongly supported from without. A family perhaps combine to send "papa" a letter every day, one taking one day, another, another. And these letters are full of the details of home life. Another worthy prisoner perhaps is supplied every week in the year with the choicest fruit or flowers the markets afford. And whatever it be, into this circle of sympathy, it is the chaplain's privilege to enter. Or if, as it may be, the poor prisoner is alone in the world, then the prison officers have the privilege of being all to him. The ordinary pastor is not necessarily a stranger to such experiences, but few can know the joy of them as a prison chaplain does.

It is not to be expected that a difficult and somewhat unpopular work can be commended to seminary students and young ministers without encountering serious objections. A minister lately remarked, "I should not like to be a chaplain, I should feel all the time as if I were a hired man." Doubtless there is somewhat less of personal liberty in prison work than in a parish. A pastor comes and goes, absents himself for days together, attends conventions here and there, and makes engagements far in advance, more or less subject to funeral duties and similar demands it is true, but otherwise with scarcely any consultation with others whose authority is recognized. He could hardly do so if he were
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a chaplain. One eminent chaplain of a state-prison has never once been away from the prison for what would be called a vacation, and rarely has been away for twenty-four consecutive hours. But he has his reward; and the man who is not willing to bear some loss for the sake of doing prisoners good is not worthy of the privilege.

But is this limitation to be wholly charged against the prison work? May it not be that pastors sometimes use more liberty in this matter than they ought? Is it right for a man who has covenanted to be the pastor of a parish, and who is in part rewarded therefor by a salary laboriously collected, to use any considerable portion of his time in outside business or in seeking his own pleasure? Can a pastor be very luxurious in this respect without losing the regard of thoughtful people? The objection is that the objector does not wish to feel like a hired man. But is not every pastor a hired man?

Every minister, however, ought to know that the man who is truly called to religious and spiritual work in any congregation, prison or other, has a commission so high that it cannot be dominated by any other. And this commission absolutely requires for him all needful confidence and liberty and privilege. To interfere with these in any way as regards the chaplain would be to threaten or abolish the office itself. Let a chaplain keep in mind that his aim is not place, or a dignity, or deference, or precedence, or any such thing, but to help prisoners as best he can as a pastor, and he is reasonably certain either to enjoy all proper liberty himself, or else to hasten the time when all chaplains will have whatever was withheld from him. A good man who is providentially allowed to suffer hindrance or calamity always gains for others, or for himself subsequently, enough to compensate richly for all that he has endured.

Another objection sometimes urged is that a chaplain's duties are merely formal, that his work is a make-believe, that his position is a kind of a sinecure, and that he has very little genuine work to do. This objection is wholly a mis-
conception. Any man who will call at any well-conducted state-prison may find abundant evidence that the chaplain there is one of the hard-worked men in the place. In a dreadful prison rebellion in 1882, the chaplain was the man who alone commanded the unlimited confidence and affection of all the prisoners, and whose word they would undoubtedly have obeyed gladly and immediately had he been allowed to compose the trouble. The religious officer in another similar institution, for instance, should be ready to superintend a large organization for Bible study on Sunday morning at 9.30; conduct a public preaching service for a congregation of eight hundred men, besides a small miscellaneous congregation, at 10.30; attend and bear some responsibility for a large non-religious meeting at 2.45 P. M., although he does not make the address there; and visit and take part in two large popular, social, and devotional meetings of over three hundred prisoners, continuing over two hours in the evening. On Tuesday and Thursday evenings, between six and seven o'clock, the hour before the schools, he conducts a service less studied than a preaching service, but more elaborate than college prayers—voluntary but largely attended. Wednesdays and Saturdays there are social prayer-meetings. Friday evenings there is a Prison Bible-class-Teachers' meeting; and during the week there are a half-dozen literary meetings of prisoners that kindly look for frequent visits, suggestions, and cheer from various officers, including the chaplain. Beside this, every week a large amount of pastoral work is to be done promptly, or else it drags until it is overtaken; and no small amount of correspondence and general labor is to be carried on with ex-prisoners, and with friends, and organizations here and there, who are taking hold of prison work. In still other prisons more may be attempted, but certainly any man who is trying to do even this amount of work is in no danger of being regarded as a supernumerary by well-informed persons, or despised as a man who has slipped into a soft place. Probably all pastors have times when they especially feel their insufficiency for their work.
But probably pastors are rarely more completely prostrated with this feeling than the chaplain sometimes is, as he looks upon a prison congregation.

Another objection with some is the danger of being hindered by the judgments of unsympathetic men in official station. The argument is this. Here is a congregation of prisoners. Over them are, we will say, fifty officers. These officers, some of them, may be profane men. Perhaps only a few of them are church men. They have no such regard for preaching that they would ever hear much of it if they were left to their own choice. If they were free in a city, every Sunday in the year they might be found in a variety of places of secular diversion or occupation, but rarely in any church. Yet they are the officers who are put in absolute control of a congregation that would be difficult to reach at best! How can a preacher expect to do anything with his audience against the coldness, and the heartless criticisms, and perhaps in secret the contemptuous sneers, of such men in positions of power? What could any pastor do anywhere if the deacons and leading men were careless of all preaching and secretly hostile to real pastoral work? We state the objection strongly in order to do it justice. And we reply, that, wherever our poor prisoners, in addition to all their other calamities, are consigned to the care of such men, there is an added motive, with a good man, to go to them and expose such godless treatment of them, and lift up the standard, and trust the Lord to sustain him. But a second answer is, that, whatever may have been the case in some prisons formerly, the day is close at hand when such officers will not be allowed in any respectable prison to hinder religious work. The standard for police service in the prison cannot be raised in a moment. But it is already evident, that, because a man abounds in physical courage, and could break all a prisoner's ribs quickly, it does not follow that he would make a good prison officer. In the prison of the future, profanity, coarseness, and scornfulness of moral
measures or of spiritual work and workers, will not be tolerated in any officer.

We are not skilful in answering objections, but we will refer to one more. It is that a chaplain is, of necessity, out of that atmosphere of sympathy and of spiritual tenderness in which much of a pastor's best work must be done. However true this may have been sometimes, it will not be true of the prison of the future. Any one may be convinced of this, I think, by visiting the best prisons to-day. In the Massachusetts Reformatory, for instance, services of revival tenderness might be reasonably expected at any time. A large meeting, often of great power, is conducted by the prisoners themselves on Sunday evenings. At the signal the doors are unlocked, and more than two hundred men come forth as freely as from their own homes, and go, each in his own way, to the large lecture-room where the meeting is held. This meeting is quite long. The singing is excellent. There is first a praise service of half an hour. A prisoner with the spirit and power of a lay preacher speaks twenty or twenty-five minutes, and conducts the entire meeting from the beginning. Prayers and testimonies follow. The superintendent comes in a few minutes and speaks briefly at the close. There is sometimes an after-meeting. There are signs of the Holy Spirit's presence. Men rise for prayers. Men appear to begin a new way of living, and they hold out. At an after-meeting I have repeatedly seen perhaps twenty prisoners on their knees praying unitedly for some special object, as for the wife of one of their number reported to be fatally sick. The communion has been observed in the prison impressively. Baptism has also been administered.

The less general meetings are often peculiarly tender. Last evening was the prayer-meeting which is only open to elected members, to the church, so to speak. It was conducted by an officer. This was a very rare thing, but it had been specially desired that this beloved officer would come
in and conduct it at this time. The Scripture read was the eighth chapter of Proverbs. The hymns beginning, "Come, sing the gospel's joyful sound," and "Ho! my comrades, see the signal," from Moody and Sankey, were then sung. Prayer was offered by a prisoner. He prayed that we might see the many things for which we should be thankful, and that we might go on with rejoicing hearts, being unwilling to live without doing good, and constantly entering into light. He prayed that God would sanctify our acquaintance to each one; also very tenderly for the officer who presided, and for his family, and then for all our families; and then finally that we might reap the good things along our path and go through our imprisonment and our life not sorrowful, but rejoicing all the way. Then we sang two verses of the hymn beginning, "Take the name of Jesus with you." A young man of eighteen, of unusual brightness and talent and of good education, next arose, and showed by his words how earnestly he felt that no other reform but the Christian reform would meet his need. A married man of twenty-five spoke of the wet and cloudy days we had had, and the bad news he had received from home, and how dreary his room had been after the bolt was drawn on him, until he read several chapters of the New Testament, when light broke in. He was followed by an old man (for a prisoner), a man of fifty, of small education, but the president of the prayer-meeting organization. The spirit of the Master is certainly in him, and all respect him. He is the opposite of voluble, but he said he had been greatly oppressed by the severe sickness in his home for two weeks past. Nevertheless, it did his soul good to meet with us. He knew it took "lots" to get our hearts right, and God does all things well. The next speaker, President of the Young Men's Christian Association, took up this thought of getting our hearts right, and referred to the translation of the Bible lesson for the coming Sunday (Ex. xvi.), into prison language, which would put "kicked" for murmured. When men "kick" against God's way, the wrong is in their own hearts. It
was in the case of the Israelites as it was here in prison, the "kickers" are very often the ones who have the most done for them. No man can make his life right until his heart is right. The leader then prayed that we might all have our hearts right. Afterwards a young man of twenty-two, who had a very fiery temper and was once almost at the door of the third grade, told of his "change" at this point. The next brother was a man of forty-three, very diffident, and he was hardly heard. The next was a married man, twenty-five that day, who had been having a "blue" time. He was expecting to be taken to court for trial on another charge soon, and wanted us to pray for him. The first and last verses of "Come thou Fount of every blessing" were sung. The next speaker was a man of twenty-six. Something had just been said about a mother's love, but he said he did not know that was, for he had lived an orphan. He wanted us to pray for him. One verse of "Yield not to temptation" was sung. A young man convicted of a very dreadful deed, but a good man, briefly told us what a good time he had had, and a happy week. A brother of twenty-two was glad to say he was trusting, and finding it easy to do right. Next a Swede, an interesting man, testified that there was more pleasure in one of our meetings than in all the theatres and concerts he ever went to. He that believeth hath—not, shall have a thousand years hence, but now and here. His own heart told him that every word of the Scripture was true. Then, "I heard the voice of Jesus say" was sung. A man of forty-nine, with a family, who had held lucrative trusts, but had been almost ruined by liquor, and who was soon to go out, spoke very fluently and beautifully of the preciousness of the love of Christ both in life and death, and of Christ's power and wish to forgive now. "I hear Thy welcome voice" was started. It was pitched too low, and we sang only one verse. The leader, who had formerly been an officer on shipboard, here told a story of the sea illustrating the value of vital religion. Three verses of "What a friend we have in Jesus" were sung. Another
prisoner here prayed for those who had spoken of their troubles; for the superintendent and for all our loved ones at home. The Vice-President of the Young Men's Christian Association spoke. A simple-hearted boy of nineteen told of his life built on the solid Rock, after which we sang "My hope is built on nothing else."

The meeting closed in three-quarters of an hour, being shorter than usual for special reasons. In all the prayers it is fair to say the chaplain was remembered. Prayer is also constant in these meetings for the administration, and for our brothers who have gone out and are battling with the world again, often against odds. The meeting was closed, as these meetings invariably close, by our standing in a circle around the room, all joining hands, when a brief prayer is offered and the verse "Blessed be the tie" is sung, after which, with a shake, all hands are unclasped.

This meeting was not at all better than the average. There was not time for all to speak or lead in prayer. But any one can see that where such meetings are constantly held, appreciated to the full by the administration, and respected by the officers, and honored by all the prisoners, a chaplain does not need to feel that he is living in a spiritually frigid zone.

Recently six prisoners sat down at my table. We had been busy all the beautiful afternoon in a practical way about the house and garden. All together, the table was quite full. How many a jocund word and merry laugh seasoned our hearty meal! It was growing dusk when we finished, and rather than light a lamp we repeated familiar Scripture verses around the table. After a song we knelt, and one of the prisoners led in a tender, intercessory prayer. Then we began singing again, which we continued for a long time. We sang from memory entirely, and a grand singing time it was. We had not sung all the hymns that were called for, when we concluded to go to the parlor and with the piano try a few secular songs, but there we soon came back to Moody and Sankey. But the longest summer evening will
have an end, and too soon the clock reminded us that as we had about a mile to walk, we must start on our return. We reached the prison gate just before it was locked for the night. On a former occasion a smaller charge of mine found the gate locked, and, rather than call down the officer, with some skill and mirth climbed back toward the guard-room through a window, while I waited without long enough to hear the guard-room officer formally announce "all right," and then returned home. It may be inferred that this company were Protestant prisoners. The reason was that that afternoon was a special season with the Catholics, five priests being busy hearing confessions, and it seemed discourteous to invite any of their men away. The next company that went out with me restored the balance, however, and we too had a cordial and pleasant visit.

This is told to illustrate the sympathy and family feeling that is possible in a cold and gloomy prison. But now some one says, "Your prison must be peculiar; you are an exception." I can hardly expect my testimony to weigh with expert prison wardens, but I believe the same principles which the superintendant applies in the Massachusetts Reformatory, if applied with equal skill, would produce similar results anywhere on earth. Who were these six prisoners at the table? One stood close upon five feet eleven inches, and fearless. One was in prison convicted of a crime not to be mentioned here; another was in prison for assault with a deadly weapon. The others were there for common prison crimes. The man convicted of the nameless crime, it may safely be said, was not guilty. But I believe, I can not doubt, that had the Lord been on earth as of old, and passing by heard our voices through the open windows, he would gladly have come in and sat with those men.

In this paper we have been appealing to theological students and young ministers to consider what they might do for prisons as chaplains. But we need not limit our appeal. They will be more likely to work as chaplains than in any other way, but they are not shut up to that way. As
society advances, men will more and more pursue professional study for other than limited professional ends. Already hundreds of young men are studying law, not for the purpose of opening law-offices, but for the value of such studies to merchants and manufacturers and business men, or in politics, or in diplomacy, or for other purposes. So men by and by will find that, for many other ends than regular pulpit work, a training in the highest studies is very valuable, and especially trained skill in the applications of motives. The idea that any determined man who can knock a rough down quickly, will do for a prison-keeper is effete. The prison-keeper of the future is to be a man of natural aptitude, and trained skill, and enthusiastic faith in the use of moral and spiritual motives. Strange and even absurd as the idea may now seem to some, the time is coming when ministers may be called to be prison-keepers, when the State will lay hands on some Dr. Wayland or Dr. Hopkins, perhaps in a Park-street pulpit, or wherever they find him, and say, "We want you to be the warden of our prison." And it may be that the United States will yet say to Dr. McCosh, or some other such man, "You have been faithful over many things, and we want you as the superintendent of our National reformatory to lay the foundation of peculiarly divine work in coming time." And the remarkable man will resign his presidency of a great university—to go up higher.
ARTICLE II.
A SHORT HISTORY OF THE MISSIONARY SOCIETY AT HERMANNSBURG, NORTH GERMANY.

WRITTEN FOR THE BIBLIOTHECA SACRA BY PASTOR G. HACCIUS, DORFMARK, NEAR HERMANNSBURG, GERMANY.

Translated by Professor Charles Harris, Ph. D., Carbondale, Illinois.

[CONCLUDED FROM PAGE 296.]

The Hermannsburg Society began a mission in Australia in 1866 at the wish of the Lutheran Church there. A station was erected on Lake Killalpeninna; but the work among that stupid people, who are given up to lust and even to cannibalism, seemed from the beginning tolerably hopeless to the missionaries, Homann and Gössling. The latter had to return to Adelaide on account of a severe sickness. One of them wrote: "Even if the Australian mission accomplishes nothing more than to hold Christian burial services for this poor people, it will have accomplished much. Our work and our joy must consist in redoubling our efforts to make the way to heaven easier for some poor dying one." After they had remained for a short time in Adelaide, in order to escape a conspiracy against their lives, Homann returned with a larger company; but after industrious and zealous labor, he was nevertheless compelled to give up the station on account of lack of water in times of great drought. And as meanwhile a division had arisen in the Lutheran Church of Australia, and the Synod of Immanuel, which was inclined towards union,¹ wished to take charge of the station, it was lost to the Hermannsburg Society. The Synod of

¹ Viz., with Reformed churches.—Eds.
Australia, which was Lutheran in sentiment, asked the government at this time for land on Finke River for the mission which they were to begin, and received a large tract there for the Hermannsburg mission. Homann and Gössling had meanwhile become pastors of Lutheran parishes. The newly sent missionaries, Schwarz and Kempe, were to take charge of the mission. On October 21, 1875, they began their journey thither under the guidance of Pastor Heidenreich, who had been made provost, and who had likewise been trained at Hermannsburg. They did not arrive at their destination until June 4, 1877, and then only with the greatest difficulty. As they would be entirely dependent upon themselves in the interior of Australia, they were obliged to take with them cattle and all that they needed. This greatly hindered their progress. But they were nevertheless rewarded for all their toils by the excellence of the place. Now they had before them the difficult task of found- ing a station in the wilderness. Up to that time no missionary undertaking had succeeded in Australia. Therefore it seemed advisable for the brethren to lay out and cultivate the station in such a way that it might have an assured future. They succeeded, and called the station Hermannsburg. It was intended to become a gathering-point for the heathen, and they did come to it gradually. However, they are unsteady, and fond of wandering, and therefore missionary work among them is difficult. In their preaching and their religious conversations the missionaries met with shocking indifference and stupidity. The Papuas are in a more degraded condition than most heathen, and are sinking still lower, because of strife and murder and fearful sexual diseases. It is therefore not strange that the missionaries have as yet baptized none of them. "Oh, how we should like to report conversions to our friends at home, as so many other missionaries do; but the Lord has not yet given us this joy," complains Missionary Schulze, who was sent out to the brethren with some colonists in 1873. But the society is right in retaining the station in spite of the lack of success
hitherto, for the work has not been entirely resuitless. The missionaries have been permitted to have many refreshing experiences in the school which they established. The children are obedient and receptive; only there is complaint about their unsteadiness. So there is hope of the conversion of the younger generation, and perhaps the hearts of many of the parents will be turned to the children.

In New Zealand the mission, which had been so successful, was almost entirely destroyed by the encroachments of the Europeans, by the insurrection of the Maoris, by the devastations of the Hauhan-Suktes, and by the wars with the English. Moreover the North-German missionary, Volkner, had been murdered by the Maoris, who then sank back into heathenism. It was, therefore, high time to begin the mission again. The Maoris were distrustful of the English missionaries, because they belonged to the race of their conquerors. German missionaries could gain entrance most easily. Pastor Heine, of New Zealand, therefore asked Harms for some of the brethren. In 1875 Dierks, Loose, and Kowert were sent there, and Gössling joined them from Australia. Heine was appointed provost of the mission, and, together with the missionaries, selected proper sites for settlements. In Rēurēu they were able to establish a station with the help of the Christian chief, Noah. It was impossible to do so in Gunake, in spite of the good prospects at first, because the government would give no land. They asked for admission courageously, but were roughly repelled by the Hauhan people under their chief and false prophet, Witi. Soon afterwards Missionary Loose died, and the brethren, Kowert and Gössling, accepted positions as pastors of German parishes. Gr. Dierks and his brother, H. Dierks, who was sent out subsequently, are alone on this field of labor, which is outwardly so beautiful, but spiritually so neglected. Their activity among the Maoris, who have decreased in number and are much injured by strong drink, has remained almost resuitless. They can rejoice only in a few children. Two youths have been baptized, and one of
them gives hope that he will in time serve his own unfortunate people as a missionary. The result of their labor till now is only that they have baptized these children, have strengthened some Christian Maoris who had remained faithful, and have preached Christ to the Maoris by word and deed; but whether to their salvation or their condemnation the future must show.

From Easter, 1866, on, students were sent out from Hermannsburg to North America, in order to help relieve the great need for preachers in the parishes there. They were accepted by the synods of Ohio and Buffalo, by the General Council, and, until the controversy about predestination, by the Synod of Missouri. When Harms declared himself against the latter, all union between it and Hermannsburg ceased.

In the years of his strength the heart of Theodore Harms was filled with all sorts of plans and thoughts, which extended to California and the Chinese laboring there, to the Moluccas, to Madagascar, and to Japan. But he could not carry out his plans, and they still remain unfulfilled. The thought of the Gallas also arose again, but this old wish of the Hermannsburg Society has never been realized. In 1869 an attempt was made by the missionary von Schlotheim, in connection with the Lutheran churches there, to begin a mission among the Mohammedan Tartars of Grusia, which ended with the expulsion of the missionaries by the Russian authorities. The attempt succeeded better in Armenia. The Nestorian Pera Johannes was led to Hermannsburg in a most wonderful way, and was there trained for a missionary. He returned to his home in Wasgrabat in 1880, and now preaches the gospel, according to the Lutheran confession to the Nestorians. His connection with the Hermannsburg Society is a loose one. Moreover he is not supported by the treasury of the society, but by collections made especially for him.

At the very time when all looked so serious and sad upon the missionary field, when the Zulu wars raged in Africa and famine in India, the Hermannsburg Missionary Society had
to pass through a crisis at home, such as no other of the German societies has had to endure. The cause of this lay in the fact that not one of the others was so much a personal affair, and therefore so involved in the struggles of its leader, as was the case with the Hermannsburg Society. It was plunged from prosperity into adversity.

After the victory over France, liberalism took the helm in Germany and became, strange to say, a leader in state absolutism. Everything should bow to the power of the state, and everything should be made subservient to the falsely understood interests of the state. The so-called Kulturkampf arose which, although it was principally directed against the Roman Catholic Church, bore heavily upon the Protestant Established Church. The first blow was the law with regard to the inspection of schools, in which the state claimed for itself alone the right of inspection. That was an encroachment upon existing church rights, and Harms, in union with many other pastors, refused to become a school inspector if he had to be commissioned by the state. The "May laws," which then followed, threatened still greater trouble. To say nothing of the details, the principle, which was manifest in these laws, made Harms and many others anxious. The state looked upon the church not as an equal, but as an inferior. Beyond doubt, the state wished to fix the boundaries between them, so that the church should have only what the state gave it or left for it. This was most clearly evident in the marriage laws; civil marriage was in the air. From 1872 on, men were busied with it and the whole marriage question. Another great danger was in the connection of the Lutheran Established Church of Hannover with the "United" government of the country. This danger was the gradual approach of union, which in spite of the good intentions of some, the ecclesiastical authorities did not oppose energetically enough. This danger was increased by the formation of a compromise party which, being devoted to the Prussian government, wrote upon its banner the admission, as guests, of members of the Reformed or United
Church to communion in the Lutheran Church. Harms opposed this decidedly. He saw in the principles, which they expressed, a departure from the doctrine of the fathers and a surrender of the Lutheran Church; for this participation in the communion meant participation in the church. He, however, wished to be true to the Lutheran Church in every particular, and intended that the missionary society should be true and remain so. In 1876 he writes:—

So far as the missionary society is concerned, our views of faith and doctrine are still the same. The Hermannsburg Society is an enemy of all union, whether it be with regard to doctrine or life, and still stands by the full confession of our Lutheran Church, from the Apostles' Creed to the Formula Concordiae . . . . In heartfelt love we extend our hand to all believing members of the United, Reformed, or Catholic churches, so far as concerns us personally, and wish to travel with them the narrow way which leads to heaven. But we cannot have church union with them either in the Christian or the heathen world.

In the face of the dangers threatened by the "United" Prussian government, Harms busied himself with the question whether the free church would not be the only salvation for the Lutheran Church. He considered that the existence of one church for the whole people was no longer possible. Thus he wrote in 1873: "I agree entirely with my departed brother, that there is no further use in thinking of the revival of the universal church, of the retention of the so-called 'church of the people,' as heretofore." And in 1875:—

Neither church nor state prospers without freedom. Both must exist side by side in the greatest freedom, and must serve one another. If the church rules the state, the latter is crippled; if the state rules the church, the latter is crippled. Church and state must be entirely independent, and separated from one another, in order to work together for each other's good and for the glory of God. Such is the case in America, and neither church nor state suffers. We too will continue to demand and pray and work that the church may become free from the state. . . . The church may never be the servant of the state nor the ruler of the state, lest both shall come to shame.

He even thought of the possibility of separation. Thus he writes in the preface of the missionary paper for 1874 that, although he and Hermannsburg had received rich blessings from the Lutheran Church of Hannover, he would nevertheless not hesitate "to leave the honorable, faithful, and
worthy Established Church of Hannover, if it ceased to be Lutheran. . . . Hermannsburg stands and falls with the church of Hannover, if it remains Lutheran. As long as the church is Lutheran, Hermannsburg will struggle, suffer, and work for it and with it, even if it can be nothing more than its little finger. If, however, the church of Hannover ceases to be Lutheran, Hermannsburg will belong to it no longer, but will remain faithful to the Lutheran Church.”

The separation of church and state was the chief question in the eyes of Theodore Harms, and his parish was already made acquainted with his views through his own verbal and written statements, and through Louis Harms’ exposition of the Revelation of St. John. The cup was already full, and the marriage question made it overflow. The sad and far-reaching decision was made. In spite of all exertions to make it optional, obligatory civil marriage was introduced on October 1, 1874. Harms did not dispute the right of the state to do so. He says: “That the authorities have the right to regard civil marriage as alone legal within their jurisdiction, is not to be doubted. That the church, however, has, no less, the full right to demand an ecclesiastical marriage of its members, is to be doubted just as little. And the church must hold as firmly to its rights, as the state to its.”

But the Established Church of Hannover did not do so. Although the old marriage ceremony of the church ritual in Calenberg and Lüneburg could exist side by side with civil marriage for years, although the Free Church was not hindered by the state from celebrating marriages in the old way, which did not in the least interfere with the rights of the state, nevertheless the church in Hannover altered the marriage ceremony of the old church ritual in the law of July 6, 1876. It was well known that this took place on the demand of the minister, because of considerations of state, and not because of church interests. And yet the law received a majority of the votes in the Synod, only on the express promise that Hermannsburg should be permitted to continue the use of the old marriage ceremony; for there was good
reason to fear a separation. The law came into operation. But the parish of Hermannsburg was not made an exception, in spite of the promises of the Consistory, and in spite of urgent petitions. The church authorities were thus compelled to demand Harms’ subjection to the law; and as he refused, he was suspended from office on January 22, 1878, and February 4 his removal followed. All attempts at mediation failed. “I cannot accept the new marriage ceremony,” he writes in 1878. “If my readers only knew what labor, what prayers, and what tears this matter has cost me, they would not accuse me of stubbornness.” All sorts of propositions were made to him, but he preferred to act rightly rather than prudently. “What is right is also prudent,” he writes with regard to this point, “and it is our business to join in with the right and with God’s word, and to remain there, let it cost what it may. . . . As little as the eye can endure a grain of sand, so little can conscience endure wrong. . . . A righteous cause, a clear conscience—blessed is the man who has both.” He felt himself bound in conscience, and he acted accordingly. It was clear to him that he could not remain in the Established Church after his deposition. He made known his secession. He was strongly moved to this, because a part of his parish had already preceded him. He did not wish by this means to separate from his brethren in the Established Church, and asked them to continue to work with him in missionary affairs, as they are neutral ground. He wished this so much the more, because he felt that the Hermannsburg Missionary Society would have to suffer severe attacks. A new parish was formed on February 13, under the name of the “parish of the cross (Kreusgemeinde).” No small number of peasants from other, and especially Lüneburg, parishes joined it. They were mostly friends of the society, who did not wish to leave Harms. That was in our opinion their chief reason, for otherwise our peasants, who cling so strongly to the old and are so little inclined to change, would not so easily have separated. So it was on account of this new marriage law,
which was forced upon the church by the state, that separation arose in the Established Church, which had seldom been a unit since the time of the Reformation. During the first years after this occurrence only a distressing picture is unrolled before our eyes. There arose a controversy between the Established Church and the Free Church, which was carried on with sharpness and bitterness. Both sides were led to deplorable expressions and measures. It was unavoidable that the mission should suffer from it. That was clear to Harms; but although it caused him much grief, he was not robbed of courage. "I am anxious, but I do not despair. It is not possible that the Lord will let his work fall; but he can let us fall. And if he wishes to let me fall, I will willingly submit, if only he saves his work," he declared in 1879. In the first place, the missionary associations of the cities, with the exception of Stade and Osnabrück, and then the provincial Consistory at Hannover, declared against the Hermannsburg Society. After short negotiations with Harms, in which they prescribed various conditions to him, five missionary associations severed their connection, and the above-mentioned consistory refused to give the customary part of the collection which was made yearly at the Epiphany. By this means the rupture with the church authorities was complete. One consequence was, that the mission students were no longer examined and ordained at Hannover, but at Hermannsburg. The conduct of the associations and the authorities caused great agitation for and against Hermannsburg. This appears to us to have been over-hasty at least. If they had attempted, through persons in his confidence, to come first to an understanding with Harms about their demands, and if they had not demanded immediate and unconditional acceptance of their terms, in a way that showed their great distrust, this distressing episode in the controversy might have been avoided. The following four points were the ones in question: (1) No mention of the separation was to be made in the missionary paper or at the missionary festivals. (2) The
students were to be forbidden most strictly to speak publicly about the separation. (3) The students or their inspectors could never be employed to conduct divine service in the parishes of the Free Church. (4) Membership in and faithful adherence to the Established Church should neither be a hindrance to the reception of students or the appointment of teachers, nor a cause of their dismissal. It is not to be denied that the opposition to these four points was a mistake in the first place; and there is no doubt that if the missionary society was to be really neutral ground and if the two churches were to work together successfully, Harms would have to agree to these four points. He was really willing to do so; but owing to the manner in which it was demanded of him, he could not so quickly make up his mind to bind his hands unconditionally. When friends in the Established Church afterward acted as mediators, he declared himself ready to agree to these demands of the Consistory. There were still many such friends in the Established Church. The people, particularly in the rural parishes of Lüneburg, Bremen, and Osnabrück, remained faithful to the Hermannsburg Society. Unfortunately the clergymen who were involved in the public controversy were the first to turn their backs upon the society. Nevertheless there were many clergymen who regretted the rupture. Thirty-one of these formed an association at Lehrte in favor of the Hermannsburg Society. They were usually called the Lehrte "Association." They tried to bring about a reconciliation between the society and the Established Church. They worked for the realization of this good purpose by negotiations with Harms and with the church authorities, by conferences, by publicly siding with the society in their discourses and their writings, and by establishing a supplement to the Hermannsburg missionary paper in order to prevent

2 The missionary festivals were just as numerously attended after the separation as before. The friends of the mission founded many new associations, in which they made collections and worked for the Hermannsburg Society.
the identification of the mission with the strongly polemic *Kreusblatt*. It is true that a formal treaty of peace was not concluded between the authorities of the Established Church and Harms, and the Epiphany collections were not yet regained; but the fulfilment of both these wishes was near at hand. Hermannsburg was ready to agree to all demands; negotiations with a pastor of the Established Church with a view to his going to Africa on a tour of inspection were already concluded, when the real conclusion of peace was unfortunately frustrated by the unexpected death of Harms. Nevertheless much had been gained, for the disposition on both sides had become decidedly better.

The number of the friends of the society increased, and the number of its enemies and their irritation lessened. All their measures had not been able to injure it permanently. The founding of a new missionary paper in Hannover did no harm to the one at Hermannsburg. The sending of many gifts from missionary festivals or from missionary schools to the Leipzig Society had not lessened the receipts of the Hermannsburg Society. Its friends exerted themselves so much the more, and many of them made great sacrifices. The attempt to transfer the interests of the devout people to the Leipzig Society did not succeed. The latter is too far away and too little popular; and, besides, many were repelled by its course with regard to the question of caste. There was often talk, in the circles of the Established Church, of founding a new missionary establishment, but fortunately it went no farther. They saw, on the one hand, that they did not have forces and means enough, and, on the other hand, that they would have to avoid a still greater division of their forces. There are enough missionary societies in Germany, and many little societies are not only expensive but can scarcely maintain an existence. That was a sad time in our dear Hannover, (and it is not yet passed,) when men groped about and did not know what to do. But the friends of the Hermannsburg Society saw with joy that, in spite of all
prophecies of its destruction, it nevertheless still existed by
the grace of God and had safely passed through the violent
storms which had made the mission-ship stagger.

The attacks which arose from the separation were not the
only ones. The cold wind of violent complaint against the
African missionaries, which blew upon the society, was just
as keen. Grave charges were made against the missionaries,
and especially against Superintendent Hohls, who died Feb-
uary 20, 1884. In consequence of these charges the whole
African mission was in a distressing condition. It was said
that the missionaries were enriching themselves by all sorts
of trade, instead of carrying on the work of converting the
heathen, and that Superintendent Hohls had misused large
sums, and had finally come to his end in consequence of
drunkenness. These charges were the more easily believed,
because they had their origin in Africa. They were spread
rapidly, and excited much anger and sorrow. A thorough
investigation was immediately begun. With regard to
Superintendent Hohls it was shown that the charges were
partly true, but mostly slanderous. It is true that he had
unfortunately been not altogether temperate in the last years
of his life, but had neither injured the work of his office
thereby nor given public offence. He had deeply regretted
his weakness, and had died sober and, so far as any one could
know, as a Christian should. With regard to financial affairs
it turned out that he had good-naturedly lent much money,
part of it without prospect of repayment, but the money of
the society was not included in it. His successor, the present
Provost Fröhling, writes of him:—

Owing to the irregularities of his later years, people entirely forget what
he was to us for so long. From 1864 on he guided the affairs of the mission
with a skill, love, faithfulness, and self-sacrifice, which are without parallel.
All the missionaries looked up to him with love and respect. He possessed
their unlimited confidence; he was the helper, comforter, and adviser of all;
he was our brother, yea, our father; it is not possible to tell what we owe
to him.

The Norwegian missionaries also felt called upon, on ac-
count of these hateful charges, to send Harms a declaration
of their sympathy with him in the death of Hohls. In it they remembered his services with appreciation. One commission was appointed at home and two in Africa for the purpose of investigating the charges against the missionaries. The commissioners went to all the stations in order to examine the state of affairs thoroughly on the spot. Their papers were sent to the home commission, which also orally examined the missionaries, Hansen and Penzhorn, who had been sent over for that purpose. The examination proved that two of the missionaries had engaged in trade too much, and the deposition of both was ordered. It was not shown that any of the other missionaries—and there were over fifty of them—had gone beyond the permitted limits. Indeed, the investigation was to their advantage, since it gave gratifying proof of their moderation and self-denial. It must be remembered that the salary of the missionaries in Africa—this was not the case in the territory of other missions—had to be reduced on account of the burden of debt which rested upon the stations. They quietly acquiesced in this, and many of them, as a result of great retrenchment in their households, finished the buildings of the station out of their own means, and bought land for the mission, in order not to be a burden to the treasury. The missionaries cannot avoid engaging in trade to a certain extent, because of the circumstances there. Agriculture and cattle raising, which they are obliged to carry on, and the traffic with the natives, who do not know the worth of money and who pay in kind, make it necessary. As the profits were used to enlarge and improve the stations, it was an advantage to the mission. "All the misfortunes, the departures from the country, the returns to it, and the removals in it, the many losses, and the building of the stations, caused many extraordinary expenses which the missionaries could not have borne, if they had not had other sources of income than their salaries," writes Missionary Kück in a report concerning the results of the investigation. In the same report he points out that these
charges and calumniations had their origin in the envy and ill-will of the European traders in Africa.

At this time it became evident that the Hermannsburg mission in Africa was in need of new regulations, as various abuses had sprung up there; for example, several of the missionaries had possession of their stations and used them for farms. New regulations were therefore prepared for the African mission in 1883, and sent over to the missionaries for examination. These regulations are now in force. But it is impossible to do everything in accordance with them at once. It requires much wisdom, and an exact knowledge of the state of affairs there, to bring these things into order gradually. The territory of the African mission was divided into two parts, and each of these was put under the charge of a provost. The appointment of a general provost is also planned. The one part of the territory embraces the mission to the Zulus in the four districts of Natal, Prince Alfred’s Land, Zulu-land, and Umpongolo; the other part, the mission to the Basutos and Bechuanas in the districts of Moriko, Rustenburg, and Pretoria. The separate districts are each under a director. A provost receives a salary of £84 and a director £70, exclusive of the cost of their official journeys. An unmarried missionary receives £40; a married one £60, and a yearly addition of £5 for every child under sixteen years. A missionary receives £30 for the building of a station and £5 yearly for its maintenance. If the cost of building or of repairs exceeds this sum, the provost with the consent of the council may grant an addition. Sixty pounds are annually paid for keeping the wagons of the mission in repair and sustaining the necessary oxen. Trade for the sake of private gain is strictly forbidden. Agriculture and all other industries are under the supervision of a superintendent. The society provides for the schooling of the children by supporting a school for the Zulu and one for the Basuto mission. The widow of a missionary receives, so long as she remains unmarried, in Africa £30 annually and £5 for each child; in Europe
420 M. and 45 M. for each child, and has, in addition, free lodging and free tuition. A fund for widows is to be established. Invalid missionaries are taken care of by the society. Those who withdraw from the work have to pay an indemnity of 450 M. for each year in the mission-house, 300 M. for their outfit, and 600 M. for their passage. These sums are to be paid in whole or in part as the provost and the council may decide. Each station is to be supplied with as much land for fields, meadows, and gardens as is necessary to furnish food. If a station owns more land than this, it is to be sold for the benefit of the society. Each station with its land, buildings, and equipments is the property of the society.

The old statutes were now revised and new ones added for all the missions. This action was under consideration at the time of Theodore Harms' death. In 1884, chiefly through the agency of Consul Burghardt, of Hamburg, the financial year, which had heretofore extended from missionary festival to missionary festival, was changed to the calendar year, the keeping of accounts was arranged in a business-like way, the whole of the property of the society was inventoried, and a comparison of the assets and liabilities of the society according to its condition on January 1, 1885, was made. According to this the total assets and liabilities were:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Assets</th>
<th>M. 1,352,994.22</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Liabilities</td>
<td>310,181.38</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Balance to credit .................................. M. 1,042,812.84

But because the landed property of a number of the stations was not yet legally deeded to the society, and because the existing buildings could probably not be sold for their value, and to provide for possible mistakes in the inventory or outstanding debts, M. 434,628.60 were substracted. And to be entirely safe against unforeseen accidents, such as the destruction of a station in time of war, an additional M. 100,000 was substracted, so that the net resources are M. 508,184.24.
And thus the storms were a blessing to the Hermannsburg Missionary Society. It has not been beaten to pieces, but has been purified and strengthened. God laid upon Theodore Harms the task of leading it through this severe crisis and of reforming it. When this task was essentially done, the Lord called his servant from disquiet to rest, from strife to peace. A short sickness preceded his death. "A blessed and joyful end is the most beautiful and glorious thing that can be seen upon earth," he had written a short time before, in the preface to the missionary paper of the year of his death. On February 16, 1885, the Lord gave him such an end in peace and quietness. The latter part of this life was much embittered by strife within the Free Church. But his work in mission affairs had been, after many a severe struggle, more peaceful and edifying.

The direction of this extended work has now been put into the hands of his youthful son. The Lord, who has revealed himself to this society so wonderfully in the time of prosperity and so graciously in the time of crisis, will henceforth sustain, bless, and guide it. His promises and also the experiences, which it has had, tell us that. But these experiences should strengthen our faith and move us to love, so that we may not become lukewarm but our zeal may be like that love which shines as a bright light upon us from out of the years between 1850 and 1860. May the Lord graciously bring it to pass that this glance at the history of the Hermannsburg Society shall serve to that end!

*This confident expression of the author has already been justified in the increased harmony between the German churches and the mission since this article was written.—Eds.
Statistical Summary of the Condition of the Hermannsburg Missionary Society in the Year 1885.

AFRICA I. ZULU MISSION.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>District</th>
<th>Station</th>
<th>Year of founding</th>
<th>No. of missionaries</th>
<th>No. of converts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Natal</td>
<td>Hermannsburg</td>
<td>1854</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>313</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ettembeni</td>
<td>1856</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>72</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ethlanzani</td>
<td>1856</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>56</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Midden</td>
<td>1859</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>140</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Neu-Hannover</td>
<td>1862</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Empangwini</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>84</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emakabeleni</td>
<td>1863</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emtombeni</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>14</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bethesda</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nazareth</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Endumeni</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>48</td>
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<tr>
<td>Alfredia</td>
<td>Marburg</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ebenezer</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Blim</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Umpongo</td>
<td>Goedehoep</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Entombel</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>72</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ekombela</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>88</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zulu-land</td>
<td>Emyati</td>
<td>..</td>
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<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ekuhlangeni</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>8</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bethel</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ehloholmomo</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Esihlangeni</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ehlobane</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
<td>..</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total 24 25 1051

* N. B.—Part of the Zulu stations have not yet been re-occupied. The converts at them have been scattered.
### Africa II. Basuto Mission

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Di</th>
<th>Station</th>
<th>Year of Founding</th>
<th>No. of Missionaries</th>
<th>No. of Converts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Moriko</td>
<td>Linokena</td>
<td>1858 (64)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Limoa</td>
<td>1864</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>226</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Harmshope</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mannane</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>517</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Polfontein</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>40</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ramalians</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>212</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Melorane</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>240</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pretoria</td>
<td>Bethanien</td>
<td>1864</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1438</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Ebenezer</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>315</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Hebron</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>679</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mosetla</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>495</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Jericho</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>230</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Nazareth</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>136</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>Polonia</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>34</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Potoane</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rustenburg</td>
<td>Rustenburg</td>
<td>1865</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>575</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Saron</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>583</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Emmaus</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>633</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pella</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>390</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Mahanaim</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>102</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Leporro</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>567</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kroondal</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>342</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Kana</td>
<td></td>
<td>1</td>
<td>493</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Beersheba</td>
<td></td>
<td>2</td>
<td>410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>27</td>
<td>9188</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### India

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stations</th>
<th>Year of Founding</th>
<th>No. of Missionaries</th>
<th>No. of Native Assistants</th>
<th>No. of Converts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Naidupett</td>
<td>1866</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>312</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sulurpett</td>
<td>1866</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>170</td>
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<tr>
<td>Gudur</td>
<td>1867</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>167</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Srijarikota</td>
<td>1869</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>...</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Venkatagiri</td>
<td>1869</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>61</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vakadu</td>
<td>1871</td>
<td></td>
<td>3</td>
<td>58</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kalastry</td>
<td>1873</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>190</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rapur</td>
<td>1873</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tirupaty</td>
<td>1877</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>123</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kodur</td>
<td>1883</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>1123</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Australia

| Hermannsburg     | 1877             | 3                   | ...                      | ...             |

### New Zealand

| Reuru            | 1876             | 1                   | ...                      | ?               |
| Vaitotara        | 1876             | 2                   | ...                      | ?               |
ARTICLE III.

SOME ILLUSTRATIONS OF MR. FROUDE'S HISTORICAL METHODS.

BY THE REV. ALFRED H. HALL, MERIDEN, CONN.

Two years ago last December, the fifth day, Mr. Froude wrote the preface to "Oceana," or "England and her Colonies." The book gives us Mr. Froude's impressions of the political, social, and material condition of Australia and New Zealand. Two years later, Mr. Froude writes a second book on the English Colonies. This time, he gives us a picture of "The English in the West Indies." Both these works come to us from one who is essayist, historian, traveller, a scholar of exceptional attainments, a writer whose style is brilliant, fascinating, and all but persuasive.

The design of this paper is not to review either "Oceana" or "The English in the West Indies," but rather to make them do duty as guides. These books are unlike anything Mr. Froude has written before; yet they are very fair illustrations of his method in writing history. It will not be regarded a misuse of the recent work of this historian, if we make it serve as a glass through which to look at his more remote writings.

For convenience of treatment, "Oceana" will be taken as the guide in these illustrations of Mr. Froude's historical methods. Before entering on the study of Mr. Froude's methods, an approximate answer is offered to the question, "What is the true method in writing history?" The impression is abroad that history is an easy study. This is true, if we mean that it is easy to understand, because it is written in language which is untechnical. But it is very far from the
truth, if we mean that history is an easy subject to master. The department of dogmatic theology in our seminaries is commonly regarded the most difficult to fill. But the opinion is ventured that there is no study which calls for so much as that of historical theology. Whether we look at the preparation demanded in the knowledge of original authorities, in the thorough acquaintance with the spirit, the laws, the customs, the language, of the period whose history is portrayed; or whether we regard that fine prerequisite for all true historical treatment,—honest dealing with authorities, and a sacred purpose to set forth the truth at any price,—from whatever point of view we look at it, the work of the historical theologian demands qualifications of the highest order. This same will hold true of all historical statement, whatever definition we give of history. We may call it with one, "philosophy teaching by example," or with another, "the precepts of moral philosophy reduced to example," or with a third, "the knowledge of man as a political being." With either definition, it is true that history is no easy study to master. The true method, then, in writing history, must, first of all, recognize that the work it has set itself to do is of the most exacting kind. This becomes the more evident, when we see the special peril to which the historian is exposed, viz., that of sacrificing truth to style. To make narrative attractive and description pleasing is both a peril and a privilege. It is a peril, whenever one aims for excellence of style, no matter what becomes of excellence of material. It is a peril, when, to make a story pleasing, one softens hard facts into metaphors, thus making history not a serious study, but an "elegant amusement." It is a privilege, when, in graphic description, accuracy is never sacrificed to brilliancy. It is a privilege, when fidelity in setting forth things as they are, easily unites itself to graceful and vigorous expression. Prof. E. A. Freeman in his "Methods of Historical Study" well says that "a narrative that is true and dull is better than one that is false though lively." He then wittily describes the temptation to which all writers of
history are exposed. "The danger of sacrificing excellence of matter to excellence of style may make us almost lament the unavoidable partnership between history and literature. We may be tempted to envy the lot of the geometer or the chemist in whose ways are no such pitfalls. The most winning style, the choicest metaphors, the neatest phrases from foreign tongues, would all be thrown away if they were devoted to proving that any two sides of a triangle are not always greater than the third side. When they are devoted to proving that a man cut off his wife's head one day, and married her maid the next, out of sheer love for his country, they win believers for the paradox."

The true historical method must then acknowledge that the difficulties in such study are great, the dangers, real, the demands, exacting. Three illustrations are offered of Mr. Froude's methods in writing history. They cannot be put before us in a better way than in his own words. In his essay on "The Lives of the Saints," one of his "Short Studies on Great Subjects," he says, "We cannot relate facts as they are. They must first pass through ourselves, and we are more or less than mortal, if they gather nothing in the transit. The great outlines alone lie around us. The details, we each fill up variously according to the turn of our sympathies, the extent of our knowledge, or our general theory of things." This last sentence is worthy of note, because it is in no respects a confession, but the deliberate statement of what Mr. Froude believes to be a necessary condition in historical study. We shall not be accused of unfairness, if we look at Mr. Froude in the light of his own words.

I. The first illustration of his historical methods is found in that he fails to subordinate literary style to historic truth. There seems to be no other explanation for the extraordinary things in many of his works than in the words of the essay just quoted. The outlines of history lie round about him. The details, he fills up in a way ever attractive, though startling. The trustworthiness of these details must be measured "by the turn of his sympathies, the extent of his knowledge, and
his general theory of things." "Oceana" is the most recent illustration in hand. Mr. Froude could not travel from England to Auckland, and return across our continent, without saying many good things in a way never commonplace. But it has been given to Mr. Edward Wakefield, a member of the House of Representatives in New Zealand, to show us Mr. Froude's method in narrative and description as applied to Australia. Attention was called, at the time, to this review of "Oceana" in the Nineteenth Century of August, 1886. The quotations then made by the daily press are not so familiar but that they may be repeated. Speaking of Adelaide in South Australia, Mr. Froude says, "Seven miles away, we saw below us in a basin, with a river winding through it, a city of 150,000 inhabitants, not one of whom has ever known, or will know, a moment's anxiety as to the recurring regularity of his three meals a day." Mr. Wakefield answers that "Adelaide is not in a basin, but on the highest land in the neighborhood. There is no river winding through it, but the little Torrens, which has long since been dammed up, and converted into a lake in the park lands. The population of Adelaide with all its suburbs never exceeded 75,000, and when Mr. Froude was there, great numbers of them were leaving daily, starved out by the failure of the harvest, the drought, and the commercial depression." Mr. Wakefield describes a visit in 1885, the same year in which Mr. Froude was there, in which he saw more poverty and worse poverty than in the twenty-five previous years in the colonies. He says, "I attended the sittings of the Benevolent Relief Committee, and learned something about the anxiety of some of the inhabitants of Adelaide as to the recurring regularity of their three meals a day." Since then, the Government house has been mobbed by multitudes of people clamoring for the means of subsistence." Thus much for Mr. Froude's geographical eyesight. Some one has called geography, "one of the two eyes of history." The truth of the definition in any given description of the earth's surface will depend very much on
the character of this organ of eye-sight. It will be of little service to history, if it be, as Mr. Froude says was true of Pompey the Great, "a squint-eye."

Other citations might be made quite as startling as this, of Mr. Froude's inaccuracy in the statement of facts, which he had the very best opportunity of verifying. It may seem a little heartless to quote Mr. Froude against himself. But in view of the repeated misstatement of fact, the false picture he gives of the political sentiments of the colonies, the characterization of men and things, for which he had simply the authority of hearsay,—just because he has "filled up the outlines" with such details as these, we may fairly read to Mr. Froude from his "Julius Cæsar." "Gossip," says he, in criticising some reflections on the character of the Roman Emperor, "is not evidence, nor does it become evidence, because it has been repeated through many generations." Leaving "Oceana" for a moment, let us go back a few years for an illustration of this same spirit. This charge of inaccuracy, which has been reaffirmed by Mr. Charles Eliot Norton in the "Early Letters of Thomas Carlyle," is quite as old as the earliest of Mr. Froude's writings. In the Contemorary Review of April, 1867, there is a careful notice of the last two volumes of Mr. Froude's "History of England," that part which deals with Ireland. Much praise has been given this history, because of the specially favorable opportunities the writer had in his access to state documents. Can it be, then, accident or incident in Mr. Froude's writings, that his reviewer, in examining these very same documents, and comparing them with these two volumes on Ireland, found misstatements of historical facts scattered all through? Or turn again to his essay on "Criticism and the Gospel History." A single quotation will suffice. "Every thinking person who has been brought up a Christian and desires to remain a Christian, yet who knows anything of what is passing in the world, is looking to be told on what evidence the New Testament claims to be received. The state of opinion proves of itself
that the arguments hitherto offered produce no conviction." This statement has, possibly, literary merit, but Mr. Froude could scarcely have constructed a paragraph in which historic truth is so conspicuously absent. He would do well to listen to one who can speak with authority on this subject. "The position and character of an historian," says Professor Fisher in the "Supernatural Origin of Christianity," "will affect his selection and disposition of matter. But the question is whether he is betrayed into inveracity and perversion by the bent of his mind and his party connections." One is inclined to remind Mr. Froude of an experience he himself recounts when he was in Melbourne. In a visit to the observatory one evening, he had looked through the telescope at the Southern Cross. He remembered that once he had seen through another telescope a blue star, and he expressed a desire to renew his acquaintance with it. "I had to learn," he writes, "that there were really no blue stars, and that the color was due to an imperfectly achromatic lens." We submit the question, as to whether our author is not equally misled and misleading in looking at some other celestial truths.

II. We are ready to notice a second illustration of Mr. Froude's historical methods. Keeping in mind the words quoted above, the details with which he fills up the historical outlines are unduly shaped by the turn of his sympathies, or, in familiar phrase, his judgment is controlled by his feeling. In this description of England's Colonies, there is a brilliant portraiture of Sir George Grey, a colonial governor of twenty years ago. Mr. Froude's admiration is sufficiently seen in a single sentence. Speaking of Cape Town, he says, "Sir George Grey's statue stands in the gardens under the window, and if the Cape Colonists were given to idolatry, they would worship at that spot." But a nearer view of Sir George Grey fails to verify this worshipful picture. Let it be remembered that this ex-governor is now living in elegant retirement and exclusiveness at his villa in a lonely island off the coast of Aukland, and that Mr.
Froude was royally feasted in the brief visit he made to New Zealand. The picture which the satisfied guest draws of his sufficient host needs to be corrected in one or two respects. We learn through this member of the colonial legislature that the career and character of the ex-governor would hardly be recognized in Mr. Froude's portrait gallery. The two years he was Prime Minister of the colony are described as the darkest period in the political history of New Zealand. On the assembling of the Colonial Parliament in 1879, a resolution affirming that Sir George Grey's Ministry "had so mismanaged and maladministered the affairs of the country, that they no longer possessed the confidence of this house," was carried in the House of Representatives by the largest vote ever recorded on a ministerial question. Admitting now that this criticism is possibly overcharged with feeling, we turn from Mr. Froude's portrait of this man of public affairs to three other notable pictures.

The first is the well-known "Julius Cæsar," which Mr. Froude modestly calls "A Sketch." Three brief quotations are taken from the beginning, the middle, and the end. "Suetonius," says Mr. Froude in the introduction, "shows an effort at veracity, a serious anxiety to tell his story impartially." Then, he adds with amazing unconsciousness of self, "therefore, I am able to follow him as my guide." The second quotation farther on is equally suggestive. "The tendency to idolize great men, and the tendency to depreciate them, arises alike in the emotions." Then, our historian shows us how the idolizing of great men is done, in a most extraordinary paragraph, the very last in the book. "Strange and startling resemblance between the founder of the kingdom of this world, and the Founder of the kingdom not of this world, for which the first was a preparation. Each was denounced for making himself a king. Each was maligned as the friend of publicans and sinners. Each was betrayed by those he had loved and cared for. Each was put to death, and Cæsar also was believed to have risen again and ascended
into heaven, and become a divine being.” Verily, this is giving
the old Roman very much more than his due, for it is “render-
ing unto Cæsar” not only “the things that are Cæsar’s,” but
the things which belong alone to Him, who was Cæsar’s un-
acknowledged King. Before such sentimentalism, criticism
finds it hard to be patient, and is tempted to apply to Mr.
Froude his own characterization of Cicero—“Nature half
made a great man, and left him uncompleted.” The second
picture which illustrates Mr. Froude’s idolatry of emotion,
is the familiar delineation of the character of Henry the
Eighth. It is thirty years by the date in the English edition,
since the first two volumes of Mr. Froude’s “History of
England” appeared, with its marvellous picture of the Tudor
king. It is surely a very ingenious defence of Henry’s
character against the verdict of three centuries. The spirit
of historical criticism has been called a charitable spirit.
Thus one generation reopens the case, and sets aside the
verdict of a previous age. Possibly, Benedict Arnold may
receive milder judgment at our second centennial than he
did at our first. Robespierre has found his friends, who
believe him to have been “an honest fanatic of iron will and
small intellect.” Mary Queen of Scots is anathematized by
one generation, and canonized by the next. Shakespeare
has located King John, though we are not so sure but that
his ghost may be transferred to some more goodly place.
Mr. Froude came, he tells us, to the study of his royal hero
with no blind admiration. But it is obvious enough that he
soon becomes an advocate, then a partisan, nor does he
leave the king until he has exalted him into the rank of a
saint, who is possessed of more than “a royal inability to
do wrong.” Mr. Froude tells us that there is a flea in the
microscope, which has ever remained to be mistaken for a
monster. The repeated domestic transfers and tragedies of
King Henry are explained on the ground of the king’s
supreme anxiety to keep the succession unbroken. For,
says Mr. Froude in one of his characteristically fine utterances,
“Henry breathed the atmosphere of suspended insurrection,
and he was determined to make insurrection a failing business." Most people will, however, continue to believe with another that "if Henry had survived Katherine Parr, he would have given her place to the most beautiful woman whom he could have prevailed upon to risk his perilous embraces preliminary to those of the executioner."

Thus much for a glance at Mr. Froude's setting forth of the character of this famous king. He begins his study with the cry, "Fair play for this misjudged man." But the tendency to idolize gets the better of his judgment, and, as he closes his work, he cries... "Verily, the gods are come down to us in the likeness of men." In the National Review of 1857, a writer wittingly voices the feeling of the world at large as to the truthfulness of the verdict on the character of King Henry. "It is fortunate," says this writer, "that no man of talent has ever ventured to write the biography of Satan. For had this been done, there would have been one sincere, enthusiastic, open, devout, devil-worshipper on earth, which would have been a novel, but not an altogether moral aspect for the eyes of men. A most clear, luminous, and satisfactory account of the conduct of Satan in Eden might have been furnished. It would have been made out that all the fault of the first recorded sin was with Eve, who had taken advantage of the devil's unsophisticated nature, to impose upon his innocence and simplicity, and had then gone about among the neighbors to scandalize his character at tea-tables and quilting parties." We pass over Mr. Froude's picture of Carlyle, he, who was more curt than courteous, with one or two brief references to Carlyle's "Life in London." The question of Mr. Froude's accuracy in interpreting, reporting, and printing the "Letters," of Carlyle, is possibly still undecided. At all events, we may give Mr. Froude whatever benefit belongs to him from his recent denial. In this earlier publication, however, we have Mr. Froude's personal tribute to Carlyle. It is a good illustration of what he calls "the tendency to idolize great men."
“Carlyle is the truest and noblest man I ever met in this world. I for one was saved by Carlyle’s writings from positivism, or Romanism, or atheism, or any other of the creeds or no creeds, which in those days were whirling us about in Oxford like leaves in an autumn storm. Carlyle taught me a creed, which I could then accept as really true, which I have held ever since with increasing confidence. Then and always I looked on him, and have looked on him, as my master.” What was this creed which Carlyle taught his devoted pupil? Writing to John Sterling, Carlyle says, “Finally, assure yourself that I am neither Pagan, nor Turk, nor circumcised Jew, but an unfortunate Christian individual resident at Chelsea in this year of grace, neither Pantheist, nor Potheist, nor any Theist nor Ist whatever, having the most decided contempt for all such manner of system builders. By God’s blessing, one has got two eyes to look with, also a mind capable of knowing and believing. This is all the creed I will at this time insist on.”

Later on, we know that Carlyle announced his disbelief in historical Christianity, and his conviction that the events cited in the Apostle’s Creed could never have happened. But Mr. Froude seems to have met with some retribution for his loyal following of his master. The recent difficulties with the Carlyle family must make him regret that he did not follow the first advice Carlyle gave him in 1843, even though later on he retracted it. “I will say to my biographer, Forbear, poor fool. Let no life of me be written. If thou write, it will be mere delusion and hallucination.”

III. A brief reference only is offered to a third illustration of Mr. Froude’s historical methods. There is a manifest want of candor in dealing with religious questions, due, as it seems, to the religious habit. It appears in this work of his on the English Colonies, when he contents himself with the most flippancy reference to the history of Christian missions among the Maori of New Zealand. Mr. Froude pays a coldly courteous tribute to Bishop Selwyn, and sees no occasion for even an allusion to John Coleridge Patteson, the martyr of
the Melanesian Islands. It is seen again as he stops at Honolulu on his way home. All he has to say of the missions to the Sandwich Islands is that "no great results seem yet to have been arrived at either intellectually or morally. There is a varnish, over the place, of Yankee civilization, which has destroyed the natural vitality, without as yet producing anything better or as 'good.'" But "Oceana" is a fair picture of Mr. Froude's other writings, in respect of want of candor. In his "Life of Bunyan," his best work, as many think, in his "Life and Times of Thomas à Becket," in his several series of "Short Studies on Great Subjects," one misses that quality of supremest value,—fairness in dealing with those from whom he differs. To him, English clergymen are not simply men, "but men of a particular sort, and unfortunately something not more but less than men, who have sacrificed their own selves to become the paid instruments of a system." The Church of England with its roll of noble men and martyrs, with its story of magnificent achievements, Mr. Froude respects as little as did Cromwell's soldiers the cathedrals, on which they laid their irreverent hands. "A foolish church," he says, "chattering parrot-like old notes, of which it had forgot the meaning, a clergy who mistook their fool's cap and bells for a crown of wisdom and the music of the spheres." The "Nemesis of Faith," published in 1849, is now out of print. In the catalogue of the Boston Public Library, it is put down as "Fiction." It is fiction in more senses than one, into which we may drop the dreary fact of the sadness of religious scepticism.

"Of what religion are you," said an English lady to Rogers the poet. "What religion, Madam? I am of the religion of all sensible men." "And what is that," she asked. "All sensible men, Madam, keep that to themselves." In this early work, Mr. Froude succeeds in a measure in doing this latter, while making very evident to his readers that which is not his religion. An Oxford student was once asked at examination to give the doctrine
of the Anglican Church on good works. He answered with laudable caution, 'A few of them would not do a man any harm.' The conversation of the poor women whom Bunyan overheard, and which resulted in his conversion, was about a religion which believed in the supreme need of the human heart of God's redeeming grace. Mr. Froude tells us that the language of those humble women has now lost its meaning, and that if they were alive to-day, they would use it no longer. Yet one is inclined to wish that Mr. Froude believed more in that kind of religion, for surely a little of it would do him no harm. It would do his many readers an amount of good.

This much for 'Oceana.' With slight modifications, the same may be said of the 'English in the West Indies.' A far more brilliant book than the first, with less flagrant mis-statements. But here again, we note inexcusable inaccuracies; for example, the assertion that Spanish sugar is admitted to the United States free of duty; and again, that our country was eager to conclude a reciprocity treaty with the British Colonies; while for judgment controlled by feeling, and candor obscured by prejudice, we note Mr. Froude's unremitting hostility to Mr. Gladstone, as well as the frequent unfair and ungenerous characterizations of Christianity, political pessimism and religious pessimism going hand in hand.

These three illustrations of Mr. Froude's are thus summarized. Historic truth sacrificed to literary style, judgment swayed by feeling, candor obscured by prejudice. Principal Tulloch, in his 'Religious Thought in Britain in the Nineteenth Century,' gives us a striking illustration of the exact reverse of Mr. Froude's method. 'What we perhaps all need most to learn is not satisfaction with our opinions, for that is easily acquired by most, but the capacity of looking beyond our horizon, of searching for deeper foundations than our ordinary beliefs, and a more sympathetic appreciation of the beliefs of others. While cherishing therefore what we believe to be true, let us keep our minds open to all truth, and especially to the teaching of Him who is the Way, the Truth, and the Life.'
ARTICLE IV.

A NEWLY DISCOVERED KEY TO BIBLICAL CHRONOLOGY.

BY J. SCHWARTZ, LIBRARIAN OF THE APPRENTICES' LIBRARY, NEW YORK CITY.

SECOND PAPER.

1. In the January number of the Bibliotheca Sacra an attempt was made to show that the chronology of the Bible, from Solomon to Jehoiakim, agrees exactly with the Assyrian Eponym Canon, and with Ptolemy's Canon, if we assume that in the royal line of Judah, with one exception, the heir to the throne was chosen from the children born when the preceding king was twenty-one years old. The present paper will begin by showing that the harmony between the two chronologies—Assyrian and biblical—can be proved without reference to the theory advanced in the first paper. References to that paper will be made thus: "Key," with the number of the section added.

2. The Bible synchronizes the accession of Nebuchadnezzar, king of Babylon, with the fourth year of Jehoiakim, king of Judah ("Key" § 4). According to Ptolemy's Canon the first official year of Nebuchadnezzar was in B.C. 604, which proves that his accession was in B.C. 605 ("Key" § 15). The Bible places the accession of Jotham, king of Judah, 150 years before this date, that is in B.C. 755 ("Key" § 11), the details being as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>King</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>B.C.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jotham</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>755</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahaz, alone</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>739</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahaz and Hezekiah associated</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>725</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hezekiah alone</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>723</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manasseh</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amon</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>641</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The capture of Samaria, and end of the kingdom of Israel, is placed in the sixth year of Hezekiah (2 Kings xviii. 10), therefore in B.C. 720.

3. If we examine the details of this table, and compare it with other statements of Scripture, it will be seen that Jotham reigned only fifteen years full, and not sixteen, as his first year is the second of Pekah (2 Kings xv. 32), and his successor Ahaz begins in the seventeenth year of the same Pekah (2 Kings xvi. 1). There is no evidence to substantiate the two years’ associated reign of Ahaz and Hezekiah, and we must therefore allow sixteen years full for Ahaz. These corrections make a difference of one year in the total. As the twenty-nine years of Hezekiah and the thirty-one years of Josiah are confirmed by other statements of Scripture (§ 5), we must deduct one year from the fifty-five of Manasseh in order to preserve the total of 150 years. The reigns from Jotham should have been given as follows: Jotham 15 years + Ahaz 16 years + Hezekiah 29 years + Manasseh 54 years + Amon 2 years + Josiah 31 years + Jehoiakim 3 years = 150 years.

4. Although the Bible clearly places the capture of Samaria in B.C. 720, it is certain, by comparing the information furnished by the cuneiform inscriptions and Ptolemy’s Canon, that it must be placed two years earlier, in B.C. 722. As has been shown (“Key” § 15) the years assigned to the kings of Israel must be reduced by one, in every case. Hence the nine years of Hoshea, the last king of Israel, and the twenty years of his predecessor Pekah are, from an Israelitish standpoint, only 19 + 8. As the Bible and the cuneiform inscriptions agree that Hoshea immediately succeeded Pekah, and that there was no interregnum between the two reigns, as has been assumed by many chronologists, it follows that the accession of Pekah cannot be placed higher than B.C. (722 +19 + 8 =) 749. Now the Bible says that
Jotham did not begin to reign until the second year of Pekah, therefore the line of Judah, which places him in B.C. 755, (§ 2) has an error or excess of seven years. That there is no mistake about the second of Pekah being the first year of Jotham is shown by the sixteenth and last year of Jotham being synchronized with the seventeenth of the same Pekah (§ 3). Consequently one of the successors of Jotham has seven years too much.

5. Of the seven kings of Judah, from Jotham to Jehoiakim inclusive, the reigns of Amon, with two years, and Jehoiakim, with three years, are, of course, out of the question. Jotham's fifteen years are confirmed by the second and seventeenth of Pekah. Ahaz has sixteen, which cannot be further reduced, as the age of his son Hezekiah, at his accession (viz., 25 years, for which we read 15) will make Ahaz twenty-one years older than his son, which agrees with the average found for nearly all the kings of Judah ("Key" §§ 9, 11). The twenty-nine years of Hezekiah are placed beyond dispute by the prophecy of Isaiah concerning that king's sickness (§ 6), and the thirty-one years of Josiah are confirmed by Jeremiah (chap. xxv. 2, 3), a cotemporary, who counts twenty-three years from the thirteenth of Josiah to the fourth of Jehoiakim. It is therefore certain that the seven superfluous years must be deducted from the fifty-four of Manasseh, who consequently reigned only (54—7) 47 years. The table in § 2 must be corrected as follows:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>King</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>B.C.</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jotham</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>748</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahaz</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>733</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hezekiah</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>717</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manasseh</td>
<td>47</td>
<td>688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Amon</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>641</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Josiah</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jehoiakim</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>608</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Accession of Nebuchadnezzar</td>
<td></td>
<td>605</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

6. In confirmation of this restoration we have the synchronism of the fourteenth year of Hezekiah with the first official year of Sennacherib, king of Assyria, which is thus recorded:

-
(1) The Bible says (2 Kings xviii. 13) that Sennacherib's first invasion of Judea took place in the fourteenth year of Hezekiah, which must have been in B.C. 704 if his first year was B.C. 717. Now it is clear that Sennacherib's invasion cannot be placed earlier than the first year of his reign, which the Eponym Canon places in B.C. 704.

(2) Nor could it have taken place later than B.C. 704, because the embassy of Merodach Baladan (2 Kings xx. 12) congratulating Hezekiah on his recovery from sickness, must be placed in the same year, since Isaiah (2 Kings xx. 6) predicted that Hezekiah (who reigned 29 years) would survive his illness fifteen years. According to Berosus and the cuneiform inscriptions Merodach Baladan usurped the throne of Babylon, for six months, in the first year of Sennacherib. As Sennacherib began to reign in B.C. 704, the embassy of Merodach Baladan and the fourteenth year of Hezekiah are indisputably fastened to B.C. 704.¹

(3) If Isaiah xxxvii. 30 indicates, as several eminent writers hold, that the fourteenth year of Hezekiah was a sabbatical year and the fifteenth year was a jubilee year, it will agree with our chronology, for B.C. 458 was a jubilee year ("Key" § 16), therefore B.C. 703 was one, since the interval between two jubilee years was forty-nine years, and B.C. 704 must have been a sabbatical year.

7. According to the annals of Tiglath Pileser, king of Assyria, he was warring against a king of Judah named Azariah, between B.C. 743–740. As we cannot assume that the Assyrians were ignorant of the names of the foreign kings with whom they came in contact, it follows that the king of Judah reigning between B.C. 743–740 was identical with Azariah. Now we have just shown that

¹ The identification of the Merodach Baladan of the Bible with the Merodach Baladan of Ptolemy's Canon and the cuneiform inscriptions, who reigned from B.C. 721 to 709 (Mardokempad in Ptolemy), is inadmissible because the earlier Merodach Baladan was a son of Yakin, according to the cuneiform inscriptions, whereas the Merodach Baladan of the Bible was a son of Baladan (see 2 Kings xx. 12). The first Merodach was probably the father of the second.
Jotham was king from B.C. 748 to 733, hence he was the "Azariah" of the cuneiform inscriptions. An examination of Scripture confirms this identification:—

(1) The name Azariah was quite common to the tribe of Levi, but very uncommon in the line of Judah. Its presence can be accounted for only on the supposition of intermarriages between the two tribes. By putting together various indications of Scripture it is quite certain that "Jerusha, the daughter of Zadok," the mother of Jotham (2 Kings xv. 33), was the sister of Azariah, the high priest, who cast out Uzziah, father of Jotham, from the temple (2 Chron. xxvi. 20). Azariah was therefore the brother-in-law of Uzziah, and the uncle of Jotham, and we can now understand how the name Azariah got into the royal line of Judah—Jotham was named Azariah after his uncle.

(2) We know that Jotham was associated as joint king while his father was a leper (see 2 Kings xv. 5), and as the son has two names, it is probable that Azariah was the one used while he was thus associated, and that he changed this to the throne name Jotham when he reigned alone. Hence the fifty-two years (2 Kings xv. 2) assigned to the king who is confusedly called alternately Azariah (2 Kings xv. 1, 6, 7, 8, 17, 23, 27), and Uzziah (2 Kings xv. 13, 30, 32, 34) must represent the combined reigns of the two kings, Uzziah—Azariah. As Azariah (or Jotham) has been shown (§§2, 5) to have reigned fifteen years, from B.C. 748 to 733, it follows that Uzziah reigned, altogether, (52—15) thirty-seven years, beginning with B.C. (748+37) 785.

(3) It has been shown, in the former paper ("Key" §18) that Uzziah and Jeroboam II. began to reign in the same year, viz., the fifteenth of Amaziah, king of Judah. Now, inasmuch as Uzziah reigned, altogether, thirty-seven years, and Pekah, king of Israel, began to reign in his last year (since Jotham, the son of Uzziah, began to reign in the second year of Pekah), it follows that Jeroboam II. could not have reigned more than thirty-six years. According to the correct chronology (§4) Pekah's accession was in B.C. 749;
but if we take the biblical date of the capture of Samaria, viz., B.C. 720, the first of Pekah must be depressed to B.C. 747, and the death of Jeroboam II. to B.C. 748. That this was, in fact, the view of the compiler of the book of Kings is shown by his placing the death of Jeroboam II. in the thirty-eighth of Uzziah–Azariah (2 Kings xv. 8), which was, in fact, (785—37) B.C. 748, as just assumed. It is clear, therefore, that, under the influence of the false date, B.C. 720, for the capture of Samaria, all the dates for the kings of Israel, up to Jeroboam II. at least, were depressed by two years each. As Jeroboam II. reigned only thirty-six years, as just shown, there can be no doubt that, in the view of the compiler of the present text of 2 Kings xv., the accession of Jeroboam II. was placed in B.C. 783. This being the case, a hitherto mysterious date is at once explained, and proves, beyond a doubt, that our identification of Azariah with Jotham is correct. In 2 Kings xv. 1, the accession of "Azariah, King of Judah," is placed in the twenty-seventh year of Jeroboam II. If Uzziah and Jeroboam II. began to reign in the same year (see "Key" §18), and Azariah was only another name for Uzziah, as has been generally assumed, then Uzziah could not have begun to reign twenty-seven years later, but if our theory is right this date is exactly correct. For, if we take the thirty-five years now reckoned from 1 Jotham to 6 Hezekiah, and add them to the correct date of the capture of Samaria, viz., B.C. 722, or, if we take the years of the kings, without regard to the synchronisms, viz., 16 Jotham + 16 Ahaz + 5 Hezekiah, and add them to the biblical date of the capture of Samaria, viz., B.C. 720, in either case we come to B.C. 757 for the accession of Jotham. Any one who adopted either of these modes of arriving at the accession of Jotham, in place of accepting the date (B.C. 755) based on the synchronisms between the two kingdoms (Israel and Judah), and compared it with the biblical date for the accession of Jeroboam II., viz., B.C. 783, would necessarily place the accession of Azariah–Jotham in the twenty-seventh year of the Israelitish king.
(4) If Azariah was the same king as Jotham, then the date B.C. 755 (§2) or B.C. 757 (see preceding paragraph) can be accounted for as representing the time of Azariah's joint or associated reign. The mistake of the writer of 2 Kings was in confounding the date of Jotham's associated reign in B.C. 755 with the date of his sole reign in B.C. 748. As he allowed only fifteen years to his whole reign, in place of twenty-two (B.C. 755—733), he was of course compelled to add seven years below, to Manasseh, as has just been shown.

(5) If Azariah—Jotham began to reign in B.C. 757 or 755, and Jeroboam II. did not die until B.C. 749, then the two kings were cotemporaries for six or eight years. That they were, in fact, reigning at the same time is expressly stated in the Bible (1 Chronicles v. 17). It is only on the theory that the fifty-two years of 2 Kings xv. 1 represent the joint reigns of Uzziah—Azariah that this synchronism can be made out. If the ordinary view—that Uzziah reigned fifty-two years alone—is correct, such a synchronism would be clearly impossible.

8. If Jeroboam II. died in B.C. 750, then the reign of Menahem, who followed Jeroboam II., after the two short reigns of Zechariah and Shallum (see 2 Kings xv. 8—22), must have been cotemporary with Pekah, who began in B.C. 749, that is, the ten years of Menahem extend from B.C. 749 to B.C. 739, exactly where the Assyrian inscriptions require his reign to be placed, for they make him a vassal of Tiglath Pileser II., king of Assyria, who did not begin to reign until B.C. 744. That there were rival candidates or pretenders to the throne of Israel during the reign of Menahem is shown by the statement (in 2 Kings xv. 19) that he paid a thousand talents of silver to the Assyrian king to "confirm the kingdom in his hand."

9. The accession of Uzziah in Judah, and Jeroboam II. in Israel, must be placed in B.C. 785, in the fifteenth year of Amaziah, king of Judah. We have the following statements respecting the chronology, from the time of the divided kingdom, down to this date:—
Jeroboam I., king of Israel, reigns 21 Tisri years (1 Kings xiv. 20).

Asa, king of Judah, begins to reign in the 20th of Jeroboam, for 41 years (1 Kings xv. 9).

Death of Ahab, king of Israel, and accession of Ahaziah, his son, is placed in the 17th year of Jehoshaphat, successor of Asa (1 Kings xxii. 51).

Jehoram, successor of Ahaziah, begins his 11 years' reign (2 Kings iii. 1) in the eighteenth of Jehoshaphat, which is also the 2d year of Jehoram, son of Jehoshaphat (as regent). See 2 Kings i. 17.

Ahaziah, successor of Jehoram, king of Judah, begins in the 11th year of Jehoram, king of Israel, and reigns one year (2 Kings ix. 29).

Athaliah usurps the throne of Judah for six years on the death of Ahaziah (2 Kings xi. 1–3).

Conspiracy against her in the 7th of Jehu—the slayer of Jehoram of Israel and Ahaziah of Judah—the "beginning" (see "Key" § 15) of Joash. His first official year is the 8th of Jehu. (See the table in "Key" § 21.)

Jehoash, king of Israel, in the 37th of Joash (2 Kings xiii. 10).

Amaziah, king of Judah, in the 2d year of Jehoash (2 Kings xiv. 1).

These statements give us the following chronology, which agrees exactly with the scheme evolved by means of the theory discussed in the first paper (see the table in "Key" § 21):

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Jeroboam I., king of Israel</td>
<td>929 B.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Rehoboam, king of Judah</td>
<td>928 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asa, king of Judah</td>
<td>910 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jehoshaphat, king of Judah</td>
<td>869 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jehoshaphat accompanies Ahab to Ramoth-Gilead, where Ahab is killed. Jehoram, son of Jehoshaphat, made regent. Ahaziah succeeds Ahab.</td>
<td>853 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jehoram succeeds Ahaziah in Israel in the eighteenth year of Jehoshaphat and the second year of Jehoram of Judah (as regent).</td>
<td>852 &quot;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ahaziah, king of Judah</td>
<td>842 &quot;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Ahasiah and Jehoram killed by Jehu. Athaliah usurps the throne of Judah for six years. 842 B.C.
Death of Athaliah. Joash, king of Judah. 836 B.C.
Jehoash, king of Israel. 800 B.C.
Amaziah, king of Judah. 799 B.C.
Uzziah, king of Judah, and Jeroboam II., king of Israel. 785 B.C.

10. A comparison between this table and the biblical dates established by the cuneiform inscriptions ("Key" §3) shows an exact agreement between the two. For the battle of Karkhar, in which Ahab, king of Israel, took part, as the ally of Ben-hadad, king of Syria, the Assyrian records place in B.C. 854, which is the year before the death of the Israel- itish king. Jehu's payment of tribute to Salmanassar II. of Assyria is dated B.C. 841, which is his 2d year in the preceding table. The synchronisms of Menahem with Tiglath Pileser, Azariah of Judah with the same king, and the fourteenth of Hezekiah with Sennacherib, have been considered in previous sections. 2

11. If Rehoboam began in B.C. 928, then Solomon, who reigned 40 years (1 Kings xi. 42), must have commenced to reign in B.C. 968, and his fourth year should be in B.C. 965. There are, however, two reasons which prove that he did not commence to date his regnal years until the death of his father David, which we place in B.C. 962, because:—

(1) The LXX., the Samaritan, and the Hebrew, all agree in placing the Exodus from Egypt at the beginning of a cycle of

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2Mr. Badger's attempt to harmonize the Assyrian Eponym Canon with the biblical chronology (in the Old Testament Student, Vol. v. no. 10), which was not seen until this paragraph was written, is based on the assumption that the fifty-two years of Uziah (whom he considers to be the same king as Azariah), and the forty-one years of Jeroboam II. of Israel, represent not their reigns, but the duration of their lives. He admits that "this use of numerals is without a parallel probably in the Bible," and it is extremely improbable on other grounds, if for no other reason, than that it requires an interregnum, between Jeroboam II. and his son Zechariah, of eight years, for which there is no evidence whatever. Mr. Badger's theory—even assuming it to be correct—leaves most of the difficulties unexplained. Only the dates B.C. 854 for Ahab, and B.C. 841 for Jehu, are made out. The synchronisms of Azariah and Menahem with Tiglath Pileser, and the 14th year of Hezekiah with Sennacherib, are irreconcilable with Mr. Badger's chronology.
490 years ("Key" § 16). As such a cycle began in B.C. 458 ("Key" § 16), the two previous ones began in B.C. 1438, and B.C. 948, respectively. The book of Kings says the fourth year of Solomon was the 480th from the Exodus (1 Kings vi. 1), therefore the fourth of Solomon was B.C. (1438—479) 959.

(2) The Tyrian annals, as quoted by Josephus, place an interval of 155 years 8 months, or, in round numbers, 156 years, between the accession of King Hiram and the building of Carthage. The twelfth year of Hiram of Tyre is synchronized with the fourth of Solomon: hence, from the building of the temple to the building of Carthage the Tyrian chronicles reckoned (156—11) 145 years. As the best ancient authorities are agreed that the building of Carthage must be placed in B.C. 814, it follows, that the fourth of Solomon was in B.C. (814 + 145 =) 959. (See "Key" § 24.)

12. If we take the 3921 years of the LXX. version, before the Exodus ("Key" § 16), as correct, we get the following scheme:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Event</th>
<th>Year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Creation</td>
<td>5359 B.C.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deluge</td>
<td>3098-7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dispersion of nations (531 after the Deluge)</td>
<td>2566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth of Terah, father of Abram</td>
<td>2098</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Birth of Abram (205—75) = 130th of Terah</td>
<td>1967</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The promise in the 99th year of Abraham</td>
<td>1868</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Isaac born (Abraham 100 years old)</td>
<td>1867</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jacob born (Isaac 60 years old)</td>
<td>1807</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Entrance into Egypt in Jacob's 130th year</td>
<td>1678</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Exodus from Egypt</td>
<td>1438</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The date 1438 B.C. for the Exodus depends, of course, on the assumption, that the 480 years of 1 Kings vi. 1 are genuine. It has been held by some writers, with whose schemes this number did not agree, that it is a corrupt addition foisted into the text, shortly before the time of Eusebius, Bishop of Cæsarea, about A.D. 325, who, it is claimed, is the first Christian writer that accepts it.8 This

supposition is incorrect. The number 480 years, between the Exodus and the building of Solomon's temple, was known, and accepted as reliable, long before Eusebius, as can be easily proved.

(1) Clement of Alexandria, who flourished about A.D. 192, or over one hundred years before Eusebius, among a mass of undigested extracts from chronologists, before his time (contained in Book i. chap. xxi. of his "Stromata"), gives the following fragment: 4 "From the birth of Moses till the Captivity, 972 years....From the reign of David till the Captivity, 452 years 6 months." This would leave from the birth of Moses to the reign of David (972—452 years 6 months =) 519 years 6 months. For some peculiar reason, not yet satisfactorily explained, the early Christian chronologists placed the building of the temple in the second, in place of the biblical fourth, year of Solomon. Assuming that the writer from whom Clement makes this extract adopted this practice, we would have, counting forty years for David and one year for Solomon, (519 + 40 + 1 =) 560 years from the birth of Moses to the building of Solomon's temple. As Moses was eighty years, at the time of the Exodus (Ex. vii. 7), there are (560—80) 480 years left between the Exodus and the building of the temple.

(2) Castor of Rhodes, according to Eusebius, brought down his Chronicles to B. c. 56. His work has been lost, but there are extracts from it preserved in Eusebius, Syncellus, and in an anonymous Latin writer, first published by Scaliger. 5 He is generally called "Auctor Barbarus." His work seems to be an undigested medley of extracts from Africanus, Eusebius, and Castor of Rhodes, and perhaps a few unknown writers. Whatever, therefore, we know, from other sources, cannot be ascribed to Africanus, we may fairly credit to Castor, especially if it agree with

what we know of his scheme of chronology. One of these extracts, relating to the Median empire, says that this kingdom lasted 269 years to the [end of the] fifty-fourth Olympiad, beginning fifty-three years before the first Olympiad, which was the fifteenth year of Uzziah, king of Judah. The Median empire began with the overthrow of Sardanapalus, king of Assyria, from whose last year to the beginning of the Assyrian empire under Ninus, Castor counts 1261 years. Therefore, Castor placed Ninus, first king of Assyria, in B.C. \(776 + 53 + 1261 = \) 2090. Both Eusebius and Syncellus make the forty-third year of Ninus to synchronize with the birth of Abram, and as they have made some remarkable and violent alterations in Assyrian chronology to produce this synchronism, it is probable that it was derived from some earlier writer. As both of these writers' lists of Assyrian kings were derived from Castor, it is fair to assume that he was the original authority for the synchronism, especially as Africanus, the only other chronologist of note before Eusebius, cannot be the source from whence it was derived, inasmuch as he placed the beginning of the Assyrian empire\(^8\) 200 years before the beginning of the kingdom of Argos. If B.C. 2090 was the first of Ninus, then Castor must have placed the birth of Abram in B.C. 2048. All the earlier chronologists are agreed in counting 505 years from the birth of Abraham to the Exodus, so that

\(^6\) Schoene, pp. 220-221.

\(^7\) After Sardanapalus, Castor has a Ninus II., with 19 years, making the total duration 1280 years.

\(^8\) Syncellus, Chronographia, ed. Dindorf, p. 236. The Exodus was placed by Africanus in B.C. 1797, in the 55th year of Phoroneus, the second king of Argos. As Inachus, the first king of Argos, has 56 years in Syncellus (p. 236), this would place the beginning of the kingdom of Argos in B.C. 1907, and the Assyrian empire in B.C. \(1907 + 199\) 2106, which is the thirty-sixth year of the patriarch Jacob in the scheme of Africanus. Counting down, from this date, 1261 years to Sardanapalus, we reach B.C. 845. Africanus placed the first Olympiad in B.C. 778, so that he would seem to have placed the end of the Assyrian empire 67 years before the first Olympiad. In Schoene, p. 214, the Assyrian list of the "Auctor Barbarus" does, in fact, end at that date. This extract is therefore from Africanus.
Castor's date for that event was probably (2048—505) B.C. 1543. Uzziah he placed, as we have seen, fifteen years before the end of the Assyrian empire, which he dates 53 years before the first Olympiad, that is, in B.C. (776 + 53 + 15 =) 844. From the second of Solomon to Uzziah the present book of Kings gives (40 — 1 =) 39 + 95 (from Rehoboam to Athaliah) + 6 Athaliah + 40 Joash + 29 Amaziah = 209 years. But Theophilus, Clemens, Africanus, and therefore probably Castor also, give thirty-nine years to Amaziah. We have, consequently, 219 years from the building of the temple to the reign of Uzziah, which would place the building of the temple in (844 + 219 =) 1063, leaving an interval of (1543—1063) 480 years between it and the Exodus.

13. There is, moreover, internal evidence that the 480 years are authentic. In Judges x. 7, 8 it is distinctly stated that the Ammonite and Philistine oppressions began in the same year, and in Judges xi. 26, Jephthah counts, in round numbers, 300 years from the last year of the wandering in the desert to the Ammonite oppression. If the whole period from the Exodus to the fourth year of Solomon was 480 years, it must be thus divided:—

1. Wandering in the desert.............................. 39 years.
2. To the Ammonite and Philistine oppressions......... 300 + x "
3. From double oppression to the fourth year of Solomon...141 — x "

Total.................. 480 "

As Jephthah speaks in round numbers, we may be sure that the second period is more than 300 and less than 350 years.

The Philistine oppression continued down to the judgeship of Samuel (1 Sam. vii. 5—14). Its duration was 40 years 7 months (see Judges xiii. 1, and compare 1 Sam. iv. 18; vi. 1; vii. 2), which is thus proved: The judgeship of Eli was twenty years (so the LXX. in 1 Sam. iv. 18—the Hebrew has 40 years), the ark was in the country of the Philistines, from the death of Eli, seven months (1 Sam. vi. 1), and its abode in Kiriath-jearim until the judgeship of Samuel was 20 years
Newly Discovered Key to Biblical Chronology.  

(1 Sam. vii. 2) and 20 y. + 7 m. + 20 y. = 40 years 7 months. The forty years of Judges xiii. 1 are a round number. According to St. Paul (Acts xiii. 20, 21), Samuel and Saul ruled together forty years. David was king for 40 years 6 months (2 Sam. v. 5), and the 480 years expire in the fourth year of Solomon. This gives us, for period 3, 40 y. 7 m. + 40 y. + 40 y. 6 m. + 4 y. = 125 y. The composition of the 480 years was, therefore, as follows:—

1. Wandering in the desert.......................... 40 years.
2. From Joshua to double oppression of Ammonites and Philistines.......................... 315 "
3. From Philistine oppression to 4 Solomon.......................... 125 "

Total.................................................. 480

14. According to Josephus, Saul reigned twenty years, which would allow the same number of years for Samuel’s judgeship, if St. Paul’s forty years (Acts xiii. 20, 21) for Samuel and Saul are correct. But Josephus has only twelve years for Samuel, or eight years less than the truth. If we examine the chronology of Eastern Canaan during period 3, we shall see at once where Josephus got his twelve years. The Ammonite oppression lasted eighteen years (Judges x. 8), after which, according to Judges xii. 7, 14, the following judges ruled: Jephthah 6 years + Ibzan 7 years + Elon 10 years + Abdon 8 years. The sum total, from the Ammonite invasion, is 49 years. Down to Saul’s first year the chronology of Western Canaan has (40 y. 7 m. + 20 y.) 61 years, so that these forty-nine years expire in the eighth of Samuel’s judgeship, leaving twelve years for Samuel’s rule over the whole land. It is only on the supposition that the period from the double oppression to Saul was sixty-one years, and that Jephthah began to judge in Eastern Canaan in the nineteenth year of the Philistine oppression over the west, that we can thus satisfactorily explain Josephus’s number.

15. From the death of Moses the book of Judges gives

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Ibid., Chap. xiii. § 5.
us the following sums down to the double oppression: Joshua x years + Oppression under Cushan Rishathaim 8 years + Judgeship of Othniel 40 years + Oppression under Eglon 18 years + Judgeship of Ehud 80 years + Oppression under Jabin 20 years + Judgeship of Deborah and Barak 40 years + Midianite oppression 7 years + Judgeship of Gideon 40 years + Abimelech 3 years + Judgeship of Tola 23 years + Judgeship of Jair 22 years. This gives us a total of 301 + x years. As the total duration of period 2 is 315 years (§ 13) the "x" of Joshua is fourteen years, and the chronology of the 480 years is as follows:—

Wandering in the desert, under Moses, 40 years..........................1438 B.C. Joshua, judge 14 years.....................................................1398 " Servitude under Cushan Rishathaim, king of Mesopotamia, 8 years.................................................................1384 " Othniel, judge. Rest for 40 years...........................................1376 " Servitude under Eglon, king of Moab, 18 years......................1336 " Ehud judge. Rest for 80 years .............................................1318 " Servitude under Jabin, king of Canaan, 20 years .................1238 " Deborah and Barak judges. Rest for 40 years ......................1218 " Servitude under Midian for 7 years......................................1178 " Gideon judges 40 years....................................................1171 " Abimelech 3 years.............................................................1131 " Tola judges 23 years..........................................................1128 " Jair judges 22 years..........................................................1105 " Ammonite oppression in the East for 18 years ......................1083 " Philistine oppression in the West for 40 years 7 months .........1083 " Eli judges Western Canaan, 20 years....................................1083 " End of Ammonite oppression. Jephthah judges 6 years ........1065 " Death of Eli and capture of the ark which remains among the Philistines 7 months......................................................1063 " Ark taken to Kiriath-jearim where it remains 20 years. Samson judges 20 years\(^11\).......................................................1062 " Ibsan judges in Eastern Canaan 7 years..................................1059 " Ebon judges in Eastern Canaan 10 years.............................1052 " End of the Philistine oppression. Samuel judges in Western Canaan and Abdon in Eastern Canaan 8 years. ..................1042 " Samuel judges the whole land 12 years.................................1034 " Saul first king of Israel 20 years...........................................1022 " David king of Israel 40 years 6 months..............................1002 "

\(^{11}\) He was born about the beginning of the Philistine oppression (see Judges xiii. 1–5), therefore he could not have been judge until about B.C. 1062, when he was about twenty years of age.
Solomon associated for 6 years (See "Key" I 23) .................. 968 "
Death of David. Solomon reigns alone 34 years ............... 962 "
4th year of Solomon ........................................ 959 "

16. From the division of the land under Joshua, which took place in the seventh year after the death of Moses to the end of the judgeship of Samuel are (1398 — 1022) 376 — 7 = 369 years, which seems to contradict St. Paul (Acts xiii. 19, 20), who appears to reckon for this interval 450 years. But the best critics are now agreed that instead of beginning at the division of the land under Joshua, these 450 years end at that point. The revised English version, based on the most ancient manuscripts, supported by the Vulgate, so reads. And if we assume that St. Paul, like his cotemporary, St. Stephen (Acts vii. 6), had in mind the 400 years of oppression in Egypt (compare Acts xiii. 17), and made that his starting-point, the 450 years—a round number—are easily explained, for the 400 years of oppression + 40 years wandering in the desert + 7 years to the division of the land under Joshua make 447 years.

17. The genealogies of the Bible, when properly explained, confirm our chronological system in the most remarkable manner. It will have been noticed, by any one who has given even the slightest attention to the subject, that these lists are constructed in symmetrical groups in which the number "seven" plays an important part. Names are dropped to secure a fixed number of generations,

12 Caleb, son of Jephunneh, was one of the spies sent by Moses to Canaan, in the second year of the wandering (Num. x. 11; compare xiii. 1-6). He was then 40 years old (Josh. xiv. 7). At the time of the division of the land he was 85 years old (Josh. xiv. 10). As the wandering in the desert, under Moses, lasted 40 years, this gives us (2+85-40) 7 years from the death of Moses to the division of the land.

13 Compare the genealogy from David to Jehoiachin, in Matthew i. 6-11 with 1 Chron. iii. 1-16. Ezra (chap. vii. 1-6) makes himself the 17th in descent from Aaron, who is placed 23 generations before the Captivity in 1 Chron. vi. 3-15. From Zadok, the cotemporary of David, to the Captivity, the 6th chapter of 1 Chronicles has 13 generations, whereas the royal line of Judah, for the same period, has 19 generations in 1 Chron. iii. Comp.
and where a genealogy is handed down in two forms, the second table, while giving the same number of generations, selects, in some cases, different names. These peculiarities occur so frequently as to preclude the idea of accident. The symmetrical and artificial arrangement of the genealogies was evidently designed for a particular purpose. What this purpose was it will now be our business to examine. The first book of Chronicles is the principal store-house of these family registers, and if we confine our attention to the genealogical tables of Jacob and his twelve sons (chap. ii.–ix.), we find that they are of very unequal length, and end at different periods. Some do not go further than the time of the Exodus, as for example the line of Ephraim (c.vii. 20–27), while others, the line of David, for instance (c. iii.), extend to the time of Ezra. An investigation in detail shows that all the lists end at one or the other of the following points: (1) The entry into Egypt in 1678 B.C. seems to be the starting-point (Gen. xlvi. 1–27). As Joseph was thirty-nine years old at that time (compare Gen. xlii. 46, 47 and xlv. 11), Judah, his brother, was probably not much more than forty-five. As he had a grown-up son, Shelah (Gen. xxxviii. 14), when his two sons Pharez and Terah (ver. 29, 30) were born, these two children must have been mere infants in 1678 B.C., yet the table (in Gen. xlvi. 13) gives two sons (Hezron and Hamul) of Pharez, who could not have been born until about 1636 B.C., as a generation, before the time of Solomon, was considered as being equal to 42 years, as we shall show in succeeding sections (§§ 19, 22, 23). Benjamin, who was but a child at the time of the going down to Egypt (Gen. xliii. 8; xlv. 20–22) has ten sons in the table of 1678 B.C. (Gen. xlvi. 21). It is clear that this list was taken from a later genealogical table made about 1636 B.C.

pare also St. Matthew’s genealogy of Christ, from Salathiel to Joseph (i. 12–16), which has 13 generations with the same genealogy in St. Luke (iii. 24–27), which has 21 generations.

(2) The second "numbering" appears to have been taken in the second year of the wandering in the desert (Num. i. 1), that is in B.C. 1437. The numbering in the last year of the wandering, in Num. xxvi., would, of course, include those born about the time of the Exodus. As the entrance into Egypt was in B.C. 1678, and Jacob's sons were then about forty-five years old, we have, from their birth to the fortieth year of the wandering (1678 + 45) 1723—1398 = 325 years, or nearly eight generations at forty-two years each. Therefore the genealogy of Asher (1 Chron. vii. 30-40), which goes down to the eighth generation, ends at the second numbering in the desert. Manasseh's genealogy (vii. 14-19), and that of Ephraim (vii. 20-29), end at the Exodus.

(3) In 1 Chron. iv. there are a number of detached genealogies of the line of Judah which appear to go down to the third generation after the Exodus, for Othniel, who married the daughter of Caleb, the son of Jephunneh, in the time of Joshua, was then about forty years old, as his father-in-law was then eighty-five, which would place Othniel's birth about the time of the Exodus. In verse 14 of 1 Chron. iv., the genealogy goes down to his grandson Ophrah. Shobal (ver. 4) was one of the "sons" of Caleb, and the "father," that is first settler, of Kirjath-jearim; therefore he was born about the same time as Othniel. His genealogy goes down to the fourth generation (iv. 1, 2): 1. Shobal, 2. Reaiah, 3. Jahath, 4. Ahumai. The remaining genealogies in this chapter, although somewhat confused and incomplete, appear to end about the third or fourth generation from the Exodus. Counting a generation as equal to forty-two years, the register from which these lists were extracted must have been made about (42 × 2) 84 years after the Exodus, that is B.C. (1438—84) = 1354.

(4) The next registration was made in the reign of David (1 Chron. xxii. 1, 2). David was born B.C. 1032 (as he was thirty years old at his accession in B.C. 1002) and the "numbering" in his reign must have ended with the generation born about his own time.
From Zabad, the great-grandson of Ahlai, one of the captains of David, to Elishama, with whom the line of Jerahmeel ends (1 Chron. ii. 37, 42) there are eleven generations. The royal line of Judah, in the eleventh generation from David, has Jotham. Meribaal (or Mephibosheth) the son of Jonathan, was five years old, at the time of David’s accession (2 Sam. iv. 4). He was therefore a cotemporary of David. Down to Azrikam, the end of the line of Benjamin (1 Chron. ix. 40–44) the descendants of Meribaal number eleven generations. This table, therefore, likewise ends in the time of Jotham. That a genealogical register was taken in his reign is expressly stated in 1 Chron. v. 17.

The last registration of genealogies was made in the times of Ezra and Nehemiah. The line of David ends there, for the Hattush, grandson of Shecaniah, of 1 Chron. iii. 22, is evidently the same as the "Hattush of the sons of Shecaniah," whose son, Daniel, was one of those who "went up from Babylon" with Ezra in B.C. 458 (Ezra viii. 1–3).

We have then six registers which appear to have been made about the following periods: (1) B.C. 1638; (2) B.C. 1438; (3) B.C. 1354; (4) B.C. 1032; (5) B.C. 757–748; (6) B.C. 458. Now if we bear in mind that a generation, before the time of David, was counted as forty-two years, the intervals between these various genealogical registers are all seven generations apart from some fixed chronological epoch. Seven generations are 294 years, and adding 294 years to B.C. 458 we come to B.C. 752, in the reign of Jotham (the 5th registration). Add 294 years to B.C. 752, and we come to B.C. 1046, or just before the birth of David (4th registration). Add 294 years to B.C. 1046 and we come to B.C. 1340—that is (1438–1340) 98 years after the Exodus, or in the third generation after that date, at which point the third registration must be placed as we have shown above. If we go up 294 years higher we come to (1340 + 294) B.C. 1634, when the first registration of the sons and grandsons of Jacob must have been made. If we place the birth of the sons of Jacob about forty-five or fifty years before B.C. 1678, or in
b. c. 1728, then 294 years down from that point will bring us to b. c. 1434, or about the time of the second registration under Moses.

18. As 294 years are equal to seven generations of forty-two years each, or six jubilee periods, and as each of the dates of the preceding six genealogical registrations, at one of which all the lists in the Bible end, are jubilee periods, it is a fair assumption that the genealogies were arranged in multiples of seven, and that they were connected with jubilee periods as convenient mnemonic points of departure; and that they are, in fact, chronological in their intention. A consideration of the genealogy of Christ, in the Gospel of St. Matthew (chap. i.), confirms this view and throws additional light on the structure and purposes of these table. The genealogy in question consists of, nominally, forty-two generations, from Abraham to Joseph, the reputed father of Jesus, divided into three divisions of fourteen generations each. However, when we come to examine the table in detail it appears that there are, in reality, only forty generations, for David and Jehoiachin do double duty: the first is the last of the first division and first of the second division, and Jehoiachin is the last generation of the second division and the first generation of the third division. Now it is certainly remarkable that in our restoration of biblical chronology there are (1967—4) 1963 years, or only three years more than forty jubilee periods, from the birth of Abraham to the birth of Christ, allowing exactly a jubilee for each generation.

19. One of the cardinal divisions of St. Matthew's genealogy begins with the birth of Jehoiachin, which, as has been shown, ("Key" § 14) must be placed in b. c. 605—a jubilee period. From Jehoiachin to Joseph, the reputed father of Christ, there are, in this genealogy, fourteen generations. As these tables are all connected with jubilee periods we will take the one immediately preceding the birth of Christ, viz., b. c. 17, as the probable terminus of the scheme, and if we deduct it from 605 we get 588 years, or twelve jubilee peri-
ods, which gives forty-two years for each of the fourteen generations.

If we assume the same number of years for each generation in the second division of fourteen generations, we get \((605 + 588) 1193\) B.C. for the birth of David, which is \((1193−1032) 161\) years too high, if we count from the real date of David's birth, or \((1193−1046) 147\) years too high if we count from the nearest jubilee period to his birth. If, however, we count down from 1046 B.C. the 588 years end at 458 B.C.—the beginning of a 490 years' cycle—and it is clear, if the fourteen generations are to be preserved, as a symmetrical division, that St. Matthew, in order to give a symmetrical division of three periods of fourteen generations each, has placed his third division \((605−458) 147\) years too high. These 147 years are equal to three and one-half generations of forty-two years each, and as the beginning of the scheme places Abraham \((1193+588)\) in B.C. 1781 or \((1928−1781) 147\) years too low, if we count from the first jubilee period in the life of Abraham, it is probable that the original table had \((42+3\frac{1}{2}) 45\frac{1}{2}\) generations,* at 42 years each, which must be thus divided:

\[
\begin{align*}
(1) & \text{21 generations from Abraham to David} = \ldots \ldots \ldots 882 \text{ years} 1928 \text{ B.C.} \\
(2) & \text{14 generations from David to the time of Ezra} = \ldots \ldots 588 \ldots \ldots 1046 \ldots \\
(3) & \text{10}\frac{1}{2} \text{ generations from the time of Ezra to B.C. 17} = \ldots \ldots 458 \ldots \\
\hline
\text{Total} & \ldots \ldots \ldots 1911 \ldots \\
\end{align*}
\]

As we have shown in our former article ("Key" § 9) from Solomon the average generation was twenty-one years. This would give us, for the third division, just twenty-one generations at twenty-one years each. As David is the last of the generations of forty-two years, he must be counted as equivalent to two generations of twenty-one years each, and as Jehoiachin is counted twice in St. Matthew's original scheme, we would have, down to B.C. 605, another period

\[\text{St. Luke has 21 generations from Salathiel to Joseph (iii. 24–27) in place of the 13 of St. Matthew.}\]
of 441 years, or 21 generations of 21 years each, leaving, between B.C. 605 and B.C. 458, 7 generations of 21 years each. This would give us the following, as the final original form of the table:

1. 21 generations from Abraham to David inclusive at 42 years each = ........................................ 882 years 1928 B.C.
2. 21 generations from David to Jehoiachin at 21 years each = ........................................ 441 " 1046 "
3. 7 generations from Jehoiachin to the time of Ezra at 21 years each = ........................................ 147 " 605 "
4. 21 generations from the time of Ezra to Joseph, at 21 years each = ........................................ 441 " 458 "

Total ................................ 1911 "

20. The present scheme of St. Matthew has fourteen generations from Abraham to David, but, as we have just seen, the original scheme had twenty-one, so that seven generations have been omitted. As Salmon the son of Nahason appears to have been one of the original settlers in Canaan (1 Chron. ii. 51), he was probably born about the time of the Exodus, in B.C. 1438. The nearest jubilee period before the entrance into Egypt in B.C. 1678, was in B.C. 1732, at which date we may, approximately, place the birth of Judah. From 1732 to 1438 are 294 years, which requires just seven generations at forty-two years each. St. Matthew has only six, viz., Judah, Pharez, Hezron, Ram, Amminadab, and Nahason, so that one of the missing or suppressed seven generations belongs before the Exodus, and the other six belong to the period between the Exodus and David. As St. Matthew has, for this interval, only five generations, viz., Salmon, Booz, Obed, Jesse, and David, the original list must have had (5 + 6) 11 to David, or 12 to Solomon inclusive. Now twelve generations, at forty-two years each, are 504 years, which will extend, in our chronology, from B.C. 1438, to

b. c. 934, or six years before the death of Solomon, showing a perfect harmony with and confirmation of the 480 years.


\[\text{Verse 43 has a Shimei as father of Zimmah, but by comparing the parallel list in ver. 16-21 it will be seen that he is an interpolation. This is also the opinion of Lord Hervey, Genealogies of our Lord, p. 211, note.}\]

\[\text{In the present text of the first book of Chronicles this genealogy is mixed up with that of Ahimoth or Mahoth, but Lord Arthur Hervey, in his Genealogies of our Lord (pp. 214-218, note), has successfully disentangled the two lines.}\]

Now if we count from the approximate date of the birth of the sons of Jacob, viz., 1732 B.C., to the jubilee period just before the birth of David, viz., 1046 B.C., we have just 686 years, or fourteen jubilee periods, that is, in all of these eight genealogies a generation was counted as being equal to a jubilee period. This is further confirmed by analyzing these lists into their two principal divisions (1) from 1732 to the Exodus, and (2) from the Exodus to the birth of David. From 1732 to 1438 are 294 years, which will require six generations of forty-nine years each down to the

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10 Similar cases occur elsewhere, thus Salmon is the son of Caleb in one place and the son of Nahason in another, and Salathiel is the son of Zorobabel in St. Matthew and of Neri in St. Luke.
Exodus, and eight generations of forty-nine years from the
Exodus to the time of David. That this division is recog-
nized in Scripture is clear: (1) Caleb, son of Jephunneh, was
eighty-five years old at the time of Joshua’s conquest of
Canaan (Josh. xiv. 10), he therefore belongs to the gene-
ration preceding the Exodus: he is the sixth in descent from
Judah. (2) Salmon, the son of Nahason, was the “father”
(that is, first settler) of Bethlehem (1 Chron. ii. 51), he was
therefore born about the time of the Exodus: he is seventh
in descent from Judah. (3) The genealogy of Samuel (1
Sam. i. 1) goes back to Zophai, probably the first settler of
Ramathaim-Zophim, hence born about the time of the
Exodus: he is the seventh in descent from Levi. (4) The
daughters of Zelophehad (Num. xxvii. 1) were probably
born at or after the time of the Exodus, as we first hear of
them in the fortieth year of the wandering in the desert.
This is proved by their genealogy: they are seventh in de-
of Saul (1 Sam. ix. 1) goes back to a certain Benjamin, who,
in analogy with the genealogy of Samuel in the same book,
was probably the first settler in Canaan. Down to Jon-
athan, the son of Saul, we have the following series: 1. Ben-
7. Saul, 8. Jonathan. As Jonathan at his death left a son
five years old, he was probably about the same age as
David. Hence these eight generations agree exactly with the
number required from the Exodus to David.

22. Eight generations (or jubilee periods), from the
Exodus in B.C. 1438 to David, would give us, to B.C. 948,
ten generations. We have shown that St. Matthew’s author-
ity must have had twelve generations at forty-two years each
for the same period. There are sufficient traces remaining to
show that while the arrangement by jubilees was the
general mnemonic disposition of the genealogies, the actual
number of generations was counted at forty-two years each.
(1) Several of the genealogies, just considered, appear in
two versions, in which, while the number of generations remain the same, the names do not always agree. It has been held that these variations represent the same persons mentioned in the other list under a different name. We prefer to assume that they are separate generations purposely suppressed to bring out the reckoning by jubilees. The following lists have the lacking two generations: (a) The genealogy of Mahath has, in the second list, for Nos. 9, 10, Zephaniah and Azariah. (b) Asaph’s second list has for Nos. 5 and 8 the variations Joah and Jeaterai. (c) Saul’s genealogy offers the following omissions: Matri (1 Sam. x. 21) and Jehiel (1 Chron. ix. 35).

(2) The genealogy of Gad (1 Chron. v. 11–15; compare verse 10) goes down to the days of Saul. The first of the line, Guni, “chief of the house of their fathers” (verse 15), cannot be identified with any of the sons or descendants of Gad in Num. xxxvi. 15. He is, therefore, probably the first settler of that family in Canaan, and born about the time of the Exodus. The full number of generations, to Saul inclusive, at forty-two years each, would be ten. This genealogy has the same number: 1. Guni, 2. Abdiel, 3. Buzahi, 4. Jahdo, 5. Jehishai, 6. Michael, 7. Gilead, 8. Jaroah, 9. Huri, 10. Abihail. The children of No. 10 (verse 13) give us an eleventh generation contemporaneous with David.

23. The additional generation required before the Exodus (§ 20) is proved (1) by the variation Izhar for Ammimadab, in the genealogy of Levi. (2) The line of Asher, as has already been shown (§ 17) goes down to the second numbering of Moses. The eight generations are (1 Chron. vii. 30–39) as follows: 1. Asher, 2. Beriah, 3. Heber, 4. Hotham or Helem (comp. verses 32 and 35), 5. Zophah, 6. Ithran or Jether, 7. Ulla, 8. Arah. (3) Joshua’s genealogy (1. Chron. vii. 20–27) is obscure. If we may assume that the Laadan of verse 26 is the same as the Eleadah of verse 20, then we should have just seven generations to the Exodus: 1. Joseph, 2. Ephraim, 3. Eleadah or Laadan, 4. Ammihud, 5. Elishama, 6. Nun, 7. Joshua. As Joshua
was 110 years old when he died (Josh. xxiv. 29.) and as his judgeship lasted fourteen years, that is \((40 + 14)\) 54 years after the Exodus, he was \((110 - 54)\) 56 years old in 1438 B.C., and therefore belongs to the generation preceding the Exodus.

24. The testimony of the genealogies might be extended much further if necessary, as only a few nuggets from this unexplored mine have been produced. Sufficient evidence has been given, it is hoped, to show conclusively that no curtailment of the 480 years between the Exodus and the building of the temple can be admitted, and it therefore necessarily follows that the Exodus from Egypt cannot be placed lower than B.C. 1438. If we have succeeded in establishing this point it will follow, as a matter of course, that Menephthah, the son of Rameses the Great, is not the Pharaoh of the Exodus, since no Egyptologist, except Lauth,\(^{20}\) places his reign as high as B.C. 1438. The association of Menephthah with the Hebrew Exodus has almost reached the dignity of an article of faith in the present Egyptologist's creed, and it will probably be regarded as a kind of heresy for anyone to question the synchronism. Almost every late work on Egypt seems to accept it as a matter of course. Yet when we come to analyze the arguments on which it is based, as first set forth in Lepsius's Chronologie der Ägypter,\(^{21}\) as has been ably done by Lieblein (Ägyptische Chronologie, pp. 42-44) and Nash,\(^{22}\) it will be seen at once that they rest on a very unsubstantial basis. We do not propose here to examine either the arguments for or against this opinion. If it can be shown that Menephthah was not the Pharaoh who was reigning in B.C. 1438, then it will need no further argument to show that his reputed connection with the Exodus must be given up. It will, accordingly, be our business in the next paper to go into a searching examination of

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\(^{20}\) He identifies him with the Pharaoh of the Exodus, and ends his reign in B.C. 1491 (see Ägypten's Vorzeit, p. 332).


\(^{22}\) See also chap. v. of Nash's Pharaoh of the Exodus.
Egyptian chronology, in which we hope to establish, by incontrovertible astronomical evidence, that our restoration, based entirely on internal evidence furnished by the Egyptian dynastic lists themselves, when compared with our system of biblical chronology, agrees with it at every point where the two chronologies come in contact. A most remarkable series of synchronisms between Egyptian and biblical history will be evolved by merely comparing the two chronologies together, which will prove, to demonstration, that both schemes tell exactly the same story. In the course of the investigation it will be shown that the Pharaoh of the Exodus was reigning in B.C. 1438, and that Egyptian tradition, confirmed by astronomy, places the Exodus exactly in that year.
ARTICLE V.

THE ECONOMY OF PAIN.

BY THE REV. HENRY HAYMAN, D. D., ALDINGHAM, ENGLAND.

[Continued from page 31.]

PROOF OF THE CORRUPTION OF MANKIND.

From crowded cities.—As some distinguished modern authorities, to say nothing of earlier ones, impugn the belief in human corruption which enters so deeply into my present subject, it may be worth while to spend a few words upon it. I would, however, refer to the Duke of Argyll's "Unity of Nature" (chap. ix., "On the Moral Character of Man"), for some most valuable remarks on the subject.¹ It is, further, worth while noticing the fact that the ethical influence which human beings exert upon one another is

¹Some such remarks are as follows: "That which is really exceptional, and indeed absolutely singular in man [as compared with lower orders of creation] is the persistent tendency of his development to take a wrong direction... Man has been, and still is, a constant prey to appetites which are morbid—to opinions which are irrational—to imaginations which are horrible—to practices which are destructive... An element of confusion amidst universal order. Powers exceptionally high spending themselves in activities exceptionally base, the desire and the faculty of acquiring knowledge coupled with the desire and the faculty of turning it to the worst account; instincts immeasurably superior to those of other creatures, alongside of conduct and of habits very much below the level of the beast... The general fact is this—first, that man is prone to set up and to invent standards of obligation which are low, false, mischievous, and even ruinous; and secondly, that when he has become possessed of standards of obligation which are high, and true, and beneficent, he is prone, first, to fall short in the observance of them, and next, to suffer them, through various processes of decay, to be obscured and lost" (pp. 365, 367, 371, 372, 373, ed. 1884).
multiplied through the closeness of their contact in all the relations of life. They come into the closest contact in great cities. Further, where that ethical influence is greatest, the ethical tendency must be most pronounced for good or for evil; just as the denser your galaxy of stars, the more brilliant, the denser your cloud of smoke, the more opaque. Now which of these two best typifies the densely massed population of a great city? Take any thousand from a spot where the density is at a maximum, and, if good predominated in human nature, they must needs be more virtuous than an equal number where they are spread out over, say, ten square miles. But every test which human experience can apply shows the directly opposite result. Population at a maxi-

*It seems to me that this might be most clearly exhibited by a simple arithmetical formula. Let the good and evil tendencies in the average individual be supposed so nearly balanced as to be represented by two consecutive numbers in the scale, say by 10 and 9, and the question to be, Is the good to the evil as 10:9, or vice versa? Place two such, A and B, in such close proximity that the influence of each on the other, for good and evil, is at its maximum. This should, I think, be represented by all the units of good in A being multiplied by all those in B, and so also the units of evil. This would give 10 x 10 x 9, or 100:81, i.e., the disproportion (on which ever side it may rest) is now nearly 10:8 which before was 10:9. Instead of two, take six persons, and, performing the same process, we arrive at 10 x 10 x 10 x 10 x 10 x 10:9 x 9 x 9 x 9 x 9 x 9, i.e., 1,000,000: 531,441, which is little short of 2:1; and of course the more factors we introduce, the greater will be the disparity. But since experience clearly shows that humanity closely massed becomes more vicious, it must be the evil, not the good, which is in this ratio of 2:1, and therefore in the detached average specimen, which formed our initial assumption, it must be the evil, not the good, which preponderates. Some high authorities, I believe, demur to representing good and evil as arithmetical units. But as they exist in human beings, good and evil mean here the moral forces which determine conduct, and I cannot see why we may not measure them in units as we do mechanical forces or degrees of heat and cold. It may be that some more complicated function than a simple product of units would more fitly express the complete influence of character upon character. But assuming moral forces expressed in units, there must be a proportion capable of being stated between whatever functions we prefer to represent them by: and those functions, however combined, must, in order to express the increase of moral force by closer contact, be so combined as to accumulate disparity, and this must still show, under whatever complications, an original disparity on the same side.
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Mum of density shows vice at a maximum of intensity. There may be here and there a virtue which closeness of proximity tends to nurture and stimulate; but taking human nature all round, it is the germs of vice in the humanity thus inspissated, which seem to find genial surroundings and for ever to flourish and abound. Crowded cities, in short, exhibit human nature in its concentrated essence. Varying in their degree of depravity known and recorded, which is probably only a fraction of that existing as a whole, they universally confirm one another in the verdict, that condensation of humanity means concentration of vice, alike in quantity and in quality. But extreme cases only exhibit more clearly tendencies which are universal. All human beings are constructed ultimately of the same primary moral elements variously mixed. Therefore the tendency which

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As regards the moral statistics of great cities see an article, in the Bibliotheca Sacra, Jan. 1885, founded on the researches of Von Oettingen, a German statistician, from which I extract the following: "As a rule, the married of both sexes are less criminal than the unmarried. . . . In Berlin crime among the married rose from 47.3 in 1873 to 49.1 in 1878" for men, and "from 42.9 to 52.9" for women (p. 56). Again, "the [same] city has grown very rapidly in the past thirty years, but prostitution has grown twice as fast as the population. As marriages decrease, harlots increase, and run a deadly parallel with increasing suicide. In 1845 there were 600 lewd women under police oversight; in 1875 there were 2,241; in 1879, 2,767; in 1880, 3,033. . . . Of the 15,000 servant girls who come annually to Berlin, 4,000, we are told, fall a prey to the destroyer. . . . Of 1000 such women in Berlin 192 live in their father's house, 137 of them are under 20, and 22 under 15 years of age (1874). . . . These women, especially in Berlin, have also particular male followers, the so-called Louis, who keep them at their vile trade, live off their earnings, and in conflict with law or police defend them. There are supposed to be 4,000 such in the city of Berlin" (pp. 64, 65). Similar statistical facts are given for London and Paris; but "compared with Berlin the prostitution of Paris and London is stationary" (p. 64); and "Hamburg is, if possible, even worse than Berlin." Still, in London "there is one harlot for every seven women" (p. 64), and "about 27,000 unknown children are sent annually—nearly half the birth-rate of the city—from Paris to 18,000 nurses in the suburbs" (p. 62). Von Oettingen's Moralstatistik reached its third edition in 1882, I believe, without its estimates being seriously impugned then or since.
comes out so strongly in every mass must pre-exist in every unit, and this is 'what is meant' by the moral corruption of man’s nature.

From the contact of civilized with savage man.—Again, take another extreme case as illustrative of tendency, in the outer zone where now for three centuries civilized and savage man have met. The passing of the electric spark of civilization to the latter seems inevitably to shatter and destroy him. The powers which dominate at the point of contact are vicious, on the whole, and therefore destructive of the weaker. Civilization, defective in the moral element as Mr. Buckle proclaims it to be, means power, and power undirected by virtuous principle proportionately strong, seems inevitably to tend to vice. This tendency is obscured in a mixed mass where all share the same power. The specialty which brings it clearly out is the absolute helplessness of the uncivilized in the presence of the "strong man armed" with all the resources of civilization. He fires the mind of the savage with more ardent passions, inoculates his body with strange diseases, finds the most acceptable objects to him are strong drink and fire-arms, alike weapons of precision and of destruction, and supplies him freely with these means of suicide and internecine strife. Thus it has come about that the greater part of the aborigines who filled, though sparsely, mountain and forest two centuries ago have withered and died before our contact, as completely as if stamped out by massacre; whilst the remnants which remain require all the vigilance of authority and all the fostering influence of the most humanizing of religions to keep them from extermination. Their incapacity for human vice is the sole but sufficient protection to our domesticated animals. But for this, they likewise would wither away at our touch, and we should be forced continually to recruit flock and herd from the wild creatures of the prairie and the steppe. Man, in short, carries his innate corruption with him. When wielding power which relatively to a weaker race is absolute, the stronger race is set free from the re-
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straints imposed by that law which is strong in proportion to the race itself,—its native tendencies start forth unchecked. And as the stronger race is impressive of them, so the weaker is receptive of the same, because the same moral elements variously mixed are present in both. But being weaker the savage has no moral stamina to resist their potency. In him those tendencies are realized at once or speedily; and their true nature, checked and tempered in a thousand ways in a stronger average individual and a thoroughly organized society, is at once revealed as by a crucial experiment. The result is the destruction of the savage, and except those tendencies were more powerful for evil than for good, that result could not be; and this dominance of evil tendencies is what is meant by the corruption of man's nature. This sufficiently shows the fallacy of Mr. Buckle's reasoning, that "mankind at large has far more virtue than vice," and that, "if this were otherwise, the preponderance of evil would long since have destroyed the human race." It does always tend to destroy, and where it works without restraint, it actually destroys.

PAIN CLAIMS A FUNCTION MORALLY, AS WELL AS PHYSICALLY AND MENTALLY.

To claim for an imperfect being perfect surroundings, and for a corrupt being completely wholesome surroundings, is probably to claim that which in nature is impossible and in reason is absurd. Given a morally corrupt humanity, an unblemished physique for the same seems to contradict all that we know of the ubiquitous interaction of moral and physical laws, and of the interdependence of the moral and physical elements of our nature, upon each other. As we might suppose these in their perfect state to harmonize, so we may expect that in their defects and drawbacks they correspond. For such creatures a discipline is plainly needed; and that any discipline without pain as a factor would be able to stem the tide of depravity, and to arrest the lapse of perpetual degeneracy, is more than we can venture to affirm. Thus we
need not be surprised that pain possible and actual has so wide a range as we find it to have.

Thus it seems antecedently on moral grounds inevitable that pain should find a place in our economy. Its physically defensive and intellectually stimulant uses have been noticed already; and thus, if it is operative in those two great spheres of our being with wholesome results, there arises some further presumption that in the third, the moral, it is not inert for good.

HOW PARTICULAR PAINS ACT ON THE MORAL SENSE.

To all who admit a moral sense as furnishing a standard of conduct to man's governing faculty, whether that sense be innate, implanted, or acquired, the following remarks will have their force. Others will explain away into necessary functions of the organism the phenomena with which they deal. Pain, while active, may be so acute as to disable reflection; but when past, it promotes it, and specially prompts the question, What is there which my will can alter which might relieve me of this affliction or prevent its recurrence? One's own consciousness, or the authority of others competent to advise, tells him, let us suppose, that the cause is his own over-indulgence. Reflection suggests that indulgence to excess is vicious, contrary to some law of his nature, and to whatever higher law he may acknowledge. Of the reality and binding force of those laws he was imperfectly, for practical purposes, conscious before. Pain by its own intense reality in the physical sphere brings home to him the cogency of those laws in the moral, and suggests that relief is possible only by fulfilling them. And here conscience, which is the moral sense reacting self-judicially, to whatever extent it is developed within him, intervenes to remind him that that moral sense has been outraged, and his conduct has been the folly of one who knows the rule of right and does it not. If by the pain, while it lasted, his will has been beaten down and his resolutions frustrated, reflection points out that his will, yielding to some appetite through depraved choice, was
the primary cause of this folly, and that this prostration of the will is a retribution in kind for not duly exerting it when he might. Further, his own partial experience, reinforced by the example of others, warns him that the prostrating pains thus caused by excess are a foretaste of the total ruin which excess is apt to bring.

WHY THIS MORAL INFLUENCE OF PAIN IS OF UNCERTAIN EFFICACY.

No doubt in many cases the moral sense and the conscience, its judicial exponent, are too feebly developed for the stimulus thus given to their action to expel the *vis inertiae* of indulgence in which the will stagnates. But this only confirms further what was said above (page 4) of the demoralizing influence of pleasure. The disciplinal efficacy of pain may indeed be wholly baffled by that demoralizing power. Further, the executive efficacy of conscience depends on loyal obedience promptly rendered to its dictates. That efficacy, through facile disobedience stimulated by the hope of pleasure, is rapidly weakened; like a pendulum which, yielding to friction, swings through an arc smaller and smaller, and at last stands still. When this is so, the corruption of nature reinforced by habit has done its full work. But as these facts where they occur are no disproof of the proper authority of the moral sense, so they are no disproof of the disciplinal influence of pain.

ANALOGY OF PAIN, AS ACTING IN THE PHYSICAL SPHERE AND IN THE MORAL.

For indeed pain so acting in the moral sphere is precisely analogous to the way in which it guides man with reference to his physical surroundings. Suppose some poisonous herb or berry swallowed, on which internal pains give a warning of danger. The sufferer, if he survives, learns what to avoid; only the moral sense is not called into action in the process, and there is no seducing influence of pleasure concerned, to mislead his will through appetite. His sense of self-preservation is all that needs rousing; and is most likely
effectually roused, because the corruption of nature has left that in untouched power. In the other case, the balance against that seduction of pleasure requires to be restored, and the authority of the moral sense enforced; but that is precisely what the corruption of nature has weakened. Therefore the disciplinal efficacy of pain is precarious and uncertain. But as pleasure and its seductive influence are moral realities, so are pain and its disciplinal influence.

TO UNDERSTAND PAIN AND ITS ATTENDANT PHENOMENA WE MUST STUDY MAN AS A WHOLE.

It seems then proved that pain is capable of such disciplinal influence and is designed to exert it. And if this is true of the particular pains which follow excess, and where we can plainly trace this influence; so it is presumably true of pain generically, even in cases where its disciplinal office is obscure. This being so, it seems idle to study the problem of pain in the physical sphere only; and a presumption is raised, that any surplus, if such there be, of pain above referred to, is concerned with that disciplinal office. In short, if we seek to know why pain has so wide a range in human experience we must study man as a whole; for as a whole he suffers, even to the prostration of the will and the incapacity to give effect to resolutions, although the primary incidence of pain may be in his physical economy. And the same presumption extends to the phenomena which attend on pain, such as its unequal distribution, and its not following any recognizable law of moral desert. These last phenomena which seem to a superficial observer to set pain against the moral law, and to load it with an insuperable objection, may, I think, be shown to be, on the contrary, the only conditions under which it could conduce to moral ends.

OBSERVATIONS FORMULATED, AND SHOWN TO LIE, AS REGARDS UNEQUAL DISTRIBUTION, AGAINST THE NATURE OF MAN.

For indeed the string of indignant and impatient queries urged above (page 19) really imply no more than two or
at most three objections: (1) The distribution of pain is unequal; (2) It does not follow moral desert; (3) It does not follow any recognizable law. These facts are alleged as offending our moral sense. Here, in the first place, I think, the objector is bound to show that a different distribution would better serve the end in view, supposed disciplinal, *i. e.*, moral. I believe it not only impossible to show this, but that all the tendencies point the other way. But here, firstly, notice that, if (1) is a legitimate objection, (2) ceases to be so, and *vice versa*. For if the distribution of pain ought to be (whether on grounds of justice or any other) equal, it could not follow moral deserts, which are manifestly unequal; and if bound to follow moral deserts, it could not possibly be equal. But, further, when we talk of equalizing pain, the question arises, Is men’s capacity for pain uniform? It seems to be established, even as regards physical pain, that it is not, and this inequality seems to extend, as before mentioned, to entire races. And when we pass to the moral sphere of emotional pain the disparity of their capacities becomes enormous. I will not further dwell on this latter fact at present. But, taken as facts, these inequalities imply a presumption arising from our nature itself against an equal distribution of pain in fact. They show that there is, pre-established in ourselves and fundamental, something which prepares for inequality of distribution and forbids equality; although it is no part of my argument that the disproportion in actual pain is analogous, even approximately, to that of capacity for it. Some will perhaps go on to object to that inequality of capacity. They might as well contend at once that all men should be equally long-lived, should be each six feet high, and have skins of the same color.

UNEQUAL DISTRIBUTION AGREEABLE TO UNIVERSAL ANALOGY; EQUAL DISTRIBUTION WOULD BE PARADOXICAL.

For indeed, if we look round nature, human and other, we shall see everywhere a total absence of equality, uniformity, and, in this sense, of regularity. Intellectually, human vari-
lations range from the zero of idiotcy to the colossal dimensions of Plato or St. Augustine or Isaac Newton, and morally those variations, although more difficult to measure, are probably greater still. But I will take one only of man's more ordinary faculties, and the one which in its results is most measurable and most marketable, the faculty of acquiring material wealth. Men sort themselves under inequalities in this respect, at least as enormous as those of the pains which they endure; and physical suffering is only like material wealth, if it has a tendency to run into lumps wholly irrespective of moral desert. If that suffering were equally apportioned, it would be the one exception of equality in an universe of inequalities. It is not inequality, but its opposite, which would constitute a paradox. But in order to meet the objection more fully, let us suppose equality to prevail, and note the morally certain consequences.

A LOW AND EQUABLE PAIN-TAX AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.

If then each human being were to receive from the total quantum of pain among mankind an equal dividend regularly distributed (for if irregularly, some of the results of inequality would be retained), that dividend would be very small, while the regularity of the incidence would enable men to discount it beforehand. Such a low rate of pain-tax levied equally and regularly upon all would be closely analogous to a restraint upon certain activities for some hours, or perhaps minutes, only of each week. We should know it to be inevitable, accept it as a law of nature, turn it to the utmost possible account as an excuse for duties undone, grumble at it while it lasted as at a November fog or a sirocco wind, and altogether escape from any disciplinal effects of it. Being normal and fixed, it would be taken into account in all the arrangements of life, but its disciplinal effect would be as utterly nil as if the average temperature of the earth were a degree higher or lower.

And further, the preservative and didactic uses of pain would be greatly jeopardized. For the system we are
supposing seems to postulate a practical limiting of human capacity for pain. For, if no one were ever to suffer more than a small limited amount, however in theory we suppose that capacity maintained, it is clear that in practice, on which human life and progress chiefly depend, the result would be as if that capacity were absolutely limited. We have seen how at present a minimum of pain for these uses suffices, because of our capacity for a maximum. I fail to see how that wise and tender economy could be retained in man and nature; how human progress, with its stimulus thus blunted from the very beginning, would be more than infinitesimal; or even in numberless supposable cases human life preserved. We can escape from this deadlock of the wheel only by assuming deeper and indeed fundamental changes in the relations of nature and man, and probably in man himself.

A HIGH AND EQUABLE PAIN-TAX AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.

If this disciplinal inefficiency were sought to be remedied by doubling or trebling the amount to each, there would be two or three times as much pain in the world as there is, but still I do not believe any disciplinal effect would be gained. It would rather resemble the tax of a tyrant who grinds all alike and squanders the proceeds in thriftless waste. Further, the heavier pain-tax would seriously disable men from their needful business, and increase the difficulty of living, at every turn. Indeed, if the suffering were simultaneous to all, it may be doubted if the needful business of life could go on. Let us suppose, however, that it came at different times to different men, thus enabling them to tend one another. This would be done merely as commercial exchange is effected now, leaving no sense of obligation and no gratitude behind. Disinterested benevolence in the relief of such suffering would be nearly impossible. At any rate there would be a declaration in the system of nature against it, and the tendency of this quid pro quo system would be to extinguish, not to promote it, and, thus outweighed in the scale, it must in the
course of ages die out of human nature. All men would be
fellow-sufferers everywhere without sympathy anywhere.
Selfishness and impatience combined could be the moral re-
sult of such equal distribution, while the preservative and
didactic uses of pain would still be jeopardized as before.

PAIN DISTRIBUTED ACCORDING TO MORAL DESERT (STRICKLY
TAKEN) AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.

We next proceed to consider the consequences of distribu-
tion of pain according to moral desert. But let us first try
to understand what this means. It may mean and, strictly
taken, ought to mean, that a perfect standard of morals is to
be applied to men by a perfect insight into their characters,
and pain then distributed according to desert so adjudged;
varying not only as between man and man, but in each
individual man as his deserts might vary. It is plain that
such moral spoon-feeding must revolutionize the world.
But before attempting to trace its consequences, we may
observe that to give this effect we must either call in the
preternatural, or we must alter human nature. For if the
proportion between suffering undergone and moral desert
were not perceived by the sufferer and by human society,
how could the alleged offence to the moral sense be removed?
And how is it other than impossible for that proportion, de-
pending on a perfect standard applied by perfect insight, to
be perceived by our corrupt instincts and our superficial
faculties? A distinct revelation in each individual case would
on this basis be required to give the scheme effect. Or else
man must be supposed equipped with a perfect moral sense
and a perfect insight. The moral revolution thus caused
would be total; and short of this revolution the scheme could
not take effect. But, although it cannot be justly required
to argue out such extravagant conditions, one may add that
it is not easy to see how vice could prevail in such a society
at all. And with vice would disappear virtue, as we now
understand it. This, however, I pass by for the present, to
remark that, with the disappearance of vice, pain, which
follows moral desert, would by hypothesis disappear also. So that we arrive at this result, either a resort must be had to preternatural intervention, or the distribution of pain according to moral desert thus understood is only suited to a society in which there is no pain to distribute.

OR ACCORDING TO A MORE POPULAR STANDARD, AND ITS CONSEQUENCES.

But to give the objection every possible advantage, let us mend our assumption, and suppose the moral standard, not as perfect, but so far as each man recognized it, to furnish his standard of desert for violating it, and his moral insight merely such as to make perceptible to him the proportion between pain and moral desert at that standard. This last is indeed an undue assumption, clogged with difficulties, and involving an altered basis of human nature. But I waive this for the present and make the objector a present of the assumption. Firstly, it seems certain that the current quantum of pain in humanity must be largely increased in order to yield an appreciable dividend pro rata even at this defective standard. For man being corrupt, and, whatever moral standard he owns, prone to fall dismally below it, pain, which now in large and fixed amounts is rare and exceptional, must become frequent to be pro rata appreciable. Thus human suffering would be greatly increased. But would proportionate disciplinal effects follow? I think that, on the contrary, thus too, they would be greatly jeopardized, in short, that virtue would vanish from mankind.

THE PROBABLE RESULT, PHARISAISM AND PUBLICANISM.

We are here supposing a very complex system at work, and must speak with due circumspection and reserve in pronouncing on its probable results. But taking mankind to be still in other respects as we know them, this new economy would tend, as the actual one does, to different results in different men—in some to the indulging of their propensities at the certain expense of their skins, in others to refraining
under salutary terror. For the former it would _prima facie_ convert the world into a purgatory. Schopenhauer's description of it as "a penal settlement" would for them be literally true. In the latter it would tend to substitute the dread of consequences for every higher motive. We cannot, of course, exclude that dread from any ethical system; but such an extension of it would plainly violate all the proportions of our ethical structure. Further, as the fact of suffering would be proof patent of moral delinquency; mankind would tend to divide into two hostile camps, the one ostracizing the other as social lepers. The two all-absorbing types of distinction would correspond roughly with those of the Pharisee and Publican, but with a fixed and widened gulf between them. In short, "God, I thank thee that I am not as [those] other men are," would be the only form of religion, if any, which could survive. The whole area of compassionate feeling for suffering of pain would be burnt up in an arid desert of censoriousness, while that of active beneficence would be enormously narrowed; for who would presume to relieve the victim of righteous retribution recognized as such? The office of Good Samaritan, unless as between these social lepers themselves, would be extinct, and that universal bond of sympathy in which uncertain suffering unites us at present would be cancelled. A set of self-righteous men with no pains to relieve, would surely be the ossification of all virtue.

**HUMAN CORRECTIVE JUSTICE WOULD BE SUPERSEDED, TO THE DETRIMENT OF MANKIND.**

Further, moral delinquency being thus far self-detective, the form in which hypocrisy would determine would be for men to attempt to conceal not their vices but their pains. Then, if any large number succeeded by self-discipline in doing so until these became intolerable, it seems certain that to make the system efficient a largely increased _quantum_ of pain would be called for. And I suppose it must further follow that no scope would be left for human corrective
justice, or only the function of assessing further pains, in case those of natural consequence were deemed insufficient to deter. This would strike a grievous, perhaps fatal, blow at the self-discipline of society, with results probably detrimental to individual morality. For society would become in this respect a self-executing machine, with a great deal done for us which we now have to do for ourselves by painful effort with wholesome results. But, indeed, probably a more summary and radical process would efface the conditions which make these remarks applicable.

Next, the Pharisees would attempt to stamp out the Publicans.

It was assumed that under this economy of retribution men's own moral standard was to be their guide. We have seen that there would be no inducements to cultivate mercy, for nature would have declared against it. This being so, the average moral standard among our Pharisees, as I have called them, would, I think, be found compatible with the actual extermination of our Publicans. Being blots on the social system, as well as incumbrances on its resources, being stamped by their penal state as reprobates, and disabled by pain for self-defence, they would, whatever their numbers, be easy victims. If we can conceive of any social system holding together under such an economy, is it not morally certain that vice being always, or nearly always, betrayed by pain, society would attempt to stamp out vice and pain together? If so, is it not plain that all such penal sufferers would be killed off by righteous indignation and selfishness reinforcing one another? A scheme of enormous severity leading up to human interference yet more severe would be the net result. Nature must become, in reference to man, a system of peine forte et dure, or Draco would become the only legislator of humanity, or these results would be in various degrees mingled. Would morals benefit on the whole? And again, I ask, What would have meanwhile become of pain as a life-preserver and as a teacher?
AND HUMAN VIRTUE WOULD BE AS "SALT" THAT "HAS LOST ITS SAVOR."

But further, in proportion as this scheme of sanguinary penalties took effect, it would tend to subvert the entire ethical system of humanity. For checked at every step by a jerk at the string of penalty, no moral course could ever be freely described, no career be left for spontaneous development of character. We should all in moral faculty be children, but children born and bred under a dismal heredity—a reign of terror—with all, or nearly all, the gentler virtues starved out of our nature. Nor only so, for justice would be done for us, just as mercy would be out of the question and humility an unmeaning name. "To do justice, to love mercy, to walk humbly," would thus dwindle to a barren or rather an impossible formula. Indeed all our virtues could at best only exist as indolent sentiments, lingering blindly in us, like germs whose development had been arrested. The moral sense itself must shrink and be attenuated for lack of use, its function being superseded everywhere by the imminence of summary retribution. Pride would be everywhere the natural attitude of those who held fast their negative and emasculated integrity. "The salt which has lost its savor" would represent the entire breadth of our moral being. Hypocrisy, being "the homage which vice pays to virtue," would be extirpated, or its object so changed that it would change its nature; but the resulting moral condition would be one which even a hypocrite would despise.

**THUS A FATAL BREACH WOULD BE MADE IN THE MORAL ORDER OF NATURE.**

It may be remembered that in the physico-sensuous sphere we saw reasons for thinking that nature aimed at quantity rather than quality. In the moral sphere her aim seems to be quality rather than quantity, *i.e.*, to ensure conditions which shall test on the whole the genuineness of virtue, rather than ensure a wide-spread average of doubtful value. Thus her system is favorable to a few eminent
examples of an exalted character, leaving the inferior types to make the best struggle they can with their doubtful surroundings. And here, for those who will receive it, the supernatural aid of Divine Grace finds its fitting sphere of operation, which in my present argument requires a passing notice only, as adapted to the natural order. But the outcome of the system we are supposing would be to make in this natural order a fatal breach. The quantity of the nominally virtuous, let us suppose for argument’s sake, would be increased; but the quality would be fatally tainted, and thus while imaginarily improving the conditions of life all should have destroyed the chief motives for living. Vice would be killed off by penal consequences, and virtue tied to its carcass to share its corruption.

AND MAN’S PROBATION WOULD BE UNDERMINED.

Indeed, all the schemes which we have been considering undermine that probation which seems to be part of the purpose of our present existence. The arrangements which regulate pain may be in great part inscrutable to us, but under them pain fits into that probation and forms a leading element of it. Accordingly to alter those arrangements would dislocate the whole. And this seems to me a conclusive general answer to such objections as I have been discussing, whatever may be thought of the particular answers which I have given to each. As we experience moral facts, virtue and vice, like all opposites, help to define one another in idea, while in practice and under the conditions of probation vice is necessary to virtue. For probation is little else than human beings acting on one other through their various degrees of opposite moral qualities, and “virtue is militant here.” Under a scheme of summary retribution first one would perish and then the other. The results of probation would be anticipated, but the process, in which lies the whole present value, would be destroyed,
TO ARGUE FROM THE LAW BEING UNRECOGNIZABLE IS TO ARGUE FROM OUR IGNORANCE.

There remains the third allegation (page 473) that the distribution of pain does not follow any recognizable law. This objection is really one against the limitation imposed on human faculties, and means that we ought to have a larger insight than we have into the working of the whole moral scheme of which we are part. And, if it be intended to argue, as I suppose it must be, that the distribution of pain is therefore vicious, this is making our ignorance a ground for impugning those very arrangements to which that ignorance applies. It is just as if a man with no ear for music were to find fault with the sounds proceeding from an orchestra, because they "did not follow any recognizable law." Than which it is not easy to state a greater absurdity. But beyond even this it is quite supposable that our ignorance may be even a necessary condition of the working of the law, i.e., that its results, being moral, may so depend upon our ignorance, that, if we knew more, we should make use of that knowledge to frustrate those results. And this becomes not only supposable but probable when we consider what follows.

AND THIS IGNORANCE MAY PROBABLY BE A NECESSARY CONDITION OF THE DISCIPLINAL RESULT.

There is certainly no presumption derivable from experience against this life being a probation with a view to a future one, i.e., a process which both tests and trains our character for that future one. We find that future events even in this life are hidden from our ken. And this seems, with a view to our conduct and therefore to our probation, highly expedient and perhaps necessary. For how, if we knew the future of this life, could we avoid shaping our conduct according to that knowledge, which might make the living for temporal ends and objects a law of our life, and give mere expediency an undue ascendancy over other motives? And wherever a future issue of present conduct
is concerned, a similar restriction on knowledge is presumably necessary. Indeed, it seems likely that a knowledge of the law of the distribution of pain would in some way involve a knowledge of the future. If, therefore, the discip-

inual result of pain is in any sense to be carried over into a future state, our ignorance of the law under which that discip-

inual result is wrought, \( i.e., \) of the law which regulates the present distribution of pain, may be probably a necessary condition of that result. Further, if man be, with all his corruptions and defects, the 'noblest creature within our experience, it must be because there is in store for him in the future something which is not self-evident in the present. And if the distribution of pain in this life be a moral para-


donx, owing to its being neither guided by moral desert, nor satisfied by any other compensating advantage, that paradox is of itself a presumption, strong in whatever proportion it assails our sense of moral fitness, that this life is not our whole area of being.

Prudens futuri temporis exitum
Caliginosa nocte premit Deus,
Ridetque si mortalis ultra
Fas trepidat,

is probably true of the conditions by which the future is wrought out of the present. A mystery may be part of an economy which we are engaged in working out for our own benefit.

**IMPATIENCE IN ACCEPTING AN ALTERNATIVE DOUBTFUL THROUGH OUR IGNORANCE.**

It is precisely in the moral sphere that our corruption chiefly disables us, and by clouding the medium in which the intellect works, imposes on the latter its own disability. If ever we reach a stage of being in which that corruption ceases to obscure our view, the mystery of pain may probably be penetrable. But, setting corruption aside, a large moral scheme, of which we are a part and see only a part, 'probably cannot appear to us perfect. Still, the imperfection may be
subjective, not objective. Therefore, if the alternative lies between a supposed blemish in the moral scheme, and a supposed future state of being in which its perfection may be fully vindicated, the consciousness at once of our limited faculty and of our inbred corruption should lead us to accept the latter as more probable. And this is true, even if we have no faith in the moral character of the universe, i.e., no disposition to trust it further than we can verify it. But on those who have faith in that character these presumptions will have the effect of assurance. But even with no more than these presumptions to guide us, and leaving faith out of the question, to accept the former alternative would seem a wanton pitch of impatience. It is really saying in the tone of peevish childhood, "I don't choose to wait till I am older: I insist on being fully satisfied now."

THE BURDEN OF PROOF LIES REALLY ON THE OPPOSITE SIDE.

The disciplinal tendency which we saw to be true of some pain is probably true of all. This is no more than saying that pain, wherever we find it in the scheme of nature, is probably adapted to the same end or ends. Nor can the fact that the law of its distribution is inscrutable to us affect its tendency to procure those ends. But on those who object to its existing distribution as a fact opposed to moral sense, the burden of proof really lies, i.e., of proving that, if it were otherwise distributed, better moral results on the whole would probably follow. This is indeed claiming for the moral scheme established in nature and man no more than is commonly claimed for the legal and constitutional systems which man sets up. They hold their ground until it can be shown that better results may be obtained by changing them. If, indeed, this can be shown, the objection of offence to our moral sense will be worth discussing; but until it is shown, it is sufficient to reply that our ignorance and our inbred corruption together deprive the verdict of moral sense of any weight which on such a question it could carry. It was not, therefore, incumbent on me to prove that the rival proposals
as regards distribution were impracticable or subversive of a disciplinal end. This I claim to have done, but it has been done ex abundanti. The burden of proof lay on the opposite side. And whatever reason there is for thinking that we do not see the whole of the moral scheme, is a reason for thinking that this burden of proof can never be duly discharged.

OF PAIN IN THE PHYSICAL SPHERE CONNECTED WITH CORRUPTION IN THE MORAL.

There is grave reason for thinking that as a considerable class of pains are directly connected with the individual sufferer through his own delinquency, so the whole class of pains known to man may be similarly connected with the human race at large through its moral corruption. Nor need the pains most obviously preservative and didactic be excluded from this connection. For we see that many of these have a moral bearing besides the physical and mental ends which they serve; and conversely many pains which arise through moral delinquency have a preservative and didactic power. The tendency of vicious excesses of which the body furnishes the direct organs is to strike home in form of bodily pain on the organism. But they may further leave inherited defects or morbid tendencies which descend far down in a family. Besides, there are other moral offences which at once distribute their evil effects abroad amongst a number of relatively unoffending victims. Thus we have (1) A class of pains which are naturally retributive on the offender himself; and (2) Another clearly produced by delinquency other than that of the sufferers, or including theirs with that of others; and there remains (3) A class of pains which cannot be referred to either class. We can see that at once, both in (1) and (2) an obvious disciplinal end is served; for (1) gives each a strong direct interest in his own conduct, and (2) gives human society a like interest in the conduct of all its members; prompting alike in (1) and (2) the prevention of the consequents of pain by avoiding the antecedents of miscon-duct. But we may further notice that where those conse-
quents of pain are concentrated in one or in a few, these antecedents of misconduct may be distributable among a vast number, in degrees too variable for us to apportion responsibility. Or again, the problem may be yet more complicated, where antecedents no less wide and disproportioned in their distribution may be followed by no less widely diffused and disproportioned consequents. And this brings us to conceive that possibly some such antecedents may be distributed as widely as the human race itself, and be followed by consequents no less widely diffused, but existing in every degree of disproportionate distribution. Now this would be, in fact, indistinguishable from the case supposed above, viz., of pains as a whole connected with the human race at large through its moral corruption. And this makes it probable the class (3) of pains mentioned above may be, if we had faculties to trace out such a complicated problem, such as would be referred ultimately either to (1) diffused by heredity or other circuitous medium, or else to (2).

PAIN IN GENERAL A STIMULUS TO THE MORAL SENSE IN MANKIND.

But wholly apart from particular origin of pains in specific offences, or their particular incidence on individual offenders or non-offenders, there may be as real a connection between pain as a fact in human nature and moral corruption as another fact, as there is between the clouds and rain-fall on the one hand and the water-surfaces of this our earth on the other. We know that that general connection is real, although we cannot point out the portion of water-surface which gives origin to each volume of cloud or shower of rain. And although we know something of the physical machinery which connects them in this case, yet the connection subsisted for ages before evaporation was thought of. Nor is the fact that the consequent is physical and the antecedent, in this case, moral, a refutation of the analogy; since we know in fact of a considerable class of pains which have their root in depraved habits, in short that the moral and
physical spheres cannot be precisely separated, but interact as shown above. And as we cannot fix limits to this interaction, so it may be at once subtle, complicated, and extensive, beyond the power of our faculties to trace; since it is precisely in the moral sphere, as shown above, that our faculties are most likely to fail us. And as it has been seen that particular pains stimulate the moral sense of the individual (page 470) and since without such stimulus moral sense would be much feebleer than it is; so on the larger scale the race of man stands in need of the perpetual witness of pain as a whole, stimulating by its presence the moral sense of humanity, and attesting higher aims of being than mere sensuous enjoyment. Our disposition to realize these, defective as it is, would be certainly far less, were it not for that witness never far removed from us.

ARTICLE VI.

THE DIVINE IMMANENCY.

BY THE REV. JAMES DOUGLAS, D. D., PULASKI, N. Y.

[Continued from Vol. xlv. p. 355.]

THE DIVINE IMMANENCY IN RELATION TO MATERIALISM.

Before entering directly upon the subject of the relation of the doctrine of the divine immanency to materialism, I propose to answer the question, How does the doctrine of immanency as here propounded differ from that of Spinoza? Spinoza traces phenomena to substance, and affirms that substance, as the ground of phenomena, is all there really is of the universe; that this substance has two fundamental qualities, thought and extension, cognizable to us; that there is only one substance, and that is God. God is the immanent cause, but a cause not passing out of itself.¹

¹Bowen’s History of Modern Philosophy.
With this theory transcendency is impossible. Substance cannot be transeunt and still be substance, that which stands under. It is only as we extend our analysis into substance, and unfold its nature, that we can reach the true solution.

In Spinoza's day, scientific thought and investigation had not discovered what it is that stands under matter; that it is force which constitutes the substratum of matter. Now the question arises, What is the source of force? The science that limits itself and its investigations to matter, both in its phenomena and substance, may affirm that we do not and cannot go beyond force, as the substance of matter, in our investigations; because into the airy regions of metaphysical speculations lying back of the physical we cannot go and apply the tests of science. But we answer: There is a science of mind, as well as of matter, a science of intellectual intuitions and moral consciousness, as well as of sentient feeling; for, all knowledge resolves itself into consciousness, and it is by this science of mind, we have revealed to us the source of force in mind itself, so that we reach, by a process of investigation thoroughly scientific, the discovery that the ultimate in the universe is not substance, but mind, as absolute spirit. And thus it is, that while we cannot affirm the transcendency of substance, for that would be an evident misuse of the term in its true significance, yet of spirit, not held to the limitations of substance, we can affirm transcendency, as well as immanency.

The whole solution of the subject lies in the doctrine of absolute spirit, rather than substance, being the ultimate principle, the principium, of the universe.

Spinoza's pantheistic doctrine of substance is essentially materialistic. In his doctrine of substance as the only reality, he really affirms only the existence of matter with its attributes. The term "matter" must include substance, as well as phenomena. Both conjoined are necessary to the complete idea of matter. We do not conceive of matter as mere phenomena. The idea of matter necessarily includes that of substance, in which the phenomena of matter in-
here. Spinoza, in his eighteenth theorem, affirms, that "God is the immanent, but not the transeunt cause of all things." This theorem necessarily follows from Spinoza's assumption, that substance is the ultimate principle of the universe, for substance, that which stands under, cannot go forth from itself and still be substance, or that which stands under. It is far different, if we regard absolute spirit as being the ultimate principle, for spirit as spirit, and mind as mind, must possess self-energizing power, by which, as transeunt cause, it can go forth in effects not only, but can exist transcendent to effects.

The thirty-second and thirty-third theorems of Spinoza land him in the "dirt philosophy," as it is justly called, of materialism and fatalism. They are these in part: "The will cannot be called a free but only a necessary cause." "God does not act by virtue of a free will; . . . . and consequently will does not belong to the divine nature any more than all other natural things; but the will has the same relation to the Divine Being that movement and repose have and every thing else, which results from the necessity of the divine nature." The last italics are our own. The following is Spinoza's thirty-third theorem: "The things which have been produced by God, could not have been so produced in any other manner, or in a different order." This is the fundamental doctrine of fatalism.

Materialism and fatalism is in every case, the inevitable outcome of every philosophy, or theory of the universe, which does not recognize absolute spirit as the ultimate principle. They invariably postulate "necessity," which is only another name for fate, as the ultimate principle which creates and controls all things. In the philosophy of Spinoza, substance, in reality, instead of being an ultimate principle, only occupies an intermediate place between phenomena and necessity or fate. This is at best only a disguised doctrine of materialistic fatalism.

The whole doctrine of materialism, with all its multifarious phases and modifications, can be effectually met, only
by establishing this fact, and that too on scientific grounds, that mind or absolute spirit is found to be the ultimate principle in the complete analysis both of matter and of substance. And it is this, which we propose to show, as the ultimate conclusion at which we arrive in our examination of the investigations by modern science into the nature and origin of matter. Let us now consider the relations of the doctrine of the divine immanency to materialism. There are four different theories of the material universe.

One is that of pantheism. This affirms the identity of God with matter, without attempting to define what matter is. "God and the universe are one."

Another theory, equally ancient and far more widely accepted, is that of dualism. This affirms God and the universe, matter and mind, to be two distinct and independent existences, and also, that there are two distinct and antagonistic principles, Good and Evil. This is the basis of all the religious systems of the world that do not accept of pantheism, except Mosaism and Christianity. But as Mosaism became infected with the dualism of Zaraathus-trianism, during the Jewish captivity, in Assyria and Babylom, so in subsequent times, Christianity became corrupted with the dualism of Grecian and Roman philosophy, which was so widely cultivated especially in mediaeval times. The dualism of Grecian and Roman philosophy, in its doctrine of matter, was a clearly pronounced theory of materialism. In fact, dualism in all cases, whether it appears as a philosophical theory, or as a theological dogma, necessarily adopts the theory of materialism in respect to the nature and origin of matter, since it recognizes the independent existence of matter.

Gnosticism was a religioso-philosophical system that sought in some way to reconcile the Grecian dualism with the doctrine of the unity of the universe.

Mediaeval theology has reached out its influence to form
and mould modern theology, and has infected it with the same philosophy, of a God separate from nature.

Idealism is another theory of modern times, whose most renowned exponent was Bishop Berkeley. He has been followed by some of the ablest thinkers of Germany, in the effort to restore unity in philosophic thought to the universe, to identify subject and object in a theory of Absolute Idealism.

All these theories of idealism, however acute, profound, and subtle, as examples of analysis and logical reasoning, have failed to satisfy the popular mind, which insists on believing in the reality of matter, as well as of mind.

The two remaining theories are materialism and spiritualism. These two stand in direct antagonism to each other. Either mind is the product of matter, or matter is the product of mind. Materialism adopts the former theory, spiritualism the latter.

Spiritualism or the spiritual philosophy (for we hope no reader will confound the word "spiritualism," as a system of philosophy, with the crudities of spiritism) the spiritual philosophy affirms the reality both of mind and matter, notwithstanding their intimate relations to each other. One stands to the other in the relation of cause to effect, of potentiality to energy, of being to existence, being constituting the ground of all existence.

Cause is a reality; so also are effects realities, however varied or multitudinous. Potentiality is a reality, as well as energy, the outcome of potentiality. The substance or substratum of matter is a reality, as matter itself. So also being and existence. The spiritual philosophy, based on the doctrine of divine immanency, alone can explain the harmony of these relations,—how these as entities are distinct from each other, yet not separate and independent. Matter is not mind, and yet matter cannot exist without the substratum of force whose origin is mind. Effect cannot exist independent of cause, nor the universe without God. The antagonism of modern scientific theories concerning the
nature of matter to the doctrine of materialism, has already been made to some extent to appear, in the exposition we have given of the relation of science to this doctrine of the divine immanency.

Notwithstanding that modern science has been largely accused of materialism, by some criticising, yet not critical, theologians, still the evidence is clear and conclusive, that the best as well as most accepted scientists thoroughly repudiate the doctrines of materialism. The materialistic theories of the scientists of former times have been effectually controverted, and, in fact, annihilated, by the scientists of our times. Professor Tyndall has most completely demolished the theory of Bastian, concerning "spontaneous generation." Huxley has abandoned his old theory, concerning Bathybius. The theologian who now wastes his time in controverting the old doctrine of spontaneous generation spends his breath in reviling a corpse over which scientists themselves have pronounced the last words of sepulture.

When the doctrine of the conservation and correlation of forces was established, some regarded it triumphantly, others suspiciously, as tending to confirm the doctrine of materialism. But as Mr. Fiske remarks, "One of the great results of the discovery of the correlation of forces is, the final destruction of the central argument by which materialism has sought to maintain its position... The materialistic hypothesis is doomed irretrievably."²

Again, not a few are inclined to regard the scientific discovery of the relation of psychical, or mental manifestation to brain-action, as confirming, or at least favoring, the doctrine of materialism. Says Moleschott, *Kein Gedanke ohne Phosphor* ("No thought without phosphorus"). This formula has been caught up as a watch-word by a school of materialists in Germany, and certain discoveries in nervous physiology, such as the invariable concomitance between psychical phenomena and the phenomena of nervous action, have been assumed, to prove the materiality of mind.

But such inference is wholly unwarrantable. Nothing is proved, except the correlation of the two, which must necessarily exist on the simple affirmation that the brain is the instrument of the mind. Brain-action involves waste, the same as muscular action, and the physiologist with the aid of the chemist has found that one of the principal chemical elements eliminated in this waste is phosphorus. Hence the aphorism of Moleschott, "No thought without phosphorus."

There are, however, occasionally materialists to be found, like Maudsley, who, while they avow belief not only in the existence of God, but also in the immortality of the soul with the body, both to be resurrected in eternal and inseparable union, consider thought to be a secretion of the brain, just as bile is a secretion of the liver. But it is in this very comparison between the functions of the liver and those of the brain that both the fallacy and absurdity of the theory of materialism is most clearly revealed. The liver secretes bile,—that is its function,—but the substance which is secreted is as plainly a material something as is the liver itself. But the brain, a material organ, on this theory secretes an immaterial something, we call "thought." That is its function. Now if thought could be shown to be a material something, the analogy would have some pertinence as an argument, but with the acknowledged immateriality of thought, it refutes rather than supports the theory. On this point of the entire diversity between thought and the physical phenomena of matter, and that it is impossible even to conceive of the transformation of matter into thought, all our leading modern scientists are fully agreed.

Says Professor Allman, in his Presidential Address before the British Association, "Between thought and the physical phenomena of matter there is not only no analogy but no conceivable analogy.... The chasm between unconscious life and thought is deep and impassable, and no transitional

*See Maudsley's Body and Mind, p. 324 sq.
phomena can be found by which, as by a bridge, we may span it over."

Professor Tyndall also writes, "The passage from the physics of the brain to the corresponding facts of consciousness is unthinkable."

Says Herbert Spencer: "Can we then think of the subjective and objective activities as the same? Can the oscillations of a molecule be represented in consciousness side by side with a nervous shock, and the two be recognized as one? No effort enables us to assimilate them."

Says Fiske: "Through no imaginable future advance in molecular physics can the materialists be enabled to realize their desideratum of translating mental phenomena in terms of matter and motion. ... We were right in hinting that one grand result of the enormous progress achieved, during the past forty years, in the analysis of both physical and psychical phenomena, has been the final and irretrievable overthow of the materialistic hypothesis."

Says Huxley: "The materialistic position, that there is nothing in the world but nature, force, and necessity, is as utterly devoid of justification as the most baseless of dogmas: with a view to the progress of science, the materialistic terminology is in every way to be preferred. But the man of science who slides from the formulae into materialism, seems to me to place himself on a level with the mathematician, who should mistake the x's and y's with which he works his problems, for real entities, and with this further disadvantage as compared with the mathematician, that the blunders of the latter are of no practical consequence whatever, while the errors of systematic materialism may paralyze the energies and destroy the beauty of life."

But beside this concurrence of views, among modern scientists, of the radical difference in the nature of matter and thought, we find a similar concurrence of views in relation to the nature and origin of matter itself, in utter op-

*Principles of Psychology, Vol. i. p. 158.
*Cosmic Philosophy, Vol. ii. p. 444.
position to the materialistic hypothesis. One of the ablest and clearest expositions of the spiritualistic theory of the nature and origin of matter may be found in the last essay of Alfred Russell Wallace in his work entitled “Natural Selection.” After stating and defending the principle as an unquestionable scientific fact, that “matter is force,” he goes on to say: “If we are satisfied that force or forces are all that exist in the material universe, we are next led to enquire, What is force? We are acquainted with two radically distinct, or apparently distinct, kinds of force; the first consists of the primary forces of nature, such as gravitation, cohesion, repulsion, heat, electricity, etc.; the second, is our own will-force. Many persons will at once deny that the latter exists. It will be said, that it is a mere transformation of the primary forces before alluded to, that the correlation of forces includes those of animal life, and that ‘will’ itself is but the result of molecular changes in the brain. I think, however, that this latter assertion has neither been proved nor even been proved to be possible.” Pursuing this argument, he finally concludes, “if, therefore, we have traced one force however minute to an origin in our own will, while we have no knowledge of any other primary cause of force, it does not seem an improbable conclusion that all force may be will-force, and thus that the whole universe is not merely dependent on, but actually is, the will of higher intelligences or of one supreme intelligence. . . . . It is surely a great step in advance to get rid of the notion that matter is a thing of itself, which can exist per se, and must have been eternal since it is supposed to be indestructible and uncreated; that force or the forces of nature are another thing, given or added to matter, or else its necessary properties; and that mind is yet another thing, either a product of this matter and its supposed inherent forces, or distinct from and coexistent with it, and to be able to substitute for this complicated theory which leads to endless dilemmas and contradictions, the far simpler and
more consistent belief, that matter as an entity, distinct from
force, does not exist, and that *force is a product of mind.*

Dr. Carpenter, the eminent physiologist, takes the same
view of the origin of force, in his work on Physiology. He
there declares: "When we have once arrived at that con-
ception of force, as an expression of will, which we derive
from our own experience of its production, the universal
and constantly sustaining agency of the Deity is recognized
in every phenomenon of the external universe, and we are
thus led to feel, that in the material creation itself, we have
the same distinct evidence of his personal existence and
ceaseless activity, as we have of the agency of intelligent
minds in the creations of artistic genius, or in the elaborate
contrivances of mechanical skill, or in those written records
of thought which arouse our own psychical nature."

This view of the origin of force in the will, which is taken
by scientists, and the only view possible to the metaphys-
cician, for the only conceivable source of force is will, is
also adopted by Herbert Spencer, both as a physicist and
metaphysician. In his work entitled "First Principles,"
he writes: "The force by which we ourselves produce changes
and which serves to symbolize the cause of changes in gen-
eral, is the final disclosure of analysis." "We are obliged
to regard every phenomenon as a manifestation of some
power by which we are acted upon. Phenomena being, as
far as we can ascertain, unlimited in their diffusion, we are
obliged to regard this power as Omnipresent, and criticism
teaches us that this power is wholly incomprehensible. In
this consciousness of an Incomprehensible, Omnipresent
power, we have just that consciousness on which religion
dwells. And so we arrive at that point where religion and
science coalesce."

With similar views Mr. Fiske writes in his work on
"Cosmic Philosophy:" "If now we proceed to the
outermost verge of admissible speculation, and inquire
for a moment, what may perhaps be the nature of that Inscrut-
able Existence of which the universe of phenomena is the multi-
form manifestation, we shall find that its intimate essence may conceivably be identifiable with the intimate essence of what we know as *Mind.* With infinite satire Mr. Fiske refers to "those shallow writers, known as materialists, who speak of 'natural law' as if it were something different from divine action" (p. 426). What will the theological admirers of the Duke of Argyll, with what Huxley well calls his pseudo-science on "the reign of law," say to such characterization of those who personify law as an intelligent and volitional agency, distinct from God?

For what is law, but an observed order of sequence? How unwarrantable and unscientific, is it, to affirm law—an observed order of sequence—to be "fixed" and "invariable!" No finite person, with his limited range of observation, can affirm the fixity and invariability of any observed order of sequence. Mr. Fiske appropriately says on page 428, "It is not science, but theology, which has thrust back divine action to some nameless point in the past eternity, and left nothing for God to do in the present world. For the whole difficulty lies in the assumption of the material universe as a 'datum objective to God' and in the consequent distinction between 'divine action' and 'natural law,' a distinction, for which science is in no wise responsible. The tendency of modern scientific inquiry, whether working in the region of psychology, or in that of transcendental physics, is, to abolish this distinction, and to regard 'natural law' as merely a synonym of divine action. And since Berkeley's time, the conception of the material universe, as a 'datum objective to God,' is one which can hardly be maintained on scientific grounds. It is scientific inquiry working quite independently of theology which has led us to the conclusion that all the dynamic phenomena of Nature constitute but the multiform revelation of an Omni-present Power, that is not identifiable with Nature. And in this conclusion, there is no room left for the difficulty, which

*Vol. ii. p. 446.

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baffles contemporary theology. The scientific inquirer may retort upon the theologian: Once really adopt the conception of an ever-present God, without whom not a sparrow falls to the ground, and it becomes self-evident, that the law of gravitation is but an expression of a particular mode of divine action, and what is true of one law is true of all laws."

Speaking of the true scientist, Mr. Fiske says: "To him no part of the world is godless. He does not rest content with the conception of an absentee God, sitting idle ever since the first Sabbath, at the outside of his universe and 'seeing it go' for he has learned with Carlyle 'that this fair universe, were it in the meanest province thereof, is, in very deed, the star-domed city of God, that through every star, through every grass-blade, and most through every living soul, the glory of a present God still beams.'"

It is also true that it is theology rather than science, or theology in the garb of pseudo-science, that has not only made the false distinction between "divine action" and "natural law," but, worse still, has deified "natural law," making it a pitiless Juggernaut, before which, humanity must bow down to be crushed under its wheels. With prelatical pomp and majesty the theologian, who worships at this shrine, discourses on "the sacredness of law." We ask, What law? We bow in reverence, confessing the sacredness of the moral law of God, which he has prescribed, as a fixed and inviolable law for man's observance. But natural law is quite another thing. That is the divine mode of action which God prescribes to himself. Moral law is for man's observance. Natural law is for God's observance. And yet finite man presumes to write out natural law for the observance of the Infinite One, and to pronounce it "fixed" and "invariable." The sacredness of moral law which God has given, for man's observance, the theologian has transferred to natural law, for God's observance.

Natural law, the Divine Power changes as it may please him. Cold contracts; this, say the scientists, is a natural
law; but we find, it is not fixed and invariable, because the Divine Power changes this natural law as it may please him. This law holds with water up to a certain degree of falling temperature, then it is violated; and instead of contracting, the cold expands this liquid. Of the beneficence of the violation of this natural law, in the specific case referred to, no one can question. It saves our streams and lakes from solid congelation, defends the life that floats within, and clothes the earth's surface, with the mantle of kindly protection. With God there is something more sacred than natural law of man's prescribing, or even than the doctrine of uniformity.

For ages men have vainly attempted to find a fixed and invariable law for meteorological phenomena. They have taxed governments, endowed bureaus, erected stations of observation, at immense expense, but have not been able to fix an invariable law, and so with commendable modesty, write, instead of law, "probabilities," but only to see "probabilities," because of its exceeding variableness, become the scoff of the populace. And yet, the hallucination still besets men, that if they only could make their observations sufficiently extensive, they would be able to write out the law that governs the weather; for it is law that reigns, not God.

Comparative religion can furnish no account of the personification and deification of any of the powers of nature among ancient religions that can parallel the personification and deification of "natural law," in modern times. For among heathen nations, these deified powers of nature were subject to God as the supreme power, but in modern theology, God is himself regarded as subject to deified law.

The law of uniformity is not to be found in any principle of necessity, or fatalism, but in the divine wisdom and goodness. The modes of operation chosen by the divine wisdom must be the best modes; and, because they are the best, they will remain fixed and invariable, so far as divine wisdom and goodness see them to be the best, yet subject
to all those variations which the same divine wisdom and
goodness may see fit to impart, for natural law is not force
working by a principle of inherent necessity, but the divine
action, God working "according to his good pleasure." Again by tracing out the relation which matter holds
to motion, and that which motion holds to mind, we again
find mind to be the ultimate principle in nature or the ma-
terial universe. Modern science has revealed the fact that
the molecules of matter, however dense or solid may be
the body in which they are aggregated, are still in constant
motion.

The sphere of their motion is more or less limited, but in
no case completely arrested. The sphere of motion is
contracted, or enlarged, depending on certain conditions,
or circumstances. When the sphere of action is enlarged
and the action itself intensified, we have the evolution of
heat. This theory, that heat is only a mode of motion, is
universally accepted in modern science. A familiar illustra-
tion is presented in the transformation of water into steam.
The expansion of the water and also the steam is produced
by the enlargement of the sphere in which the molecules
of water move, and also by the intensification of their
movement or action.

Modern science has also established the fact, that the
chemical changes constantly going on about us, as well as
within, are always accompanied by molecular motion. No
function of life is performed without these changes.

Clerk Maxwell, a most eminent physicist, who has written
largely on the subject of molecules and atoms, has calculated
the rapidity with which the particles of hydrogen, at the
barometrical pressure of thirty inches, and a temperature
of sixty degrees, must move in order to produce a pressure
of fifteen pounds to the square inch, the same as the pressure
of the atmosphere on our bodies or on the earth's surface,
and he estimates the velocity at more than six thousand
feet per second, or about seventy miles a minute. He has
also calculated the number of times in which one of these
hydrogen molecules, moving at this rate, of seventy miles per minute, strikes against others of the vibrating swarm, and finds that in one second of time, it must knock against others, no less than eighteen thousand millions of times. Incomprehensible as this may seem to the ordinary mind, the fact of such motion is now regarded as demonstrated mathematically in modern science.

Now the next question is, What is the power that produces this motion among the particles of matter with all this astonishing rapidity.

G. T. Romanes, another eminent scientist as well as evolutionist, has written upon this subject of the relation of mind to motion. Quoting Hobbes' statement, that "the beginnings of motion within the body of man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking and other visible actions, are commonly called endeavor," he shows how in consciousness is revealed the source of motion. He also affirms "that all the forms of energy have been proved to be but modes of motion," and "all that we perceive in what we call matter, is change in modes of motion."

From this view of the relations of matter and motion, Mr. Romanes goes on to affirm, that "the antithesis between mind and motion, subject and object, is only phenomenal and apparent, not absolute or real;" and after deciding affirmatively on the question whether the will is to be regarded as a cause in nature, he says, "that from what we know, we feel impelled to conclude, that there is a mode of mind which is not restricted to brain, but co-extensive with motion, con-substantial and co-eternal with all 'that was, and is, and is to come,' and that "the advance of natural science is now steadily leading us to the conclusion that there is no motion without mind." Thus again we attain to mind as the ultimate principle in the analysis of matter and energy.

Again, that the ultimate principle in nature is mind, appears, in the very doctrine, which the materialists originally claimed as proof conclusive of materialism, that of the cor-

* Rede Lecture, 1885.
relation and conservation of forces. This doctrine, well established as a scientific principle, is intimately associated with that of the indestructibility of matter and also the indestructibility of force. No property, both of matter and of force, is more firmly established. Matter may be transformed in many ways, but cannot be destroyed.

Whatever may be the molecular constitution of matter, its indestructibility must be allowed, and from this it follows, that the whole quantity of matter in existence must be fixed and constant. Now the question arises, What is it that fixes and determines this invariable quantity? The same question applies to force as to matter, for they stand in the most intimate relation to each other, since force is the substratum of matter and also indestructible. Says Clerk Maxwell, in his essay entitled "Matter and Motion," "The total energy of any material system is a quantity, which can neither be increased nor diminished by any action between the parts of the system, though it may be transformed into any of the forms of which energy is susceptible."

Now as it is impossible to conceive of any source of energy or force but mind, or will, we find at once in mind that which is not only capable of fixing and determining the amount of energy, but what must be postulated to explain the very existence of energy; so that alone in the existence of mind do we find a principle or power that can explain both the fact of energy and its condition of indestructibility.

The deepest of all philosophical questions is the relation of natural forces to the divine energy. Although inherent forces immanent in matter, they are not independent self-acting agents. On the contrary, in an important sense "they must be regarded by the philosophical thinker," says Mr. Fiske, "as the ever-present, all-pervading, ever-acting energy of Deity."

It is then this view of force, as having its origin in mind, which, applied to nature, not only exhibits all the phenomena of the universe in their immediate connection and dependence on the Divine Power, but also gives us the philosophic
explanation of the fact of the indestructibility, both of matter and force. To annihilate matter would be to annihilate force, to annihilate force would be to annihilate the energizings of the divine will. But these energizings must be dependent on God alone. So we have revealed to us the fact that all power of creation and of annihilation dwells only in God. Such is the sublime conclusion of science concerning the relation which the material universe sustains to God as the Absolute Spirit.

The fact is that modern science, in its very theory of the immanency of force in matter, has wrought out its own deliverance from the old materialism based on the theory of the material atom. Although some scientists may refuse to answer to the question, What is the source of this force, immanent in matter? yet there are others, as we have seen, who answer to the question, unhesitatingly postulating mind as the only conceivable source of force, while the origin of force in mind is verified in our own consciousness. In view of the vast array of the most eminent scientists who have fully discarded the old materialistic theories of the nature of matter, we may fairly consider that modern science has declared against the doctrine of materialism.

The only remaining stronghold of materialism is to be found in theology, in the doctrine of dualism, of the independent and separate existence of the natural and supernatural, of Nature and God, in which it is assumed that nature exists, and its processes are carried on by a principle of inherent necessity, while God exists apart from nature, with no power to interfere in the operations of nature except from without: that is to say, the dualistic theologian still clings to the old doctrine of materialism in respect to matter, and affirms the separate existence of God. To the theologian holding the old materialistic theory of matter who yet reviles science as being materialistic, or, at least, having a materialistic tendency, the scientist of to-day may well reply, "Cast out the beam out of thine own eye, and then mayest thou see clearly to cast the mote out of thy brother's eye."
is only as the theologian rejects the theory of dualism, of the separate and independent existence of the natural and the supernatural, by adopting the doctrine of the divine immanency, that he can be delivered from the thralldom of materialism, and free the universe God created, from the degradation and opprobrium he so constantly casts on it, calling that "base," "vile," "corrupt," which God in creating pronounced "very good." "And God saw every thing that he had made and behold it was very good" (Gen. i. 31).

The doctrine of the divine immanency stands opposed, not only to the materialism of science, but to the materialism of theology, for both agree in this, that matter is an independent entity, having a separate existence of its own, dependent alone on its own inherent forces and laws, or on some principle of necessity—while, on the contrary, the doctrine of the divine immanency affirms the immediate and constant dependence of matter and the material universe on the Divine Power. The theories of modern science unite in sustaining this doctrine, by affirming that the potency which works all these wonderful transformations in matter is within, and that this potency is, in its essential nature, akin to mind. Most scientists do not hesitate to use the term "mind" as applicable to its nature. A true theology comes to our aid, to supplement the discoveries of science, revealing this potency as the divine power, this mind to be the divine mind, Creator and Lord of the universe not only, but a Father of infinite love, as well as of wisdom and power: the God and Father that adorned the lily surpassing the glory of Solomon, that feeds the raven, without whom not a sparrow falls to the ground, ever-present, ever-near, above, around, within, notwithstanding the "little faith" that would limit that infinite power to a throne in the skies, or to a narrow section somewhere in the universe, which men call heaven.

It may be truly said, that modern science has already freed itself from the old materialistic theories of the material atom, by the recognition of force as the substratum of matter, and
not only by the recognition of the immanence of force, but also of mind, as its source. It now remains for theology to emancipate itself from thraldom to the old theory of the separate and independent existence of matter, renouncing the old Epicurean doctrine that the processes of nature are carried on by an inherent necessity, and recognize natural law as divine action, God in nature, if it would escape the reproach of the Master that (Revised Version) "the sons of this world are for their own generation wiser than the sons of light."

The next article in this Series will treat of The Relations of the Doctrine of the Divine Immanency to the Miracles of Christ.

[To be continued.]
ARTICLE VII.

TWO HISTORIES OF CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE.

BY THE REV. FRANK H. FOSTER, PH. D., PROFESSOR OF CHURCH HISTORY, OBERLIN THEOLOGICAL SEMINARY.

[Concluded from page 185.]

We paused in our review of Thomasius’ and Harnack’s Histories of Doctrine with the close of the fundamental part of Harnack’s work, and the beginning of his description of the formation of the system of doctrine in the church. We resume at this point, and attempt to trace the development of the system as Harnack describes it.

In closing the previous article we gave expression to the hope that we might find the remaining portion of the work “less marked by great faults, and more fruitful in valuable suggestions.” We hoped, in particular, that the history might assume less of a destructive character, less that of a controversial tract, and more that of the objective history. And we expected, if this should be the case, that Professor Harnack’s great familiarity with his theme, and extraordinary mastery of its details, would enable him to render essential service in interpreting the yet dark periods of the distant past. These expectations are to a certain extent met. In the purely descriptive parts, where details are to be presented, and where the question is simply whether the historian has sufficient knowledge of the subject under discussion rightly to understand the writers whom he is perusing, and where discrimination in weighing single elements of the development and faithfulness in reproducing them before the reader, as well as power of clear statement, are the main qualifications for the work, Harnack’s success is great, and the service that he has rendered to the discipline eminent. But in those portions where the points of transition are to be brought to the reader’s notice, and where the history is to be interpreted, and its worth, conformity to its origin, and value as a means of instruction to future generations are to be estimated,—in short, in the grander reaches of the historian’s task, the old phenomena reappear, and the same perversion and misrepresentation of the course of events, of which we have repeatedly complained, disfigure the result. Professor Harnack’s effort has been, as he remarks in the preface of the second volume, “to set forth the theme in a form which must be read in connection; for a work upon the History of Doctrine which is used only as a book of reference, has failed of its highest purpose.” This book, on account of its novel opinions, and its rush and vivacity of style, will at first be read as its author wishes; but, unless we are greatly mistaken, it will finally
be laid aside and relegated to the precise use which the writer deprecates, that of a book of reference, prized indeed for its minute investigations, a trusted guide in regions where the dogmatic prejudices of its author have not marred it, but in its "highest purpose" thoroughly distrusted and unused.

We shall not pause long upon these less successful parts of the work. Enough to quote such illustrations as shall justify the criticism and put the reader on his guard. An instance in point occurs as soon as the Apologists are touched. We have noted the difficulty which Harnack has had from the beginning in explaining the origin of the doctrine of the Logos. The difficulty has not been surmounted when he comes to the same doctrine in these writers. He says correctly that they are not influenced by the idea which is the ground of the view of Philo,—to interpose a being between God and his Universe for the sake of separating him from defiling matter,—but he goes on to say also that they are not all determined by their view of the person of Jesus Christ, and seems to treat the topic in a way to suggest, or perhaps state, that the course of thought with them all was the following: (1) The idea of God which had been derived from their theory of the universe contained the element of personality, but also that of the plenitude of all spiritual potencies. Hence a formula was needed which should embrace both the supermundane and immutable character of God on the one hand, and on the other the plenitude of the creative spiritual potencies. These must be combined by the same formula in a unity. Thus originates the concept of the Logos, which must be regarded as distinct from God from the moment when the realization of the creative potencies is conceived of as beginning. "The Logos is the hypostasis of the effective force of reason, which on the one hand preserves the unity and unchangeability of God in spite of the realization of the potencies which abide in him, and on the other hand make this same realization possible." (2) So in reference to Revelation, it is impossible to think of the Fulness of all Being as speaking, revealing. This demands a divine Word, which is the Logos, who is thus not only the creating reason of God, but also the revealing Word.

Now, we submit that it is more philosophical to interpret the other Apologists from their teacher and model Justin as a starting-point than vice versa. As Justin and Tertullian do, according to Harnack, "manifest a specific interest in the Incarnation," and indeed make the historical personage of Jesus Christ the centre of their thoughts and reasonings, it is sufficient to say that the explanation of the Logos doctrine must be sought in this fact, and in the forms of language which the apostle John used in his Gospel. We do not forget, while we do not accept, Harnack's rejection of the historical nature and apostolicity of this Gospel. After the idea of a Logos is once gained from the Gospel, the admission of such philosophical ideas as to the realization of the powers of God as are above sketched, is intelligible, and hence the true historical method, having accepted the evidence for the authenticity of the Gospel first, would then explain the more abstruse thought from the simpler, and not the opposite. Harnack himself sees
dependence on the old Christian tradition in the fact that the Apologists name the Logos expressly 'the Son of God.'” It was better to give this element greater prominence, and thus do away with this long, labored, and unsatisfactory deduction of what is perfectly plain to an ordinary mind.

We select for a second example the treatment, partly correct, and partly marked by the erroneous style of discussion which we are reviewing, of the christological controversy in the time of Cyril. After a review of the Antiochian school, which is helpful in a high degree, Harnack comes to the Alexandrian school. It follows in the line of the older efforts of church writers, like Irenæus, Athanasius, and the Cappadocians, and is governed by the soteriological interest, to make redemption one which shall be appropriate to men as they are. Now, as Harnack thinks, a real incarnation is possible only upon the basis of the ideas of Apollinaris, by whom the human was replaced by the Logos. But this would not suit the ideas of the Alexandrians. The Christian must have a constant and strong feeling of the mystery of the subject. Hence Cyril occupies himself with controversy with the Antiochians, and only rarely attempts a positive definition of the doctrine himself, and then only to fall into Apollinarianism. The distinguishing marks of Cyril's christology are these: he “expressly rejects the view that there is an individual man in Christ, although he ascribes to him all the elements of humanity.” Everything depends for Cyril's doctrine on the actuality of such a human nature, else human nature as such cannot be redeemed, and yet this human nature must after the incarnation be one with the Logos. But this, with every view which does not take the ground that Christ was an individual man, is monophysitism. Cyril, it is true, does not mean to be a monophysite, and insists on “perfect humanity, unconfounded natures,” but these speculations which deal with “substances, as if there were no living personalities in the case, are after all nothing.” “The logical contradiction involved is fundamentally no more difficult to get along with than the whole method of procedure. Both together constitute the great mystery of the faith.” The process of thought demanded finally that a formula should be obtained which should define the faith and protect it against Apollinarianism more completely than the phrase “perfect humanity” had done. “The contradictions must be strengthened still more, so that not only the concrete union of the two natures should be a mystery, but even the concept of the union should contain a contradictio in adjecto, and become a mystery.”

Now, this is not a denial or perversion of the facts, as the other cases we have considered were, but it is an interpretation of ideas by a man who is hostile to them, and therefore fails to perceive their full meaning. One would think that even a man entirely outside Christianity would see that so great a body of men as the church could not be held for so many centuries in the belief of a real logical contradiction. There must be beneath the imperfect phraseology some self-consistent idea which holds men, if the phraseology is so imperfect. But Harnack is so out of sympathy with the course of the Christian history that he cannot see anything but contradiction, or worse, even a play
with words without meaning, in the struggles of the great thinkers of the
ages to put thoughts too profound for ready comprehension into a satisfactory
form of expression. His criticism of Thomasius may be turned against him-
self. He says: "Thomasius in his presentation of the christology of Cyril
finds only difficulties, not contradictions." Of himself it might be said:
Harnack unduly presses forms of verbal expression,—"treibt Consequen-
macherei,"—sees logical contradictions instead of considering ideas and seek-
ing to get at the meaning of the fathers. His criticisms remind one of the
standard objection of American Unitarians to the Trinity, that it is a con-
tradiction of the fundamental laws of mathematics.

With these general criticisms, we turn now to the pleasanter task of re-
viewing Harnack's development of the history. The remaining portion of
the first volume is occupied with completing the history of the rise of
ecclesiastical dogma by adding to the history of the rise of the church as a
system that of the rise of the doctrinal ideas themselves which were gradually
formed in the church, and which constituted the basis of the subsequent de-
velopment. The Apologists are the first group of men to fall under the
historian's notice, and are discussed under the conception that their histori-
cal position required that they should regard Christianity as a philosophy,
and attempt to justify it in the eyes of the philosophic world about them as
the highest wisdom and the absolute truth. The demand in the heathen
world for a system of certainty founded upon a revelation naturally defined
the Apologists' problem, and suggested the lines of their reflection. And
hence we find, as the result of their efforts, the establishment of a system in
which a monotheistic cosmology, a system of morals, and the doctrine of
revelation are the chief elements. In general they teach that "Christianity
is a philosophy because it appeals to the intellect, because it gives a satis-
fying and intelligible answer to the questions which have concerned all true
philosophy; but it is not a philosophy, it is properly the exact reverse of a
philosophy, so far as it is derived from revelation, that is, has a supernatural,
divine origin upon which alone the truth and the certainty of its doctrines
rest." A full statement of the doctrinal teachings of each of the Apologists
follows, in which a multitude of details are so presented that it is easy to get
light upon almost any point that may suggest itself to the independent
student of these authors.

The next stage of the history is given by those writers who, in opposition
to the efforts of the Gnostics to supply a philosophic explanation of Christian-
ity, began the ecclesiastical and theological explanation of the Rule of Faith
within the church itself. These are, of course, Irenæus and his compeers,
Tertullian, Hippolytus, etc. It is Harnack's merit to have done here what
he has in many other places, and thereby made a great advance on Thomasius, viz., to have considered the period before him as a whole, brought into
the range of his treatment all the various accessible writers, and reduced, so
far as possible, the theological thought of the age to a characteristic system,
and thus marked off distinctly the stage of progress to which it had come.
To be sure, with him it is a state of "secularization," or what not, to which
the church has come; but it may nevertheless be to the more objective historian, progress towards a fuller apprehension of the contents of the divine revelation. Thus we find here, what we missed in Thomasius, a summary of the system of Irenæus, and such hints as to the doctrines of other "anti-gnostic" fathers as the unsystematic character of their remains will allow. Irenæus, says Harnack, kept in mind constantly, as his fundamental thought, the conception of the identity of the Creator of the world with the highest God, and was guided in the development of his system by the conviction that Christianity is a realistic redemption, and that this is brought to pass solely through the coming of Christ. From this view of redemption comes the theory of recapitulation, which in its turn suggests the most important features of the system. Redemption is the deification (Vergottung) of human nature by the bestowment upon it of immortality. In explanation of this view Irenæus is led to put the question as to the cause of the incarnation, and, in fact, to give it a central place in his consideration. The old Logos-doctrine now gives way to the doctrine of Christ as God become man. The answer to the question is briefly: Man is created capable of immortality; he is destined for it; but he is subject to death. He can be crowned with immortality only when the possessor of this unites himself with human nature and thus adopts it. Hence the Incarnation. In this Christ "recapitulates" or repeats in the higher and ideal form, all that Adam was, or was designed to be, and thus sets forth the ideal of humanity, and thus brings man back to this ideal. It is a recapitulation because God the Creator, and God the Redeemer are identical, and God now effects that which it was his plan from the beginning to effect, but which sin had interfered to prevent. When, now, under the influence of this idea, Irenæus comes to treat of the Logos, he does not identify him with the idea of the world, or the reason of God, etc., etc., but begins with the Jesus Christ who is both God and man. He does not treat of the inter-trinitarian relations; but on the other hand he calls the pre-existent Logos "Son of God." The Son is the revelation of the Father, and there is no distinction of being between them. In connection with these ideas Irenæus develops his christology, which is his great historical service, and which remains, says Harnack, in the church now just as he left it. Over against the Gnostic who made a distinction between Jesus and Christ, Irenæus maintains, with as much earnestness as he does the doctrine of the Creator, that the "Son of God was made Son of man." It is his problem to show (1) that Jesus Christ is really the Word of God, i.e., God; (2) that this Word really became man; and (3) that the incarnate word is an inseparable unity. Irenæus conceives the unity of the human and divine as so intimate that he does not always stop to distinguish between what the man knows, and what God knows; but when it seems as if a merely ideal humanity would be thus introduced, Irenæus is ready to let this intimate unity sink out of sight, as for example in the temptations. There is, says Harnack, a tendency in Irenæus to put the two natures merely side by side, without a true union, and this, he thinks, shows that the doctrine of the two natures
was the 

**catholic way** of explaining the *filius dei filius hominis factus* which the Gnostics explained by their distinction between Jesus and Christ!

We have lingered so long over this presentation of Irenæus' doctrine, because it is a good illustration of the best features of Harnack's work. The comprehensiveness, the minuteness of detailed study, the historical instinct, keenness of analysis, and mastery of details which form the best characteristics of the work, are all excellently displayed here. We hasten on to a more rapid sketch of the following portions.

Upon these beginnings of Irenæus come in the next stage, the introduction of the idea of a **system** of doctrine and the first attempts at the formation of the same by Clement and Origen. After a section tracing the history of the different schools of thought in the church, Harnack proceeds to set forth the system of Origen in the same excellent manner as he has previously set forth that of Irenæus. The last step in describing the rise of the dogmatic system can now be taken in the discussion of the successful introduction, as Harnack calls it, of the Logos-Christology into the church. This is effected through the exclusion of dynamistic and modalistic Monarchianism, the discussion as to which forms the theme of the last one hundred pages of the first volume. Methodius is regarded as closing this epoch by the attempt to unite in one system the theology of Irenæus and that of Origen. The different churches also begin to introduce into the Rule of Faith the formulæ of speculative theology.

Thus the history of the rise of the dogmatic system is completed. The second volume is occupied with the first book of the **development** of the dogma. After a chapter upon "historical orientation," the fundamental conception of salvation and the system of doctrine in outline are treated. The positive history begins with the doctrine of the Scriptures, tradition, and the church. The three divisions of the subject are then made, natural theology, the doctrine of redemption in the person of the God-man, the cultus. We shall confine our review to the second of these heads.

In the Greek conception of theology, natural theology held the chief place. Nothing would have been sufficient to bring it down from this pre-eminence except an historical fact of so great magnitude that it could not be ignored. Such a one was found in the incarnation. This could be considered, however, only in connection with some point of the natural system, and the most appropriate one was that fact which seemed the more irrational the higher the worth which was laid upon man, viz., death. The sad condition of man led to the doctrine of redemption, and the consideration of this led to the same question which Anselm subsequently asked, *Cur Deus Homo?* —a question which Athanasius attempted to answer in a youthful work concerning the incarnation of the Logos. The principal element of his answer, says Harnack, is that the Logos must assume a human body to restore humanity from the condition of death to that of immortality,—the realistic idea. Hereby the completion of humanity is effected, which consists in restoration and the communication of the divine nature to man. It was consequently a question of supreme importance for Athanasius, what the nature
of this divinity was, and what the kind of connection existing between it and man. Hence the Trinitarian controversy.

We pass over many detailed discussions, such as that of the theory of redemption of Gregory of Nyssa, and come directly to the trinitarian controversy. This began with Lucian of Antioch, the Arius before Arius. The history proceeds to Arius himself, and the general course of the events from his appearance to the Council is well described. Before the Council itself, summaries and criticisms of the doctrines both of Arius and Athanasius are given which are marvels of their kind. They are written with great clearness, fulness, and impartial correctness, although with that of Athanasius Harnack does not pretend to have much sympathy. At one point, after a brilliant defence of the position that Athanasius taught the numerical unity of the Father and Son, he says: “The twofoldness is only a relative one—if one may write the nonsense—the twofoldness of archetype and image.” And here, about one of the most fundamental of all the doctrines of theology, the most important and valuable collection of detailed investigations, embodied in the briefest possible notes, have been gathered by the unparalleled industry of the author.

The view of Arius given by Harnack does not differ essentially from that of Thomasius, nor indeed, with the abundant materials before us, can there be much doubt as to what Arius believed and taught. Harnack then passes over to the orthodox party before the Council of Nice as represented in the writings of Bishop Alexander. This writer does not seem to him to have risen above “confused thoughts and formule,” but he gives to Athanasius the full tribute of his admiration. Yet Athanasius’ greatness does not consist so much in the objective value of his theological utterances as in his general conception of the problem, and in his personality. “The entire faith, all for which Athanasius staked his life, is contained in the one sentence: God became man” (“in die Menschheit eingegangen,” elsewhere “Mensch geworden”). Both Arius and Athanasius have advanced a great way beyond previous church teachers in that they have established the difference which exists between the Creator and the creature. Origen had indeed made a difference between the Creator and the material creation, but gave to the Logos an intermediate and ambiguous position. In distinction from all previous teachers, Arius, and Athanasius also, declares that God needs no intermediate being. He creates directly. This is, according to Harnack, a separating of the idea of the divine which appeared in Jesus Christ from the cosmological ideas with which it had been involved up to this time. The divine Son, Jesus Christ, is no longer the “principle of the universe,” but the “principle of salvation.” As to this, some exceptions may be made in favor of Justin Martyr and the other Church Fathers, who do not seem to be guided so exclusively by the cosmological idea as Harnack thinks.

We may make a few quotations from the criticism which Harnack makes upon Arius and Athanasius. He says: “We are first to get clearly before us the common elements of the doctrine of these two teachers. Religion and doctrine subsist in the most intimate connection according to the con-
ception of both, and indeed, formally considered, the doctrine is the same in both, that is, the fundamental ideas are the same. The doctrine of the pre-existence of Christ...forms the common basis. Both are interested in maintaining the unity of God, and the strict distinction of Creator from creature. Finally, both seek to establish their doctrine from the Scriptures, and both claim for themselves the tradition of the church. Both are convinced that the Scriptures, and not tradition, are to have the decisive authority...But the theology of Arius consists of two entirely distinct portions: First, he has a Christ who gradually becomes God...i.e., he teaches Adoptionism. And secondly, he connects with this a metaphysical system which is derived entirely from cosmology, and has nothing whatever to do with christology...As cosmologist, he is a strict monotheist, as theologian a polytheist....The doctrine of Origen is not the foundation of his system, and that which it has in common with the orthodox system is not its characteristic, but a secondary element. It is derived from the doctrine of Paul of Samosata....It is a new doctrine in the church....It is really Hellenism....Only the old names have been retained....It is full of inner difficulties and contradictions which Athanasius has discovered, and as to which he is almost everywhere in the right....Arius and his friends do not give the impression that they are concerned in their theology with establishing communion with God. Their doctrine of Christ has, in fact, nothing to do with this question....Whoever allows religion to evaporate in cosmology and in the veneration of an heroic teacher, however high he may put him...is according to his religious sentiments a Hellenist....Had the Arian doctrine gained the victory, it would probably have entirely ruined Christianity, i.e., resolved it into cosmology and ethics and destroyed religion in the religion."

Passing now to Athanasius, Harnack says: "Nothing can better illustrate the perverse state of the problem as conceived in the Arian controversy (!) than the plain fact that the man who preserved the character of Christianity as a religion of living communion with God, had destroyed in his christology nearly every trace of the historical Jesus of Nazareth...Christ for us is the divinity: in the Son we have the Father. This idea is not new, for it was never wanting in the church. The fourth Gospel, Ignatius, Irenæus, etc., prove this. [How can Harnack maintain his position as to this whole doctrine, so often illustrated, in the face of this confessed fact?] But so clearly conceived, in such confidence of victory, so strongly and simply expressed, it never was since the days in which the fourth Gospel was written....The faith which Athanasius represented was strongly maintained, and saved the Christian church." Yet Harnack has other things to say: "When Athanasius expressed his belief in the essential unity of the ultimate Godhead with that which appeared in Christ, he fell into an abyss of contradictions....The Father is himself perfect, and sufficient unto himself; yet, although Father and Son are one essence (in the sense of a single nature), the Father is 'The God,' also the
principle and root of the Son. *Quot verba, tot scandala!* What contains a complete contradiction cannot be correct. . . . It consumed two generations to bring the church to recognize in the perfect contradiction the holy privilege of revelation."

We thus close our hasty review of this great work. Marred as it is by one fundamental error and by many lesser defects which will greatly impair its usefulness, it is nevertheless in its plan, and in the thoroughness and boldness of its execution a great, and in many particulars a valuable work. It is the antithesis of Thomasius in many respects, and though in some of these it falls far below that, in others it rises above it. The model History of Doctrine needs to combine the excellences and avoid the defects of both of these works. It needs to have the devout faith, the Christian spirit, the churchly sympathies of Thomasius, and the comprehensive range of Harnack. It must know with the former what is important, vital, in the line of progress, and helpful in the solution of the problems of the church, and with the latter, where more detailed studies in the philosophy of the times or among insignificant writers will cast illustrative light upon the great actors in the drama. It must preserve the clearness of the former in tracing the history through the tangled mass of details; but it must have the sense of the unity and distinctness of each period in itself which marks the latter. It must recognize the teaching of the Holy Spirit with the former; it must also see that the men who wrote in the ancient church were men in fact, and seek the explanation of their course in the same conditions which govern men to-day, as does the latter. Thus orthodox teachers must profit in this case as they always should, from the services of those who stand in a certain sense without the pale of historical Christianity, and must combine excellences of every sort in their attempts to set forth the truth of God after whatever manner. When a History of Doctrine shall be written with the spirit of Thomasius and after the general method of Harnack, a very great, decisive, and permanent advance in this department of theological science will have been made.
ARTICLE VIII.

CRITICAL NOTES.

I.

THE NAME OF GOD AND THE CUNEIFORM INSCRIPTIONS.

Holy Scripture not only exalts God, but also gives special prominence to his name. The name of God occurs often where we would speak of God himself. Thus God says to Pharaoh (Ex. ix. 16), “I have raised thee up—that my name may be declared throughout the earth,” i.e., that I may be known everywhere. So God speaks (Ex. xx. 24) of “places where I record my name.” He also says of Solomon (2 Sam. vii. 13), “He shall build a house for my name,” Compare 1 Chron. xxii. 8; 2 Chron. vi. 9; vii. 20. God speaks of his name being blasphemed (Isa. lii. 5); of its being great among the Gentiles (Mal. i. 11); of giving glory to his name (Mal. ii. 2); and of “you that fear my name” (Mal. iv. 2). The third commandment is, “Thou shalt not take the name of the Lord thy God in vain” (Ex. xx. 7). We are told to pray, not, “Be thou glorified,” but “Hallowed be thy name” (Matt. vi. 9). And the glorified Redeemer commends one church because, to use his own words, “Thou holdest fast my name” (Rev. ii. 13), and another, “for thou hast not denied my name” (Rev. iii. 8).

All this constitutes a very marked usus loquendi; and without presuming either to account for it, or to call in question the common explanation of it, it is the object of this paper to inquire what light is thrown on this mode of speech by the cuneiform inscriptions.

It appears from them that just as the old realistic philosophy held that there is not only an idea in the mind when using words that denote genera and species, but also actual entities back of the words; so the old Babylonians held that names were things, not only representing objects, but themselves the equivalents of the things they represented. Thus the first line of an account of the creation reads, “When the heavens above had not yet announced, nor the earth beneath recorded a name,” as though announcing or recording a name, and creating the things so named were equivalent acts. So it is written, lines 7–9 of the same tablet, “When the gods had not any of them come into being, were mentioned by no name,—then the great Gods were created,” as if the gods came into being when names were assigned to them.

Their magical incantations also confounded together persons and their names. Many specimens of these have been found, and it only needed the name of a person to be inserted in the reading of a spell either to afflict him with disease or to heal him. The idea was that whatever was spoken concerning the name was done to the person that bore the name. The idea that incantations could injure by means of pictures, locks of hair, parings of nails, or even shreds of clothing seems to have originated in Babylonia, but the use of the name seems to have been the more common mode, because regarded as the more efficacious. The result was effected by means of spirits, who were supposed to have their abode in every created object. These spirits had power to confer good or inflict evil, mostly the last, though they were all under the control of "the great Gods," but both gods and spirits were under the dominion of fate, and the sorcerer had power to control this fate as he pleased. In other words, by using their names in his spells he could compel both gods and spirits to do his will,—so great potency lay in a name.

This identification of a name with its possessor made names the objects of supreme regard, and nowhere is this exhibited more forcibly than in the dreadful curses invoked by each Assyrian king on whomsoever should erase his name from his inscriptions. Two or three examples of these will suffice to show the extreme value attached to the record of the name, and even to the stone or clay on which it was recorded.

Tiglath Pileser I., in the original, Tugulti pal utsur, i.e., "The God in whom I trust (literally, my confidence) will protect my son," reigned B. C. 1120-1100, and writes as follows: "In future days when the temple of the great Gods my Lords Anu and Rammanu, and these lofty ziggurat (towers) shall fall into decay, let whoever occupies the throne repair the falling edifice, anointed with oil, let him restore my written tablets to their places, and let him offer sacrifices. Let him also inscribe his own name along with mine on the renovated structure, and the great Gods Anu and Rammanu will keep him in gladness of heart and in the enjoyment of victory as they have kept me. But he who shall dash my inscriptions in pieces, cover them up, throw them in the waters, or burn them with fire, he who shall bury them in a grave (literally, the house of the pure god, i.e., Ia, the god of Hades), or put them in a place out of sight, and where no man goeth, he who shall erase the name which is written, substitute for it his own, and consign my records to an evil oblivion (literally, epoch of night), let the great Gods my Lords Anu and Asshur inflict on him terrible injury, and curse him with a dreadful curse. May they overthrow his kingdom, remove the very foundations of his throne, and swallow up the armies of his lordship. Besides causing the destruction of his soldiers, may they break his weapons and cause him ever to

8 See Cuneiform Inscriptions of Western Asia, Vol. ii. p. 17, col. 1, l. 30; also Sayce, Hibbert Lectures, 330 and 442.

8 Inscriptions of Western Asia, Vol. i. p. 16, l. 50-88; also Professor Sayce's Elementary Grammar, pp. 111-113.
bow down in the presence of his enemies. May the God of storms (Rammanu) smite his land with destructive lightnings, fill it with famine, and strew it with corpses. Against his lordship may he utter his extremest curse, and cause his name and posterity to perish from the earth."

Over and above their estimation of names, these words remind us of that Scripture (Ps. cix. 17, 18), "Yea, he loved cursing, and it came unto him; he delighted not in blessing, and it was far from him; he clothed himself also with cursing as with his garment, and it came into his inward parts like water, and like oil into his bones."

Assurbanipal (Assur creates a son), who reigned B.C. 668-626, writes in gentler mood: "In the last days, let the ruler in whose reign this structure shall decay build up again its ruins. Let him write my name along with his own, my inscription may he see. Let him anoint with oil, sacrifices let him offer, and with his own inscription let him set it up, and the Sun God (Shamash) will hear his prayer. He who shall treacherously destroy my name, and the name of my beloved brother, he who will not inscribe my name along with his own, and with his inscription does not set it up, may the Sun God, who is Lord of all above and below, destroy him in anger, and may his name and posterity perish from the earth. Compare Ps. xli. 5, "When shall he die and his name perish?" also Ps. cix. 13, "Let his posterity be cut off and blotted out;" also Eccles. vi. 4, "His name shall be covered with darkness."

He also closes a long account of his rebuilding the palace where he was born in this unique manner: "When this Bitriduti (Harem) becomes old and ruinous, the name of whosoever among the kings my sons, Assur and Ishtar shall have then proclaimed ruler of the land and the people, let him repair its ruins. Let that remote descendant see the written record of my name, the name of my father, and my father's father. Let him anoint with oil and offer sacrifices, then place it along with the written record of his own name, and let all the great Gods named in this inscription confirm to him the power and glory they have bestowed on me. But whoever shall destroy the written record of my name, my father's name, and the name of the father of my father, and with his own inscription does not set it up, let Assur (the god of Assyria), Sin (the moon god), Shamash (the sun god), Rammanu (the god of the atmosphere), Bil (Bel, the warrior of the gods), Nabu (Nebo, the god of intelligence), Ishtar of Nineveh (the Assyrian Aphrodite), the divine queen of Kidmuri (Is this a separate goddess?) Ishtar of Arbela (the Assyrian Bellona, goddess of war), Ninip (or Adar, or Uras the Assyrian war god), Nergal (the great lion, the god of Cutha, the death-dealing Lord of

6 On this rendering see Professor Lyon's Manual, p. 75, top.
6 G. Smith's Assurbanipal, p. 314, 93, and p. 316, 111; also Inscriptions of Western Asia, Vol. v. p. 10, l. 108-120.
Hades), and Nusku (brilliance of the dawn, or Lord of the Zenith), judge him with a judgment worthy the naming of my name."

Could language set forth more forcibly the importance attached to a name than this entire extract from the inscriptions of Assurbanipal in Bitiriduti?

The risen Redeemer thus addresses the Church at Pergamos (Rev. ii. 17): "To him that overcometh, to him will I give of the hidden manna, and I will give him a white stone, and upon the stone a new name written." Here a gift is bestowed by way of reward, and on it is written a name. Assurbanipal thus writes of Pharaoh Necho, "From among the rulers of Egypt I shewed favor to Nikuu and spared his life. I made with him a treaty more favorable than before. I clothed him with birmi (embroidered? variegated?) garments, and a chain of gold, the insignia of royalty I gave him. [Joseph was thus honored in Egypt (Gen. xlii. 42), and Daniel had the promise of similar honor in Babylon (Dan. v. 6)] rings of gold I bound upon his hands [compare Luke xv. 22], an iron girdle-dagger [so they are worn by Kurds and Arabs to-day] whose hilt was of gold, the naming of my name I wrote thereon and gave to him." No doubt that dagger was looked on by both the giver and receiver as the most precious of all the gifts, because of the royal name it bore, and who does not feel that all these things from the records of a kindred race throw light on the Scripture usage respecting the name of God?

THOMAS LAURIE.

7 Inscriptions of Western Asia, Vol. v. p. 2, l. 8-13; Professor Lyon's Manual, p. 48, l. 8-14; G. Smith's Assurbanipal, p. 27, l. 34-p. 28, l. 40.

II.

PARAPHRASE OF ROMANS V. 12-21.

NOTE.—I believe that the mind of the Spirit is in harmony with the highest reason, or, rather, that reason, if sufficiently enlightened, would ever be in accord with the mind of the Spirit. Consistently with this belief I must hold that if the interpretations of the divine word conflict with the declarations of reason, either there is a mistake in the interpretation or there is a fallacy in the reasoning or the premises of the reasoning are not stable.

This is suggested by the fact that some have taught that each of Adam's descendants is guilty of or for Adam's first transgression; and, if I mistake not, some have also affirmed this in very nearly the sense in which this language would now be understood. If the words of inspiration teach this doctrine anywhere, it is in Romans v. Of this passage I offer an interpretation, of the legitimacy of which careful students of the New Testament must judge.

ISAIAH DOL.

(12) Because of this (that solely by the redemption wrought by Christ we through faith attain to the favor of God and all the blessings of his love and grace), (there is presented the opportunity of illustrating the greatness of the work of Christ by instituting a comparison between its fruits and those of our first father's transgression, and it may be said) as through one man sin entered into the world, and through sin death (or the penal suffering for sin); and thus

1 Death, the most dreaded and the last incident of penal suffering for sin that comes under observation here, by metonymy gives name to the full penalty.
death went throughout unto all men (penal suffering for sin reached men universally), upon which [ground it is evident] all men were chargeable with sin. For up to the time of law (as well as since) there was sin in the world. But (some one will perhaps say, this cannot be,) sin is not reckoned, if there is not law. On the contrary (there is full proof that all men are accounted sinners, even those who have not knowledge of law, since death (or penal suffering for sin) reigned (or was dominant) from Adam to Moses over even those who had not sinned after the likeness of the transgression of Adam, who is a type of him that was to come. But not as the offence, so also the act which procured the bestowal of the grace (this reached to results beyond comparison more stupendous); for if by the offence of the one the many died (if all those connected with Adam by natural generation all along the ages became subject to penal suffering), much more did the gracious kindness of God and his gift consequent upon the gracious kindness of the one man, Jesus Christ, come in superabundant measure to the many (to all those connected with Christ by regeneration). And not as that which ensued through one man's sin was the act which procured the conferring of the gift; for judgment became to the many condemnation from (or because of) one [offence]; but the act

2 It may be supposed that the apostle here pauses in his comparison, in order to set forth the tremendous consequences of Adam's transgression, that he may afterwards the more exalt Christ's work of redemption. This supposition accords with the apostle's manner of dictating his letters; and, if it helps to the only satisfactory interpretation, it may be regarded as required by the exigency of the thought. The preceding words suggested the inference immediately presented.

5 The infliction of penalty under a righteous government is demonstrative ground or proof that the sufferer was connected in some way with some transgression, so that he became in some sense chargeable with it.

6 For introduces an illustration of the statement that all men are chargeable with sin.

7 In the preceding sentence the apostle personated an objector. Here he replies to the objection.

8 This fact shows that not only was he a sinner who, before the law came through Moses, violated some command, divinely communicated to him or handed down by tradition, or who offended his moral sense, or did that which he might have known to be wrong; but even those who had not consciously done evil, and could not have broken any command or sinned personally, infants and idiots, as being members of an organic whole, were constructively accounted sinners because of Adam's transgression. Considering the apostle's object, this argument need not be pressed to the logical outcome that Adam's posterity are guilty of and for his sin; but it does show that the whole race are sufferers through their progenitor's transgression (in which God cannot be unjust), and thus serves the apostle's purpose, enabling him to present Adam and Christ under analogous aspects, the one as mightily affecting all connected with him by natural descent, the other as still more affecting all connected with Him by spiritual birth.

9 The Greek noun in each case ends in μα, and etymologically may have an active meaning as interpreted above, as δίκαιωμα certainly must.

10 The many in each case denotes all who are accounted as a posterity. The superabundant measure of the gift of grace is a measure, the lower limit of which is to be forthwith stated. δι' ἐνος with the next word takes the place of a subject nominative.

11 οἱμ, often understood, with εἰς and the accusative, is the formula for expressing transition to another condition or quality.
which procured the bestowal of the grace of justification from many offences (reaching to satisfaction for all the offences of those who through faith become partakers of the benefits of the propitiatory sacrifice, as well as to their discharge at length from the penal suffering that befalls them in consequence of Adam's transgression. But beyond this, beyond a simple acquittal from one and all offences reaches the grace, the bestowal of which the act of Christ procured. For if by the offence of the one Adam death reigned through (or by means of) that one, much more shall those who receive the abounding measure of the gracious gift of justification reign in life (be exalted as to royal state and life for ever) through the one Jesus Christ. Now then, as that which ensued through one offence became condemnation to all men (to the many connected with Adam by natural descent), so that which ensued through one act of satisfaction to the requirements of justice became life-giving justification to all men (to the many connected with Christ by spiritual birth). For as through the disobedience of the one man the many were constituted sinners, so also through the obedience of the one Jesus Christ shall the many be constituted just before the law. But (exceeding this is the overflowing fulness of all the blessings because of the act of satisfaction, for) law came along with the state of sinfulness and condemnation through Adam's lapse that offending might abound beyond the first offending of Adam. But where sin abounded (and this was in all who attained to any knowledge of good and evil), grace exceeded; that as sin was dominant in conjunction with its attendant penalty death, so also grace might reign through justification unto eternal life through Jesus Christ our Lord.

III.

NATURAL AND SPIRITUAL LAW.

Rev. James Scott, D.D., LL. D., of Aberdeen, Scotland, has published a clear and concise pamphlet in review of Professor Drummond's book following the line of the ablest criticism upon it. Dr. Robert Watts, Professor of Theology at Belfast, says of the thesis of the book, that it "cannot be accepted either by scientists or theologians." Dr. Scott pronounces its ground "sloping and slippery." After discriminating tersely forces, properties, and

11 The foregoing statement is some ground for the inference that Christ's act of satisfaction places those who depart this life without actual transgression in as good a condition at the least as that in which they would have been, had Adam not fallen; that, if being is continued to them, it cleanses them from the taint of an inherited sinful nature, and thus fits them to join in the worship of the redeemed.

12 The apostle here returns to the comparison which he began in verse 13, but in resuming conforms his words to what intervenes.

13 This verse no more proves the culpability of Adam's posterity for his sin than it proves merit in the redeemed for the redemption wrought by Christ.

14 This must be interpreted as a subordinate and incidental end, not as final cause.
laws, and showing that the nature of a law depends upon the nature of the substance in which it obtains, he shows how Professor Drummond misstates the question at issue. It is not whether science rests on facts, while religion does not; nor is it whether matter and spirit are one; nor whether scientific method can be used in theology; nor whether analogy is valid in religion; nor whether law, in some of its changing and confusing senses, is continuous. But it is simply whether known analogies between the two worlds of matter and mind establish an identity of law in both.

Dr. Scott maintains that the interchange of analogy and identity throughout the author's argument is "illicit and sophistical." "The laws of both worlds, like their forces and phenomena, are merely similar, and not the same." The assertion of their identity leads to materialism, or to idealism. It cannot consist with the separate dual existence of matter and mind. Monism is its goal. "If the law of both worlds be one, their substance, forces, and phenomena must also be one, or mere modes or modifications of one another. Mind would be merely a mode of matter, and the spiritual world but a form of the natural world." Freedom and responsibility would disappear. The moral tendencies of Professor Drummond's theory are "even worse" than the logical or theological. It "would reduce the whole realm of the spiritual world to the low level of natural religion, if not even of evolution."

But the principle asserted is an impracticable one. It cannot be applied to the incarnation or the atonement "as lying within the range of natural law." Nor to the resurrection as evidencing no greater power than plant-life, or regeneration as taking hold of souls literally dead, as mineral matter is. Continuity of physical uniformity does not here hold good. But this "nullifies the whole argument." Action and reaction may be said to be "opposite and equal to each other in matter and mind, but unless their forces be also the same," i.e., unless the words mean identically the same thing in mind, as in matter, "the laws" of action and reaction "cannot be identical." A "moral law of gravitation," so-called, as between man and man and man and Christ, "cannot be identical with the natural (law), which is directly as the mass and inversely as the square of the distance."

This is the ground taken in these pages (Bib. Sac., vol. xlii. pp. 270-290, April, 1885). Professor R. A. Lipsius (Jena), in the next succeeding issue of the Theologischer Jahresbericht (1885), supports the criticism here made, and treats the book as of very little account. He commends thoroughly the protest here made against the teaching of the book, and repeats his judgment in the Jahresbericht for 1886, referring a second time to the article in this Review. It is most desirable that analogy, as employed in science, religion, literature, be clearly discriminated from other things confounded with it. The books of logic, which ought to give definitions to critics, are here sadly deficient. Dr. Scott seems to use the word only in the sense in which scientific men employ it, as a means of classification, and in this sense it is doubtful whether identity of law can be denied as he denies it. Very properly throwing upon Professor Drummond the burden of proof as to uni-
formity of physical facts in the domain of spirit, and very justly suggesting that his remark that gravitation holds good in mind, if it be "in any sense material"(!), indicates "stress of weather," he seems to blend two sorts of analogy, that which brings objects under the same classification, and therefore, of course, under identical law, and that which does not. "Analogy was known and employed before true science began. Analogy, or a radical agreement between things or phenomena, has been more or less understood and acted on by the sages and saints of all ages." But can it be said that in one and the same unchanged sense it is alike "a first principle of all philosophy, the basis of inductive logic, the basis of all language, and specially of all poetry and parable"? or, that its value is "not only illustrative but evidential"? What evidence, in the proper logical sense, is there in poetry or parable? In loose popular and literary language an illustration is often said to be in itself a conclusive argument, but not by those who know well the difference between what is called analogical reasoning and logical. Some of Professor Drummond's asserted identities of law do not even amount to analogical reasoning, any more than does ordinary metaphor or simile. Dr. Scott well says: "We must be careful not to convert metaphors into literal or natural laws, and thereby travesty the language of all science, ethics, and religion." We are to "distinguish between analogy and identity on the one hand, and analogy and mere resemblance on the other." The organs of the ape are similar to the physical organs of the man, but they are not the same; [i.e., scientifically, by classification]. The frost-work on a window resembles the structure of a flower, but it is not analogous to it [i.e., in the scientific sense of analogy, "radical agreement between things or phenomena."] There is something here which needs clearing up for the sake of truth—the analogy recognized in science, and that which is here called "mere resemblance"—and sound logic furnishes all that is needful for accomplishing it. And when it is done, writers like the author of this excellent little pamphlet will not assert that it is both "illustrative and evidential," "at once the language and the logic of thinkers and writers from the days of the prophecy of Jacob, the poetry of Moses and the prophecy of Solomon, down to the parables of Jesus, the philosophy of Bacon, the poetry of Shakespeare, and the analogy of Butler."

It is very desirable that the critical judgment of experts on such questions should not be overridden by mere popular acceptance on other grounds than the true ones.

G. F. MAGOUN.
ARTICLE IX.

THE DEBT OF THE CHURCH TO ASA GRAY.

The death, in January last, of the distinguished botanist, Asa Gray, removed one of the most remarkable men of the century. He had attained the 78th year of his age, and died suddenly in the midst of a literary activity which had been unceasingly maintained for a period of fifty years. In recognition of his labors, he had from time to time been "crowned with diplomas and honors from all the principal universities in Europe." Only a few months before his death the universities of Cambridge, Oxford, and Edinburgh had severally honored themselves by conferring upon him the highest degrees which they have to bestow upon men of science.

But Dr. Gray was more than a specialist in science. In his last years, as well as in the vigor of his manhood, he took profound interest in defending and establishing the fundamental principles of religion, so far as these foundations are affected by scientific discoveries and theories. In the preface to his collected essays, entitled "Darwiniana," published in 1876, he describes himself as "one who is scientifically, and in his own fashion, a Darwinian, philosophically a convinced theist, and religiously an acceptor of the 'creed commonly called the Nicene,' as the exponent of the Christian faith." The weight of his opinions in England is illustrated in the following incident: The Quarterly Review appeared soon after the publication of the "Origin of Species" with an article, afterwards traced to Bishop Wilberforce, in which much is said as to the extent to which Darwin's theory "contradicts the revealed relation of the creation to the Creator." Not long after, Mr. Darwin writes, "The Bishop of London was asking Lyell what he thought of the review in the Quarterly, and Lyell answered, 'Read Asa Gray in the Atlantic.'"

This reference is to articles published in the Atlantic Monthly for July, August, and October, 1860, drawn out by the charges, then so freely made, that Darwinism was not only unscientific but atheistic. These articles were republished in a pamphlet, which circulated extensively in England in 1861, and they occupy ninety pages of "Darwiniana." The great botanist's comprehensive grasp of the subject is well displayed in the last paragraph of those articles:—

"The English mind is prone to positivism and kindred forms of materialistic philosophy, and we must expect the derivative theory to be taken up in that interest. We have no predilection for that school, but the contrary. If we had, we might have looked complacently upon a line of criticism which
would indirectly, but effectively, play into the hands of positivists and materialistic atheists generally. The wiser and stronger ground to take is, that the derivative hypothesis leaves the argument for design, and therefore for a designer, as valid as it ever was; that to do any work by an instrument must require, and therefore presuppose, the exertion rather of more than of less power than to do it directly; that whoever would be a consistent theist should believe that Design in the natural world is coextensive with Providence, and hold as firmly to the one as he does to the other, in spite of the wholly similar and apparently insuperable difficulties which the mind encounters whenever it endeavors to develop the idea into a system, either in the material and organic, or in the moral world. It is enough, in the way of obviating objections, to show that the philosophical difficulties of the one are the same, and only the same, as of the other.1

But it would be impossible to reproduce the whole of Dr. Gray's argument at that critical time without reproducing the essays themselves; for the subject is approached by him from almost every conceivable point of view, and treated with a freshness and keenness of perception which constantly surprise the reader.

Twelve years after the publication of the first series of Essays, Dr. Gray returned to the subject, and bestowed upon it some of the best and most vigorous thought of his later years, the results of which are to be found in the seventh and eighth chapters of his "Darwiniana," and more particularly in the closing chapter, entitled "Evolutionary Teleology," written specially for the book. The subject was also continued in his lectures given in New Haven, entitled "Natural Science and Religion," and prepared about the same time. It was at this period that the writer was privileged to form the acquaintance of Dr. Gray, and to obtain an insight into the motives which prompted his later writings. The statement of a few facts upon this point cannot fail to add interest to the discussion.

The occasion of Dr. Gray's return to the subject was the publication of various books and essays about that time upon the question of the Theistic Bearings of Darwinian Evolution. Among them was a small volume by Dr. Hodge, attempting to prove that Darwinism is atheism. In view of this renewed discussion, Dr. Gray was requested by some of his theological friends to reprint the essays already written, which seemed completely to cover the ground, and to be eminently adapted to meet old objections that were being revived. In response to such a request, which had been forwarded to him, is the following letter, under date of July 31, 1875:—

"I will say that while I am not unwilling to collect them for reprinting in case they are called for, it would not quite do for me, in the position I occupy (I mean as a man of science), to republish them in a collected form, without entering anew and further into some of the pending questions,—to do which would seriously interrupt the legitimate work which I have in hand, and to which I am deeply pledged. I suppose I could add, and

1 See Darwiniana, p. 176.
should be disposed to add, a note or two, especially one upon teleology from a Darwinian point of view—a subject upon which there is something still to be said, though I do not see the way to say it conclusively. . . . At present, I think I should let them alone, unless there comes what you ministers recognize as a call for them, and such a call I should defer to. . . . But you don't know how I dislike to have my name bruited about."

Under date of August 14, of the same year, when the determination had been more fully formed, he writes as follows:—

"The important thing to do is to develop aright evolutionary teleology, and to present the argument for design from these exquisite adaptations in such a way as to make it tell on both sides,—with Christian men, that they may be satisfied with, and perchance may learn to admire divine works effected step by step, if need be, in a system of nature—and the atheistic people, to show that without the implication of a superintending wisdom, nothing is made out and nothing credible.

"Now for a month or two I am pressed by daily technical work to the extreme, and get no chance to turn these matters over in my mind.

"I don't want to handle this argument in such a way that it can be gain-said, nor without touching the very point."

How admirably he succeeded in touching the very point is abundantly manifest to any one who reads the discussions in natural theology which have been written since the publication of these essays. For example, in a recent large and valuable work upon "Theism and Evolution," by a prominent clergyman, we find the following paragraph, which the reader familiar with Dr. Gray's essays will at once recognize as made up almost wholly of phrases from "Darwiniana," but, we are sorry to say, without acknowledgment:

"The waste of nature is enormous—seeds, eggs, germs, infant life. The organisms which perish ere they commence individual development vastly outnumber those which leave successors. Destruction is the rule: life the exception. Not one, probably in ten million comes to perfection. Was the design destruction, or was there no design? Must dysteleology be allowed to take the place of teleology? The light of the sun is diffused in all directions—only a small portion strikes the planets. Is purposelessness written on the leaves of nature's great book? Why this immense waste everywhere? Our present teleology can give no answer. The teleology which will be possible, if evolution becomes an established theory, shall be able to answer,—Unless there were competing multitudes there could be no struggle for existence; if there were no struggle for existence, there could be no natural selection; if there were no natural selection, there could be no such thing as the survival of the fittest; if there were no survival of the fittest, there could be no improvement of the species, no new varieties resulting from adaptation to changed circumstances."

It is gratifying to the friends of Dr. Gray to see this evidence of the influence of his thought. But they cannot refrain from feeling that the truth would have been still better served if the writer of the paragraph just
The Debt of the Church to Asa Gray. [July,

quoted had referred his readers to the original source, where they would have come in contact with the carefully chosen illustrations and phraseology of the great scientist and philosopher himself. How much attention Dr. Gray was accustomed to give to every sentence and word, and to the whole literary aspect of his essays, may appear in the following brief note in reference to an article of the writer's upon Immortality, for which he had solicited Dr. Gray's criticism: "I like an article to begin or end with an aphorism or some sort of snapper. I think you may end your next article with a condensed expression something like this, 'Not vitality, but personality, is the witness for immortality.'"

In the limits of present space we can do no better service to sound Christian philosophy than to throw into proper relief, by ample quotations, some of the main portions of Dr. Gray's treatment of the profound and important themes of his later essays. Even in these quotations the reader cannot fail to recognize the source from which nearly all later writers on natural theology have drawn their supply both of argument and illustration. In the review, among other books, of Professor Hodge's book on Darwinism, Dr. Gray writes in 1874 as follows:—

"It may be well to remember that, 'of the two great minds of the seventeenth century, Newton and Leibnitz, both profoundly religious as well as philosophical, one produced the theory of gravitation, the other objected to that theory that it was subversive of natural religion; also that the nebular hypothesis—a natural consequence of the theory of gravitation and of the subsequent progress of physical and astronomical discovery—has been denounced as atheistical even down to our day.' It has now outlived anathema.

"It is undeniable that Mr. Darwin lays himself open to this kind of attack. The propounder of natural selection might be expected to make the most of the principle, and to overwork the law of parsimony in its behalf. And a system in which exquisite adaptation of means to ends, complicated interdependences, and orderly sequences, appear as results instead of being introduced as factors, and in which special design is ignored in the particulars, must needs be obnoxious, unless guarded as we suppose Mr. Darwin might have guarded his ground if he had chosen to do so. Our own opinion, after long consideration, is, that Mr. Darwin has no atheistical intent; and that, as respects the test question of design in Nature, his view may be made clear to the theological mind by likening it to that of the 'believer in general but not in particular Providence.'

Ought not theologians to consider whether they have not already, in principle, conceded to the geologists and physicists all that they are asked to concede to the evolutionists; whether, indeed, the main natural theological difficulties which attend the doctrine of évolution—serious as they may be—are not virtually contained in the admission that there is a system of Nature with fixed laws. This, at least, we may say, that, under a system in which so much is done 'by the establishment of general laws,' it is legitimate for any one to prove, if he can, that any particular thing in the
natural world is so done; and it is the proper business of scientific men to
push their enquiries in this direction."  

Dr. Gray's whole discussion of the subject of design in nature as affected
by the Darwinian theory reveals a singularly clear conception of the funda-
mental questions of metaphysics underlying the whole subject. To these
questions he repeatedly recurs, both in the essays collected in "Darwiniana"
and in his lectures at New Haven on "Natural Science and Religion." So
far from looking upon Darwinism as fatal to the doctrine of design, he aims
to show that it furnished the material to strengthen the argument greatly, and
contends that "in Darwinism, usefulness and purpose come to the front again
as working principles of the first order; that upon them, indeed, the whole
system rests." With great cogency of reasoning he shows that "the proof of
purpose in any assemblage of phenomena lies in their manifest adaptation to
discovetable ends." Purpose is not disproved by our failure to discover the
ends. In God's work, as in man's, inferior intellects must suspend their
judgment until further light gives them a fuller view of the whole. We can
have faith that a complicated piece of machinery is designed throughout, even
though we can see the adaptation only in a few particulars, and our faith
will illumine a sphere of darkness in proportion to our conception of the skill
of the artificer. "Design in Nature is distinguished from that in human af-
fairs—as it fittingly should be—by all-comprehensiveness and system. Its
theological synonym is Providence. Its application in particular is sur-
rounded by similar insoluble difficulties; nevertheless both are bound up
with theism."

There are two fundamental modes of conceiving the relation of the universe
to the Creator. The first conceives of him as acting from all time. This
gives us a mechanical view of the universe, and is the fundamental error of
deism and of fatalism. A second theory conceives of the Creator as acting
through all time. This is the doctrine now more generally known as that of
the Divine Immanence, so ably set forth in the articles by Dr. Douglas in
the current volume of the Bibliotheca Sacra. The danger of this latter
theory is that it easily degenerates into pantheism. What Dr. Gray regards
as an intermediate and as the more popular conception is favored by him, viz.,
that "events and operations in general go on in virtue simply of forces com-
municated at the first, but that now and then, and only now and then, the
Deity puts his hand directly to the work." This view allows us to retain
our conceptions of reality in the forces of nature, makes room for miracles,
and leaves us free whenever necessary, as in the case of the special endow-
ments of man's moral nature, to supplement natural selection with the direct
interference of the Creator. It is the exigencies of the moral world which
make the demand for miracles. But God, while able to provide in the main
for the wants of his moral creation through the mechanical operations of Nature,
must certainly have left himself free to make special adaptations to the wants

* Ibid., pp. 258, 259.
* Ibid., p. 381.
* Ibid., p. 158.
of their free moral natures. No theory of evolution can be entertained which implies impassable limitations to God's spontaneity in manifesting himself to our most deeply implanted wants.

Dr. Gray's familiarity with facts concerning the vegetable kingdom enabled him to illustrate, with rare felicity, many points in the argument for design which the ordinary mind would fail to see. There is much confusion concerning the extent of evidence necessary to prove pervasive design in a complex organ or system. We are prone to forget that our failure to discover the design may prove the incapacity of our understanding, rather than the lack of design in the thing examined. In supposing a correlation between means and ends, we presume a knowledge both of what needs to be done and of the best way to do it. In both these respects man is a most incompetent critic of the universe of God. For example, the spontaneous circular movement in the end of a twining plant expresses a generalized purpose, which does not become effective, for the advantage of the plant, until some object presents itself around which the vine can twine. But it will go on making its revolutions, irrespective of any particular advantage which may accrue; and thus, if no object interferes, its energy will be entirely wasted. This is but one of innumerable instances in nature where to the untrained observer, there seems to be an enormous amount of waste in the action of natural forces. Even the writer of the book of Job was impressed by it, when he asked who could tell why the rain is permitted to fall in the wilderness, where no man is.

We know of no other discussion of this aspect of the subject equal to the following paragraphs from Dr. Gray:

"By the adoption of the Darwinian hypothesis, or something like it, which we incline to favor, many of the difficulties are obviated, and others diminished. In the comprehensive and far-reaching teleology which may take the place of the former narrow conceptions, organs and even faculties, useless to the individual, find their explanation and reason of being. Either they have done service in the past, or they may do service in the future. They may have been essentially useful in one way in a past species, and, though now functionless, they may be turned to useful account in some very different way hereafter. In botany several cases come to our mind which suggest such interpretation.

"Under this view, moreover, waste of life and material in organic Nature ceases to be utterly inexplicable, because it ceases to be objectless. It is seen to be a part of the general 'economy of Nature,' a phrase which has a real meaning. One good illustration of it is furnished by the pollen of flowers. The seeming waste of this in a pine-forest is enormous. It gives rise to the so-called 'showers of sulphur,' which every one has heard of. Myriads upon myriads of pollen-grains (each an elaborate organic structure) are wastefully dispersed by the winds to one which reaches a female flower and fertilizes a seed. Contrast this with one of the close-fertilized flowers of a violet, in which there are not many times more grains of pollen produced than there are of seeds to be fertilized; or with an orchis-flower, in which the proportion
is not widely different. These latter are certainly the more economical; but there is reason to believe that the former way is not wasteful. The plan in the violet-flower assures the result with the greatest possible saving of material and action; but this result, being close-fertilization or breeding in and in, would, without much doubt, in the course of time, defeat the very object of having seeds at all. So the same plant produces other flowers also, provided with a large surplus of pollen, and endowed (as the others are not) with color, fragrance, and nectar, attractive to certain insects, which are thereby induced to convey this pollen from blossom to blossom, that it may fulfill this office. In such blossoms, and in the great majority of flowers, the fertilization and consequent perpetuity of which are committed to insects, the likelihood that much pollen may be left behind or lost in the transit is sufficient reason for the apparent superfluity. So, too, the greater economy in orchis-flowers is accounted for by the fact that the pollen is packed in coherent masses, all attached to a common stalk, the end of which is expanded into a sort of button, with a glutinous adhesive face (like a bit of sticking-plaster), and this is placed exactly where the head of a moth or butterfly will be pressed against it when it sucks nectar from the flower, and so the pollen will be bodily conveyed from blossom to blossom, with small chance of waste or loss. The floral world is full of such contrivances; and while they exist the doctrine of purpose or final cause is not likely to die out. Now, in the contrasted case, that of pine-trees, the vast superabundance of pollen would be sheer waste if the intention was to fertilize the seeds of the same tree, or if there were any provision for insect-carriage; but with wide-breeding as the end, and the wind which 'bloweth where it listeth' as the means, no one is entitled to declare that pine-pollen is in wasteful excess. The cheapness of wind-carriage may be set against the over-production of pollen.

"Similar considerations may apply to the mould-fungi and other very low organisms, with spores dispersed through the air in countless myriads, but of which only an infinitesimal portion find opportunity for development. The myriads perish. The exceptional one, falling into a fit medium, is imagined by the Westminster Reviewer to argue design from the beneficial provision it finds itself enjoying, in happy ignorance of the perishing or latent multitude. But, in view of the large and important part they play (as the producers of all fermentation and as the omnipresent scavenger-police of Nature), no good ground appears for arguing either wasteful excess or absence of design from the vast disparity between their potential and their actual numbers. The reserve and the active members of the force should both be counted in, ready as they always and everywhere are for service. Considering their ubiquity, persistent vitality, and promptitude of action upon fitting occasions, the suggestion would rather be that, while

'... thousands at His bidding speed,
And post o'er land and ocean without rest,
They also serve (who) only stand and wait.'

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"Finally, Darwinian teleology has the special advantage of accounting for imperfections and failures as well as for successes. It not only accounts for them, but turns them to practical account. It explains the seeming waste as being part and parcel of a great economical process. Without the competing multitude, no struggle for life; and without this, no natural selection and survival of the fittest, no continuous adaptation to changing surroundings, no diversification and improvement, leading from lower up to higher and nobler forms. So the most puzzling things of all to the old-school teleologists are the principia of the Darwinian. In this system the forms and species, in all their variety, are not mere ends in themselves, but the whole a series of means and ends, in the contemplation of which we may obtain higher and more comprehensive, and perhaps worthier, as well as more consistent, views of design in nature than heretofore. At least, it would appear that in Darwinian evolution we may have a theory that accords with if it does not explain the principal facts, and a teleology that is free from the common objections."*

We conclude this brief notice by repeating that no student of natural theology can afford to neglect the original store-houses of argument and illustration which Dr. Gray has placed within reach in the two volumes to which attention has been called. Philosophy has been enriched and the possibility of religious faith broadened and deepened by the enlarged views of nature which naturalists have come to have concerning the origin of species through the operation in part of natural selection. To the late lovable, devout, and profoundly philosophical botanist of Harvard College the church owes more than it yet appreciates for its deliverance from such another mistake as was made in the time of Galileo. The world even yet is slow to learn that we may find out how God does a thing without shaking our faith in the fact that he does it.

G. FREDERICK WRIGHT.

*ibid., pp. 375-378.
ARTICLE X.

GERMAN PERIODICAL LITERATURE.

PROTESTANT PROBLEMS IN GERMANY.

To an American Christian in the full enjoyment of religious liberty and jealous of his rights and opportunities for Christian work in this liberty, the servile subordination in Germany of the Protestant Church to the state is a perplexing anomaly and enigma. To all intents and purposes the management of the affairs of the Protestant churches is simply one branch of the political government as such, and it is in spirit and manner controlled by the same interests that direct the political measures of a state. In reality the churches enjoy only so much liberty and freedom of action as the State has deemed it wise and agreeable to its own interests to grant, and these limits of liberty may be enlarged or curtailed as the political authorities may direct. Thus state and church in their relations to each other do not represent two distinct factors, each with its own rights and powers which must be considered and can exert themselves in the adjustment of the relations between these factors, but practically and also theoretically the sole possessor of governmental power is the state. More or less of this power may be delegated to the church by the state, and the measure of this is also the measure of the liberties and rights of independence enjoyed by the state church. The fundamental idea underlying the relation of church to state is, accordingly, the entire control of the church by the state. The church has no *magna charta* which in this union secures to it certain inalienable rights and prerogatives.

It would be impossible here to particularize in detail the many ways in which this unscriptural and unnatural relation works injury to the best interests of the church. Naturally, whenever political and ecclesiastical interests clash, the church must yield to the state. In an article in the January number of the *Bibliotheca Sacra* the writer drew attention to one of the most glaring wrongs inflicted upon the church from this standpoint, namely, the selection of theological professors by the state without consultation of the wishes or needs of the church and even directly against their well-known interests in this regard. An instructive case of this kind is the University of Heidelberg. The faculty of theology at that, the oldest university of Germany and once the stronghold of the most pronounced Reformed theology, is now entirely rationalistic. The conservatives of Baden have for years again and again prayed the government to appoint at least one "believing (glaubiger) teacher," *i.e.*, a man of positive and not merely negative convictions. But because those in authority in the state happen to be "liberal," which in Germany means radical and rationalistic, these petitions have been in vain. Again the church can exercise certain rights given her by scriptural authority only in so far as the state may permit. The latter, for instance, determines that residence within a parish by one who was born a Protestant
entitles him to the vote and full rights of church membership. A synod or a congregation has no right to determine under what conditions a man may become a member of a congregation, least of all can they insist upon evidence of a spiritual regeneration and inner communion with the head of the church. It thus happens that within the same congregations, especially in the larger cities, are firm believers and unbelieving sceptics. In Berlin, Leipzig, and other larger cities, not the spiritual oneness of confessors, but ward and city limits determine who are members and who are not of this or that church. This explains why, for instance, in a congregation like the St. Nicholas in Leipzig, where for more than two decades the venerable and pious Dr. Ahlfeld preached to large masses of believing Christians, yet at his death it was possible to elect a member of the rationalistic Protestantemverein to the vacancy. The careless or sceptical masses, who probably never darkened the door of the house of the Lord for years, came when election day was on hand and made use of their church rights given them by the state. Again the church cannot decide who is to be excommunicated or excluded from church membership. Unless the sanction of the government is secured, no steps of this sort can be taken, even against the most open of sinners. Without this sanction such a man is entitled to all church privileges, even partaking of the Lord’s Supper. Were a pastor to refuse him any of these privileges he would be fined, imprisoned, or deprived of his office. Examples of this sort could be increased almost ad infinitum.

Such a state of affairs demands an explanation. It can be satisfactorily explained only as the result of an historic process that began centuries ago. There is no single state church for Germany as there is an established church in England, an established church in Sweden, in Denmark, and in Norway. The state churches of Germany are conditioned by the political divisions of the empire. As at present constituted there are twenty-four Lutheran, eleven Reformed, seven United, and four confederated state churches within Germany. Of course this is a greater number than the political divisions. But it must be remembered that within the last twenty-five years a number of smaller German states have been absorbed, politically, by the larger, while in church affairs the status ante has continued. Accordingly we find that while in the nine old Prussian provinces the Union Church has been established, in the three new provinces acquired in 1866, namely, Hanover, Schleswig, and Holstein, the Lutheran is the state church as it was when these provinces were independent; and in lower Hessen the Reformed officially retains this prerogative. The leading Lutheran state churches are Saxony, the two Mecklenburgs, the three new Prussian provinces, Oldenburg, Protestant Bavaria, and Württemberg. The most consistent and conservative in church government of these is Mecklenburg, with its university at Rostock. Saxony, with Leipzig, and Bavaria, with Erlangen, have not maintained confessionalism to quite the same degree; while at Göttingen the prevailing theology is the new rationalistic school of Ritschl, although the pastors and congregations of Hanover are strongly conservative and confessional. The Reformed state churches are hard to find except on paper.
They are nearly all small, and the Reformed as a distinct church has in the past few decades been rapidly losing ground. Only within the last two or three years have efforts been made, especially in Hessen and along the Rhine, to revive its confessional consciousness. The greatest of German states, Prussia, has, since 1817, a United Church, in which the Lutheran and the Reformed churches have been absorbed into one Evangelical Church. This was done not because the adherents of the two bodies had determined to throw their differences aside and become one, but because Frederick William III, and his counsellors thought that it would be a good thing for the state to have only one and not two Protestant churches in Prussia. The people and the churches were not asked about the matter. It was the pet scheme of the king, who himself prepared a large portion of the Agende, or liturgical forms, to be used by the United Church. The majority of the people, however, agreed to the new arrangement. According to the latest statistics the total population of Prussia was 28,318,470. Of these 18,244,405 were Protestant. Of these again 15,385,946 were evangelicals or adherents of the United Church, 2,646,104 were Lutherans and 378,427 were Reformed. These Lutherans, however, are not only those who, like the Breslau and the Immanuel Synod, have withdrawn from the State Church and formed independent bodies, but also the adherents of the so-called Positive Union party, i.e., those who believe that they can remain consistent in their Lutheranism even in the United Church. This is a very influential party, really the aggressive and positive party in the United Church. Its chief organ is the Kircheneitung, of Berlin, once the mighty weapon of Hengstenberg in his wonderful contest for orthodoxy and confessionalism thirty years ago, but now edited by Professor Zöckler. The learned theological exponents of this party are the faculty at Greifswald, with some of the ablest men of Germany in the chairs. It is an open secret that the Prussian government, by sending its ablest conservative men to Greifswald, has endeavored to make that school theologically the conservative rival of the ever popular Leipzig. In a measure this policy has been successful. Berlin was not pitted against Leipzig, because at Berlin the mediating theology which naturally harmonizes best with the union tendencies of the Prussian church government must have place. Other states have followed Prussia in the union movement, notably Baden. The confederated churches are those where the Reformed and the Lutheran churches have absolute equality before the law and are controlled by separate consistories. This is the case, for instance, in the imperial province Elsass.

The beginnings of the process that has ended in the present state of affairs go back to the Reformation era. Humanly speaking, the union of state and church was a necessity to the latter in those momentous times. The Roman Catholic Church on principle made use of the political arm to carry out her projects. Without the strong support of his noble Saxon electors, it would apparently have been impossible for Luther and his co-adjutors to reestablish gospel purity and gospel Christianity. It is very plain from a number of passages in Luther's writings that he well under-
stood the danger that the union of state and church might imply for the church. But as matters stood, another arrangement seemed impossible at the time. And indeed as long as the princes, as protectors of the church, were men imbued with gospel spirit who were willing to subordinate their political interests to those of the cause of Christ, the union could prove only a blessing. But just as soon as this personal equation changed, the same hand that had supported the church might be used to smite her down. And it is a well-known fact that already in the day of the Reformation the remarkable ups and downs of Protestantism were to a great measure due to the position taken by the princes and not to the convictions of the Christians. Even at that time the ambitions and political aspirations of the rulers caused a number of instructive but sad episodes in that otherwise most interesting period in the history of the church. The central sources of danger to the church in this connection with the state thus lay in the subordination of her welfare to considerations that might antagonize her best interests. The source could not but become more prolific of such dangers when the personal government of earlier centuries, through the introduction of the constitutional and parliamentary principles into modern government, took the government of the church out of the hands of princes, whose personal piety might at least furnish some guarantee that the church should not suffer, and placed the legislative and the executive control of church affairs in the hands of a body of men chosen for political purposes and without any regard whatever as to their fitness for deliberating on the welfare of the church. Consistently carried out, the constitutional and parliamentary principles, which practically meant self-government by the people, would, as far as the church is concerned, naturally have included disestablishment. But this application of these new principles has not been thought of except by a few. Good principles, however, when inconsistently applied, may be fruitful of great calamities to important interests. And this certainly has been the case in the government of the state churches in Germany. Historically it is thus easily understood how it has come that in a political parliament all manners and conditions of men, Jews and Roman Catholics, Social Democrats and Radicals, sit and vote on measures affecting the very life of the Protestant cause. They have now the legislative power that formerly the princes enjoyed, while the executive power is in the hands of the consistorys appointed by the rulers and generally politically in harmony with the parliamentary majority.

The agitation now so strong, particularly in Protestant Prussia, is directed against the evils arising from the state of affairs just mentioned. The v. Hammerstein resolutions do not ask for, or even hint at, disestablishment. They ask merely that those agencies which modern parliamentary government has introduced between the king as the summus Episcopus of the Evangelical Church, and which are controlled by political considerations, be removed, and that their prerogatives be assigned to synods or other organs appointed by the church herself, with an eye to her spiritual interests. In other words, it seeks a restoration of the personal connection formerly exist-
ing between the rulers and the churches, but with the proviso, that the actual government of the church shall be in ecclesiastical and not in political hands. The form or forms of government shall remain, but the governmental agents shall be chosen from the church and not from the state. Of course, if this is granted, the Church of Prussia will enjoy a degree of liberty and independence never before in her possession. Nominally the king would still be at the head, but practically the church would be autonomous. The greatest blessing would be that the church would be delivered from political control, and could no longer be made to do handmaid services to the state. As the interference of the latter has during the last decades been steadily in the interests of liberalism, it is not to be wondered at that the Conservative and Confessional parties are the protagonists of the new movement for independence.

G. H. S.

THE "EVANGELISCHER BUND."

We closed a former account of this new organization (vid. p. 186) with the statement that the General Lutheran Conference at Hamburg had taken ground against uniting in this movement for the defence of Protestantism. The accounts of the Conference which afterwards came in contained nothing of much value upon this subject except the speech of Professor Luthardt, who took for his theme: The Position and Problem of the Evangelical Lutheran Church in face of the Advance of the Romish Church at the present time. The principal points of the address are suggested by the "theses" which he defended in the paper, and which formed the subject of the following discussion. Somewhat abridged, they were as follows:—

1. The advance of the Romish Church calls upon us for resistance, and for the defence of the interests of our church and people.

2. This defence must rest upon the foundation of our scriptural Confession. (The effect of this would be to exclude from cooperation with this church all who were not confessional Lutherans, and to prevent it from joining in any such attempt as the "Evangelischer Bund.")

3. Our principal problem must then be to hold up, in opposition to the false doctrine of Rome as to salvation, the doctrine of salvation by faith alone, and to cherish among our churches a sense of the free, forgiving grace of God.

4. We must also defend the memory of Luther against the attacks of Rome.

5. The ethical doctrines and moral life gained for us by Luther we must also defend against Romish precept and example.

6. For these purposes, we need better pastoral care in our congregations, and to this end must seek to have our enormous parishes divided, and the smaller ones thus created provided with suitable pastors.

7. We must call in both the aid of the State and the generous charity of our members to this end.

8. We must awaken the feeling of loyalty to the church, and particularly warn the people against mixed marriages. Etc., etc.

In the course of his remarks, though he did not incorporate it in the theses, Luthardt had spoken of a union among the Lutheran provincial churches. As reported, he said: "The territorial isolation of the little Lutheran ecclesiastical bodies has outlived its usefulness. We must aim at an alliance
of the Lutheran churches for the protection of their common interests!" In subsequent explanation of this utterance, Luthardt said that he was thinking of a general alliance of all Lutheran churches throughout the world. America and the "Dispersion" must be thought of. A subsequent speech made by the representative of the American "General Council" referred to the suggestion with warm favor. It would seem as if this idea, though thrown out, as it were, by chance, were destined to be more fruitful than anything else which Luthardt said.

The great objection, as before said, on the part of the orthodox Lutherans to union with the "Bund" was its negative character. Its Confession was intended to be something less than the Augsburg, and the fear was that it would prove to be antagonistic to that Confession. "As if to justify this objection," says the Allgemeine Ev-Lutherische K-Zeitung Dr. Schwalb, of Bremen, a member of the Protestantverein, says in a recent utterance that the creed of the "Bund" is too vague to answer any good end. It is not pointed enough to exclude the real unbelievers, but, on the other hand, it has served to frighten away the orthodox. The basis of the organization ought to have been only an interest in the preservation of Protestantism. This seems to the high Lutheran like an open avowal by a rationalist of just what he expected, and he points to it as the justification of his course.

Meantime the formation of branches of the "Bund" is going on in all parts of Germany.

The activity of the Lutheran Church in every branch of Home Missions is very great. We note, among other methods employed, that of special courses of instruction in subjects pertaining to this department of church work. We should call them Institutes, or Conferences. Among a series of such conferences one was held in Frankfort last September. Students of theology and law, ministers, and various officials were invited. The session lasted twelve days. The mornings were taken up with papers prepared upon such topics as Care of Little Children, the Y. M. C. A., Sunday-schools, the Care of Idiots, the Deaf and Dumb, etc., by experts in these forms of Christian activity. In the afternoons the Conference visited the various charitable institutions in the vicinity, which furnish examples of almost every kind of such Christian effort.

Under the head of the "Cultivation of the Mission to the Jews in the Universities," the Allgemeine Ev-Lutherische K-Zeitung has an interesting notice of the growth of the Institutum Judaicum. In January of the present year one of these societies was formed in the Theological Seminary of the Evangelical Association in Geneva, with nineteen members. The new Society has formed connections with the societies of the same name in Germany and Scandinavia.

There are now societies of this kind at Leipzig, Erlangen, Rostock, Breslau, Berlin, Halle, Greifswald, Bonn, Gnadenfeld (a theological seminary of the Moravian Brethren), Upsala, Copenhagen, and Christiania. The purpose of these Institutes is to give their members an insight into Jewish literature,
and to cultivate an interest in the missionary work among the Jews. There is a central office in Leipzig for all the branch societies, which serves as a means of communication with their former members. Professors Delitzsch of Leipzig, the father of the whole movement, Schlottmann of Halle, Strack of Berlin, and Licentiate Dalman in Gnadenfeld, give special lectures for the Institute. At least eight hundred clergymen are now in connection with the office of the Institute in Leipzig, and are not only awakening an interest in the subject in their parishes, but also often doing missionary work themselves.

The Leipzig Institute has already published seventeen tracts, the Berlin five. The central office in Leipzig is also a bookstore, and will furnish literature on these subjects to all friends of the movement. The Institute at Leipzig has furnished the students for the Seminary there, from which three missionaries have already gone forth. It is a sign full of promise that while many Jews have begun under the influence of Delitzsch's New Testament to turn to Christ, in the European universities many hundreds of students have turned with a new interest to the study of Jewish literature.

A later number of the same paper gives a statistical view of the condition of the Jewish Missions in the world at the present time. At the beginning of this century there was only one Society for Missions among the Jews, that formed in 1767 at Hamburg. This was more for the help of proselytes than for the extension of missionary work. In 1808 the London Society was formed, which now has 135 missionaries in Europe, Asia, and North America, and an annual income of over $175,000. There are 45 other societies, 13 in Great Britain and Ireland, 11 in Germany, 5 in Switzerland, the Netherlands, France, 5 in Scandinavia, 4 in Russia, 7 in North America. Altogether they have an income of about $450,000.

A great increase in the interest in this matter is to be noted since 1870. Since that date 25 societies have been founded. And yet the number of workers among this people is much less than it should be. The three millions of Jews in Russia are almost unreached, so the 700,000 in Galicia. Just what the success of these missions has been is difficult to say, but it is thought that in this century not less than one-third of the Jewish population has become Christian.

We find the following works favorably reviewed in the German Reviews:—


Delitzsch, Franz. Earnest Questions to the Educated Followers of the Jewish Religion. (Ernst Fragen an die Gebildeten juedischer Religion. Leipzig, 1888. 72 S. M 1.)

Delitzsch, Frans. New Commentary on Genesis. (Neuer Commentar ueber die Genesis. Leipzig, 1887. v. 554 S. M 12.) This book deserves more than the mere statement that it has appeared. We subjoin extracts from the review given in the Theologisches Literaturblatt for March 2d.—The
The title of this work is fully justified by its contents. It has been called forth by the "History of Israel" of Wellhausen, in which the new theory of the composition of the Pentateuch was presented with so great acuteness as "to carry a great number of academic theologians along with it." Delitzsch allows the right of the new critical analysis of the Pentateuch, and agrees with the newer forms of the critical theories so far as to admit that the elohistic document of Gen. i. is later than the account of Paradise in Gen. ii. and iii. But his general view of the course of things is essentially different from that taken by the new criticism. He holds fast to the central truth that Christ did truly rise from the dead, and this carries with it, what many of the critics deny, the supernatural nature and origin of the sacred history. Hence our relation to the Scriptures is not only "a scientific, but a moral and responsible one." The religious contents of the early chapters of Genesis are so certified by our experience of sin and redemption that we know that they cannot be a mere myth. Hence we must suppose this account to have come from Egypt with the Israelites, and thus to be of Mosaic origin. Although there is no trace of the art of writing in Genesis, yet, when the Israelites came out of Egypt, they were no mere mob, but a people who had been under the influence of the foremost nation of their day, and who possessed, undoubtedly, the art of writing as well as a mass of traditions as to their ancestral history. Hence the period of the Exodus was really a creative period for the nation, and we must refer to it a Mosaic Thora which was more than the Ten Words. The whole form of the post-Mosaic literature demands a Mosaic revelation. The Pentateuch is no law-book properly so called, but it is the history of a law. Numerous portions of it cannot be referred to any other author beside Moses without charging the record with absolute falsification. Hence the criticism of the Pentateuch must begin by separating from the rest the Mosaic elements, and then the two documents called respectively the Jehovist and the Elohist give us further suggestions as to divisions which should be made. Of the more general features of the work it is not necessary to speak, for the characteristics of Delitzsch are too well known to need comment. This new commentary, it will be readily seen, is indispensable to any one who wishes to keep himself well informed as to the progress of the Old Testament investigations of the present day.


Kittel, R. History of the Hebrews. (Geschichte der Hebraeer i. Halbdd. Quellenkunde und Geschichte der Zeit bis zum Tode Josuas. xii. 281 S. M 6.)

Luthardt, D. Chr. E. Ancient Ethics in its Historical Development, as an Introduction to the History of Christian Morals. (Die antike Ethik in ihrer geschichtlichen Entwicklung als Einleitung in die Geschichte der christlichen Moral dargestellt. Leipzig, 1887. viii. 187 S. M 6.)

Mers, Adalb. Chrestomathia Targumica, quam collatis libris manuscriptis antiquissimis Tiberiensibus editionibusque impressis celeberrimis e codicibus vocalibus Babylonicae instructis edidit, annotatione critica et glossario instruxit. (Porta ling. orient. etc. Berlin, 1888. xvi. 300 S. M 7.50.)

Meyer. A new edition of the Commentary on John, by Duesterdieck, is out.


Sohm, Prof. Rudolph. The Outlines of Church History. (Kirchengeschichte im Grundriss. Leipzig, 1888. vi. 194 S. M 2.80.)


Wattenbach, W. The Historians of German Antiquity. Under the German title of Die Geschichtsschreiber der Deutschen Vorseit, a German translation of the great collection of German historians by Pertz appears in its second edition. It includes the historians of the early centuries down to the fifteenth inclusive. The price varies according to the size of the work in question, but is set at the rate of five cents per section of 16 pages.
We subjoin a list of the principal articles in certain German Reviews for the year 1887.


**ZEITSCHRIFT FÜR KIRCHENGESCHICHTE:**—I.; Erbes, S. Cecilia in connection with the papal Crypt and the oldest church of Rome. Virk, Melanchthon’s political position at the Diet at Augsburg, 1530. Wilkens, Literature of the history of Spanish Protestantism for the Years 1548–86.—II. and III.; Zahn, The Dialogues of “Adamantius” with the Gnostics. Sauerland, Cardinal John Dominici and his relation to the Efforts at ecclesiastical Union in the years 1406–1500. Vink, Melanchthon’s political position, etc. Wilkens, Literature, etc., continued.—IV.; Jacob, The Euchites. Lascher, The Latin Sermons of Wiclif, the Time of their Composition, and their Use by Huss. Dresde, On Nicholas of Methone. Geis, Luther’s Theses and Duke George of Saxony.
ARTICLE XI.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.

THE SEMINARY METHOD OF ORIGINAL STUDY IN THE HISTORICAL SCIENCES illustrated from Church History. By Frank Hugh Foster, Ph. D. (Leipzig). Professor of Church History in the Theological Seminary at Oberlin. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1888. (pp. xii. 129. 5¾ x 3¾.)

Professor Foster has presented the public with a highly interesting and valuable exposition of what is termed the "Seminary" method of teaching history. While the history of the Church is kept prominently in view in the discussion, the author's observations embrace a consideration of the historical sciences in general. They include very judicious suggestions to teachers and pupils respecting the true way of prosecuting study and giving instruction in this department. Numerous pertinent illustrations are given, which serve to render the processes recommended fully intelligible, and are, at the same time, in themselves extremely instructive and attractive. The entire volume is well adapted to accomplish the purpose of presenting the investigation of the "sources" of history, and of guiding students into the right path of pursuing this work. The Introduction defines the scope of the book, and briefly sets forth the peculiar advantage of historical studies as a part of American education. Then follows, in Chapter I., an unfolding of what is meant by history, as involving, beyond the record of facts, the ascertainment of their causes and effects—in other words, the interpretation of occurrences in the past. In Chapter II., the German Seminary is described,—a group of select students, working, each at his desk, in a room set apart for the purpose, and furnished with a library of authorities, which they examine on topics previously assigned, making their reports to the instructor who directs and aids them, hears their essays, and presides over the discussions which they hold in common. In the next following chapters, Professor Foster offers many judicious suggestions on the qualifications of a student in the "Seminary," and on the ways which he should take in exploring the subject which is committed to him. In the fifth chapter, three detailed examples are given, viz., The Significance of the Colloquy at Marburg, Diplomatic Relations of the United States with Great Britain, 1861–65, and Augustine's conception of the Constitution of the Human Mind. These examples are well chosen, and they will enable the reader, whether teacher or pupil, to possess himself fully of the method of research which it is the design of the author to elucidate. They show incidentally the thoroughness of his own researches, and his ardor in the
branches of study to which he is devoted. The remainder of the book is of equal interest and value. Naturally the study of history in theological schools is a prominent topic; but college instruction in this science is also the subject of remark.

The general aim and character of Professor Foster's volume deserve cordial approbation. It is in the highest degree desirable that the most competent and aspiring students should be initiated into fresh and original inquiries, should be taught to weigh the statements of historical authors, to examine the basis on which they profess to rest, and, besides all this, to construct essays on topics which they look up for themselves in the sources. We do not think—and Professor Foster would not dissent from the remark—that "the Seminary method," as it is practised in Germany, is the only way of bringing this result to pass. It is, no doubt, under favorable circumstances, one method, having striking advantages. Beyond the merits of Professor Foster's little volume, as an explanation of this method, his thoughts on historical study, and how to prosecute it, are eminently sound and worthy of attention.

George P. Fisher.

The Book of Jubilees. Translated from the Ethiopic by Rev. George H. Schodde, Ph. D., Professor in Capital University, Columbus, Ohio. Oberlin: E. J. Goodrich. 1888. (pp. xv. 131. 6½ x 3½.) $1.25.

In providing biblical students with an attractive translation of the important "Book of Jubilees," Dr. Schodde has performed a service for which many readers must be deeply thankful. If, as the translator holds with Dillmann, the work be the product of the Jewish school in the first Christian century, its ideas must be very similar to those which Jesus and his apostles encountered among their countrymen in Palestine. Even a hasty perusal of the book is enough to show the workings of that power of tradition which Jesus refers to in the Gospels.

The Book of Jubilees occupies itself with the period covered by Genesis and part of Exodus, i.e., from the creation of Adam to the deliverance from Egypt. The story is in the main the same as in Genesis and Exodus, but with many differences, especially many curious additions. The minuteness of detail as to dates and names is very interesting. The division of this long period into shorter periods of forty-nine years each, or jubilees, is the chronological feature of the work. Events are dated in such and such a year of such and such a jubilee.

Written originally in Hebrew, the Book of Jubilees was translated into Greek, thence into Ethiopic, and now from Ethiopic into English. Professor Dillmann had already divided the work into chapters. Professor Schodde now adds a division into verses, which will greatly facilitate reference to passages. It is to be hoped that Professor Schodde's translation may induce many biblical students to give attention to the Book of Jubilees, and may tempt some of them to take up the study of the language from which the new version comes.

D. G. Lyon.
The Church—Kingdom: Lectures on Congregationalism, delivered on the Southworth Foundation in the Andover Theological Seminary, 1882–86. By A. Hastings Ross, Lecturer in Oberlin Seminary, etc. Boston and Chicago: Congregational Sunday-School and Publishing Society. 1887. (pp. xxiv. 386. 6¾ x 3¾.)

The custom of calling in the services of ministers not regular members of their faculties to take some part in the instruction of our theological seminaries has given to the world a large number of good books which without this stimulus and help might not have seen the light. The lectures of Dr. Ross, for which we are indebted to Oberlin and Andover seminaries, are a valuable addition to our literature on Church Polity, and these seminaries are to be congratulated, in connection with the author, on the noble volume before us.

The title suggests the idea under which the writer has performed his work. "Organized and manifested Christianity" is the "kingdom of heaven coming. The church is the human side of the kingdom, and the kingdom is the divine side of the church. In other words, the church is the kingdom in manifestation." Dr. Ross follows Professor Harris in his definition of the church as "the organic outgrowth of the life-giving and redeeming grace of Christ penetrating human history in the Holy Spirit." Hence he regards it as beginning in "the patriarchal dispensation, or the family form," and traces it through the "ceremonial" or Jewish, to the "Christian or the ecumenical form."

In opening the discussion of the Christian form of the church, the author commences with the definition of the kingdom of heaven. To this he ascribes among other properties that of infallibility. It is a characteristic of the work, which begins to exhibit itself thus early, to treat its topics with great strength. Dr. Ross, therefore, points out at this stage that the Romish Church ascribes infallibility not to the kingdom as such, but to its outward manifestation, the church. This is its fundamental difference from Protestantism. From the kingdom, the author passes to the manifestation of the kingdom, the church, which was not, however, a completely new creation, but was formed out of the Jewish Church by a process of separation. "The process of winnowing cleansed the threshing floor." But the kingdom in its manifestation retained some of the original features, such as the Sabbath, the Scriptures, etc., and in substance the synagogue form of worship, which was "suited to ecumenical extension." Through the local churches thus formed, the kingdom manifests itself to the world. Its unity is expressed through the unity existing between these. "Here . . . lies the parting of the ways. Here, in the communion of saints beyond the bounds of local congregations, emerge the various theories of the church which are embodied in the great ecclesiastical communions." Hence at this point Dr. Ross sees the formation of four fundamental forms of church polity, which are the only four possible, the Papal, the Episcopal, the Presbyterian, and the Congregational. But though actual, they are not all equally legitimate. "It is manifest that there can be but one normal or true development of the kingdom
into organic manifestation. Whatever theories of the universe science in its infirmity may from time to time present, no one is so foolish as to imagine that God has constructed the universe on a plurality of conflicting plans. He has built it on one sublime plan, and all the theories of science are tentative efforts to comprehend and state that plan. We hold the same to be true of God's sublimer scheme of grace in its organic manifestation." We see thus that Dr. Ross is a High-Church Congregationalist, or holds to a _jure divino_ theory of Congregationalism. He says later: "The system is the only one, as we view it, which those principles and facts [given in the New Testament] warrant."

Dr. Ross now passes in review the three other forms of polity before coming to the Congregational. The discussion of the Papal scheme is particularly valuable and timely. Dr. Ross not only comprehends the system in its main ideas, but sees also the logical bearing of them, and indulges in illuminating remarks in striking contrast to the shallow and superficial view of the nature and aims of the Catholic Church in America, so common and popular in the "liberal" press. "The Papal theory," he says, "is a living power." "The alternative with the Papal theory is either victory or death." "When the Papal theory perishes, and not till then, the Roman Catholic churches may be reformed." We have noted a few flaws in the excellent presentation of this topic which we point out, that the author may have an opportunity, if he pleases, to correct them in subsequent editions of the work. Irenæus's testimony does not seem to be quite so completely in favor of the papacy as he implies. A more careful consideration of the latter part of the quotation, "Where the Spirit of God is, there is the Church," would show this. The exact work done by the Vatican Council could be better stated (p. 53) by saying that the definition of the Pope with the consent of the Council located infallibility in the Pope as its organ. The Pope with great skill, in order to convey the idea that the Pope had always been recognized as infallible, said: "The sacred Council approving, WE teach and define, etc." Neither is it true that "all private judgment in religion is denied," since there always has been and still is a large range of truth not defined by any express utterance of the papal chair, in respect to which the Catholic is free to hold his own opinion.

In the treatment of Episcopacy, we will only call attention to one original remark of the author, that the Low-Church element in the Episcopal Church, being foreign to it, must in time be eliminated from it. This is because the doctrine of Apostolical Succession is the constitutive principle of this church. The Reformed Episcopal Church must for the same reason either return to the mother church or else fail. This shows the author's confidence in the power of truth. What is logical, he would say, will be. And so he adds, in reference to the four polities: "He dreams who thinks of uniting them in some perpetual Christian union." According to Dr. Ross, the history of polities will be that of a struggle for existence and the survival of the fittest.

The constitutive principle of Congregationalism, according to Dr. Ross, is
the independence under Christ of each fully constituted church of Christ." Fellowship is not a distinctive principle, since "every theory of the church uses fellowship as its common element." The realization of fellowship is attained through conferences, the series of which Dr. Ross thinks should not be crowned by national bodies as now, but by an ecumenical association. Of this the feeble and scattered missionary churches stand in great need. Our author, who was one of the most prominent in bringing about the organization of our National Council, expressly says that he expects this ecumenical organization will shortly be effected. Thus his plans for Congregationalism, and the character of his book, are international, or as he would prefer to call it, ecumenical. Indeed, the frequent mention of the usages of Congregational churches in other lands shows that Dr. Ross is not only a student of other forms of Congregational organization, but that in seeking to understand and interpret this divinely organized system, he is looking to all the providential forms it has taken upon itself for light in regard to its true development. Incidentally he shows that Presbyterianism has abandoned its fundamental idea in organizing its international council on the principle of fellowship instead of that of authority, and that it does not form such a parallel to the government of the United States as do the Congregational churches.

We pass over the discussion of the materials of the churches, their independence and relations to each other, and of the ministry, and come to the next peculiarity of Dr. Ross' treatment. It is that of the subject of ministerial standing. Here he is upon his own ground. He has been the principal means of an entire change in the method of certifying to ministerial standing in the United States, and hence he who would understand in all its bearings the system which is no longer a theory with one man, but the officially adopted method of the principal states of this land, must consider the statements of this book carefully. Our author claims that ministerial standing cannot be held in the unassociated churches of any locality, and assigns a number of reasons for this. The historical argument, that, in fact, the old method did not work successfully, would have been a stronger one, and more satisfactory, had the limits of Dr. Ross' work permitted him to go into it.

We pass over the pages upon the minutiae of the internal organization of a church, and come to the presentation of the subject of worship, and particularly the sacraments. Here the strong hand of the author is again visible. In days when many Congregational ministers do not seem so much as to have heard that there are any sacraments, it is refreshing to see the fulness of the conception which Dr. Ross has. Baptism is the "sign and seal of the covenant of promise." The Lord's Supper is a sign and seal also. They are no mere symbols, though they are that. We note with pleasure that this great treatise is opposed to many of the sentimental vagaries of the present day about both sacraments. Speaking of the consecration of children he says: "This... seems foreign to the covenant of grace. Infant baptism is more than this, or it is not baptism." Considerable space is also
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devoted to the question of the proper qualifications for admission to the Lord’s Supper. These are said to be faith, baptism, and church membership. After assigning several reasons for this prescription, Dr. Ross continues: “This position is confirmed by the nature of the case, both as to privileges and as to discipline. The prime condition of the existence and prosperity of any organized society is that it furnishes its members privileges which it neither offers to others nor permits them to share. All organizations rest upon this common-sense principle, and the primitive churches guarded their most sacred privileges even from the gaze of all not in full membership, as a thing demanded as the condition of their continuance and growth. The requirements of discipline demand the same. If a church excommunicate a member, it not only nullifies its action, but nullifies itself, if such an excommunicate be permitted to come to the Lord’s table the same as before. To permit him to commune would turn discipline into a farce; and yet some have presumed to set Scripture, history, and common sense aside, and opened the door to all who desire to commune. This position ends logically in one of two things: either in the extinction of the churches that adopt it, or in turning them into parish churches, including the whole community of worshippers as members.”

The processes of discipline, both in the individual church and in case of ministers, are fully discussed, and their new aspects introduced by the action of the National Council upon ministerial standing, presented for the first time in any treatise among us. But we must hasten to notice the last peculiarity of the work which we shall pass in review, its theories of the proper method of church cooperation in missionary and other common labors. These have been recently applied to the case of the American Board in an Article in the Bibliotheca Sacra (July, 1887). Dr. Ross believes that the churches are not only the best, but the only certain conservators of sound doctrine, and that they can be sure of the perpetual maintenance of purity of doctrine and practice in theological seminaries, colleges, benevolent boards, etc., only when they govern these by their united action in their local or state conferences. As the churches are the units of our system, and as it is self-evident that our churches must have some way of carrying on those labors which can only be carried on by them in combination with one another, they must do this in the exercise of their power as units, or in conferences by their authorized delegates. This view deserves the most careful consideration, for if sound, the churches cannot be too quick in availing themselves of it for the protection of their valued and beloved institutions.

A word upon a minor matter. We hope that Dr. Ross will favor the common wish of all concerned and withdraw his proposal of the phrases “uni parte” and “duo parte” to express two different kinds of councils. Shall it be asked a hundred years hence, when some intelligent man shall read this work, so full of evidences of mental power, but marred by this barbarism, Can it be possible that in the last quarter of the nineteenth century classical scholarship was in the condition suggested by these phrases among Congregational ministers, and within the walls of two seminaries of
sacred learning? Dr. Ross owes it to the reputation of his constituents, as well as to his own, to remove these offensive phrases from his pages.

We bespeak for this latest presentation of Congregational polity the careful study of the nation. Let its new and peculiar features receive special attention. That church must be a living one which can produce so new and fresh modifications of its polity as are expounded or recommended here.

CHRISTIANITY IN THE UNITED STATES from the first Settlement down to the Present Time. By Daniel Dorchester, D. D. New York: Phillips and Hunt. 1888. (pp. 795. 7¼ x 4¾.)

This is a remarkable book. Dr. Dorchester, already so well known for his statistical labors upon the religious progress of our times, has in this book fairly earned the honorable title of an historian in that important but heretofore neglected field, the church in America. Although the statistical element is quite preponderant, and the general treatment is massive rather than delicate, still the emphasis placed upon the causes of events, the care with which these have been traced out, the pains taken to summarize results, the impartiality with which phenomena are judged, mark the historian, and entitle the work to the place of honor as the first work dealing with the whole American church in the spirit and after the methods of impartial history.

The work is divided into two general eras, the Colonial and the National. In the former, after the "beginnings" are described, both Protestant and Catholic, an excellent sketch is given of the relations of church and state (pp. 84–124). Then comes a chapter upon "The Religious Life of Protestantism," in which under a skilful and accurate division of periods, the great events which mark the life of each of the colonies are presented. Then comes the treatment of the "Religious Customs among Protestants," next the history of Protestant missions, then Diverse Currents, Morals, and Education. We see thus from the beginning the three elements which Dorchester conceives to present the main competing forces of the religious life of the nation,—Protestantism, Romanism, and a variety of divergent elements lacking any firm organization within themselves.

The national era is divided into three periods, 1776–1800, 1800–1850, 1850–1887. In the first period the most interesting chapters are those upon "Protestant Beginnings beyond the Alleghanies," "Diverse Currents," in which particularly a treatment of the "Unitarian Trend" is to be found, and "The French-American Infidelity," though the other rubrics are fully handled. The second period is the most interesting to the student of historic forces who loves to see the development of a great progressive movement. Chapter I. presents the "New Life in the Protestant Churches—An Era of Revivals Inaugurated." Chapter II. is upon "The New Life Expanding—The Mississippi Valley." Chapter III., "The New Life Organizing," in which the various evangelizing agencies, for Home Missions, Foreign Missions, etc., religious publication agencies, educational institutions, etc., are described. Chapter IV., "The New Life Reformatory," treating of
Temperance, etc. In the following chapters the Organic Changes in the Protestant churches, Divergent Currents, Scepticism, Mormonism, and the Roman Catholic Church are presented.

The final period is the most impressive for the magnitude of the facts brought before us, and gives a clearer view of the tremendous power of those agencies at work among us for good or evil than can be obtained in any other existing book. A new rubric is added, "Convergent Currents," such as "From Atheism to Theism," and a great variety of summaries, in which the utmost pains have been taken to arrive at an accurate view of the real growth of all the great denominations, and of the Roman Catholic Church in particular.

It is thus easy to see that we have here a work laid out upon a comprehensive plan, which, well carried out, will afford a most instructive view of the peculiar problems and achievements of the American churches. We have examined it with the view of deciding so far as possible upon its reliability, and have reached the conclusion that it is marked with an unusual degree of independence and originality, and has attained a very high degree of accuracy. The history of the Congregational churches, with which we are better acquainted than with that of other denominations, is certainly told with accuracy, impartiality and cordial appreciation of what is excellent in both men and achievements. Slips like that upon page 500, where it is implied that Andover Seminary is not now under the Board of Trustees of Phillips Academy, or that upon page 670 which seems to connect Dr. Tyler with Hartford Seminary since its removal from East Windsor, are rare.

To pass, now, the principal features of the work which will be of the greatest interest to our readers, in review, we begin with the section which treats the relations of church and state. The philosophical character of the work can be seen in the arrangement of the matter by which the author first describes the forms of government among the colonies, then gives the points of agreement between them, and then pursues the history of the various colonies each by itself. The amount of attention paid by the colonists to religion in Virginia will prove a matter of surprise alike to him who supposes that New England was the only region where religion was much cultivated, and to him who regards the religious laws of the Puritans as of exceptional severity. When the period of religious decline is entered upon, the history of the "Half-Way Covenant" is detailed with considerable fullness, though less emphasis is placed upon the theological element than should be done. With Edwards the upward movement begins, and is traced with a great degree of appreciation of the services of the early New England heroes. The defective features of the Revival at Northampton might have been more emphasized, as when it is seen that even Edwards did not have a sufficiently clear idea of the readiness of God in Christ to forgive. But this would have been to leave the field of the external history for that of doctrine. The peculiar excellence of the work is here shown in the concreteness given to the account of the revival by the detailed statements of the places where the revival met with its chief success, etc. So much
definite information cannot probably be met in any other book in so convenient shape for instant comprehension and use. Under the head of Diverse Currents, the history of Unitarianism is treated with a true historic sense of the origin of such movements in former phases of thought, and with a highly successful effort to get at the precise lines of influence which constitute the causes of the peculiar phases of American Unitarianism. The English sources are presented in Whitby, Emelyn, Clarke, etc., and then the American sources, among which the Half-Way Covenant is rightly mentioned as a principal one. The true centre of the Unitarian movement is brought out in the statement that "the exciting point in this conflict was the question of 'a change of heart.'" Unitarianism was, from the first, opposition to what Protestant Christians have always understood by vital religion.

With the close of the Revolutionary War a change in the spirit of the nation as to religious tests and taxes was evident. The steps by which this effected a readjustment of the churches to their new conditions, are fully described. The extension of Unitarianism and the increased hospitality towards Catholicism were among the fruits of the change. The relation of the "organic changes" to the same spirit, and their connection with the readjustment of the various denominations to the new conditions of work in a new country under new principles of action, should have been discussed. With about the year 1837 the churches as a whole pass from the attempt to include within the same body differing elements, and insist upon the strictest denominational differentiation, with a view to more efficient denominational, in distinction from Christian, work. But the tests are too strict and the causes of division too minute. Hence failure to attain the best results, and reconstruction upon new methods, but above all in a new spirit. We do not think that Dr. Dorchester has so fully grasped the philosophy of the changes of the present as of the former century.

As the author approaches the last period, the great diversity of religious methods and organizations makes it extremely difficult to gain a comprehensive view of the whole. We think that Dr. Dorchester has succeeded very well in this portion of his task. He has called to his help an unusual number of diagrams, charts, etc., and has used them with great skill. We close this review by giving a few of the numerical statements which set forth the growth and present condition of the American churches. From 1800 to 1850 there were gained 40,000 churches, 23,000 ministers, and nearly 3,200,000 members, by the "evangelical" Protestant denominations, or nearly 800 churches and 600,000 members annually. In the two decades 1850-1870 the number of churches increased nearly 37,000, the ministers 22,000, and the communicants over 3,100,000, or about as much as in the previous fifty years. In the one decade 1870-1880 the increase is respectively about 27,000; 22,000; 3,400,000. And between 1880 and 1886 THE RATE HAS INCREASED!! So that, whereas the number of communicants was increasing 339,258 annually between 1870 and 1880, between 1880 and 1886 it has increased 344,449 annually!
We present one more group of facts. The startling growth of the Roman Church has alarmed some as to the stability of our institutions. But we find that on the whole the growth of Protestantism is more remarkable yet. The most unfavorable region for the comparison is New England, where a greater proportion of the original population has removed to other portions of the country than elsewhere, and where the incoming immigrants have been more numerous than the removing natives. New England-born persons to the number of 600,000 have removed to other portions of the country, and 800,000 foreigners, almost wholly Catholic, have taken their places. The Catholic population has risen from 100,000 in 1850 to 1,161,000 in 1886. But the evangelical population has increased in almost exactly the same ratio as the total population, so that while it was 32,000 less than 50 per cent. in 1850, it is only 35,000 less than 50 per cent. in 1880!! Comparing the periods 1850–1870, and 1870–1886, the Catholics have begun visibly to decline in their rate of progress, for they have increased 890 ministers less in the latter period than in the former, 1,180 churches less, 386,000 in Church population less, while the Protestants have increased respectively 14,520, 14,282, 8,287,465, more than in the former! And in 1886 the Catholics were .4 of 1 per cent. more than in 1870, but .3 of 1 per cent. less than in 1880; while the Protestants were 12.5 more than in 1870, and 2.5 per cent. more than in 1880.

We close by expressing the deep debt of gratitude under which the Christian church lies to Dr. Dorchester for this work. We expect a new impulse to go forth from these labors into all our American church work, and we hope for a new impulse in the study of our American church history.

**The Book of Revelation: an Exposition based on the Principles of Professor Stuart's Commentary, and designed to familiarize those Principles to the Minds of Non-professional Readers.** By Israel P. Warren, D. D., New York and London: Funk and Wagnalls. 1886. (pp. 300. 5¼ x 3¾.)


These three volumes are among the many indications of a wholesome revival of interest in the study of the Apocalypse. Dr. Warren's little work is based, in large measure, upon Professor Stuart's interpretation, and presents in the main what we believe to be the true explanation of the book. The volume of Dr. Düsterdieck, from Meyer's series, is, in the present reprint, supplemented by Professor Jacobs, who skilfully introduces such notes from other commentators as are necessary to correct the erro-
neous interpretations and conclusions of the original. Dr. McIlvaine has produced a well-considered treatise in which full use is made of his ample experience "in the interpretation of the symbols of the Jewish, Christian, Hindoo, Greek, Roman, with more or less of the Egyptian, Scandinavian, and other religions." Among the interpretations which are original with Dr. McIlvaine are (1) That of the first seal (chap. vi. 1, 2) as signifying the plague of wild beasts, which in ancient times so often proved destructive to human life; (2) The fallen star (chap. ix.) and the locusts which he was permitted to unloose, as referring to Satan and the bodily and mental diseases with which he is permitted to afflict mankind; (3) The sixth trumpet (chap. ix. 13–21) as symbolic of sudden death, especially in modern warfare in the use of firearms, gunpowder being symbolized by the fire and smoke and brimstone issuing out of the mouths of the demon horses; and (4) The two witnesses (chap. xi.) as symbolic not of persons, but of Faith and Prayer, after the analogy of the two olive-trees in Zech. iv.

If we must adopt this style of interpretation, Dr. McIlvaine is certainly a safe and instructive guide. But, as already intimated, a more specific and less vague interpretation of the book is to be preferred. The interpretation of Dr. Warren, and in the main of Dr. Dillerdieck, imply, however, that the Apocalypse was written before the destruction of Jerusalem, a date to which many writers, among them our esteemed contributor in the preceding number (Rev. J. Ritchie Smith), object. As the whole interpretation of the book is seriously influenced by this question of the date, we may profitably pause to say a word about it.

The positive evidence upon which the Apocalypse is assigned to the reign of Domitian (about the year 95) consists of a passage from Irenæus, translation of which is seriously in question. (Against the Heretics, Book v. chap. xxx. sect. 3, quoted above in the article referred to, p. 398.) Upon this we should remark that the grammatical construction by no means makes it so certain as some suppose that Irenæus refers to the vision as seen in the time of Domitian, since the verb has no nominative expressed, and therefore might refer either to John or to the Beast as the object that was seen in the time referred to. But granting, as the more probable view, that Irenæus means to say that the vision of the Apocalypse was seen in the time of Domitian, we are not at liberty to overlook the fact that Irenæus was a very precarious witness in positions where he was unsupported by other testimony. Irenæus was as certain that Jesus lived till he was fifty years old as that the Apocalypse was written in the reign of Domitian. (Against the Heretics, Book ii. chap. xxii. sects. 5, 6.) Nor is he content with basing this belief upon the interpretation of Scripture passages; but, as in the former case, he appeals to positive traditions upon the subject, saying that those "who were conversant in Asia with John the disciple of the Lord affirm that John conveyed to them that information," and that "some of them, moreover, saw not only John, but the other apostles also, and heard the very same account from them, and bear testimony as to the validity of the statement." Now nothing can be more certain than that
Irenæus was mistaken in this particular case. And in general it must be said that little confidence can be placed in the arguments adduced by him in defence of Christianity. This view of Irenæus as a witness must not, however, be allowed to prejudice the evidences of Christianity based on the testimony of the early Christian Fathers. The evidences of Christianity are not based on the direct testimony of these Fathers so much as on the indirect witness of their writings. They had the frailties of all commentators, and the fact that the symmetry of the Christian system was not utterly destroyed by these human workmen of the second and third centuries is the most certain proof that the system itself was established and perfected before their day, and that they were restrained by a mass of objective facts firmly believed in by the widely scattered churches of the period. That the Christian system survived such expositors as Papias, Irenæus, and Tertullian is irresistible evidence of its objective truth, and of the early establishment of the New Testament canon.

Setting aside, therefore, Irenæus' testimony to the date of the Apocalypse, and considering the internal evidence, that would seem ample and decisive in favor of the last years of Nero's reign. It is true that we have no direct evidence, aside from the book, that John was banished to Patmos during Nero's reign. But the history of the period is very imperfect, and, considering the intimate relation between the provinces and the metropolis, such a banishment is by no means improbable. Nor is the state of declension in the churches of Asia Minor as described in the Apocalypse at all improbable when we consider the apprehensions of Paul on his farewell visit at Miletus, several years before, and the state of things described in Ephesians, Colossians, and First Timothy still later. The prominence given to the opposition of the Jews in the first half of the Apocalypse is difficult to reconcile with the date which is later than the destruction of Jerusalem; and, considering the violent opposition of the Jews to Paul, and the dangers to which the church in its infancy was subjected by Judaizers, the interpretation which applies the first half of the book to them is most satisfactory. Moreover, in the eleventh chapter Jerusalem and the temple are still considered as the seat of the persecuting power. After the destruction of Jerusalem, no such prominence could have been given to Jewish persecutors as appears in this portion of the Apocalypse.

Furthermore, the interpretation of the section beginning with the twelfth and ending with the nineteenth chapter, as having reference to heathen Rome as a persecuting power then already in the field, and destined yet to continue for many decades threatening the very existence of the church, is also most natural, giving an appropriate object for the book; and this view is confirmed by various minute particulars which cannot be mere coincidences. Nero seems certainly to be pointed out in chap. xvii. 10–12 as the sixth emperor, while the number 666, in chap. xiii. 18, on a very probable theory, must have been understood by the early Christians to refer to Nero. For, from the nature of the situation it is likely that this numerical symbol should have referred to some inimical power then in the ascendant, and also that the
reference should have been such that Christian readers should have been more likely to understand it than heathen. And *Neron Kaisar* is a form in which Nero's appellation is found in the Talmud.

Not to pause longer upon this evidence, it is sufficient to remark that the ease and naturalness of the interpretation upon the theory of the early date is the best kind of proof of such an early date. And we can but regard the present tendency of evangelical interpreters to defend the later date as an evil omen in exegesis, and as destined to prepare the way for wide-spread practical evils and delusions, like Millerism, which have heretofore so often ensued upon that theory. Nor can we close without saying a word as to the apostolic authorship of the Apocalypse. Dr. Düsterdieck, though regarding the book as canonical, believes that it was not written by the apostle John, but by presbyter John, adopting the theory of Dionysius. We are sorry to have so eminent an interpreter give countenance to such an ill-founded view; for, that the book was written by John the apostle is abundantly proven by external as well as internal evidence. Justin Martyr, in describing passages in the Apocalypse, expressly ascribes them to one of the apostles. (See Dialogue with Trypho, chap. lxxi.; Jerome, Di Vir. Ill, chap. ix.; and Eusebius, H. E., Lib. iv. chap. 18.) The Muratorian Canon likewise identifies the writer of the Apocalypse with the author of the fourth Gospel. Irenæus is also explicit to the same effect. The doubts of Dionysius respecting the apostolic authorship are evidently not based upon any external testimony, but are entirely subjective, and so clearly originate in the exigencies of a controversy with millenarianism that little attention need be paid to them.

**FUTURE RETRIBUTION viewed in the Light of Reason and Revelation.**


This book is not what we expected and hoped it would be, and like most of the author's writings is too profuse for proper literary effect. We regret to say, also, that the indications which we had previously seen of heterodoxy in the author's writings are fully pronounced in the discussion of the solemn and important theme forming the subject of the present volume. Throughout, the author aims to bring odium upon the ordinary doctrine, by the common bald exaggerations with which the public has been so long familiar in the writings of pronounced Universalists. For example, he represents the orthodox party as holding "that the overwhelming majority of that innumerable multitude of men who have existed in the past and who exist in the present, will after this life is ended pass into a state of endless existence in never-ending misery" (p. 2). And again: "Those who, according to the above theories, will thus perish everlastingly will constitute an overwhelming majority of them,—the thought is so awful that it may well set men thinking whether such theories can possibly be true. Yet such is the action which
popular Christianity attributes to Him" (p. 16). Again, according to Calvinistic views as ordinarily held, he says: "God has so conditioned his creative work, as respects mankind, that the final result will be the everlasting felicity of a very small number out of a multitude so vast as to be impossible to realize in thought, and the everlasting misery... of the remainder through a course of painful, and in cases of extreme wickedness, terrible suffering" (p. 137).

It is needless to remark that these are not the popular evangelical views, since in the ordinary popular view the outlook into the future is ameliorated by a belief in the salvation of all who die in infancy, which itself makes up fully one-half of mankind. In the next place, the severity of the popular belief is mitigated by the hope that the glory of the Lord is eventually to fill the earth as the waters cover the seas, when for a long succession of generations, with the earth vastly fuller of populations than now, salvation will be the rule, and the loss of a soul the exception. But really the difficulty of reconciling eternal punishment with the goodness of God is not greatly increased by the enlargement of our conception as to the numbers to be lost, though we believe that relatively to those that are to be saved the number will eventually be very small.

Dr. Row's discussion of the scriptural teachings upon the subject seems to us very unsatisfactory and unfair. For example, in Matt. xxv. 46, the force of the word ἐδράλατον, "punishment," is admitted; but he suggests that "inasmuch as the New Testament passed through more than fourteen centuries of transcriptions before it was committed to the safe custody of the printing-press, it is impossible to be certain that an isolated expression was the word actually employed by the sacred writer" (p. 268). He holds, moreover, that the "word αἰών in the singular, its plural, αἰώνες, and even the far stronger term, εἰς τοὺς αἰώνας τῶν αἰώνων," to the ages of the ages, "are never the precise equivalents of duration without limits;" that the word "involves the idea of limitation, and its indefinite multiplication of ages of ages," like our English expression 'millions of millions,' really denotes only a finite quantity:... it is simply impossible that the same word can denote duration which is limited and duration which is limitless" (p. 206). Even in the phrase in Mark x. 30 translated "in the world to come eternal life," Dr. Row maintains that "the word, here translated 'eternal,' cannot have suggested to the speaker of Greek the idea of duration without limits" (p. 216). His uniform translation of αἰώνευον would be "age-long." The objection that the kingdom of the Messiah, indicated by the age to come, is an everlasting kingdom, and is elsewhere described as one which has no end, he does not squarely meet, but contents himself with saying that if that be so, the plural, the "ages of the ages," becomes meaningless; so our author works himself up into the belief "that it may be a question whether our modern philosophic conception of eternity ever entered into" the minds of the apostolic writers. All this is very feeble reasoning, and shows an utter misconception of the force of language. In the same way you could prove that, in English, "for ever" does not mean "for ever," because we sometimes strengthen the force
of the expression and make it "for ever and ever." And what folly to talk
about the "philosophic conception of eternity" as being so different from
the common conception of it! The idea of everlasting continuance is not a
recondite idea, to which only philosophers attain. There is no profound
distinction between the English words "everlasting" and "eternal," except
that one is derived from the Latin and the other from the Anglo-Saxon.
And it is little short of ridiculous for a man writing in English to try to
substitute "age-long" as the translation of αἰώνιος to the exclusion of the
word "everlasting." The words "for ever" and "everlasting" in English
have no negative limitations in them, and yet everybody knows that they
refer to a period in the future that is without end, and the students of Greek
are few who do not see that αἰών and αἰώνιος, especially in the phrase
εἰς τοὺς αἰώνες τῶν αἰώνων, express the idea of everlasting continuance
as clearly as any words could do it. It is pitiable, therefore, to have the author
in his summary state, as he does, "respecting the meaning of the word αἰών,
I have proved that when it is used to denote duration it is incapable of ex-
pressing the idea of duration without limits, unless it is united with a particle
of negation. When it is not thus united it expresses a period of indefinite
but limited duration, such for example, as an 'age' or dispensation" (p. 416).
And this is a fair specimen of the author's mode of reasoning from beginning
to end. It is disheartening to find so large and sumptuous a volume filled
with such inconsequent reasoning.

CLEAR AS CRYSTAL: A Series of Talks to Children on the Crystal, given in
the West Denver Congregational Church in Denver, Colorado, during 1886
and 1887. By Rev. R. T. Cross, Author of "Home Duties." Chicago
and New York: Fleming H. Revell. 1887. (pp. viii. 196. 5 x 3¼.)

This is a book of five minutes sermons preached to children, in which
the author has made abundant use of his own extensive knowledge of min-
eralogy with which to illustrate truth to the younger members of his
congregation. Altogether there are fifty sermons, and each one is as clear
as crystal, while the variety of illustrations is only matched by that of the
texts which the Scriptures furnish for the weekly necessities of the preacher.
It is not every preacher who has the Rocky Mountains from which to
gather precious stones with which to illustrate the truth, or who has the skill
with which to do it; but if there were more such attention paid to natural
objects as Mr. Cross has given to those at his own door, the preaching of
the times would have a greater resemblance to that of the Saviour than it
now does.

LEHRBUCH DER DOGMENGESCHICHTE. Von Prof. H. Schmid. In vierter
Auflage neubearbeitet von Dr. A. Hauck, Nördlingen. Verlag der C.
H. Beck'schen Buchhandlung. 1887. (pp. 414. 7 x 4.) M 6.50.

This is not a book to be read with feet on the sander; it is not, like
Harnack's brilliant book on the same subject, entertaining as well as instruc-
tive; for its aim is less to build up a History of Doctrine than to show the
student how to find valuable and suitable material, and to help him frame his own story of the creed of the church. It seeks to do for this particular department of ecclesiastical history what the indispensable work of Gieseler does for the whole field. And, within those limits, there is compressed, especially in the new edition by Hauck, a fulness of material, well sifted, selected, and arranged, such as, to the reviewer's knowledge, the student can find in like handy form nowhere else. Schmid calls dogma the public belief of the church. It is the necessary definition of faith; and it guarantees the continuity of the original convictions of believers. Hence, he says, "No church, which has had a history, is found without dogma." The unformulated creed of Christians took shape usually in conflict with error; the theological position was reached through controversy; accordingly, the substance of every church dogma bears an historic stamp, which must be carefully understood, and frequently removed, before we can say that we have the faith once delivered to the saints in just the form suitable for presentation in our day. Under the first attempts to give a connected view of Christian doctrine in the early church, he distinguishes Jewish Christianity, Gnosticism, Montanism, Irenæus, Justin Martyr, and the Alexandrian theologians. When he comes to the positive development of doctrine in the same period, he treats it under the heads of the Trinity, the God-Man, Anthropology, and the Church. It will thus be seen that he keeps fairly close to the rubrics made so familiar by Hagenbach.

This arrangement is perhaps the best for the purposes of such a hand-book; but we are of the conviction that such a scheme fails to present the several doctrines in proper historic perspective, and does not give the student an adequate idea of their relative importance in the minds of early theologians. For example, in the Ante-Nicene period, christology and eschatology were much more prominent than might be inferred from Schmid's division of the subject. But, as we have observed, the value of this work is not in the text, but in the judicious and copious notes. The first adds very little to the knowledge of a young minister of average information; but the second gives information, by which our views may be tested, supplemented, and made more vital. We are a little surprised not to have met the work in earlier editions, and now the more heartily commend this greatly enlarged form of so profitable and serviceable a hand-book.


This is without doubt one of the most important publications in the department of biblical literature that has appeared in the last score and more of years. The scientific discussion of Old Testament textual criticism is really only beginning, but so much has already been gained, that scholars agree as to the prime importance of the Septuagint in this research. The problem as far as its aim is concerned is, of course, the same as that of the New Testa-
ment, namely the restoration of the *verba ipsissima* of the divine writers; but as far as method is concerned, it is entirely different. The manuscripts of the Old Testament text cannot relatively occupy the same position in the text-critical process that the New Testament manuscripts do, partly on account of their age, there being none earlier than the ninth Christian century, or fully thirteen hundred and more years after the close of the Old Testament canon; and, partly, because the divergencies and differences of the text do not exist between one Hebrew MS. and another (for these agree in all but minor particulars) but between the Hebrew on the one hand and the much earlier versions on the other. Here then the versions must occupy a much more prominent position in the critical process than is assigned them in New Testament textual criticism; and here again, for evident reasons, the first place must be assigned to the Septuagint. The only question that divides scholars in this regard is the extent to which the Greek should be allowed to control the Hebrew. It is thus not a question of principle, but rather one of more or less conservatism in the application of this principle.

But just here the text critics meet with a great difficulty. We have no critical edition of the Septuagint text; and this we must have, if we would use this text justly and correctly. The chief reason why the Septuagint is given such a decisive voice in the Old Testament criticism is on account of its age. Having been translated about 150-200 years before Christ, it represents a text over a thousand years older than our oldest Hebrew MSS. *i.e.*, providing it was a good translation and that this translation has been preserved for us in its integrity. The text-critical value of the Septuagint is thus measured by the degree in which we can secure the original form of this version. The problem is not an easy one, as the Septuagint has a strange history. No less than three new translations were made into Greek for the reason that the LXX. did not throughout agree with the Hebrew original, and parts and portions of these revised later translations found their way into the old Septuagint. Then Origen, in his Hexapla, *ex professo* attempted to correct the LXX. according to the Hebrew, and his asterisks and obeli, with which he marked the *minus* and the *plus* of the LXX. over against the Hebrew, have to a great extent been erased or removed, so that the Hexapla LXX. is not a reliable basis from which to reproduce the original. Then it is well known from the statements of Jerome, that no less than three recensions of the Septuagint were in circulation in the Greek Church, that of Hesychius in Alexandria and Egypt; that of Lucian, in Antioch and Constantinople; and that of Pamphilus and Eusebius at Caesarea, the last mentioned being practically the Hexaplaric text of Origen.

Critically to glean from these sources the old original Septuagint text that underlies them all, must be the work of more than one generation of scholars. All that can be done now is to prepare the way for this critical edition, and this is all that is attempted by scholars appreciating the difficulties of the work. Lagarde has undertaken the difficult task of restoring the texts of the three recensions mentioned by Jerome; and on the basis of these three, he thinks the one and original Septuagint text underlying them all can be
secured. In his Pars Prior of the Greek text published at Göttingen in 1883, he has sought to restore the Lucian text, and he thinks the other two can also be found. Others have applied his methods to separate books, taking however the Septuagint readings in bulk and on their intrinsic merits, without any further consideration of the recension. This has been done by Wellhausen with Samuel and by Cornill with Ezekiel, and with some slight modification by Ryssel with Micah. But all these special and detailed researches only emphasize the difficulty of the task and show that for many years yet we cannot expect the resultant Septuagint text.

In the meanwhile scholars must have as good and as reliable a text to operate with as possible. The Sixtina, or ordinary Septuagint text, by a fortunate accident, was based on the famous Vaticanus text, the best of the four great Uncial Bibles, so that comparatively we have been having a better textus receptus of the LXX. than we had of the New Testament before modern text-critical science took the matter in hand. Tischendorf’s edition was and is essentially the same as the Sixtina. But within recent years the great Vaticanus MS. has been published in fac-simile type, and the Alexandrine in autotype photography. It has been found that the ordinary Sixtina text differs widely from the Vaticanus; and besides that scholars have had no access to any of the variae lectiones of the other MSS. except the collection of Alexandrine readings added to later editions of Tischendorf, by Nestle. But the materials were on hand for the publication of a Septuagint text based upon the Vaticanus, the lacuna of which could be supplied from the Alexandrine, together with an apparatus criticus drawn from the other Uncials. It is just this that Swete has done and thereby prepared a critical edition of the texts, or rather, the best text accessible, with so much of critical apparatus as the Uncial MSS. of the LXX offered. The reader has thus for the first time collected together the best material accessible with which to operate critically in using the LXX. for textual purposes, and a larger edition, with a complete apparatus and prolegomena, is promised for the future. This new edition is so far in advance of any other, that the Septuagint student simply cannot do without it. All other manual editions through it become antiquated, and the student is warned not to buy them, not even the Tischendorf edition, even with Nestle’s notes, simply because it bears a good man’s name. Tischendorf himself would not now, if he were living, allow it to go out in its present shape under his name. But the publisher finds it more profitable to use his old stereotype plates than to make new ones.

The editor has done his work well. The various readings are at the bottom of the page containing the text, although a number of less important ones are found in the appendix. The type is somewhat small, but is clear cut and distinct. The print and divisions are after the manner of the Revised Version. The book is remarkably cheap. The Introduction, while not containing a complete resumé of the LXX. problems, nevertheless contains everything that is needed to understand the full import of the new publication. In short, it satisfactorily supplies a keenly felt
desideratum in biblical philology and every thorough Old Testament student ought to have one and use it.


The most characteristic and hopeful feature of the theological research of our own day over against that of earlier generations is that it is more directly biblical in this sense, that it maintains a greater or less independence over against the older system with the avowed purpose of building entirely upon biblical foundations. Whether this new attitude of theology towards Scripture has made this theology more scriptural or not, is a question of results and not of method. But the new method has developed two new theological disciplines, namely Biblical theology over against Dogmatics; and, secondly, the History of New Testament Times, or the historical substratum and background of New Testament Revelation and History. Both these disciplines have, each in its way, done excellent services for the elucidation of biblical truth and doubtless are destined for still greater usefulness. For the second of these disciplines the work of Weber (announced at its appearance in the *Bibliotheca Sacra*) is one of the most important that has yet appeared. Indeed for one feature of the whole problem of New Testament, namely, the understanding of the Jewish thought of the New Testament era, it is the only reliable and complete work that we have; while, in the nature of the case, it cannot but be at least negatively of great value also for the problem of New Testament theology.

The idea of putting into systematic shape and form the teachings of New Testament Judaism, as these were formulated by Talmuds, Targums, and Midrash, is not a new one. Christian scholars have always been more or less interested in so attractive a theme. However only a few, such as the Buxtorfs and several of their contemporaries in former times, and Delitzsch and possibly Wünsche and Strack in our own days, would have been able to manage the materials satisfactorily. The attempts that have been hitherto made were either undertaken in the spirit of hostility to Judaism, as was the famous *Entdecktes Judenthum* of Eisenmenger and the recent pseudo-investigations of the anti-Semitic Professor Rohling, in Prague; or they consisted merely of a chrestomathy for New Testament exegetical purposes, as did the works of Lightfoot, Schöttgen, and Delitzsch. Weber is the first who has combined full control of the vast materials with a spirit of objective and critical research and a logical systematization of this material so as to make as complete and rounded a representation of the difficult subject as in the nature of this material could be expected. The aim of the author has thus been an unique one, and it is a rare thing that a protagonist in a new field of research succeeds the first time in doing such satisfactory work as we have here before us. It would of course be foolish to say that Weber has satisfactorily answered all the questions that the New Testament
specialist must ask in this department of study; but doubtless Weber has
taken the subject as far as it can at present be developed. Whatever is to
be done further must be based upon newer detailed research. As it is, the
book is one of the most valuable and original contributions that Germany
has of late years given us for New Testament work. The present is, strictly
speaking, the second edition of a work that appeared a few years ago under
a misleading title and for that reason did not receive the attention its high
qualities merited. It ought to win many friends wherever a healthy use of
the historico-critical method of Bible work enables the student to appreciate,
at its full value, a book marked by such eminent and rare learning and pa-
tient research.

**Life and Times of Henry Melchior Muhlenberg.** By William J.
Mann, D. D., Pastor Emeritus of St. Michael's and Zion's congregations,
and Professor in the Theological Seminary of the Evangelical Lutheran
Church at Philadelphia. Philadelphia: G. W. Frederick. 1887. (pp. xvi.
547. 8vo.) $3.00.

The American branch of the Lutheran Church now numbers nearly one
million communicant members, thus standing numerically about the fourth
on the list of Protestant denominations in the United States. And yet her
literature, which in Europe, especially in Germany and Scandinavia, is so
rich, as also her influence on the church life of America, has not by any
means stood in proportion to her numbers. More than one reason can be
assigned for this anomaly. The Lutheran Church in America is really a
church of foreigners, is the most polyglot church in the land. In a dozen
and more languages her people hear the gospel preached. In the city of
Minneapolis alone seven different tongues are heard every Lord's Day in
Lutheran pulpits. Then, unfortunately, the church has suffered serious dis-
sensions. There are no less than four general bodies of Lutherans, occupying
various positions from the somewhat lax standpoint of the General Synod to
the extreme confessionalism of the Synodical Conference. And then there
are yet fully a dozen independent synodal organizations, who owe their
existence to doctrinal or lingual difficulties.

Such circumstances did not favor the development of good Lutheran
literature in the English language. What has been done in this line of any
noteworthy character have been almost entirely translations. With the ex-
ception of Krauth's Conservative Reformation, and Jacob's second volume
on the Confessions, there have been few, if any, really prominent books pre-
pared by English Lutherans. A better day seems to be dawning, and the
appearance of this biography of the "Patriarch of the Lutheran Church of
America," on the hundredth anniversary of his death (October 7, 1787) is a
welcome addition to the literature of American church history. When Mühlenberg, in 1742, came to Philadelphia at the invitation of a number of
congregations, he found the Lutheran congregations of the land in a pitiable
condition. The American condition of things was so entirely different
from that existing in Europe, that these people did not know how to
manage their church affairs. In Mühlenberg they found a man prov-
identically prepared by character, training, and education for just such work. A pupil of the Pietistic movement of Halle, he held fast to the confessions, but associated with his confessional loyalty warm piety and servid devotion to living Christianity. His peculiar mildness in his firm Christian and Lutheran views enabled him to win the hearts of the disheartened people, while his wonderful power of leadership and organization enabled him not only to establish the congregations on a firm biblical and confessional basis, but also to bring about a union between them in the organization of the Pennsylvania Synod, the oldest synodical body of the Lutheran Church in the land. By common consent Mühlenberg became the leader of the Lutheran Church of America, and for forty and more years labored incessantly for her best welfare. He has richly merited the title of "Patriarch" of his church in this land.

It may seem strange that hitherto no satisfactory biography of so prominent and influential a man had been prepared. Only a short account of his life was published by Dr. Stoever, of Gettysburg, twenty and more years ago, and a few years ago was republished. This looks like ingratitude on the part of the Lutherans of America. We fear it has been such, at least in a measure. There was at least an inability to appreciate the merits of this tireless laborer. The generation of Lutherans after Mühlenberg's day were not as faithful to his principles as they should have been for their own good. A somewhat rampant spirit of new-measureism set in, which did not understand the firm doctrinal and yet mild Christian spirit of Mühlenberg, but by a desertion of his healthy conservatism endangered the individuality and even the existence of the church. It is only within the past quarter of a century that the principles of Mühlenberg's work have been revived, and they now are fast gaining adherence even in the most liberal circles of the Lutheran Church. It is chiefly for this reason that only now the Lutheran Church of America seems to be ready to learn and appreciate the lessons of the life of her Patriarch.

As a literary work the biography ranks among the best of our day. The greater portion of it is drawn from Mühlenberg's own accurate and very complete diary and from the Reports (Nachrichten) sent by him and his colleagues to their Halle friends concerning the growth of the Lutheran Church in America. Very few of our modern biographies contain so much manuscript material and so little that has been accessible in print. For this reason it is also a contribution of merit to American church literature, and a positive addition to our information in this rather neglected field. One merit of the work must not be overlooked. The book treats of the times as well as the life of Mühlenberg, and thus has a wider interest than the merely denominational. Mühlenberg was in constant communication and connection also with non-Lutheran Christians, and the book gives a fair idea of church matters in general, particularly in the Middle States, for the period of his life. We give the work a hearty welcome.

We have already given a general view of this series as a whole (vol. xliv. p. 735). Of the part of the present volume written by Drs. Zoeckler and Luthardt it is sufficient to say that they have performed their task with the skill for which they have already become well known among all the readers of German orthodox literature. Luthardt has long been accustomed to treat the Epistle to the Romans in his regular university lectures, so that he comes to his task here well prepared by frequent repetition to say exactly what he means in the shortest possible form. The preparation of the Epistles to the Corinthians has fallen to Dr. Schnedermann of Basel. This young scholar, educated and for a time Privat-docent at Leipzig, now Docent at Basel, is a good representative of the rising generation of orthodox Lutheran scholars, who do not blindly accept the confessional theology of their church, but seek to penetrate to its innermost meaning, conceive it for themselves, and reproduce it to others in living form. We have here a good specimen of the work which is to be expected from men actuated by such a spirit and filled with a true evangelical faith. The general features of the Commentary are preserved. With the regular commentary on the text are combined a series of excursuses on such points as The Lawful and the Expedient, chap. 6, ver. 12-20, The Spiritual Gifts of the early Christians, chap. 12, ver. 4-11, etc., which are masterpieces of their sort. Schnedermann possesses the art of the good teacher by which he can put a point so as to fix it in the memory, as, e. g., where he describes the second Epistle thus: "Apostle—congregation—opponents, such are the three divisions of the Epistle." While the more ponderously learned apparatus is kept in the distant background, every topic deserving learned discussion is treated with all desirable fulness, and the total impression of the whole is that the author has succeeded in presenting the Epistle to our consideration from the position of a fresh investigator, and has yet found in it the old word of God which has refreshed and taught the church from the beginning.


The professors in Chicago Theological Seminary continue, in this volume, their valuable services in the dissemination of knowledge concerning current theological discussions. We miss in the present volume the hand of Professor Hyde in New Testament Criticism, but it is well supplied by his successor, Professor George H. Gilbert. The whole field of philosophical, exegetical, historical, and practical Christian literature is surveyed in these pages, and altogether it is a great credit to its authors. The only criticism we feel inclined to make is that the writers do not give the reader enough of their own views. It would add greatly to the value of the production if
the editors would themselves more frequently discuss the views of the many writers they summarize. To this end also it might be in place to suggest an enlargement of their contributors, so as to include specialists in other seminaries. The corresponding annual in Germany, for example, has as many contributors in the single topic of Church History as this has for the whole field.

**Brief Institutes of General History.** By E. Benjamin Andrews, D. D., LL. D., Professor of History in Brown University. Boston: Silver, Rogers, and Company. 1887. (pp. xii. 440. 5¼ x 3½.)

This work is "a precipitate rather than an outline, being to history at large what the spinal cord is to the nervous system or the Gulf Stream to the Atlantic." It is not intended to be read and recited by a class, but it rather introduces the student to the topics under consideration, and then sets him at work reading the larger works upon each valuable point. It is thus a kind of collection of materials for introductory "Seminary" work. In the hands of a skilful teacher it may be made very stimulating and instructive. Or for the general reader it will serve, as the author says, to "blaze through the jungle of ages a course," and make the reading of any one more systematic and successful than it would ordinarily be. The successive topics treated are: History, and the Study of History; The Old East; The Classical Period; The Dissolution of Rome; The Mediæval Roman Empire of the West; Feudalism and the French Monarchy; Islam and the Crusades; Renaissance and Reformation; The Thirty Years' War; The French Revolution; and Prussia and the New Empire.

**Church and State in the United States, or the American Idea of Religious Liberty and Its Practical Effects.** With Official Documents. By Philip Schaff, D.D., LL.D., Professor, etc. Reprinted from the Papers of the American Historical Association, Vol. ii., No. 4. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons. 1888. (pp. 161. 6¼ x 3½.) With an appendix containing Dr. Schaff's Inaugural Address as Professor of Church History in Union Theological Seminary, N. Y.

The Nestor of Church History in America has here done us a great service in presenting in a collected form a discussion of the relations of church and state with accompanying official documents. The American theory is presented, compared with other systems, its constitutional basis given, the systems of the several states reviewed, the Christian activity of the nation, its public recognition of religion, the connecting links between church and state, the results of the system, and the progress of religious freedom in Europe are set forth. We need only add that the book is what might be expected of Professor Schaff, and that it is a discussion of the theme as important as it is full. It constitutes another of those many cheering proofs that American scholars are no longer to be imitators of other nations, but are to do work upon their own peculiar province, and thus help America teach her special lesson in religious things to the world.

This is a most entrancing book. The story is told with rare simplicity and taste. The work of the author and his family among the Sioux Indians will compare favorably with that of any other which may be selected from the whole history of missionary operations. In no other way can the reader get a better idea of the power of the gospel than by the perusal of such completed missionary narratives. Those of us who remember the massacre by the Sioux Indians of the white settlers in the early part of the War of the Rebellion can appreciate better than most what it means that so many of the survivors of those engaged in that massacre, and of their children, are now active and devoted followers of Christ.


The growth of California has been phenomenal. Within a third of a century it has come to be a world by itself, rich in all material products, and more liberally endowed with educational institutions than any but the most favored of the New England states. The present history of the College of California is complete as to that institution, since it has been prepared by one who has been with it from the beginning. The volume is a noble monument of so good an undertaking, and must be read by every one wishing to know how, in these days, commonwealths are made.


These sermons are the ripe fruit of the long service in the ministry of one of our ripest Christian scholars, the sweetness of whose spirit was only equalled by his devotion to his parish, and his loyalty to the truth as handed down to us in the inspired word. The sermons are practical, in good style, and worthy of imitation by those who aim for long pastorateS. Many of the hymns and much of the poetry introduced are the composition of the author.

FROM DEATH TO RESURRECTION; or, Scripture Testimony concerning the Saints DeaD. By S. H. Kellogg, D. D., Professor in the Western Theological Seminary, Allegheny, Pa., author of "The Jews," "The Light of Asia and the Light of the World," etc. New York: Anson D. F. Randolph and Company. 1885. (pp. 63. 4½ x 2½.)

This little book supplies a want often felt by the pastor when called upon to minister to friends mourning for their dead. It is then of first importance to have some little work which unfolds all the proper inferences from Scripture concerning the state between death and the resurrection. It is equally important to be warned against inferences which may not be properly drawn from the Bible. The present little volume covers the ground in an admirable manner and is to be heartily commended.
A LETTER FROM PROFESSOR DRIVER.

To the Editor of the Bibliotheca Sacra.

Sir: I have just seen your notice of my article in the Andover Review for December last. I trust that you will find space in your next issue to allow me to disclaim altogether the construction put by your reviewer (p. 356) on certain of my words. Nothing was further from my thoughts than to charge Professor Dana with "misrepresentation." My meaning in the sentence which the reviewer has misunderstood was briefly this. There is a disagreement—real or apparent—between Gen. i. and the teachings of geology as to the order in which certain of the Vertebrata are stated to have appeared upon the earth: and Professor Dana, in order to account for the difference, has recourse to a theory which, as it seemed to me, implied that in the cosmogony of Genesis the actual order was changed "for the sake of a theory,"—a theory, viz., of their relation to man by which the order there adopted is supposed to have been determined. The improbability of such a change of order, in the narration of facts admitted ex hypothesi to be revealed, was what the sentence quoted was intended to exhibit. No doubt the term "misrepresented" (which I am sorry now that I employed) mislead the reviewer, though I should have thought that the following sentence would have made my meaning plain; the "transference" there spoken of being clearly none made by Professor Dana, but one which (as I conceived) was postulated by his theory for the author of the cosmogony. Your reviewer may, of course, estimate my argument as he pleases; but I have not, I submit, been guilty of charging Professor Dana with "misrepresentation." And when in another sentence, at which the reviewer takes exception, I say that he "deflects" the sentence of Genesis, the next sentence surely makes it evident that I am not in any way imputing to him an intention to mislead, but am simply expressing the opinion that this is a result—but in no way the design—of his general theory. Nothing was further from my intention than to wrong Professor Dana and I am not conscious that I have done so. I have endeavored to make this explanation as brief as possible, and trust, even more on Professor Dana's account than on my own, that you will give it publicity.

I am yours, etc.,

S. R. DRIVER.

Christ Church, Oxford, May 25.

In respect to the foregoing restatement of the case of Dr. Driver, Professor Dana writes that in justice to his own motives it should be said that he supposed the interpretation was one generally accepted, and that from his first use of it many years ago until 1887 he was not aware that it had been criticised. "I used it," he writes, "with implicit confidence that it was right exegetically; that the expression 'creeping things' in the twenty-
fourth verse meant the prowling animals among beasts of prey, as sometimes so employed (my authority said) elsewhere in the Bible [e. g., Ps. civ. 20; compare Gen. vii. 21].... The language to the uninitiated in Hebrew implies mammals;—the 'creeping thing' is put between cattle and the beast of the earth.... The theory was therefore no theory with me; no assumption to explain a certain view as to Genesis, but a fact and its direct application. Whatever the range of meaning under the Hebrew word translated 'creeping thing,' may not mammals alone have been originally understood or implied in the sentence? This is a right question for consideration, and it is the one which Dr. Driver supposed I had decided under my geologico-biblical prejudices." We may add that Professor Dana's interpretation is certainly supported by many of the ablest commentators. The question cannot be settled in the ex cathedra way employed by Dr. Driver.
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ARTICLE I.

THE DIVINE IMMANENCY.

BY THE REV. JAMES DOUGLAS, D. D., PULASKI, N. Y.

[Continued from Vol. xlv. p. 505.]

THE RELATIONS OF THE DOCTRINE OF THE DIVINE IMMANENCY TO THE MIRACLES OF CHRIST.

The subject of miracles is somewhat complicated. It naturally divides itself into two general parts: one is the historic fact of miracles, with proofs of the fact of their real occurrence as miracles; the other is, the mode in which these miracles were performed, by what agency or means, in what manner, or by what process. The explanation of the mode of their occurrence has some relation to the proofs of the historic fact of miracles, for if no satisfactory explanation can be given, and miracles are impossible, then no amount of historic evidence will convince the investigator or sceptic of the historic fact.

Another question arises in regard to the miracles of Christ, in relation to his divinity, whether they are absolutely essential as proofs of his divinity. Some treatises of polemical
theology may doubtless be open to the criticism, that an undue importance is given to miracles, as proofs of the possession, by Christ, of a divine nature, as well as of divine power. The fact that all persons claiming a divine mission, especially among heathen nations, assert the power of miracle, as proof of such mission, has greatly tended to disparage the miracles of Christ. It is the common argument of superstition.

The best proof of Christ's divinity to many minds by no means lies in his miracles. Far better and more convincing proof, appealing directly to the moral consciousness, is found, for many cultivated and thoughtful minds, in the teachings, character, and life of Christ. The distinguished scholar and theologian, Tayler Lewis, pointedly expresses the sentiment of thousands of believers in that pregnant phrase, "I believe in Christ because my soul has need of him." Even in the earthly lifetime of Christ, none were more profoundly impressed with the fact of his divinity, than those who returned from their interview with him, saying, "Never man spake like this man." It was the moral grandeur of that God-like heroism in death, more than the earthquake's shock, or the darkened sun, that led the Roman centurion to separate Christ in contemplation from those dying with him, and to exclaim, "Verily this was the Son of God." And it was a similar view and conviction in long after years that wrung from Rousseau the confession, when comparing the most renowned of the sages and martyrs of history with the Nazarene, "Socrates died like a philosopher, but Jesus Christ like a God."

The miracles of Christ have little to do with those deep moral convictions of the divine nature of Christ which are the most essential to a true belief. It is his character and life, moral manifestations, signs, and tokens of the nature and spirit within, that capture the assent of the soul. It is more to be divine in character, than to be divine in power. Christ himself repeatedly upbraids the Jews, because they did not believe in him without the working of miracles, and especially appeals to the beneficent character of his works,
as manifestations of his relation to the Father, rather than to their wonderful nature as miracles.

So far from miracles being proofs of a divine power or mission, they are repeatedly spoken of in the New Testament, as signs and tokens attending powers of evil and falsehood, "And then shall that Wicked be revealed whom the Lord shall consume with the spirit of his mouth and shall destroy with the brightness of his coming. Even him whose coming is after the working of Satan with all power and signs and lying wonders" (2 Thess. ii. 8, 9). The word here translated signs (σημεῖον) is the same that is translated "miracles" in the Gospels. Again (Rev. xiii. 13, 14), "And he doeth great wonders so that he maketh fire to come down from heaven on the earth in the sight of men and deceiveth them that dwell on the earth by means of those miracles which he had power to do in sight of the beast." Again (Rev. xvi. 14), "For they are spirits of devils working miracles" (signs). So also in Rev. xix. 20, "And the beast was taken and with him the false prophet that wrought miracles before him." Here, again, the word translated "miracles" is, in the original, σημεῖα, "signs." This is the common and most significant term used in the New Testament, to designate the miracles of Christ. They were, in the case of Christ, signs of the divine, in him, of goodness and compassion, as well as of power, different in character from the signs wrought by "the wicked," by the "spirits of devils" and by "the false prophet," which were signs only of magical power, "lying wonders" by which "they deceived them that dwell on the face of the earth."

The miracles of Christ should be examined apart from all other miracles, whether false or real, that we may find in them signs or proofs and manifestations of the divine power and mission of Christ, as the true Son of God. And it is especially and exclusively the miracles of Christ, that we propose now to consider. Our theory, of course, will include those miracles which were performed by the disciples of Christ in his name, that is, by the power of Christ.
The doctrine of the divine immanency has no relation to the historic proofs of the miracles of Christ, only to the mode or manner in which those miracles were performed, so that our task now is, not to discuss the historic fact of miracles, but taking it for granted that the narratives given us by the evangelists in the Gospels are true, to explain the mode or manner in which the miracles of Christ, as by them recorded, were performed, and to show, how, by this mode, they were signs of Christ's divinity and mission.

For a long period in the history of Christian apologetics the definition given to a miracle was, that "a miracle is a suspension of the laws of nature." This definition has so generally been abandoned as untenable, that it is scarcely necessary to consider it for the purpose of controverting it. The surprise is, that it was ever accepted as an appropriate definition of the miracles of Christ, and it never could have been so accepted, but for those vague ideas that are so commonly associated with the laws of nature. An examination of the nature and character of the miracles performed by Christ shows, that instead of their being effected by a suspension of the laws or forces of nature, it was rather by an intensification of those laws and forces that they were produced.

Natural laws, as we have seen according to the dictum of modern science, are the divine action. A suspension of natural laws then would be a suspension of the divine action. So that a miracle would be a ceasing of the laws or forces of nature to act, and absolute nothingness would inevitably result. The most superficial examination of the miracles of Christ reveals the very opposite of such a condition.

Let us begin this examination with the first miracle of Christ—the conversion of water into wine. This is effected every year in all the vineyards in the world. The whole process is a natural one, both in the formation of the juices of the grape and the process of fermentation, if we admit that it was fermented, and such it may be argued it was, as the governor of the feast pronounced it the best wine, and
Christ in one of his parables says, "And no man having drunk old wine" (which must necessarily be fermented wine) "straightway desireth new, for he saith the old is better."

The miracle was in the process, not in the product, for wine is no miracle in itself. The result was not new, only the process of producing that result. It is not necessary to postulate a new force, because the process of transformation was effected in so brief a period of time, and was, moreover, secret, hidden, and invisible, without those apparent instrumentalities by which such transformation is ordinarily effected. Such a change of process, from a long to a brief period of time, from the apparent to the secret and hidden, we have in the natural history of organic transformation and development. According to the accepted theories of scientists, the long processes of centuries not only, but ages in the past, are now summed up into a comparative moment of time, in the development of the higher organisms of the animal kingdom. For centuries, animal organisms were limited in their development to the simple one-celled Protozoa. The scientist tells us that it required millions of years for those successive transitions and advances of organic structure, by which the complicated organisms we now find in the higher vertebrates, and especially in man, were reached, but that now the embryo of the quadruped or higher mammals in a few months passes through all those changes, secret and invisible, which in the original process of manifest development required ages for their consummation; that in the embryonic development of man there is now a condensed epitome of a process of transformation from a lower to a higher organism, beginning, as in the Protozoa, in a single cell, which once consumed ages for its original development. The period now required for this marvellous transformation from a single cell to the most complicated organism, compared with that once demanded in the first formative process, is as brief as is the single tick of the clock to all the seconds of time enumerated during an entire year, if we accept the geologic data given us by Lyell. So wonderfully have the
forces of nature quickened their processes! And yet no law of nature has been suspended, and no new force introduced. That same process, beginning, as then, in a single cell, and carried forward to higher and more complicated organisms, by the same forces as then existed, is completed in an infinitely small segment of that vast period originally required. Who then can assume to limit these forces or their intensity of action as applied to other and far simpler processes in nature?

The second miracle of Christ, a miracle of healing from disease, is a type of a large class of miracles which Christ performed. Science, as found in a Christian civilization, has dissipated belief, even now common among heathen nations, in the medicine-man as a miracle-worker, and instructs us in the fact, that it is a power in nature, the vital power, that really works all cures, and that it is only the province of the physician, either to remove obstructions to the working of this force, or to aid, invigorate, and sustain it. It was the invigoration of the vital forces, in all the cases of miraculous healing, by that very divine power which is the source of all vital force, the inner power of vitality, which then effected those cures performed by Christ, and that, too, through these vital forces exalted and reinforced by that very divine energy, which is the immediate source of the vitality itself.

Another class of miracles was the restoration of sight to the blind. What was this, but the restoration of the organ of vision to its true normal function? We are not informed as to what was the special manner in which this restoration was effected: whether it was by removing some film or obstruction that had gathered on the outer coats of the eye, or clearing up some opacity in the lenses, or by imparting greater sensibility to the nerves of vision. Whatever may have been the mode of the cure, it was simply enabling the eyes to perform the functions for which they were created and formed.

The restoration of the dead to life was of a similar character. It is a function of the vital power in nature to
convert dead matter into living matter. This we know, at
the same time we are compelled to acknowledge that both
the mystery of the power itself and its modes of operation
transcend human research. Life! we know not what it is,
how it comes, or goes, and most imperfectly has the keenest
and most patient human scrutiny been able to trace even the
mode of operation. In itself and in all the varied modes of
its operations, it is the standing miracle of the universe, the
most wonderful of all the forces working in the realm of
nature; and it was in the revelation of himself as the power
of life, the Lord of life, that Christ most fully vindicated his
claim to divinity. As the Lord of life "he could not be
holden of death."

Now take the axiomatic truth, that like causes produce
like effects, and let us consider the miracles of Christ on this
principle; and what can we affirm concerning their natural
effects but that they were produced by natural causes? But,
as we have already seen, science discloses the fact that natural
causes or forces and laws are only another name for the
divine energy and action. In the case of the miracles of
Christ, as we have discovered from the examination of these
miracles, the result was not new, only the mode of action in
which these natural forces produced the result. So that by
this analysis of the miracles themselves, we are led to the
definition, that the miracles of Christ were a new mode of the
divine action in nature revealing the divine presence and power.
On this ground the miracles of Christ were proofs of his
divinity.

There is another definition of miracles whose considera-
tion we cannot omit, and yet give any completeness to
the discussion of our subject. It is that of Dr. Bushnell, as
set forth in his elaborate work, entitled, "Nature and the
Supernatural." As a relief from the untenable definition to
which we have already alluded, that a miracle is a suspension
of the laws of nature, it has been favorably regarded and
widely accepted, notwithstanding the absurdities into which
the author was led in his conclusions.
Dr. Bushnell naturally adopted the nature-philosophy of the current theology of his times, which had been bequeathed to Christianity by the Latin Fathers who were educated in the Greek and Roman philosophy of materialistic dualism, that is, to regard God and nature, matter and mind, the natural and the supernatural, as distinct, separate, and independent entities.

The fact that Dr. Bushnell adopted the theories of the old Greek philosophers concerning the nature of matter appears in the very definition he gives to nature as "that which has a fixed law of coming to pass; such that, given the thing or the whole of things, all the rest will follow by an inherent necessity." This is the very doctrine of Epicurus, who affirmed that everything which takes place in nature has its natural causes. The intervention of the gods is unnecessary for the explanation of natural phenomena. These are controlled by an absolute necessity.¹

In the heading of the third chapter of "Nature and the Supernatural," Dr. Bushnell gives a still more explicit statement of the doctrine that nature has its existence and processes separate from God, in the words "nature is not the system of God," and again, in his fourth chapter, on the problem of existence as related to the fact of evil, he writes, "So is it with cause and effect, laws and instincts, all that we call nature, it is not the system of God and is really no coordinate part of his universe considered as related to the powers that have their society in it and get their relations from it" (p. 71).

These statements of the complete separation of nature from God—especially this, "that cause and effect, all we call nature, is not the system of God," cannot be exceeded in fulness and explicitness. The direct and unavoidable implication, at least so far as the language is concerned, clearly is, that nature is not even a creation of God; for, if it were, it must necessarily be a part of the system of God.

This theory of nature so far as its dualistic character is

¹Ueberweg's History of Philosophy.
involved, is even more complete and explicit than that of Epicurus, which has been uniformly denounced by theologians as atheistic materialism, when regarded, standing by itself, as an attempt to explain the whole universe. Its essential character is not in the least changed by being associated with a theory of a divine existence external to the material universe. It is still a theory of atheistic materialism in respect to the universe of matter, that is to say, it is a godless theory of matter, a theory of the material universe existing without God, by virtue of an "inherent necessity."

This part of the dualistic theory, that, in regard to matter, is atheistic materialism. The other part, in regard to God, is supernatural theism, that with which no theory of nature has anything to do, because wholly external to nature. In it, there is nothing to prevent a person from rejecting this supernatural part of dualism, as superfluous and irrelevant to a philosophy of nature.

The doctrine of the "inherent potency" of matter by Tyndall, is infinitely further removed from atheism, although often so denounced by theologians, than is the doctrine of "inherent necessity," accepted by Dr. Bushnell from Epicurus. For the analysis of "potency" reveals as its origin, mind, as we have already seen, while the doctrine of "inherent necessity" is only another form of the atheistic doctrine of fate. In place of "inherent necessity" write the "immanent God," and you have the true theory of matter and the material universe.

The doctrine of dualism again appears, in equal clearness, in the definition which Dr. Bushnell gives of the supernatural, which is, "that is supernatural, whatever it be, that is either not in the chain of cause and effect, or which acts on the chain of cause and effect in nature from without the chain." It is impossible to formulate a statement more complete and explicit than this, setting forth the theory of the entire separation of the supernatural from the natural, or of God from nature. If this is not a doctrine of dualism,
then no language can be found and no words marshalled to express it.

With this doctrine of Dr. Bushnell, the action of the supernatural on the natural, whether that action originates in the spiritual nature of man, in a spirit, or in God, alike partakes of the nature of the miraculous, since he defines a miracle to be, the action of the supernatural on the natural, including in the supernatural man in his spiritual personality, as well as spirits and Deity. Such is the language of Dr. Bushnell: "We act supernaturally ourselves, which God and other created spirits may as well do as we" (p. 492). According to this theory and definition of miracles, every exercise of the human will, a supernatural power, as Dr. Bushnell affirms it, by which a man lifts his foot from the ground, thus overcoming the law of gravity, is a miracle. If this be a miracle, then the miracles of Christ cease to be a proof of his divinity. The direct tendency of the author's theory of dualism is to produce that very state which he so justly deprecates on page 452, "God is too far off, too much imprisoned by laws, to allow expectation from Him." "Prayer becomes a kind of dumb-bell exercise, good as exercise, but never to be answered." From this moral condition, he sees no deliverance, except as "God breaks forth in miracles and holy gifts to let it be seen, that he is still the living God." The result of such breaking forth into miracles the author shows from history is "a rushing into fanaticism," so that the final outcome is that "between these two kinds of excesses"—lethargy and disbelief in the power of God on one side and fanaticism on the other—"the church is always swinging and by a kind of moral necessity must be." In this perplexing dilemma, the author "finds ample room to doubt, which is really widest of a just respect, the excesses of fanaticism and false fire, or the comatose and dull impotence of a religion that worships God without expectation;" at the same time admitting (p. 468) "that the class called thinking men, in our age, will be ready with few
exceptions; to reject in the gross and without hesitation, all such pretended facts"—which he furnishes.

Dr. Bushnell goes on to cite, as historic facts, that among the Huguenots, during the period of their persecution and flight to the mountains of Cevennes and to England, after the repeal of the edict of Nantz, "the miraculous gifts were developed and by them were more or less widely disseminated abroad. They had tongues and interpretation of tongues. They had healings and discerning of spirits. They prophesied in the Spirit." He also states that "about forty years after this appearing of the gifts among the Huguenots, a very similar development appeared among the Catholic or Jansenist population of Paris. Cures were wrought at the tomb of Saint Mènard and particularly of persons afflicted with convulsions.... They had the gifts of tongues, the discerning of spirits, and the gift of prophesying.... The sect of Friends from George Fox downwards have had it as a principle, to expect gifts, revelations, discerning of spirits and indeed a complete divine movement." The tragic severity of the author's rebuke of "thinking men" for questioning these alleged facts prepares the reader for what follows in stories of dreams and prophets; and surprise ceases that this author should give his sanction to the imposture of saint's miracles, should justify by inference, at least, saint's worship and honor the grossest superstitions of mediæval Romanism:

It may well be asked, Is it not time that another theory of miracles should be considered, that will not impose on "thinking men" the religious necessity of exercising credulity on such fanatical claims to the power of miracle, will deliver the Church from the heathen doctrine of dualism, and restore to it its pristine belief of an ever-present, ever-acting God, ("My Father worketh hitherto and I work;") will induce the constant recognition of Him, as the source of all power, the life of all life; will harmonize the truths of science and religion; will present Christ in the powers of his Divinity, as something other than a human fanatic, or juggler, and re-
veal him in his true relation of Oneness with the Omnipresent and Omnipotent God, who is himself the Absolute Spirit, Creator, Upholder and Lord of the universe?

In contrast to this theory of miracles based on dualism, as the action of the supernatural, an ab-extra power, on nature, the doctrine of the divine immanence presents the miracles of Christ, as a new mode of the divine action in nature disclosing the fact of the presence and power of God in nature and its processes. Thus viewed, the miracles of Christ were especially corrective of the false philosophizings of the age in which he made his advent, and of the erroneous views that existed, alike among Jews, Greeks, and Romans, of the true relations of God to the material universe.

Aristobulus, a Jewish priest who lived 160 B.C., may be regarded as the most influential teacher of his time whose expositions of the Hebrew Scriptures assumed anything of a philosophical character. He taught that although God is invisible He yet sits enthroned in the heavens and is not in any respect in contact with the earth, but only acts upon it by his power, having formed the world out of matter previously existing. The relation of God to the material universe was thus regarded as being simply that of the mechanic or artificer to the work he has formed or made. His existence, though absolute, was yet separate from the world. He also held that the Logos was a being intermediate between God and the world, the first begotten Son of God and, for us, who are imperfect, a God; that through the agency of the Logos, God created the world and has revealed himself to it. The Logos is also the representative of the world before God, acting as its High Priest, Intercessor, and Paraclete.

Philo was born only twenty years before Christ. He taught a confused doctrine of omnipresence in some of its aspects, in others he was dualistic concerning the nature and being of God, teaching that He is everywhere by his power but in no place with his essence, (describing him as enthroned on the outermost borders of the heavens, an extra-mundane place, as in a sacred citadel); that in creating the world, he
employed as instruments incorporeal potencies or ideas, since he could not himself come in contact with polluting matter; that these potencies surround God as ministering spirits, just as a monarch is surrounded by the members of his court, and that the highest of all the divine forms is the Logos. He rejected the idea of the incarnation of the Logos, on account of the impurity of matter.

Among the Greeks the doctrines of Democritus and Epicurus, were those commonly accepted, concerning the relation of God to nature, which was, that the idea of God was not necessary in natural philosophy, for all things take place by the operation of natural causes, that atoms exist from eternity and have their motion in virtue of their gravity, that animals and men are products of the earth, that the soul is material and composed of exceedingly fine atoms.

Diametrically opposed to all these theories was the doctrine taught by Christ, that "God is Spirit" and that as Spirit, he is the Creator and upholder of the universe. By Spirit-power performing his miracles, energizing, directing, and controlling the forces of nature, through the simple exercise of his own will, as divine personality, Christ manifested the spiritual nature of the Creator, and asserted his own relation to Him as partaker of the same essence, himself God of very God,—"I and the Father are one."

The word most commonly used in the New Testament to designate the miracles of Christ is σημεῖα "signs," as we have already explained. Let us now consider the miracles of Christ under this appropriate designation. Of what were these miracles the signs? They were especially signs of the power and presence of God in nature—the power that works all the varied processes in nature, doing his pleasure here as well as among the inhabitants of heaven. He showed that the power in nature was divine, that it was not held in the bonds of necessity, but that back of these forces was a free will changing their mode of action at pleasure, that uniformity in the action of the forces of nature is not grounded on any principle of necessity, but in the wisdom and benevo-
lence of God. As a wise Being He must choose out of all possible modes of action the best mode. This fact will give permanency to the mode chosen and uniformity of action. But this uniformity is not necessitated.

There is still another principle which secures uniformity of action. God demands of his intelligent creatures that they be co-workers with him. But there could be no cooperation, were there not uniformity of action. It would be impossible to work with capricious and changing plans and modes of operation. Uniformity of action in the forces of nature is not grounded on the nature of those forces apart from God, but as related to Him and emanating directly from Him.

The miracles of Christ were especially significant of the mode in which that civilization he came to inaugurate would achieve its destined triumphs in the realm of nature,—not by overcoming and paralyzing, but by intensifying and multiplying, adding force to force, one increment to another, giving greater energy to the forces of nature. Christian civilization has given greater fertility to soil, causing "two blades of grass to grow in place in one." It has sought out and applied mechanical and other devices by which it can increase water-power, intensify steam-power and can multiply indefinitely electrical power. The peculiar characteristic of Christian civilization is its command of the forces of nature and intensification of these forces.

Observe, further, how it is by the exercise of the childlike spirit of humble docility which Christ especially inculcated, that Christian civilization has won its victories and achieved its marvels in the realm of nature. Not by self-conceited theorizings about the nature of these forces, but by humbly seeking to understand their mode of action,—"being taught of God," humbly knocking at the door of nature in patient experimenting, asking the God of nature to tell them the secret hidden things of force and law, did Bacon, Newton, Davy, and Watts gain that knowledge of the forces and laws of nature, which has enabled men so to command these forces as to achieve results miraculous to other civilizations. And,
observe, these wonderful works of a Christian civilization have been wrought, not by introducing new forces into nature, but by obtaining from them new modes of operation and giving intensity to them.

In complete harmony with the manner in which Christ performed his miracles has Christian civilization obtained its triumphs, wonderful not only, but also especially beneficent to our humanity.

But the highest significance of the miracles of Christ lies in the fact, that they were especially signs and symbols of his true work and mission of spiritual healing and restoration.

The special mission of Christ was not to heal the sick and restore sight to the physically blind of Judea, for there were doubtless thousands of the diseased, infirm and blind, that he himself passed by, without attempting to reach with his divine power of cure and restoration. An ultimate spiritual intent is revealed in the miracles of Christ, with more or less fulness. Take, for example, the death and resurrection of Lazarus. Instead of responding to the call of the sisters, when they sent the message, that their brother was sick, he let death do its work, in order to furnish the occasion for revealing himself as "the resurrection and the life."

A spiritual aim will reveal itself to every thoughtful reader of the miracles of Christ, who seeks to apprehend their true significance. His was a higher mission than that merely of relieving physical infirmities and sufferings. It was that of spiritual healing and restoration, of which the few isolated cases of physical cure were only emblematical. His aim was the restoration of the souls of men, to impart health, holiness, i.e., to make hale, healthy, holy (words of kindred root and signification), to give soundness and vigor to the spiritual faculties of men, to deliver them from spiritual death, to call them forth from the corruptions of that grave, "where their worm dieth not." As Luther says, "The true miracles of Christ and Christianity are their creation of spiritual life in the human soul, compared with which, such outward miracles as the healing of the sick and walking on the water,
were quite secondary and unimportant." These too are the miracles perpetuated, the greater miracles, which he assured his disciples they should perform, through the divine power of the Holy Spirit to be conferred on them in greater measure because he went to the Father.

The miracles of Christ then, so far from being a suspension of natural laws, were rather an exaltation and reinforcement of the forces in nature, signs of the presence and power of God in nature and of that exalted and intensified spiritual power which Christ confers, giving what Carlyle calls "more soul," strength and control to the spiritual nature, supremacy over the lower or carnal nature, its appetites and passions, in one word "power to become the sons of God."

Nor was a miracle the action of a supernatural power on nature, as something ab-extra from itself, for the divine power is in nature, a power without which, nature itself could have no existence and without whose constant energizings, nature could have no continuance in existence. Nor again was a miracle the introduction of a new force in nature. These forces of growth, healing, transformation, life were already existing and working in nature. Only the mode of action was new. These forces were simply reinforced, new power imparted to them, so that they accomplished results in briefer periods than ordinarily, worked changes more rapidly.

The intent of the miracles of Christ was to reveal the forces of nature as dependent upon or rather as the very energizings of the divine will, held by no bond of necessity, except in the self-imposed limitations of the divine power and will, from which they emanated. And thus it was that Christ revealed himself in fulfilment of prophecy as Immanuel, "God with us."

This was the central fact and principle, from which all the redemptive processes radiated. God with us, to reveal to us truth, to impart life, spiritual life, to succor in temptations, to strengthen in trials, to sympathize with us in our sufferings, to forgive our iniquities, to aid us in our struggles, to redeem us from transgressions, to deliver from sin, to heal
our diseases, to restore us from death, to be the triumphant power of the resurrection, "the Resurrection and the Life." Such was the significance of Immanuel, "God with us."

The revelation of this primal and fundamental fact of the divine relation to nature and to man constitutes the key to the ministry and teachings of Christ.

The miracles Christ wrought were signs of a present God, that he is not afar off, but is that power in nature which can change the operations of nature at his own pleasure. They were also signs prophetic, of what men, receptive of his Spirit and teaching, would be able to do and achieve in the realm of nature by the use and command of its forces, gaining that power by the exercise of the childlike, humble, teachable spirit which he inculcated as the inexorable condition for entering his kingdom, the kingdom of truth—the spirit demanded by science for all scientific investigations;—learning the character and laws of the forces in nature, and thus getting power with God and ability to produce those marvellous results in the realm of nature which are found and found alone in a Christian civilization.

We now find a ready solution to the questions, so often asked concerning miracles, How? and For what end? They were performed by an in-dwelling divine power. To the leper, Christ said, "I will; be thou clean." Virtue or healing power is represented as flowing out of him at the touch of those seeking healing. The whole class of miracles called nature-miracles, those performed on nature or the objects of nature, as distinguished from persons, manifested the possession of a power, not only competent to control and direct the forces of nature, but a power which is the very source of energy in nature.

The power that acted in the healing of diseases exhibited a similar nature. In all these cases, an immanent power of life, to others a fountain of life. The Saviour always attributed his miracles to the Father, both by prayer invoking His power and by affirming, that they were the
works of the Father. They served also to characterize that new dispensation he came to establish, as a religion of humanity, giving relief from suffering, as well as from sin, fostering not only a spirit of reverence and sympathy in man toward his fellow-man but also toward all existences and all life, awakening those better moral sentiments resulting from the discernment of a divine beauty in the lily which "God so clothes"—of divine life as the source of all life, which shall suppress needless cruelty to brute creatures, will tend to beautify and improve the creation of God, "converting the desert into a garden," will cherish industry, dignify labor in the consciousness of fellowship with the divine presence and ministrations, will inspire art with loftier and purer, because with spiritual, ideals and aims, and so bring in that day for which "the earnest expectation of creation waiteth for the revealing of the sons of God."

In the next article the doctrine of the divine immanency will be further considered in its relation to instinct and inspiration.

[To be continued.]
ARTICLE II.

THE ECONOMY OF PAIN.

BY THE REV. HENRY HAYMAN, D. D., ALDINGHAM, ENGLAND.

[Concluded from page 487.]

FOR HUMAN INFlictION OF PAIN, THE ONLY CURATIVE TREATMENT IS MORAL.

Although the cases in which we can directly trace individual pain to personal misconduct may be only the minority, yet it appears from the foregoing remarks that there may be an indefinitely large class of sufferings which have their antecedents in the ever-accumulating total of human misconduct at large. And here should be specially noticed the vast amount of gratuitous suffering caused to men by men, with a more or less clear foresight of the consequences. Of wide-spread sufferings caused by purely human agency, destructive wars may be taken as the standing type, although slave-hunting and all the desolating tyrannies of savagery should also be noted. These, again, often concur with natural agencies of destruction, as seen in the famines and pestilences often arising from war. Now of this gratuitous infliction by man on man, the known remedial agencies are exclusively moral. Such are the purifying of the passions, the setting before men worthier or less immoral objects, the development of the affections, the growth of the moral sense, and the stimulus given to some of these by various religions, but to all these means by Christianity above all religions. Now the fact that for so large a class of sufferings only moral remedies are possible, is a further strong confirmation of the moral aspect and disciplinal uses which we have ascribed to pain. Nay more, the fact that even wars have often concentrated and called out the higher energies of a nation or
race, and thus given them a moral elevation which they had not before, is a testimony to the same thing.

EXCEPTIONAL CHARACTER OF SUFFERERS WHOSE PAIN IS INTENSE.

And we may now turn to consider, by way of contrast to some foregoing strictures on supposed emendations of the moral scheme, the results of the distribution of pain, unequal and not calculable beforehand, nor individually to be accounted for afterwards—in short, promiscuous, as regards antecedents and especially moral deserts, as we in fact find it to be. Just as the results of an equal pain-tax all round, whether light or heavy, were found to be either absurd to the verge of the ludicrous, or else a serious propaganda of selfishness and isolation; so, on the other hand, the concentration of pain in comparatively rare cases, but with massive proportions and impressive tenacity, enforces attention to the derangement, whether physical or moral, of which it forms a permanent evidence. And further, the absence of any obvious reason in many cases why the individual afflicted should be thus selected to suffer, stamps such cases with a mystery which makes them ineffably impressive. Pain is indeed measured out in every degree of either intensity or duration, up to the maximum at which it absorbs all the interests of life, shortens the life which it thus usurps and burdens, and becomes a superior and dominating power under the stress of which all slighter things, all the mere conventions of life, give way. Every one is compelled to be in earnest in the presence of such pain. Its intense reality sobers or scares away all superficial triflers. It leads to nothing, and seems to be an end in itself, and thus to stand in awful possession of the whole area of being. The man seems to live for pain, and the more unaccountable his doom the more overwhelming the spectacle. This gives to every such sufferer in proportion to the heaviness of his burden a character exceptional and in his own social circle emphatically unique. His passiveness fixes their minds
more than the activities of others, and lifts him into a higher sphere while yet among them and taxing their services, and something of awe mingles with the compassion with which he is regarded.

Most of the remarks in this and various preceding sections apply not only to pain itself, but to the morbid mischief which pain attests. The inequality of distribution with all its consequences, applies to this mischief as much as to pain, its outward symbol in sensation. And so some following sections, in which the vicarious character of pain is noticed, should be taken to include the same character in that mischief, often inward and subtle, and in itself unimpressive, however real, but which through pain becomes expressive. Both alike are in fact the complex attestation of that moral corruption in the race with which the next sections following deal. Only the limitations of my subject lead me to fasten exclusively on the translation of the morbid energy through the nerves and their centres into pain; but for which the severest affliction would be a mere dumb-show of inarticulate endurance.

THE MYSTERY OF EVIL IN MAN A KEY TO THE MYSTERY OF PAIN.

And here comes in the sense of human corruption amidst the spectacle of human suffering. However much and however necessarily professional attendants may become fixed upon their offices of minstry, and therefore so absorbed in attention and action that they have little scope for reflection, yet it seems certain that by such contemplation of woe, bewildering though it be, reflection is promoted. The apparent prostration of all the energies of life and subversion of its uses lead to the thought that there must be some higher use behind. The conviction comes naturally to all minds not tainted by pessimistic views, that there must be, inexplicable as the paradox seems, a reason why such suffering should be. And having exhausted the reasons for pain in the physical and mental spheres, we must seek our "reason why" for this apparent surplus in the moral sphere.
Suppose, then, an answer were attempted to be given in the moral sphere—"the 'reason why' is to stimulate our otherwise defective sympathies, and to uphold the principle of altruism." Now, I think this answer, however it might approve itself to our feelings, would give scant satisfaction to our reason; since by concentrating sympathies on the extraordinary and the exceptional, it would lead us to reserve them for such cases; and, instead of promoting "altruism" as a general principle, would tend rather to narrow its range. I am not saying that the answer would be untrue, but that it would be insufficient—not ample enough, by reason of the reserve and narrowing tendency by which it would be attended. Nor would the weight of the answer be much mended, if to it were added as a reason, the development of patience and fortitude in the sufferer; unless, indeed, there were any special reason to think him exceptionally defective in those virtues. But if we once are filled with a sense of default and delinquency wide as human nature itself, and assume that the vindication of this is the "reason why" for our paradoxical spectacle of pain, we seem to have a dignus vindice nodus. For evil in man is a fact of overwhelming power, leaving a taint in human nature everywhere, and needing a fortiori something overwhelming to enforce it as a lesson, because the acknowledgment of it is feeble in proportion as its diffusion is wide. Human vices shock us only when enormous, or when turned against ourselves. But this inbred corruption, the protoplasm out of which they are all moulded, because diffused everywhere, strikes no contrast and challenges no observation, and therefore needs an abiding witness. And as a witness on this behalf nothing is so powerful as otherwise unaccountable pain. Thus the mystery of evil is a key to the mystery of pain in man.

PAIN ATTESTS MAN'S MORAL CORRUPTION MORE POWERFULLY WHEN UNITED WITH MORAL EXCELLENCY IN THE SUFFERER.

And as a witness to this corruption is of all others most needed, so no witness so intensely and emphatically impressive
can be given as this of pain, often amounting to a life-long decay, and often allotted, not only apart from all moral desert but apparently against it. Take the case of "Sister Dora," dying of cancer after a life spent to gray-hairs in the most self-devoted service to the pains of others; or that of the Spanish priest Damien who lived for and among the lepers in their island, until his own life was gnawed away by the loathsome scabies to the victims of which he ministered. If there be a corruption which is shared, in however variable degrees, by all, and is the root of all the wickedness which embitters humanity, then on any who share that humanity may fall the lot of bearing witness to the common bane. If that common bane be an admitted fact, the incidence of the attesting pain, wherever it may fall, cannot be misplaced, if it fall on any in whom the fact is found. And it is evident that the more emphatic the testimony given, the more signally it serves this all-important branch of the moral economy. Now, what can make such testimony so awfully emphatic as a character of self-devoted heroism previously established in the sufferer? It seems to proclaim the need of the most impressive of all possible attestations, as a cogent and indefeasible necessity, when even lives of such priceless value are not exempt from the tax of that sacrifice. Such hero-victims have their burden to bear, not because they deserve it most, but because they can bear it best, i.e., most effectively for the purpose. That burden is a testimony, and it is no strain on language to call them martyrs. On the contrary, if that universal bane be denied, and human beings viewed as started without such let or hindrance in the race of "altruism," it becomes enormously difficult to account for the non-exemption of those whose "altruism" already reaches the highest degree known to humanity.

WHOLESOOME RESULTS OF THE ALLOTTMENT OF PAIN AS WE SEE IT.

It was shown that to make moral desert regulative of pain would annul probation—indeed that to couple the two would
tend to mankind's attempting to stamp out vice and pain together (page 479), in which case neither vice nor pain could have its proper remedial treatment and its due share in that probation. And it may be added that vice would thus tend to be lost in pain, the latter acting so directly as it does on our sensitive organism the former by comparison so languidly on our moral. And thus, whereas now in the physical and in the moral sphere pain and vice both alike attest, while one embodies, the corruption of man, the remarkable effect of making one follow and penalize the other (so captivating a result to the superficial moralist) would be to efface the attestation of both alike, and yet to leave that corruption lurking like a secret poison in the constitution of the quasi-virtuous, and thus hopelessly to infect virtue herself. As it is, the virus is made to strike out, like a well-defined malady with pronounced symptoms, in the form of vice, leaving the universal human system more healthy on the whole. And thus pain, by being often dissociated from vice and even individually united with exemplary virtue, is made to give the most affecting and tremendous testimony to moral corruption, to make probation possible and consistent, and to reinforce virtue on the whole. Indeed it is probable that under such conditions that attestation and this reinforcement reach their maximum with a minimum expenditure, so to speak, of pain.

THE RESULT, A MAXIMUM OF DISCIPLINE WITH A MINIMUM OF SUFFERING.

For as it has, I conceive, been shown (pages 474-481) that to penalize vice wholesale by pain as a natural consequence, would defeat the moral economy; so the greatest efficacy of attestation is wrung from pain under the present system. And in this way a few painful examples go a long way. How great an increase in the quantum of pain, as an attesting power, among mankind, might be needed to produce the same effect, if these exquisite examples, of blameless and relatively excellent lives bowed down with anguish,
were nowhere extant among us, it is impossible to say. But it seems plain that the increase must be considerable. As suffering, by being concentrated, gains in attesting power, and by diffusion loses, so a few examples comparatively, and that wholly without reference to the moral character of the sufferers, suffice to embody the testimony needed. But then again, among these relatively few examples, a still more select few, who are signal examples of acknowledged human excellence, are burdened with pain, and still more intensify the attestation. Thus we seem to see "wheel within wheel" of merciful, minimization, concentrating on the few and thereby making effectual for its object that which, if multiplied in amount a thousand-fold and distributed equally among the many, would be ineffectual, or would fall at least far short of its present efficiency. Nay, we have seen reasons for thinking that it would, so distributed, have a demoralizing influence, and be a pernicious and not merely a gratuitous infliction. In short, the system which we experience seems to economize pain to the utmost, and at the same time to realize a multum in parvo—a moral multum in a physical parvo. It is like the instinct of the bee which leads her to construct her cells, not triangular nor four-square, but hexagonal, gaining thereby the maximum of capacity for the minimum of expended material. The examples of wisdom and goodness match and confirm one another—a goodness which shrinks from a profuse expenditure of suffering and becomes a divine economy, in the physical sphere and in the moral,—worthy, one may say again, of One who "does not willingly afflict."

THIS SUGGESTS FUTURE RETRIBUTION AS A POSSIBLE REALITY.

And this fits exactly into, and so far confirms, the belief of a future moral retribution to individuals. By that retribution being postponed, probation is made possible, and pain meanwhile made to minister to it in various ways, but chiefly perhaps by the testimony to human corruption which it maintains. For a lively sense of that corruption in us is one
of the greatest stimulants to moral efforts and self-discipline which our nature can receive.

Now, while the human race and the societies in which it is grouped form a continuous area, is the time for pain to exercise its disciplinal power. Thus a moral career is left open and a moral character determined in each human unit which helps to constitute that race. And upon such units pain, when become fully retributive, may finally operate, if its disciplinal efficacy was exerted in vain. Hereafter, supposing the continuity of the race to be then resolved into its constituent units with characters determined, will be the turn for the retributive energies of pain to have full effect. Pain must be in a great degree promiscuous now, if it is to be fully retributive then. Thus its promiscuousness is a sort of earnest of those future retributive energies. But meanwhile you cannot wholly moralize pain without utterly demoralizing man.

RETribution, INTENSITY AND PERPETUITY OF PAIN MAY HERE- AFTER BE UNITED.

And yet it is in a certain degree individually retributive even in the present. Perhaps it is so as far as is safe, consistently with the other more important intermediate interest which it serves. And the reason why it is so partially retributive may probably be, to remind us that it can become completely and exhaustively so, when the intermediate objects are fulfilled and probation completed. Thus, as in the physical sphere, so in the moral, a danger signal is kept constantly hoisted. And although the most formidable excesses of pain may now be as often witnessed in worthy as in unworthy characters; yet our moral sense suggests that that is an accidental derangement of the moral order caused by moral evil and the needful probation under it. And so, as we plainly see both the retributive power of pain in a small degree and the intensity of anguish in a high degree, reflection suggests that it is possible that these may be united when the process of all probation is complete and the result thereof
realized. For they seem now only dissociated, as said before, by accidents and temporary causes. And further we see the duration of pain prolonged through sometimes the greater part of a human lifetime, there being a great moral end to serve by it. And, further, we see pains which were strictly retributive in him whom they first assailed, continuing in his heirs and successors sometimes for generations. And this suggests the possibility of the prolongation of pain without limit when provided with an organism on which it may fix its hold. Thus we have even in this life a glimpse of retribution, of intensity and possible perpetuity of pain. And thus we are warned of the possible future union of all these three.

PAIN THUS AN ABIDING CHARACTERISTIC OF MORAL GOVERNMENT.

And indeed, so far as analogies of the present can guide us in estimating the future, these characteristics of pain in the present constitute a serious and awful warning of the formidable resources of the Power (unknown to us, the agnostics will have it, but that does not touch my argument by a hair’s-breadth), which seems to dispense pains in this life. And the fact of such moral government as we see being so largely carried on by pain, and indeed of pain being in every sphere, physical, mental and moral, a principal and indispensable agency, may surely be intended to warn us, that pain, like all the moral qualities which it has disciplined meanwhile, may find a still ampler sphere in whatever future state awaits those creatures who are capable of such state. Without pain the education of the world would be impossible, but when that education is done it does not follow that the office of pain will be ended. May it not rather be only then fully realized?

AND THE PRESUMPTIONS SEEM ALL IN FAVOR OF ITS CONTINUANCE.

And as pain, to whatever extent retributive now, becomes so through natural agency, so it may be then. The moral
government (whether personal or not, for I leave that question open), extending itself now into the physical sphere, may no less do so hereafter, and avail itself of physical surroundings as a basis of pain. And, however science may extend the remedial alleviations which are possible now, even supposing them able to achieve the extinction of pain in this life, yet it is science concurring with merciful dispositions. And how far those merciful dispositions may be necessarily limited to this state of probation, we cannot say. But we can plainly see that they are proper to a state of probation, in a way in which they are not to its results when established, supposed to include retribution as an absolute rule. And we must remember that it is equally as possible for science to be applied to aggravate pain as to mitigate it. And plainly the whole presumption arising from the large employment of pain in this life with wholesome results on the whole, is not in favor of but against its entire extinction in a future state; which state, if it solves the mixture of good and evil, retribution and warning, which prevails now, may probably also prove a solvent of pain from the remedies and alleviations which now temper its incidence. But, assuming the personality of a Moral Governor, we know his character, unless so far as it is declared by revelation, only from that of his government, which plainly includes pain among its resources, and may, for aught we know, carry over a "surplus of pain" into a future state.

THE FEW BEAR THE BURDEN OF THE MANY.

On the view above suggested, the pain-tax due from the human race at large, as a deodand on its moral corruption, is from motives of economy levied in fact upon a few only. It is plain that on this view the few bear the burden of the many. The load is so heavy that it bears some of them wholly down, and absorbs all the interests of life in the one sad and mysterious duty of bearing through pain their appointed witness to the taint of depravity in all. It was shown above (page 586) that such sufferers have an excep-
tional and unique character among their fellow-men; but how much more intense this character becomes when we recognize the fact that their suffering is vicarious—borne for their fellow-men! The life-long clinic bears his burden in effect for you and me and many more. The average depravity which all share, is the measure of our interest in his pain, which, because he suffers, we escape. His suffering is the condition of our escaping that which is due from each of us as fully as from him. It is as if life contained so many penal lots of variously graduated suffering up to the maximum possible, intermixed with blanks of acquittance. For the few on whom falls the maximum lot or some high figure in the cadre, a hundred or a thousand have a nominal share or go scot-free. The immunity of these latter is purchased at the expense of the former. The plague-spot of our common taint breaks forth in its afflicting power upon them, and leaves us physically scatheless. Because "they are bowed down and fallen," therefore "we are risen and stand upright." It is a common warfare in which they purchase our discharge. If there be a moral Disposer of events, he is making use of their afflictions to benefit us—to enrich us at their expense at once with the physical exemption and the moral lesson. We ask ourselves, "Why should this be?" and, as between us and the sufferers, we can find no reason why; unless, indeed, in the rarest of rare cases, where the lot of suffering lights on the hero-dovotees of self-sacrifice, as mentioned above (page 589).

WHAT ACKNOWLEDGMENT IS DUE FOR EXEMPTION SO GAINED?

There are few perhaps so dead to reflection and so bent on living purely for self, whom such examples will not move to gratitude. For indeed the law of pain thus considered not merely stimulates gratitude to the highest pitch, but enriches human life with a mystery in whose presence we hold our breath with awe. The sufferer is invested with a halo of reverence, and raised to an elevation moral as well as physical, which makes him belong almost to a higher sphere of
existence, as realizing intensely a substantial verity which is not of this world, and of which the shadow only falls upon ourselves. In that higher sphere the physical and moral entities intertwine their roots, and in such a sufferer their secret relations seem personified and incarnate. The plague-spot of suffering becomes to him a seal of a moral patent of nobility conveying the superior blessedness of pain endured for others' benefits. The dark outline of these profiles of vicarious pain is thrown upon an illuminated disc, and the gloom of these beds of anguish draws a moral glory round it. But, above all, their sufferings form a bond of sympathy on the part of all whose lot is so light because theirs is so heavy. What acknowledgment on our part for so unmerited a privilege can be too great? They "minister to us in" higher "things, is it a great matter if they reap our" lower "things?" A selfish neglect of them has the dimensions of a moral enormity, a sin against nature.

**PAIN BECOMES A BOND OF BROTHERLY SYMPATHY.**

It seems to me impossible to conceive a greater change in the aspect and conditions of the whole question than that which these considerations import into it. Pain which, equally distributed, would isolate, as we have seen (page 475), now becomes a tie of brotherhood. All that can be done to minimize that suffering in itself, we are bound to do, not only for the sake of physical alleviation, but of the moral balm of fellow-feeling, the tenderest and most soothing of all. Nor is it easy to exaggerate the impression of wisdom and goodness combined, which this dispensation of pain leaves on the student of human nature—one which interweaves with disciplinal power the fast-clinging sympathies of gratitude and succor, and wrings from the scourge which most appalls us by its infliction a sovereign balm to moralize humanity. As regards the sufferer, such considerations are likely to promote patience and ripen a type of character profound and intense in its power of teaching by example, as well as purified and ennobled in itself. Of course there will
be cases of a querulous and fretful, or an obdurate and sullen type, and some of angry and exacting selfishness; for inbred corruption will produce according to its kind, although modified by the conditions under which it works. I must leave to those who have opportunities of observing any estimate of the proportion which such cases bear to others. Under any law of distribution the proportion of such cases would probably be no less. But is it not plain that under the opposite system of equal distribution we should all become some one of these, or each of them in turn, if the burden laid on all were heavy, and perhaps cynically careless, if it were light? Whilst the temptation to unrestricted indulgence at such times as we were free, by way of recompense for the infliction, would probably prevail with most, and turn pain to a discipline of licentiousness. In short, the system of unequal and apparently arbitrary distribution, seems not only the one alone capable of carrying a moral purpose, but the one which raises it to the highest possible level.

BUT ANY MAY BE CALLED TO THE LOT OF SUFFERING.

And at the same time those who escape have no guarantee of security. Our exemption, if we are exempt under this law, is not absolute. The office of vicarious suffering which exalts by humiliation may come in turn to any. Hodie tibi cras mei may be verified any day. When we are least expecting it, the lot may be changed, the burning arrow may light on us, and kindle "a fire in the bones" at any moment. It may then be ours to lie down and rise up with pain, or to wrestle prostrate day and night with it. And thus, among the lessons in which pain is fertile, that of humility chastening presumptuous assurance is one. No doubt there are those whom philosophy is able to arm with resignation, patience, and fortitude, even under such a great and sudden change. But of this I will speak further on.

THE TEACHING POWER OF CONSPICUOUS EXAMPLES OF PAIN.

The guiding and typical example followed in the above remarks has been that of protracted and painful sickness or
the prostrating result of some shock of accident. But other forms of suffering revolve more or less round the same point of origin, in orbit concentric or eccentric, as it may happen, and approach the same general law. And whatever the special form of the affliction may be, if it falls on one morally unblemished and in human eyes worthy of escaping, or if it produce greater purity of character by its chastening effects on him, the more intense becomes the moral power with which it appeals to those who witness it. One such I myself knew, who united talents of a high order to indomitable perseverance, although clogged and overweighted by a sickly frame, which for the last ten years of his life made him dependent on others for the most ordinary locomotion, and which accumulated malady upon malady to paralyze and afflict him. Always ready to exert himself when the pains relaxed, to resign himself when they overwhelmed him, he struggled on, bright with hope and courage to the last—the most instructive and pathetic example of which it was ever my lot to feel the influence. There will of course be some too obdurate in sceptical cynicism to appreciate the lesson, or to find in such a spectacle anything but an occasion of cavil. But on the average mind, sensible of the average emotions of humanity, such examples of suffering will impress themselves with an urgency and plead with a stress of persuasion more eloquent than all the exhortations of philosophy, as the reflection matures itself—"That undeserving sufferer bears this for me."

THE PROVINCE OF PHILOSOPHY, AND OF RELIGION WHERE PHILOSOPHY FAILS.

The philosophy which can support a sudden change from the energies of health to privation and pain requires a robustness of the moral fibre and a reserve of mental resources only to be found among the few. To fortify the weak and "make strength perfect in weakness," to raise the timid nature which shrinks from the ordeal of pain, to the level or above the level of philosophy, is the special privilege of reli-
gion, as casting the creature expressly upon the same Power which afflicts as the source of consolation also, and drawing closer the ties which unite the two. And of all religions probably none has been so fruitful in such resources as Christianity, taking it merely as one of the aspects which the relations of man as a spiritual being to some thing or some One above him assume. I have written hitherto with a studied indifference to all such questions, and have not even assumed the personality of a Supreme Being, and to all of whatever creed, or indeed of none, I submit the foregoing argument, without prejudice arising from any form of belief and without offence to any. But my office would be incompletely done, as attempting the interpretation of pain, if I forebore to point out further the special bearing of the foregoing upon great further questions.

THE ECONOMY OF PAIN IS THUS AN ARGUMENT FOR NATURAL RELIGION.

It will be found that, although the above considerations do not postulate a Moral Governor of the universe, they harmonize with that notion, and fit into the conditions which it implies. Metaphysicians may reason one another blind to facts upon the argumentative necessity of supposing the Absolute and the impossibility of knowing or approaching it or him. But the moral government—or system, to use a more neutral term—of the universe goes on as if it were ordered by wisdom and goodness in a very high degree, one sufficient to comprehend subordinate, and combine the many complications and divergencies of things physical, intellectual, and moral. Some affect to regard the universe as a mere display of power. They might as well regard the whole spectrum as containing only one primary color. The facts which we experience and the laws under which they seem to our apprehension grouped, prove wisdom and goodness at least as plainly as they prove power. And we reason from the facts to the qualities or character, as completely and as effectively,
as if we were discussing the policy of ancient Rome, and demonstrating there the lower wisdom which combines with selfishness. In the case, however, of ancient Rome we have our person or persons historically attested, and thus independent of our argument, in the august personality of the S. P. Q. R. In the present case we have the qualities of wisdom and goodness, and on them the personality depends as an inference. We can only understand them as seated in a person, not in a cosmogony, or a chaos, or a vortex. Therefore, when the facts point to qualities, and the qualities form a personal character, the facts may be said to point to a person. And those who recognize that all the facts of existence are as if a Person presided over the world, and who, therefore, conduct themselves as if there were a Person so presiding, are keeping touch with nature far more closely than those who roam the maze of metaphysics in quest of the Absolute. Under what mental conditions we can identify that Person with the Absolute, we may possibly in some future stage have faculties to decide. Meanwhile, the facts of existence being as they are, we follow their clue in safety, feeling it probable or more that on the further side of this earthly state there will still be facts of existence among which we must take our place, and from the incidence of which a recognition of the impossibility of relations with the Absolute will no more shelter us than it does at present. Accordingly the economy of pain is an argument in favor of natural religion.

ON MEN'S DIVERS CAPACITIES FOR PHYSICAL PAIN.

And here perhaps I may venture some further remarks on what was touched in general in an earlier section (page 473), the variable capacity of human beings for pain, even physical, and the much greater variation as regards capacity for moral pain. It is well known that the quick vibrations of the air producing a musical note may become augmented continually in rapidity, until they reach an acuteness of tone imperceptible to the ordinary human ear. But here and there an ear
will be found perceptive of them when to others there is absolute silence. And this exalted note will produce in the hearer a sensation of pain by its acuteness from which others are exempt. To the auditory apparatus of all alike the pulsating waves of air must find access, but on a few only they register sensation, and that in pain. And so I suppose there are eyes which can bear more intense light than others without the sense of blinding and dizziness. Although here the relation is inverted; for, whereas it is the extra margin of sound perceived which produces pain, this extra degree of light, excessive to others, would be endured painlessly. This, however, is not at present important. What is important to notice is that the register of painful sensibility differs in different organisms, and that some seem moulded on more sensitive lines than others.

ON MEN'S DIVERS CAPACITIES FOR MORAL PAIN.

But the differences of capacity for moral pain seem to exceed in their width of range all differences in physical sensiveness. Dulness of emotion and bluntness of sensibility are common phenomena—nearly as common as a lack of musical ear. There are to some no lively regrets, to some no tingling shame, no sense of keen exasperation, no depth of mortification, no recoil of disappointment, no tenacity of affection, and therefore no anguish of bereavement, or no strain of anxiety, possible. How differently the sentence of death and the doleful or ghastly insignia of execution affect different persons! Nature indeed delights in variety and "it takes all sorts to make a world." But again, these varying capacities are wrought upon by variety of surroundings no less great, and may be intensified by situations and circumstances differing in every degree within the range of experience. And these latter varieties seem to increase and multiply with civilization, at the same time that the capacity for moral pain, as stated above, is thereby increased. Hence arise enormous inequalities in the amount of moral pain which falls to the human lot; and heavy burdens of this sort
seem to be more frequent than in the physical sphere, although it is nearly impossible to fix any standard of comparison; nor shall I attempt to do so here. But indeed the subject of these pains needs further research; and, save so far as they are connected with the passions, they have not received the notice which they deserve in moral philosophy.

ON THE TRUTH ATTESTED BY MORAL PAIN.

As is the case with physical pains so with moral, such of them as arise from wrongful indulgence of some propensity may be viewed as similarly related to that indulgence as are their physical parallels. Of this we may take the feelings of Alexander after killing Cleitus, as recorded by historians, as a notable instance. Moral pains have no direct relation with things dangerous or noxious to life, nor at all with the physical sphere and man’s progress therein. Thus their preservative and didactic uses, in the sense used hitherto, are hardly if at all traceable. But they seem to have a lesson to teach of no less importance than that of human corruption which is attested by physical pain. They seem to point out clearly that the human soul cannot satisfy itself with the perishable nor stay itself thereupon. They attest our need of personal communion with One who knows not shock or change, and vindicate the need of an accessible Moral Governor of the world. Our grandest moral powers are those which find their motive in the affections, and those powers are so intense as often to explode in recoil and shatter the subject of them; or the affection itself becomes morbid when bestowed on unworthy objects, often with tragical results. I believe that such facts are meant to teach a lesson which the romancist seldom draws from the agonizing incidents constructed by him on these lines. It is that long ago proclaimed by St. Augustin, "Fecisti nos ad Te, et inquietum est cor nostrum donec requiescat in Te." And thus the truth attested by moral pain is in a sense the opposite to that attested by physical. The latter attests human corruption a drawback and disqualifi-
cation for that communion with the Moral Governor, whose standard is taken to be perfect. It seems the opposite, but is really the complement; for the more we are conscious of our corruption the more we feel our need of Him. And thus moral pain is preservative of the higher life, as physical pain of the lower.

THE ECONOMY OF PAIN AN ARGUMENT FOR CHRISTIANITY.

But not only does this economy of pain fit into and illustrate natural religion, but still more exactly and closely it fits into and illustrates Christianity. For we see the principle of vicarious suffering herein made co-extensive with humanity; and the central idea of our religion shown to be so far from exceptional, that it is actually normal, and crowns the entire edifice of such suffering with an instance the highest in its own kind. The unique and sublime effect ascribed in Christian teaching to the cross of Christ stands of course apart from all other effects of suffering, and is here only noticed to be excluded from the comparison. But as the crucifixion includes with that higher aspect, that of a martyrdom, or witness borne to the stern reality of human corruption, by the stern agony of prolonged suffering, so to that martyrdom we have an absolute parallel under the conditions set forth above (page 589). But yet more, in being a suffering endured for others, and by virtue of which those others escape their proper share of a penal testimony due equally from all, or from each in proportion as he is tainted with the common bane, the examples of pain under the law indicated above are each a replica of the crucifixion itself. Every victim of what in human eyes is an inscrutable visitation, in proportion as he is by every human standard blameless, becomes a closer realization of the great Ideal, which in Him who suffered, "the just for the unjust," finds its highest expression. Precisely in that proportion he endures for others rather than or beside himself, and becomes a scapegoat of humanity, "Stricken of God and afflicted." The individual apostle whose personal suf-
fferings are most fully known through his own indignant self-vindication, thought it no presumption to speak of "the sufferings of Christ abounding in us," of "the fellowship of" those "sufferings" as what he hoped to claim, and of his own "filling up that which is behind of the afflictions of Christ" (2 Cor. i. 5; Phil. iii. 10; Col. i. 24). Such phrases we may without exaggeration apply to many a struggle of human beings with pain, on whom has been concentrated that which was due to the corruption of humanity at large. The "household words" of Christianity thus shine with a new light of experience, illuminating the wards of every hospital. The example of Christ is a die which stamps with its own Image a wide currency, more or less alloyed indeed, but still of intrinsic value. It interprets the pains before it took its place in history as well as those which occur since. Countless humble sufferers for sins other than their own give in their witness to Him and "follow in His train." Assume Him to have suffered in a mystery to atone for sin, and they suffer in a mystery no less real to attest its terrible reality.

AND CHRISTIANITY IS THEREBY JUSTIFIED IN ITS IDEA.

And conversely, if their life is spent in an endurance, which, as we have seen, is the ransom of others, why cavil at the notion of His life given in a super-eminent sense as "a ransom for many?" And if, as may often happen, the heaviest load is laid on the gentlest and most Christ-like souls, if it cuts short careers of exemplary beneficence, or turns some who chafed impatiently at their own unequal burden, to bear it with resignation at last, then the Great Sacrifice, which finds its moral features reflected in some and transforms others to their likeness, justifies its own idea in both and reproduces after its own kind. Thus the reasonableness of that idea finds confirmation all around us, and vicarious suffering, unique in its "bright peculiar flower," shows its roots struck deep in human analogies. The distribution of pain, again, only follows the same central idea of
redemption in the stimulus which it gives to charity and the firmness in which it knits the bond of sympathy. It shows the intensely moral character which pervades that idea, and at the same time justifies faith in that redemption as a reality.

I am not for the purpose of this argument assuming the divine authority of the example of Christ or of the New Testament record. But I urge that this argument tends to vindicate that authority by the force of human analogy widely diffused. It seems absurd to suppose that so large a phenomenon as pain, so effectual in the physical and mental spheres, should be accidental and meaningless in the moral, should have so sharply defined a reality and yet be there a mere superfluity. Presented as above, it bespeaks gratitude, cements brotherhood, "provokes to love and to good works," exalts the sufferer to a place of honor, becomes a text of humility and patience, and turns to a blessing what seemed a curse. It becomes, therefore, an argument in favor of that belief in a Moral Governor into which it exactly fits, and of that Christian idea into whose very focus its lines converge.

PAIN STIMULATES REFLECTION THROUGH THE MEDIUM OF SENSATION.

Pain is thus exhibited as the great stimulant of reflection through the medium of sensation. This I venture to think is its presiding idea. It lets us into the secret of our weakness, defectiveness, corruption, which would otherwise remain unknown or be inertly known. It is the condition which makes the education of mankind possible, alike in the lower and in the higher sense. It not only safeguards the physical basis on which rest all higher faculties, nor only urges on the mind to seek knowledge, nor only drives the lesson home, but it draws out what is in man, shows the instinct of self-preservation what to lay hold upon and keeps it in constant exercise. It draws out, further, what is in nature, the object, and rivets it subjectively in man. Thus
how fruitful in the whole field of gaseous chemistry have been the perils of mining with their shocks to life and limb!

**THE HIGHER LESSONS OF PAIN.**

But pain suggests higher lessons. It is an abiding witness that man is corrupt and his best civilization defective and detrimental—a fact which is never so mischievous as when it is missed, and which some will probably miss to the end of time by steadily ignoring this testimony to it. It confirms the idea of a Moral Governor, and in the moral sphere points to Him as the resource of His defective and dependent creatures, and thus justifies the universal instinct of prayer. It shows these two ideas,—the one of the moral degradation, the other of the moral elevation of man,—to be each the complement of the other, and that instinct as a bridge thrown across to unite them. It supplies the salt of heroism and the balm of brotherhood. A bond of operative sympathy among living humanity, it passes on from age to age a continuous conductor of intellectual effort, and makes the unexhausted balance of pain in one generation the platform of new problems and the pledge of progress for the next. Although most impressive in its vast masses which overshadow a lifetime, it becomes more so because those masses are rare; but most of all so because, rare anywhere, they are possible everywhere. The sparse incidence is multiplied into the ubiquitous possibility; and the two factors unite, as we saw above (page 5) the minimum of pain endured reinforced by the maximum of pain endurable, to give the product a maximum efficacy, and thus combine the web and the woof of a merciful economy.

**SUGGESTIVE OF THE ASCETIC IDEA AND OF MAN'S GREATER FUTURE.**

The vast fruitfulness of pain in many lessons lies no doubt at the base of the ascetic idea (page 589). Men were so conscious of its many sided stimulative power, that they thought to cultivate it as an artificial product, and expected increas-
ingly useful results. Nor is the notion wholly void of practical success. Only, things artificial have their limits, often soon reached, but if not then recognized, the proportion of nature is violated. Thus manure in agriculture supplies artificially certain natural elements to the soil, but by an overdose the result is marred. Next, the stimulant itself is discredited, even within the limits of its useful application. Even so it has fared with the ascetic idea in the moral history of man. Pain, moreover, suggests that vicarious suffering is a human need; for unequal distribution means vicarious suffering, and if equal distribution would stultify the entire economy, then the necessity of unequal distribution is confirmed. In all these respects, and perhaps in many others which have escaped me, the economy of pain seems worthy of the Great Administrator to whose personality it points, suggesting sublimer aspects of "things not seen as yet" and implying a larger economy than the present, lying beyond the visible horizon. Pain is the raw material of our probation; effectual, whether as an emollient or an astringent of the character, to reveal what is in man, and while it educates to test him. Pain drives us ever on from the present to look to the future; and on it Faith builds the suggestion of a greater future, where, although there "be no more pain" for that army of martyrs whose "warfare is accomplished" in their triumph; its result, in the character may abide, like the spear wound and the nail-prints in Him whom they resemble; where for those whose probation is perfected through suffering, the corruption to which it witnessed shall be effaced, and nature's signal of distress be displayed no more. Probably enough, with pain, pleasure also may disappear, and the resulting state be analogous to an exalted form of that life-joy of which mention was made in the earlier sections of this essay.
ARTICLE III.

CLEMENT OF ALEXANDRIA NOT AN AFTER-DEATH PROBATIONIST OR UNIVERSALIST.

BY THE REV. WM. DE LOSS LOVE, D. D., SOUTH HADLEY, MASS.

Of late, in the "New Departure" controversy, some have gladly and some have regretfully said, that Clement of Alexandria was a believer in after-death probation. Some have gone farther, and said that he believed also in the doctrine of Universal Salvation, even in the salvation of demons, and of Satan the ruler of demons. These views have found some sanction among authors of former days. Several writers have recently quoted Dr. Shedd thus: "Clement and Origen both found the final recovery of Satan and his angels, upon this abiding existence of free-will to good in the rational spirit" (Hist. Chris. Doc., Vol. II, p. 416). Dr. Shedd does not cite Clement's language to prove his statement, but cites Baumgarten-Crucius. The reference of the latter is to Clement thus: "Now the devil, being possessed of free-will, was able both to repent and to steal; and it was he who was the author of the theft, not the Lord, who did not prevent him" (Miscellanies, Bk. I, chap. 17). Though Clement believed the devil was able to repent, that does not show that he believed he would repent. The passage cited for proof does not prove that Clement believed in "the final recovery of Satan and his angels." It is not best for evangelical men to be led about by such sort of evidence, or for unevangelical men to trust to it. In our day, the greater portion of theologians believe in the free-will of Satan; and yet, they have not the least expectation that he will ever repent. They believe that something more than power to repent is necessary to repentance.
The second reference of Baumgarten–Crucius to Clement’s testimony is, to Miscellanies, Book seven, chapter twelve. On those several pages, the only possible reference, in either Greek or English, to anything approaching this subject, is in one place to human freedom of choice, and in another to the true Gnostic or Christian, not to Satan, thus: “He, attracted by his own hope, tastes not the good things that are in the world, entertaining a noble contempt for all things here; pitying those that are chastised after death, who through punishment unwillingly make confession.” This does not claim “the final recovery of Satan and his angels.” Its most probable reference is, to punishment after death of sinners of the human race, who are not recovered, because their confession is “unwillingly” made. Possibly it is a reference to Clement’s view of purgatory; yet, sinners there confess “willingly.” In connection with this second reference to Clement, Baumgarten–Crucius gives two Greek phrases, apparently the first and last of a sentence, or passage, with a dash between, thus: “ἐξεβαθοντα μετανοεῖν—παιδίουσις ἀναγκαῖα.” The former phrase may be rendered, “They are severely forced to repent;” or, possibly, “They give great diligence to bring themselves to repent.” The latter phrase means, “Necessary disciplinings.” The whole passage seems to be a quotation from Clement; and yet it is not found in this place of reference or anywhere else so far as appears. As it here stands it does not prove anything. If it be a mere comment of Baumgarten–Crucius, it is only his opinion. If there is a passage anywhere in Clement’s writings, beginning and ending thus, it may simply refer to his purgatorial view.

Gieseler (Ch. Hist. Vol. I., p. 214) says that Hofstede de Groot has proved that Clement did not hold that the devil was capable of salvation.

With reference to probation after death for mankind, Professor Shedd says: “Clement of Alexandria, the teacher of Origen, makes the following representations, according to Redepenning: ‘The deep corruption of
mankind fills God, whose compassion for man is as unlimited as his hatred towards evil, not with anger, for he is never angry, but with the tenderest and most pitiful love. Hence he continually seeks all men, whom he loves for their own sake and their resemblance to God, as the bird seeks her young who have fallen from the nest. His omnipotence, to which nothing is impossible, knows how to overcome all evil, and convert it into good. He threatens, indeed, and punishes, but yet only to reform and improve; and though to public discourse the fruitlessness of repentence after death be asserted, yet hereafter not only those who have not heard of Christ will receive forgiveness, but it may be hoped that the severer punishment which befalls the obstinate unbelievers will not be the conclusion of their history. For man, like every other spiritual being, can never lose his free-will. By means of this power, at all times, here and hereafter, noble minds, aided by that divine power which is indispensable to success, are lifting themselves up from ignorance and deep corruption, and are drawing nearer in greater or less degree, to God and the truth.' (Hist. Chris. Doc., Vol. II, p. 235).

How are the foregoing representations concerning Clement's views sustained? The most or all persons would much prefer that Dr. Shedd himself should give citations from Clement's writings which would sustain the allegations. But they are not thus gratified. The rather, Professor Shedd says: "The citations from Clement upon which Redepenning relies for the above representation, are," etc. He then copies Redepenning's references, which will here be cited and briefly examined. Clement's writings are divided into three classes, thus: Cohortatio, or, Exhortation to the heathen; Pædagogus, or, The Instructor; and, Stromata, or, The Miscellanies. Redepenning's citations from Clement, as given by Professor Shedd, are,

1. "Cohortatio, 74," which is equivalent to, "Exhortation to the heathen," chapter 10, first part. It is a plea to the heathen to abandon the evil customs of their fathers.
Sentences from that paragraph are these: "The good and godly shall obtain the good reward, inasmuch as they held goodness in high esteem; while, on the other hand, the wicked shall receive meet punishment. For the author of evil, torment has been prepared. . . . What an infatuated desire, then, for voluntary death is this, rooted in men's minds! Why do they flee to this fatal brand, with which they shall be burned, when it is within their power to live nobly according to God, and not according to custom? For God bestows life freely; but evil custom, after our departure from this world, brings on the sinner unavailing remorse with punishment. . . . The idols' temples to be in reality graves or prisons. . . . And will you not escape from those dungeons, and flee to the mercy that comes down from heaven? For God, of his great love to man, comes to the help of man, as the mother-bird flies to one of her young that has fallen out of the nest." Here is the idea of free-will in the phrase, "voluntary death." Here is the idea of "good reward" for the "godly," and of "meet punishment" for the "wicked." Here is the idea of God's "great love to man," illustrated by the love of the "mother-bird" for her young. But it all pertains to sinful men in this life, in an exhortation to them to break off from their sins. Here is the idea of punishment to the impenitent "after our departure from this world," when "evil custom," or sin, "brings on the sinner unavailing remorse with punishment." In this paragraph there is not even a hint at universal salvation, or at after-death probation, but at what is directly the opposite. "Unavailing remorse with punishment" "after our departure from this world!" "Torment has been prepared" "for the author of evil." No indication here that Satan is to be restored to holiness; rather, the opposite.

On the next two pages following the foregoing citation, are these and similar passages. "What, then, of the Lord? He remembers not our ill desert; he still pities, he still urges us to repentance." "Let us therefore repent, and pass from ignorance to knowledge, from foolishness to wisdom, from
licentiousness to self-restraint, from unrighteousness to righteousness, from godlessness to God. It is an enterprise of noble daring to take our way to God; and the enjoyment of many other good things is within the reach of the lovers of righteousness, who pursue eternal life.” “You have, O men, the divine promise of grace; you have heard, on the other hand, the threatening of punishment.”

2. “Cohor. 79,”—the same as Exhor, etc. c. 10;—in Clark’s Ed. Ant. Nicene Library, Clement, Vol. I, pp. 90, 91. “Let us then openly strip for the contest, and nobly strive in the arena of truth, the holy Word being the judge, and the Lord of the universe prescribing the contest. For ’tis no insignificant prize, the guerdon of immortality which is set before us. Pay no more regard, then, if you are rated by some of the low rabble who lead the dance of impiety, and are driven on to the same pit by their folly and insanity, makers of idols and worshippers of stones.” “To whom shall the Lord say, ‘Yours is the kingdom of heaven?’ ‘Yours, whose choice is set on God, if you will; yours, if you will only believe, and comply with the brief terms of the announcement; which the Ninevites having obeyed, instead of the destruction they looked for, obtained a signal deliverance.” No sign in this citation of either universal salvation, or second probation. Rather, on the next page, the opposite is indicated by the following striking sentence: “Not only unable to pity yourselves, you are incapable even of yielding to the persuasions of those who commiserate you; enslaved as you are to evil custom, and, clinging to it voluntarily till your last breath, you are hurried to destruction.”

3. “Cohor. 82”—Exhor. c. 10;—Ant. Nic. Lib., Clem., Vol. I, pp. 93, 94. Clement shows here how unreal and vain are the gods of the heathen, and how real, gracious and sovereign, is the true God. He adduces nothing to show that there is an after-death probation, or universal salvation. He even warns the heathen by the case of Sodom, and Lot’s wife. On the next page, he writes: “Christ is able to save in every place.” He is speaking to dwellers on the earth,
and not to the lost in hell. He holds out hope in the power of God to save all who call upon him. His next sentence is this: "For he that is fired with ardor and admiration for righteousness, being the lover of One who needs nothing, needs himself but little, having treasured up his bliss in nothing but himself and God, where is neither moth, robber, nor pirate, but the eternal Giver of good. With justice, then, have you been compared to those serpents who shut their ears against the charmers. On the second page following he says: "If you have respect for old age, be wise, now that you have reached life's sunset; and albeit at the close of life, acquire the knowledge of God, that the end of life may to you prove the beginning of salvation." No after-death probation, no universal salvation, here; but a strong trend to the opposite.

4. "Cohor. 89"=Exhor. c. II;—Ant. Nic. Lib., Clem., Vol. I, pp. 102-104. In this passage occur the following: "That light is eternal life;" "Through the cross brought death to life;" "For sin is eternal death;" "And the Word, having unfolded the truth, showed to men the height of salvation, that either repenting they might be saved, or refusing to obey, they might be judged. This is the proclamation of righteousness: to those that obey, glad tidings; to those that disobey, judgment." "And, what is of the highest importance, salvation runs parallel with sincere willingness—choice and life being, so to speak, yoked together." "The spark of true goodness, kindled in the soul by the Divine Word;" "What, then, is the exhortation I give you? I urge you to be saved. This Christ desires. In one word, He freely bestows life on you." In saying, "I urge you to be saved," he implies a doubt about their being saved, and that indicates that he did not believe in universal salvation. This closes the evidence cited from "Cohortatio."

and Gentiles in hades; in that part of it where the righteous were. The next previous chapter he devotes to showing, that the Greeks, or Gentiles, had some knowledge of the true God. He argues from that the repentance and salvation of some of the Gentiles.

(1). There is nothing in the chapter even attempting to show universal salvation.

(2). There is nothing in the chapter attempting to show probation for any after death. Such probation means being put back into another state of trial, with uncertainty as to conversion and salvation. It is not that for which Clement pleads. But he pleads for belief in the salvation of unevangelized, righteous Gentiles, as well as righteous Jews, the Gentiles especially receiving new light after death, and exercising repentance according to the new light.

(3). They were righteous Gentiles on earth, who had died without the gospel, to whom the gospel was preached in hades. Passages, on the three pages now referred to, concerning this point, are the following: (a). “Wherefore the Lord preached the gospel to those in hades.” Who were they? Just previous they are described as “those that were righteous according to philosophy.” (b). “And they [should bring to repentance] the Gentiles; that is, those who had lived in righteousness according to . . . Philosophy.” (c). “It was suitable to the divine administration, that those possessed of greater worth in righteousness, and whose life had been preëminent, . . . yet confessedly of the number of the people of God Almighty, should be saved. (d). “One righteous man, then, differs not, as righteous, from another righteous man, whether he be of the Law or a Greek.” (e). “And [if] those who lived rightly before the Law and were classed under faith, and judged to be righteous,—it is evident that those, too, who were outside of the Law, having lived rightly, . . . . with all speed turned and believed.”

(4). Clement speaks of those unevangelized Gentiles or Greeks as not having faith, though having righteousness.
Truly, they had not faith in the things of salvation not yet revealed to them; but, if really righteous, they must have had the character and heart of faith, ready to believe whenever and wherever the new, gospel revelation came. Clement says, on the three pages now under inspection,—"For to those who were righteous according to the law, faith was wanting." "Then all who believe shall be saved, although they may be of the Gentiles, on making their profession there." "If, then, he preached only to the Jews who wanted the knowledge and faith of the Savior." "And those who lived rightly before the Law were classed under faith, . . . . those, too, who were outside of the Law, . . . . on hearing the voice of the Lord, . . . . with all speed turned and believed."

(5). Clement assumes that the righteous, though unevangelized, Gentiles, do believe on having the opportunity, and do exercise proper repentence. "Straightway, on the revelation of the truth they also repented of their previous conduct." "That those possessed of greater worth in righteousness, . . . . on repenting of their transgressions." "Those, too, who were outside of the Law, having lived rightly, . . . . with all speed turned and believed." "On hearing the proclamation, might either exhibit repentance." Clement regards the gospel proclaimed in hades as a touchstone to test souls and draw them to it if of the same spirit.

(6). Clement calls the beginning of the new era of faith and repentance on the part of those dying righteous but unevangelized, a "conversion;" but, plainly, by his own view it is only a second conversion. The first was in this life, when they began to be "righteous." "The apostles also, as here, so there, preached the gospel to those of the heathen who were ready for conversion." And the same he held concerning the well-disposed Jews who died before Christ came.

(7). While nothing appears in this section favoring universal salvation, or probation after death, there does appear
the *seed* of what became the Roman Catholic doctrine of *purgatory*, which is not an after-death *probation*, but a *purification* for the righteous who die not sufficiently holy to be admitted at once into heaven. "God's punishments are saving and disciplinary." He does not mean that they are wholly and only such, as we shall hereafter see, but so with such as will rightly use them. Clement adduces no Scripture proof for even the *germ* of the doctrine of purgatory. Nor does he give any evidence that the earlier Christian Fathers held the doctrine. He does refer to the Shepherd of Hermas, where he teaches that the gospel was proclaimed to the righteous dead who departed before Christ came. The doctrine that some of the heathen are righteous and will be saved, he applies to an unwarranted number, embracing even some idolaters. Yet, it is possible that he refers only to such as worshipped the true God under merely an idol by name.

6. "Strom. VII, 832"—Mis., B. VII, c. 2;—Ant. Nic. Lib., Clem., Vol. II, p. 410. Here, instead of finding Reds penning's representation that "Omnipotence, . . . . knows how to overcome all evil, and convert into good," we find just the *opposite* in this: "For he does not *compel* him who through choosing and fulfilling . . . . is able to receive salvation from him." There is evil contrary to God's will. We find here, that the Savior "does care for all;" yet not in a way to justify Universalism; for "He has dispensed his beneficence both to Greeks and Barbarians, even to those of them that were predestinated, and in due time called, the faithful and elect." Still, he "called all equally, and assigned special honors to those who have believed in a specially excellent way."

7. "Strom. VII, 895"—Mis. B. VII, c. 16;—Ant. Nic. Lib., Clem., Vol. II, pp. 481-483. In this passage Clement speaks of "partial corrections, which are called chastisements, which many of us who have been in transgression incur, by falling away from the Lord's people." He says also, that God does not punish in "retaliation for evil." He
says, that some "heretics," who may be those who temporarily fall "away from the Lord's people," "precipitate themselves into judgment," by which he means discipline; and he prays that they may "be chastised by God, and undergo paternal admonitions previous to the Judgment." He may mean, previous to death. If he means after death, unless corrected before, it is again the germ idea of purification by the discipline of purgatory.

8. "Strom. VII, 860"—Mis. B. VII, c. 7;—Ant. Nic. Lib., Clem., Vol. II, pp. 438-440. Clement here describes at length the Gnostic, who in his view is the highest kind of Bible Christian. He says: "And the man who turns from among the Gentiles will ask for faith, while he that ascends to knowledge will ask for the perfection of love." He regards faith as rudimentary, and love as the greatest of Christian attainments.

9. "Strom. I, 369"—Mis. B. I, c. 17;—Ant. Nic. Lib., Clem., Vol. I, pp. 407-409. "So in no respect is God the author of evil. But since free choice and inclination originate sins, and a mistaken judgment sometimes prevails, from which, since it is ignorance and stupidity, we do not take pains to recede, punishments are rightly inflicted." "For it is the work of divine wisdom . . . to ensure that what happens through the evils hatched by any, may come to a good and useful issue, and to use to advantage those things which appear to be evils, as also the testimony which accrues from temptation." He is speaking in general of natural and not moral evils, and wholly, so far as appears, of things of this life. This closes Clement's citations from "Stromata."

10. "Paedagogus, I, 102"—The Instructor, B. I, c. 3;—Ant. Nic. Lib., Clem., Vol. I, pp. 118-120. The "Instructor" is the Word, the Logos, Christ. The present chapter is on "The Philanthropy of the Instructor." The concluding sentence, which comes nearer to our particular inquiries than any other, is this: "Wherefore let us regard the Word as law, and his commands and counsels as the short and straight
paths to immortality; for his precepts are full of persuasion, not of fear."

11. "Paed. I, 137"—Inst. B. I, c. 8;—Ant. Nic. Lib., Clem., Vol. I, pp. 155–157. Leading sentences are these: "Consequently God does all good. And he does no good to man without caring for him, and he does not care for him without taking care of him." "The general of an army, by inflicting fines and corporeal punishments with chains and the extremest disgrace on offenders, and sometimes even punishing individuals with death, aims at good, doing so for the admonition of the officers under him." This is not reformatory but exemplary punishment, intended as a sanction or support of law. "It is not, then, from hatred that the Lord chides men; for he himself suffered for us, whom he might have destroyed for our faults." This implies that sinners might justly be destroyed.

12. "Paed. I. 140"—Inst. B. I, c. 8;—Ant. Nic. Lib., Clem., Vol. I, pp. 159–161. "For the Divine Being is not angry in the way that some think; but often restrains, and always exhorts humanity, and shows what ought to be done. And this is a good device, to terrify lest we sin." This is not saying that it is best to "terrify" under false pretenses. It is equivalent to saying, "Knowing, therefore, the fear of the Lord, we persuade men" (2 Cor. 5:11). Clement quotes from Ecclesiasticus: "For the fear of the Lord drives away sins, and he that is without fear cannot be justified" (1:27, 28). He adds: "And God does not inflict punishment from wrath, but for the ends of justice; since it is not expedient that justice should be neglected on our account. Each one of us, who sins, with his own free will chooses punishment, and the blame lies with him who chooses. God is without blame." He means by "justice" something beyond mere correction.

13. "Paed. I. 142"—Inst. B. I, c. 8;—Ant. Nic. Lib., Clem., Vol. I, pp. 160–162. "I will grant that he [the Lord] punishes the disobedient (for punishment is for the good and advantage of him who is punished, for it is the correction of
a refractory subject); but I will not grant that he wishes to take vengeance. Revenge is retribution for evil, imposed for the advantage of him who takes the revenge. He will not desire us to take revenge, who teaches us 'to pray for those that despitefully use us.' But that God is good, all willingly admit; and that the same God is just, I require not many words to prove." "To show that he is just, and that Jesus is the justifier of him who is of faith." But what does he hold concerning those not of faith? "For if one must censure, it is necessary also to rebuke; when it is the time to wound the apathetic soul not mortally, but salutarily, securing exemption from everlasting death by a little pain." He holds that those of faith are corrected, and those not of faith receive everlasting death.

14. "Pæd. I, 149"—Inst. B. I, c. 9;—Ant. Nic. Lib., Clem., Vol. I, pp. 164–173. The object of the chapter is to show, that a beneficent God may justly use severe chastisements for correction and recovery of the fallen. There are no hints that this is to extend to the future world. There are hints of unavailing correction. "The Lord acts towards us as we do towards our children." "He shows their offence to be clearer, by declaring that they understood, and thus sinned wilfully." "For if you do not receive his love, ye shall know his power." "Such are the causes of provocation for which the Judge comes to inflict punishment on those that would not choose a life of goodness. Wherefore also afterwards he assailed them more roughly; in order, if possible, to drag them back from their impetuous rush towards death." "He declares that it belongs to the same power both to judge and to do good. For there is power over both together, and judgment separates that which is just from its opposite." "Then justice came down to men both in the letter and in the body, in the Word and in the law, constraining humanity to saving repentance; for it was good. But do you not obey God? Then blame yourself, who drag to yourself the judge."

Clem., Vol. I, pp. 329–331. “But not to-morrow in truth, but already, are these dead to God; burying their dead, that is, sinking themselves down to death. The apostle very firmly assails them: ‘Be not deceived; neither adulterers, nor effeminate, nor abusers of themselves with mankind, nor thieves, nor covetous, nor drunkards, nor railers,’ and whatever else he adds to these, ‘shall inherit the kingdom of God.’” “The affection which arises from the fire which we call love, leading to the fire which will never cease in consequence of sin.” This does not sound like universal salvation.

The foregoing are all of Redepenning’s citations from Clement, as given by Prof. Shedd. Redepenning’s representations of Clement’s views, on the more important questions, are his own mistaken inferences. (1). His citations fail to show Clement holding that Omnipotence “knows how to overcome all evil, and convert it into good” in the eternal future. (2). His citations do not show Clement holding that God punishes “only to reform and improve.” (3). His citations do not show Clement so insincere and immoral as to teach “in public discourse the fruitlessness of repentance after death,” and then in private to teach or hold the opposite. (4). His citations do not show Clement holding that all “those who have not heard of Christ” in this world, “will receive forgiveness.” (5). His citations do not show Clement holding that there is hope of the final salvation of even “the obstinate unbelievers.”

Redepenning says further of Clement’s views, which Prof. Shedd does not quote: “In the Stromata, which are intended for the more advanced, the eternity of hell pains, and the immutability of the fate of the dead is everywhere denied. See Strom. VI, c. 6. The expression ἀθέων, ἔχοντα, declared in Strom. III, c. 5 to be destined for sinners, is no exception, as the expression is borrowed from the Odyssey XII, 118.” 1. Redepenning gives no proof of Clement’s denial of “the eternity of hell pains” in respect to all. 2. Homer doubtless meant literally “deathless evil,” and
Redepenning gives no proof that Clement did not mean it. Neander attributes to Clement the "doctrine of a progressive development and course of purification after death" (Torrey's Trans. Ed. 1852, Vol. I, p. 656). That doctrine, Clement held concerning heathen who had "lived rightly" in the world. Neander cites from Clement (Mis. B. VI, c. 6; Clark's Ed. Vol. II, p. 331, ¶3, sentence 2): "For it is not here alone that the active power of God is beforehand, but it is everywhere and is always at work." But this does not prove that Clement held to a "universal restoration." He wrote the sentence in support of his theory that the heathen or Gentile "righteous" would be saved. It is not logical or fair on that ground to represent him as either a Universalist or after-death probationist. No one shows that Clement made a universal application of his language. The same kind of reasoning would make him a believer in the final salvation of Satan and all his angels, but it would not be just.

McClintock and Strong's Cyc. Bib. Theol. and Eccles. Lit., in article "Punishment, Future," quotes from Clement (Mis. B. VI, c. 6) thus: "If in this life there are so many ways for purification and repentance, how much more should there be after death. The purification of souls, when separated from the body, will be easier. We can set no limits to the agency of the Redeemer: to redeem, to rescue, to discipline is his work: and so will he continue to operate after this life." This must be a professed summary, and is not wholly correct. Clement, in his plea for Jews and Gentiles "who had lived in righteousness according to law and philosophy," and yet "had ended life not perfectly," says this: "God's punishments are saving and disciplinary, leading to conversion, and choosing rather the repentance than the death of a sinner; and especially since souls, although darkened by passions, when released from their bodies, are able to perceive more clearly, because of their being no longer obstructed by the paltry flesh (Mis. B. VI, c. 6). This is simply the doctrinal germ of purgatory. When Clement is
speaking of "righteous" Jews and heathen, dying before Christ, it is not right to say he applied his statements to others, or to say on that ground that he "advocated universalism."

Schaff-Herzog's Encyclopædia represents Restorationism as Universalism, and then in article "Punishment, Future," by Dr. Francis L. Patton, it declares that Clement was a restorationist. But in article "Apokatastasis," by Dr. J. Köstlin, it declares that there is no proof of his being a restorationist. Was the former statement a fruit of Redepenning's unwarranted representations, and the latter a fruit of original investigations? Dr. Köstlin, Professor of Theology in Halle, says: "He [Clement] merely asserted, that, in the next world, there is an operation of salvation upon lost souls; but how far it effected a change he does not say." Köstlin does not say, "operation of salvation upon all lost souls." He refers, doubtless, to the heathen that "lived rightly" in this life.

**CLEMENT ON PUNISHMENT.**

Redepenning represents Clement as holding that God punishes "only to reform and improve;" and many, following this statement made some fifty years ago, have said, that Clement's view leads to Universalism, because he held that all punishment is simply *reformatory*. Clement's chief statements about punishment, pertain to its infliction upon the righteous, and mostly in this world. In all these cases its design, as he conceived it, was reformatory. He often speaks of God's *design* in punishment, implying that its *tendency* is reformatory, whether in all cases it reforms or not. Just as, when the Lord says, "The goodness of God leadeth thee to repentance," the meaning is that it *tends* to lead; not, that it always does lead to repentance. The three designs in punishment are, first, reformatory; second, exemplary, or deterrent, or preventive; third, vindicatory, or retributory. The vindicatory has also a deterrent influence, and those two kinds of punishment inflicted upon some, have often a
reformatory influence upon others. Did Clement hold to anything but a reformatory design in punishment? He says: "But punishment does not avail to him who has sinned, to undo his sin, but that he may sin no more, and that no one else fall into the like. Therefore the good God corrects for these three causes: First, that he who is corrected may become better than his former self; then that those who are capable of being saved by examples may be driven back, being admonished; and thirdly, that he who is injured may not be readily despised, and be apt to receive injury." (Mis. B. IV, c. 24). Here are the reformatory and deterrent designs. And in the third kind may be the vindicatory; for, God does not punish the transgressor after death for the sake of revenge, but by the retribution of justice to protect his universe from "injury." Clement elsewhere speaks of punishment for the ends of justice, implying the Divine right to punish the guilty. "God does not inflict punishment from wrath, but for the ends of justice; since it is not expedient that justice should be neglected on our account" (Inst. B. I, c. 8). "Such he wishes us to be, that we may be blessed. Again, showing the opposite scale of the balance of justice, He says: 'But not so the ungodly—not so; but as the dust which the wind sweeps away from the face of the earth.' By showing the punishment of sinners, and their easy dispersion, and carrying off by the wind, the Instructor dissuades from crime by means of punishment; and by holding up the merited penalty, shows the benignity of his beneficence in the most skilful way, in order that we may possess and enjoy its blessings" (Inst. B. I, c. 10). Here is retributive punishment upon some, and by it others are warned and dissuaded. "'Being judged by the Lord,'" says the Apostle, 'we are chastened, that we may not be condemned with the world.' For the prophet had said before, 'chastening, the Lord hath chastised me, but hath not given me over unto death'" (Mis. B. I, c. 27). Here is punishment of some for correction—chastisement—and the assumption of retributive punishment to others. Judging from
all this the conclusion follows, that they are wrong who represent Clement as holding that God punishes "only to reform and improve."

CLEMENT ON UNENDING RETRIBUTION.

Probably it is on the ground of Redepenning's statements, that McClintock and Strong's Cyclopædia, article "Universalists," says, that Clement of Alexandria "advocated Universalism on the ground of the remedial character of all punishment. Many have joined in a similar statement. We have seen that Clement did not say that all punishment is effectually remedial. Did Clement hold that to some unending retribution would be allotted? "Will you not allow the heavenly Word, the Savior, to be bound on to you as an amulet, and, by trusting in God's own charm, be delivered from passions which are the diseases of the mind, and rescued from sin—for sin is eternal death" (Exhor. c. 11). "Such are the men who believe in their belly, 'whose God is their belly, whose glory is their shame, who mind earthly things.' To them the Apostle predicted no good when he said, 'whose end is destruction'" (Inst. B. II, c. 1). "Punishments after death, on the other hand, and penal retribution by fire, were pilfered from the Barbarian [Jewish] philosophy." "For the fiery men are meant to signify the angels, who seizure and punish the wicked. 'Who maketh,' it is said, 'his angels spirits; his ministers flaming fire.' It follows from this that the soul is immortal. For what is tortured or corrected, being in a state of sensation, lives, though said to suffer" (Mis. B.V, c. 14). Clement quotes from Heraclitus as a borrower from the Hebrews, "who considered that there was a world everlasting," and who said that there "is, and will be ever-living fire, kindled according to measure and quenched according to measure" (Mis. B. V, c. 14). "'They which do such things shall not inherit the kingdom of God'" (Mis. B. IV, c. 8). "'Declare among the heathen his statutes,' that they may not be judged, but that those
who have previously given ear [lived rightly] may be converted [to Gospel truth]. But those who speak treacherously with their tongues have the penalties that are on record” (Mis. B. VII, c. 16). “And the way of the ungodly shall perish” (Mis. B. II, c. 15). “It is in reference to the unbelieving that it is said, ‘that they are reckoned as the chaff which the wind drives from the face of the earth, and the drop which falls from a vessel’” (Mis. B. IV, c. 24).

“The Gospel supposes two ways—the Apostles, too, similarly with all the prophets—and seeing they call that one ‘narrow and confined’ which is circumscribed according to the commandments and prohibitions, and the opposite one, which leads to perdition, ‘broad and roomy,’ open to pleasures and wrath” (Mis. B. V, c. 5). “The broad and wide way leadeth to destruction.’ . . . ‘Fool, this night shall thy soul be required of thee.’ . . . ‘What shall it profit a man, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul’” (Mis. B. IV, c. 6). “For except ye believe,” says the Lord, ‘ye shall die in your sins’” (Mis. B. V, c. 13). “And they will understand neither the honors after death, which belong to those who have lived holily, nor the punishments of those who have lived unrighteously and impurely.” He quotes approvingly, ‘Life were indeed a feast to the wicked, who, having done evil, then die; were not the soul immortal, death would be a godsend’” (Mis. B. IV, c. 7). “For God bestows life freely; but evil custom, after our departure from this world, brings on the sinner unavailing remorse with punishment” (Exhor. c. 10). Even where Clement contends that “the excellent among the Greeks worshipped the same God as we,” and hence would have the privilege of hearing the gospel in hades, he implies the final condemnation of those who “believed not” (Mis. B. VI, cs. 5, 6; Clark’s Ant. Nic. Clem., Vol. II, p. 326, 332). “It was therefore a fit subject for all fear on the disciples’ part; if both he that possesses wealth and he that is teeming with passions were the rich, and these alike shall be expelled from the heavens. For salvation is the privilege of pure and passionless souls”
(Who is the rich man that shall be saved? s. 20). "Being deprived of eternal life" (Ibid. s. 26). "The penalty for which is the punishment of eternal fire" (Ibid. s. 33). "But if one chooses to continue and to sin perpetually in pleasures and values indulgence here above eternal life, and turns away from the Savior, who gives forgiveness; let him no more blame either God, or riches, or his having fallen, but his own soul, which voluntarily perishes" (Ibid. s. 42). "Imortal are all souls, even those of the wicked, for whom it had been better not to have been incorruptible; for, punished by a limitless infliction of unquenchable fire, and dying not, they obtain no end of their misery" (Fragment from Clement's lost work on the "Soul;" Patres Graeci, Vol. VI., Wirceburgi; Sheldon's Hist. Chris. Doc., Vol. I., p. 154). In reference to the above Fragment from the work on the "Soul," Prof. Sheldon recently says, that he has found it also "in the writings of Maximus (Confessor), a distinguished writer of the seventh century, who quotes it as coming from Clement, together with another extract on the nature of the soul. It is contained in his Capita Theol. Logica, Sermo LIII., a work made up mostly of quotations from a great number of writers. Migne's Patrologia gives the passage both in the writings of Clement (under the head of 'Fragm. 29') and also in those of Maximus. The reference of the passage to Clement's work on the "Soul," is rather a probable conjecture than a certain conclusion. Maximus does not specify the particular work of Clement from which he obtained it. The editor in Migne gives it as being from the De Anima."

Taking all of the foregoing into consideration, several conclusions follow:

1. It can not be just longer to say, that Clement of Alexandria "advocated Universalism," or was a Universalist.

2. It is not right against Clement's own declaration to say, that he held to the "remedial character of all punishment" as to its effect, whatever he may have held as to its tendency.
Therefore, his view concerning punishment does not favor Universalism.

3. It is unsustained by evidence, that Clement was an after-death probationist. He did teach, that both Jews and Gentiles, dying before Christ came, and in many things having lived "rightly" here, yet having ended life "sinfully," had the gospel preached to them by either Christ or his Apostles, and became purified for heaven. This was not probation but purgatory.

4. It is wrong to charge Clement, as some do, with double dealing,—teaching the opposite of Restorationism in public, and Restorationism itself in private. So grave an impeachment requires evidence. He seems too serious and earnest, too much a believer and dealer in Scripture, too able and fruitful in writings, to resort to any such deceitful pretence in doctrine. Even his Gnosticism did not make him such a consummate hypocrite. He claimed that every true Gnostic was a high-minded Christian.

5. The suggestion of some that Clement was a Restorationist because his pupil Origen was, is unworthy of credit. The same kind of reasoning could be applied to convict Clement of believing in the preëxistence of all human souls, even of the human soul of the Redeemer; for, his pupil Origen believed in it. Even Origen himself proves to be but a feeble support of the doctrine of Restorationism. It was a tenet he held in his earlier age. His work against Celsus, by far his most able and interesting, and written in his later years, contains hardly any glimpses of that view; nothing that of itself would show it. Neander was so impressed with signs of change on this point in Origen, that he said, "It may be questioned whether this also was not one of those points upon which his views became changed at a later period of his life" (Hist. Chris. Rel. Ch., Torrey, Vol. I., p. 656).

6. The last evidence that after-death probation was held by the Christian Fathers in the second century, gives way in the showing that Clement did not hold that view. His writ-
ing of anything akin to that subject dates as late as A. D. 195.

7. Clement's view on any given subject, should be inferred, not from isolated passages, but from the great sum of all he says concerning it. He did not define, or adhere to his definitions, so carefully as authors generally do now. Nor did scarcely any of his period. Not observing this difference has led to many misinterpretations of his meaning.

8. Redepenning's misstatements concerning Clement's belief, having been put in circulation long ago, and having been handed on through a long line of students and scholars, have done much harm to evangelical religion. They have declusively encouraged errorists, and have unjustly weakened the hearts and hands of many loyalists to the truth.

9. We all have an urgent and solemn duty not to slander or misrepresent the dead. We have an important office in keeping the just reputation of those who are not here to answer for themselves.
ARTICLE IV.

"THE OLDEST BOOK IN THE WORLD."

SOCIETY, ETHICS, RELIGION, IN EGYPT BEFORE 2000 B. C.

The French Version of the Papyrus Prisse, by M. Philippe Virey, and of the Maxims of Ani, by M. François Chabas. Translated by Howard Osgood, Professor in Rochester Theological Seminary.

This work is not published because it is a literary curiosity, but for its importance in the history of man. In the opinion of pre-eminent Egyptologists, Chabas, de Rouge, Naville, Maspero, Renouf, and many others, it is the oldest book now extant in the world, and they, not I, have assigned its title. It professes to have originated at an era many centuries before the epoch of the Exodus. This claim, if alone, would demand too much of our credulity, but with the numerous monuments of the first six dynasties telling their clear story of the high civilization, of the art and literature, of Egypt in hoar antiquity, this claim appears to be without exaggeration. The fragment of the work of Kakimna is assigned to the third, and the work of Ptah-hotep to the fifth dynasty.

As to the civilization of Egypt in Pyramid times, the numerous other monuments of this early age have led those most competent to give a sound opinion to tell us as follows:—

It is certain that at least three thousand years before Christ there was in Egypt a powerful and elaborately organized monarchy, enjoying a material civilization in many respects not inferior to that of Europe in the last century. 1

The fourth dynasty ascended the throne about 3124 B.C., and at that time, long before our usual ideas of the development of nations, there is found a people highly instructed in all the arts of peace; a state completely organized; a hierarchy, firmly founded, minutely divided, and organized.

1 Renouf, Rel. of Egypt, p. 82.
even to the smallest external matters; an universally diffused system of
writing, and the common use of papyrus; in short, a civilization, which in
all essential points has already attained its full maturity, and only by sharp
investigation is the further development in some directions discovered. 2

Art under the fourth and fifth dynasties obtained a height never sur-
passed by following dynasties. Egypt had also a complicated administration,
the result of efforts pursued through long years. There were civil grades
and religious grades, bishops as well as prefects. Registration of lands was
maintained. The King had his court, and a whole world of officials, power-
fully and wisely organized, gravitated around him. Literature was held in
honor. 3

At the time when the oldest monuments now extant were erected, the
Egyptians were a people of high civilization; they had a complete system
of writing, a literature, a highly developed art, and a well-ordered state. 4

In one of the tombs of Gizeh, a high officer of the first period of the
sixth dynasty takes the title of "Governor of the house of books." This
simple mention, occurring incidentally between two more exalted titles,
suffices, where others are wanting, to show us the extraordinary develop-
ment of Egyptian civilization at that time. Not only was there already a
literature, but this literature was sufficiently large to fill libraries, and its
importance was so great that one of the court officers was specially design-
nated for the keeping of the royal library. 5

On the inside of the pyramid of Unas (fifth dynasty), it
is said of him in the other world:—

When men receive burial, the flesh is miserable that has no writing;
the writing of Unas is sealed with the great seal, surely, his writing is not
sealed with the little seal. . . . . . His books are on both sides of him. 6

Literature was not a slow fruit of the development of Egypt, but it
goes back to the first dynasties. . . . This period seems to have been that in
which Egypt was best governed and arrived at the highest point of internal
prosperity. 7

If we have hitherto believed that the immense literature of the Dead
arose gradually during the long history of the Egyptian people, and that it
must be possible to follow the development of these ideas among the Egyp-
tians, we can hold that view no longer. This literature was made at an
epoch that lies almost beyond our historical knowledge, and later times did
no more than pass it on. 8

There is, therefore, not only no good reason for rejecting

3 Mariette, Gallerie de l’ Eg. Anc., p. 27.
4 Erman, Ägypten, p. 59.
5 Maspero, Hist. Anc., p. 69.
8 Erman, Berliner, Philol. Wochenschrift, Oct. 8, 1887.
the claim of this work to its high antiquity, but there are many reasons for accepting it.

The history of its translations is fully told in the preface of Monsieur Virey, which follows. A high estimate of M. Virey's excellent critical work is also given in the extract from Professor Maspero's address in presenting the work to the French Academy of Inscriptions and Belles Lettres.

With M. Virey's permission this translation is published, to popularize, if possible, more correct views of the early history of man. It is made from the French translation in M. Virey's critical edition. Of course, being a translation of a translation, this publication can do no more than represent fairly the French version, and this is sufficient to give a general idea of thought on some most important themes in early days. We may subtract all the words or phrases over which critics contend, and their loss will not at all affect the general picture.

The fragment of Kakimna reveals a society, long removed from the savage state; where manners go far towards making the man, and the ill-mannered surly man is an affliction to his mother; where gluttony is regarded as bestiality, and the man who does not govern his appetite is marked as worthless; where the right instruction of children is the first duty of parents; where the deity is spoken of in the singular, as God who brings to pass events which none foreknow.

But it is to the complete work of Ptah-hotep that we turn for better, fuller instruction on these early days. The whole cast of the work shows the mind of one who has all his life been accustomed to the higher walks of life in a well-ordered society, where he has respected the authority above him, and required the respect and obedience of his subordinates. If Ptah-hotep conformed his life to his excellent precepts he was a calm, firm, gentle, generous, and refined man, as well as a high officer of the court of Pharaoh.


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SOCIETY IN PTAH-HOTEP'S DAY.

The state of society to which Ptah-hotep introduces us shows us the king as supreme in the land and the source of all honors (§§ 1 and 44); service in the palace is profitable but severely onerous (31); there are well-defined classes, the lord (15, 24), the ruler of a city (30), the great man (7, 27), the teacher (42–44), the scholar, the artist (2), the judge (17), the plaintiff and defendant (17), the police (28), the officer on guard with the countersign (13), the miners of precious stones (2), the farmer with well-marked limits to his property (9), the pilot and sailors (25). There is also the service of the great man where active obedience and faithfulness are required for success (25–27); and there is the service of another great man where rapacity and oppression were the rule (6, 7, 9). But, better than all else, there is the well-ordered household (21), with the father deserving the reverence of his children and receiving it (39, 40, 42, 44), the single, tenderly loved and honored wife (21, 37), the children trained gently, but firmly, in knowledge and obedience (12, 42), the servants well treated, and faithful in adversity (22, 35), the manager of the estate maintained in his authority (36); and in this household loose morals are abhorred as death (18).

In this state law is supreme, and has been maintained for ages (5), authority is respected (10), "to put an obstacle in the way of the laws is to open the way before violence" (5), but the application of the law to the offender is justice (23).

There is the council where the double-minded talk long on both sides of the question in order not to say anything (15), but the wise man, when he speaks, knows "what objections may be made to him," for "to speak in council is an art, and speech is criticised more than all other work; it is contradiction that puts it to the proof" (24).

PTAH-HOTEP'S ETHICS.

Ptah-hotep instructs his son that the safest path is found
by the elevation of mind which attains calmness in the midst of unceasing activity; "Whatever makes souls calm penetrates him who heeds" (1); "he who is master of his own spirit is superior to him whom God has loaded with his gifts;" and so he advocates calmness in a leader (5), in a counsellor (15, 24), in a judge (17), in a man of power (25), in a man in high station (30), when one meets a heated debater (3, 4, 33), or a great man (7), or a man in anger (23), or when one is in trouble (26), wearied beyond endurance (29), under burdensome authority (31).

This advice is the reflex of the Egyptian ideal from the earliest times. Osiris, the god, had come to earth to benefit man by his teachings as to good government, good laws, an upright, kindly life, and had been slain by the god of evil; but rising from the dead, soul and body joined together again for eternity, he has become the unchangeable god of the final judgment of all men. All who died and were pronounced accepted by Osiris were made like him, partook of his nature so fully that they were addressed as Osiris; the deceased and Osiris were one. So deeply had this idea possessed the Egyptians that every statue, however remarkable as a portrait, also bore the calm, impassive front of Osiris, under which plays the suggestion of a kindly smile, telling of a gentle heart, that will not reject the suppliant.

Tiele's summary of this belief is: "A moral life, a life of holiness and beneficence, was conceived of as being a matter of solemn obligation towards the deity himself. To become like god Osiris, a benefactor, a good being, persecuted but justified, judged but pronounced innocent, was looked upon as the ideal of every pious man, and as the condition on which alone eternal life could be obtained and the means by which it could be continued." 10

In accordance with the same ideal are the maxims on the brotherhood of man. Positive injunctions: act as a "steward of the goods belonging to God" for the benefit of others (30); "Give men life in the midst of peace" (6); Love thy

10 Egyptian Rel., p. 230.
people (27); Treat dependents well (22, 35); Return a gentle answer (2, 3, 20, 25); "The gentle man overcomes obstacles" (25); Forget the wrong (29); Be content with what you have (9); Be just (5, 23); Inspire men with confidence in you (9); Be kind to all (17); Be companionable (30); Be cheerful (34); Respect authority (10); Respect knowledge and calm speech (25); Be a good hearer (38–42).

Negative injunctions: Do not intimidate men (6); Do not contemn or ridicule them even when wrong (4, 33); Beware of pride (2), of hardness of heart (30), of oppressing others (6, 9, 31), of bad temper (19, 20), of scandal (23), of libertinism (18), of accepting flattery (14, 16).

Among the purest gems of Ptah-hotep's thoughts are those recognizing the essential manliness of man; "He who is master of his spirit is superior to him whom God has loaded with his gifts" (14); "Treat well thy people as it behooves thee; this is the duty of those whom God has favored" (22); "May the love that thou dost feel pass into the hearts of those that love thee; may thy people become loving and obedient" (27). "If thou art great after having been low," "do not harden thy heart on account of thine elevation; thou hast become only the steward of the goods belonging to God. Do not put behind thee the neighbor who is thine equal; be to him as a companion" (30); "Take care of those who are faithful to thee when thine affairs are depressed." "It is of more importance than" one's "nobility" (35).

Men have always known more than they have practised, but if Ptah-hotep in any measure exemplified his principles, he deserves to be ranked high among the moral teachers of mankind. Whether he exemplified his principles or not, he teaches truths of the noblest morality, truths which are needful among the most advanced nations of the present day.

**PTAH-HOTEP'S CONCEPTION OF GOD.**

I have followed M. Virey in calling Ptah-hotep's deity "God." I do not intend, nor do I believe M. Virey intends,
by the capital letter to be understood as deciding Ptah-hotep's view of the deity beyond his own reiterated statements.

Ptah-hotep is certainly no monotheist in our understanding of that term, for he speaks of the gods (1), he prays to Osiris (1), he also mentions Horus as an example (42), and twice he asserts that a man becomes, or is like, a god (9, 13) by certain courses. But in all the other instances (16 times) he speaks of God in the singular and ascribes to him the attributes which seem necessarily to belong to one only. "God loves that man should hearken; if he does not hearken he is abhorrent to God" (39). All that man has is the gift of God; children (44), means of existence (7), possessions (9, 22), rank (10), all are held at the will of God (6, 7), and man at his highest estate is only the steward of the goods belonging to God (30). God's will toward men is that they should have life with peace (6), he wars against the oppressor, and reduces him to helplessness (6, 10). God loves the man who is obedient (12), who loves his people (22) and seeks their good (6). Ptah-hotep believes in prayer, he prays, and believes that he is answered (1), and he also believes himself "beloved of God" (1). All this is as far removed from a "nature god" as it is from pantheism.

Certainly Ptah-hotep's society, and ethics, and conception of God, have nothing in common with savagery or dim moral perceptions. All oppression and antagonism to law is condemned, and war is not once mentioned.

PTAH-HOTEP AND THE USUAL THEORIES OF DEVELOPMENT.

These views, held and taught before 2000 B.C. by an Egyptian, set before us a far purer system of religious belief and a nobler conception of the Supreme Being than heathen Greece and Rome, many centuries later, ever possessed. That at an age so remote, far antedating the era of Abraham, the conception of God was so full of truth as to his personality, his attributes, his care of men, his exaltation above all nature gods, and that the moral teaching was so elevated, are facts
which directly contradict the assumption of many orthodox teachers of the Bible. It is often assumed and taught that men in these early ages had no such conception of God or of morality as would warrant the revelation of the higher truths of God and of morality. And hence a theory of development in the Old Testament has been assumed by orthodox writers which is as far from the facts as is the antagonistic theory of development assumed by those critics who deny all historical validity to the Old Testament. The inscriptions in the pyramid of Unas, the precepts of Ptah-hotep, and the Book of the Dead, stand as irreversible contradictions of the theories of these antagonists. Men at this early age taught a morality of great purity, and this morality, they affirmed, was the will of their deity, and only by conforming to it could one be well pleasing to God.

Some teachers of the Bible tell us that the morality taught in the Old Testament was on a much lower plane than that of the New. But the highest authoritative Teacher has told us that the very heart of all Old Testament teaching was, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind;" "and thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself." "On these two commandments hangeth the whole law and the prophets." Jesus also condenses the essence of his moral teaching in the injunction, "All things whatsoever ye would that men should do unto you, even so do ye also unto them;" "for this," he asserts, "is the law and the prophets." From the mouth of him who inspired both Testaments we have the assurance that the morality of both Testaments is precisely the same.

All a priori theories of development are frail craft among the reefs of hard fact, and, to avoid shipwreck, the study of the monuments of Egypt and Chaldea is now an indispensable requisite for those who would instruct others about the development of religious thought and morality among men.

THE MAXIMS OF ANI.

In order that a comparison may be made with some of the
later ethical teachings of the Egyptians I have added the translation of the maxims of Ani, as they are rendered in the French version of Chabas, in his periodical, *L' Egyptologie*, 1874–1877. Of the age of these maxims, Chabas says: "It is probably in the last half of the interval of at least six centuries [i.e., from 1300 to 720 B.C.] that our papyrus must be dated. It will be difficult to reach a closer approximation, but it is certain that the greater part of the maxims which this manuscript reproduces belong to a much more ancient teaching." 11

Though these two Egyptian moralists are separated by more than a thousand years there is a striking resemblance in their teachings. Ani is not an imitator of Ptah-hotep. Where the similarities are the most apparent, there are also differences which prove the independence of the later writer. And yet the grand result is the same in both teachings. The morality is true, of a high order, and is referred to God as its source, who will punish all infractions of his will. There is not a word of Ani’s which implies his service of any but the one God; though, when the papyrus containing these maxims was written, Egypt was crowded with temples dedicated to many gods and decorated with the bas-reliefs of many more. Similar strange contradictions, with many other evidences, have led a large number of Egyptologists to the conclusion, that the Egyptian religion can be explained only by a primitive monotheism, which never entirely lost its hold on the minds of men.

The most succinct statement of the Egyptian conception of God and of their worship, which I have seen, is given by Ani: "The God of this world is in light above the firmament, and his emblems are on the earth. It is to them that worship is offered daily" (36).

According to Ani,—

God dwells in light above the firmament (36);
He is the source and giver of life (25, 26, 36);
He hears and answers prayer (11, 61, 62);

11 Part I., p. 12.
He knows the thoughts and acts of men (11, 35);
He punishes the guilty (35, 36, 46).
Hence it is man's duty,—
To give himself wholly to God (46);
To avoid what is abominable to God (36);
To hearken to God (62);
To pray to God (11);
To be grateful to God (26);
To keep God's appointed seasons (2);
To elevate his spirit towards God (5);
To worship in quietness in the sanctuary, for God will hear
though no words are uttered (11): To prepare for death
(15). 12

All this is far removed from a "nature god" or pantheism.
The similarities in thought and expression between these
Egyptian moralists and many passages of the Bible, espe-
cially of the books of Proverbs and Ecclesiastes, cannot fail
to impress themselves on the reader. Ptah-hotep and Ani,
though heathen, are much nearer to the teachings of the
Bible, as to God and morality, than they are to the teachers
of Greece and Rome, or to Confucius or Buddha. And it is
to this general similarity, and not to any accidental similarity
of words, that is due the great interest in these works for
students of the Bible and of the history of man.

I am indebted to my daughter for much work on these
translations, but I alone am responsible for them.

HOWARD OSGOOD.

12 On this most interesting subject I must content myself with referring
the reader to the works of those Egyptologists who have written upon it.
E. de Rougé, Rituel Funéraire, 1860; Conference Sur l. Relig. d. anc.
Égyptiens, 1869; Melanges d'Archéologie, 1873; A. Mariette, Notice d.
principalux Monuments, etc., 1869; F. Chabas, Calendrier des Jours, 1877;
Études sur l'Antiquité Hist., 1873; Grébaut, Hymne a Ammon—Ra, 1874;
Renouf, Hist. of Eg. Religion, 1880; Pierret, Panthéon Égyptien, 1881;
H. Brugsch, Religion u. Mythologie d. alt. Ägypter, 1885; Lieblein, Egypt-
tian Religion, 1884; Maspero, Revue d. l'hist. d. Religions, 1887; Archae-
ology, 1887; Tiele, Hist. of Eg. Religion, 1882, and others.
The Oldest Book in the World.

PREFACE OF MONSIEUR VIREY.

All that is known of the origin and discovery of the Prisse Papyrus was made public long ago by Chabas in "Le Plus Ancien Livre du Monde, Étude sur le Papyrus Prisse," Revue Archéologique, 1858. I do not pretend to do anything more than give a summary of the statement by Chabas.

Prisse, who gave this papyrus to the National Library in Paris and published it in 1847 ("Fac-simile d'un papyrus Égyptien en caractères hiératiques," Paris, Franck), had obtained it from one of the peasants whom he employed on his excavations at Drah-aböI-Neggah, in the necropolis of Thebes. This man pretended to have received the manuscript from a third person, who did not know whence it came; but Prisse suspected that they wished to make him pay for an article which already belonged to him, found among the excavations which were being made at his expense, and that the papyrus must "have come from the tomb of one of the Entews of the eleventh dynasty. The large and solid character of the writing gives the impression of a date earlier, rather than later, than the twelfth dynasty.

But if there is still uncertainty regarding the time when the copy which has come down to us was made, on the other hand, we know exactly to what date we can trace the composition of the text, and we know it from the text itself.

Our first two pages, in which we find some precepts concerning manners and morals, form a treatise which was composed in the beginning of the reign of the king Senofebru (third dynasty) by a man named Kakimna: "At this time the majesty of the king of the south and north, Huni, arrived in port [died]; then arose the majesty of the king of the south and north, Senofebru, a king beneficent over this whole land; then I, Kakimna, was made prefect." The last sixteen pages contain a treatise on morals composed by the prefect Ptah-hotep in the reign of Assa (fifth dynasty): "Precepts of the prefect Ptah-hotep, under the king of the south and north, Assa."
The name of Ptah-hotep, common under the ancient empire, is found also in connection with the name of Assa, where he is called "the favorite of Assa, Ptah-hotep." This Ptah-hotep is perhaps the author of our book, for he boasts of having been "favored by the king among the first of those whose works have made them noble." One passage seems to indicate that he was of the royal race, for he is called, "the son of the king, eldest, legitimate;" however, this last point does not seem at all certain. We might question why the eldest and legitimate son of the king did not reign, if he lived, and Ptah-hotep did not die early, since he was one hundred and ten years old when he wrote his treatise. To admit that he was the son of Assa, and that he died before this king, one must attribute to the latter an extraordinary length of life.

But Professor Maspero has already shown that one must not take literally the titles of "royal mother, royal wife, royal daughter;" and that a woman was a royal wife, for example, by right of birth, before marriage. These names served only to determine the rank which a princess occupied at the court in matters of etiquette and precedence.

If the name of royal wife was only an honorary title, I take this as warrant for supposing that one could be called a son of the king without really being one; and that the title meant "prince;" in this case "son of the king, great, legitimate," was equivalent to "prince of the blood." That this last name could have been given to a person not belonging to the royal family, is not without example in contemporary history, even in the West; there is all the stronger reason therefore that it might happen in the East, where high-sounding epithets accumulate so easily. At the Egyptian court, where the king was the source of all privilege, and all honors came from the king, perhaps all nobility consisted in attaching one's self, at least nominally, to his family, or in drawing near to it. The relatives of the king bore the highest title; but the "royal nurses" themselves, gloried in "the suckling which had mingled their blood with Horus."
Ptah-hotep, at the age of 110, after so many years of service, must have attained the highest dignities, and if the title of prince of the blood appears lofty, I remember that he was first among those whose merit had made them noble. Then enfeebled by old age, forced to give up the work which had made his glory, but unable to resign himself to live uselessly during the remaining days of his life, he resolved to write for younger generations the lessons of wisdom which he himself had received from the ancients, or which long experience had taught him. By a poetic fiction, he addresses himself to Osiris, depicts the miserable state to which old age and infirmities have reduced him, and asks if the god will permit an intelligent being to be condemned to be good for nothing. Osiris replies to his prayer and commands Ptah-hotep to teach the wisdom of the ancients which they learned from the gods.

Then Ptah-hotep begins to "set in order the good word," and sets it in order with a fertility of invention, the cause of which I will soon state. He has chosen his son for hearer; otherwise his doctrine is applicable to all men. After the explanation of his precepts, he returns more directly to his hearer, "If thou dost listen to what I have just told thee, etc.;" and sings the praises of this doctrine. The ma,\(^{18}\) wisdom and knowledge, were acquired by listening with docility, for docility is the best of all. And since these old precepts are good, they must be held, and no one should teach new ideas. Undoubtedly some innovators will make themselves heard by the ignorant crowd (§ 42), and for a time inspire the public with confidence; but their glory will not last as long as they wish. Therefore nothing must be taken away, nothing added, nothing changed of the

\(^{18}\) The ma, upon which Professor Grébaut has made a most interesting and complete study in his lectures at the College of France, includes here what we call "the true, the beautiful, the good;" it is the principle of order and harmony in everything. This explanation, which I give here of the meaning of this passage, is entirely insufficient and the question is very complex; but more careful examination would lead to details which would not be in place here.
established teaching; and if any one feels ideas contrary to these germinating in himself, he must beware of disclosing them.

This horror of new ideas and of innovators is interesting to see in the oldest book in the world; but one must not hastily conclude from this that Ptah-hotep was unfriendly to all kinds of progress. He himself says that "the barriers of art are not closed, no artist having attained that perfection to which he should aspire." Only the teaching of morals has been perfect from the earliest times, because it is of divine origin; therefore it must remain unchanged. But it is not forbidden to comment upon these established precepts; the author considers them a "canvas to be embellished," upon which the masters shall exercise their eloquence; but in order to comment upon them without falsifying their spirit, knowledge is necessary, knowledge acquired by application and docility. Again and again he insists on docility; the docile son who receives the word of his father shall live long for that reason, he shall please his lord and obtain favor of the king; on the contrary, the man without experience, who does not listen to the counsels of wisdom, goes astray and is on the road to ruin. And Ptah-hotep ends by quoting his own example: "I have reached one hundred and ten years of life, blessed by the favor of the king among the first of those who have exalted themselves by their works, doing the pleasure of the king, in an honored place."

As for these precepts, the study of which will be fruitful in its results, I shall not try to sum them up here. The work is so composed that such an attempt would lead me to bring into this introduction almost my entire translation; or else I would be obliged to limit myself to a simple list of titles which would not be interesting and would give the impression that the treatise is dry. On the contrary, it is a collection of counsels which, taken separately, are generally very well drawn up, but which follow one another without much order; when two of them can be connected it is because the author insists upon one idea and returns to it; but it is very
hard to find any trace of method; still less must we look for
the spirit of system, the well-ordered development of a
philosophy, which one could grasp and epitomize. For this
Ptah-hotep does not care; not that his work is slovenly; on
the contrary, the style is very elaborate, sometimes even over-
wrought, and this leads me to speak of the difficulties of
various kinds which embarrass the translator.

The subtlety of the style, which has been considered not
the least of these difficulties, is due principally, I think, to
the Prisse Papyrus having been written in verse; the oldest
book in the world is a work, if not poetic, at least rhythmic.
In this will be found the explanation of constructions which
seem a little strained, for example: "While the father is in
great sorrow, and the mother who bore him, another is hap-
pier than she." This shows us what Ptah-hotep means when
he says that he "set in order the good word." But this
order will aid the translator more than it will embarrass him,
since the discovery by Professor Grébaut of the laws which
regulate the poetic language of the Egyptians enables us to
divide the phrases with certainty.

Another difficulty appears to be more serious; it is due to
the use of a certain number of words whose exact meaning
we do not know. Some of them, undoubtedly fallen into
disuse at an early date, have never until now been met with
in the other texts which we have. We may hope that fresh
publications will bring us new examples of them. The
Ebers' papyrus has given us some archaic words; and archaic
terms may yet be found in the numerous texts of the old
Empire which Professor Maspero has published. Moreover,
in spite of the beauty and the size of the writing, the text is
not always as easy to decipher as one would think at first
sight. There are passages of whose meaning I cannot be
sure, because I have not yet been able to read them in an exact
manner. Sometimes the writing is much abbreviated, which
is very embarrassing in the hieratic. Finally, though the
manuscript is, in general well kept, it is not irreproachable.
Thus, I have noticed evident faults, and I also think I recog-
nize the omission of some words where the phrase seems to have no meaning and where the verse is too short.

In spite of many difficulties, this papyrus is so interesting that at an early date Egyptologists courageously undertook its study. Without pretending to reach by the first step complete and definite results, they could at least grapple with the subject, and it is no mean result to make known little by little, even imperfectly, a document of this value. Though Dr. Heath, who set the example in 1855, did not succeed in making Egyptologists accept his too bold interpretations, Chabas some time after was more successful. I have already spoken of his work published in the *Revue Archéologique*. Under the modest guise of an analysis, he gives a satisfactory translation of the first fourteen lines of the treatise of Ptahhotep and of important passages from the latter part; the rest of the work is simply analyzed. This analysis was very incomplete; and by a partial translation one is liable not to grasp the exact meaning; nevertheless a great advance had been made. In 1869 and 1870, Lauth went farther, and published a complete and coherent translation, accompanied by numerous notes. Such a translation must necessarily be far from perfect; but though one might make a number of criticisms upon this important work, its merit must not therefore be forgotten. It has many times been very useful to me, and I should make a greater point of this here, if I did not have occasion to speak of it constantly in the course of my work. Finally, the translations of Brugsch are very ingenious and interesting, and I shall often quote or discuss them. I had composed this study before the work of Dümichen upon the first two pages of the papyrus appeared: the reading of his translation has not been useless to me, though mine had been finished long before.

Outside of the help furnished by the works of my prede-

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14 My translation of the first two pages was shown to Professor Grébaut in August, 1883. The remainder was sent as a thesis to the École des Hautes Études in April, 1884. Various circumstances have delayed the publication of the work.
cessors, I have already said how much easier my task has been made by putting into practice the teaching of Professor Grébaut. But I wish at the same time to acknowledge what I owe to the masters who have, from the start, directed my studies; to Chabas, who, unhappily prevented by sickness from guiding me in the way which he had pointed out, did not cease to show me by many tokens of good-will how much he was interested in my progress; and to Professor Maspero, who, taking up again the teaching hardly commenced, has taught me to decipher, and helped me with advice and encouragement in the accomplishment of a difficult work on a newly discovered manuscript which I brought from Thebes.

PROFESSOR MASPERO'S PRESENTATION AND COMMENDATION OF THIS WORK TO THE ACADEMY OF INSCRIPTIONS AND BELLES-LETTRES, TAKEN FROM "LES CONTESTES RENDUS DES SÉANCES DE L' ANNÉE," 1887.

"The Egyptian work contained in the Prisse Papyrus," says Professor Maspero, "is partly a treatise on morals, partly a childlike and honest treatise upon civility. We find in it beautiful maxims concerning the respect which the husband owes to his wife, the obedience which the son owes to the father, and, side by side with these, injunctions concerning the necessity of not eating untidily in society, and upon the demeanor which one should strive to observe on meeting an influential person. The very obscure text has been often translated, but none of the translations, neither that of Chabas nor that of Brugsch, is satisfactory. M. Virey devoted six years to the study of this work. I cannot say that he has entirely succeeded in solving all the difficulties, but his translation is consistent throughout and is very superior to any other that has been made up to the present time. It is the best first appearance that any one has made for a long time in the science of Egyptology, and after this we have the right to expect great things of the author. M. Virey has been attached to the mission at Cairo and has brought
back from there important materials, the publication of which he is hastening."

PROFESSOR MASPERO'S CRITICISM OF THE PRISSE PAPYRUS IN HIS "HISTOIRE ANCIENNE DES PEUPLES DE L' ORIENT," 1886, PP. 78-80.

"Another papyrus, presented by Prisse to the National Library of Paris, contains the only complete work which remains to us of this primitive philosophy. It was written, doubtless, under one of the first kings of the twelfth dynasty, and contains the works of two authors, of whom, one lived under the third, the other under the fifth dynasty. It is, therefore, not without reason that it has been called 'The Oldest Book in the World.' Imperfect at the beginning, it contains the close of a treatise on morals composed by a certain Kaqimna in the first part of the reign of the Pharaoh Senofru. There followed a work now lost; one of the ancient owners of the papyrus rubbed it out in order to substitute in its place another work which was never written. The last fifteen pages are filled by a work now celebrated in Egyptology, under the title of 'The Instructions of Ptah-hotep.' This Ptah-hotep was the son of a king of the fifth dynasty. He was, no doubt, an old man when he wrote his book, for he begins by an unflattered picture of old age. As we see, Ptah-hotep took up his pen to show old men how to be useful. He would teach them the wisdom of the ancestors, in order that they might teach it again to the young, and preserve virtue in the world.

"One must not expect to find in this work great profundity of conception. Learned analyses, refined distinctions, metaphysical abstractions, were not fashionable in the time of Ptah-hotep. Speculative ideas were neglected in the interest of positive facts, theory in the interest of practice. Man was studied, his passions, his habits, his temptations, his failures, not in order to construct a new philosophy, but in order to reform what was imperfect in his nature and to point out to the soul the way of a glorious eternity. Thus
Ptah-hotep does not trouble himself with new discoveries and deductions. He gives the reflections and counsels which occurred to him, just as they came, without grouping them, and without drawing any conclusion from the whole.

"Wisdom is useful in order to know the good; he recommends wisdom. Gentleness towards subordinates is necessary to safety; he praises gentleness. Mingled with all are counsels on proper conduct in the various circumstances of life; when one meets an imperious man, goes into the world, marries. A detailed analysis of such a work is impossible; to translate it fully is still more impossible. The nature of the subject, the strangeness of some of the precepts, the style, all tend to bewilder the student and mislead him in his researches. From the most ancient times, morals had been considered a science good and praiseworthy in itself, but so hackneyed that one could freshen it only by form of treatment. Ptah-hotep did not escape the necessities of the subject he chose. Long before him others had spoken the truths to which he aims to give new expression; he must, in order to allure the reader, search for new and spicy modes of expression. He does not fail in this. In some cases his thought is so disguised that the moral point of his sentence escapes us."

P. LE PAGE RENOUF, ESQ., PRESIDENT OF THE SOCIETY OF BIBLICAL ARCHAEOLOGY, LONDON, ON THE PRISSE PAPYRUS, IN HIS HIBBERT LECTURES, 1880, P. 76.

"We are acquainted with several collections of Precepts and Maxims on the conduct of life. Such are the Maxims of Ptah-hotep contained in the Prisse Papyrus, the Instructions of Amenemhat and the Maxims of Ani; and fragments of other important works are preserved in the museums of Paris, Leyden, and St. Petersburg. The most venerable of them is the work of Ptah-hotep, which dates from the age of the Pyramids, and yet appeals to the authority of the ancients. It is undoubtedly, as Chabas called it in the title of the
memorable essay in which its contents were first made known, 'The most Ancient Book of the World.' The manuscript at Paris which contains it was written centuries before the Hebrew lawgiver was born, but the author of the work lived as far back as the reign of King Assa Tatkara of the fifth dynasty. This most precious and venerable relic of antiquity is as yet very imperfectly understood. Its general import is clear enough, and some of the sections are perfectly intelligible; but the philological difficulties with which it abounds will for many years, I fear, resist the efforts of the most accomplished interpreters. These books are very similar in character and tone to the book of Proverbs in our Bible. They inculcate the study of wisdom, the duty to parents and superiors, respect for property, the advantages of charitableness, peaceableness, and content, of liberality, humility, chastity and sobriety, of truthfulness and justice; and they show the wickedness and folly of disobedience, strife, arrogance and pride, of slothfulness, intemperance, unchastity, and other vices. It is only through a lamentable misunderstanding of the text that some scholars have discovered anti-religious, epicurean, or sceptical expressions."

THE BOOK OF KAKIMNA.—A TREATISE ON MANNERS IN THE TIME OF THE KINGS HUNI AND SENOFEPU OF THE THIRD DYNASTY.

I am sure of being respected. A song that is right opens the stronghold of my silence; but the paths to the place of my repose are surrounded by words armed with knives against the intruder, no admittance except to those who come aright.

18 The book is speaking here.

16 In the 145th chapter of the "Book of the Dead," we find the gateways of the field Aanro guarded by gods "armed with knives," and the first gate is called "exterminating lady (?) arranging the words which repulse the rebels;" which reminds us of these "words armed with knives against the Intruder." The deceased or the Horus, who presents himself at each door in succession, must recite a sort of litany in which he explains that he is in order, that he enters by right. When he has discharged this duty, he is acknowledged pure, and the door opens. The substance of our sentence,
If thou sittest down to eat with a number, despise the dishes which thou loveth;¹⁷ it is but a short time to restrain thyself; and voracity is something degrading, for there is bestiality in it [comp. Ptah-hotep, §§ 7, Ani, § 39]. As a glass of water quenches thirst, as a mouthful of vegetables strengthens the heart, as one good takes the place¹⁸ of another good, as a very little takes the place of much, he who is drawn away by his stomach when he is not on the watch is a worthless man. With such people the stomach is master. However, if thou sittest down to eat with a glutton, to keep up with him in eating will lead afar; and if thou drinkest with a great drinker, accept in order to please him. Do not reject the meats, even from a man repugnant to thee; take what he gives thee, and do not leave it; truly that is disagreeable.¹⁹

As for a man lacking good manners, upon whom all that one can say is without effect, who wears a surly face towards the advances of a gracious heart, he is an affliction to his mother and his relatives. All say: "Show thy name, thou whose mouth is silent; speak, be not proud because of thy strength!"

therefore, is this: "I receive kindly those who deserve it; but none must come to disturb wrongfully my repose, which is guarded as well as the field Aanro." This comparison is interesting because it enables us, perhaps, to trace back to the time of Huni and of Senoferu the 145th chapter of the Book of the Dead. It was a little later, under Menkara, that the prince Hartiti-f discovered, it is said, at Hermopolis, the 64th chapter (Book of the Dead, ch. 64, i. 30 & 31).

¹⁷ That is, "at a repast in society do not give rein to your appetite, your greediness."

¹⁸ The text means that for a man who is not a glutton one good thing is as good as another, and that a moderate amount of food repairs one's strength as well as a greater quantity.

¹⁹ Professor Maspero thinks that reference is here made to that rule of politeness which consists in receiving, with at least the appearance of gratitude, the morsels which another guest divides with you as an honor. This custom is still in vogue in the East. If this guest is repugnant, as the text says, it is disgusting, but one must submit to the custom.
The Oldest Book in the World.

Do not harden the hearts of thy children. Instruct those who will be in thy place; but when he does not permit, none know the events which God brings to pass. Let the chief talk to his children, after he has accomplished the human condition;\(^2\) they will gain honor for themselves by increasing in well-doing, starting from that which he has told them.

If all that is written in this book is heeded as I have said it, in order to make progress in the right, they who heed will learn it by heart, they will recite it as it is written; it will do good to their hearts more than all things on this whole earth, in whatever position they may be.

Then at this time the majesty of the king of the South and of the North, Huni, arrived in port [died]; then arose the majesty of the king of the South and of the North, Senoferu, a king beneficent all over this entire land. Then I, Kakimna, was made prefect. It is finished.

THE PRECEPTS OF PTAH-HOTEP.

I.

The Precepts of the Prefect Ptaḥ-Hotep.

Under the majesty of the king of the South and of the North, Assa, living eternally, forever. The prefect Ptaḥ-Hotep says: "O god over the two crocodiles,"\(^1\) my lord, the progress of time brings old age. Decay falls upon man and decline takes the place of novelty.\(^2\) A new misery weighs him down each day; the sight grows dim, the ears become deaf; the powers are constantly failing. The mouth is silent, speech is wanting, the mind flickers, not remembering yesterday. The whole body suffers. That which is good becomes bad, taste departs. Old age makes man miserable in every way; the nose is stopped, breathing no longer from ex-

\(^2\) That is, when he has gained the experience of life.

\(^1\) [The notes on these precepts are those of M. Virey, except the references to the precepts of Ani, which are by the translator.]

This god is Osiris, as is shown by the 43rd invocation in the 24th chapter of the "Book of the Dead." We might question why, among the many names of Osiris, Ptaḥ-Hotep chose this one. But, in an article in the Zeitschrift für Ägyptische Sprache (1868, p. 101), Chabas, studying the steles of Horus on the crocodiles, and observing that this god is called "the one grown old who grows young again in his hour, the old man who becomes a child," recalls our passage in the P∫ase Papyrus, where Ptaḥ-hotep invokes against the evils of old age the aid of the god over the two crocodiles. [On prayer, see Ani, §§ 31, 37, 46, 67, 63.]

\(^2\) Doubtful translation. Literally: "comes upon newness."
haustion. In whatever position, this is a state (?) of . . . . (?) . . . . 3 Who will give me authority to speak 4 that I may tell him the words of those who have heard the counsels of former times? And the counsels of the gods which have been heard, who [will give me authority to tell of them]? Let it be thus; let the evil of the rekhë be driven away; send the double . . . . 5 The majesty of this god says: "Instruct him in the speech of former times. This it is that constitutes the worth of the children of the great. Whatever makes souls calm penetrates him who heeds, and what is thus told will not produce satiety."

II.

The beginning of the arrangement of good words, spoken by the noble lord, the divine father beloved of God, the son of the king, the eldest of his race, 6 the prefect Ptha-hotep, as a means of instructing the ignorant in the knowledge of the choice of good words. There is profit to him who will listen to this; there is loss to him who will transgress them.

He says to his son: "Be not proud because of thy knowledge; converse with the ignorant as with the scholar; for the barriers of art are never closed, no artist ever possessing that perfection to which he should aspire. But wisdom is more difficult to find than the emerald; which is found by slaves 7 among the rocks of pegmatite.

III.

If thou hast to do with a disputer while he is in his heat, and if he is superior to thee in ability, lower the hands, bend the back, do not get into a passion with him. As he will not permit thee to spoil his speech, it is very wrong to interrupt him; that shows thou art not able to be quiet when thou art contradicted. If then thou hast to do with a disputer while he is in his heat, act as one not to be moved. Thou hast the advantage over him, if only in keeping silent, when his speech is bad. "Better is he who refrains," says the audience; and thou art right in the opinion of the great.

IV.

If thou hast to do with a disputer while he is in his heat, do not treat him with contempt, because thou art not of the same opinion. Do not be provoked with him when he is wrong; away with that! He is fighting against his very self; do not ask him to flatter thy views. Do not amuse thyself with the spectacle which thou hast before thee; this is odious, small, and of a contemptible spirit. Struggle against this, as something condemned by the great, when on the point of giving thy views. [Comp. §§ 3, 4, with Maxims of Ani, § 16.]

3 The transcription of this passage is quite uncertain.
4 I suppose the poet here asks of the god inspiration that he may speak with authority and success.
6 I do not understand this word, I cannot even read it; I suppose that Pth-hotep prays Osiris to give him his power or to send him inspiration, but I can only conjecture.
6 Of his lotsa, that is legitimate. I have stated in the introduction how this title must be understood.
7 Literal translation "being found, the latter, by female slaves."
V.

If thou art in the position of leader, to decide the condition of a large number of men, seek the best way, that thine own position may be without reproach. Justice is great, unchangeable and assured; it has not been disturbed since the time of Osiris. To put an obstacle in the way of the laws, is to open the way before violence. Will the low be exalted if the unjust does not succeed to the place of justice, he who says: "I take for myself, according to my will," but does not say: "I take by my authority." The limits of justice are unchangeable; this is a precept which each man receives from his father.

VI.

Do not intimidate men; or God will likewise contend with thee.

If any one wishes to live by that means, he [God] will take the bread out of his mouth; if any one wishes to enrich himself by that means, he [God] says: "I shall take to myself these riches;" if any one wishes to strike down others, he [God] will end by reducing him to impotency. [See Ani, § 36.] That none should intimidate men, this is the will of God. Let one give them life in the midst of peace, and he will obtain as willing gifts [what would have been taken from them by fear].

VII.

If thou art among persons who are sitting down to eat at the house of one greater than thyself, take what he gives thee, 8 bowing low. Look at what is before thee; bowing profoundly. Look at what is before thee; but do not stare at it: do not look at it frequently; he is blameworthy who breaks this rule. Do not speak to him [the great man] more than he asks, for one does not know what might displease him. Speak when he invites thee to do so, and thy word will please.

As to the great man who has behind him the means of existence, his line of conduct is as he wishes. He does what pleases himself; if he forms the intention of resting, his body realizes it. The great man in stretching out his hand, does that to which other men cannot attain. But as the ["eating of bread"] means of existence are under the will of God, none can revolt against that. [See Ani, § 26.]

VIII.

If thou art one of those who carry messages from one great man to another, keep exactly to that he has enjoined upon thee; do his bidding as he has told thee. Beware of altering in speaking the repulsive things which one great man addresses to another; he who distorts the fidelity of his message by repeating only what is pleasing in the words of any man, great or small, is a detestable being.

8 "When thou art sitting at meat at the house of a person greater than thou, look at what is before thee." This passage is found in the Proverbs of Solomon, chap. xxiii., "When thou sittest to eat with a ruler, Consider diligently him that (marg. what) is before thee." It is a true trans. lation. The Hebrews knew then, if not the whole of the maxims of Psh-hotep, at least several of them which had passed into proverbs.
IX.

If thou art a farmer, reap in the field which the great God has given thee. [See Ani, § 26.] But do not surfeit thy mouth among thy neighbors; it would be even better to make thyself feared by the possessor. [Comp. Ani, §§ 23, 48.] As for him who, master of his own actions, all powerful, seizes like a crocodile in the midst even of the keepers, his children are by reason of that an object of cursing, of contempt, and of hatred; while his father is deep in trouble, and the mother who bore him, another is more happy than she. But a man becomes a god when he is chief of a tribe who has confidence in following him.

X.

If thou humblest thyself in obeying a superior, thy conduct is wholly good before God. Knowing who ought to obey and who to command, do not lift up thy heart against this one. As thou knowest that in him is authority, be respectful towards him as is his right. Fortune comes only in accordance with his will, and has no law but his caprice; as for the one who..., God who made him superior, turns away from him, and he is overthrown. [See Ani, § 36.]

XI.

Be active, during the time of thy existence, in doing more than is commanded. Do no wrong in the time of activity; he is blameworthy who wastes his hour. Do not lose the daily opportunity for the increase of that which thy house possesses. Activity produces riches, and riches do not last when it [activity] slackens. [See Ani, §§ 21, 53.]

XII.

If thou art a wise man, train a son who will be well pleasing to God. If he adjusts his course to thy way and occupies himself in thine affairs as he should, do him all the good thou canst; he is thy son, a being attached to thee, that thy body has begotten. Do not separate thy heart from him.... (But) if he behaves badly and transgresses thy will, if he rejects every word, if his mouth moves in wicked speech, strike him upon his mouth, such as it is. Give a straightforward order to those who act badly, to him who is restless at heart; and he will not deviate from the direction, and there will be no opposition to interrupt thy course. [See Ani, § 20.]

XIII.

If thou art on guard, stand erect or remain sitting rather than to walk. Lay down this rule to thyself from the first moment: "Never go away, even when thy weariness makes itself felt." Beware of him who enters announc-

9 "It is one making himself to be God." This translation is uncertain.

10 I have not risked a translation of this passage, because a study of the rhythm causes me to suppose that some words have been omitted. If I am not mistaken, half of a verse is wanting.

11 "Thy will" or "thy counsels."

12 We probably have here a sort of pun, and that the meaning is "strike right," "strike directly" (on his mouth or his face). The explanation which follows seems to say that with unruly subordinates one must give without hesitation precise and positive orders.
ing that what he asks is secret; the countersign allows no such consideration, and all argument to the contrary is to be rejected. He is a god who penetrates into a place where there is no concession even to privileged persons.

XIV.

If thou livest with people who show an extreme love for thee: "Breath of my heart, breath of my heart, where there is no remedy! What is said in thy heart, may it be realized by spontaneous growth! Sovereign Master, I follow thine advice. Thou art right without speaking. Thy body is full of strength, thy face is above thy neighbors."\(^{18}\) If, then, thou art accustomed to this excess of flattery and it becomes an obstacle to thy desires, then thy feeling is to obey thy passions. But he who, after his own caprice, his soul is... his body is... While he who is master of his spirit is superior to him whom God has loaded with his gifts [see Ani, § 5], the man who obeys his passion is in subjection to his wife (?).

XV.

Declare thy line of conduct without reserve;\(^{14}\) give thine advice in the council of thy lord; there are people who take all sides when they speak, so that, by not replying, they may not grieve the one who has made a statement, reasoning thus: "It is for the great to recognize the error; and when he shall raise his voice to combat the error, he will have nothing to reply, since I have spoken to say nothing."

XVI.

If thou hast the position of leader prosecuting plans according to thy will,\(^{16}\) do the best things which after days will remember; so that the word which multiplies flatteries, excites pride, and produces vanity, shall not succeed with thee.

XVII.

If thou hast the position of umpire, listen to the discourse of the petitioner. Do not ill-treat him; that would discourage him. Do not say to him: "Thou hast already told that." Indulgence will encourage him to do that for which he has come. As for ill-using the complainant because he tells what happened at the moment when this wrong was done, instead of complaining of the wrong itself, do not allow that! The way to obtain a true explanation is to listen with kindness.

XVIII.

If thou desiriest to inspire respect in the house which thou dost enter, for instance in the house of a superior, of a friend, or of a person of consideration, wherever thou dost enter, beware of approaching the wife, for there is no good in what one does there. There is no prudence in indulging in that, and thousands of men are lost for the enjoyment of a moment short as

\(^{18}\) That is "thou art superior to those who surround thee."

\(^{14}\) Or dissimulation.

\(^{16}\) That is "having power to execute that which thou decidest."
a dream, while they gain death, in knowing her. It is a base disposition, that of the man who excites himself to such a deed; if he is moved to execute it, his mind abandons him. For he who lacks repugnance for this,—there is no reasoning with him. [See Ani, §§ 8, 55.]

XIX.

If thou desirest that thy conduct be good and kept from all evil, beware of all fits of bad temper. This is a sad malady which leads to discord, and there is no more life at all for the one who falls into it. For it brings quarrels between fathers and mothers, as between brothers and sisters; it makes the wife and the husband abhor each other, it contains all wickedness, it encloses all injuries. When a man takes justice for his rule, walks in her ways, and dwells with her, there is no room left for bad temper.

XX.

Do not give way to temper on account of what occurs around thee; do not scold ["translation uncertain," Virey] except about thine (own) affairs. Do not be in a bad temper towards thy neighbors; a compliment to him who gives offence is better than rudeness. It is wrong for a man to get in a passion with neighbors so that he knows not how to manage his words. Where there is only a little difficulty he creates an affliction for himself at a time when he should be cool. [See Ani, §§ 34, 49, 58.]

XXI.

If thou art wise, take care of thy house; love thy wife purely. Fill her stomach, clothe her back; these are the cares (to give) to her body. Caress her, fulfil her desire, during the time of thine existence; it is a kindness which honors its master. Be not brutal; consideration will lead her better than force; her . . . . this is her breath, her sim, her gaze. This establishes her in thy house; if thou repellest her, it is an abyss. Open thine arms to her for her arms; call her, show her thy love. [See Ani, § 54.]

XXII.

Treat well thy people, as it behooves thee; this is the duty of those whom God has favored. [See Ani, § 26.] If any one neglects to treat his people well, it is said: "He is a person . . . ." As none may know the events that may come to pass to-morrow, he is a wise person in whose house the people are well treated. When devotion is to be shown it is the people themselves who say: "Come, come," if good treatment has not left the place; if it has left, the people are wanting.

XXIII.

Do not repeat an excess of language; do not hear it; it is something which has escaped a heated soul. [See Ani, §§ 28, 31.] If it is repeated,

16 Uncertain word. The reading even is doubtful.
17 I give with reserve the explanation of these lines, in which are two words, which I do not surely understand, and one which I only know in an uncertain way.
18 Perhaps "an execrable (?) person" in opposition to the words ending the preceding sentence.
look, without hearing it, towards the ground; say nothing about it. Make him who talks with thee, who provokes to injustice, know what is right; do what is wise, let it prevail. Do justice to the abhorred of the law by unveiling it.

XXIV.

If thou art a wise man, sitting in the council of thy lord, set thy thoughts toward that which is wise. Keep silence, rather than pour out thy words. When thou speakest, know what objections may be made to thee. To speak in council is an art, and speech is criticised more than all other work; it is contradiction which puts it to the proof. [See Ani, § 59.]

XXV.

If thou art powerful, pay respect to knowledge and calm speech. Command only to direct; to be absolute is to enter into evil. Let not thy heart exalt itself, nor let it be cast down. Make thine orders heard, and make thy replies understood; but speak without heat; let thy face be stern. As for the vivacity of a warm heart, temper it; the gentle man overcomes obstacles. [See Ani, §§ 34, 58.] The man who hurries all day long has not one good moment; but he who amuses himself all day long does not retain his house. Aim at the right point as (do) the pilots; while one sits down, another works, and applies himself to obeying the command.

XXVI.

Do not disturb a great man; do not distract the attention of the busy man. His care is to accomplish his task, and he strips his body for love of the work. Love for the work they do brings men near to God. Therefore compose thy face, even in the midst of trouble, so that peace may be with thee, when agitation is with.... These are the people who succeed where they apply themselves.

XXVII.

Teach men to render homage to the great man. If thou gatherest the harvest for him among men, return it in its entirety to its master, by whom thou dost exist. (But) the gift of affection is worth more than the offerings themselves with which thy back is covered. For what he receives from thee brings life to thy house, not to speak of the consideration which thou enjoyest, which thou wouldest preserve; it is by this means that he holds out a beneficent hand, and that with thee possession is added to possession. May the love that thou dost feel pass into the hearts of those who love thee; may the people become loving and obedient.

XXVIII.

If thou art a son of one of the guard having in charge the public peace, execute thy orders without question and speak firmly. Do not replace what the instructor has said by that which thou believest to be his intention; the great use words as it pleases them. Thy part is to transmit, rather than to comment.

XXIX.

If thou art wearied beyond bearing, if thou art tormented by some one
who is in his right, put away from thee his visage, and think no more of it when he has ceased speaking to thee. [See Ani, § 16.]

XXX.

If thou art great after having been low, if thou art rich after having been straitened, when thou art at the head of the city, learn not to take advantage of thy having risen to the first rank; do not harden thy heart on account of thine elevation; thou hast become only the steward of the goods belonging to God. Do not put behind thee the neighbor who is thine equal; be to him as a companion. [See Ani, § 38.]

XXXI.

Bow thy back before thy superior. Thou art attached to the house of the king; thy house is solid in its fortune, and thy profits are as is proper. Yet a man is annoyed by having an authority above himself, and he passes his life in being wearied by it.

Although this does not harm thy...“Do not pillage the house of thy neighbors, do not take by force the goods which are beside thee.” Do not exclaim against that which thou hearest, and do not be humiliated by it. A man must reflect, when he is fettered by it, that the annoyance of authority is also felt by his neighbor.

XXXII.

[“I am not sure of the general meaning of this precept.” Virey.]

XXXIII.

If thou aimest at having polished manners, do not question him whom thou meetest. Converse with him alone so as not to annoy him. Do not dispute with him until thou hast allowed him time to impregnate his mind with the subject of the conversation. If he displays his ignorance, and if he gives thee an opportunity to put him to shame, rather than that, treat him with consideration; do not keep pushing him on, do not...his words; do not reply in a crushing manner; do not finish him; do not worry his life out; for fear that he for his part will not recover, and that men will leave thee to the benefit of thy conversation. [See Ani, § 16.]

XXXIV.

Let thy face be bright during all the time of thy life. When one of those who entered carrying his products 18 comes out of the place of toll with a drawn face, that shows that his stomach is empty, and that the authorities are an abhorrence to him. May that never happen to thee; it is....

XXXV.

Take care of those who are faithful to thee, when thine affairs are depressed. Thy merit then is worth more than those who have done thee honor. His...this is what a man possesses absolutely. It is of more importance than his nobility; this is something which passes from one to another. The

18 Word for word, “the bread of division,” probably the portion which each was obliged to remit as tax upon their harvest.
merit of the son of a man is advantageous to him, and that which he is really
is worth more than the remembrance of what his father has been.

XXXVI.

Distinguish the overseer, who directs, from the laborer; for manual labor
is degrading, and inaction is honorable. If one is not at all in the evil way:
what then takes place is the want of submission to (?) authority. [See Ani,
§ § 17, 60.]

XXXVII.

If thou takest a wife, do not.... May she be more content than any other
of herfellow-citizens. She will be doubly bound if the chain is sweet to her.
Do not repulse her; grant that which pleases her; it is when contented that
she will value thy guidance. [See Ani, § 54.]

XXXVIII.

If thou heedest these things which I have told thee, thy wisdom will be
ever increasing. Although they are the means for reaching the ma, and it
is that which makes them precious, their memory would pass away from the
mouth of man, but thanks to the beauty of their arrangement in verse, all
these words shall be borne without alteration eternally upon this earth.
They will make a canvas to be embellished; of it the great shall talk to in-
struct man. After having listened to it, he who has hearkened well to the
word will become a master because he has hearkened to it.

May he succeed in gaining the highest rank, an excellent and enduring
place, with no more to desire forever. By knowledge his course is assured,
and by that he is happy upon the earth. The wise man, then, is satiated with
his knowledge; he is great because of his merit. His tongue is at one with
his mind; right are his lips when he speaks, his eyes when he looks, his
ears when he hears. The advantage of his son is to do what is right without
mistake.

XXXIX.

To hearken is of benefit, then, to the son of him who has hearkened.
A docile hearer is created because I have hearkened. It is well when he
hearkens, well when he speaks; whoever has hearkened profits, and it is
profitable to hearken to him who has hearkened. To hearken is worth more
than all else, for it produces love, the possession doubly blessed. The son
who receives the word of his father shall live long on account of it. God
loves that man should hearken; if he does not hearken, he is abhorrent to
God. [See Ani, § 62.] The heart is his master when he hearkens or when
he does not hearken; but in hearkening, his heart becomes a beneficent
master to man. Hearkening to the word, he loves what he hears, and to do
what is said is pleasant. When a son hearkens to his father, it is a double
joy to both, for when these things are told to him, the son is gentle towards
his master. Hearkening to him who has hearkened while this was told him,

80 The author has finished the explanation of the wisdom of the ancients. He now speaks in
his own name, in praise of the doctrine which he has repeated.
81 The ma is "the true, the beautiful, the good."
he engraves on his heart what is approved by his father, and thus the memory of it is preserved in the mouth of the living, who are upon the earth.

XL.

When a son receives the word of his father, there is no error in all his plans. So instruct thy son that he shall be a teachable man whose wisdom shall be pleasant to the great. Let him direct his mouth according to that which has been told him; in the teachableness of a son is seen his wisdom. His conduct is perfect, while error carries away him who will not be taught; to-morrow knowledge shall uphold him, while the ignorant will be crushed.

XLI.

As for the man without experience, who hearkens not, he does nothing at all. He sees knowledge in ignorance, profit in injury; he commits all sorts of errors, seizing always whatever is the opposite of praiseworthy. Thus he lives only on the perishable. His food is the evil word that charms him. He lives every day on what the great know to be perishable; fleeting what is best for him, because of the many errors which are before him each day.

XLII.

A son who hearkens is like a follower of Horus; he is happy, because he has hearkened. He grows, he attains consideration; he teaches the same lesson to his children. Let no man make changes in the precepts of his father; let the same precepts be his lessons to his children. "Surely," his children will say to him, "doing thy word works wonders."

Foster the *ma* [see § 38], the life of thy children. If teachers follow what is not right, surely the people who do not understand them will say the same, and, this repeated to the teachable, they will follow what is told. Then all the world will esteem them [these masters], and they will inspire the people with trust; but their glory does not last as long as they wish. Do not, then, take away one word from the established teaching, do not add one. [Comp. Deut. iv. 2; xii. 32.] Do not put one thing in the place of another; beware of uttering the ideas which germinate in thyself, but teach according to the words of the wise. Hearken, if thou wouldst abide in the mouth of those who will hearken to thy words, when thou hast risen to the position of teacher, that thy words may be on our lips....and that there may be a chair for thine arguments.

XLIII.

May thy thoughts overflow, thy mouth be restrained; and thou shalt argue with the great. Agree with the way of thy master; make him say, "This is my son," so that those who hear this shall say, "Praise of him who has begotten this one." Consider when thou speakest; say only perfect things; and may the great who hear them say: "The issue of his lips is twice blessed."

XLIV.

Do that which thy master tells thee. Doubly good is the precept of our father, from whose flesh we come forth. May what he tells us, be in our hearts; do for him more than he has said and satisfy him wholly. Surely a
good son is one of the gifts of God [see Ani, § 25], a son doing better than he has been told. For his master he does ["the ma," see § 38] what is right, throwing his whole heart into his ways.

By following these lessons I secure that thy body shall be in health, that the king shall be satisfied with thee in all things, and that thou shalt gain years of life without failures.

They have gained for me upon earth one hundred and ten years of life, with the gift of the favor of the king, among the first of those whose works have made them noble, doing the pleasure of the king in an honored place.

It is finished, from its beginning to its end, according to what is found in writing.

MAXIMS OF THE SCRIBE ANI. DATE, 1000-720 B. C.

I.—ON MARRIAGE.

Marry a young wife; thy son will do the same on account of thine example. At thy birth thou wast a child, who, they predicted, would become a distinguished man; one whom his relatives in great numbers received at his birth with acclamation.

II.—ON RELIGION.

Celebrate the feast of God; keep his appointed seasons. Having once performed your religious duty will condemn you [if you do not continue].

III.—ON STUDY.

If any come to seek thine advice, let it cause thee to turn with diligence to thy books.

IV.—ON THE EMPLOYMENT OF TIME.

The propitious hour having passed by, we do our best to find another.

V.—THE PRIVILEGES OF A CONTEMPLATIVE LIFE.

There is chant, prostration, and burning of incense in every act of his who elevates his spirits; there is acceptable adoration in all that concerns him. Whoever conducts himself thus, God will place his name above that of the sensual man. [See Ptah-hotep, § 14.]

VI.—RESPECT DUE TO THE HOUSE OF ANOTHER.

Do not enter the house of another; if he brings thee in, it is an honor to thee.

VII.—ON DISCRETION.

Do not watch from thy house the actions of others. If thine eye has seen and thou hast kept silence, do not let it be told outside by another, lest it be for thee a crime worthy of death that the matter has not been revealed.

VIII.—ON GAY WOMEN.

Beware of the foreign woman, unknown in her town; do not associate with her; she is like all her fellows; have no intercourse with her. She is a deep gulf, and her subterfuges are unknown. A woman whose husband is far away, sends thee letters, calls thee each day; if there are no witnesses, she stands up, throwing her snares, and this may become a crime worthy of
death when it is noised abroad, even if she has not in reality accomplished her design. Men commit all sorts of crime for this very thing. [See Ptah-hotep, § 18.]

IX.—NEITHER ENTER NOR LEAVE FIRST.

Do not enter or leave first, so that thy name be not tarnished.

X.—ON POLITESNESS.

If there are deaf people, do not multiply words; it is better for thee to be silent; say nothing.

XI.—ON THE MANNER OF PRAYING.

In the sanctuary of God, that which he abhors is noisy demonstrations. Pray humbly with a loving heart, all of whose words are said in secret. He will protect thee in thine affairs; he will listen to thy speech; he will accept thine offerings.

[Compare Papyrus of Boulak, 1.17. “The sanctuary of God—noise is his abhorrence. Pray for thyself with a heart of love, whose words remain hidden, that he may give thee thy needs, hear and receive thy words.” Quoted by Erman, Egyptian, p. 370.]

XII.—ON FUNERAL CEREMONIES.

Give the water of the funeral sacrifice to thy father and thy mother, who lie in the tomb; make sure of the water of the divine oblations; in other words, offer that which is acceptable. Do not neglect to do it, even when thou art away from home. Thy son will do for thee in the same manner.

XIII.—ON ABSTAINING FROM INTOXICATING LIQUORS.

Do not warm thyself in the house where intoxicating liquors are drunk; avoid all words that reveal the action of thy neighbor, that leave thy lips and thou art not aware of having spoken them.

Thou fallest from drunkenness, thy limbs are broken; no one holds out the hand to thee. Thy companions drink: they rise up and say: Take thyself off, thou drunken man! Men come to seek thee in order to talk about thy business, and they find thee lying on the ground, like a little child.

XIV.—ON ASSOCIATES.

Do not go out of thy house. Whom thou knowest not, provoke not. Know well where thou dost place thine affections.

XV.—ON THE LAST END.

Remember that which has been. Place before thee, as a path to be followed, an equitable line of conduct. Thou shalt be considered as preparing for thyself a suitable burial in the valley of the dead, which to-morrow shall hide thy body. Let this fact be before thee in all the matters that thou hast to decide. Thou shalt sleep in their midst, as well as the very old men. There is no remission, even for him who behaves well; he meets the same fate. So to you shall come thy messenger of death to carry thee away; yes, he is now ready. Speeches will be of no avail, for he comes, he stands ready. Do not say: I am a young child, I, whom thou bearest away. Thou knowest
not how thou shalt die. Death comes, it walks before the nurseling, before the child at its mother's breast, as before him who has reached old age.

Lo! I have told thee useful things, consider them well in thy heart before thou dost fulfill them; thou shalt find happiness in them, and all evil shall be averted from thee.

XVI.—ON PRUDENT IN SPEECH.

Avoid all occasions of wounding by thy words; do not make thyself feared. In the heart of man garrulity is condemnable; it will not be a resource in days to come. Hold thyself aloof from the wrangler; do not make a companion of him. [See Ptah-hotep, §§ 3, 4, 29, 33.]

XVII.—ON MANAGEMENT OF BUSINESS.

Have one manager only, judicious, truthful, and observe what he does; let thy justice bear him up above his balance-sheet and his sums total. Let thy hand care for him who is in thy dwelling and who has the charge of thine affairs. [See Ptah-hotep, § 36.]

XVIII.—ON PRUDENT IN MANAGEMENT OF POSSESSIONS.

Let not thy hand be lavish toward the man unknown to thee; he comes for thy ruin; if thou puttest thy possessions at the disposal of thy children, the tempter will come to thee again. Lay up treasure for thyself, and all thy relatives will pay marked attention to thee.

XIX.—ON GENEROSITY.

He who gives little, having received much; it is as if he should requite a serious injury.

XX.—ON DISCIPLINE.

The discipline of a house is its life; make use of reprimand, and it shall be well with thee. [See Ptah-hotep, § 12.]

XXI.—ON IDLENESS.

Have thine eyes open for fear of ending in beggary; there is no man who, having often given himself up to idleness, has been rewarded by fortune. Be a man of business. [See Ptah-hotep, §§ 11, 26.]

XXII.—PRUDENT IN RELATIONS WITH THE SLAVES OF OTHERS.

Do not associate familiarly with the slave of another, whether belonging to a man of no reputation, to a notorious scoundrel, or to a great lord. One does not always know about it. He rises up; he gives information concerning the theft by his slave accustomed to obedience, pursuing him in order to have him punished for the theft of that which was in his house. Thou art tormented and thou sayest: What have I done? Thy companions say: He is an obstinate man! This is to teach thee the means by which a man seeks to govern his house well on the earth.

XXIII.—ON CONTENTMENT WITH ONE'S LOT.

Thou hast made for thyself a watered enclosure; thou hast surrounded with hedges thy tilled ground; thou hast planted sycamores in a well-marked circle all about thine abode; thou fillest thy hands with all the flowers that
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thine eye beholds. Yet one wearies of all that. Happy is he who does not abandon it. Do not rest thy contentment upon the things of others; guard thyself well from that. Work for thyself; do not count upon the wealth of others; it will not enter thy dwelling-place. [Comp. Ptah-hotep, § 9.]

XXIV.—ON LIVING APART.

Build thyself a house; thou shalt succeed in suppressing the hatreds that come from a dwelling in common. Do not say, "There is a house which comes from my father and mother, whose names are in the abode of the dead," for that leads to a division with thy brother, and thy portion will be the outbuildings.

XXV.—PATERNAL LOVE.

Thy God has granted thee children, [see Ptah-hotep, § 44] and thy father knows them; so, whoever suffers with hunger satisfies it in his house: I am his sure shelter and his raiment.

XXVI.—ON REMEMBRANCE OF GOD.

Be not without heart; it is thy God who gives life. [See Ptah-hotep, §§ 7, 9, 22.]

XXVII.—ON POLITENESS.

Do not remain sitting while another is standing up, if he is older than thou, or if he is thy superior by the office he holds.

XXVIII.—ON THE DANGER OF SPEAKING EVIL.

He who speaks evil does not reap good. [See Ptah-hotep, § 23.]

XXIX.—ON THE RIGHT WAY.

Always follow the right way; thou wilt make easy the way of return. Who stands stock still though called every day!

XXX.—ON REASONING.

Each profession leads on its obligation; the reasoning of the wife leads on her husband; and a man reasons according to his profession.

XXXI.—ON DISCRETION.

Do not call every comer bad; may the words spoken in the day of your gossiping be buried in thy dwelling; thou wilt find that in the day of thy sorrow. When trouble comes thou wilt be able to bear it. The licentious man is repellent. The pleasure of the licentious is an insanity to his brothers. Thy relatives may gaily praise thee, but they weep in their hearts. If thou art good, eyes are upon thee; whether with a multitude or alone thou wilt find thy circle, and thy wishes will be done. [See Ptah-hotep, § 23.]

XXXII.—ON THE DIGNITY OF KNOWLEDGE.

If thou hast made thyself proficient in the Scriptures, if thou hast penetrated into literature, let them be within thy heart, and all thy right wishes shall come to pass. To whatever profession the scribe may belong he always reasons from literature. There is no son for the chief of the treasury, no heir for the aged chancellor. The scribe whose hand is expert in his profession

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does not transmit this profession to his children: their advancement is by their own deeds, their greatness the result of their own care.

XXXIII.—ON THE NECESSITY OF DISCRETION.

Do not let thy thought be known to the man of bad tongue, to give him occasion to abuse with his mouth. The revelation from thy mouth circulates quickly. In repeating it thou dost create hatred. The fall of man is by his tongue; beware of bringing ruin upon thyself.

XXXIV.—ON GENTLENESS IN CONVERSATION.

The breast of man is the hall of the public store-house filled with all kinds of motives. Oh! choose what is good, as good words, and imprison the evil in thy bosom. The brutal reply is like the raising of the stick. Oh! speak with the gentleness of friendship, and thou wilt preserve a lasting peace. [See Ptah-hotep, §§ 30, 25.]

XXXV.—GOD REVEALS TREASON.

The traitor accuses falsely, afterwards God makes known the truth, and death comes and carries him away.

XXXVI.—ON REVERENCE OF GOD.

In making oblations to thy God, beware of what he abominates. Do not discuss his mysteries. Do not have a haughty bearing when he comes forth. Do not approach familiarly the man who carries him.

Do not add to the ritual commands; it is forbidden to give more than is consecrated. Let thine eye consider the acts of his anger! [See Ptah-hotep, § 6.]

Thou shalt make adorations in his name. It is he who gives spirit to myriads of aptitudes, who is the maker of him who becomes great. [See Ptah-hotep, § 10.]

The God of this world is the light above the firmament, and his emblems are on the earth; it is to them that worship is rendered daily. The divine rising the [sunrise] causes all vegetation to flourish so as to multiply food.

XXXVII.—ON MATERNAL LOVE.

It is I who have given thee thy mother, but it is she who bore thee, and in bearing thee she suffered great pain, and she did not throw it off upon me. Thou wast born after the months of maternity and she has carried thee as a real yoke, her breast in thy mouth for three years. Thou didst grow in strength, and no disgust for thine untidiness led her to say: Oh! what shall I do? Thou wast sent to school; while they taught thee in the writings, she was busy each day near thy teacher, bringing thee bread and drink from her house.

Thou didst reach adult age; thou didst marry, thou didst form a household. Never lose sight of the pain which thou hast cost thy mother, nor of all the wholesome care that she has taken of thee. Do not give her cause to complain of thee, for fear that she will raise her hands towards God and he will hear her complaint.
XXXVIII.—THE MAN NEITHER POOR NOR RICH.

Do not eat bread in the presence of an assistant, who is standing, without extending thy hand towards the bread for him. Has one never seen that men may be neither rich nor poor? But bread remains with him who acts as a brother. The rich who has his day, and who sometimes lasts for a while, becomes in time a miserable groom. [See Ptah-hotep, § 30.]

XXXIX.—ON GLUTTONY.

Be not gluttonous to fill thy stomach so that thou canst no longer stand straight. When thou camest into existence I gave thee another happiness.

XL.—CHANGING CLIMATES.

The course of the waters changes from time to time and takes a different direction. The great oceans become arid lands. The shores become deep abysses.

XLI.—NOTHING UNCHANGEABLE.

There is no man who is unchangeable in anything; such is the reply of death. Have an eye to thy life.

XLII.—ON THE RETURNING ROAD.

Labyrinth or precipice, it is not of good augury to tempt it first. Tread the homeward path.

XLIII.—THE WELCOME OF STRANGERS.

Be not rude to the man who is in thy house; he is thy guest. He has given thee an account of what he is. Thou repliest to the salutation of his mouth; thou art acquainted with the business which brings him. Let a repast be offered.

XLIV.—ON THE FINAL ACCOUNT.

He who detests negligence comes, not having been called.

XLV.—THE GOOD WALKER.

Not hurrying himself to come, the good walker comes.

XLVI.—TO KEEP ONE'S SELF FOR GOD.

Give thyself to God, keep thyself continually for God, and may to-morrow be like to-day! Let thine eye consider the deeds of God; it is he who smites the smitten. [See Ptah-hotep, § 6.]

XLVII.—AVOID OCCASIONS OF DISTURBANCE.

Enter not a crowd if thou art there in the beginnings of a quarrel.

XLVIII.—BEWARE OF ENCROACHING ON THE RIGHTS OF OTHERS.

Do not encroach upon any other property; be sure respecting the ancient titles of the owners, lest thou be taken to court before the judges, after legal inquiry has been made. [Comp. Ptah-hotep, § 9.]

XLIX.—KEEP THE PEACE.

Keep thyself aloof from quarrelsome people, and let thy heart be silent in the midst of an armed force. The first comers are not taken into court; the unsuccessful peacemakers are notstrangled. [See Ptah-hotep, § 20.]
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VI. — WONDERS OF FRIENDSHIP.

Pleasant are the deeds of a friend; he is cleared from his faults, kept from all breach [of friendship].

VII. — THE HEAD OF THE HERD IS ONLY AN ANIMAL LIKE THE OTHERS.

The ox, the head of the herd, leads to the fields, and he himself is an animal like the others.

VIII. — THE SPIRITS ARE INVOKED WHEN HARVESTS ARE LOST.

When the crops of the country are lost the spirits are earnestly invoked.

VIII. — ON LAZINESS.

He who has a heart without energy brings woe into his house, for he believes everything absolutely. [See Ptah-hotep, §§ 11, 26.]

VII. — WORTH OF THE PRUDENT WIFE.

Be not rough to thy wife in her house, when thou knowest that it is in good order. Do not say to her: Where is that? Bring it to us! For she has put it in its proper place. For thine eye has seen her and thou hast kept silence while recognizing her worth. Full of joy put her hand in thine. [See Ptah-hotep, §§ 21, 37.] There are still many people who know not how a man brings misfortune into his house, and, in fact, do not know how to manage it.

All management of housekeeping lies in the calmness of the man.

IX. — ON LIBERTINISM.

Do not follow women, let them not capture thy heart. [See Ptah-hotep, § 18.]

X. — A GENTLE REPLY APPEASES ANGER.

Do not reply to an angry master; behave so as to hold thyself aloof. Speak gently when he has spoken brutally; that is the remedy which will calm his heart.

XI. — REPLY OF THE OLD MAN.

Let the reply of any old man carrying his staff repress thy boldness, lest thou expose thyself to indignation by thy words.

XII. — ON CONCILIATORY SPEECH.

Do not change opinion in thine own favor; after an hour of malice, there is an entire change in the favor one has enjoyed; conciliating words are for the best. Hearts are disposed to welcome them. [See Ptah-hotep, §§ 20, 25.]

XIII. — ON SILENCE.

Try to be silent. [See Ptah-hotep, § 24.]

XIV. — HUMANITY TOWARDS THE MANAGER.

Restrain him who acts as steward, as manager in thy house. Do not let him turn a deaf ear towards thee; let him share in all that happens in thy house. Do not send him away to be a beggar. Speak honorably to him as long as he behaves himself on earth without reproach in that which he does. Surely, without bread, having no food, his life would be a matter of charity.
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He found thy work to do; driven out he is thrown back upon the mercy of thy goodness. [See Ptah-hotep, § 35.]

LXI.—ENTRANCE AND DEPARTURE DIVERSE.

Thou dost enter a city with acclamations; thou leavest it and savest thyself only by the strength of thine arms.

THE DIALOGUE.—FIRST REPLY OF THE SCRIBE KHONSHOTEP.

The scribe Khonshotep replied to his father, the scribe Ani: That is too much for me! for I have been taught by thee; in other words, I have fulfilled thine own decisions. All men pull the hair of the son who comes to take his father’s place. Art thou a man of this kind, or a man with elevated tastes, all of whose words are chosen? A son has poor judgment who says: All is determined by the Book of the Doctrine. Kind words are for the best; hearts are inclined to welcome them; hearts are joyful. Do not then multiply thy good counsels. They will refer all care to thee. The Book of the Doctrine is always on the tongue of the young man who has not enjoyed superior teaching.

FIRST REPLY OF THE SCRIBE ANI.

Do not let these quibbles delude thy heart; beware of using them in thy prayers to God. They break in the heart. I have already given thee my decisions upon them. Are they not authoritative, these words of mine, by which, thou sayest, thou dost wish to govern thyself?

LXII.

The bull grows old, the victim of the slaughter house does not know how to leave the soil where he tramples under foot his food; his breeding has made him quiet, he is what the herdsman has made him. The terrible lion, though he remains ferocious, goes farther in obedience than the poor ass.

The horse goes under his yoke, and, obeying it, goes on his way.

The dog, oh! he hears the word; he follows his master.

The she-camel carries burdens. Had not her mother carried them?

The goose falls with the multitude of birds that followed her and is smothered in the snare.

The negro is taught to speak the language of the Egyptians, of the Syrians, and of all foreign countries.

As I have told thee I have done in all my offices; be docile, and thou shalt learn the way to do it thyself.

SECOND REPLY OF THE SCRIBE KHONSHOTEP.

And the scribe Khonshotep replied to his father, the scribe Ani: Do not tell over thy merits: I am troubled by thy deeds. Man does not desert his way by listening and replying properly. Man is God’s second, and he is bound to listen. [See Ptah-hotep, § 39.]

The man is under him who replies to him. When two men do not know one another, their words are amiss, like those of him who does not know his teacher.
I have become a man with a heart made to command; and all the vexatious oppositions which thou hast spoken are at an end. Do not raise a great cry about them as though it concerned some affair of thine ancestors. What I say to God, what thou hast made me swear, put it aside.

The scribe Ani replied to his son, the scribe Khonshotep: O give up these noisy discourses.

LXIII.

Broken wood, left in the field, which shadow and sun have touched, the workman gathers; he straightens it, he makes out of it the chief's whip. Hard wood serves to make delicate furniture.

O heart ignoring judgment! Hast thou made vows or hast thou fallen away? Lo! they cry alike; the wise man with the powerful hand and the young child still on its mother's bosom. Lo! he says, as soon as he can speak, Give me food!
ARTICLE V.

THE ESCHATOLOGY OF THE NEW ENGLAND DIVINES.

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IV.

We have hitherto considered the great writers of New England down to Hopkins severally. We have traced the operations of their minds under the influence of the new ideas which had begun to germinate and grow, but had attained no ripe and perfect result. It will be better from this point on to consider the development of their ideas with less reference to individual peculiarities, and mark how they advanced, substantially in entire agreement, to meet an attack from without upon this portion of their cherished faith. Till now they had opposed individual errorists, and often found them among their own proper leaders. Now a movement was initiated from without, was soon organized into a new denomination, the Universalist, and hence had its defined line of attack, and could be better estimated and more effectively opposed. The corporate character of the attacking force gave unity and solidity to the defence. We may therefore treat less individually the replies made by men who speak now more as members of one host opposing another. In one respect this controversy is less interesting than one could wish. It is too involved with other controversies to possess the piquant interest derived from concentrated attention to one great theme. But history follows the actual course of affairs, and derives her true attractiveness not
from the development of some ideal plan, but from the sense of faithfulness to facts which in the providence of God are designed to teach us some form of eternal truth. If then it is impossible wholly to distinguish the Universalist from the Unitarian Controversy, the affinity of Universalism with that feeble apprehension of human guilt which is characteristic of Unitarianism, will do something to put the nature of the doctrines opposed by the New England divines in clearer light. Let us turn then to

VI. THE UNIVERSALIST CONTROVERSY.

The first Universalist of America in the denominational sense of that term, was the Rev. John Murray, who, born in 1741, came to this country in 1770. As a theologian, he has no just claim to an independent consideration, since he derived his ideas from James Relly, of England, and remained a consistent Rellyan so long as he lived. We put first, therefore, the views of Relly.

I. JAMES RELLY.

Mr. Relly's views were set forth by himself in a book entitled "Union." The occasion of the studies which led to the discovery and promulgation of the doctrine of Union, is said to have been the recurrence to Relly's mind of a question which he found himself unable to answer, viz., "Wherein is the justice and equity of one man's suffering death, yea, even the torments of Hell, for another?" The

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1 For an account of Mr. Murray see Eddy's "Universalism in America," a book to which I shall have frequent occasion to refer, and which is specially valuable for many extracts from books now exceedingly difficult to obtain.

5 The edition before us is an American reprint of the original. The title runs as follows: Union; or, a Treatise of the Consanguinity and Affinity between Christ and his Church. By James Relly. For as the Body is one, and hath many Members, and all Members of that one Body, being many, are one Body, so also is Christ. 1 Cor. xii. 12. Boston: Printed by EDES & SON for Benjamin Larkin at Shakespeare's Head, No. 46, Cornhill, Boston. (No date.)

8 Ibid., p. xii.
answer was supplied by the idea of Union. We do not find this idea formally presented or philosophically deduced. Indeed, Relly was not the man either to perceive the propriety of this, or to perform it with success. His thought is, however, perfectly plain. He sets out from the doctrine of "the fall of Adam, and of the world in him." The union between Adam and his offspring was such "that his sin was their sin, and his ruin their ruin; whilst they, included in him, were in passivity, and he the active consciousness of the whole." "In like manner, Christ's righteousness is upon all his seed; by his single act, before they had any capacity of obeying after the similitude of his obedience, or of assenting to what he did or suffered. This manifests such a union to him, such an inclusion of the whole seed in him, as renders his condition theirs in every state which he passes through. Insomuch that his righteousness, with all the blessings and fruits thereof, is theirs, before they have known it, believed it, or ever were conscious of existence. Thus by the obedience of one, are many made righteous."

This is the doctrine of salvation en masse in its extremest form. All men are saved simply because they are men, and possess all the holiness of Christ, and that without regard to faith or character. It is also a system of complete antinomianism. Relly is perfectly aware of this, and in his book teaches it all with the utmost frankness. The word believing or faith, as applied to the attitude of the Christian towards the gospel, always means regarding it as true; and


*Ibid.,* pp. 26, 27. Relly's scheme is not properly a scheme of universal salvation, inasmuch as it provides only for the salvation of all men, leaving that of other spirits uncertain. It may be that only men are thus united to Christ. That Relly believed that there were lost spirits is evident from page 110, where he speaks of devils. Will they always remain devils? So far as we have seen, Relly does not answer this question.


See pp. 67, 72, 78, 90, 159, *et al.*
by the gospel he means principally the doctrine of Union. Evangelical faith he entirely rejects, with opprobrious comparisons. "Union with Christ before faith is true," he says, inasmuch "as the gospel is true before our believing."9 "But if it is not true until our believing and by means thereof, then doth believing make that a truth which was not a truth, and faith creates its own object, and then embraces it. This looks like the heathen idolatry, first making their gods, and then trusting in them."10 "Where the all-sufficiency of the sacrifice of Jesus to put away sin, and that without any act of ours either mental or external, is denied, it amounts to what the Scriptures call a crucifying of the Son of God afresh, and putting him to an open shame!"11 His indifference to character is as openly confessed. The Old Testament saints "were not the [good] men they are represented to be, their conduct and behavior considered, . . . but were so in Christ."12 His readers are actually urged, if in distress over sin and seeking repentance, not to strive for it, since Christ cried mightily unto God, "and," he says, "gives you this repentance"13 (italics Kelly's). And in complete accord with this he rejects with expressions of contempt the doctrine of conversion and all its corollaries.14

It can scarcely be expected that such a doctrine should be supported by any arguments worthy of our consideration. They are, in fact, a tissue of absurdity and folly. Yet they had their influence, and gained a following, and our fathers were compelled to rebut them. We must, therefore, briefly review them. There seem to be the following positive proofs:—

1. The first is that this Union is necessary to the harmony of the divine perfections.

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9Ibid., p. 67.
10Ibid., p. 70.
11Ibid., p. 71.
12Ibid., pp. 127, 128.
13Ibid., p. 120.
14Ibid., pp. 134, 135.
Without Union it is impossible to maintain the truth that every man shall die for his own sin. "Such a union or relation between Christ and his church as gives him the right of redemption and brings him under that character which is obnoxious to punishment, is absolutely necessary that his suffering for sin might accord with the declarations and demands of truth."  

It is contrary, again, to justice to afflict the innocent. Hence there must be such a union as makes us suffer in his person, or else Christ's sufferings are unjust. It is also contrary to love. The argument here is mixed.

2. The second proof is from the Scriptures. Relly first presents a number of texts of Scripture, similar to these: "We are members of his body, of his flesh, and of his bones," (sic) Eph. v. 30; "That they may be one, even as we are one," John xvii. 22; together with many which do not seem to have the slightest natural connection with the topic, as e. g., "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself," 2 Cor. v. 9.

3. While explaining the nature of this union, Relly advances other arguments for it, some of which are quite fantastical, as e. g., one from an analogy between Christ and his church, and Aaron and his garments. "But," he says, "as all who profess Jesus Christ understand not the Scriptures, nor the power of God, it is probable that this method may be ob-

18Ibid., pp. 6, 7.
16Ibid., p. 9.

We add the entire list of proof-texts cited on pp. 13-18. Ps. cxxxix. 16; Eph. v. 30; 1 Cor. xii. 26, 12, 27; Col. i. 18; Eph. i. 22, 23; Col. ii. 10; Rom. xii. 5; Eph. ii. 16; v. 3, 32; Heb. ii. 11; Judges xvii. 22, 23; Jer. xviii. 4; Isa. lxvi. 7, 8; Col. ii. 11, 12; Gal. ii. 20; Ps. xlix. 5; 1 Pet. ii. 24; Rom. vi. 6; Col. iii. 3; Rom. vii. 4; vi. 8, 11; Isa. xxvi. 9; Hos. vi. 2; 1 Pet. i. 3; iii. 21; Col. i. 21, 22; 2 Cor. v. 9; Rom. iv. 25; Eph. ii. 6, 5; Col. ii. 13; Eph. i. 3, 4; 1 John iii. 2; iv. 17; 2 Tim. i. 9; Eph. i. 6; Isa. xliv. 17; xxiv. 25; Jer. xxxiii. 16; xxiii. 6; 1 Cor. i. 2, 30; Matt. i. 23. We have preserved Relly's order, for we suppose it to have had an argumentative force in his mind.
jected unto, and the matter treated by many as fables of
allegory." 18

4. The vine and its branches is adduced; also
5. Membership of Christ's one body; and
6. The similitude of a building.

After these positive arguments come answers to objections.
The first of these, to the objection that this doctrine tends to
licentiousness (in modern English, license) and that the doc-
trine of rewards and punishments is overthrown, and man
left with nothing to stimulate him to virtue; leaves the great
point presented in the first part of the objection unanswered,
or rather makes Relly's antinomianism clearer than ever.
"But such an obedience [excited by fear,] is far from being
compensate for the despight [sic] done thereby to the Spirit
of grace, and dishonor to the crucified one." 19

But not to delay longer upon this work, we will close our
view of it with two extracts which equally show its substan-
tial disregard of fairness in interpretation, and of facts:—

Unto the right understanding of the Scriptures it is necessary to know
that they consist of two parts, letter and spirit, or law and gospel. Now
the letter or law killeth, but the spirit or the gospel giveth life. And as this
is useful to be known, so is it also, that we should be able to distinguish one
from the other; else how doth it appear that we rightly divide the word of
life? If the gospel be considered as . . . glad tidings to mankind . . . a fallen
creature . . . what can be called good tidings unto a creature in this condition?
Surely nothing short of that which tells him all is given, and that freely,
without condition on his part because he can perform none.20

All the warnings of the gospel are thus relegated to the
domain of the law, and disposed of. Again:—

O what grace is this! that we, helpless worms, whose every word, work,
and thought, is unholy, yea, in whom according to the strongest testimony

18 Ibid., p. 37. Similar exegesis was characteristic of Murray. (See Eddy,
Vol. i. p. 156.)

19 Ibid., p. 79. This passage is also interesting on account of the words
next following those quoted above, which show that even Relly could not
free his mind of the idea of retribution and of the propriety of it. He con-
tinues: "They shall sooner or later know [this]: when all their works shall
be burnt up, and they shall suffer loss."

20 Ibid., pp. 81, 82.
of our senses and reason there is [sic] yet found the motions, life, and love of sin, should have a right to reckon ourselves dead unto sin, dead unto what we feel the life of, dead unto what we yet feel the love of, dead unto what is yet stronger than we, . . . . what an amazing reckoning is this! 81

Murray always preached upon the basis of this theory. A sketch of his views was given by Hosea Ballou 2d in the Universalist Quarterly, January, 1848. We quote the following summary:—

A few are elected to obtain a knowledge of the truth in this life, and these go into paradise immediately at death. But the rest, who die in unbelief, depart into darkness, where they will remain under terrible apprehensions of God’s wrath until they are enlightened. Their sufferings are neither penal nor disciplinary, but simply the effect of unbelief. Some will believe and be delivered from their darkness in the intermediate state. At the general judgment, such as have not been previously brought into the truth will “come forth to the resurrection of damnation;” and, through ignorance of God’s purpose, they will “call on the rocks and mountains to fall on them, etc.” . . . . Then the Judge will make the final separation, dividing the “sheep” or universal human nature, “from the goats,” which are the fallen angels, and send the latter away “into everlasting fire.”

We will introduce at this point a man who remained in the orthodox ministry all his life, but who appears before us in a posthumous volume in the light of a Universalist, and one much influenced, if not determined in his position, by the views of Relly. An actual historical link between the two men cannot be established. But inasmuch as Mr. Relly’s views were well known in America through Mr. Murray, and our author especially claims to have read all the writers upon the subject, we shall credit Relly with an influence over him, though the disciple was in this case greater than his master. We refer to the Rev. Joseph Huntington, D. D., of Coventry, Connecticut, whose work appeared in 1796. 82

II. JOSEPH HUNTINGTON.

Huntington’s position in early life was that of Arminian-
ism, but he was subsequently led to adopt Calvinism. His modifications of this system were only those necessary to introduce the doctrine of Universalism. He clung close to the old theories of the atonement, refusing to follow the lead of the younger Edwards and others into certain modifications now known as the "New England theory." His statements as to total depravity are also quite Calvinistic. But he had been led by a gradual process to adopt the view that the promises of the gospel were meant to assure us of the salvation of every man, that this was the significance of the "good news," and that salvation would be conferred immediately upon death, without any period of punishment, or even of such darkness and suffering as Murray taught.

Huntington opens his discussion with the statement of an antithesis which he conceives to run through the entire Scriptures. He says:—

The two great doctrines we are taught to believe are, first, What is just and right for God to do with us, considered in our own personal character and desert. This I shall call the pure voice of justice to man, without regard to an atonement or a mediator. Secondly, What God will in fact do with mankind, as united to a mediator, and one with him by divine constitution, in a federal sense: Or how in very deed, God hath promised to deal with man, in that union with the second Adam: What his condition shall certainly be in this life and the life to come. This I call pure gospel; or tidings from God, which never could have been known but by his own revelation.

Justice, Huntington says, demands the eternal punishment of every sinner, and this is threatened in the law. He does not pretend that the word \( \text{aiμων} \) signifies anything but eternal in the proper sense of that word. He says:—

All the learned know that this word, in the Greek, signifies an age, a long period, or interminable duration, according as the connected sense requires. This word with all its repetitions sometimes signifies no more than a long, limited time; ages of ages; and sometimes endless duration, when applied to the existence of Jehovah. But there is not the least need of any criticism on this word, or any other single word or phrase in the Bible. There are express propositions and assertions enough in the word

\[23\] Calvinism Improved, p. 94 ff.
\[24\] Ibid., p. 144.
of God to exclude any possible termination of the misery of the damned, as well as to assure us in the plainest manner that mankind shall be damned.\textsuperscript{28}

At first mankind supposed that this threatened punishment would be actually inflicted upon them in person. But little by little the gospel was introduced into the world, by which we have learned that the punishment will not be inflicted upon us men, but will be borne only by our substitute, the Saviour. Thus there run through the Bible two distinct lines of statement, the voice of threatening, which speaks as justice demands, and the voice of mercy, which corresponds to what God actually has in store for the race. In Huntington's own words:

I readily grant, if this distinction, which I would everywhere keep in view, between the voice of justice and that of mercy, the display of law and that of gospel, running through the whole word of God, is without foundation, my whole argument falls to the ground. So does the whole of divine revelation, for aught I can possibly discern after a most careful inquiry for many years. And (with awful reverence would I speak it) I am not able, without this distinction, to vindicate the holy Bible from many more flat contradictions than any other book I have ever read. But this distinction is the peculiar glory and mystery of divine revelation.\textsuperscript{27}

In explaining how this salvation is effected, Huntington begins with the doctrine of election. This he holds with true Calvinistic rigor, and founds upon it the foreknowledge of God. The divine election embraces the salvation of all men. "Whenever election...doth distinguish one person, or one community or description of persons from another, it never hath the least regard to anything beyond the grave: excepting a difference in degree of felicity." As to eternity, "God has one elect head and no more; and one elect body and no more. The elect head is Ben-Adam, the Son of Man, in equal connection with all human nature. The elect body is all human nature."\textsuperscript{28} Hence, whatever differences there are between men as to the time in which they

\textsuperscript{28}Ibid., p. 47.
\textsuperscript{27}Ibid., p. 191.
\textsuperscript{28}Ibid., p. 81.
learn of their redemption, all are redeemed in Christ. "The divine purpose alike secures all men in Christ alone; in his union with and covenant for human nature, as a covenant for the people, and God's salvation to the ends of the earth; and by the exertion of his office of priest, prophet, and king, in equal extent with each other. In this way, I say, alike secures every part of human nature from any pain or sorrow in the world to come, and alike secures real happiness and glory to every one in that proportion of grace which infinite wisdom and goodness hath appointed."  

So much for election. But the foundation of the election is in the atonement. Christ is strictly a substitute for us, all the modifications of Edwards being rejected. "The true doctrine of the atonement is in very deed this. A direct, true, and proper setting all our guilt to the account of Christ, as our federal head and sponsor, and a like placing his obedience unto death to our account."  

Hence as the atonement was made for all men, their guilt is removed by it, and "by a true and proper imputation" its benefits are immediately communicated to the race. Huntington goes so far as to answer expressly the arguments which New England men were beginning to use, founded upon the idea that personal guilt and righteousness cannot in the nature of things be transferred. This is possible because property can be transferred, and all "men are God's property, absolutely and wholly so; and of consequence [!] all their doings are equally his property." Through their "union with Christ" the character of men becomes the character of Christ when he is to be punished for them, and then his obedience becomes their obedience, thus giving them salvation.  

This is the Rellyan idea, and it is often expressed in phrases strikingly like Relly's.

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See, for example, pp. 55, 130, 133, 165, 183.
In conformity with these ideas faith is represented, in complete harmony with Relly, as consisting in believing that the declarations of the gospel are true. "All who hear the gospel are commanded to believe it; . . . their believing it does not make the foundation of their faith and salvation more true than it was before; but their faith is built on previous truth."\textsuperscript{35} In Relly's words he says,\textsuperscript{36} "Certainly, repentance, as an exercise in the human soul, does not create its own object, or lay its own foundation, any more than faith does, or hope, or joy, or any grace whatever." And then he goes on to say:—

The foundation of God hath the seal, not of alterations in creatures, but of his own eternal decree, and his knowledge of our salvation founded thereon. Let the mind of man, at present, be in what state it may, "nevertheless the foundation of God standeth sure, having this seal, the Lord knoweth them that are his."

If there could be any doubt, after these passages as to our author's meaning, it would be entirely removed by the two paragraphs immediately following that last quoted. They are:—

When all men are commanded everywhere to repent, no doubt saving, evangelical repentance is the thing commanded, and this we know is the exercise of a new heart, and implies union with Christ by regeneration, or a new creation in him. The very command implies that this is made sure, and all the benefits connected with it, as what Christ had laid a foundation for. The doctrine preached is only a piece of good news, founded in truth and certainty, as all other gospel doctrines are. The doctrine is an object of faith, as all other gospel doctrines are. It has a reasonable duty connected with it; which is common to all gospel doctrines.

When the doctrine of repentance is preached for the remission of sins, this remission is always considered as sure in Christ. Repentance as a fit temper of mind to receive it and enjoy the benefit, is also engaged by him who orders the doctrine to be preached. Christ considers all nations of the earth, and every human creature as reconciled to God by his blood, and God to them. What remains in the preaching of the gospel, is that they be brought to the knowledge, sense, and enjoyment of it, that it may have proper influence on their hearts.

\textsuperscript{35}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 55.
\textsuperscript{36}\textit{Ibid.}, p. 129.
The subsidiary arguments brought we cannot dwell upon. They are derived from the nature of prayer, in which we pray for things we cannot expect, unless all men are to be saved. 37 The sentiments of mankind, 38 the form of baptism, 39 and the attributes of God 40 are all mentioned, as well as several other arguments. We pass to his decided rejection of Restorationism. 41 After describing the theory, and mentioning the argument that it seems necessary that there should be some suffering in the world to come “to purge, humble, and subdue some sinners, and make them fit for a pure and spotless heaven,” he proceeds to refute the idea. “All want purgation at the moment of death as really as any one.” “A special work of Christ there certainly must be in death; or never one of the mere human kind can get to heaven.... We are very plainly taught in the word of God that every soul goes immediately after death into an eternal, fixed state.” He mentions Enoch and Elijah, Lazarus and Paul, and other scriptural examples, and then adds:—

The utmost torment for a long period, even for ages of ages, could have no more effect in humbling sinners of the human than of the angelic nature. The devils are no better for their long-continued anguish and pain. Afflictions in this world do not make sinners any better; but are invariably only an occasion of their growing worse and worse, if the special, almighty energy of the Divine Spirit does not attend them. There is not the least intimation of the operation of the Spirit of God, or any means of grace in hell.... God has power enough to change the nature of all the devils there; but he has not told us he ever will do it, and we know of no saviour provided for them, or that ever will be.

We make room for only one more feature of the work, which is necessary, however, for a full understanding of the method in which Huntington would reconcile his doctrine with the words of Scripture. He repeatedly says that there is no statement in Scripture that any soul has actually been

37 Ibid., pp. 158, 200.
38 Ibid., p. 187.
39 Ibid., p. 254.
40 Ibid., p. 263.
41 Ibid., pp. 202–208.
lost. To remove the objection that would be derived from Matt. xxv. 46, he adopts the following interpretation:

In their Surety, Vicar, or Substitute, i.e., in Christ, "the head of every man," they go away into everlasting punishment, in a true gospel sense. In him they suffer infinite punishment, i.e., he suffers for them. The sufferings of Christ are eternal sufferings, just in the same way of reasoning that they are infinite. It is only by personal union with Deity that either term will bear."

The final scene of judgment is thus explained:

At the great and solemn day, characters shall be separated one from another, as a shepherd divideth the sheep from the goats. God will show infinite approbation to the character of his own Son, the Son of man, as federal head in union with his redeemed creatures, placing it at his right hand; a phrase denoting approbation and honor. And he will manifest infinite wrath, indignation and vengeance against the real character of man, placing it at his left hand; which denotes the utmost detestation and abhorrence. God, never will hate anything in man but his bad character. In Christ he has no bad character, but one infinitely good. And God will bid all that sustain it, welcome to all the joys and glories of heaven.

In a similar way Judas is said not to have gone to hell.

We may stop in our view of Rellyanism with these representatives. We come to an altogether different style of Universalism in the next writer whom we shall consider, who with an Arminian theology united the theory of Restorationism. We mean

III. ELHANAN WINCHESTER.

Mr. Winchester was originally a Baptist, and after several changes of view settled down in the type of theology we are about to set forth. He is the next great leader among the Universalists after Murray, and his views came to prevail over those of his predecessor "except in the localities where Mr. Murray was personally laboring."

Winchester founded his proof of Universalism upon orthodox premises. His statements as to the ruined condition of man without a Redeemer are as satisfactory as those of his

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42 Ibid., p. 165.
43 Ibid., p. 167.
44 Ibid., p. 280.
45 Eddy, p. 381.
opponents. His Dialogues on Restoration relate his conversion in the following language: 'I was brought to resign myself into the hands of God, and thus I expressed myself: 'Lord, here I am, a poor helpless sinner; I resign myself into thine hands; take me and deal with me just as thou pleasest; I know thou canst do me no injustice.'" The absolute need of repentance to forgiveness was thus a foundation stone of his system. None could be forgiven who did not repent. But the fundamental idea is that all will finally repent, some before death, in which case they will be received immediately to glory, others during the intermediate state before the Judgment, but finally, under the long and serious discipline of the "aonian" punishment, all who may have remained incorrigible by the means that have been used for their recovery before.

In the Dialogues we have an account of the "First Principles upon which the Doctrine of the Final and Universal Restoration is founded." They are: (1) "God is the universal and only creator of all." (2) "The universal benevolence of the Deity, or the love of God to his creatures." (3) "Christ died for all." (4) "The unchangeableness of God." (5) "The immutability of God's counsels." (6) "God hath given all things into the hand of Christ, who hath declared that it is the Father's will that of all that he gave him, he should lose nothing." There is also an extended Scripture proof in the "Lectures on the Prophecies." Indeed, it should be said that Winchester's great reliance in the conduct of his discussion is the interpretation, however mistaken, of Scripture.

46 The Universal Restoration exhibited in Four Dialogues between a Minister and his Friend, etc. Litchfield, 1795. (Reprint.)
47 Ibid., p. 112.
48 Ibid., p. 95 ff.
49 The title of this book is: A Course of Lectures on the Prophecies that remain to be fulfilled. The edition before us is that printed in Walpole, 1800. The principal texts employed are: The last two chapters of Revelation; Acts ii. 21; Gen. iii. 15; Heb. ii. 14, 15; 1 John iii. 8; Gen. xii. 1-3, etc. Passages extending the mercy of God beyond his wrath, Ex. xx. 5, 6, etc.; Ps. xxx. 5; Phil. ii. 7-11; Rom. viii. 19-25; Eph. i. 10; Col. i. 20; Phil. ii. 9.
We now take up certain points of detail, and first, the intermediate state. It is Winchester’s chief argument for a state of conscious existence after death that otherwise there would be no opportunity for a change in the moral condition of men, and hence the plan of God to save all men would be lost. He goes on to make among others the following remarks:—

If no possible change can take place after death, neither infants nor idiots can ever be happy, because they die without any ideas of God, Christ, or salvation, and indeed really without the knowledge of anything, or the habit or practice of goodness or virtue, or commission of any actual sin. The great, good, and pious Dr. Watts was so puzzled by this dilemma that he concluded that infants could not be saved, because they died without knowing anything of God, or the plan of salvation by Jesus Christ, and without ever practicing virtue or goodness....As for their being condemned to suffer the torments of hell to all eternity, he could not endure the idea of that...... therefore his great benevolence led him to conclude that all who died in infancy (except the infants of believers,......) would be annihilated.

It is thus evident that Winchester considered certain ideas that have been current in our own day. His thought was not perfectly clear, for upon another page he says that the standard of judgment will be “the light, knowledge, abilities, opportunities, etc., with which they are favored,” and makes it evident that he distinctly includes those who live under different dispensations by remarking on the following page, that the judgment will be determined by the “different dispensations under which men lived,” in immediate connection with mention of Greeks, the inhabitants of Tyre and Sidon, etc. But in this passage “ideas of God, Christ, salvation,” etc., are necessary elements of the case. And in the very passage quoted, by ellipsis the strange thought may be brought out that “neither infants nor idiots can ever be happy because they die without....commission of any actual sin!”

The argument for an opportunity for change in the intermediate state is also conducted in connection with the now

80 Lectures, II., p. 68 f.
81 Ibid., p. 57.
famous passage, 1 Pet. iii. 18–20. Winchester believes that "the soul of Christ as certainly went to hell, as he afterwards ascended to heaven." The object of this was not "to suffer," but it was a necessary part of the process of Christ; was to fulfill Scripture; was the progress of a mighty warrior; but its main purpose was that he might preach to the spirits in prison. Our author has already shown, as he thinks, that the preaching was not done by Noah, or in his time. He continues:—

But if the question be asked, What did Jesus Christ the anointed Saviour preach, or proclaim to them? I answer, He proclaimed the gospel; of this we may be assured, for nothing can be more absurd than the idea that the merciful Redeemer went into the prison to proclaim condemnation and endless misery to them......It would have been unworthy of his character to have descended into the lowest parts of the earth to increase the misery of the sufferers.

Some reasons for this distinguishing act of mercy are added by the writer. (1) The immense and inconceivable numbers that were destroyed by the flood, whom Winchester calculates to have been, at the rate of multiplication previously maintained, 17,179,869,184, "which is considerably more than eighteen times the supposed number of the present inhabitants of the globe." (2) They had sinned much longer than any others ever shall, and had doubtless acquired a hardness and obduracy beyond any of the human race, and were therefore fit subjects for our Saviour to try his mercy. (3) Their having been so long lying in painful imprisonment.

Hence Winchester concludes that "the Lord Jesus still continues to restore and redeem lost souls out of their state of sin and misery in the same manner as he did the inhabitants of the old world." As a specimen of the style of reasoning upon which he depended, I quote the following:—

I confess, respecting this last question, I have had great satisfaction from the testimony of a very particular friend of mine, and one of the best men that I am acquainted with, as far as I can judge. He was sick of a confirmed consumption, and in his own apprehension, and to the view of all

52 Ibid., p. 331 ff.
53 Ibid., p. 77 ff.
around him, died and lay in that situation forty-one hours, and when he appeared to begin again to live, he found himself in his coffin, and the people assembled to his funeral. During the time of his absence, he beheld most wonderful things, and especially the restoration of a number of lost souls. 64

Winchester realizes that the day of judgment may seem superfluous upon his scheme, and is at some pains to overcome this difficulty. He says 65 that it is necessary (1) to put an end to the triumph of vice over virtue; (2) to take off the vail or mask, and show everything as it really is without disguise; (3) to reprove the wicked, and set their sins in order before their eyes; (4) to set forth the holiness, righteousness, and other perfections of the Deity, and the amazing hatefulness of sin, and its just desert; (5) to form the beginning of a course of correction which is to issue in the good of the criminals.

He justifies the belief that the punishment of the ages after the judgment will issue in the repentance of all souls upon the following grounds: "Punishment to a certain degree inflames and enrages in a most amazing manner; but continued longer and heavier, produces a contrary effect—softens, humbles, and subdues... Some sins are so daring and presumptuous as to provoke God to threaten that they shall not be purged away in this life; and perhaps their malignancy may be so great that nothing that can be used here is able to subdue them.... Thus punishments are designed for the humbling of the proud: but if they fail of answering that purpose as administered in the present state, they will be continued and increased in future periods to such a degree as shall bring all down in due time." 66

The Dialogues are "chiefly designed fully to state and fairly to answer the most common objections that are brought against" the doctrine of universal salvation. We may profitably notice a few of these. The objection from the word "everlasting," employed in the Scriptures of future

64 Ibid., p. 381.
65 Ibid., p. 38 f.
punishment, is thought to be removed by showing that it is very often used of things which are not strictly without end. The force of the argument may be fairly stated in the form that because everlasting does not always mean strictly endless, therefore one can never prove that it does in any disputed case. No ponderous discussion of derivations is attempted, but the writer evidently leans to the idea that the proper meaning of αἰων is age. "What must be the meaning of the word in many places and what may be the meaning in all, is the true sense of the same."\(^5\)

This objection has its greatest force in connection with the passage Matt. xxv. 46. Winchester presents it in its full force, when he says: "Now, can you show me any passage of Scripture where the same word is applied to two different things, whose existence is the same, or the time of their continuance not alike?\(^6\) In reply, he quotes Heb. iii. 6: "He stood and measured the earth: he beheld and drove asunder the nations; and the everlasting mountains were scattered, the perpetual hills did bow: his ways are everlasting." And he goes on to say: "The question is, Are the mountains or the hills eternal in the same sense in which the ways of God are?...Thus, no solid argument can be drawn from the application of the same word to different things to prove that they shall be equal in their continuance, unless their nature be the same."

The objection from the tendency of character to permanence, he does not answer very pertinently. It involves, he thinks, the existence of two eternal principles, good and evil, a pagan doctrine which in Christianity we have learned to discard. This answer he derives from the "Everlasting Gospel" of Sievolfk.\(^7\)

But the final stage of New England Universalism was not reached in the writings of Winchester. It remained for

\(^5\)Ibid., p. 10.  
\(^6\)Ibid., p. 19.  
\(^7\)See Eddy, Vol. i. p. 219.
another writer to change the prevailing form of doctrine from the Trinitarian basis upon which it had hitherto rested, to the Unitarian. This was the work of

IV. HOSEA BALLOU.

The book in which the revolutionary change wrought by Ballou was effected, was his treatise on the atonement. We shall restrict ourselves at this time to a sketch of this work.⁶⁰

Ballou's decisive, and among the Universalists, epoch-making work, sought to go to the foundation of the subject. Its title intimates as much as this, for though it was intended as a means of propagating the Universalist faith, and had its sufficient raison d'être therein, it dealt professedly with the atonement. It purposed to root out all the old theories and doctrines which were the foundation of the Orthodox scheme, and thus lead to the positions where Universalism was the only consistent conclusion. It is a system of doctrine culminating in Universalism. It is divided into three parts which deal respectively with sin, atonement, and the consequences of atonement. In general, the argument is straightforward, does not intentionally beg the question or misrepresent opponents, and seeks to remove objections before they shall occur, rather than answer them when they are forced upon the writer. Still, the limitations of Mr. Ballou's mind in the department of metaphysical and exact thinking are often very manifest.

The definition of sin with which he begins is this: "Sin is the violation of a law which exists in the mind, which law is the imperfect knowledge men have of moral good."⁶¹ The "legislature" which prescribes the law to all moral beings is "the capacity to understand." Since this is finite, "sin in its nature ought to be considered finite and limited, rather than infinite and unlimited, as has by many been

⁶¹Ibid., p. 41.
supposed." To the proof of the proposition that sin is a finite evil, Ballou devotes considerable space. He thus designed to meet squarely one of the strong positions of his opponents. He directly opposes Edwards' arguments in fact though he does not mention him by name when he sets up against the idea of obligation measured by the being to whom it is due, viz., God, this idea of a finite "legislature," the mind of man. How important he deemed this point may be seen by the frequency with which he returns to the topic. And yet he did not thereby rise to the height which the New England divines had themselves already attained.

But certain of Ballou's fundamental assumptions appear also in these opening pages. He says:—

Now to reason justly, we must conclude that, if God possess infinite wisdom, he could never intend anything to take place or be, that will not take place or be; nor that which is or will be, not to be at the time when it is. And it must be considered erroneous to suppose that the Allwise ever desired anything to take place which by his wisdom he knew would not; as such a supposition must in effect suppose a degree of misery in the eternal mind equal to the strength of his fruitless desire.

The root of this conception, as we shall see, is a denial of all true freedom on the part of man, which makes God's will all in all, and leads to the express denial of those distinctions between the secret and revealed will of God which are introduced into Calvinistic systems to save human responsibility.

By a strange coincidence ideas also appear here as to the nature of evil which agree in form of expression strikingly with Samuel Hopkins. Ballou says: "If by the real evil be meant something that ought not to be in respect to all the consequences which attend it, I cannot admit of its existence." He also maintains that "the consequences of an act do not determine whether the act be good or evil."

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**Ibid.,** p. 39.  
**Ibid.,** p. 41.  
**E. g., ibid.,** p. 250.  
**Ibid.,** p. 48.  
Passing now from the nature of sin to its origin, Mr. Ballou refers the entire theory of the Fall to the "chimerical story of the bard Milton." Viewing the whole as an attempted explanation of the introduction of sin into the universe, Ballou propounds the crucial difficulty in saying that it does not account for the case of Satan himself. "Was not the angel holy in every faculty? Was not the command for him to worship the Son holy and just? All answer, Yes. Then from such causes, how was sin produced? The reader will easily see, the question cannot be answered." 88

Our author's own solution of the problem is as follows: God had a design in making us, the whole of which "must be carried into effect and nothing more, admitting him to be an infinite being." 89 Sin is therefore in the plan of God. To arrive at a satisfactory account of the entrance of evil into the world, we must begin with natural evil. This is a natural result of our physical organization. In the combination of the various elements entering into the composition of our bodies, there is provision for the rise of all manner of disorders. The same feature is found in our senses, which are at the same time the "origin of our thoughts and volitions." Hence physical evil is the source of moral evil. "Want unsatisfied is an evil; and unsatisfied want is the first movement to action or volition." Let now the element of confusion enter into our desires, and the introduction of sin is explained. "From our natural constitution, composed of our bodily elements, we are led to act in obedience to carnal appetites, which justifies the conclusion that sin is the work of the flesh." This language, derived from an earlier edition, conveys the thoughts of the later one before us in simpler form. Ballou subsequently clothed his theory in an expository form, but without much gain in clearness. 70

But, says the objector, this is to make God the author of

88 Ibid., p. 53.
89 Ibid., p. 57.
70 Ibid., pp. 57–63.
sin. No, says Mr. Ballou, it is to make God the author of that which is in a limited sense sin.\(^7^1\)

In this connection comes in the discussion of the freedom of the will. As Mr. Ballou's great doctrinal argument for universal salvation is that the plans of God will certainly be carried out, he is compelled from his standpoint to remove the objection that the will of man may interpose to persist in sin. He does it by denying that the will has freedom. "In order for a choice to take place, the mind must have the preception of two or more objects; and that object which has the most influence on the judgment and passions will be the chosen object; and choice in this instance has not even the shadow of liberty." Other expressions which he employs show that Mr. Ballou believes in strict determinism.\(^7^2\)

In treating of the consequences of sin, our writer rejects the doctrine that they are spiritual, temporal and eternal death. Temporal death is incidental to our constitution since we are by nature mortal. As for eternal death, the whole discussion pertains to this, but Mr. Ballou puts in a disclaimer here, that the effects of sin are limited to the state in which they are committed.\(^7^8\)

In treating the subject of the atonement, to which he now comes, Mr. Ballou transgresses the proprieties of a sober discussion by the bitterness of his expressions against Orthodox theories. Or, waiving this, he shows too little sympathy for, or understanding of, what his opponents meant to say, to inspire us with much confidence that he will contribute to the theme.\(^7^4\) We shall not delay upon his criticisms of other theories, but shall content ourselves with reproducing Ballou's own. It is substantially as follows:—Jesus Christ was not God. To suppose this is to involve one's self in inextricable difficulties. "To say of two persons, exactly of the

\(^{71}\text{Ibid., p. 64 ff.}\)

\(^{72}\text{Ibid., pp. 65, 66, 71, especially 95 ff. See, also, Select Sermons (Boston, 1832), p. 306 ff.}\)

\(^{78}\text{Ibid., p. 95.}\)

\(^{74}\text{Ibid., p. 103 ff.}\)
same age, that one of them is a real son of the other, is to confound good sense." "If the Godhead consists of three distinct persons, and each of these persons be infinite, the whole Godhead amounts to the amazing sum of infinity multiplied by three." It will be noted that it is necessary thus to diminish the dignity of Christ to establish the view of atonement which is to follow. The dissatisfied party needing reconciliation is man, not God. The sin of Eden produced two errors in Adam's mind which have remained in the mind of man ever since. (a) He believed God to be his enemy. (b) He believed that he could reconcile his Maker by works which he could himself do. But on the contrary God loved Adam after his sin as much as before. He did not regard himself as the injured party, for the only party injured by the sin of man was man himself. His love for his Creator was interrupted, and his views of Him were corrupted. The atonement was necessary to renew man's love to God. God himself sought to effect this, and so the atonement did not produce love in God towards man, but was the result of that uninterrupted love. And so the atonement consists in manifesting God's love to us, and so in causing us to love him. The temporal death and the literal blood of Christ did not make the atonement. Apparently Mr. Ballou did not have any clear place for the death of Christ in his system.

Incidentally the writer has introduced a discussion at this point of endless punishment as the penalty of the law. It is not necessary (a) to maintain the law and secure the government of God, since he is almighty. Nor (b) to reclaim the delinquent, for of course it is especially calculated not to reclaim him, since it is endless. Nor (c) is it necessary to deter others from crime, for through the sin of Adam the entire race would be involved in endless punishment, and there would be no one to deter. And (d') endless punish-

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90 Ibid., p. 134.
96 Ibid., p. 140 ff.
97 Comp. ibid., pp. 167, 233.
98 Ibid., p. 126.
ment involves endless sin; but to inflict endless sin is against the law which requires endless holiness.

We now enter upon the closing portion of the work, the most important from the author's point of view,—the Consequences of the Atonement to mankind. These are, in general, the universal holiness and happiness of the race.

This statement has no sooner been made than the influences of Mr. Ballou's surroundings become evident in his pausing to discuss the supposition that eternal punishment is necessary to the greatest final amount of happiness. The speculations of the Hopkinsians were before his mind here, though the statements which Mr. Ballou makes of their positions are very objectionable. His great answer is derived from the conception that what is meant by these reasoners is that pain is an object of enjoyment in and of itself. We may therefore pass, without stopping on this topic, to the positive arguments which Mr. Ballou now begins to propose for universal salvation.

Certain objections are first noticed. That derived from Rev. xiv. 10, 11, he answers by referring to the present time as the period of punishment. But it is objected that millions go out of this world unreconciled and therefore shall remain so to all eternity. But, says Ballou, this implies that there will be no change after death, and if this is so, saints will not increase in holiness, which is too absurd to need refutation. The answer to the objection from moral agency consists in repeating the denial of the freedom of the will. Or, on the ground of the objector, which Ballou always tries to take, it gives men an opportunity of repentance and salvation, and thus is no obstacle to universal salvation. Again, the word "everlasting" does not mean endless. If the "day of judgment" of the Scriptures be an objection to universal salvation, the proper understanding according to Mr. Ballou, substantiated by a long exegetical discussion, is that the "coming of the Lord," and the "day of

80 Ibid., p. 190.
judgment” were accomplished by the destruction of Jerusalem. The account of Dives and Lazarus is not literal. In Matt. xii. 31, 32 (neither in this world nor in that which is to come), “world” means dispensation; “this” world, the legal priestly dispensation, and “that which is to come” the gospel. And finally, Mr. Ballou thinks that endless misery demands a principle to support such misery, in the divine nature.

The treatise closes with the reasons for believing in universal salvation, and with them our review shall close. They open with the argument from the goodness of God, with which we are already familiar. Further arguments are:  

(a) There is an immortal desire in every soul for future existence and happiness. “Why should the Almighty implant this desire in us if he never intended to satisfy it?” (b) All wise, good, and exemplary men wish for the truth of the doctrine. “If it be God’s spirit in us which causes us to pray for the destruction of sin, is it reasonable to say that this same spirit has determined that sin shall always exist?” (c) If any of the human race are endlessly miserable, the whole must be, provided they know it, on the principle of sympathy. (d) The world is a place of education. Sin is a mistake, and is it conceivable that men should never find this out, unless the school is to be a failure? (e) Mankind in their moral existence originated in God. They must finally be assimilated with the fountain from which they sprang. (f) Finally, the Scripture proof. This is to be of the plainest sort. “I am determined to admit no Scripture as evidence in this case that needs any interpretation to cause it to mean what I wish to prove; therefore I shall produce but a small part of the Scriptures which I conceive have a direct meaning in favor of Universalism.” We are relieved by this fact from the necessity of entering into the discussion of the sep-

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81 Ibid., p. 224.
82 Ibid., p. 225.
83 Ibid., p. 227.
84 Ibid., p. 229 ff.
arate passages. The most obvious meaning which will tell in favor of the doctrine of Universalism is the one which Mr. Ballou has in mind. We therefore append a list of the passages and leave the reader to make the examination for himself. 86

Such was the work of Hosea Ballou. With him we may close our sketch of Universalist writers, and pass to the general discussion of the subject in which the New England divines now joined.

86 These occur upon p. 240 ff. They are:—Acts iii. 20, 21; Col. i. 20; Eph. i. 10; Gen. xii. 3; xlix. 10; Ps. lxxii. 11; xxxvii. 10; xxii. 27; ii. 7, 8; Col. i. 19; Is. xxv. 6, 7, 8; i Cor. xv. 54; Rev. xxi. 4; Jer. xxxiii. 20; Ezek. xvii. 22-24; 1 Tim. ii. 4; Eph. i. 11. Specially i Cor. xv.; Rev. v. 11, 12, 13, 14; John v. 22, 23; Is. xlv. 22-25; Rom. viii. 22, 23; 2 Cor. v. 14.

[To be concluded.]
ARTICLE VI.

MUSIC AND CHRISTIAN EDUCATION.

BY EDWARD S. STEELE, OBERLIN, OHIO.

What interest music will have for Christian education must naturally depend upon the capacity of music for Christian uses. The question thus suggested involves two, namely, what in general the powers of music are, and what in special Christian uses are. The discussion of these questions—which in their treatment, however, need not be widely parted—will occupy the present article, while a second will carry the result which may be reached to its practical applications.

Upon the worth of music the average practical citizen places no very high estimate. As an amusement he concedes it that degree of value which he is accustomed to assign to amusements in general, with variations relative to his individual taste. He does not deny it a certain use, especially when coupled with words, in moving people's feelings in evangelistic and temperance efforts and in working up military and political enthusiasm. And as a Christian worshipper he finds it for some reason indispensable in public religious services.

But the lover of the art makes his estimate in a very different spirit. His expressions are touched with a glow which shows that music has a value for him quite regardless of ordinary standards of utility. It gives him a satisfaction which he would scorn to attribute to an amusement. And while he gladly acknowledges himself moved by its power, he does not conceive that its best effects are found in the
stimulus it affords to the fiery charge or other instant action. He esteems it rather as an inwardly enlarging, elevating, and refining force, which, while exercising the mind with a pure enjoyment, leaves it rested and better attuned to the heavenly harmony whose notes are so hard to catch amidst the jangle of the world. With the worshipper he is most nearly at one; for, however insufficient his philosophy, the worshipper feels that music in some way helps him into a becoming frame of mind, and here comes nearest to freeing himself from the bonds of commonly reputed utility. And to the good Puritan singing:

My willing soul would stay,
In such a frame as this,
And sit and sing herself away,
To everlasting bliss—

the friend of art might likely enough put the query what "use" there is in the extremely unpractical state of mind indicated by the verse.

The former and, as we must regard it, less adequate of these estimates—though the latter on its part might easily pass into one-sidedness and extravagance—arises from a defective view of utility and from a failure to appreciate the part which it is possible for music to play in the human economy. As regards utility, all that is useful which meets any wholesome demand of the human constitution. The fact that certain of our wants are instant and self-enforcing, while others may be deferred without destroying our physical life, does not show that the latter are not equally normal and equally essential to life at its best estate.

But, after all, the real ground of indifference to the claims of music is the failure to appreciate what the art can do, particularly the failure to have deeply felt its charm in one's own experience. This short-coming results sometimes from a defect of the organism, more often from a deficiency of musical cultivation, which may consist with a very high degree of refinement in other directions, or with a thorough grossness and sordidness of character. The most effective
way to advance the interests of music is to make its power felt by actual contact. Music is its own best advocate; give it the field and it will find and claim its own. It were well, however, that our appreciation of the art should take a more intelligent shape than a mere personal feeling in its favor; else there would be color for the suspicion that music is at best a private satisfaction to those who may happen to love it, with no significance beyond. Then, too, attention is the first objective point in the effort to promote any interest; and to this may be added that the theme itself is inherently interesting.¹

Music, then, belongs to the sphere of the fine arts, and the fine arts fall within the scope of æsthetics, and æsthetics concerns itself with the beautiful, the sublime, and the objects of other kindred sentiments. For the present purpose beauty may generally be referred to as if it covered the whole range of the æsthetic judgment. It is plain that the capabilities of music are determined, first, by the general conditions of the æsthetic nature, then by the more special conditions of the fine arts, and, finally, by its own private laws. A complete analysis of the æsthetic faculty and its object cannot be undertaken merely as incidental to a practical end; a concise account of the subject may be offered, however, as exhibiting the practical relations of music to the human mind.

It is first to be observed that the beauty of things does not consist in their awakening certain feelings in us. The apprehension of beauty normally occasions pleasure, but the beauty is not on account of the pleasure. An object is enjoyed as beautiful, not beautiful as enjoyed. In this respect the beautiful stands in sharp contrast with the good, using good here in the sense of a means to happiness. Anything is good in so far as it ministers to satisfaction; its goodness lies in its very relation to the sensibility. Now the

¹ The writer wishes to acknowledge special obligations, for suggestion and information, to Hermann Lotze's Grundzüge der Ästhetik, to Mr. Haweis' Music and Morals, and to Mr. Mathews' How to Understand Music,
beautiful may be a good, since, as already said, it normally produces satisfaction; but it is not as good that it becomes beautiful; rather, being beautiful it becomes a good to us, since it is the law of our nature to take pleasure in the beautiful.

But, second, beauty is an ideal quality of things, not, properly speaking, a real. That is to say, you may pull to pieces, and submit to the closest scrutiny, a confessedly beautiful object, and you will not by that method detect the slightest trace of beauty. If skilled in æsthetics, you may find in that manner the conditions upon which the beauty of the object depends; but the beauty itself is quite otherwise apprehended. In this respect beauty resembles rightness or obliqutoriness, which is no real quality of things either physical or spiritual. Nor can either of these properly be brought under the category of "relations;" they are rather ideal qualities of things—not on that account, however, any the less valid and significant.

Third, the æsthetic judgment does not affirm beauty, as it were blindly, of each of a great number of individual objects. On the contrary, beauty is predicated according to a principle, in view of the fulfilment of certain universal conditions. The general evidence of this lies in the fact that in all the variety and seeming contrariety of beautiful objects, beauty is still to us only one thing, whose essence men, though often disappointed, still feel impelled to seek.

Fourth, the conditions of beauty are twofold, lying, namely, in an idea, and in its embodiment or expression. This distinction is fundamental, and its observance essential. For if, as may easily happen, the inquirer should fix his attention unduly on the outwardness of the beautiful, he might arrive at various rules of the arts, and at some comprehensive but incidental characters of the beautiful, yet could not attain to its ultimate bond of unity. On the other hand, one would fail to vindicate even the correct idea, should he not observe that beauty is conditioned, not only upon the idea, but upon its manifestation.
Fifth, the idea embodied in a beautiful object is necessarily an ideal. The ideal is, in the first place, the perfect, or at least that which approximates toward perfection. But perfection, absolutely taken, is meaningless; perfection is always relative, namely, to an end or purpose. That is perfect which fully and precisely occupies its place, fulfils its vocation, meets its end. Thus the essence of the ideal is teleology. Hence the beautiful is the fit, the appropriate, the becoming, or at least the representation of them.

Teleology may be perfect or imperfect; yet in so far as it is imperfect, it falls short of being fully teleological. Thus perfection and teleology are not independent characters of the ideal, but the former is involved in the latter. And here we find one, though not the main, reason why the beautiful does not coincide with the useful. A thing may be actually useful, yet so imperfectly teleological as to fall short of the ideal. When the means passes into the end immediately and wholly, without friction and waste, then the utility takes on an ideal character.

Sixth, all end is ultimately the good in the sense of happiness or well-being. Thus the ideal does not pertain to the mere mechanism of means, but to the means only in relation with real and vital interests. Accordingly, beauty does not arise from any mathematical or otherwise merely formal condition, like "unity in multiplicity," albeit that character may often be incidentally present.

Seventh, the idealizing faculty proceeds in two principal methods. First, it busies itself with creating the world as we would enjoy having it. Things are constituted on the basis of the presently agreeable—not necessarily from a low point of view. Things go right, here and now. Wickedness is soon punished or soon repented of. Pains and difficulties are reduced to vexations, unlucky plights fit to laugh at afterward, griefs which no more than give tone to joy, struggles which exhaust only the exuberance of energy. This is the comediaal form of the ideal. Here belong day-dreaming and castle-building, hence exhales the fairy world, and here is
framed the popular conception of heaven. This is the sphere of the lighter works in drama and fiction, and of the corresponding creations in the other arts.

The second method of idealizing is the tragedial. Instead of excluding or softening any evil of the real world, it accepts all, and frames a world in which, indeed, the good is no less the end, but is attained only through conflict and pain. It is a mistake to suppose that the essence of tragedy is a bad outcome. There is an evil issue, but it is not the grand issue. From the standpoint of the lower sphere things are going badly. Justice dies from the earth, and the powers of evil work their will. But in genuine tragedy we are allowed to catch through storm and darkness the gleam of an Eternal Righteousness ruling serene and radiant above the earthly process. Or, perchance the world and the flesh have gained the better of the spirit, and are just dragging their victim into the pit, when lo! the spirit, empowered by the self-sacrificing devotion of some pure soul, eludes the demon's grasp, and ascends purged and redeemed to its native sphere. Tragedy from the nature of the case partakes somewhat of the character of an inquiry, an attempt to solve the problem of evil; not so much either an attempt to solve it, but rather to substantiate to the perplexed soul its faith that goodness is at the bottom of things. Tragedy will evidently not be so pleasing to the unreflecting as comedy; but for serious minds it possesses a deeper interest and yields a fuller satisfaction than the other. This is not meant to imply, however, what is certainly not true, that the comedialement in art has no interest for wise people.

Our analysis thus far has exhibited the fact that the beautiful, far from being merely a pleasure of sense, is founded upon thought, and often of a highly serious character. We are led to consider, eighth, the relation of the beautiful to the right. That the two often coincide no one will care to deny; but it may easily be supposed that this is accidental; that fine art appropriates moral matter to its use indifferently, just because it is an element in the world and
human life, and these must furnish the material of art; and that beauty may be employed to add a charm alike to virtue and vice. These statements do not express the truth. The relation between the right and the beautiful is intimate, definite, and friendly, and the positions already taken prepare us to understand it. The two ideas, it is fully conceded, are entirely distinct, and neither of them is the ground of the other. Nothing is right merely as beautiful, or beautiful merely as right. But the æsthetic judgment as we have seen, refers to ends, and so also obviously does the moral. And there is but one ultimate end, the same for both, namely, the good, or happiness. But the two refer to the end in quite different ways. I am morally obliged to will the good in general, and, so far as in me lies, to act toward its realization. The æsthetic judgment, on the contrary, affirms no duty, and except indirectly has no relation to the will. It is not practical, but contemplative. Nevertheless, what the moral judgment says I ought to fall in with, and in my part perform, the æsthetic judgment disposes me to take delight in. My objective duty consists in realizing the good according to my best view of it; my æsthetic pleasure arises, so far as the idea is concerned, from the contemplation of the good realizing. The æsthetic faculty becomes thus a powerful coadju- tor of the ethical; for it creates an interest in precisely those courses of action which we ought to pursue. All that which we call enthusiasm is the product of the ideal view of things. So also shame, as far as it relates to morally wrong conduct, appears to be founded, not on the sense of guilt, but of the æsthetic impropriety involved in the sin.

Ninth, certain supplementary statements need to be subjoined to the above. First, the writer is quite aware that many will refuse to grant the proposition that happiness is the ultimate good; and this is no place to defend it. But, while it is necessary that the writer should proceed on his own lines, he is still in hopes that dissenting readers, making their own reservations, will be able to sympathize with the general effect of the discussion, and so he may still retain
their company. But, second, without dissenting from the above definition of the good, one may still make it an objection to the position taken that much of the beautiful has no obvious moral significance, and, further, that it is sometimes low or even positively vicious in its tendency. But, as regards the first, there are also many satisfactions which by themselves considered are entirely innocent, yet become evil when they stand in the way of a greater good. The pursuit of these satisfactions may be said to be morally indifferent, since its right or wrong is determined by its relations in each particular case. But naturally the ideal, which is based on enjoyments of this sort, will have no special moral significance. It is innocent, yet it does not exhibit the conflict of evil and good. Of this nature are many comedial ideals. But as regards the low and vicious beautiful—if that combination of terms is endurable,—when the general good is subordinate to a merely relative good, this is wrong; but so at the same time is it un-teleological and un-ideal. To give one's self up to the so-called "lower pleasures" is immoral, and so it is unbeautiful; for he who does so does not meet his true end, does not fulfil his part in the grand scheme of the world. When, as is common, people conceive their whole environment as properly revolving around their personal interest, we call them selfish, and selfishness is wrong. But at the same time this procedure is æsthetically preposterous. It is like setting a glass diamond with gold and precious stones, or placing a fat spider in the central foreground of a magnificent landscape. If it indeed be true that the æsthetic conflicts with the moral, then the æsthetic must give way; but really the æsthetic corrects its own morals. Those who hold but a low conception of the world and of the sphere of man will of course idealize accordingly, and their ideals, well clad, will afford a certain counterfeit of beauty, whose falsity, however, is exposed in the light of the true beauty.

The sympathy of the ethical and the æsthetic spheres is strikingly exhibited in the frequent use of æsthetic considerations for moral purposes. The preacher constantly presents
right action, not merely as right, but as noble, pure, manly, and true, all of which terms so used are æsthetic; while wrong action in the same spirit is called hateful, shameful, and mean. When Paul says, "Whatsoever things are true, whatsoever things are honorable, whatsoever things are just, whatsoever things are pure, whatsoever things are lovely, whatsoever things are of good report"—"honorable," "pure," and "lovely" have clearly an æsthetic sense, as have in some measure perhaps all the remaining epithets. The terms "high" and "low" as applied to character and conduct are strictly æsthetic. Moral action as such is right or wrong, and in varying degrees; it becomes high or low only when measured by the ideal scale. Nor can this use of terms be explained as a mere accommodation. Not only are they, as in accordance with the above positions, literally true, but they actually bear to the mind that peculiar radiance, or, on the other side, that peculiar offence, which belongs to the æsthetic point of view. In fact, the æsthetic treatment of things moral springs from the necessary relation of the two spheres, and is constantly taking place without observance. And it is interesting to note how in such a writer as Ruskin the two almost coalesce, probably to their mutual advantage.

Tenth, the service of the æsthetic faculty to the religious nature, though obvious, is probably greater than is commonly recognized. In so far as the æsthetic judgment cooperates with the moral, it is also relevant to true religion. Further, we have already seen how the spirit of tragedy grasps into the great religious question of the fundamental goodness of things. Again, it is manifest that the idealizing faculty has been widely active in shaping men's conceptions of the Divine, both among polytheists, whose deities are often idealizing personifications of special powers and characters, and among Christians, whose God is the sum of all perfections, and whose Saviour embodies the ideal of certain divine qualities, and also of human character, and thus commands the enthusiasm of the race. These are merely glances into a large and important domain, which must for the rest be
passed by, except as later touched in relation with the fine arts.

But we must turn our attention now from the nature of the ideal to that of its embodiment. It is requisite to the material of beauty, first, that it make a vivid address to the senses or imagination; the ideal must not be reasoned out, but projected objectively and pictorially. It is necessary, second, that it possess the power of awakening some degree of sympathetic emotion; by which is meant, not the pleasure which follows the apprehension of beauty, and not the various affections and passions which spring up in our practical contact with the real world, but rather those moods of the sensibility which arise in contemplation and reflection, as it were the echo of the satisfactions and griefs, the loves and antipathies, of real experience, the sympathetic vibration of the chords of the heart with a weal and woe in which it is not now participant. Such, in different ways, are the gladness of springtime and the melancholy of autumn, the sombre feeling awakened by the ninetieth Psalm and the more cheerful effect of the ninety-first, the whole train of emotions that accompany the reading of a tale, and the moods produced by music. The intellectual and the emotional element are always both present, though their relative prominence varies greatly.

The range within which these conditions may be fulfilled is extremely wide. In fact, there is nothing which is capable of manifesting an idea which may not conceivably be of service in embodying an ideal. Thus the whole manifold of the world and of human experience, and all that the creative imagination can base upon it, make up a fund upon which the ideal may draw for its own purposes. But there is also a special material of the beautiful which has no small significance. This belongs immediately to the sphere of the senses, and consists of the first elements of the physical world and their sensible qualities. Thus various geometrical forms are instinctively felt to be in themselves expressive; and the various colors have an inherent sympathetic quality which
fits them for an aesthetic medium on the emotional side; and similar things are true, as we shall find, in the domain of sound. Out of this material may be constructed a beautiful object which is not only not useful itself, but has no explicit reference to any specific utility. Here is the place of what is sometimes called "free" beauty, which might also be termed symbolic. For though it manifests no specific teleology, yet, if it really attains to beauty, it becomes the symbolic expression of teleology; for instance, through a nice adjustment of parts as if to an end, and similarly through a happy combination of colors. Contrasted with free beauty is "adherent" beauty, whose characteristic is that it derives its idea from some actually teleological object, in which, or in the representation of which, it resides. The distinction here drawn is substantially that of Kant, and is genuine and important, though it requires much circumspection to carry it safely out. All purely ideal figures, such as are used in decoration, are examples of free beauty. The beauty of flowers probably belongs here, because, while even their form and coloring, may, scientifically considered, play a part in the economy of the plant, yet our apprehension of their beauty takes no note of the fact. A large portion of the beauty of music must also be referred here. An obvious example of adherent beauty is furnished by architecture, where the relation to a practical purpose is manifest. The beauty of animals must on the whole be considered adherent, yet in the case of sea shells and corals, it is nearly or quite free, like that of flowers. In the case of representative works of art, such as paintings and statuary, the question relates to the object represented. The beauty of a statue is adherent, because the beauty of the man it represents is such. The reminder will be in place here that not even the beauty of useful objects is grounded upon the consideration of their actual utility; the decisive question is what they express, and the useful may, or may not, reveal the ideal utility. Thus a finely finished tool is more beautiful than a plain one, because more significant to the imagination; and a golden
miniature of a useful article, say of the square and compasses, is more beautiful than the article itself. It would seem now, that the question, why, in view of the principle adopted, the beautiful is not identical with the useful, is fairly answered. First, as earlier said, the actually useful is often but imperfectly teleological. Second, the actually useful is not necessarily in any high degree expressive according to aesthetic laws. An idealized copy of an object may reveal its idea better than it can itself; and even a symbol may have more aesthetic significance than a real object.

For further examination we must classify beautiful objects as those belonging to nature and those produced by art. It is obvious from the examples adduced above that the distinction between free and adherent beauty holds in both these departments. Of the beauty of nature but little can here be said. Relatively to our apprehension the beauty of the world is highly defective. Faith, indeed, insists that the world as a whole is perfectly beautiful, just as it insists that it is the product of a perfect goodness. But we are obliged to confess ourselves unable to comprehend the world as a whole. Science affords us glimpses of a universal system; history of a far-reaching divine purpose in the earthly order; and inner experience, of a birth of spiritual blessedness out of pain; and yet our best apprehensions are but fragmentary, and the beauty in whose universality we confide, is to us realized only here and there, or in the general survey only obscurely. And in the detail of the world, much which to us seems homely would doubtless seem otherwise if we could only grasp its full significance; while that which now seems to us beautiful would sometimes in the larger view appear less attractive. Of the natural beauty which can be apprehended by us that which belongs to the spirit is highest. This, to be sure, does not directly touch the imagination, like a physical property; yet the spiritual is brought within the grasp of the imagination through certain natural laws of symbolism—not to say how closely the spiritual nature is invested by the emotional. Next to the beauty of the spirit is that of the living organ-
ism, whose superiority consists not in the fineness of its mechanism, but precisely in the fact that it is lifted by its subordination to a living principle above the plane of mechanism. The inorganic, however interesting its laws, is not so highly teleological as the animate. It has no proper ends in itself, and in order to serve real ends it must be subjugated, as in our machines; even the finest of which are but an awkward means of performance, compared with the animate organism. Nevertheless, much might be said in its favor, in view of its orderly products, and especially of the grand unity and harmony of the solar and stellar systems, suggesting a "music of the spheres," and of the free beauty of the starry heavens. The beauties of the inorganic realm are quite largely without suggestion of specific ends, and therefore free, as for instance in case of crystals. With these scanty observations, we must leave the field of natural beauty for that of the beauty purposely created by man—that is, the domain of the fine arts.

We have seen how man, in the exercise of his idealizing faculty, creates a world after his own fancy, or strives to realize the deeper meanings of the actual one. Now in so far as he undertakes to embody his ideals according to aesthetic laws so as to enjoy their contemplation and communicate them to others, he becomes an artist; and his production is, in motive at least, a work of fine art. The fine arts are distinguished from other art in their controlling purpose to embody the ideal.

The particular material employed by an art gives it its specific character. In poetry, including artistic fiction, the material consists chiefly of real or possible experience, action, and character of human beings. In the lyric poem only a fragment of life, though a pregnant one, is exhibited. In the epic, the drama, and the novel, in their several ways, there is an orderly complication of circumstances and experiences, developing up to a culmination. The beauty of these works is heightened by tropical expression and elegant composition, sometimes by rhythm and rhyme; but all these
are properly accessories, though in some lyrics they seem to constitute nearly the whole material. Sculpture avails itself of the expressiveness which belongs to form; not for the most part, however, form in the abstract, as yielding free beauty, but organic form, form in relation with life and with rational being. Painting employs the resources of form under laws of perspective, and also those of color. From the more tractable nature of its material, it can treat a vastly wider range of subjects than sculpture, while through the sympathetic power of color it more richly expresses the things of the heart. It has its highest uses in embodying ideals of natural scenery, and still more those of the inward human life so far as it manifests itself through the body, as in historic groups and faces typical of some phase of character or experience. Architecture applies the significance of form and color and mass to the expression of those ideals which are naturally associated with buildings—accordingly, therefore, social and religious ones, the religious being in fact also social. The expressive resources of music will be noted hereafter.

It was found above that the æsthetic ideal has a distinct sympathy with morals and religion; we are now ready for the question whether in general the æsthetic embodiment of true ideals has any Christian uses. First, then, let it not be imagined that the fine arts have any important direct use in imparting information. All the resources of the fine arts would, for that purpose, be inferior to the deaf and dumb alphabet. Second, as a means of enjoyment the fine arts unquestionably deserve a high place. This is true of them, not only in that lower form which we call amusement, but also in serious and more intellectual delights, which afford a deeper, if less demonstrative, satisfaction. The pleasurableness of the arts would constitute for them a solid value, even if they had no other. Third, the fine arts may be employed to a certain extent in direct incitement to some proposed course of action, and in the production of a frame of mind suitable to a given occasion. Outside of the sphere of
music we may cite, as examples, the "tendency" novel, the
poem intended to excite interest in a given cause, the church
edifice considered as inspiring a devotional spirit, and didactic
pictures like those of Hogarth. To excite in the mind a
devotional or other elevated mood is akin to the best use of
art; yet it can hardly be denied that the manifest subordina-
tion of an art to an immediate practical end detracts in
greater or less measure from its worth as art.

But, fourth, the grand use of art is to awaken and cherish
in the mind pure and noble sentiments. Sentiments spring
immediately out of ideals, and belong therefore to the æsthetic
sphere. Sentiment is, in that sphere, the correlate
of conviction and principle in the specifically moral sphere,
and the two mutually react. We have already seen how
æsthetic considerations enter into moral persuasion; but
right principle in turn tends to produce right sentiment.
Moral sentiment is not less æsthetic than any other; its
peculiarity is that it relates to distinctively moral questions.
Sentiment without principle is weak, but so, in a certain way,
is principle weak without sentiment. Principle cannot make
itself fully effective without sentiment; it needs enthusiasm,
and enthusiasm is kindled only in view of ideals. Every
thoroughly formed character has a stock of abiding senti-
ments, which form very largely the basis of its outward con-
duct. True, one's life, being led by appetite or interest, may
fall below the plane of his sentiment; but the schism is
likely to be healed presently, either by the elevation of the
life or the degradation of the sentiments.

But, the importance of correct sentiment being granted,
the question still remains whether after all the fine arts are
available as a means of producing it. A claim in their favor
will be met with objection from various points of view. First,
it will be apprehended that the artistic expression of the
ideal tends to end in mere sentiment. The pleasurable con-
templation even of a right ideal, it may plausibly be urged,
has little or no good influence upon the practical habit, but
only induces an artificial life of the imagination which de-
stroys the relish for wholesome action. At the same time it makes one too fine for this rude world, critical and unsympathetic, scornful rather than loving, unable to appreciate genuine values. This objection indicates some incidental dangers, not the main tendency of fine art. Doubtless one may dwell too much in the ideal world, doubtless a shock is sometimes felt when he descends into the real. Generally, however, a season of aesthetic enjoyment extends a softening and brightening influence over the period of action following, which does not detract from its efficiency. The spirit of finical discontent springs from a superficial aesthetic culture which ends upon the embodiment without penetrating to the inner sense. In all cases, too, we must beware of charging upon art what only belongs to its depravation. That the contemplation of the beautiful detaches the mind in a certain way from the real world is nothing to its discredit; we need to be detached from the world. Religious contemplation does something similar. No man is fit to live in the world unless he is sometimes out of it. It is by transporting us that fine art confers its benefits. For the moment it emancipates the mind from its prejudices, annuls the force of habit, calms the agitation of passion, and charges the spirit, even though unwilling, with noble sentiments. That moment will live on, for it has done something to form the mind. Even the unwilling soul will be haunted by the reminiscence of a time when it was almost pure, or kind, or religious in spite of itself, and be inclined to be what it felt. And even those works of art which have the least moral significance, if they are true, help us to get into our right relations with some aspect of the world, while serving often at the same time the purposes of an amusement.

An objection closely allied to the foregoing refers to the action of certain arts upon the feelings. It is alleged that these arts work disastrously in that they call the emotional nature into vigorous exercise, yet the energy thus generated is not applied to practical service. Rev. F. W. Robertson in one of his letters brings this accusation against the
novel, Dr. Josiah Strong in a religious journal\(^2\) has urged recently the same against the theatre, and others have spoken likewise concerning music. But this objection, irrespective of the art to which it may be applied, is mistaken in principle. The primary thing in fine art is the ideal, and around this the feeling gathers. The feeling brings the ideal home, and fixes it as the goal of a sentiment. It is not true that this feeling is wasted; it is expended in a natural process of character formation; and, when the practical occasion comes, the mind will be more responsive to the demand upon its sympathy than if it had not beforehand been so exercised. The habitual disregard of the promptings of sympathy doubtless tends to destroy the feeling; but in the case in hand there is no call to action, therefore no abuse of the moral nature in not acting; and the disposition to act which was awakened by the fictitious situation tends to become a permanent bent. In practical life one hears of a thousand instances of suffering in respect to which he is no way called to act. But he need not close his ears for fear of wasting his emotional energies; his feeling, or at least his practical impulse, will be stronger rather than weaker for the present exercise in compassion. Much of the excitation of the pulpit does not relate to immediate specific action, but contributes its force to the grand fund of sentiment which so largely moulds the conduct. As against music, the objection is scarcely even plausible. The real danger of the novel and the theatre, so far as concerns us here, lies in the presentation of false or trivial ideals, and the excitement of feeling in a wrong direction or with insignificant occasion, which are undoubtedly unwholesome, but in equal degree unartistic.

A third objection will relate to those forms of art in which the thought is not expressed in words or easily translatable signs, in great measure, therefore, to architecture, sculpture, painting, and music. The fine meanings which enthusiastic critics discover in the great works of these departments seem

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\(^2\) *The Congregationalist*, Oct. 20, 1887.
to many minds fanciful, and of an influence too slight to enter into the calculations of sensible people. They concede a certain educational virtue to poetry and fiction, and to music accompanied by words, perhaps to some easily interpreted examples of painting and sculpture, but beyond this range all seems to them vague and unreal. On a question of this kind there is no argument that can carry the sceptical by storm. It is a matter of cultivated feeling and developed consciousness, and of broad and fine appreciation of the phenomena that mark the spiritual history of the race. A competent reflection cannot ignore the fact, that logical forms are not the only media of human expression and impression; that words are not essential to the embodiment of ideals, and, when used in that office, serve another end than the mere conveyance of information; that artistic expression whether with or without words has a real meaning for the human mind, and, however subtle, a real efficacy in the formation of character. It is impossible to draw the line of moral significance at the point where words disappear. The buildings, the statuary, the paintings, and the music of a people embody its ideals just as truly as does its poetry. These all express the life of the people, and in turn react upon it.

If such is the relation of art to life, it follows that art has authoritative claims upon Christianity. The sphere of Christianity is the whole territory of life, throughout which, in order to fulfil its mission, it must exercise a pervasive and dominating influence. It is not that Christianity ought to appropriate all the resources of the world to its own corporate ends, as if subjugating them to a foreign yoke; rather it must diffuse itself as an integral and vital element into the whole circle of human interests, as supplying them with their normal light and warmth. Now the artistic propensity is no excrescence, but a regular and wholesome demand of our constitution; and Christianity must provide it a satisfaction which is artistically adequate as well as Christianly pure and true, or else confess that it is not the religion of the whole man. And at the same time, if it fails to possess this field, men will seek at
less pure fountains the satisfaction of their thirst for ideal creations.

We have thus considered the serviceability of the fine arts in general for Christian use; we must now turn our attention to the special properties of music. In music the material in which the ideal is embodied consists of sounds, varying in pitch, intensity, and duration, and ordered according to certain definite laws of melody and harmony. The mere observance of these laws, however, does not secure music. Relative to our receptive faculty, the material just specified is endowed with a variegated expressiveness, and it is only when this power is applied to the embodiment of an ideal that a production achieves the standing of music. Thus music has the same fundamental character as the other fine arts; and it will be observed that this construction differs from that of Mr. Haweis, and others referred to by him, who define music as the "language of the emotions." This is far from saying, however, that the emotions are not concerned in music, and in a most intimate manner. Music more than any other art depends upon emotion as a medium of expression. Like every other art, music also addresses the imagination—for there is an imagination of the ear no less truly than of the eye. But a mere uncolored fabric of regulated sounds, if perhaps of some symbolic worth, would not possess the efficacy of music. Neither, on the other hand, would a bare series of awakened emotions, however well arranged, be equivalent to a musical effect. The imagination must have a body of justly articulated sounds to rest upon. In poetry there is a train of ideas, and, associated with them, a series of emotional states. In music the organized body of sound takes the place of the train of verbally embodied ideas, and forms an objective nucleus around which the emotion gathers. Yet in music the imaginative element is subordinated, and the emotional given the leading part. Poetry, including fiction, approaches it most nearly in this respect; yet, on the whole, poetry gives a decidedly larger place to the intellectual element. This emotional quality of music evi-
dently adapts it to those classes of subjects into which the inner life largely enters.

A second distinction of music lies in its relation to time. Excepting poetry, no great art but music involves progress-ion. In sculpture and painting, motion can, to a certain extent, be suggested, but its representation is not proper to them. They unquestionably express life, yet not life as an unfolding process, but as it appears at some critical juncture, or in some typical attitude of mind. But in music, from the very nature of its material as involving continuance and suc-cession, the embodiment of progression and event is normal and principal. Combining this character with the one already noted, it becomes obvious that the sphere of music is the aestheti expression of the inner life. Natural feeling attaches itself to all the phases of an actual experience, and hence, by awakening feeling, music is able to bear us along through the succession of moods in an ideal experience; and since feeling largely relates to objects other than self, music may in its way refer to these. Yet it is not the office of music to tell a story, or give a description except in a sense quite peculiar to itself; it cannot narrate or paint; it follows not the law of things or events, but of emotion, which, though connected with a history, is something other than its counterpart. Moreover, it must not be supposed that in hearing music the experience expressed becomes as our own; on the contrary, it is objective to us, a thing contemplated; the emotion in which it is realized is, as already said, sympathetic. Nor must it be thought that the pleasure derived from music lies in the experience of these emotions, which, as matter of fact, are often sad. Our pleasure, so far as it is aesthetic, springs from the contemplation of the ideal, whether sad or other-wise; which explains the seeming contradiction of enjoying the pathetic in music or poetry, and of a "pleasing melancholy" from any occasion. Both possess movement, and both deal largely in emotion, and have close relations with the inner life. Consequently music is often associated with poetical words. Yet the laws of the two arts are so far dif-
ferent that this union can be effected only by mutual accommodation. For instance, the manifold repetition of words often required in a musical rendering would be intolerable in poetry, as may be seen by repeating the words of the Hallelujah Chorus with all the hallelujahs. So music must in turn concede somewhat, particularly in view of the limitations of the human voice. Nevertheless, the results of the combination are often very noble.

But, notwithstanding the affinity of those two arts, each holds a place that the other cannot fill. Poetry can narrate and depict, while music cannot. Poetry can also appeal strongly to the feelings, and express much that is most inward and sacred. Yet it must be confessed that music has an access to the inner sanctuary of the heart which poetry has not. It is not merely fanciful to say that music expresses feelings which are too deep for words. It reaches down to the very springs of life, where experience hardly knows how to define itself in logical forms. And the very fact that it does not appeal to the ocular imagination adapts it to deal with the life of the spirit. In this aspect, it is as when a man retires from the world to be alone with himself. At the same time, because music reaches thus deep, it is also highly social. For it strikes down to the unity of feeling underlying the diversity and conflict of opinions—and that, even more than does poetry; for many unite in singing the hymn who would scarcely be willing to repeat it. So, too, the artist in singing or performing establishes a fellowship between himself and his audience; and it is doubtful if a concert could be enjoyed by one sole auditor, even apart from the sense of the good wasted; for he would miss the feeling of community with the mass which the music ought to inspire.

With the general insight now attained into the adaptations of music its availability for Christian uses lies almost on the surface. It was noted earlier how largely religion moves in the realm of the ideal. Christianity, as seen, is no exception. If in its purer forms it discards the mythologizing and idolizing tendency, it is not because it has no ideals, but because
its ideality moves in a higher range. That these nobler ideals should find for themselves some medium of artistic expression is, under the laws of our nature, a matter of course. It is on the one hand inevitable, and on the other, indispensable. The occasion for solicitude is lest the embodiment be inadequate. Now, to what medium should Christianity resort for its aesthetic self-expression?

Christianity is the religion of inwardness. It looks upon the religious life, not merely as performance, but as experience. It looks upon man as naturally allied with God and capable of a sensible spiritual fellowship with him. It addresses the burdened conscience, and invites it to be reconciled with a Father not less grieved than angry. It approaches the soul in every phase of moral and spiritual experience, searching the hidden springs of its life, winging its aspirations and hopes, and turning the light of the upper firmament upon the mysteries which confound it in this lower sphere. Its God is light and love and spirit; to be worshipped everywhere in spirit and in truth; toward whom in its hour of trial the soul goes forth in unutterable longings, and in whom in its hour of triumph it rejoices with joy unspeakable and full of glory. By what power of utterance will the ideals of this inward and upward domain find themselves so well served as by music, the most inward and most transcendent of the arts?

The artistic wants of Christianity are naturally first thought of in connection with its public religious services. And here, for genuinely Christian demands, music, though it does not stand alone, is yet preëminent. Sculpture and painting are, for the uses of a pure worship, only incidentally available. The objects of Christian devotion they can neither represent nor adequately suggest. The statue and the picture are not necessarily unspiritual, but they are insurmountably finite. It is not necessary to deny that at an undeveloped stage of human intelligence they may have their value in defining and realizing the divine presence. It remains true that the craving for the image or picture in worship is a part of an intellectual and spiritual darkness, without the removal of which
the soul can never rise to religious manhood. He who
depends upon such helps is a babe, possibly innocent, cer-
tainly helpless. The iconoclasm of Protestantism was not
a revolt against art, but against a misuse of art; the images
destroyed were the emblems of a spiritual bondage. Human-
ity is the best symbol of the divine; but the carved or painted
man is hopelessly locked up in his humanity. The true
symbol is the free spirit of man, purified, perfected, and
infinitized. This becomes concrete in the living, historic
Christ; best apprehended through the written Gospels. As
subsidiary to architecture, however, and as means of sur-
rounding worship with fitting associations, these arts are not
without legitimate interest to the worshipping church.

It is possible to speak of architecture in a decidedly differ-
ent tone. It can unquestionably do something in the aid of
genuine worship. It must be kept in mind that we are here
concerned, not with the convenience and practical necessity
of houses of worship, but with their capacity for aesthetic im-
pression. Church architecture in its sublimer forms can
produce a feeling of the loftiness and eternity of God, and of
his immediate presence, and can invite the soul to find in
him an unfailing refuge; and, in its humbler forms, it may
at least embody in some wise the spiritual unity and common
aspiration of the Christian brotherhood. Abused, it may
tend to a localization of the divine presence, which would be
false to the divine ideal. Yet, rightly used, it is under limi-
tations. It cannot move with the soul through the cycle of
human experience, keeping the heart company in all its con-
licts, doubts, and triumphs, and voicing all its longings and
enthusiasms. It stands for the abiding and unchangeable;
scarcely for the active participation of the Divine Spirit in the
life of the individual and the process of the world. From the
very nature of its material, moreover, architecture cannot
enter into the movement of the service; nor can it be at
hand in all places where men need to worship. The help of
an appropriate architectural effect may rightly be coveted at
every fixed seat of divine service; yet, on the whole, it can-
not be considered the most vital of the worshipper's aesthetic needs.

Turning now to poetry, which of all the arts has closest affinity with music, we shall find that for outright, unqualified poetry the house of God offers little or no demand. So far as called for, it is for the most part subordinated either to the music or to the preaching. This results not from a want of capacity on the part of poetry to deal with religious themes, but from its lack of adaptation to the peculiar exigencies of a religious service. For the devotional part of the service it appeals, in its ordinary forms, too much to the understanding and the pictorial imagination. In devotion thought must distinguish itself just as little as possible from feeling. The prayer must carry the mind, not instruct it; and such is the way in which music serves. In the hymn and anthem and mass, the words are in some degree poetical, but here their main value lies in their relation to the music. They make singing possible, and they interpret the sense of the composition; but essentially the effect is not theirs. In the psalm we have a species of poetry which can be used with some devotional profit without music; yet even so, to be devotional, it must be written and delivered in the spirit of a song. But as compared with the song, it stands at a disadvantage; for it can neither make an equally effective appeal to emotion, nor exercise the same unifying influence upon the congregation. This is not to deny, however, that there is a more reflective side of devotion where the psalm and similar compositions have their place. As regards the preaching side of the service, the address to the understanding is there quite in place; but the independent use of poetry then meets with another difficulty, namely, that he who delivers poetry well must lose his personality in it, becoming either an actor or a mere reader, either of which is, from the standpoint of preaching, intolerable. Unquestionably, however, there is a poetical contingent among the legitimate resources of the pulpit. The preacher, in the nature of the case, must handle ideals; and, with a temperament poetic in
the slightest degree, he will be sure to treat them in a more or less poetic spirit. This is entirely proper, so only that he never lose his personal grip upon the audience. The poetry of preaching, then, as of devotion, is subordinated poetry, not poetry as it develops itself in simple obedience to its own genius. Thus from an artistic point of view the office of poetry in the service becomes a rather inferior, though not an unworthy, one.

Returning at length to music, we find it the most vital among the artistic elements of a religious service. It excels in devotional quality, because it has power to vehicle an inward disposition without requiring a sensible effort of the understanding or distracting the attention with vivid pictures, and because it knows how to touch the deepest and finest veins of feeling. It has the additional advantage of a high social capacity. It must not be overlooked, however, that its social quality is of a peculiar kind; it is not that of conscious and purposed interchange, but that in which a group of individualities melt together. In the former case there is a certain competition of personalities, the advances of one mind to another and the welcome or resistance of the other; sometimes in moral attack or defence, sometimes in a rivalry of wits, sometimes in the mutual invitation and compliance of reciprocal affection. The sociality of music most resembles the last, yet is something distinctly different. In concerted singing, and also in hearing, the company forgets both its antipathies and sympathies, and consents for the time to be one on the basis of a committal to the same current of feeling. While it is granted that this form of communion would not be adequate to all the purposes of religious fellowship, even in the sphere of devotion, yet a large employment of it is essential to the best success of united worship. The spoken prayer supplies to devotion a suitable body of distinct ideas. But devotion has also a feeling side, and is not complete without that perfect blending of fraternal hearts in reverence, praise, and aspiration, of which music is the natural artistic medium.
As a resource of preaching—using the term broadly—it can hardly be denied that music has also a certain vocation, somewhat as poetry has in the field of eloquence. Yet its precise function here may easily be misunderstood. So soon as a song undertakes to advocate a certain opinion, or urge to a certain course of action, it begins to lose the power of music. On the other hand, when it merely realizes through emotion the practical, not the theoretic, significance of a doctrine, or when it merely awakens the group of impulses suitable to a certain course of action, it remains within the musical domain. The preacher as such cannot be a musician as such. The preacher must keep his personality bearing upon his hearers. The musician must lose his personality, except in the sense of establishing an identity of feeling between himself and his audience. Strictly with this understanding, music may fulfil an office in persuasive address. But between this use and the devotional there is no hard-and-fast line. As Mr. Haweis says, "There is a grace of hearing as well as a grace of singing; there is a passive as well as an active side of worship." To this passive side of worship is intimately related the right use of music in persuasion. The mode of affecting the mind is the same, the theme different. In one case the subject is distinctly worshipful, relating directly to God; in another, the feeling is to refer to the church, or a needy world, or to temptation, or affliction, or personal guilt. The use of a proper musical address is quite in keeping with the spirit of the art, as well as an important instrumentality; and together with the cultivation of the "grace of hearing" it deserves greater attention in the churches. If we were to study the uses of the arts in private devotion, there would be some changes in the result, which it is not necessary here to note.

We must now give our attention briefly to the large and splendid field of religious art outside of the immediate uses of the church. Here, while the theme is still religious, it is not so treated as to meet the special demands of worship. In this department the relative fitness of the several arts appears
in a quite different light. The objections against sculpture and painting largely disappear. Painting especially has the capacity to treat worthily a great number of ideal and historical religious subjects, including a great part of the characteristic scenes in the life of Christ. A statue of Jesus, however, would hardly be tolerable. Viewed as edifying but not devotional works, many originally ecclesiastical pictures are justly cherished by multitudes who would not find them useful in worship. For a distinctively religious architecture apart from the church, there seems to be, except perhaps in monumental works, no very wide sphere. But for poetry, again, the field is both legitimate and rich—witness the great religious epics, and the numerous company of religious lyric and didactic poems. So music in turn finds here a splendid province, most notably, but not exclusively, in the form of sacred oratorio.

In the field of general religious art, as distinguished from that which is special to worship, only painting and poetry can be compared with music. Noble as are the capacities of religious painting, it suffers under limitations which exclude it from the highest service. While unquestionably a certain religious impression may be conveyed through a landscape, yet the religious power of painting must lie mainly in the representation of the human form and face. But the human body, if ever quite adequate to express the soul, is, at any rate, often governed by a power other than that of the spirit, which incapacitates it to reveal the spirit's actual estate. Painting can, if it wishes, depict a mortal agony or a haggard corpse; but it cannot in the same figure exhibit the transport of self-sacrificing love or the triumph of the immortal spirit. Hence Calvary, and perhaps Gethsemane, ought to be reserved for the two arts which least need the flesh as the index of the spirit, namely, poetry and music. And for the finest competency, especially in these most spiritual and tender situations, music must, of the two, still have the precedence. For it is capable of touching the chords least inured to exposure, and yet with a delicacy which could not
injure the most subtile fibre, whereas poetry has not the same immediate inwardness, but must avail itself of symbols bearing distinct marks of the earth. These comparisons, however, must not be taken as depreciative of all arts other than music, even in the religious sphere. Each art corresponds to a special susceptibility and capacity of the human mind, and each has a place which no other can fill. And each also, especially of the last three, has a necessary place among religious arts; and yet "one star differeth from another star in glory."

 Barely an allusion can be made to the confirmation which the history of music affords to the above analytic showing of its affinities. Music in any large sense did not exist prior to that great movement of self-discovery which manifested itself in the revival of letters and the Reformation. The people of Europe at length became sensible of their own inward powers and rights, began to rebel against conventionality and authority, to appropriate whatever was congenial in the creations of earlier ages, and to create for themselves out of their own spirits. Religion became subjective, each man questioned his own heart, formalism lost its hold. The more objective arts had reached their first Christian culmination, in the Gothic and other forms of architecture, in the great masters of modern sculpture and painting, in the Renaissance and Elizabethan literatures, before music reached its majority. But the deepening self-consciousness could no longer forget the expression of itself in so spiritual a medium. Originating from the introspective habit of monasticism, the art found its later and fuller development in the inward freedom and activity of Protestant Germany. It is the own precious daughter of a mature, reflective, and liberated Christian intelligence.  

 It remains to say that the interest of Christianity in music does not end with that music which is specifically religious; just as its interest in science does not end with theology and

8For a fuller treatment of this topic, see Haweis, Music and Morals, p. 41 ff.
ethics. Christianity, rightly conceived, rejoices in the healthful exercise and prosperous development of the human soul in all its normal susceptibilities and powers. The moral and spiritual functions cannot be isolated from the remainder of our endowments, but their fulfilment is in the midst of, and through, the whole life. Hence Christianity ought to encourage the cultivation of music, as indeed of all the arts, in all its wholesome uses, even if denominated secular.

[To be concluded.]
ARTICLE VII.

GUilt. 1

Julius Müller, in his treatise on "The Christian Doctrine of Sin," finds an antinomy between the fact of "Original Sin" (so called) and the human self-accusation called "Guilt." In the survey of the ground occupied by the former, he finds no place for moral freedom, and that the seeming choice must be pre-determined by the necessities of the nature; and on the other hand concludes that the consciousness called "guilt" is inexplicable except upon the admission of moral freedom, since the self-accusation implies that the subject might have decided otherwise. Hence his attempt to resolve this antinomy by the notion of an extra-temporal decision, involving the subjects, having come under time conditions, in the chain of necessity. An examination into the genesis of the judgment of guilt may show that there is no need of any such postulate; which has, besides, its own other difficulties.

The feeling of guilt, in concrete experience, precedes the judgment of guilt, and ever after accompanies it, such feeling anticipating obscurely the fully formed and conscious judgment; but as feeling, it is, in part at least, a posteriori in origin. It comes from the discovery in experience that suffering and ill-being are possible and actual; and that while much of it is indeed inevitable and indubitably ab extra, much beside might have been avoided, and has come from the violation of known laws of the universe. The simpler and more obvious the law, the sooner comes the retribution. The subtler and profounder the law, the remotest is the recoil. Sooner or later, and with variant depth of conviction, is the inference drawn that no law of the universe can be violated with impunity. Hence the dread of suffering, more or less clearly imagined, which is the primal feeling in human guilt. The inference is first and most readily drawn with reference to physical laws. To disregard the law of gravitation brings accident; to disregard the laws of health brings bodily pain; to disregard social laws brings various and remoter distress; to disregard the simpler moral maxims, such as command truth and honesty, is met by punishment in so many cases, as to arouse the suspicion or create the conviction that every violation of moral law must meet its return in suffering.

1 The following is a chapter from a work that will shortly be published in two octavo volumes by G. P. Putnam's Sons, entitled "Christian Doctrine Harmonized, and its Rationality Vindicated." Copyright secured, 1888, by John Steinfort Kedney. It is selected as having independent interest; yet in another chapter the argument is to be found that the doctrine of "Original Sin," need not be, and can not be, so thought as to exclude moral freedom, and on this account also, that there is no true antinomy.
or something equally to be dreaded. To set the whole life in violation of known moral law and by a refined prudence to evade its speedy, and fence off its remoter retribution may indeed dull the apprehension, since imagination cannot wander very far into the remote, yet not so utterly as to put to sleep the dread that the law of retribution has no exception, and that the deeper the ground of perversity from which such calculating violation may spring, the farther off indeed but the surer the return, and the more dreadful the penalty.

This dread of suffering, and perhaps permanent ill-being, is one constituent of the feeling of guilt, and the first form which it takes. It is, however, individualistic, and respects the subject as able to suffer or enjoy in and for himself alone. Thus far the feeling, and the judgment therefrom formed, that by transgression of the moral law the subject has rendered himself liable to suffering, are a posteriori in origin, and no other ethic is needed to explain them than an ethic of expediency.

But in the judgment of guilt there is something a priori in origin, and here in consciousness the judgment antedates the feeling. As the moral law comes to be understood as the law, not only for the individual reflecting subject, but for humanity as such, and for the whole rational universe, if it be in thought extended beyond humanity; as it takes a universal form, and is thus absolute in its character, and is ruled as to its requirements by some ideal state of things, possible in thought to be realized; as it is seen to imply a commonwealth, and an organic unity, moral, intellectual and physical, and therefore spiritual by virtue of the harmony and normal inter-relation of these three aspects or elements of all concrete being; the knowledge of one's self that he is not yet a member of such commonwealth, and that while others are endeavoring to realize it, he is a disturbing and disorganizing element, either from wilfulness or weakness; the knowledge that one withholds himself from the stream of tendency towards this realization, or by some single act, throws himself out of the current;—such knowledge forces a comparison of one's self with the ideal requirement, and brings about the discovery that he is in an irrational state. Here is not only a contradiction to the reason, but a violation of the moral sense, (this name being given to the feeling which ensues after moral judgments). This is not the apprehension of punishment, but the present discontent from the consciousness of discord. The moral sense is here identical with the aesthetic sense. That harmony and beauty which only can bring about the purest and highest aesthetic emotion is troubled by the discordant element, and when seen to be so troubled by the subject's own wilful act or neglect, the discovery produces this feeling of discontent, or spiritual pain, which too is an element in the complex consciousness of guilt. Whether it would receive this name, were it purely this spiritual pain, and not mingled with the feeling of apprehension for our composite being above described, may be questioned; but that is a needless and unprofitable enquiry, since in the concrete they are never separate, but more or less intimately mingled.

In our conscious experience we find that conviction of moral freedom
accompanies this discovery of the violation of the prudential law of the understanding, as well as the discovery of the moral shortcoming towards the requirements of the reason and the aesthetic sense. These mental states would be inexplicable were not such moral freedom implied. But even if the conviction of such freedom be apparently abandoned and denied in some objective utterance, and the subject regard himself as determined and in the chain of necessity, the judgment and the feeling of guilt, as I have analyzed it above, would still exist in all the essential constituents. He may apprehend punishment and lament his liability to suffering, even though he think he has been irresistibly drawn along in the current of events, and dread the result of his misfortune in the one case, as he dreads the result of his fault in the other: and his aesthetic sense may be violated by the discovery of his shortcoming toward his own ideal, just as poignantly when he regards his condition as remediless as if he thought it remediable.

If we thus eliminate the conception of moral freedom, the judgment of guilt does not constitute the judgment of sin; and there is no true antimony between this and the fact of the universally inherited selfish propensities of human nature, called or miscalled "Original Sin." Thus far there is no need of the doctrine of moral responsibility, or of immortality, or even of God as a personal principle. But these ideas, and the convictions ensuing, exist, as we have claimed, implicit in human consciousness. Were there no personal God, infinite in resource, no human immortality, no responsibility, these ideas and convictions could never have been reached by any physical process thought as purely such. They constitute the very essential fibre of human consciousness, and their very existence is the highest possible evidence that we belong to a universe other than merely physical. They are convertible terms. To say that we have these ideas is to say that we transcend the physical nexus. They show themselves in all human knowledge, and without them we could never rise above animal understanding. If these ideas are baseless and untrustworthy, all knowledge is baseless and untrustworthy, and we reach the vanishing point of pure subjective idealism only to recoil into a Pyrrhonism that contradicts itself in its very attempted attitude of negation.

If, then, we hold as firm against all possible attacks the truth of moral freedom, we find that it implies the possession of a universalistic ideal more or less dimly described, to be preferred to any individualistic end manufactured out of the material of the universe changeable by our physical liberty or power. This ideal, to satisfy the requirements of the reason and the aesthetic sense, and produce the judgment and the feeling called "obligation," must do so at all points. It must comprise not only an accord of wills, strong beyond assault, but free from assault, therefore in accord with the environment. Human aspiration, man's highest need, must be met. No want, no longing must be unsatisfied, since there exists no longing that may not be satisfied without removing the contradiction. No power can be denied the possibility of successful exercise. No limit must be set to the subject's advance and expansion. The personal God cannot be left out of
this ideal commonwealth, thus environed. The whole structure falls to pieces if He is. Love, which craves the perfect object, can be content with nothing less than God. To deny to the soul a never ending approach to him, and penetration of the recesses of the infinite, or to leave out the unifying principle and erect here an impassable wall of darkness, would be to repel it back in an infinite recession. The desire for knowledge and the delight in it, would expire unless the field for knowledge were infinite, unless there were room for its activities through all the eternities, and unless there were indeed a perfectly satisfying object for such delight.

Unless, then, God, freedom, and immortality are ideas involved in the very mental structure of the human being, sin cannot exist, and no notion of it can be legitimated. And if sin cannot exist, then we have a world in which more or less prudence only is possible,—in which any future generation, however it has attained a state of things more desirable, yet has not conquered nature, nor subdued the elements and all pain-giving powers, from which deranged and selfish instincts might again spring and renew the conflict, nor avoided death. Such a world is but little satisfying to the aesthetic sense, rather violates it the uttermost; since the contradiction between the spiritual soul and the physical environment is more pronounced than ever, and seems to be remediless. As the desire for elevation and the ideal harmony becomes more intense, and these clearer and purer, the human soul would become more hopeless of gratification, and the acutest agony would have become possible. ②

But with the postulates of God, freedom and immortality, sin and guilt, become for our thought something more than liability to suffering, contradiction to the reason, and violation of the aesthetic sense thus far defined. These all must receive modification and new elements, as they connect with the idea of God; and we find disharmony not only between the subject and the physical forces, not only between the actual and the ideal, but we have an abnormal or deranged personal relation, the normal and highest conceivable one declined, and a spiritual independency seeking to make itself absolute. Thus only does the notion of sin acquire its full significance, and the contradiction its full intensity. If moral freedom be postulated, sin becomes then a wilful refusal to realize or aid in realizing that ideal for all rational existence which only can satisfy the reason; and guilt is the natural yet attenuating pain at this contradiction. If immortality be postulated, sin becomes a refusal to accept the perfect well-being and the amplifying development, and proposes to stop up all other avenues of delight, and concentrate all complacency upon one—of spiritual independency; and guilt become the apprehension of a hostile environment from which the subject is not yet strong enough to escape. And thirdly, if God be postulated, sin becomes

② The terms "moral sense"—"aesthetic sense" are used, meaning thereby a spontaneous judgment accompanied by feeling, which bears resemblance to "sense" proper, in its immediacy; yet it is a true judgment, and requires the presence of the absolute norm to furnish ground for the comparison.

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likewise a refusal of that personal relation which is felt to be possible, and which is the true spring and real element in all original human desire; for all going out of one’s self for delight is a confession of dependence. It is the first element of love, gathering itself afterwards into clear consciousness. The soul, therefore, cannot become purely and intrinsically evil until it has acted from this spring and made for itself a world of ideas; and thus, in its very attempted independence it confesses its obligation, yet declines all return, and ultimately scorns any new increments to its subjective world. Thus sin is potentially and may become at length an absolute reversal of the primitive tendencies of our being; and a re-creation of one’s self with material limited and shut off from further supply. In this case the judgment of guilt, which remains clear, separates itself from the feeling, which goes on to a vanishing point; for while it remains, recovery and retrogression are in our thought possible.

In the ordinary Christian consciousness, the most constant and pain-giving element in guilt is the deranged and inadequate relation between one’s self and the personal God, in which the man looks upon himself as temporarily severed from the source and security of all harmony and well-being, as having interposed an impediment in the currents of love flowing between Father and child.

The apprehension of suffering from violation of law which constitutes the primary feeling in guilt receives a new element from the acknowledgment of a personal God. Transgression and suffering exist. They are either entirely disconnected, and belong to different processes and only accidentally meet, or else they are connected by an intelligent will, which can adapt the latter to the former. The faith in such adaptation modifies the pain. Nature no longer appears a merciless tyrant, but a free movement, with far-off purposes of love. Thus while the pain which she brings is borne with more courage, the agony of guilt becomes so much more poignant that one hastens to extinguish it in repentance.

If, then, the total and complex judgment and feeling of guilt contain the idea of a personal God, the healthy moral consciousness and life a fortiori imply it; and we are ready to seek the indication of this idea from other, ampler, and purer sources.
ARTICLE VIII.

CRITICAL NOTE.

BETHSAIDA.

The seeming discrepancy between Luke ix. 10 and Mark vi. 45, in their diverse mention of the "city called Bethsaida," has occasioned considerable controversy first and last; which has been renewed by the recent Sunday-school lesson on the parallel passage in Matthew. The most common solution of the difficulty is, that two different cities of the same name are referred to by the two evangelists, cities not more than six or eight miles apart, on opposite sides of the Sea of Galilee near its head.

This will answer for an explanation, if no better can be found. But it is by no means fully satisfactory; and, since the Revised New Testament has opened up what appears to be a more probable solution, (which no one seems to have noticed,) I would here draw attention to it. A few facts must be taken into consideration.

1. The New Testament BETHSAIDA was in Galilee, on the western shore of the Sea of Galilee, and very near Capernaum, at one extremity of it as it stretched along the lake; very likely just over the promontory of Capernaum, on its northern side, as long ago indicated by Dr. Robinson. It was a sort of suburb of Capernaum, where people, engaged in the fishery or other business of Capernaum, could have their homes, passing readily from the one place to the other. For,—

1. We read at John i. 44, "Now Philip was of Bethsaida, the city of Andrew and Peter." And it was "Bethsaida of Galilee," as said at xii. 21. For which reason, Peter was called a "Galilean," Mark xiv. 70; Luke xxii. 59. (As to Mark viii. 22, 27, in the continual crossings of the sea about that time, they may as well have passed from their own home Bethsaida, on to Cesarea Philippi, as from the eastern side of the sea.)

2. At Mark i. 21 we read, "And they went into Capernaum, and straightway on the Sabbath day he entered into the synagogue and taught. Ver. 29, "And forthwith, when they were come out of the synagogue, they entered into the house of Simon and Andrew, with James and John. But Simon's wife's mother lay sick of a fever." Ver. 32, "And at even when the sun did set,....... all the city [of Bethsaida] was gathered together at the door." Here plainly was a passing directly and at once from the synagogue meeting in Capernaum to their home, which we just learned was in Bethsaida. There was no great time spent on the way; nor did the Jewish law allow
much travel, for it was "on the Sabbath day," and no issue was as yet raised on Sabbath observance.

3. Christ's Galilean home, when driven from Nazareth, was evidently with these disciples, to whose house, he (and they) oft resorted. And this was what made the adjoining Capernaum (with its synagogue) so much the head-quarters of Jesus' preaching; as it made the suburb Bethsaida one of the chief cities upbraided, as where "most of his mighty works were done." (Matt. xi. 21; Luke x. 13.) The location of Bethsaida is therefore very evident.

II. There could not be a second Bethsaida at the same time in the near neighborhood,—so near that the people "ran afoot...and outwent them," when passing from one to beyond the other. (Mark vi. 33.) No such confounding of neighborhood names could be tolerated or practised among any people, without some appended epithet of distinction. All will agree in this. But—

1. It is true, that in times long before that, the village at the head of the lake, just east of the mouth of the upper Jordan, had been called Bethsaida. But some twenty or more years before those New Testament events, in the days of Augustus Cæsar, Philip, the ruler of that country east of Galilee, "advanced the village Bethsaida, situate at the lake of Gennesaret, unto the dignity of a city,...and called it by the name of Julias, the name of [Augustus] Cæsar's daughter." (Josephus, Antiq. xviii. 2, 1.) And afterwards, Philip "died at Julias." (4, 6.)

2. Doubtless, then or afterwards, Capernaum's suburb town (nearest to Julias) took up the relinquished name Bethsaida, (Heb. "the house of food," ) as the eating and lodging place for Capernaum's overflow. But it is simply impossible that both places (so near together) should have and keep in use at the same time the same undistinguished name. The one expression in John xii. 21, which points out Philip as a Galilean, is not sufficient to set this difficulty aside.

3. It was thirty years later still when the Gospels were written, or more than fifty years after Julias had lost the name of Bethsaida; so that the title had been fully appropriated by the Galilean city, to which Luke and all the Gospels apply it without qualification. It is not likely, that then the educated physician Luke would speak also of Julias by its ancient name Bethsaida, without any qualifying word, especially, as he takes pains to say "a city called Bethsaida," as though this were a new name applied; not "a city once called Bethsaida," as the theory in question would require. Why should he (or Mark) take pains to dig up an obsolete title, to confuse another city with the existent Bethsaida, so called by themselves?

III. Cannot a better explanation be found for Luke ix. 10? Look at the following:—

1. The new rendering of Luke ix. 10 is simply this:—"And he took them, and withdrew apart to a city called Bethsaida [i.e., from Capernaum or elsewhere]. But the multitudes perceiving it followed him [i.e., thither and thence]: and he welcomed them," i.e., to the "desert place" subse-
quently reached (verse 12). This shortened rendering of verse 10 seems to be absolutely required by the preponderance of ancient manuscripts; and this is one of the places where no one disputes the correctness of the Revisers' work.

2. So, then, this "Bethsaida" of Luke no longer locates the "desert place;" his statement is of retirement to a city, the other writers tell of retirement directly to a desert place, quite a different affair. The fact opens before us, that there were two stages of withdrawal from the crowd, the first one here definitely named by Luke alone; though, for some reason, he fails to note clearly the transition between the first (or city) stage and the second (or desert) stage of withdrawal. They first sought refuge in the city of Bethsaida, their usual quiet home-resort (from Capernaum), at the residence of Peter and Andrew. They were trying to eat (Mark vi. 31), probably at Peter's house, where Jesus made his home. Just this seems to be the revised record of Luke, who says he "withdrew apart" or retired privately (Gr. ἀπελθεν, ἐξῆλθεν),—"took her unto his own (home)," it is rendered in John xix: 27.

3. But Jesus, finding there no privacy, because of the crowds that collected (Luke ix. 11), said to them (as in Mark vi. 31), "Come ye yourselves apart into a desert place and rest awhile. For there were many coming and going, and they had no leisure so much as to eat," even there at their own house in Bethsaida,—not referring alone to Capernaum, whence they may have first withdrawn. Whereupon, (verse 32) "they departed [thence, Matt.] into a desert place by ship privately [apart, Matt.]." The evangelist John (vi. 1) locates the desert, as "over the Sea of Galilee," thus explaining why it was by ship. When Luke says (in verse 10), they "withdrew apart to a city called Bethsaida," how certain it is, that he is not here stating the destination reached at last, which was "a desert place" (verse 12), and not a city. They certainly did not go to the city of Julias at all; what "city" could it be they actually went to, but Bethsaida, their home?

4. At night (Mark vi. 45), Jesus "constrained his disciples to get into the ship, and to go before him, to the other side to Bethsaida" whence they had started out. (The expression here "to the other side" forbids the notion of some, that this desired sall was perhaps to be only along the shore to Julias, as the place meant by Bethsaida.) How plainly but one Bethsaida, namely, their home city, is in the narrative! with which city no "desert place" is here mixed up; (though there were, of course, retired spots about Bethsaida itself, Luke iv. 38, 42). And how beautiful the harmony thus brought out of the seemingly discordant narratives, proving them separately and wonderfully inspired! Here is one of the apparent "discrepancies" happily removed—an unwitting result of New Testament revision.

IV. The source of error.

1. In early times, readers imagined a difficulty (where there was none) merely because Luke had failed to mention the passage by ship over the sea; for he has not a word about either the going or the return. So they altered the text, trying to have Luke say, that his mentioned withdrawal, (which was only a first stage of the withdrawal,) was itself a passage over
the sea. They did not reflect, that if Luke had meant to speak of the trip over, he would certainly afterwards have spoken of the more striking trip back, and the miracle on the sea, which he entirely leaves out.

2. The spurious reading made itself manifest in A.D. 1590, in a map of the Sea of Galilee by Adrichomius, with Bethsaida rightly located near Capernaum on the western side, and with the "Desert of Bethsaida," and just back of it the city "Julias" on the northeastern shore. (Mark 7:12, "Julas," not Bethsaida there.) This is just as the corrupted text of our common version puts it: "—into a [desert place belonging to the] city called Bethsaida." (See Sunday-School Times, Dec. 3, 1887.) Not that the city Bethsaida itself was on the eastern side; but only a desert over there supposed to "belong" to Bethsaida. No one in the early days dreamed of the city Julias near that desert as being the city Bethsaida named by Luke. That map did not so claim it.

3. The earliest writer we know of as broaching such an idea, is referred to by Dr. W. M. Thomson in "The Land and the Book," where he speaks of "the invention of a second Bethsaida as the work of the geographer Re-land, in the eighteenth century." No one doubts that there was another Bethsaida (with the name given up) at an earlier date; but Dr. Thomson, Major Wilson, and other critical scholars (including prominent members of the revision committee), do not believe there were two Bethsaidas at the same time, but a few miles apart, with no distinguishing suffix to the name. Nor was this the meaning of the map referred to, nor of the interpolated reading of the received text on which that map was built.

4. That false reading, evidently a spurious enlargement by way of attempted explanation, is now happily ruled out by the Revised Version (not even leaving it in the margin); and it is seen that Luke's statement in verse 10 does not at all refer to the boat-trip or the desert place, but notes only a preliminary attempt at retirement in their home, which ended in a desert picnic (Luke does not say where). Why Luke does not mention the trip over the sea, which was all the stumbling-block that caused the spurious reading, we may not be able to explain. As Luke thus fails to notice this sea-trip and miracle, so John fails to notice the previous sea-trip and miracle which Luke does give (viii. 22-40).

5. Perhaps in Luke's case, it was because, in his order of narrative, this sea adventure comes so soon after the similar sea adventure of the previous chapter (the 8th), that in the abundance of material, (John xx. 30, 31; xxi. 25,) he for brevity made the omission. Or, as Luke received his instruction largely from Paul, and neither of them was an eye-witness, he was not impressed with the sea-miracle, as the other evangelists were, who were on board that storm-tossed boat; and so it was not called to his mind in connection with the mountain feast.

Upon the whole, is not this view of the history worthy of consideration, alongside the current theory, which certainly has some difficulties which it is hard to surmount?

S. B. GOODENOW.
ARTICLE IX.

NOTICES OF RECENT PUBLICATIONS.


It is not the least among the benefits of the Johns Hopkins University publications that they take us to some overlooked and obscure sources of American history. They enable us to correct impressions made by writers who are regarded as standard authors. To how many, for example, will such statements as these, from Randall's "Puritan Colony," come like a new historical revelation!

"Years before Pilgrims or Puritans came to the shores of Massachusetts, Puritanism was a living force in Virginia. Among the first comers there were Puritans, who, for the time being, hushed religious convictions in their attempts to leave the mother country unobserved." "In the very bosom of Virginia a Puritan colony waxed strong, until its very strength necessitated expulsion." "Virginia and New England each passed through the same phases, and each fostered the growth of political opinion." There was a Providence on the Severn, now forgotten, which was sister to the Providence that still sits as a queen beside the Narragansett.

Those who will be puzzled by this have doubtless also puzzled over the question—even some good New Englanders have done so—why the Pilgrims when they sailed expected to land in "Virginia," at all. What had been done there to attract so sturdy Nonconformists? As early as 1609–10 the father of the poet Crashaw said in a sermon at "the Temple:" "Suffer no Brownists, nor factious separatists; let them keep their conventicles elsewhere; let them go and convert some other heathen, and let us see if they can constitute such churches really [i.e., Congregational], the ideas whereof they have fancied in their brains, and when they have set us such an example, we may then have some cause to follow them." This was preached before Lord Delaware, just appointed Captain General of Virginia. Yet the lay reader who accompanied the second clergyman of the English Church to Virginia (with Sir Thomas Gates) was a Brownist. "American Congregation-

1Neill's English Colonization of America, pp. 35-49. London. 1871.
alism found its earliest; though a brief, home in Virginia. In the very first ships that came to the mouth of the James River were Puritan families, and they wrote back inviting their friends to follow.\(^8\)

What is known of the early Southern ministers confirms this statement. How many of Delaware's five hundred colonists, or of Dale's three hundred, or of Gates's three hundred and fifty were nonconformist Christians cannot now be discovered. An Amsterdam Puritan elder, Francis Blackwell, sailed with one hundred and fifty "of Presbyterian tendencies," but only thirty reached Virginia (1618).\(^8\) But there came with Dale Rev. Alexander Whitaker, distinguished as a Puritan lecturer at St. John's Cambridge University. The father had brought up his son after his own way. The son preached to the Dutch near Henrico about seven years. His only clerical fellow was Rev. Wm. Wickham at Henrico,—also a Puritan, and, after Whitaker's death by drowning, the only Virginia clergyman. Whitaker had discarded the surplice;\(^8\) Wickham was never ordained. Rev. George Keith succeeded the former in 1616, a Scotchman, who came from Bermuda, where conformity was not favored. In 1621, the year after the Pilgrims reached Plymouth, Rev. Hawte Wyatt, another Puritan, came to Virginia, and remained three years. In 1623 "Gov. Wyatt stated that there were ministers in the colony, but not in orders."\(^8\) Others were sent over who were better Churchmen, but "during the Cromwellian era there were none who strictly conformed of whom we have any record."

In 1677 the third Lord Baltimore said there were four ministers of the Church of England. Of these, Rev. Matthew Hill had been ejected in England for nonconformity; another, Rev. Francis Doughty, had been arraigned before the High Commission; and a third, Rev. Charles Nicholet, subsequently was pastor of a Congregational church in Salem.\(^8\)

These gentlemen owed their clerical titles to a national church under whose hand they did not care to live. There is no ground for denying the following statements:—"Orthodox [Churchmen] and Nonconformist were equally welcomed by Governor and Council. Doubtless reports from the brethren in Virginia, where the English Archbishop's heavy hand could not be felt, came to the ears of the English separatists in Holland." And the Pilgrim Fathers were influenced thereby.

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\(^8\) Neill's Terra Maris, p. 75. Philadelphia, 1867.

\(^8\) English Colon., p. 98. The emigration to the Bermudas, so closely connected with that to Virginia and Maryland, seems to have been Puritan to a still greater degree. Rev. Patrick Copland, who organized there a Congregational church, and Rev. Lewis Hughes, who wrote "The ceremonies are in no request, nor the Book of Common Prayer," were pretty poor Churchmen. Two other ordained clergymen in Bermuda, Rev. W. White and Rev. N. Golding, withdrew from the English Church with Copland, 1643-44. Neill, Brief, p. 39.

\(^4\) Eng. Colon., p. 278. Neill, Virginia Vestusta, p. 164. A friend of Crashaw, the Temple preacher, he was of a very different spirit.

\(^5\) Terra Maris, p. 75. A statement of the Virginia Assembly the same year is, "Divers of them have no orders." English Colon., p. 324.

\(^6\) The fourth of those possibly referred to by Lord Charles was Rev. John Coode, the political agitator of 1679, whom neither party probably will be anxious to claim.
The same year that Wyatt strengthened the Puritan element in Virginia, Edward Bennett, London merchant, brought his Puritan colonists to his land grant on the Nansemond River, south of the James, and, with them, Rev. William Bennett, a Puritan, as their minister. But already in the three previous years (1618–21), twenty-five hundred persons had come to Virginia, says one of the publications before us, "some enticed by Governor Wyatt's offers and others driven by persecution during the last years of Archbishop Bancroft." Milton and Pym would have come but for the king's proclamation requiring a royal license to leave the kingdom. Henry Jacob actually came in 1624, and died on Virginia soil. In the Virginia Assembly of 1629, the Puritan county of Warrasquoyacke, or Isle of Wight, was represented by two burgesses. This was two years before the government became intolerantly Episcopal. Puritan settlers had been invited from Plymouth about this time, as they were afterward in 1641, when Rev. Messrs. Thompson of Braintree, Knowles of Watertown, and James of New Haven were appointed to remove to Virginia, as they were also by Baltimore himself shortly after; and a few years later by Stone, who was made Governor of Maryland in 1648. When Episcopal persecution arose in Virginia the Virginia Puritans were invited to emigrate to Bahama and to Maryland, not to New England; but by this time, they numbered about one thousand souls. This was the estimate of Rev. Thomas Harrison, who began as a persecutor with rough old Governor Berkeley,—driving the three New England ministers out of the colony,—but ended by going down to "the wilds of Nansemond a zealous Puritan;" was himself compelled to leave Virginia; went back to England, and became Henry Cromwell's chaplain in Ireland. Ten families of Virginia Puritans now led the way to the mouth of the Severn River in Maryland, and three hundred members of the Nansemond church emigrated to the same place, which—in the same spirit with that of Rhode Island colonists, and with a like zeal for freedom and religion—they called "Providence." Other Puritans followed, and Anne Arundel county and Annapolis—both named for Lady Baltimore—were founded. From 1649 (the date of Puritan legislation for toleration) to 1654, "the influx of perhaps a thousand colonists of Protestant persuasion threw the balance of power in their favor," in Maryland, and against the Roman Catholics. Thirty-five or forty years later Anne Arundel county was reported as "the richest and most populous" in the colony.

It was this transfer of Virginia Puritanism to Lord Baltimore's colony, and its superior growth beyond that of the Romanism, or the English churchism even, of Maryland, that brought on in a few years that struggle for republican freedom, of the true character of which we are now for the first time getting glimpses from original sources. In this correction of historical error the two

7 Doyle, who is not inclined, as an Oxford Fellow, to rate the number of colonial Nonconformists very high, says that, "By 1653 the Puritans formed two distinct communities, numbering between them close upon a hundred and forty houseolders." English Colonies in America, p. 304. 1882. This would give them seven or eight hundred souls in families, besides single men, servants, etc.
Writers above named are doing excellent service. Mr. Neill, indeed, has been doing it for years, the altered tone of Bancroft and others being largely due to his successive volumes, of which the "Brief" named above is a condensation. He has specially made clear the Protestant emigration to Maryland from the first, which even the Jesuit White complained of as an "infidel" majority. Mr. Randall gives a graphic account of the conflict (1655), the battle of the Severn, and the re-establishment of Puritan supremacy. It was five or six years after the famous "Toleration Act" that things came to a head, and ten years after the act of Parliament securing toleration in the Bermudas, which was the model and parent of the Maryland act, and, indeed, itself enacted religious freedom for all "in any other part of America." King Charles had been beheaded before the Maryland "Toleration Act," and two years before the battle of Severn the English government had become republican and Puritan; but Lord Baltimore hesitated a year to sanction the Act—(for it was largely Puritan, as well as Protestant, instead of Roman Catholic)—and when the Puritans in 1657 triumphed in his colony, they felt it necessary to take a formal pledge from him never to repeal it. Mr. Randall well says, that "apart from the Act of 1669, proceeding as that had done from the will of the people, religious freedom, up to this time, was a political and economical necessity in Maryland (cf. Mr. Gladstone's Vaticanism). If, in the early days of the colony, the Roman Catholics were superior in numbers—still a debated question—their charter forbade intolerance, and Protestant Virginia would have been a standing menace to any attempt at intolerance." A Protestant Governor (Stone) had been for the first time appointed by Baltimore, 1648, and his commission is the first express provision for freedom of worship, but this was merely to protect Catholics against the growing Protestant power in the colony.8

It is in the light of these contemporaneous facts that we must look at the Puritan uprising in 1654. It was an act of self-defence throughout. It is to be remembered that, whoever ruled in England, Baltimore was always intent upon sovereign power in Maryland, and his colonial officers supported his claim of absolute feudal sway under his charter, save when the spirit of the people rendered this impossible. The struggle for popular rights against the Lord Proprietor was always on, and the chief effect of republican rule in England was to strengthen the people against him. After the Long Parliament dissolved, Governor Stone attempted to restore in full Baltimore's authority against the people. A few months later (1654) he did indeed, by proclamation of an act of assembly, under pressure, acknowledge Cromwell, who recognized the commissioners appointed by Parliament to "settle the government" of the colony; but Stone nevertheless repudiated the commissioners. He appointed "counsellors all of the Romish religion, excluding others appointed by the Parliament commissioners." So said the Commissioners, Bennett and Clayborne, in a manifesto issued against him, and in behalf of Parliament, the Protector, and the people. Stone doubt-

8 "No considerable number of Catholic immigrants appears to have arrived subsequently to the first migration." Hildreth, Hist. U. S., Vol. i. pp. 365, 366.
less was instigated by Lord Baltimore; but the assembly that acknowledged Cromwell disfranchised the disloyal Papists, which certainly conflicted with Stone’s commission from Baltimore; but the governor’s military proceedings against the people were without written authority from any one. If a man named Eltonhead who arrived in January, 1654, brought instructions from Baltimore to Stone to do as he did, then the issue clearly was just this: the Governor under the Proprietor vs. the Commissioners under Parliament and the Lord Protector, now virtual king of England, and the people of Maryland. After all, Catholics were only nominally disfranchised by the act of assembly which Baltimore and Stone complained of,—as was the case also under the act of Parliament in England. Their creed was not assailed; and when they “came boldly into court, upholding their creed, they were always protected in their civil rights.” Stone seized the colony records by force, and moved his troops against the Puritan settlements, pillaging as he went. The Puritans offered to surrender to him, if three things were granted: (1) The liberty of English subjects; (2) Indemnification for late troubles; (3) Liberty to emigrate. If these were refused, they said, “we are resolved to commit ourselves into the hands of God, and rather die like men than be made slaves.” Stone refused, raised the Baltimore flag, yellow and black, and with the cry, “Hey for St. Mary’s!” made attack. Under the flag of the Commonwealth, with the cry, “In the name of God, fall on!” the Puritans routed him utterly, driving everything before them, like their fellows under Cromwell over sea, giving no time to surrender, killing and wounding fifty—their own loss being but six—and capturing the force. Mr. Randall’s remarks upon this are quite unlike those of some so-called historians. He says:—

“In these two miniature armies we see but a colonial reproduction of the two forces which met ten years before at Marston Moor. The questions here involved were not merely of a religious nature, as so many hold; the great principles of self-government, individual liberty, and civic equality were causes for which the Puritans fought and died, both in England and in the small colony of Maryland. The fate of the battle of Severn was to determine whether the colonists of Maryland should endure or throw off the absolute authority of their Proprietor and his chosen Council; whether ‘the liberties of English citizens’ were really to be granted to the colony or trampled under foot.”

The victorious Puritans showed their supreme respect for law all through. They seized an English vessel or two lying in the river in due form before the battle, and after it held court martial, under which three of the attack-

* Randall gives more than this as the cry of Stone’s men—“St. Mary’s, and wives for us all.” Hildreth (vol. i. p. 360) adds this to the Puritan cry, “God is our strength.” Leonard Strong, one of the Puritans, wrote afterwards that same year: “God did appear wonderful in the field and in the hearts of the people, all confessing Him to be the only worker of this victory and deliverance”—quite in the tone of a Cromwell dispatch after battle. Mr. Bancroft observes (vol. i. p. 173) that “Parties became identified with religious sects,” etc.; and this is clearly so far true that nonconformity in Virginia and Maryland strengthened the purpose of those who fought for civil freedom, as it did over sea.
ing party of two hundred and fifty were executed, with Eltonhead, the adventurer, before named. Officers took charge of all rebel estates till estimate of losses could be made, and fines imposed. Courts were held in the counties. All were pardoned who had joined in the attack under constraint or misrepresentation of the purposes for which it was made. Of the new sheriffs appointed to deal with offenders the Puritans chose some from Stone's own men.

Puritan rule continued after this victory—in all eight years—and meanwhile the representatives in England of both parties defended themselves, before the Council of Virginia, the Council of State, the Parliamentary Committee on Plantations, the Committee on Trade, and the Lord Protector. At last, in November, 1657, Baltimore and the Maryland Commissioners came to terms, and the government was given back to him.

Mr. Doyle gathers from all the facts—they are given in Bozman's "History of Maryland," 1837, Vol. ii. p. 553, seq.,—that without force or fraud, without one substantial sacrifice, by the bloodless arts of diplomacy, he [Baltimore] had now won back every position for which he had fought" (Engl. Colonies, Vol. i. p. 312). As throughout his career, when compelled to do so, he always yielded other things to secure income from the province, there is a sense in which this is true. "Substantial sacrifice" would have been, in this sense, the yielding any control that would have cost any income. But he certainly did not win back what he now conceded. And he conceded the oath of fidelity. A form of general submission was substituted for it by the Puritans in the council, and it was never after exacted.

The land claims of "the people in opposition" were conceded, subject to proprietary charges. Acts of persons in arms vs. Baltimore were condoned; assurances of indemnity for their losses from Stone's plundering were given; they were permitted to retain their arms; all acts of assemblies and courts under the opposition were confirmed. Permission to emigrate within one year was conceded, though the concessions made this less an object, especially Baltimore's engagement never to consent to repeal the "Act of Toleration," so-called, which they had carried in 1649 to supersede his required toleration of Roman Catholics under Puritan rule. It was characteristic of Baltimore that he should put into the agreement with his successful opponents the words "the said Lord, upon a treaty, etc., hath condescended, and is willing to do as followeth." The terms demanded of Stone before the battle of Severn were, in short, agreed to. "Perfect liberty and equality," says Mr. Randall, "were all the Puritans desired. These points gained, they readily yielded up to Baltimore his province." These points conceded, the Proprietor regained his income, which really included "every position for which he had fought."

Mr. Bancroft, who allows himself to express no sympathy for the popular cause in this struggle, masses together these and subsequent transactions by representing that, on Cromwell's death, nearly six months later, the general assembly, "weared with the convulsions of ten years," planted the government on the will of the people, "without dependence on any other power.
in the province.” But this was really done before by the Puritan warriors on the Severn and their representatives in the agreement at London. The assembly simply carried out what had been accomplished. “The burgesses refused to acknowledge an upper house.” “The representatives passed an act making it felony to disturb the order which they had established.” As a datum for the growth of freedom in Southern colonies to which English Puritans went, it may be noted that this was done the day before Virginia adopted independent legislation. “Till the final separation from England” the two colonies “hardly made any further advances towards freedom and independence.”

When Lord Baltimore died, at the close of the third quarter of the century, the Romanists in the colony, according to a letter of the (then) Bishop of London, did “not amount to one of a hundred of the people;” but the Puritan settlement, with the complete religious toleration that ensued, and which it perpetuated, had so promoted the secular prosperity of all, that the annual tribute to the Proprietor, from fines, quit-rents, tonnage, and export duties amounted to a handsome sum, and there were “ten counties, with perhaps sixteen thousand inhabitants,” “for the larger part Protestants” (Hildreth, Vol. i. pp. 565, 566). “By the close of the century,” says Mr. Randall, “fifty years from its settlement, the county of Providence stood at the head of Maryland affairs, but it was no longer Puritan. Its history now blends with that of the province at large.” In their principles “the men of Severn went forth to conquer the whole province.” They “represented in Virginia and Maryland what the Puritan masses represented in England in 1648; what the Third Estate represented in France in 1789.”

Subsequent conflicts, however, like the “Great Rebellion” in Virginia, had no historic connection with them. It is not among possibilities to join Thomas Harrison and the Nansemond colonists for Christ’s sake with John Coode and the “Association in arms for the defence of the Protestant religion,” forty years later. In 1689 and subsequent years such terms meant simply “The Church of England by Law Established.”

**Manual of Christian Evidences.** By George Park Fisher, D.D., LL.D., Titus Street Professor of Ecclesiastical History in Yale University. New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons. 1888. (pp. ix. 123. 5½ x 3½.)


Professor Fisher’s studies have admirably fitted him for preparing a manual of Christian Evidences, and in the little work before us he has met our highest expectations. In presenting the argument he holds the balance, with admirable precision, between the external and the internal evidence, and uses them both, in their combined effect, with remarkable success. The

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10 Bancroft, Last Revision, Vol. i. pp. 175, 176.
11 The whole population is estimated to have been in 1660, eight thousand (Bancroft, 176).
brief compass of the book, also, permits the reader to gather in everything almost at a single sitting, so as to feel the cumulative force of the considerations. The only place where we feel at all like criticising is on page 92, where the author goes out of his way to state that "neither Christ nor the apostles took up questions respecting the authorship and date of Old Testament writings—such questions as belong to historical and scholarly inquiry." Such an effort to foreclose the argument drawn from the New Testament for the Mosaic authorship of the Pentateuch is extremely unfortunate, and is entirely unnecessary in a work of such general excellence.

Of Mr. Row's little volume we cannot speak in such high terms. The author is inclined to give entirely too much prominence to what he calls the "moral evidence," and seems unduly oblivious of the extent to which this evidence has been presented by previous writers; and, in general, the style of the treatise is in striking contrast to the clear-cut, precise, forcible, and orderly paragraphs of Dr. Fisher's work. On page 17 we find him saying that "our Lord never once attempted to prove the truth of a single utterance of his by working" a miracle. By what manner of exegesis he would explain Mark ii. 10, 11, where Christ expressly says that he performed the miracle of healing the palsied man on purpose to show that he had authority to forgive sin as he had said, Dr. Row does not inform us, and this is of a piece with numerous random assertions of the author. For example, again, on page 126, we are told that the proof of the genuineness of the Gospels, as well as of their authenticity, "involves a careful investigation of the writings of the early Fathers," but that "none of these early writers mention either of our Gospels by name." If, by early Fathers, he means, as we suppose he does, those who wrote in the early part of the second century or the latter part of the first, it is not true that the proof of the genuineness or authenticity of the four Gospels is largely dependent upon those writings. The public acknowledgment and use of the Gospels in the latter part of the second century is such as to prove both their genuineness and authenticity, especially as combined with the previous use of the New Testament made by the churches and earlier writers.

**The Spirit of Beauty**: Essays Scientific and Æsthetic. By Henry W. Parker. New York: John B. Alden. 1888. (pp. 252. 5½ x 3.)

The writer of this volume is the master of a charming and convincing style, as well as of the subject of which he treats. Professor Parker is a competent and well-known naturalist, and, as this volume shows, an able defender of a true aesthetic conception of nature. While not rejecting the theory of the derivation of species by descent he does reject the sweeping evolutionism of such writers as Herbert Spencer. The first chapter in the volume contains a powerful argument for design in nature, drawn from the prevalence of beauty in the natural world; while the second chapter presents the convincing reasons for holding that man in his mental and moral qualities is far more than a developed animal. The gulf between instinct and reason is impassable, except by a bridge of special creation. The remaining chapters have, for
the most part, been previously published, and have already commended the
writer to the warm regard of many of the strongest thinkers of the times.
These chapters treat successively of "The Moral in Nature," "Lessons of
Crystals," "Ornament in Nature," "The Divine in Art," "Christ in the
Rainbow," "Life Transfigured."

**BIBLICAL THEOLOGY OF THE OLD TESTAMENT.** Based on Oehler. By Pro-
Fessor Revere Franklin Weidner, Professor of Exegetical Theology in
Augustana Theological Seminary, Rock Island, Ill. Chicago: F. H.
Revell. 1886. (pp. 240. 6½ x 3¾.) $1.25.

**AN INTRODUCTION TO DOGMATIC THEOLOGY.** Based on Luthardt. By
Revere Franklin Weidner. Rock Island, Ill.: Augustana Book Concern.
1888. (pp. 260. 5¼ x 3¼.) $2.25.

Dr. Weidner has, in these volumes, placed theological students under
additional obligation, and the success with which he has treated the subjects
will prepare the public to give a favorable reception to his future volumes. Dr.
Weidner does not claim to be an original investigator, but has chosen rather
the mission of disseminating the works of others. The first of the volumes
mentioned above is, however, we think, an improvement on Oehler, and the
second, far better adapted to the wants of American students than a mere
translation of Luthardt would have been. All students will find the volumes
a great convenience.

**RATIONAL THEOLOGY; or, Ethical and Theological Essays.** By John Milton
Williams, A.M. Chicago: Charles H. Kerr and Company; Boston:
George H. Ellis. 1888. (pp. 310. 5½ x 3¾.) $1.50.

This small but significant volume embraces eight essays on the following
topics: Old and New Calvinism; The Conscience; Virtue from a Scientific
Standpoint; Regeneration; Divine Sovereignty and Free Agency; The
Atonement; The Future of Incorrigible Men; The Christ of Nazareth—
Who was He?

By the term "Rational Theology" the author intends, not a rationalistic
theology, but a theology which accords with reason,—"the faculty which
makes its possessor an intelligent and moral being, gives him authoritative
laws of thought and duty, lifts him to the awful summits of accountability,
and more than any other, constitutes his likeness to his Maker." The style
of the essays is terse, vigorous, and luminous,—sometimes, possibly too com-
 pact and condensed to meet the necessities of those to whom the line of
thought is not familiar. The author depends upon no very elaborate course
of argument to secure the assent of his readers, but upon the clearness of his
statements addressed to each one's intelligence and reason. He does not
disparage or neglect the Scriptures, but for the most part his discussions have
to do with the philosophy underlying Christian doctrine, rather than with the
Scripture presentation of those doctrines. Such principles of common
sense and common reason must be applied in all successful interpretation of
the Scriptures, and even those theologians who discard all philosophy, assume and apply a philosophy in all their applications of Scripture.

In the preparation of these essays the author "had chiefly in mind his brethren in the sacred calling," but the subjects presented do not lie beyond the range of ordinary thought; and the book would furnish profitable and interesting reading to a multitude of Christian people. Such readers will not often find themselves compelled to dissent from the conclusions reached by the author, and when they do, they will find his discussion of the subject stimulating and helpful. The eighth essay—that on the nature of Christ—will doubtless meet with more dissent than either of the others. Indeed, the author in undertaking this discussion seems to have transcended the limits of what may be properly called rational theology. The mystery of the incarnation necessarily transcends all rational explanation, and the monophysitical view presented in the essay will doubtless seem to the majority of readers to bring into the problem as many difficulties as it relieves. On the whole the book is a most wholesome one, and can scarcely fail to be helpful in the present condition of theological thought.


Mr. Cook has slightly changed the form of his publication,—no longer appealing to the public through the channel of the newspapers, but limiting himself to his monthly periodical, Our Day, and to a more sumptuous and higher priced volume containing his preludes, lectures, and symposiums all in one. This volume well maintains the interest of the series. In addition to his own lectures, there are communications upon Current Religious Perils by no less than twenty-five representative men of all denominations. The book is a library of information.


This third volume continues the translation of the author’s invaluable work, the first two volumes of which have been noticed (vol. xliii. p. 390). The present volume is of special value for its bearing upon the interpretation of the New Testament, since it deals almost exclusively with the literature in circulation among both the Palestinian Jews and the Hellenists in the time of Christ. This is a field which has been too much neglected by interpreters, and from which we are more likely than from any other quarter to get light upon various obscurities in the New Testament.

In the "Bible Doctrine of Inspiration, explained and vindicated" Dr. Manly has furnished the world one of the best books upon the subject that has yet been published. The style is forcible and perspicuous, the author limits himself to the essential points in the discussion, and presents a view of the inspiration of the Bible which is at once loyal to the truth and defensible from all attack. He equally avoids taking up extreme positions and the surrender of important posts, and is not to be classed among those whom he describes as kind-hearted, liberal men who, in striving to propitiate opponents, and to gain them over by making a mild and unobjectionable statement of truth, may unconsciously surrender the very citadel to the enemy (p. 19).

After dwelling upon the importance of the subject and some sources of misapprehension arising from indiscriminate definitions, the author proceeds to the statement of the true doctrine, insisting that inspiration is not mechanical in its operation, nor destructive of the individuality of the writers; that it does not imply perfect knowledge on all subjects, or exemption from error in conduct; does not prevent errors of subsequent transcription, nor endorse sayings or actions introduced without express approval. Positively the true doctrine of inspiration is that God by ways and methods of his own has made the Bible his word, while still leaving it human in its literary form. The authorship is twofold. This occupies the First Part of the book.

The Second Part deals with the proof of inspiration, and properly recognizes the necessarily cumulative character of the argument. Strong presumptions that there would be an inspired record are drawn from the goodness of God and the need of man, from the importance of the object in view, from the prominence of the supernatural element in the Christian system, and from the uncultured character and straitened circumstances of the witnesses. For direct proof of inspiration, the author, assuming the general truth of Christian history, relies upon (1st) The manner in which one portion of Scripture is quoted in other portions, especially the Old Testament by the writers of the New; (2d) Specific declarations that particular passages are inspired, as in Matt. xxii. 43, where Jesus refers to Ps. cx. 1 as an utterance spoken by David in the spirit, meaning, as Mark xii. 36 shows, the Holy Spirit; (3d) The promises of inspiration to the writers both of the Old Testament and the New, especially in our Lord's discourse upon the occasion of sending forth the twelve, and in his last discourse on the evening before the crucifixion, recorded in John xiv. 16; (4th) The claims of the writers themselves to inspiration. These are abundant in the Old Testament, and in the case of Paul almost superabundant in the New Testament. These claims are such as to force upon us the alternative of either taking a high view of inspiration, or of rejecting the writers altogether as untrustworthy men, laboring under hallucinations, or
aiming to commit pious frauds upon the public. This part of the argument is judiciously wrought out and with great power.

The author is equally happy in Part Third in answering objections. These he does not take up in detail, but classifies, and refutes in typical examples. Luke's painstaking care did not prevent his being inspired at the same time. The words which Paul spoke by permission were as much inspired as those he spoke by commandment (1 Cor. vii. 6-25). Paul's thinking that he had the Spirit of God does not make it sure, as some suppose, that he did not have it. Paul's speaking after the manner of men (Rom. vi. 18, 19), and his speaking "not after the Lord, but as in foolishness" (2 Cor. xi. 17), but asserts his right to use figurative speech and ironical language whenever necessary. The chapter upon alleged discrepancies is brief but judicious, and he commends in the highest terms Rev. Mr. Haley's work upon the subject. The author does not believe that any of the alleged discrepancies are real, but that they all admit of a reasonable explanation. To those who would live in constant fear lest "we should find a case of insuperable discrepancy," his answer is, "Wait till such a case actually arises. Do not adjust your doctrines to remote and imaginary contingencies which may never arise. The fact that such discrepancies and errors have been so often and so confidently alleged... and have been found to admit of a reasonable explanation, is a ground of confidence that in the future it will be as in the past."

As to the morality of the Old Testament, the author holds that inspiration is not responsible for the morality of many of the individual actors introduced into the Old Testament; that we are liable to be premature in our adverse judgments upon the actions of others, as in Samuel's slaying of Agag; that some actions which would now be wrong were under the peculiar circumstances of those times right. The Mosaic law, for example, was not an absolute standard for all ages, but a statesmanlike adaptation to the wants of the times. The imperfection of a code when applied to our time arises from its perfection as applied to the time of Moses.

To the objections on critical and scientific grounds the author is equally judicious in his remarks, and he well emphasizes the fact that definitely established contradictions to science have not been found in the Bible. In treating of the objection that many insignificant details are unworthy of inspiration, the author is peculiarly happy in what he says of the incident of Paul's sending for his cloak at Troas. Such incidents, he well says, reveal to us the man Paul, and bring us nearer to him in actual real life.

"Consider the case about this much complained of cloak. Here is a man who, some thirty years ago, renounced ease, fortune, popularity, brilliant prospects—all for Christ, in order to do good to the souls of men. He has had his reward all along, from the world and from his nation, in stripes, in rod-beatings, in stonings, in imprisonments, in treachery and deadly conspiracy, in unblushing falsehoods, in unassuaged malice. And now his end is near. He is advanced in years, in his last prison, his usefulness accomplished, his course finished. He is just awaiting the sentence of death.
Bravely, cheerfully, triumphanty, he writes his last letter to his dearest friend, his son in the gospel. Not a note quivers, not a word hints of gloom or regret.

"But he is shivering with cold. Winter is commencing. He is in want of clothes. And in that prison he is lonely. He cannot solace himself by talking, as of old, to the guard to whom he was chained; nor can he, as formerly, have interviews with the hostile Jews, and strive to convert them, or with the loving Christians, and endeavor to comfort them. He is shut off from such intercourse. Some of the Christians themselves are afraid or ashamed now to stand with him; and others are debarred from doing what they would for him. Only Luke is with him, sharing apparently his imprisonment for the sake of alleviating his sufferings,—Luke, who had been with him in his imprisonment at Cæsarea, and again in his first imprisonment at Rome. He is used to it: he has come to stand by him to the last. But the good man wants his books, especially certain beloved precious parchments. They would cheer his lonely hours. He needs his cloak, he wants his manuscripts. Is there nothing touching, nothing affecting in this?... We put a high value upon that cloak, and the little passage that alludes to it" (p. 253).

PROFESSOR ELIJAH P. BARROWS, D.D.

Biblical learning in America has lost one of its eminent representatives by the death of this venerable scholar whose long life of usefulness closed in Oberlin on the fourteenth of September.

Dr. Barrows was born at Mansfield, Connecticut, 1805; graduated from Yale College, 1826; was pastor of the Dey Street Presbyterian Church, New York City, 1835 to 1837; professor of Sacred Literature in Western Reserve College, Hudson, Ohio, 1837 to 1852; professor of the Hebrew language and literature in Andover Theological Seminary, 1853 to 1865; instructor in New Testament literature in Union Theological Seminary, New York City, 1869 and 1870; and professor of Hebrew and Old Testament literature in Oberlin Theological Seminary, 1872 to 1880.

For thirty-one years Dr. Barrows was a contributor to the pages of the Bibliothea Sacra, his last and most important work being a series of twelve articles on Inspiration and Revelation, which was begun in 1867 and completed in 1873.

Possessed of extraordinary acquirements, not only in sacred literature, but also in the Greek and Latin classics, in mathematics, in natural science, and in general literature, Dr. Barrows retained his intellectual vivacity and the easy control of all his learned stores to the last. As increasing age and illness reduced him to physical helplessness, the dignity of his mind and the serenity of his faith only shone forth more conspicuously.
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