RENAN'S ANTICHRIST.

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Under the general title of "Histoire des Origines du Christianisme," M. Renan is giving to the world a series of works, five in number, of which the one to be considered in this article is the fourth. The first of the series is entitled, "Vie de Jesus;" the second, "Les Apôtres;" the third, "Saint Paul;" the fifth, and last, which has not yet appeared, is to bear the title, "Les Derniers Hommes Apostoliques." Of these several works, the first is much the best known. It was M. Renan's introduction to most American and English readers, and its peculiarities awakened an interest quite out of proportion to its real merits. Perhaps, however, no one of the series is more marked by the author's characteristics, or more truly representative of his critical method, than that which we here propose briefly to review.

It soon becomes evident to the reader of these volumes upon "The Origin of Christianity," that the author has a theory to support, and that to the exigencies of this theory all matters historical and critical alike bend. What he sets himself to do is to account for the existence of the Christian religion in the world, by a method that shall eliminate every supernatural element, and so explain all things upon purely rationalistic principles. It is assumed throughout that the idea of a divine inspiration, either of the Old Testament or the New, is wholly inadmissible; that prophecy, and miracle, and revelation are to be explained in a way not to recognize so impossible a thing as divine interposition in human affairs for any purpose whatever; that Judaism was simply a national faith and culte founded upon antique traditions, and wrought up into a system for purposes partly political, partly moral; and Christianity, the same national faith transformed by the introduction of certain elements originating in the person and teachings of Jesus, or through its contact with the Gentile world, and with Gentile modes of thought; that Jesus was an amiable Galilean, endowed as a teacher with many gifts, and above all with that species of personal magnetism which draws and holds with such tenacity the devotion of followers and disciples—self-sacrificing and beneficent in his life, unjustly put to death, and then, afterward, by the zeal of those who had loved and followed him, first represented as a worker of miracles, and finally declared to be none other than the Lord from heaven. These ideas, either assumed as first principles, or else treated as scarcely needing argument in their support, are everywhere found in Renan's method of interpretation and criticism; while history, exposition, recognized principles in human nature, and all that is known of those phenomena which reverent minds trace to an overruling Providence, are forced to grind in this rationalistic mill.

Renan's theory is, of course, by no means original with himself. It is simply the French form of the German rationalism, more especially as found in the schools of Strauss and Baur. Whatever of peculiar interest this teaching assumes in his hands is due largely to the eminently Frankish dress in which he arrays it, and to the curiosity one feels in those transformations which the ponderous German speculations
put on when manipulated by a lively and imaginative Frenchman. It must also be conceded to M. Renan that, as a writer, he has many facinations. There is nothing coarse or hard even in the most offensive of his sceptical deliverances. He is courteous to those from whom he differs, and writes as if seeking to convince, at least to interest, not eager to attack. He has a power of vivid narrative, and of artistic grouping in the incidents and personages introduced, joined with skill in the delineation of character, such as that his descriptions are often veritable pictures, while the interchange of narrative, criticism, reasoning, supplies variety without confusion. The several volumes, as they successively appear, furnish ample proofs of the study and care he has given them. It is twelve years since the first of the series, the "Vie de Jesus," was published. In the preparation of "L'Antichrist," he has travelled extensively in Italy and the East; he has read widely in rabbinical and early Christian lore; the work is erudite, scholarly, evidently painstaking in a high degree. The author has been, in short, in these several productions, in a position to render most essential service in the cause of Christian learning, had not his work in every part of it been so vitiated by conceptions fundamentally false, and a theory destructive to Christianity itself. One reads on with a feeling of utter sadness that so much genius and learning should be employed in an effort to rob humanity of its last consolations and its last hopes, or wasted upon puerilities, redeemed from contempt only by their audacity.

Instances of that to which we now refer must be familiar to those who have read, either in the original or in translation, the "Life of Jesus." An example or two may be given here, illustrative of what we have been saying, although to some of our readers they are, no doubt, already familiar. The incident of the message of Pilate's wife to her husband: "Have thou nothing to do with that just person, for I have suffered many things this night in a dream, because of him," Renan presents thus:

According to one tradition, Jesus found a support in the Procurator's own wife. She had chance to observe the gentle Galilean from some window of the palace looking upon the temple courts. Perhaps she saw him again in her dream, and the blood of this handsome young man, soon to be shed, lui donna-t-il le cauchemar.*

Tischendorf shows Renan the kindness to render these last words paraphrastically—"rested like a mountain load upon her spirits." The literal truth of the translation would be, "gave her the nightmare!"

For another example, take Renan's account of the scene in Gethsemane. We copy the passage as given by Tischendorf's translator.†

Here is Renan's travesty of that scene to which the reverent Christian mind turns always with awe, as if at the threshold of some Holy of Holies. Speaking of Jesus in that moment, he says:

Perhaps his thoughts were running back to the clear springs of Galilee, where he had often found refreshment; to the vine-stock and the fig-tree, beneath whose shade he had rested; to the young maidens who it may be had responded to his love. Did he curse his hard fate, which had denied him the old joys of his life? Did he lament his high call, and weep, a sacrifice on the altar of his own greatness, that he had not continued to be a simple Nazarene Artisan?

One needs scarcely more than these quotations to convince him of the justice of Tischendorf's severe words:

The author of that book ("Vie de Jesus"), not troubling himself with any speculations respecting the share which the Apostles may have had in delineating the gospel portraits, but following his own self-imposed theories about miracles and revelations, has displayed boundless recklessness, and given way to the most unbridled phantasies respecting the gospel

* Vie de Jesus, p. 408.
† Origin of the Four Gospels, pp. 29, 30.
history, caricaturing both it and its hero. He has written a book which has much more the character of a calumny of Jesus, than of an honest investigation into his career.*

In his effort to discredit the theory of a divine origin for Christianity, there were two main points of assault upon which Renan would find it necessary to concentrate his force. One of these is the New Testament history; the other, New Testament prophecy. Four of the five volumes in the series already described, the three first and the last, are devoted, as their titles indicate, to the former of these; the other, the fourth in order, now under consideration, is occupied with the latter. In the New Testament prophecy, besides, there are two chief themes which serve as centres, about which the whole prophetical scene revolves. The one is the Second Advent of Christ; the other the Great Apostasy, the "Falling Away" which must precede that grand final consummation. In each of these, again, a central figure is observed; in the one a Person, in the other a Personification—Christ and Antichrist.

It is, therefore, with excellent tact, considering the purpose in view, that Renan takes for the theme of this present volume that which is indicated by its title. To leave that portion of New Testament prophecy which concerns Antichrist to stand with the interpretation Christian writers give, would be fatal to his whole system. For if there has been a single instance of genuine prophecy in connection with Christianity, a single real and unmistakable forecast of the future, especially of such a nature as this, if it be real, then it cannot be denied that in this one feature of it Christianity is a revelation; and if in one, it at least may be in all. Renan's purpose in writing could not admit of this. Even the possibility of a divine element in the Christian religion is to be set aside, and everything in it shown to originate in ways akin to the fables of Grecian or Indian mythology. What he has to do, then, is to show that this conception of Antichrist is scarcely prophetic even in intention, but is simply an historic fact set forth under prophetical imagery.

As to the other great feature of New Testament prophecy, the Lord's Second Advent, since in any case it is a prophecy unfulfilled, he has but to treat it as a mistake, a misapprehension of some saying of Jesus, magnified by the imagination and the hopes of those who, while always lamenting his cruel death, were only too ready to seek comfort in the belief that he would return. Accordingly, everywhere Renan speaks of the apostolic belief and teaching as being to the effect that Jesus would speedily come in his Second Advent, bringing with him the consummation of all things, and the catastrophe of the physical universe. He takes it for granted, without giving himself the trouble to argue the point, that the words found in the epistles of Paul and of Peter, and in the Apocalypse, mean this, and cannot be even supposed to mean anything else. What seemed, then, like a prophecy, was simply a mistaken dream and hope, which the event showed to be a dream and a hope only. By this easy method the one difficulty is disposed of without even the necessity for an argument.

The prophecies concerning Antichrist could not be thus easily shuffled aside. These are prophecies whose fulfilment the world already sees, while the striking and unmistakable character of the fulfilment is claimed as proof unanswerable that the system to which it belongs is so far accredited as a true revelation. A bare assertion will not do here. Besides, scarcely another field could open in the whole scene traversed in these speculations more prolific in those dramatic effects, to the French mind always so fascinating. Troubled by no scruples as to the obligation

* Origin of the Four Gospels, pp. 27, 28.
to deal honestly by his subject, more intent upon making out a case, and, above all, upon entertaining his reader, than upon setting forth truth, Renan perceives in the figure of Antichrist what supplies the elements of boundless sensation. And the history of the period of which he writes, if skilfully manipulated, will lend him excellent help. At a time not very remote from that at which those prophecies were uttered, there sat in the imperial throne a monster to whom the epithet, "the Beast," might most fitly be given, and whose name was a word of terror, especially after one hideous event in his reign, to every Christian in every part of the world. This emperor is selected as the hero of Renan's brilliant fiction. In a word, Antichrist is—Nero!

A characteristic peculiarity of Renan's method in dealing with his subject is to first put forth some hypothetical interpretation, and then afterward, throughout, assume it as established. The hypothesis is announced in some such phrase as this: "One is tempted to think"—on est tenté de croire; or, "it is permitted us to suppose"—il est permis de supposer. For example, it is important to his theory that something be found to actually connect with Nero that epithet, already alluded to as applied to Antichrist in the Apocalypse, viz., "the Beast".

Renan not only succeeds in this, but in doing so settles the point that Nero and Antichrist are identical. He begins with his favourite phrase:

One is tempted to believe that it is to the Christians that a passage in Suetonius has reference, concerning a monstrous jest which Nero had invented. Lads, men, women and young girls, were fastened naked to stakes in the arena. A beast issued from his den and outraged their bodies. . . . The beast was Nero, clad in the skin of a tawny animal. . . . A name is found for Nero; it is THE BEAST. Caligula was the Antigod; Nero will be the Antichrist. The Apocalypse is conceived.*

Thus one essential point is established, simply by the method of a convenient hypothesis. Another one, equally material, is in the question how John was led to adopt this imagery in the Apocalypse. In determining this it becomes convenient to assume that John himself visited Rome, and was a witness, personally, if not of this scene in the arena, at least of that yet more fearful one, when in the gardens of Nero, Christians bound to stakes, and clad in garments soaked in pitch, were set on fire as torches for the infernal pageantry. Here, again, the essential fact, it seems, may be quietly assumed:

If, as is permitted us to believe (comme il est permis de la croire), John accompanied Peter to Rome, we shall be able to find a plausible foundation for the antique tradition according to which John was to have been plunged in boiling oil, near the spot where, later, stood the Latin gate. John appears to have suffered for the name of Jesus. We are led to think that he was a witness, and, up to a certain point, a victim, of the bloody episode to which the Apocalypse owes its origin. The Apocalypse is for us the cry of horror of an eye-witness, who has dwelt at Babylon, who has known the Beast, who has seen the bloody bodies of his brother-martyrs, who has himself felt the embrace of death. The wretches condemned to serve as living torches, must have been previously plunged in oil, or in an inflammable substance (not boiling, it is true). John had been, perhaps, devoted to the same punishment as his brethren, and destined to illuminate on the evening of the festival, the suburb of the Latin way; a chance, a caprice, saved him.*

Renan deals as unfairly with legend as with history, varying each to fit his purpose. The caldron of oil is no longer boiling when it suits him to have it so, and the Apostle is no longer a martyr when he finds it convenient to keep him alive, to become later the author of the Apocalypse. Now, that John was ever in Rome at all is without other evidence than the tradition, to which Tertullian alludes, but which history utterly rejects, that this Apostle perished in that city, being thrown into a caldron of boiling oil. The

* L'Antéchrist, p. 189.
historical evidence is to the effect, as all readers know, that John died at Ephesus, and was never martyred at all. By whom we are “permitted to believe” that John accompanied Peter to Rome, nowhere appears. We can only conclude that in M. Renan’s view it is permitted a man to believe whatever he finds it convenient to believe.

Another curious example of Renan’s skill in manufacturing history out of legend, and then using it as authentic in his theory of interpretation, may be noticed. Besides “the Beast,” another prominent figure appears in the Apocalypse—it is that of “the False Prophet,” understood to be alluded to in the passage which describes a star falling from heaven (ix. 1—11). Let us see what our author will tell us upon this:

Mathematicians, that is to say, conjurors, among others a certain Balbillus of Ephesus, surrounded the Emperor, and under pretence of exercising that part of their art which consists in averting scourges and evil omens, gave him atrocious counsels. The legend which mixes up the name of Simon the magician with this herd of sorcerers, is it without any foundation? The author of the Apocalypse is much occupied with a “false prophet,” whom he represents as an instrument of Nero, a thaumaturge making fire fall from heaven, giving life and speech to statues, marking men with the sign of the Beast. It is, perhaps, Balbillus with whom he is concerned; nevertheless, we must notice that the prodigies attributed to the false prophet in the Apocalypse have much resemblance to the tricks and jugglery attributed to Simon. On the other hand, the legend of Simon precipitated from heaven is not without analogy with an accident which happened in the amphitheatre, under Nero, to an actor who was playing the part of Icarus.*

Elsewhere he describes this accident. It occurred in the wooden amphitheatre of the Campus Martius. An actor personating Icarus “had attempted to fly through the air, and had fallen on the very stall of Nero himself, spattering him with gore.”† The Christians of Rome, he tells us, never themselves, indeed visited the amphitheatre, but they had reports of what occurred there from those who did. And this incident just alluded to, as thus reported, Renan supposes to have made an impression so vivid as to suggest and embody the imagery of the star falling from heaven in the Revelation. Puerilities such as this are sufficiently exposed by merely mentioning them.

The very important question of the date of the Apocalypse, Renan settles in much the same way as some others to which we have already alluded. As respects authorities, he fails to mention, so far as we have observed, those more conclusive ones, such as Eusebius, Irenæus, Clement, Origen, by whom the date of this remarkable writing is fixed at about A.D. 95, in the reign of Domitian. Epiphanius, much later than either of these, and much less reliable, is the authority he quotes, apparently because it suits his purpose better so to do.

Renan’s account of the origin of the book is substantially as follows:—Escaping from Rome, along with other Christians, whom the persecutions of Nero had spared, the Apostle John passed with them into Asia Minor, where they could be comparatively safe. Here he remained until and after the death of Nero; and here, or somewhere in the vicinity, the book was written, either by John himself, or by some one who assumed his name, and wrote perhaps under his supervision. The date of its appearance he seems to fix at about the year A.D. 69. It was suggested, he claims, by the sufferings which the Christians had endured, especially under Nero, while its form and its peculiar imagery were decided by the excited temper of the times. By a method similar to that in which he explains the symbols of “the Beast” and the “False Prophet,” he accounts for other imagery of the Book. We must here quote again:

When one reads the Apocalypse without knowing its date, and without having the key to its interpretation, such a book seems the work of a phantasy the
most capricious and the most peculiar; but when one replaces the strange vision in that interregnum from Nero to Vespasian, when the empire passed through the gravest crisis it had ever known, the work is found to be in marvellous accord with the state of the human mind, we may add, with the condition of the globe itself; for we shall soon see that the physical condition of the earth at the same epoch furnishes the elements of this. The world was infatuated with miracles; never had it so occupied itself with presages. God the Father seemed to have veiled His face; impure larvae, monsters begotten of some mysterious slime, seemed to wander in the air. All believed themselves upon the eve of some unheard-of thing. Belief in the signs of the times and in prodigies was universal; hardly were there a few hundred men so instructed as to perceive the vanity of it all. Charlatans, depositaries, more or less authentic, of the ancient chimeras of Babylon, took advantage of the popular ignorance, and pretended to interpret the various prognostics. These wretches became persons of consequence; the time was spent in driving them away and in recalling them; Otho and Vitellius, in particular, surrendered themselves to them altogether. The highest political wisdom did not disdain to take account of these puerile reveries.

One of the most important branches of the Babylonian divination was the interpretation of monstrous births, considered as simply implying indications of approaching events. This idea took possession of the Roman world beyond any other; a many-headed fetus, above all, was held as a manifest presage, each head, according to a symbolism which we see adopted by the author of the Apocalypse, representing an emperor. It was the same with hybrid forms, or what were pretended as such. In this regard, again, the unhealthy visions, the incoherent images of the Apocalypse, are the reflections of popular tales which filled all minds. A swine with the talons of a hawk, was held for the perfect image of Nero. Nero himself was very curious in these monstrosities.

They were also much pre-occupied with meteors, with signs from heaven. Meteoric showers made the greatest impression. It is known that abundant showers of meteors are a periodical phenomenon, occurring about once in every thirty years. At such times there are nights when the stars have the appearance of falling from heaven. Comets, eclipses, parhelions, aurores boreales, where they seemed to see crowns, swords, streaks of blood; clouds in plastic form, out of which they fashioned battles, fantastic animals, were eagerly remarked, and appeared to have never had such intensity as in these tragic years. People talked only of showers of blood, of amazing effects of the thunderbolt, of streams flowing up toward their source, of rivers red with blood. A thousand things, to which in ordinary times no attention was paid, gained from the feverish condition of the public mind an exaggerated importance.

The use which our author would have us make of these somewhat overdrawn representations is indicated in the clauses which we have italicized. Thus, and thus only, according to him, was the Apocalypse conceived; this, and this only, is its significance. To the completeness of Renan's scheme of interpretation, however, one thing more is necessary, and this he proceeds to supply. "The Beast" is spoken of in the Apocalypse prophetically, and other indications of him are mentioned as yet future. He is described as one "that was and is not, and yet is;" as one that "shall ascend out of the bottomless pit and go into perdition;" while "they that dwell on the earth shall wonder (whose names were not written in the book of life from the foundation of the world) when they behold the beast that was, and is not, and yet is." An incident which occurred in the year A.D. 69 Renan, following certain rationalistic interpreters who were before him however, eagerly employs in the effort to meet this new condition of the problem. Soon after the death of Nero a report got abroad, especially in Asia Minor, that he was not really dead; that he had escaped from those who sought his life, and had been sheltered in some remote place from that vengeance which it was supposed had overtaken him. The obscure manner of his death, and the private burial which followed, afforded opportunity for an invention of this kind, and a person soon arose to seize upon it and turn it to account.

A false Nero appeared; according to some, an Italian of servile condition, according to others a slave of Pontus. He bore considerable resemblance to the late emperor; had, says Renan, "his great eyes, his thick locks, his haggard air, his farouche and theatrical head; he knew also, like him, how to
play upon the harp and to sing." By one means and another this pretender succeeded in collecting about him a band, made up largely of deserters and vagabonds, and at length put to sea with a view to lay hold upon the provinces of Syria and Egypt. A gale drove him to the isle of Cythnos, where his followers by degrees abandoned him, and at length he fell into the hands of the Roman force that had been sent against him. It was this incident, according to Renan, which suggested the crowning feature of the Apocalypse. Amidst the terror inspired by the belief that the monster supposed to be dead was about to return and to take possession again of the empire, and by the anticipation that redoubled horrors of persecution must follow, numbers of Christians living at Ephesus, he tells us, fled away. Some, including the apostle John, may have taken refuge in such retreats as the island Patmos. While this fear of popular terror and death was at its height, the later chapters of the Apocalypse were written. And here we quote another curious passage. It begins, the reader will perceive, with the customary hypothesis, with its categorical implication.

One would be at some moments even tempted to believe that a coin was issued, bearing the impress of the Nero redux. What is certain is, that the Christians imagined that there was a purpose to compel them to adore the statue of Nero; this coin, stamped with the name of "the Beast," "without which they could neither buy nor sell," caused them insupportable scruples. The gold marked with the sign of the great chief of idolatry burned their hand.*

Here, he would have us believe, originate those passages in the Apocalypse which speak of "the image of the beast," and his "mark" in the right hand and in the forehead.

But the reader, probably, has enough of this. The whole theory is so much in the nature of a pure evasion, that it cannot deserve even a formal refutation. A single effort on the part of any candid reader to

In fact, it would be rather in the persecuting Roman emperors as a class, than in any one of them, that we should find, even in the limited sense here supposed, an application of the epithet, "the Beast." It may well be that the symbol, as found in the Apocalypse, is in part at least suggested by the coarse sensuality and the brutal cruelties which have given to the names of so many of those emperors their bad eminence in history; this, associated with their

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* L'Antéchrist, pp. 353, 354.
bloody edicts and acts against the Christians, their leadership, during all those ages of Pagan persecution, in the deadly war with the Lamb, and the "called, and chosen, and faithful," who follow him. In them may be found a first stage of fulfilment for the prophecies concerning Antichrist; but when all which is thus supplied toward a full interpretation has been exhausted, the principal conditions of the problem are still unfulfilled.

For it is to be remarked that it is not chiefly as a persecuting power that Antichrist in these prophecies comes before us. We first meet with the New Testament view of Antichrist, in any express utterance, in that familiar passage in Paul's Second Epistle to the Thessalonians. We must quote the words, because of their important bearing upon the point before us:

\[\text{Now we beseech you, brethren, by the coming of our Lord Jesus Christ, and by your gathering together unto him, that ye be not soon shaken in mind, or be troubled, neither by spirit, nor by word, nor by letter as from us, as that this day of Christ is at hand. Let no man deceive you by any means: for that day shall not come except there come a falling away first, and that man of sin be revealed, the son of perdition: who opposeth and exalteth himself above all that is called God, or that is worshipped; so that he, as God, sitteth in the temple of God showing himself that he is God. . . . For the mystery of iniquity doth already work; only he who now letteth will let, until he be taken out of the way. And then shall that Wicked be revealed, whom the Lord shall consume with the spirit of his mouth, and shall destroy with the brightness of his coming.} \](2 Thess. ii. 1—8.)

This is, in any way of viewing it, a very remarkable passage. The evidence which fixes the date of the epistle at about A.D. 54, remains unshaken by all the attempts that have been made to determine for it a later one. Nero was at this time a mere stripling, with nothing whatever in his character or actions to foreshadow the hideous career he was to run. Claudius was still emperor. Nothing short of divine inspiration could have made it possible for Paul to predict at this moment in Nero such a "Man of Sin" as he afterward became. Even, therefore, if it were to be admitted that Nero was that Man of Sin, it would be necessary still to claim that the apostle wrote "by revelation." But in that case he could not have made so great a mistake as to connect the destruction of Nero with the second coming of the Lord. Those magnificent words, "consume with the breath of his mouth, and destroy with the brightness of his coming," point to far other things than the degrading circumstances amidst which the vile Roman tyrant met his death. Neither the letter nor the spirit of the passage can be adequately thus interpreted. But what follows is still more important in relation to our present point:

Whose coming is after the working of Satan, with all power, and signs, and lying wonders, and with all deceivableness of unrighteousness in them that perish; because they receive not the love of the truth, that they might be saved. And for this cause God shall send them strong delusion, that they should believe a lie, that they all might be damned (be judged) who believed not the truth, but had pleasure in unrighteousness. (2 Thess. ii. 9—12.)

With this ought to be connected that passage in the First Epistle of John (ii. 18—23) where alone in the whole Scripture the word "Antichrist" actually occurs:

Little children, it is the last time: and as ye have heard that Antichrist shall come, even now there are many antichrists; whereby we know that it is the last time. They went out from us, but they were not of us; for if they had been of us, they would no doubt have continued with us: but they went out, that they might be made manifest that they were not all of us. . . . He is antichrist, that denieth the Father and the Son.

Those words of Paul and of John sufficiently indicate that the New Testament idea of Antichrist embraces far more than simply the rising up of some persecuting power, "wearing out the saints of the Most High." That is included, but it is by no means the-
whole, nor even the principal part of it. What these passages intimate is, first, a Christian degeneracy, growing later into apostasy, and this itself carried at last to the utmost extreme of impiety and blasphemy, culminating finally in some person, or system, or combination of impious powers, in which is embodied the whole anti-Christian tendency so active and so formidable in all the ages; in a form so stupendous and mighty, as that only the breath of the Lord's own mouth and the fire devouring before him at his coming can destroy it. These predictions might well be supposed to reach their fulfilment in successive stages. One form of that fulfilment may have been the bloody and brutal persecutions of Roman emperors, to whom as a class the significant epithet in the Apocalypse so fitly applies. This seems the more evident, as in the description of "the Beast" he is represented as having "seven heads," which heads are afterward explained as "seven mountains on which the woman sitteth." The great anti-Christian manifestation evidently takes in, as it proceeds from age to age, the persecutions of pagan Rome; but that is only one form of the manifestation. Immediately connected with it is that other, closely identified with it, represented by the woman sitting upon the scarlet-coloured and many-headed Beast, herself drunk with the blood of saints. Yet the beginning of all was earlier than either of these. It was in that earliest exhibition of the spirit of unbelief and revolt of which John speaks. There, in the bosom of the church, the real Antichrist was born. Departure from the faith, "falling away," apostasy, this is the pernicious anti-Christian germ; and from this, in its development, proceeds that enormous growth in spiritual wickedness which so fights against God and against his truth, while persecuting worldly power acts as its ally and often its instrument.

It is quite common, we believe, among Protestants to consider Antichrist as identical with the Papacy. We admit that so far the Papacy has been, and still is, the most enormous and formidable embodiment of the anti-Christian spirit. And still we cannot think that even in the Papacy we have Antichrist in his fully developed or his worst form. Nor does it seem that what is implied in the prediction that the Man of Sin, such as he finally becomes, is to be consumed only by the breath of the Lord's mouth and destroyed by the brightness of his coming, is to be met in the ultimate fortunes of the Papacy. That supremacy which the Papacy held in the middle ages, and which in more recent times it has so much lost, it can probably never regain. It seems more in accordance with the historical course of things that as persecuting paganism breathed its own Anti-Christian fury into that spiritual apostasy which even in the midst of those prosecutions had its birth and growth, and in that apostasy was reproduced under forms more violent and more deadly still, so this apostasy itself is to merge in some yet more formidable embodiment of the same spirit, which it will foster, if it does not give it birth, and which shall prove to be the final, culminating manifestation of the world-old Antichrist. As a spiritual power, tyrannizing over the human conscience, and trading in the bodies and souls of men, the Papacy can never again be what it once was. That sort of supremacy is reached only in ages of ignorance, such as it seems impossible the world should ever see again. As a political power it is virtually dead, and its schemes, however artful, to recover any portion of that power in any part of the world, must be counteracted by those motives of self-protection which the history of Papal usurpation in the past must always keep alive. It is not in itself that the Papacy is now formidable, either spiritually or otherwise. It is formidable chiefly as "the mother
of abominations;” as the fruitful source of disorganizing and demoralizing tendencies which are the things really to be feared; as furnishing in its own enormities, committed under the mask of Christianity, an exhaustless armoury of weapons for those who in these latter days make war against the truth; as more the parent of Antichrist than Antichrist himself.

It is impossible for thoughtful Christians to contemplate without anxious forebodings the aspects of the present time. There is a passage in the Diary of the poet, Thomas Moore, which in our reading of it has sometimes suggested unpleasant reflections. Speaking of a conversation with the German philosopher and critic, Schlegel, he mentions the inquiry of the latter: “If a man conscientiously, and without any intentional levity, published a book in England expressive of his disbelief in the Scriptures, and giving the reasons of his disbelief, how such a book would be received?” “Answered,” Moore writes, “that as to the book I didn’t know, but I knew well how the man would be received; and I should not like to be in his place.” We are very well aware that many would find in this incident a far different lesson from that which suggested unpleasant reflections. They, however, may not be far wrong who see in it beginnings at least of that last and worst apostasy of which Paul speaks, when the spirit of revolt and denial, in its most formidable embodiment, shall oppose and exalt itself above all that is called God and is worshipped; so that as God it shall sit in the very temple of God, pretending to be itself God. When there shall be recognized no divinity but reason and force, and when the dominant powers of the world, intellectual, moral, political, shall be utterly godless and impious.

However [says one writer], the delicate and tender-hearted may shudder at the idea of such a degenerate, atheistical, as it were devilish, generation, yet according to the course of things it is probably what we have to expect. In humanity good and evil go forward parallel to each other. As the culture of the understanding, science, and art increase, man attains greater opportunity on the one side for improvement, but on the other also for deterioration. Of this last melancholy truth the evidences are only too abundant.

One of the most unpleasing in the intellectual signs of the times is the appearance of such works as this of Renan, with the re-
THE KINGDOM OF GOD; OR, THE GREATNESS OF THE BIBLE
THEISM, AS COMPARED WITH THE PHYSICAL, SCIENTIFIC,
AND PHILOSOPHICAL.

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Preliminary ideas—Greatness relative—Distinction between conception and idea—Names of Deity in Genesis—Value of man not determined, increased or diminished, by any space extent of the universe—Psalm viii., and its interpretation as given in Heb. ii.—Psalm Ixviii.—Christ's ascent above all worlds—His raising humanity to higher spheres of being—Beings higher than man—Bible presentation of these higher ranks of existences—Nature producing beings capable of interfering with nature herself—Science stops with man—Man, just evolved from a very low condition, the highest product of a past eternal evolution!—Inconsistency of this—The hideous Hysterion proteron—Biblical order—The Logos in the beginning—Idea first—The perfect first—Physical order—Matter and force first—The nebula in the beginning—All things made by the nebula—The highest in the lowest. Quantitative or dynamical, as distinguished from spiritual value: the first the ratio of force-being in anything to the amount of force-being in the universe; the second measured by nearness to God the centre of being—Faith, the value ascribed to it in the Scriptures as the measure of spiritual worth—Old Testament faith compared with heathen virtue—Dictum of Strauss that the Hebrews had the personal, the Greeks the absolute idea of Deity—Absurdity and falseness of this—The absoluteness infinity, timelessless of Deity, more powerfully and clearly expressed in the Bible than by Plato—Examples—The Divine ubiquity, Psalm cxxxix.—

The Infinitely Near, as well as the Infinitely Far—The tremendous equilibrium as maintained in the Scriptures—Pantheism—The Scripture Pantheism, Acts xvii.—Anthropopathism of the Bible—All revelation of the Infinite to the Finite necessarily anthropopathic: not a make-believe accommodation, but a real coming into the Finite—The Word, the Reason becoming flesh—Revelations through nature, anthropopathic—Scripture equilibrium of apparently opposing Divine attributes—God the Universal Power and at the same time a patriarch Deity—No inconsistency—Boldness of the Bible writers—Philosophy cannot keep its balance here—Need of more study of the Bible as the great defence of faith.

The greatness of an object of thought is wholly relative. So is the attendant conception: so is the emotion it inspires. It is this latter element that enters chiefly into the spiritual measure of value. In one sense it may be said that we are what we think. In a still truer sense, we are, spiritually, what we feel in view of what we think. One soul may have a higher feeling of God's greatness, in connection with a very limited knowledge, than another whose scientific or notional views extend immensely beyond it. One soul may have
a more religious emotion, a really greater emotion, a higher inspiration from the sight of a mountain, than another from the contemplation of the starry heavens, or the utmost thinkable spaces, and motions, and forces regarded simply in their mathematical interest. Thus, as has been already said, but will bear to be repeated, David, and Pythagoras, and Socrates, with their little astronomical knowledge, may have had a higher view of that highest thing, the divine glory, as exhibited in the cosmos, than D'Alembert and La Place. The unscientific Jonathan Edwards may have felt more in the contemplation of the astronomical heavens than a Herschel or a Pierce.

In such estimates as these, a distinction must be made, too, between two words often confounded—a conception* and an idea. In the same mind the one may be very small, quantitatively, and yet representative of an idea as lofty, as limitless, and as perfect as might exist in connection with the highest knowledge. Let me endeavour to make this plainer by an illustration: Abraham had very little of what may be call astronomical science. The sky over his head not very far off, and a great personal being ruling on earth, yet more specially dwelling in the vast unknown space that lay above the visible dome; this was his sense-conception when he thought of God, his diagram by which he represented Him in space, as he was compelled to do if he would think of Him at all. It was a very limited conception, we may say, but, after all, not greatly differing from the sense-conception we are now compelled to take when we would thus represent to ourselves that idea. It was, I say, his conceptual diagram, and ours is very much like it, though we know, as Abraham probably suspected, that it was far from filling the measure either of the spiritual thought or the spiritual emotion. There is, however, no reason for doubting that the patriarch's idea, in distinction from the limited sense imagining his knowledge allowed, was as high, as complete, as perfect, in every way, as that of Sir William Hamilton. Above him and around him lay the infinite, as expressed in those three mighty Hebrew words that meet us so early in Genesis—those three infinities, God of eternity, God Omnipotent, God Most High—αἰώνως, παντοκράτωρ, ὕψιστος—time, space, rank of being—living beyond all duration, strong above all might, high above every conceivable altitude of glory and dignity. What a contrast between this sublime monotheism, and the grotesque horribleness of the Assyrian and Babylonian theology, as deciphered from the exhumed tablets to which our attention has been lately called! And what must we think of the criticism that would regard these as furnishing the "Editio Princeps," whilst relegating Genesis to the position of an unauthentic, second-hand copy derived from such foul deformities! It was the same grand patriarchal idea expressed by Zophar, the Naamathite, Job xi. 7, under similar conceptual representations, and challenging comparison with any philosophical attempt to set forth the unknowable, whether made by a Spencer, a Mansel, or an Arnold:

Eloah's secret, canst thou find it out?
Or Shaddai's perfect way, canst thou explore?
Higher than Heaven's height, what canst thou do!
Deeper than Hades' depths, what canst thou know!

Heaven above, and the supposed Hadean deep below; these were the Hebrew conceptual limitations used to express the illimitable, as they were in our Saviour's day, and as they appear in His language concerning...
the doom of Capernaum. But the idea itself they are chosen to represent, has no sense bounds. The representative figure is, in truth, the necessarily finite diagram of infinity.

There is another thought on which I would briefly dwell here as introductory to the main argument of this lecture. The enlarged modern knowledge, it is also said, has interfered with the old idea of Providence, whether as general or particular. We cannot believe in it, especially in the latter, as in former days. It is very difficult to hold now to any such minute supervision of human affairs as might have seemed credible for a smaller world. The immense size of the cosmos throws into insignificance the destinies both of nations and of individual men. The objection, moreover, assumes a philosophic air: it claims to be an enlarged view, far more grand and lofty than the old religious notion as grounded on what it calls the narrow space and time conceptions of the Bible. But with all its pretension, it is, indeed, a most human mode of thinking. It wholly overlooks the thought, of all others most important in a religious point of view, namely: that in the true idea of the Infinite One, there must enter also, as the complement of its fulness, the acknowledgment of the infinitely near as well as of the infinitely far and the infinitely high—a thought on which we would more fully dwell in a subsequent part of this lecture, as forming the marked distinction between the Biblical and the philosophic theism. We can think of but one thing at a time. He who transcends this, transcends it immeasurably. “As the heavens are high above the earth, so are my ways above your ways, my thinking above your thinking, saith the Lord.” Vastness of space does not tire, innumerable-ness of objects does not perplex, their infinity does not exhaust: “Have ye not known? have ye not heard, that the everlasting God, the Creator of the earth,”—“He who sitteth above the orb of the world fainteth not? He is never weary; there is no searching of His knowledge;” “He bringeth out His hosts by number; it is because He is strong that not one of them faileth.” “How can God know?” Such is their real language. How can He be present in every part, with a knowledge of each thing, as it is, without losing for the time, the thought of others, or having His attention drawn from the great totality, the proper object of the infinite mind. This is simply a judgment of the infinite by the finite. We think of a great totality, or of a great system of causation, as something separate from its parts and sequiences. We are compelled to take things piecemeal, as it were, not from the greatness, but the exceeding narrowness of our finite thinking. The idea of some all-embracing intelligence we take on trust as the necessary complement to our own deficiency. But with God, or a mind we call infinite, all effects must be seen in their causes, and therefore, as distinctly known, ever known, without any intermitting of knowledge, as the great movements, the great causes, or the great totality itself. It is astonishing how it can be supposed that this difficulty, which comes from the objectors’ own poor thinking, can be remedied by that exceedingly human and finite idea of machinery, carrying on an original impulse like the turning of a crank, or the opening of a valve, and thus relieving the original power, and the original intelligence, from all after-supervision or control. A semi-conscious plastic nature created by God and endowed by Him with exquisite skill, such as Cudworth imagined, or Plato’s Anima Mundi, which is very much the same conception, or a view, not obscurely intimated in the Scripture, of mighty superhuman beings carrying on the movements of God’s providence; these have a spiritual dignity, though not unattended with difficulties; but the idea of a dead machinery such as we use—trusting all the
time to a foreign force to carry it on for us—is wholly anthropopathic. It is thus indeed that machinery helps us; in ascribing it to the Deity we are measuring Him by ourselves, and all our talk of gravity, or of "the correlation of forces," fails to relieve the difficulty. And so we may say in regard to what is called a general intelligence. As applied to man, it is simply another term for imperfect knowledge; as predicated of Deity, it is without meaning. If the universe can do without God now, it could have so done without Him in the indefinite past. So, too, an absence of the divine thought at any time from any part is equivalent to a failure of that presence always and everywhere.*

* Instead of having any claim to be regarded as an enlarged or scientific mode of thinking, there is nothing, in fact, more deserving of the name of a vulgar prejudice than the disposition to limit the moral grandeur, either of a miracle, or of what is called a "particular providence," by the spatial or dynamical littleness of their physical means. The theist or theologian, of the Colenso stamp, may do this, but the man of science, however sceptical he may be, ought to know better than to reason in that way. He understands too well that the wonders of the microscope equal, if they do not exceed, those of the mere outlinemasses, or repetitions of masses, which the telescope brings to our view. His investigations are constantly leading him to suspect that the smallest things lie nearest the secret of life, and that the smallest movements, apparently, may be most closely connected with the highest workings of the organizations to which they belong. Especially is this belittling disposition shown, sometimes, in respect to certain miracles recorded in the Bible, and that without any regard to the grandeur of the moral reasons on which their true credibility so essentially rests. Thus the theologian above named objects to the miracle of the "plague of gnats" as recorded Exod. viii. 12, and referred to Ps. ev. 31. It is beneath the dignity of Deity, he thinks, to suppose Him immediately engaged in the production of such insignificant creatures as the Egyptian kinnim. Now, the language of the account is perfectly consistent with the idea of a purely physical process, if there were anything to be gained by such hypothesis. We know not what physical secrets may lie near the surface of nature, ready to manifest themselves suddenly when brought into the proper conditions; as new plants unexpectedly make their appearances in an old soil, or new insects, like the plague of grasshoppers, whose seeds or eggs may have lain buried for ages. But, as a miracle proper, what has reason to say against it, unless it can allege the absence of any higher law, or moral reason for it from the hyperphysical sphere! Beneath the dignity of Deity! But the kinnim are made somehow. Their law, therefore, their idea, their reason, must have had a spermatic place in the original plan of the cosmos. So the scientific theist must say, if he would shun the blankest atheism. But the immediate or supernatural production of such insignificant creatures! That is the objection. Let us look at it. Why is it more irrational than to have provided, billions of ages ago, for their ultimate evolution,—to have made a machine, to make a machine, to make a machine, and so on, to terminate at last in such a result! Where is the economy? Where the saving of labour or of dignity! Another element, moral and hyperphysical, the element on which we have so much insisted, is to be brought in to determine the rationales of either process, general or special, according to the higher laws and higher reasons of the great divine kingdom.

But let us state the case more familiarly: For the sake of the argument, then, the supposition may be made, without objection, that the doctrine of providence, to the extent in which it appears in the Bible, is not incredible when connected with the thought of this being the only world, and the human race upon it the only class of rational beings aside from God and a few spiritual essences, called angels, dwelling in some adjacent spheres, atmospheric or ethereal, connected with the earth. On such a scale, then, we may regard it as admitted that the Scripture ideas of providence, of redemption, and the degree of divine care for men that they imply, would not be incredible, or beyond the very probable bounds of rational belief. Now, suppose another world to be added to our knowledge, is this credibility diminished, and in the inverse ratio? Suppose two, three, more, to any extent; does the care, the providence, the supervision grow less in the same proportion: one-half as much for two worlds, one-third as much for three, one-thousandth part for a thousand? or does the moral ratio—the moral value—remain unchangeable, measured
not by a varying universe according to a magnitude real or supposed, but by the relation, physical, moral, or spiritual, which each part, especially each rational part, bears to the immutable God? Does the measure of human sins, and the worth of the human soul, thus rise and fall? Bigger in a small world, less in a greater, vanishing to an infinitesimal in a universe supposed to be immeasurable? Or must we regard each individual world, and each individual rationality, as never falling below that estimate of moral and spiritual value it would have were it alone with God, the only world, the only rationality, in infinite space and infinite time? To think otherwise, as has been said before, is to suffer the lower power of imagination to cloud, for a time, the higher faculty of the reason; it is to imagine God to be just such a one as ourselves; it is to sink down to the low conclusion that moral ideas, truth, holiness, soul, Deity itself, are but quantitative or mathematical notions, having no absolute value, but measured on a sliding scale ever rising and falling with the space dimensions of a hypothetical universe.

The force of this pretentiously philosophic, but really anthropopathic view, is supposed to press most heavily on the scheme of religion called Evangelical, with its leading ideas of atonement and redemption. The universe is too big for that. But there is no stopping here. Carry it farther, make the cosmos bigger still, and there must be a denial of any of that care for men which the easier scheme of "Liberal Christianity" is supposed to allow. Pull out the slide of the telescope, and a general providence goes with the particular; retribution, moral government of any kind, punishment of wrong by any designed process, penal or consequential, rewarding of virtue either by making it its own reward, or in any other way, become as incredible as special or general answers to prayer. Human virtues and human sins are small affairs, becoming smaller and smaller with every widening of the physical scale. There is no holding on to anything partial, however large it may seem from our point of view. Imagine the universe larger still, and the generic begins to share in the diminution. Races as well as individuals disappear in the computation. Particular worlds become too small for the divine thought. Carry out the ratio, and systems, solar, stellar, nebular, vanish in like manner. We are left with a God who has no moral attributes, no care for parts of any kind, no thought of individuals, no knowledge, in fact, except of one vast boundless, indivisible totality. We have reached a region where all divine thought, all divine knowledge are merged in a mindless blank. The conception of totality, too, has vanished; for a real whole, in distinction from a mere all, or aggregate mass, cannot be truly thought without its parts. In our imperfect thinking, we may take it on trust from a higher mind without its filling up, or we may get an obscure hold of it from some dim and exceedingly partial deduction from a few parts, by which we leap the vast unknown, or supply its chasm by hypothesis. But to the Perfect Intelligence, where all things, if they appear at all, must appear as they really are, and in all their relations, whether universal or particular, there cannot be a whole, as a whole, without a distinct vision, and a distinct thought of every part, as a part, in its relation to such whole, and to every other part.

If, however, we admit an ideal change of ratio for man as accompanying a supposed enlargement of the universe, it will be in a direction the opposite of that which the objection seems to require. For all things that can be called ends, such as are all rationalities, all rational existences, whatever may be their physical proportion of being, such change, if admitted at all in an absolute estimate, must be in a ratio direct, instead
of inverse. The anthropopathic view against which we are contending seems to say: Man becomes of less account,—it is less easy to believe him to be the subject of a particular providence, or of an intense divine care, as a member of an immense universe, than when regarded as dwelling on a lone planet, the only region of life to be found in all space. Reason teaches just the contrary. The importance of man as a rational being—his spiritual importance, though in itself an unchangeable quantity,—is relationally enhanced by the greatness, both spatial and numerical, of the rational spheres. He is the greater being the greater the city of which he is a citizen, and as embraced in a scheme of redemption designed to raise him to some higher πολιτεία, some higher sphere. It is more easy to believe that for this the Eternal Logos became flesh, that now, through this great evolution accomplished in the Second Adam, man who had been of the earth earthy might be raised to a higher stage of being, and made "to sit ἐν τοῖς ἐπουρανίοις, in the heavenly places in Christ Jesus." Which things, say the Scriptures, "the angels bend down to look into." Thus viewed in its spiritual aspect, the scheme of redemption becomes grander, more gloriously credible with the expansion of the rational as distinguished from the physical universe. The interpretation which the author of the Epistle to the Hebrews gives to that wonderful VIII. Psalm, shows that the germ of this idea had, even then, its inspiration in the mind of the royal seer. This germinal thought was the destined human glory as shadowed in the physical inferiority itself: "Lord, what is man! When I survey the heavens, the work of thy fingers, the moon and the stars which thou hast ordained, what is man that thou rememberest him? What is a son of Adam that thou shouldest have regard to him?" It is then, as the Apostle interprets it, there comes the thought of a "Son of man," of "one made a little lower than the angels for the suffering of death, yet crowned with glory and honour." Dominion over nature had been given to man at his creation. But he had lost it, in its highest spiritual sense; for nature ruled over him. He was the slave of appetite and passion. David well knew that. But the "Son of Man," the typical humanity, was one in whom the language was to receive its highest inspiration. "All things," says the Apostle, in seeming contradiction to the Psalm, "all things were not yet put under him;" that is, under the Adamic man; "but we see Jesus," one in whom the dominion was to be complete; we see one man, the head of a new humanity, and "to whom all power"—the highest spiritual rule—"was given in Heaven and on earth." Such is the glorious harmony of Scripture. It is the same One who is spoken of in another Psalm, interpreted in like manner by the Apostle, as a conqueror, "ascending up on high, leading captivity captive," that he might receive "gifts for men," and introduce humanity itself into the highest spheres of being. Immense the rising, as immense had been the descent. "Now that he ascended, what is it but that he descended first into the lowest parts of the earth," κατώτερα μέρη τῆς γῆς, the lowest state of physical being, the silence, the darkness, the immobility of the grave. "He was crucified, dead, and buried."

Thence He arose ascending high, And showed our feet the way; "above the heavens," ἐνθάρρησον, "far above the heavens, far above the physical cosmos, to the spheres of supernatural and spiritual glory," or, as the Bible language gives it, "to the right hand of the Most High." "Lift up your heads, ye gates, and be ye lifted up, ye doors of eternity, that the King of Glory,"—ἀγχυδὸς τῆς ζωῆς, the "Prince-Leader of Life,"—"may enter in." It was that glorious ascension having to human sense its beginning here on earth, as His rising form faded away from the human
eyes so rapturously gazing upon it from the summit of the Mount of Olives. We must not explain this away into a phantom show, or an unmeaning spirituality. The Scriptures more than intimate that this risen body of Christ transcended, in some way, the ordinary conditions of material being in respect to time and space. And yet it was a real cosmical transition, though to the questions, how, or where, or through what spaces, our best conceptions return no answer. It may have passed through all spheres, thus connecting man as saved and glorified, and raised above the physical, with the highest orders of being, and, through it, manifesting to them τὴν πολυτικῖκλον σοφίαν τοῦ Θεοῦ, "the immensely diversified wisdom of God." Men may dispute the truth of such a doctrine, and deny its evidence, but they must not say that it carries with it a narrowing conception of God's cosmical kingdom. The very lowness of man, physically, enhances the spiritual greatness of the Bible revelation. When science of herself can give us assurance of any such glorious human destiny, it may venture to challenge a comparison.

It is this idea of higher orders of being, of worlds transcending the physical, and of man's eventual connection with them, in which the Bible leaves behind it both science and philosophy. In the space aspect, the Bible language falls short of the modern scientific statement as numerically expressed, whilst excelling it, even here, in emotional power. In its time aspect, and time language, it has a concepive grandeur, to say the least, which our decimal notation can never surpass. In the third dimension, or that of height, or rank of being, no scientific view of the cosmos comes near to it in spiritual elevation. Worlds beyond worlds; that is the space view. Worlds after worlds, that is the time conception. Worlds above worlds: this is the thought to which the Scripture calls us; not in the space relation, where there is really no above and below, but in that of rank and spiritual value. Thus we speak, and truly speak without a figure, of the moral world, or the world of worlds viewed in the moral design, as distinct from the mere material evolution. Again, there are worlds, so called, and properly called, from the kind of beings embraced or the ideas manifested by them—worlds intellectual, ideal, artistic, it may be—worlds ineffable, transcending both sense and idea—such as "eye hath not seen, nor ear heard, nor the human heart conceived"—real worlds, yet having no reference to space, or correlation in space with other worlds, yet filled with a higher order of being—worlds hypercosmical, supra-mundane, if such expressions do not seem paradoxical; as where Christ says: "I came forth from the Father into the cosmos, and again I leave the cosmos and go to the Father."

There is nothing in science, indeed, to exclude such ideas of higher worlds than the physical and material, or of higher and higher orders of spiritual being; but this can be safely said, that since the days of Kepler and Newton, the course of scientific speculation has not been favourable to it. What is called "the Positive school," especially, with its many able advocates, is directly hostile to any such tendencies of thought. The reason for this, however, is moral rather than scientific. It comes from an aversion to the thought of anything superhuman. That would be too suggestive of the religious. Something higher than man! the conception must be barred out, or it will mount up to a higher, and higher, and higher still. It cannot stop short of a highest, of a comparative supreme, some mighty personality, having in his hand vast control of nature, though produced by nature, and thus falling infinitely below the true theistic idea of the eternal, the unoriginated, or the unborn. Here would we apply it to the still more conceivable hypothesis of
superhuman beings, simply regarded as transcending our own power of interference with the physical order. There is the possibility—according to the mathematical doctrine of time and chances, there is the strong probability—that this awful nature, from whose eternal play of atoms comes all that is or seems to be, may have produced such beings, immensely superior to man, and yet with no security drawn from any possible knowledge of nature herself, that they may not be beings of inconceivable malignity. Physical science has no a priori law or idea demanding that the atoms shall produce a good and benevolent, rather than an evil and a hating consciousness. It may be, too, a being or beings capable of interfering with Nature herself; as in the awful imagining of Milton: 

"Gnawing their mother's bowels; when they list,  
To the womb returning,—hourly thus conceived,  
And hourly born, with sorrow infinite."

For according to the hypothesis against which we are contending, or the unqualified evolution scheme, nature has produced, in man, such a being capable of interfering with nature to a vast extent, of deflecting it from its course, or of making it do what, if left to itself, it would not have done. Now whether we call it the supernatural or not, there is nothing in the way of conceiving it as belonging to mightier beings evolved from this unknown fearful womb,—and to mightier still, and mightier still, as far as the utmost effort of our science-aiding imagination can carry the appalling idea. Thus science may have to admit the miraculous, or, not to dispute about names, the mirabilia, the things beyond our utmost sense, our utmost induction, stupendous wonders as judged by Hume's rule,—in other words, phenomena depending on an unknown personal interfering will, far out of any traceable chain of impersonal physical sequences. It is these sense-transcending mirabilia, this thought of appalling personal interferences, which the infidel science would exclude from the cosmical being. But here they are again, in spite of "the Positive Philosophy" and on the very hypothesis that seems to exclude them. Here they are again, without the unoriginated I AM, the unborn God of Love and Reason, to shield us from their malignant power.

I have dwelt on this, digressively, to show that the very inconsistencies into which the system of unqualified evolution is compelled to run, in its denial of the higher being, prove the strong aversion of its adherents to the thought of any personalities above the human having been, as yet, evolved from nature, or that primal nebular substance in which all things have been lying potentially from the beginning. But be the cause what it may, the fact is undeniable. The scientific form of infidelity is inclined to stop with man. It would, perhaps, admit any amount of mere physical being as occupying the space universe; but rational being, if elsewhere existing, is essentially a repetition, in rank at least, whatever diversity there may be in form, of our earthly homo. Here they are the narrow thinkers; they are the ones who make earth the centre, or our own sphere of being the central sphere in dignity, if not the space centre of the universe.

How immensely does the Bible transcend this! How much more expanding as well as elevating its view! For here our discussion has reference mainly to this charge against the teachings of the Scriptures, that they narrow the mind, and that, in this respect, modern science has outgrown religious faith. The Bible does not, indeed, give us imaginative or descriptive detail, but it most vividly sets forth this altitude dimension of the universe, or of universal being. It transcends any view which would give it simply duration in time, or an endlessly expanding evolution in space—making it a mathematical universe, an immeasurable series of motions, a limitless play of correlated forces, an endless repetition of elemental phenomena.
—immense length and breadth, we may call it, with a lack of height, or an almost infinitesimal thinness, as compared with the idea germinant in all religious thought, and which the Christian Scriptures so wonderfully confirm and expand. The Bible, both Old and New, places God in the empyræan. He is described as "inhabiting the high and holy place," transcending in rank, immeasurably separate in moral purity; the heavens are not clean before Him. Φῶς οἶκον ἀπρόστιτον; He dwells in light unapproachable. His name is the Most High. He rules over the kingdom of all eternities, of all worlds, in time, in space, in rank of being. It is a spiritual as well as a physical kingdom—the latter subordinate to, and deriving its value from, the first. This kingdom contains countless ranks of being far below Deity, yet still many of them transcending man. The names given to them are not to enlarge our scientific insight, but simply to denote superlative excellence and power: Angels, Archangels, Seraphim, or burning ones, Kedoshim, or holy ones, Bene Elohim, Sons of God, Morning Stars, Thrones, Dominions, Principalities, and Powers. Immense the range, inconceivable the height in this upper direction. The more exalted their rank, the more occupied are they with the glory and adoration of their still infinitely transcending Maker:

To Thee, Cherubim and Seraphim
Continually do cry.

Again there are orders of being that may be conceived of as more nearly related to earth, and the lower physical being. There are references to cosmical powers of this kind of which science has nothing, and can have nothing, to say, either by way of proof or disproof. They are set forth in the Bible as God's ministers ruling in the elements, having an invisible elementary organization, yet exercising power over nature as man does; doing things which are not miraculous in their sphere, however they may be regarded in ours. The angels of the Egyptian plagues, the angel of the pestilence in Israel, the mighty power that smote the Assyrian host, belong to this class. They deal with the interiora of nature, the springs of nature, lying far down below our deepest science, the keenest search of our chemical analysis, the most penetrating gaze of our microscopes. On the pages of revelation the "curtain of the dark" is sometimes drawn aside, and these powers are symbolically exposed to view; but how often, in the history of the world, may be ascribed to such unseen agencies as these, events that so puzzle, as they are now puzzling, our best science! New diseases, sudden and strange in their form, ever and anon invade the world; inexplicable phenomena present themselves. Don't be afraid, is the cry; it is indeed hard to explain, if it be not jugglery and delusion; but even if real, it is still law; it is all law somewhere, and that comforts us, that magic word so much more tolerable than the idea of a near personal God, or the near presence of any of His more immediate ministers. All law doubtless, even as man's operations in nature may be said to be in accordance with natural processes on the nearer surface; but who or what wields the power of law in these deep interior stages, or these more hidden springs? Our scientific conventions take up the matter; they begin to trace some of the plainer sequences. They get hold of a few of the nearer links; and lo, another form appears, or some other inexplicable manifestations present themselves. All law doubtless, but how does that reiteration help the matter in cases where we stand in most pressing need of help, whilst medical science, and all science, instead of its usual vaunting, can only confess its incompetency? The same thought is suggested by what may be called seemingly abrupt transitions in nature—some revealed by geology, others occasionally presenting themselves in nearer historical manifestations. The clock strikes a
new hour; we are startled for a moment; but soon comes the comfort again: there is a law for it somewhere; there are no leaps in nature. True, but what has made the connection? There may have been cogs and wheels far below where science sees; law has been going on in the silent approach of all that awful depth, or there may be unseen powerful beings that by means of other natural forces have hastened the momentous contact. These may be ministers of God, or, take the pure evolution scheme, they may be of nature's own evolving, entering into the bowels of their parent, as has been said, or interfering with nature even as her younger child man has derived from her a power thus to interfere. The juxtaposition of atoms have made our consciousness, our thought, our will, our strength, our power to interfere with the all-breeding parent; why may not a congeries of higher and more ethereal atoms have somewhere and somehow produced a higher consciousness, a more energetic will, a mightier strength for analogous purposes, and still mightier and more science-baffling effects? I may refer here to the phenomena now predominant in what is called spiritualism, but which have manifested themselves in other ages and from the earliest times. The evidence has so accumulated, that the easy talk about the imagination and "unconscious cerebration," and the power of sympathy, has become stale. That there is a high measure of reality here can be no more doubted than some of the positions of science itself, as based on similar evidence. Equally clear to a sane religious mind is the proof that it is an evil as well as a very ancient thing. Its defenders adopt the common style; they, too, babble of "law," and show a like tendency to include all things in a godless physical system. In reference, however, to our present argument, there is need only to insist on the fact of its wholly baffling the positive irreligious science; and I would only remark, once for all, that when I seem to speak harshly of science anywhere, I mean no other. Here, however, it is enough to maintain that no science can deny, any more than it can affirm, the possibility of aerial and ethereal existences, good or bad. There may be organizations transcending the utmost ken of the microscope, or the laboratory, and yet as real as anything visible on earth—personal beings, benevolent or malignant, having control over the electric, magnetic, or odic forces, call them what you will, or themselves connected with them as correlated organic agencies. There is something very significant in the name the Scriptures give to some of these powers, whose existence it unhesitatingly assumes. It calls them Κυριοκράτος τοῦ σκότους τοῦ αἰῶνος τοῦτον "the cosmical powers of the darkness of this world," αἰών or sphere—the unseen agents that rule in the dark world of nature, and who are also parties in the moral conflict in which the Christian is called to wrestle, Eph. vi. 12. In Eph. ii. 2, they are called ἡσυχία τοῦ ἀέρος, "the powers of the air," whether the term refers to the nearer surrounding atmosphere or to the space-filling ether, a notion which the ancient mind, both philosophical and poetical, clearly recognized, and which modern science is rapidly confirming.

But turn we now to the higher regions of cosmical and spiritual being, and the higher beings before referred to as named by Paul in his glorious nomenclature, from whatever source derived: Angels, archangels, thrones, dominions, principalities, and powers. Immeasurable height! And yet above all these did Christ ascend when He "left the cosmos," and "returned to the Father, to the glory which he had with Him before the cosmos was." A narrow conception, shall we call it, this sublime scale of being, and that high destiny to which men are called through the mediation of the uncreated Logos! Place it in contrast with that well-known view of the positive philo-
Sophy which makes man the être suprême, the highest order of being the infinite evolution has yet reached after an ante-past eternity of working. Not man redeemed by Christ, not civilized man, even, with all the animality and vice to which we give that name, but man as he was only a short time ago in the evolution chronology, when he first developed a thumb, and began to walk erect, though still a prognathian troglodyte surrounded by stone implements and gnawed bones—the Straussian or Hegelian man, in whom the universal force, the hitherto undeveloped cosmical soul, was just emerging into consciousness. Think of it! An endless evolution, an eternal working, an infinite causation, and yet an effect so finite. Nature has been working upward from eternity, and has just passed the long-armed ape who begat Prognathus, as Prognathus begat the troglodyte homo. What becomes of our doctrine of progress? As sure as mathematics, it should have been all evolved, all that we now have, over and over again,—all out, or far more of it out than has come out, incalculable ages ago. An eternal ante-past of progressive working. To what a height should it have arisen! It should have transcended all our ideals. The most exalted finite being should have been reached, the most exalted that our minds can conceive, instead of this creature man, so poor, so low; for my hearers will bear in mind that I am speaking of him as measured by no higher scale of value than that afforded by this physical hypothesis,—man evolved from nebular gas—man just coming out of darkness and so soon to return to darkness again—ε tenebris in tenebras—man just stepping above the ape, or just emerging from the fungus, and having nothing to secure him against speedily returning to nothingness, or becoming manure to the fungus that succeeds.

This all comes from that hideous ἵστερον πρώτερον, that inversion of all necessary thinking. Nature first, it says, matter first, an impalpable nebulous nihilism first, the lowest and most imperfect first; life, thought, reason, idea, their junior products, and God, therefore, the last product, if there be a God at all, or anything to which such a name can possibly be given. And we are asked to adopt this, and call it grand, whilst rejecting as narrow and soul-contracting the Revelation which makes God first, reason first, idea first, the perfect first,—as has been said before—the imperfect and the finite ever a departure from it, whether in the scale of order or of time, whether as exhibited in processes of lapse and deterioration or the contrary seeming of recovery and restoration in cyclical rounds. The two schemes have two entirely different modes of speech. Says the mere physical hypothesis: In the beginning was the nebula, and all things were in the nebula, and all things were self-evolved from the nebula— even life, thought, consciousness, idea, reason itself, having no other source. The other speaks to us in language like this: Ἐν ἰδίᾳ Ὄς ὁ Λόγος, "In the beginning was the Word," the Ὄς, the Reason, "and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. All things came into being by Him. In him was life," Ζωή, and "from this life"—not from motions, or molecules, or correlated forces, or the vibration of fibres, or the arrangements of nebular atoms, but from this life of the Logos, the eternal reason—"came the light of men"—the mind, reason, conscience of humanity,— even "the light that lighteth" every rational being, "coming into the cosmos." St. John and Herbert Spencer! This human light itself shall judge between them, and we need have no fear for the ultimate decision. But let us hear more of this magnificent style of language: "Who is the image of the unseen God, the First Born before all creation, the impress of His substance: because in Him were created all things,—things in the heavens, and things
upon the earth, things seen, and things unseen,—things of the sense world, and things transcending sense—all ranks of being, "whether they be thrones, or dominions, or principalities, or powers,—all things were by Him, and for Him, and in Him all things consist, συνέστηκε, or stand together"—in Him the Logos, the reason, the idea, the wisdom, the eternal and "only begotten Son of God." This is the narrow view; this is the order of things we are asked to give up, that our minds may be enlarged by the more lofty method of science in its wholly hypothetical scheme of the universe,—a science which puts the nebula "in the beginning," and makes man, the ape-evolved man, the highest product that has yet been produced from a past eternity of progress.

There is a tendency, even among some who believe the Scriptures, to depopulate the vast interval between the human and the divine, leaving it an immeasurable blank, or a few angels, perhaps, who fly about the only inhabitants of the void. But this overlooks the sublime significance of the Bible language. The reason for it, however, easily suggests itself: The ascending view seems to impair the dignity of man as the subject of so great a redemption. But this is all changed when we come to regard that redemption itself as the lifting up of man into a higher sphere of being, and the rescuing him from that sinking into nature through which he tends to the level of all below, or to the lowest forms of a demonic animality.

The other idea proceeds, moreover, from a false conception of dignity or moral worth. It confounds two totally different modes of estimating value, the spiritual and the physical—the quantitative or the dynamical, as compared with the estimate of faith or nearness of relation in which the finite being, however small, physically, may stand to the infinite centre of all being. In the one aspect, the value of any individual part sinks in the proportion which its total capacity of being bears to the whole of physical existence. The universe, not God, is the sponsor and index of value. The bigger the universe, the less are human sins, the less the human worth. It is, as before intimated, a variable quantity, which, when this ratio is carried out, becomes an infinitesimal. When measured by the other scale, it is a constant quantity, unchangeable in itself, whilst, in this central faith relation, it may even be said that, instead of sinking, it truly rises, and that too, in the direct ratio of the greatness of the universe considered as entering into the greatness of the Creator. In other words, the more glorious the universe in all the aspects mentioned, and especially in that of ascending ranks of being, the greater is man in this moral aspect, that is, when regarded as a rational, conscious participant and contemplator of this glory. "All things are yours; for ye are Christ's and Christ is God's." If so be there are immense degrees above him, the higher is his own value as one rejoicing in it, and thus losing himself, as it were, in an adoring view of Him, by whom, and through whom, and for whom are all things. The lower the vale, physically, from which this rational, conscious contemplator looks up, the more beautiful and serene the heavens above, the more sublime the idea of the Supernal One sedentis eternitatem, "inhabiting eternity," "dwelling in the high and holy place, with Him also"—O immeasurable contrast!—with him also "who is humble and contrite in spirit, and who trembleth at my word."

Physical or quantitative value, as I have called it, is numerical or mathematical. It has a fixed summation in decimals, if we could find room in which to put them. It is quantitative, therefore, in distinction from that transcendental calculus which no arithmetical summing, no algebraic equation, no fluxional series can ever state. It is this moral nearness to God, as distinguished
from such quantitative relation to the universe, which is so pathetically represented
in the Scriptures. Man, as a rational being, is allied to the divine; the imaged likeness,
though frightfully deformed, is still discernible to the all-seeing Eye; God recognizes this distant relationship as He sees him lying in spiritual ruin, and then, when he believes, the distance is gone; it is his faith which brings him near to the Infinite One, and makes him, in some sense, a partaker of His infinity. This is his value. Hence the power of that glorious scriptural anthropopathism: The Almighty Shepherd leaving the ninety and nine to seek the one that is lost in the wilderness. Hence it is that the ranks of ascending being, who are represented as standing before the face of our heavenly Father, rejoice over the sinner, the one sinner, that returns from his straying, and through faith in God becomes united to that higher fold, that higher spiritual sphere transcending all the spheres of force and nature.

In his mere physical aspect, man is, indeed, allied to the lowest things. Science, in tracing him through the inferior animal types, does not present this lowly aspect more emphatically than is done in the language of Abraham: "who am but dust and ashes;" or in the moaning of Job, when he had lost his sense of the divine communion, the link that bound him to the Eternal, and having in itself "the power of an endless life:" "I said to corruption, thou art my father; to the worm, thou art my mother and my sister." It is something more than a mere despairing ejaculation. In his physical being, "as of the earth earthy," man is, indeed, allied to all below, as in Christ he becomes allied to all above. And this suggests the thought whether the lower creation may not rise with him in some proportional ascent? Scripture encourages the idea. The κτωσις, the creation, "the creature, groans with man." It is "waiting" in mute hopefulness, σωμάτων ἀποκαραδοκία, with bended head, with forward-gazing eye, with outstretched neck, as the pictorial word implies, with longing expectation, εἰς τὴν ἀποκάλυψιν τῶν ζων τοῦ θεοῦ, "for the revelation of the sons of God." It is thus, too, we see what grandeur links itself with this human lowliness in the cheering language of the Prophet: "Fear not, thou worm, Jacob, for it is I who have redeemed thee; I hold thee by thy hand, I call thee by thy name; thou art mine." "Fear not; only believe." "For I am persuaded," says the rapt Apostle, "that neither death nor life, nor angels, nor principalities, nor powers, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any thing created, shall be able to separate us from the love of God which is in Christ Jesus our Lord." What wondrous ideas are these! So new to the world! new to any phase of its speculative theology, newer still as a living emotional human utterance! "The love of God"—the love of God in Christ Jesus the Incarnate Redeemer—"the love of God that passeth knowledge!" That heavenly strain; whence came it? That superhuman flash of glory; from what philosophy, Greek, Latin, Egyptian, Chaldaean, Persian, Hindu, was it ever developed? All space, all time, all rank of being—the universe in its trine aspect—all is here. Science shrinks from the mighty declaration: "Nor height, nor depth," no power of the cosmos, either in its altitude or its profundity, can separate from God, or affect the estimate of souls that truly believe. Here, we say, is glory. But the infidel philosophy cannot see it. "Its eyes are holden." Extent in space, dynamical change, duration, motion, physical evolution, endless repetition of material being—these fill its range of vision. The height and depth of the spiritual universe, or as manifested in the glory of God; these are ideas which its inductions ever fail to reach.
So is it to a great extent in the literary world. The sublimest Bible truths are unknown. The organ for their discovery is not wholly lacking, but the frivolousness of the predominant sense-philosophy prevents their true appreciation. The mere litterateur sees nothing in passages which to the believer are full of glory, whilst things not worthy to be named in comparison from classic, Brahminic, or Confucian writings, call out rapturous expressions of admiration. The Bible is full of anthropomorphisms, they say. How offensive to their spiritual tastes are Hebrew gnats, whilst swallowing, without the least difficulty, the most monstrous of Hindu elephants and the most deformed of Assyrian camels! And yet to the devout student of the Scriptures, even the portions over which the careless worldly reader is most apt to stumble, are full of evidence that they are from an earth-transcending sphere of thought. Many have been thus stumbled, perhaps, on reading the glowing eulogy of the Old Testament believers as contained in the eleventh chapter of Hebrews,— or the long record of the men "who pleased God," because they had that thing "without which it is impossible to please Him," even their faith. They wonder that the writer should speak in this manner "of Gideon, and of Barak, of Jephthah, of Samuel, also, and of David." What was there in these uncultivated semi-barbarians that they should be pointed out as favourites of Deity, or as men "of whom the world was not worthy." To the Bible-taught soul the answer comes with an unearthly light and power: "They believed God," says the record; "they endured as seeing Him who is invisible." It is the trait which most allures the spiritual eye in those grand old patriarchal figures, so uncultivated, as some would say. In their unaltering trust, they confessed themselves to be "strangers and pilgrims on the earth; they were looking for a better country, seeking for something stable, 'even a city which had foundations.'" They had that gem of faith shining far up into the highest heavens, and more precious in the sight of God, even when seen in the heart of an old Hebrew warrior, like Gideon or Jephthah, than all the philosophy of Plato, and all the pretentious ethics of an Epictetus, a Seneca, or an Antonine.

It was the saving faith of Samuel, of David, and those other rude old Hebrew men, so different from that which has been invented, and sometimes on the most untenable grounds, for what are called "heathen worthies." The belief in the salvation of Socrates, it has been said, stands on the same footing with our belief in that of Noah, Moses, David, or other Old Testament saints, so called, who died before the coming of Christ. But it is ignorance of the Bible alone that can confound the cases. The faith of these Old Testament men was ever a belief in a righteousness out of, and higher than, themselves. It was to this they clung, whatever the message, rite, or symbol by which it was represented. It was ever a righteousness of God's own providing. I will yield to no one in due reverence for Socrates. But could I find that for which I have earnestly searched among his best utterances, any hearty confession of sin, any self-condemning humility aside from his frequent ironical disclaimer of knowledge, anything like the prayer of David or the Publican, any confession like that of Job, when renouncing his own unsatisfying arguments, he falls upon his face and says, "I repent in dust and ashes,"— any language of deep self-distrust, any recognition, in short, of any the least need of a righteousness higher and holier than his own—could I discover any trace of these, I could draw from it more hope of his salvation, in Christ's sense of the word, than from all the fine sayings that have ever been truly or ignorantly ascribed to this noblest of the heathen, this prince of all the philosophers.
The heavens are not clean in thy sight; Thou art of purer eyes than to look upon evil; Thou desirest truth in the hidden parts; O wash Thou me, and then shall I be clean; when Thou shalt judge me, then shall I be whiter than snow; a broken heart, O God, Thou wilt not reject; search me, O God, and try me; explore me, and see if there be any evil way in me, and lead me in the way everlasting; I will make mention of Thy righteousness, Thine only; for with Thee is the fountain of life, and in Thy light do we see light. When we can find anything like these utterances in Socrates, or Epictetus, in Seneca, in Antonine, in Confucius, in the Zend-avesta, or in the Vedas, then may we have some charitable respect for the parallels which certain literary men are so fond of drawing. Sublime examples for our argument are still more abundant in the New Testament, but, for obvious reasons, it was thought best here, and in citations to follow, to keep in view chiefly the earlier revelation.

"Against Thee, Thee only have I sinned." Hunt through all the dialogues of Plato, hunt through all the Vedas for anything like that. Sin as against God, against God alone; Socrates knew nothing of it. It is an idea hardly to be found in the classical Greek literature. The Grecian sage acknowledged a war in the soul; the lower had got above the upper. It was a civil war, destructive of all good. That he saw clearly. The disordered spirit he would compose and reconstruct, but he would do it by philosophy. He would make peace between the reason and the appetite. He would put to sleep the wild beasts, or chain them up, or set them in balancing antagonism one against the other. But he could not "cast them out." That could only be done by prayer, and fasting, and penitent confession that acknowledges sin to be in the centre of the soul, and seeks peace there by first seeking peace with God. It was the primal defect of the Platonic or Socratic thinking, that it made matter the original evil, and laid all our sins upon the wretched sympathizing body. Of that older war between God and the spirit, of which the Scriptures are so full, Socrates knew nothing. The Psalmist, too, was acquainted with this strife between appetite and the reason; but he found not the cure in philosophy. "Unite my heart," he prays (Psalm lxxxvi.), make one my divided heart, as it literally reads, "to fear thy name." How deeply Paul felt this inward strife we learn from that wondrous seventh chapter of Romans, and we know, too, his only remedy, "O wretched man, who shall deliver me? I thank God through Jesus Christ my Lord." "Let him lay hold of my strength that he may make peace with me, make peace with me," as the Prophet so tenderly repeats it.

"Our modern monotheistic conception of God," says Strauss, "has two sides, the absolute and the personal." "The first element," he proceeds to say, "is Greek,"—that is, we derive it from the Greeks; "the second comes from the Hebrew Christian sources." The distinction between the Greek and Hebrew conception, such a favourite with Strauss and others, is a mere tinsel antithesis, having a false show of learning, but without any real foundation. Especially is it false on the Hebrew side. The personal in Deity is indeed set forth in the Scriptures with awful distinctness, but in no writings is the absolute, the infinite, the unconditioned, the knowledge-surpassing, the time-and-space-transcending aspect of the divine character so sublimely presented: "The I am that I am, the 'O ΩN, The Being pre-eminently, who is and was, and is to come, and whom no tense form can adequately describe—the one—the all—" who filleth all things," "who inhabits eternity," "of whom there is no similitude," with whom "one day is as a thousand years, and a thousand years as one day," whose "ways
transcend our ways, and whose thinking is above our thinking, even as the heavens, the infinite heavens, are higher than the earth.” Where do we find anything like this in Plato or Aristotle? For Strauss must have reference to the Greek philosophers rather than to the intensely personal conceptions of the poets. Where do we find anything in any of the Greek schools which so sets forth the absoluteness, the eternity, the infinity, the incomprehensibleness of the divine character? It does not detract from this, that such representations of the timeless absoluteness are sometimes made through the most vivid sense-picturings, though there are other cases, and equally sublime, where the general or abstract forms of speech are used.

It is so, also, in regard to conceptive power. This has already been alluded to in what was said of the old names in Genesis, and the comparison between the ancient and the modern sense-imaging accompanying those terms. God does not seem, after all, much higher to the modern astronomer than he did to Abraham. No figure of immutability surpasses that of the Biblical “inhabiting eternity”—filling the changeless totality of being; or as Boethius expresses it, tota simul et interminabilis vitae possessio. So also the representations of the divine unknowableness to which reference has already been made. Again, God’s mighty harmonizing power—“the reign of law”—which he has established throughout the worlds, and the Scripture mode of expressing it. There is no show of philosophizing; no assuming to speak the language of any science. It may be said, perhaps, that there is an attempt here to get more out of this style of speaking than the words will warrant; but it cannot fail to be seen and felt how directly it carries the mind to the ultimate causal ideas, and causal forces, be they what they may.

Take again those attributes which, though physical in their manifestation are connected with the moral aspect of the Divine,—the ideas of providence and omnipresence. How wonderfully are these brought together, in one picture, the near and the far, the intimate personality and the unconditioned absoluteness of Deity! We have a remarkable example in the CXXXIX. Psalm; the loftiest conceptual expression of the space-filling presence followed immediately by language denoting the closest personal familiarity with the finite human soul: “Whither shall I go from Thy spirit, or where shall I flee from Thy presence? If I ascend to the heavens, Thou art there; If I make my bed in Sheol, behold, Thou art there; let me take the wings of the morning and dwell in the uttermost West; even there Thy hand shall guide me; Thy right hand shall hold me fast. If I say, let darkness bury me, the night shall be light about me. No darkness hides from Thee; the night shineth as the day; the darkness is as the light.” All philosophical and scientific language is ultimately grounded on figures; but what figures for the soul can telescope the remote more powerfully than these? And, then, in almost immediate sequence, the ineffable nearness: “For Thou dost possess my reins; Thou didst overshadow me in my mother’s womb. How precious are Thy thoughts of me, O God, how great their sum! When I awake I am still with Thee.” It is as though the soul that thus apprehends the Infinite by faith did, in some way, partake of God’s ubiquity. In heaven above, in Hades deep below, in all conceivable spaces that lie between the remotest East, where morning begins its flight, and the uttermost parts of the boundless sea, the conceptual limit of the illimitable West,—wherever Thou art, there “am I still with Thee,—still with Thee,—evermore with Thee.” And so in the time aspect. God’s eternal thought transcends duration and succession. The longest as well as the shortest intervals disappear before the time-
less contemplation; as in the language already quoted from the Psalmist and the Apostle: "A thousand years;" it is numerically finite, even as one day or a watch in the night; but conceptually it is a symbol of eternity, of a timeless eternity. The thousand years represent the idea as well as the longest row of decimals. It is simply the most vivid way of setting forth the absolute timelessness of God's being except as He chooses to manifest Himself in the flow of the finite. Talk of the Greeks, and their superiority to the Hebrews in respect to this idea of the Divine absoluteness! what, as compared with the Psalmist's language, is Plato's laboured effort in the Timaeus to give us the difference between αἰών, the immovable eternity, and χρόνος, or time, its revolving mirror. Indeed, the human mind must ever fail to grasp the idea of timelessness, but no language can carry our thought higher or farther in that direction than the solemn musings of this old XC. Psalm: "A thousand years in Thine eyes as yesterday when it is past, and as a watch in the night!" The wings of Plato's abstractions grow weary in every attempt to soar to such a height. Compare, too, the effort of the same philosopher to set before us his much-laboured distinction between the τὸ ἀναμνήσθαι and the γνώσθαι, the absolute and the flowing, the ὑπάρχον and the ἀπαρχά, the visible and the invisible, the ἀπαρχή and the ὑπάρχη, the sense world and the world of ideal or necessary truth. Great as that is, compare it all, I say, with that short soaring sentence of Paul, the Hebrew of the Hebrews: "For the things that are seen are temporal (πρόκειται), they belong to time; the things unseen are eternal." Or go back to the older Hebrew prophet, the cotemporary and the minister of King Hezekiah: "Lift up your eyes to the heavens, and look upon the earth beneath; for the heavens shall dissolve like vapour; and the earth shall wear out like a garment; but my salvation shall be for eternity, and my righteousness (my moral kingdom) shall never fail." Take it in connection with the near language of the railing Rabshakeh, which now so repeats itself, in all its bald sameness, everywhere on the Assyrian tablets. What must we think of those who talk of these monuments as shedding light upon the Bible, or of the ideas it derives from them, or from the kindred Egyptian darkness. To a serious intelligence the conviction is irresistible that there was something unearthly in those Hebrew books, as distinguished from the literature of all cotemporaneous surrounding nations, and that this fact furnishes an unanswerable argument for their inspiration and unearthly origin.

And yet such is the nature of this vivid Hebrew style, that, whilst it rises beyond all philosophizing, the child can feel, and, in that feeling, understand its lofty meaning. It elevates the soul while it sets it pondering; calls out the contemplative spirit, showing the truth of that pregnant Scriptural declaration: "The entrance of Thy word giveth light." It quickens the intelligence through the awed emotion: "it giveth understanding to the simple." At the earliest dawning of the youthful intelligence should the grand Old Testament ideas, and this sublime Old Testament language, be made as familiar to it as possible. It is, indeed, above them, but that is no reason for making it stand aside: Trust the power of God's word for lifting up the youngest minds to some good measure of its comprehension.

It is astonishing how ignorantly some of our literary men will talk of the narrowness of the Old Testament, and the lowering conceptions it presents of Jehovah as an earthly and patrial Deity,—as a God bloody, vindictive, jealous, in the human sense, narrowly competing for earthly sacrifice and earthly homage—or pictured simply as thundering in the sky, or walking on the seeming vault above, or inhabiting temples built by human
hands, or "snuffing," as the gross infidel says, the savour of the burning victim. Solomon’s sublime prayer, before referred to, would be sufficient for the refutation of this, aside from all the other passages cited from the Prophets and the Pentateuch. Let it be remembered, too, how much that prayer reveals of the spiritual culture of the Jewish nation; barbarians, as some would style them in comparison with the Greeks. In the simplicity of an adoring spirit, Solomon seems to feel that every heart in that great assembly throbbed in unison with his devout utterance: "Will the Most High dwell with men? Will God indeed dwell upon the earth. Behold the heaven, yea the heaven of heavens, cannot contain Thee; how much less this house that I have builded." "for the name of the Lord God of Israel." Talk of the Greeks! Fancy such language used at the dedication of a heathen temple; fancy an Athenian, a Corinthian, or a Boeotian audience listening to such a strain; fancy the wonder that we should feel at finding a supplication like it in Pindar or Sophocles. How would the page be marked, had there been found in the writings of the noblest of the Greek theosophists, or the most celebrated of their lawgivers, thoughts so elevated, so unearthly, as are uttered by Moses, the man, as some say, who derived his best ideas from the dark animal-worshipping, or, at the utmost, symbol-adoring Egyptians: "Take heed lest ye forget the covenant of Jehovah your God, and make for Him the likeness of any similitude," as before quoted; "Take heed lest ye lift up your eyes unto the heavens, and when ye see the sun, and the moon, and the stars, ye be tempted to worship them." Think what was all around this peculiar people, with their most peculiar literature. Think of this strange monotheistic cleft lying between a misty pantheism, filled with all monstrous shadows on the East, and the foul polytheism that everywhere spread beyond them in the West. What was the restraining power which so "dwelt in the tents of Shem, this Shekinah presence that abode so constantly in the ark of Israel?" A due consideration of the spiritual wonder here, casts into the background the important, though still subordinate, question of physical miracles.

Strauss would regard the ideas of the infinite and the absolute as inconsistent with the personal character. But how do he and Spencer know what is inconsistent with the unknowable? Even pantheism may be so held as to admit the idea of personality. In fact, the only pantheism we need fear is that which strips God of His moral attributes by sinking Him into nature. I may believe in God as the to παν, and yet regard this Great Whole as a person who knows me a personal part, and thinks of me, and numbers every hair of my head. For personality is the most definable of ideas. It denotes a being, whether all or part, whether infinite or only very great, of whom I can use the personal pronouns, saying "He is," or "He is good," or "He is the rewarder of those who seek Him." Or it means one to whom I—even as a part—can say thou—imploring Him in the language of the dying philosopher: O thou Great all, Summa rerum, Summa Omnium, Causa Causarum, miserrere mei. I can believe thus in God as the TO ΠΑΝ, and yet, if I am a Christian, can say, Elohai, my God,—even as the Apostle warrants us, when he says: "All things are yours; for ye are Christ’s, and Christ is God’s." It was the Hebrew Paul that gave these philosophical Greeks a lesson in absolutism, when standing upon Mars hill he said: Εν άνευ γαρ ΖΩΜΕΝ, και κινούμεθα, και ΕΣΜΕΝ: "For in Him we live and move and have our being"—not γινόμεθα, but ΕΣΜΕΝ: in Him we live and move and are.

The infinite can have its finite aspect. The infinite may enter into and act in the finite; may assume the finite. The denial of this is, in fact, the denial of the infinite. It is
virtually saying that God cannot do all things; that because we cannot ascend to Him, therefore He cannot come down to us. It is the idea which makes intelligible, and renders so precious all the anthropopathisms of the Bible, as they are called. It is the ground of the doctrine of the incarnation. All revelation, whether in written language or through nature, is necessarily anthropopathic. Those who talk of holding communication with God through his works use anthropopathic language. The Bible only goes beyond in making it mutual. God "comes down to see what the children of men are doing." The youngest Sabbath scholar is not deceived by the language; whilst the highest minds may thank Him for such a condescension to our poor thinking, our sense-bound conceptions, our yearning for communion in some way, between the infinite and the finite mind. We may bless God for such a mode of speech; but we should not forget how sublimely these same Scriptures set forth also the far aspect, the high aspect, the philosophic aspect, if any prefer the term, as well as the near presence. It is the great peculiarity of the Bible in distinction from all other writings, that it so unites the two—that with such unshrinking boldness it maintains this tremendous equilibrium of the near and the far, and sometimes in closest connection: "Am I a God at hand, saith the Lord, and not a God afar off? Can any hide himself in secret that I shall not see him? Do not I fill heaven and earth, saith the Lord?" But philosophy cannot keep its balance here. In soaring towards the infinite height, as it would esteem it, it loses sight of the infinite depth, the infinite lowness; in stretching itself out towards the infinitely far, it fails to comprehend the infinitely near. The Scriptural writers have no misgiving in the use of such a style: "The high and holy One"—"the humble and broken spirit to whom He comes down." There is no incongruity; both notes belong alike to the mighty sweep of this infinite diapason. It represents the fulness of the divine, the fulness of Him that filleth all in all—entering into the finiteness, knowing the knowledge, thinking the thought, feeling the feeling, and thus truly using the language of the human in its intensest and most human utterance. It is no inspiration of earth that dares to employ such a style as this.

There is a mode of intelligence which the Bible represents God as challenging to Himself, when he says: "My thinking is above your thinking as heaven is high above the earth." Timeless, spaceless, without succession, one great totality of cause and effect as they are mutually seen in each other; we try to talk here, but our words fail us. They are aiming at something; they are not altogether meaningless; we are confident that there is some reality to which they point, as we are sure that there is a real North to which the needle directs its tremulous motion in the dark night of storms; but that is as far as we can go. "Such knowledge is too high for us; it is wonderful; we cannot attain unto it." The Scriptures go beyond Hamilton, Mansel, and Spencer, in what it affirms respecting the divine unknowableness. But still it is the known of God that gives this idea of His unknowableness. "His thoughts are not as our thoughts." Most true indeed. But again the question returns, and we may defy any one to show that it is an irrational one: Is the belief in this transcendent thinking and knowing at war with that other belief on which all religion is grounded, that God may also, if it pleases Him, think as we think, and know as we know, and even feel as we feel,—entering not only into our finite thought, but into our sense-world,—yet remaining infinite, as he dwells unchangeably in the time-and-space-and-sense-transcending sphere? This is the great Bible idea, "the Logos, or Eternal Reason, becoming flesh." Believing it, we
have no more trouble with the Scriptural anthropopathisms. To know, to think, comes under this term as much as to remember, to feel, to love. We hail these modes of expression; we rejoice in them as the language of a father with his transcending intelligence coming down to his finite children, and that, too, not as a mere show, or make-believe, but as really entering into that lower sphere, and there really speaking the child's language as the truthful though far-distant reflection of His own eternal thought. All this, it may be said, involves the absurdity of the infinite becoming finite, or entering into the finite sphere without ceasing to be infinite. But how dare we thus apply our measurement to One we declare to be unknowable, and boast of the declaration as the highest attainment of a knowledge transcending the vulgar? If we resort to scholastic reasoning, it would certainly seem that the denial of the possibility of such a becoming would be a denial of the infinity itself, a limitation of the very idea expressed by the term. Another question is raised in respect to these anthropopathisms: Why could there not have been used a more philosophical style, though still human, or one more adapted to cultivated minds? The answer is, that whilst nothing would have been gained in point of significance, or any nearer approach to the ineffable idea, much would have been lost in power and vividness. All philosophic and scientific terms have sense images at their roots. It is impossible for human language to get out of this. It is ever metaphorical in the conveyance of ideas transcending sense. By the fading away of the metaphorical hue, words become dead abstractions, algebraic symbols, as it were, deficient in vividness of meaning, yet compromising the truth sometimes by cheating the soul into the notion that there is more in them than they really contain. When thus dead and dried, they are laid away in the fossil cabinets of philosophic, or scientific, or learned speech. They are the language of "culture," as Mathew Arnold would say. In this state they become a dead weight upon our thinking, whilst the simpler or earlier language, never losing its unchangeable freshness, leaves the soul at liberty to follow the illimitable idea, whether in the direction of the infinitely high, the infinitely far, or the infinitely near.

This same awful equilibrium, as we have called it, is preserved ever in the representation of the divine moral attributes. It is another peculiarity of our Holy Scripture in which no other resembles it. The terribly severe, the meltingly merciful; the inexorable judicial righteousness, the loving fatherhood; we find them both expressed,—and in the same passage, sometimes,—without the least shrinking from the near conjunction of things, to our thinking, so seemingly antagonistic. The same view may be taken of the unshrinking representation the Bible makes of God in His universality, as Lord of all worlds, "Lord of Hosts," of all transcending ranks of being, as "King of eternities," and at the same time, and sometimes in near connection, as a local deity, a patriarchal deity, EL ISRAEL, God of Israel, God of His people,—the I AM THAT I AM, the 'O ΩΝ, and in the next verse almost (Exod. iii. 13) "the God of the Fathers, God of Abraham, and Isaac, and Jacob," that much-used Old Testament formula in which our Saviour, in His argument with the blinded Sadducees, the broad churchmen, or wide-thinking people of His day, found so much of "the power of an endless life." It is that same presentation of the infinitely far and the infinitely near on which I have been insisting, and which is so striking a feature of the Bible as distinguished from all other books.

By such writers as Strauss this near patrial language, so precious to the believer, is cited to prove that the Bible represents
Jehovah as ranking with the gods of the surrounding nations, like Zeus, or Thor, or Dagon, or Bel, or Chemosh. In such a charge there is wholly overlooked, or purposely ignored, these declarations of absoluteness and universality, sometimes in the same chapter, and so transcending the loftiest language of any philosophic or scientific theism. God is, indeed, set forth as a paternal deity, the God of His people, of those who are near to Him by faith. Not unfrequently does this language become still closer, more familiar, more personal. He declares Himself a tribal and family divinity. “His mercy is unto children’s children of those that fear Him.” He is, moreover, the God of the individual, of everyone who believeth. He permitsthe worshippers to address Him by those near personal pronouns that so astonish us by their boldness in the prayers of the Old Testament saints: “O God, my God; early will I seek Thee.” “Why art thou cast down, O my soul; for still do I make confession unto Him, the salvation of my countenance”—my salvation ever before me—“and my God.”

What the age demands is a more intense study of the Holy Scriptures, accompanied by the earnest prayer: “Open Thou mine eyes, that I may behold wondrous things out of Thy law.” The Bible itself must be brought out, and its mighty spiritual power unfolded, as the best answer to infidelity—the Bible subjectively, the Bible objectively, as the great standing miracle of human history,—as presenting a train of events most unaccountable in their bearing on the world’s course, as containing ideas which no philosophy, no theory of development, can ever explain. To such study it will reveal itself as “the power of God.” Other defences are, indeed, important, but without this they are shorn of the great strength which alone can make them available to the pulling down of “strongholds,” and the overthrow of the truth’s unwearying foes.

THE INTUITIONAL EVIDENCE OF THE TRUTH OF CHRISTIANITY.

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PROPOSE to compare the evidence of intuition for the ultimate and fundamental truths of science with the evidence for the alleged truths of Christianity derived from the same source.

Intuition is the last test of science. When facts and phenomena have been duly collated, when experiments have been fully made, when partial inductions have been generalized, and a law or principle of extended application has been reached, it seems to the scientific man a necessary truth. He sees, not only that it is, but that it must be. It becomes self-evident, and forms thenceforward a part of his scientific consciousness. No universal scientific truth is fully established, until it is thus intuitively recognized as, of a priori necessity, appertaining to the department of science which it defines and comprehends.

A like intuition the Christian possesses as the result of his experience. He may at the outset rest for his belief mainly on testimony; he may enter on a series of experiments in Christian living with faith rather than with knowledge; but, if he is true to his own
soul, the time comes when he sees and knows from his own spiritual intuitions the verities of his religion; the excellence of its precepts; the beauty, holiness, loveliness, power of its Author. There is a stage at which argument or cavil may impair or overthrow his belief. There is a stage at which the truths of Christianity and the divine attributes of its Founder have so become a part of his own consciousness, that no force of reasoning can by any possibility dislodge them. Here, for instance, is a lone widow, who has been a mark for all the shafts of adverse fortune. Poor, infirm, lowly in estate, she has no treasure but her Bible, no hope but in its promises, no fountain of joy but that which flows "fast by the oracles of God." Yet she has a peace more profound, a joy more intense, than worlds could give. Her soul is a living transcript of the evangelical record. Her prayer is not the groping after an unknown God, but, as it were, a face-to-face communion. Her heaven is not in the far-off future, but in her own beatific experience. She has realized the promises. She has entered into the rest that remaineth for the people of God. Ply her with all the infidel arguments that have been started from the days of Celsus to the present moment, you cannot ruffle for an instant the serenity of her faith and trust. She knows whom she has believed. His life throbs in her veins. His words are strung in the living fibres of her whole being. She feels herself transformed into his image,—a member of his body; and who shall separate her from the love of Christ? Now this intuitive knowledge of Christianity has been possessed by thousands for every one who has intuitive knowledge of scientific truths.

It is, moreover, the prerogative of Christianity over all other religions that its alleged truths can thus become intuitions. There could have been no intuition of the ceremonial law, which forms an essential part of Judaism. There can be no intuition of the vagaries of the Koran, of the avatars of the Hindoo mythology, of the chimeras of Buddhism. But there is not a (so-called) truth of Christianity, which, if true, is not of such a nature that it may, in some form or measure, enter into the consciousness, and thus rest on the same evidence on which we believe in our own existence. This statement cannot indeed be made as to the individual facts of the biography of Christ, nor yet as to the objective side of certain Christian doctrines: but the facts of Christ's life are mere tokens of and pointers to the spiritual relations in which he professes to stand to the individual soul, as a sure guide, as a safe exemplar, as an infallible teacher, as an all-sufficient Saviour, and these relations, if real, may all become subjects of consciousness; while of the doctrines of Christianity there is not one which is simply and solely objective.

Let us not, however, content ourselves with general statements. Let us see what intuition comprehends, and how far, or under what conditions, it is availing as a source of evidence.

Intuition is inlooking. It is intellectual perception. It is that apprehension of the truth which comes not from reasoning or proof, but from the nature of the case, from the nature of our own minds, or both. What we perceive intuitively shines either in its own light, or in light which we ourselves cast upon it. It either is self-evident, or it has the attestation of our own consciousness, and needs no other proof.

Intuition may thus be either objective or subjective. We may either so look into the object-matter of our thought or enquiry as to see in it that which could not but have been,—that which, once apprehended, is its own sufficient evidence; or we may so look in upon our remembered and current experience as to recognize in it truths so manifest as to need no other proof than that of consciousness. Objective intuition has its
chief scope in the mathematical and physical sciences; subjective, in mental and moral philosophy. Both objective and subjective are claimed in behalf of Christianity.

I will first speak of objective intuition. Christianity alone gives us a tenable theory of the universe. Independently of revelation, there are in the universe unmistakable and innumerable tokens of design, and thus of an intelligent Creator; of beneficent design, and thus of a merciful Creator. There are, in every department of nature, not chance coincidences, but organisms, processes, and products, which are manifestly adapted to the enjoyment of man and of other sentient beings, and which can have no other destination, can serve no other purpose. There are, on the other hand, no organisms, processes, or products, of which the necessary and inevitable tendency is the creation of pain, grief, or misery; but in the course of events physical evil is incidental, or subsidiary to greater good; its agencies, such as may be evaded, controlled, neutralized, often transformed and utilized, so that in proportion to the growth of man's intelligence they become subject to his command, and constantly tend to disappear. Man's own native powers of mind and soul, in their normal exercise, in the only exercise of them which the developed intellect can approve, tend to his self-respect, his growth in intelligence and capacity, and his enduring happiness. There is, however, in human society, and there has been in all past ages, an overwhelming amount of degradation and misery, almost all of which is visibly due to the depraved will of man. To this are chargeable, not only the immediate consequences of vice and sin, but as surely, though less directly, by far the larger part of the poverty, hardship, and physical infirmity and suffering in the world; for in a community of saints there would be no abject want, no social oppression or depres-
and nowhere else, we have precisely what might have been thus anticipated. We have a revelation of God in the person of Christ, of the law of God in his precepts and his life; a regenerating power in his whole earthly ministry; the forgiveness of sins in his cross and sacrifice; help for our infirmities in the Holy Spirit, proceeding from the Father and the Son in accordance with his promise; a power of progress in his everlasting Gospel; eternal life made manifest in his resurrection. Moreover, by his emphatic recognition of the Hebrew Scriptures as authentic, we learn that God had never "left himself without witness" in the world; that primeval revelation preceded even man's first transgression; that the knowledge of divine things given to man, was lost by man; that this knowledge was at intervals renewed, only to be circumscribed and obscured by the depraved wills of those on whom it was bestowed; and thus that Christ came, not after ages in which God had abandoned men wholly to their own evil devices, but as the supreme term of a culminating series of interpositions on his part for the relief, reformation, and spiritual training of his human family.

We thus, and thus only, can reconcile the history of man with the being, omnipotence, and infinite love of God. We thus, and thus only, have a rational and consistent theory of the universe,—a God who has never forsaken his own work; a free agency whose proclivity to evil has never been left without check or remedy; a redemption and everlasting salvation for all who, under whatever culture, are faithful to such light as they have received and such law as they know; a provision by which, without annulling human freedom, sin is to be purged away, the right to culminate, and the reign of God to be ultimately established in the realm of living souls no less than in outward nature. The system is coherent and complete. It satisfies, if I may so speak, the scientific consciousness. To the Christian it not only seems to be true, but he cannot conceive of its not being true. It comes to him through what he receives as the record of divine revelation; but it justifies itself,—it is its own evidence. Still more, it adds confirmation to the very record from which it is derived. We are certain, from other evidence that the Gospels are genuine and authentic; but evidence of a different and even higher type is furnished by the coherence of their contents among themselves, and with what beside is known of God and man. I say, evidence of a higher, not a surer type: for testimony may be, and is, sufficiently multiform, explicit, and strong, to produce absolute certainty of conviction; yet there is a more vivid and realizing sense of the veracity of the sacred records, when their contents thus present intrinsic tokens of their truth. While testimony prepares the way for intuition, intuition calls forth the testimony of our own apprehensive powers to supplement the witnesses from without,—indeed, transfers us from the number of those who depend on testimony to the list of those who themselves bear testimony.

We pass now to subjective intuition, or the evidence of Christian consciousness. As I have said, there is no alleged truth of Christianity which may not be tried by this test, and in behalf of which this evidence is not claimed. Such is the case, in the first place, with the ethics of the Gospel. There were in the Sermon on the Mount and in various other portions of the teachings of Christ not a few things so entirely opposed to the mind, voice, and practice of antiquity, as to have made many a hard strain upon the faith even of the most docile hearers. It is worthy of remark that it was not any dogmatic statement, but the command to forgive an offending brother seven times in a day, that called forth the exclamation from the disciples, "Lord, increase our faith,"—forbearance that could not be
wearied out by pertinacity in wrong-doing seemed to them so utterly unreasonable and impossible. Indeed, had not their Master embodied his precept in his life, and re-enacted it on the cross in the prayer for his murderers, it may be doubted whether his followers would ever have had faith enough to make experiment of it. But no one has made trial of it, and persevered in so doing, who has not been profoundly conscious of its divine excellence; for it has been as proof-armour to the soul against all assaults from without; it has blunted the keenest weapons of calumny and malevolence; it has kept the spirit in sweet serenity under insult, provocation and violence, and has made it more than conqueror in its conflicts with evil.

Thus, also, have those who have made trial of humility found it exaltation. It has raised them above the world. It has given them an unassailable position among their brethren. It has in unnumbered instances brought them much larger honour and profounder deference than they disclaimed; and even when this has not been the case, it has fortified them against disesteem and misappreciation by the consciousness of the honour that comes from God, and by the realizing foresight of the chief places that shall be theirs, when the Lord shall find them in the lowest room, and shall say to them, “My friends, go up higher.”

A like consciousness attests the truths concerning God in his relations to man, promulgated through Christ. The divine Providence is a truth of consciousness. That “all things work together for good to those who love God,” the mature Christian needs no longer to learn from the record of the apostle; for the apostle’s experience is repeated in his own soul. As he looks back on the way in which God has led him, he sees that it was for him the safe and the best way. He has had trials, but they have strengthened his faith and deepened his joy. He has had sorrows; but the bread of affliction has been to him the bread of life,—in the valley of weeping he has drunk of fountains that flow from the river before the throne of God. He has parted from those with whom half his own life seemed to go; but they have opened for him new avenues to the upper rooms in his Father’s house. He has had experiences that have loosened his roots in his native soil; but the vine, unearthed, has struck out tendrils that have clung closer and climbed higher around the tree of eternal life. Thus in the faithful soul is God’s loving providence so fully verified, that no words of holy writ can bear to it more explicit testimony than is borne by the inner consciousness of the believer.
The efficacy of prayer is verified in like manner. The Christian knows that he has never prayed in vain. True, there have been specific petitions that have not had their specific answers; but even these have been more than answered. So was it with Jesus himself, and it is enough for the disciple that he be as his Master. He prayed that the cup might pass from him,—it passed not; but there appeared an angel from heaven, strengthening him. So the great apostle prayed that "the thorn in the flesh"—some bodily infirmity which he feared would prove disabling—might be removed,—it was not removed; but it was said to him, "My grace is sufficient for thee; for my strength is made perfect in weakness," and he thenceforth gloried in his infirmities, through and above which the power of Christ rested upon him. The Christian finds that prayer and sin, prayer and hopeless sorrow, cannot coexist; that prayer disarms temptation, renders prosperity safe and adversity sweet, makes work worship and joy gratitude, his home a sanctuary, the house of merchandise his Father's house. It more than keeps the soul; for it gives over its guardianship to him of whom it is written, "He that keepeth thee will not slumber." Thus does the consciousness of the praying soul bear perpetual testimony to the words of Jesus, "Ask, and it shall be given you; seek, and ye shall find; knock, and it shall be opened unto you."

Christian consciousness equally attests the truths appertaining to Christ in his relation to the human soul. Do you ask, How is it that in this field of thought there have been so many diverse, nay, opposite theories, while a common consciousness ought to make some approach to a common expression of itself? I answer, that the dogmatic differences among Christians relate to those aspects of Christ's nature and work which cannot be subjects of consciousness; while as to the part which he bears in Christian experience there is a substantial agreement. Who Christ is, cannot be determined by my consciousness; but I can know what he does, what he is, for me, to me, and in me. There is a divine side of Christ's work of redemption of which I cannot be conscious; but if he has wrought that work for and in me, I can know from my own consciousness the blessedness of having received the atonement,—the inward assurances of forgiveness and reconciliation with God,—the peace, not as the world gives, which flows from the heart of Christ into the heart of his disciple. In fine, the Christian is inwardly conscious of influences at work in his heart and upon his life which precisely correspond to the power of Christ's death and the power of his resurrection,—influences of which he had no experience till he came within the sphere of Christ's attraction, of which he cannot conceive as flowing from any other source, and through which he feels that he is brought into a vital union with Christ, corresponding to that of the branch with the parent-vine. The physiology, if I may so term it, of Christian regeneration is described with no little diversity of nomenclature; but the phenomena of consciousness which attend it—the death to sin, the consecrated will, the affections set on things above, the fruit of the Divine Spirit in the heart and life—are the same in those whose formal theories vary however widely; and they are such phenomena as are not alleged to be produced by any other than Christian belief, culture, or influence.

To the individual soul this consciousness of Christian verities is, of course, the most convincing of all proofs, surpassing even objective intuition. What one feels he cannot but believe; and when there has been for him a source from which he knows that he has derived peculiar inward experiences, it is impossible that he should not associate the source and experiences as cause and
effect. He, the better part of whose being and life has taken shape consciously through the instrumentality of the Gospel of Christ, so far as outward means are concerned, and, inwardly, through an influence upon the soul corresponding in all its characteristics to the influence which Jesus promised should rest upon his followers, cannot but believe in Christ and his Gospel with a positiveness and strength of conviction such experience alone can produce.

We now arrive at the question, What is the evidential value of intuition to those outside of Christian circle? Can the scientific or spiritual consciousness of one man be made availing to another, and, if so, how? I answer, first, that the attitude in which intuitive conviction places the Christian believer, inspires, extends, deepens such faith as falls short of intuition. When those who call themselves Christians have a faith like Penelope's web, daily unravelled and rewoven, yielding to every show of cavil or scepticism, bending before every adverse blast, Christianity receives ghastly wounds in the house of its professed friends, is tolerated rather than honoured by those outside of its household, and, so far from making new converts, drops from time to time those who hang loosely on its skirts. Equally, when the faith that exists, though firm and unyielding, is traditional and not vital, when the Church clings to its belief without being penetrated by its spirit and its power, unbelief prevails. The epochs when infidelity has been most rampant have been those at which externality rather than inwardness has been the prevailing type of the religious life; and, whenever that life has been so rekindled as to present the spectacle of intense and glowing vitality, unbelief has been arrested in its progress, and new confidence in Christian verities has taken possession of the collective mind of the community. Such faith—sincere, no doubt, of its kind, but "dead-sure"—as existed in the licentious court and the time-serving clergy of the age of Louis XIV., was among the chief causes of the French infidelity of the eighteenth century. The eminent champions of infidelity in England and Scotland, during the same century, were nurtured in the bosom of the easy-going Erastianism and luke-warmness of the national churches. Its tide was turned, not by the masterly and unanswerable defences of Christianity which it called forth, but by the infusion of spiritual life, alike into the establishments and the dissenting churches, under the auspices of Whitefield, Wesley, and their coadjutors. Men ceased to doubt and cavil when they witnessed a faith which indicated a profound, active, and influential consciousness of its contents.

Similar views would present themselves throughout Christendom, and in every period of its history. At the present moment, you might go from place to place, and in each community, in and around every congregation, you would find that the amount and strength of belief on the part of those not within the circle of professed Christian experience bear a very close proportion to the inwardness and energy of the faith of Christian men and women: the quiescent, worldly, and formalistic church being surrounded by people who either avow their scepticism, or do not think the subject of sufficient importance for them to take any cognizance of it; the living church, surrounded by those who give religion their assent, respect, and honour, and lie open to influences that may win them to sincere discipleship. This principle underlies all successful revivalism. Nothing can be done outside of the Church, till its inward life is renewed. The sole error of revivalism is that it seeks to make occasional and paroxysmal that which ought to be constant and perennial; for did the light shine as it ought and might always in the heart of the Church, it would be seen all the time, and there would be no pause in the accession of those who, seeing
it, would give glory to their Father in Heaven.

Nor is the conviction thus produced mere feeling. It has a logical basis. Intuition is a valid argument to those who have not attained to it. Even objective intuition is so. It is constantly admitted in other departments than religion. Of those who learn and implicitly believe the truths of science, of astronomy for instance, by far the greater number do not occupy a position in which they can have a clear scientific consciousness of them. Were these truths in the minds of their representative men mere hypotheses, they would be no more than hypotheses to other intelligent persons. But we take them on trust and believe them without a question, because we are assured by those who have given their lives to their investigation that they are so related to one another and to the phenomena of the universe, that they cannot but be true. Now it seems to me that we are similarly impressed by the clear vision of religious truth, which has been a characteristic of the greatest minds of these Christian ages. It is of no small worth to an intellect of feebler grasp that to such men as Milton, Newton, Boyle, Locke, Pascal, and a host beside that might be named, Christianity has seemed self-evident, shining in its own unborrowed light, incapable of being obscured by doubt or cavil. These men, indeed, believed with the heart no less than with the intellect; but their mere intellectual intuition is of itself an independent ground of argument. They were men in whom feeling could not have preceded or produced belief, as in many lesser minds. The eyes of their understanding were wide open. They had before them the grounds of unbelief; they could see round and through the objects of their faith; and that their faith was clear as sight and impregnable to doubt, may well give reassurance to intellects of less keen and comprehensive vision.

But, above all, subjective intuition furnishes valid ground for belief. The Christian camp presents, indeed, not an homogeneous aspect, but unnumbered rival hosts, often turning their arms against one another rather than against the common enemy. Yet there are points of view from which their differences are merged, their enmities harmonized. There are certain traits which are common to the best men of all sects. The definition of the Christian spirit and life given by one would be accepted by all. The same manuals of practical piety are in the hands of all. The same Christian lyrics are sung with equal fervour in sanctuaries that stand over against each other like Zion and Gerizim. To the prayers of each all would add a hearty amen. Were they brought together, forbidden the use of technical phraseology, and induced to utter in the simplest language their several modes of consciousness as to what Christ had done for them, their duty to God, to Christ, to man, their abnegation of self-dependence, their trust in a divine redemption, their hope full of immortality, there would be no Babel-like confusion of tongues, as when they parade their distinctive dogmas, but a sweet consent and heavenly harmony. Now those who would thus with one heart and voice reveal a common consciousness are the foremost men in the esteem of their fellow-men, the leaders in all good works,—those whose lives are confessedly pure, true, faithful, generous, holy. Is there not in the united testimony of such men of all ages, nations, and sects, evidence of no mean worth to that which they all affirm; namely, that Jesus Christ is the Sent of God, the Saviour of men, the Source of all excellence, the Inspirer of all virtue, the Way to the Father, the incarnate Truth, the eternal Life made manifest?

As in thought I take my stand outside of the Church, of any church, I am profoundly moved by the unanimity of this cloud of witnesses. Supposing myself not even in
the humblest measure a partaker of their consciousness, I see evidently that it is in them not mere belief, but consciousness; that they are in their inmost souls so identified with Christ that you cannot separate them from him, with his Gospel that you cannot wrast it from their hearts; that to them, literally, "to live is Christ." I must believe that which is so interwoven with their whole being a reality, even though it have not become a reality to me. I must give my assent, though I be not yet ready to give my consent. The elect spirits of my race cannot be the slaves of a puerile superstition. Falsity and delusion cannot bear the noblest fruits that have ever ripened on earthly ground. Their lives give to their testimony a confirmation which I cannot disallow. Their manifest consciousness must constrain my faith. The Gospel which they profess not to believe, but to know as the truth, has proved itself to and in them "the power of God unto salvation" from folly and sin; and can I doubt that the salvation is divine and everlasting, as they believe it to be?

We thus see that as to intuition science and Christianity occupy the same ground; with this advantage on the side of Christianity, that the intuition is more intimate and vital, permeating the whole being, moulding the character, and manifesting its reality and intensity in the life to which it gives aim, direction, and end. How then, from the outer circle, can I accept the intuitions of scientific men, and reject those of Christian men? Or if I can with my own inward vision gain some clear and self-evidencing views of scientific truth, and at the same time trust that I have some measure of insight, independent of and above external proof, into Christian verities, how can I yield credence, as I must, to the former, and yet suffer aught of incredulity or doubt to obscure the latter?

There is in our time no scepticism as to science, but only too willing assent to whatever purports or claims to be science, though only in the form of postulates or hypotheses. The established truths of science no one is so bold as to call in question. Scientific truth rests on the joint evidence of testimony, experiment, and intuition. Christianity has in its behalf testimony unequalled in its clearness, fulness, and validity; experiment, in a vast diversity of forms, in numberless individual instances, and in the history of the civilized world for these eighteen centuries; and professed and manifest intuition, on the part of the greatest and best of our race through these same centuries, and I trust, also, in the minds of not a few who have listened to me, and have borne witness in their own consciousness to the divine worth and power of the everlasting Gospel, and of him who is the believer's hope. Science and Christianity rest on the same foundations. Let no one, then, suppose that he does honour to Christianity by jealousy of science. Let no one imagine that he serves science by discrediting Christianity. They are equally divine, equally from the inspiration of God, and each has essential ministries for the other. Science illustrates the very attributes of the Supreme Being which Christianity proclaims; while Christianity prepares only the more generous receptivity for the truth which God has written on all things that he has made. May we not, then, join in the prayer of the great instaurator of the inductive philosophy? "This also we humbly and earnestly beg,—that human things may not prejudice such as are divine; neither that from the unlocking of the gates of sense, and the kindling of a greater natural light, anything may arise of incredulity or intellectual night towards divine mysteries; but rather that by our minds thoroughly purged and cleansed from fancy and vanity, and yet subject and perfectly given up to the divine oracles, there may be given unto faith the things that are faith's."
FOREIGN THEOLOGICAL AND LITERARY INTELLIGENCE.

GERMANY.

The first volume of A. Schone's critical edition of \textit{Eusebii Chronicorum Libri duo}, is nearly ready for publication; the second volume was published in advance, in 1866, edited by Petermann, containing Jerome's Latin edition of the Chronological Canons, and a Latin translation of an Armenian version of the same. The first volume will contain all the other versions, and fragments from various sources, besides several ancient works, illustrating the Chronological Canons, derived from all the known sources, with collection, of manuscripts, such as the Armenian and Latin \textit{Series Regum}; a Syriac epitome from the British Museum; a Greek \textit{Chronography}, first edited by Cardinal Mai; and an \textit{Excerptor Latinus Barbarus}, so called by Scaliger, not re-edited since his times.

Leopold von Ranke is engaged in preparing for publication the memoirs of the well-known German minister, Von Hardenberg. These documents, which refer more especially to the events of 1805-1806, and the leading men who participated in them, were, on the death of the Count, deposited in the Prussian State archives, where they have hitherto remained, in accordance with the express injunctions of the King, Friedrich Wilhelm III., of Prussia, that they should not be made public till after an interval of more than half a century.

George Weber, author of the well-known \textquote{Universal History}, has published a volume on the \textquote{History of the Reformation}, containing essays on the Anabaptists, the Peasants' War, the reformation in popular literature, Charles V. and Protestantism. He had previously written on the \textquote{History of the Reformation in Great Britain.} 1853, and incorporates parts of that work in the present volume.

Dr. Ernst Bernheim, on \textquote{Lothaire III. and the Concordat of Worms}, gives a valuable account of the great struggle between the Church and the Empire on the subject of investitures, ending in the Concordat of Worms, between Henry V. and Pope Calixtus, A.D. 1122. Dr. Bernheim shows how this treaty was understood and carried out by Lothaire III., successor of Henry V., and contributes to the understanding of this vital question. This Concordat, like many subsequent ones, was a compromise and an armistice. The same question, essentially, is now up between the German Empire and the Papacy.

\textit{Theologische Studien und Kritiken.} Part I., 1876.—The first article is a continuation and conclusion of Prof. Kostlin's admirable essay on the \textquote{Proofs of the Being of God.} Having previously disposed of the so-called ontological proof, whose validity he questions, he here takes up the cosmological, the teleological, the moral, and the other arguments. His analysis and statement of the cosmological proof is especially noteworthy. He puts the teleological in a right point of view against recent objections. The only notable deficiency in his whole discussion is in respect to his non-appreciation of the value and force of the ontological proof, as a necessary part of the whole argument. The \textit{combination} of the ontological with the other arguments, gives the whole chain, or circle, of evidence. Neither the ontological, nor the teleological is, by itself, sufficient. Each supplies what the other lacks. Such a thorough discussion as that of Kostlin ought
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to be made accessible to the English reading public. The other articles of the review are, Rotermund on Ephraim and Golgotha; Schum on a Quedlinburg Fragment of an Illuminated Itala, with a fac-simile; Rösch on King Phul; and reviews of Voigt's "Fundamental Dogmatics;" and Von der Goltz's "Fundamental Truths of Christianity"—both of the latter works illustrating the apologetic character which Christian theology is now taking in Germany.

Jahrbücher f. deutsche Theologie, III., 1875.—1. Weizsäcker. Reminiscences of Dr. Christian Palmer—an affectionate and worthy tribute to the memory of a true Christian scholar. 2. Sieffert, the First Epistle of Peter on the Sufferings and Death of Christ in Relation to Salvation. 3. Wagenmann, Thoughts on the Prologue to John's Gospel. 4. Prince Louis Solms, Remarks on some Passages of the Gospel of John. 5. Sander, Historical Introduction to the Smalcald Articles. Among the notices, special attention is given to Prof Lorimer's recent work on John Knox and the Church of England, which has been too little appreciated in England.

Zeitschrift f. die lutherische Theologie. Part I., 1876.—Dr. Klostermann defends Isaiah xl—lxvi, as a genuine work of the same prophet who wrote the first half of the prophecy. Fr. Delitzsch, in a "Biblical Study on 'Nothing,'" contends that in the Bible nothing is non-being, in contrast with God who is the fulness of being; and that the Bible nowhere teaches that anything that is, can, or does become nothing. K. Kinzel's article on "The Biblical Doctrine of Election, with a comparison of the views of Augustine, Luther, and Calvin," written from the Lutheran standpoint, contains a good selection of historical material. He shows that Luther held even the supralapsarian view of the doctrine of election.

Zeitschrift f. die wissenschaftliche Theologie. Part III., IV., 1875. Waldemar Sonntag, The Essence of Fanaticism. A. Hilgenfeld (the editor), on Ritschl's Representation of the Biblical Doctrine of Justification and Atonement, an able and thorough review, showing some of the defects in Ritschl's interpretation of the biblical view of the doctrine. A. Thoma, Justin's Literary Relation to Paul and to the Gospel of John—two articles of importance in reference to the controversy now going on in England on this subject, raised by the rash speculations of the work called "Supernatural Religion;" Thoma allows that Justin knew the Gospel, though he does not name its author; and his theory is, that Justin considered it as belonging to "Christian Gnosis," and not to Christian history—a somewhat violent hypothesis. C. Siegfried, The Jewish Hellenism in its Historical Growth, with a criticism of the latest work upon it. A. Hilgenfeld, in a criticism of a work on the Epistle to the Philippians, by Hoekstra, a Dutch writer, defends the genuineness of the epistle, as he has before done. He also reviews "Supernatural Religion" with some sympathy, but takes the author to task for several of his heedless assumptions and theories.

As reported in the Neue Evangelische Kirchenzeitung, the Director of Missions, Dr. Wangemann, in a pamphlet recently published, finds no less than twelve errors in the addresses and writings of Mr. Pearsall Smith, in Germany, England, etc., viz: the doctrine of the Higher Life has no basis in the Scriptures; the evangelical doctrine of Justification is dishonoured by the position, that it only leads to a lower stage of the Christian life; his views of Sin, and of original Sin, are superficial; that one can live without sin, is self-deception; he leaves no place for repentance, daily sorrow for sin, in those who live in this higher life; the Scriptures do not promise constant joy to the believer; the church is not rightly appreciated as a means of grace and a divine
kingdom; in insisting upon immediate sanctification there is impatience with the ways of God; the ministry and sacraments are undervalued or ignored; Smith's interpretations of the Bible are often fanciful and forced, etc. He calls it "a new Methodism, not of high-strung repentance, but of high-strung joy." The Kirchenzeitung adds, that Mr. Smith also virtually annuls the co-working of man in sanctification, makes him entirely passive; he lets "Christ do all and answer for all." "The Lord would not have us be agents, but instruments," says one of his followers. Some of these errors and loose expressions rest upon inconsistencies, but there is room for criticism as to the fundamental theory. Faith, doubtless, works in sanctification, but not in just the way it does in justification; in the latter it is once, and once for all. In respect to Perfection, Mr. Smith is undoubtedly inconsistent. He shows, throughout, the lack of theological training.

Historische Zeitschrift. Edited by Prof. Von. Sybel. Parts I, II, and III, 1875. Part I contains an article by Carl Von Noorden, "On the More Recent History of Spain; and a review, by Ludwig Geiger, of the latest works on Humanism. The publications noticed by the latter, are mainly contributions to the biography of the leaders of the humane movement, Petrarch, for example, in Italy and the brilliant circle of scholars at the court of Lorenzo the Magnificent; Sir Thomas More and John Colet, in England; Erasmus and Reuchlin, in Germany; and many lesser lights. In this number is also to be found the Report of the 15th Meeting of the Historical Commission of the Royal Bavarian Academy of Sciences. Part II contains: "Henry IV. of France, and the Contest of Succession in Jülich," by Martin Philipson; "History of the Constitution of the United States of Columbia," by H. A. Schumacher; an article on "Thomas Aquinas," notices the recent publications of Baumann and Thèmes; and "Pope Alexander VI. and his daughter, Lucrezia Borgia," by Moritz Brosch, reviewing Gregorovius' "Lucrezia Borgia, from Documents and Correspondence of her Own Time." Part III is exceptionally rich in articles embodying the results of original investigation. Reinhold Röhricht contributes "The Preparations in the Occident for the Third Great Crusade;" Dr. Sauerland writes the history of "Gregory XII., from his Election to the Treaty of Marseilles;" and F. H. Reusch corrects many of the errors of previous writers in an account of "The Trial of Galileo." This number has, also, a review of the latest publications of the Swiss Historical Societies, by Von Knonan. Von Holst, the author of "Verfassung und Demokratie in den Vereinigten Staaten," contributes to the literary notices rather a sharp review of the tenth volume of Bancroft's History of the United States. He accuses the historian of writing with a "Tendenz." The number closes with the report of the Central Direction of the Monumenta Germaniae, in Berlin. Appended to Parts 1 and 3, will be found a catalogue of the historical publications of the year 1874, in Europe and America, a special reprint from Dr. Muldener's Bibliotheca Historica.

FRANCE.

The Revue des deux Mondes, Nov. 1. Containing an admirable article by M. E. Caro, of the French Academy, on the Ethics of Evolutionism, as found in the leading English writers of this school—Darwin, Herbert Spencer, and others. M. Caro is one of the chief representatives of the "spiritual school" of philosophy in France, and he subjects to a keen analysis the methods and principles of the materializing evolutionists, stating them fairly, and refuting them with precision. He shows how the doctrine of the develop-
ment of force annuls all moral distinctions and all natural rights. The theory, as its advocates avow, would lead, under the law of natural selection, to the propagation only of those of sound minds and bodies, and all others must be excluded from the marriage state. The whole end and aim will be the enjoyment of life. Legislation must be enforced against the marriage of "those feeble in mind and body, those who are poor and weak;" the race is to be propagated on the principles of stock-breeding. What then becomes of sympathy, Christian love, human rights? The only right is might; the one law of progress is sexual and natural selection. "Who knows if, in such a society, Pascal, the feeble and suffering, could obtain the right of existence and of genius?" But the true principle of morality is love. "It seeks to elevate all, through and by their sufferings and evils."

And when it has succeeded it has done more and better than the science of evolution, which only follows and imitates nature. Love is like art—it does not imitate nature, it transforms it. As a sculptor takes a block of stone and imprints upon it the likeness of his thoughts, so charity takes suffering humanity, it chisels it—if I may so say, it transfigures it—by imprinting upon it a superior beauty," etc. M. Caro also argues the question in its bearings on the democracy of the future, and the result of its adoption upon political and social life.

M. Ganneau announces that the work of completing the famous Moabite Inscription about King Mesha is nearly completed,* and that it will soon be published in full. A part of the "right angle," he says, has been recovered, and gives the commencement of three lines, this being "almost the only part" which could be satisfactorily determined. "There are also two small fragments, the position of which is uncertain."

M. F. Lenormant's (the eminent historian) *The Primitive Language of Chaldea and the Turanian Idioms,* is said to be "an epoch-making work," settling the position of the Accadian language, viz. that spoken by the earliest inhabitants of Babylonia, and preserved in the cuneiform characters.

A new periodical, *The Philosophical Review,* is announced by Messrs. Baillière, edited by M. Ribot (author of the work on *Heredity,* translated, and published both in England and America), with the aid of Caro, Janet, Wundt, Bain, Herbert Spencer, and others. This list of contributors seems to indicate that the new Review will be eclectic, so far as its contributors go.

Seven hundred and fifty-four journals are published in Paris, thus classified: Theological, 53; jurisprudence, 63; geography and history, 10; entertaining reading, 56; public instruction and education, 25; literature, philosophy, linguistic, ethnography, and bibliography, 53; painting, 11; photography, 2; architecture, 8; archaeology, 5; music, 17; the stage, 7; fashions, 61; industrial, 78; medicine, etc., 69; science, 47; military and naval art, 23; agriculture, 18; various subjects, 12. The number of political dailies is 37, and that of political reviews, 11.

* Since the above was written the completion has been announced.

In view of the conflict now raging between the assailants and adherents of the old-fashioned idea of immortality, we much wish that Messrs. Clark of Edinburgh, or some other publisher, would issue a translation of Dr. Leonhard Schneider’s remarkable work on the subject.* The author, a learned Roman Catholic, has produced a work which is a perfect storehouse of information on the great and important question with which it deals. For ourselves we cannot help thinking that the advocates of the “Life in Christ” theory, much as we admire their sincerity and earnestness are, theologically, philosophically, and ethically, on the wrong track. As Martensen says (Christian Dogmatics, page 453) “they confound the distinct conceptions of immortality and salvation.” Martensen adds, “It is wholly unavailing to call in the Scripture doctrine of everlasting death, as if it gave confirmation to this theory of annihilation; for by everlasting death Scripture does not mean absolute destruction, but misery, the conscious, self-conscious death.” Yet the advocates of this theory assume that Scripture does mean by everlasting death absolute destruction and nothing else, although the Hebrew and Greek words vary according to the nature of the subject, and do not carry the idea of utter and complete extinction as has been often shown. But we regret to say that most of the books in defence of this theory, that have come under our notice, abound in assumptions. To speak of nothing more, witness the manner in which the Apostolic fathers, as a body, and the “best” of the post-apostolic fathers, are claimed; and witness also the account which is given of the origin of the commonly received doctrine in the Christian Church. Professor Bartlett declares that the theory of extinction is in conflict with the unanimous understanding of the Scriptures by all classes of men for eighteen centuries, that heretics, sceptics, and Christians have been as one in this matter, and that what is now vaunted as the ancient faith “is purely a modern vagary.” Those who desire to see what has been said in support of this theory will find it, in a small compass, in the little book named above. But we advise the reader not to be too much influenced by strong statements or a show of learning. The title is singular—“The Struggle for Life,” strangely reminding us of the Darwinian theory. Would the author apply the law of “Natural Selection,” or, as it is called by others, “The Survival of the Fittest,” to explain the salvation of men? We regret to observe the name of Mr. Dale associated with “the miserable doctrine of annihilation.” Assuredly science knows nothing of such a doctrine, neither, we think, does the Bible.


Church history has few chapters so morally grand as that which relates to the labours of the early Methodist preachers in Ireland. Nor is there in all that band of apostolic-spirited men a more illustrious name than that of Ouseley. We are glad that the abiding memorial of his life was committed to Mr. Arthur, for he has done his work wisely and well, allowing the missionary himself, as far as possible to tell his own story, and yet putting all into a small compass. We hope that this memorial of the “apostle of Ireland,” as Ouseley has been called, will be read far beyond the precincts of Methodism.

King Edward the Sixth on the Supremacy. The French original and an English
translation. With his Discourse on the Reformation of abuses; and a few brief notices of his life, education and death. Edited by Robert Potts, M.A. Cambridge: William Metcalfe.

We have space only to notice this little volume as a literary curiosity.


When this work first appeared we spoke of it in terms of high commendation, (see Theological Quarterly for 1875, p. 159,) and a second and more careful reading has enhanced our estimate of its importance and value. We think there are few living ministers who could have produced such a work, and we heartily congratulate the author on the reception it has met with from the press and the public. We observe that in this new edition, Dr. Parker has wisely availed himself of some critical suggestions on one or two points.

A Chronological and Geographical Introduction to the Life of Christ. By Ch. Ed. Caspari. From the original German work; revised by the Author. Translated, with additional Notes, by Maurice J. Evans, B.A. Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark.

This work addresses itself to the consideration of history and chronology, geography and topography, to establish the authenticity of the Gospel records, to harmonize their contents, and to show their agreement with contemporary historical literature. The learned author has accomplished his task with great carefulness, caution, and clearness. It is a masterly work, and although not a "Life of Christ," is indispensable to the student, for it deals with those minuter and humbler points of the Gospel records which "Lives of Christ" and Commentaries scarcely ever touch, and yet which modern sceptical criticism is not slow to lay hold of to produce doubt and disquiet.


These lectures, six in number, are by men of well-known ability, and are the result of much learning and thoughtful examination of the subjects treated of. They represent far more scholarship and patient study than a cursory reader would suppose. We strongly recommend them, not only for their matter, which is multum in parvo, but for the admirable spirit of candour and charity which pervades them.


Of course everybody knows that Mr. Spurgeon feeds daintily, but few, we think, will have suspected that his "bill of fare" is so extensive as this volume discloses. Here is a list of 1437 works, all more or less in the Commentary line, representing various sections of the Christian Church, and to nearly all a notice is appended, giving in a few, pithy, and sometimes humorous sentences, such an estimate of each as intended to guide the students of the Pastor's College, and all others who have confidence in Mr. Spurgeon's opinions; for in most cases the notices are the result of his own careful reading and examination. But what surprises us even more than this exhibition of literary labour is the character of the notices. For as Mr. Spurgeon is an uncompromising Calvinist (at least so we have always understood), and an equally uncompromising Baptist (we believe he once called himself a Baptist to the backbone), we had no idea that he was accustomed to rise so far above his theological and ecclesiastical surroundings as to read and appreciate some of the works included in this catalogue. Upon the whole we think his recorded judgments of the different works passed under review are faithful and true, although as might have been expected some of the great German Commentators are not savoury enough for Mr. Spurgeon. We are amazed that amidst all his other work, he should have found time (and we are thankful that he found strength) to undertake and perform such a
piece of herculean toil as this book represents, and we sincerely hope that his labours will be adequately appreciated and rewarded. We would particularly call attention to Lecture 2, so wise and practical in its counsels. Altogether, we believe that such a half-crown's worth of safe and useful information on "Commenting and Commentaries" has never been before offered, and with grateful acknowledgments to author and publisher we give this book our hearty recommendation.


A work of great spiritual insight and beauty: most instructive and helpful.

The Church and the Cherubim; or, the Glory of the Saints. By the Rev. James G. Tanner, M.A. London: Hatchards.
The author regards "The Cherubim" as symbolic of the manifested glory of Christ, and the union of His people with Him, and of their glory in and through Him. To those who love this kind of spiritualising, this work will be a rich treat.

The Biblical student will find this little work very useful. It condenses much scholarship and wide reading into a small compass, and the author's own judgments and applications of the results are most valuable.

We are pleased to be able to give this volume our warmest commendation. A careful study of the spirit and scope of its articles can hardly fail to widen and elevate pulpit teaching—a consummation devoutly to be wished for.

We do not believe a "philosophy of the Atonement," in its God-ward relation, possible to man in this world; and we think much mischief has been done to Christian faith by the attempts which have been made to set forth a "philosophy" with authority. Of course no objection can be made when an independent thinker publishes his views, for it can only be in the way of suggestion, or to help those who may be endeavouring to formulate a philosophy for themselves. We know how the Atonement operates on the mind of man, but how it operates on the mind of God is not revealed. The fact we know; the modus operandi we cannot know. These sermons of Mr. Robinson are thoughtful, and provocative of thought; and although we might take exception to some of his expressions, we have, upon the whole, read them with admiration and profit. We much like the discourses he has added under the somewhat indefinite title of "Other Sermons;" and the "Fragments of Discourse" are, many of them at least, gems of thought. As to the paper read before the Congregational Union, on "The Oxford and Brighton Convention," it opens up a controversy into which we cannot enter, save to call the attention of Mr. Robinson and others who think with him to the article in this number of our Quarterly, entitled, "To whom does Romans vii. 7—25 apply?"

This is a somewhat bulky volume closely printed, the primary object of which is to show that the phrase, "the kingdom of Heaven," denotes not (as it is commonly said to do) the Church or the Christian dispensation, but the Davidic kingdom foretold by the prophets—the millennial Messianic reign on earth of Christ and confessors after His second advent, conditionally appointed to take place in the apostolic age. These are the author's own words; and we must give him credit for the fact that he has spared no pains, or labour, or learning to prove his thesis. Without pronouncing any opinion concerning the matter or manner of his main argument, we may say that the work here and there contains exegetical passages of great value; so much so that, were it only for this reason, ministers would do well to make themselves acquainted with this volume.
THE FEARFULNESS OF ATHEISM.

By Professor Tayler Lewis, LL.D., Union College.

A feature of the times which is most dreaded may be discovered one of the chief sources of hope for the cause of truth. We may reverently thank God that it is a day of sharp and inevitable issues. The most sacred truths, the foulest forms of error, stand face to face. Difficulties in religion are weakened, or utterly vanish, when we see what immensely greater difficulties of irreligion our yielding to them must finally involve. Error must develop itself. It is a law of the thinking soul, as sure, as steady in its progress, as certain in its results, as any alleged evolution of the physical world. Error must develop itself. It is especially true of religious error. It has no tenacity, no holding-place. It cannot stand still; it must keep on, wandering farther and farther from the light, until it comes to that precipice of atheism beyond whose verge, or beneath whose verge lies ὁ θάνατος τοῦ σκότους εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, "the very blackness of darkness for ever." That issue is now presenting itself, short and sharp. The haze which has covered "the bridge of the war," as Homer calls it,—that has rendered indistinct and confused the middle ground of the battle-field,—that has prevented our seeing truly the dividing lines of the opposing hosts—is fast clearing up. There is revealed a spectacle that, in one sense, may indeed be called appalling, and yet is full of encouragement in respect to the issue of the great conflict. Natural religion is gone; the old forms of deism have departed; difficulties of Scripture, questions of inspiration and canonicity are thrown into the background; pantheism has dropped its mask; apparent extremes have come together; a false spiritualism is found to be but a spectre of the grossest materialism. The mirage is dissolving; the ghosts have fled; and now there stand directly confronting each other, the two mighty foes that all along through all the illusions, and all the obscurities of the darkened battle-field, have been the only real antagonists. On the one side stands Christianity, the old Christianity, the only Christianity that has ever had power for the souls of men; on the other, blank atheism, with all the appalling desolation that connects itself with the thought of a godless world. As thus presented, we cannot doubt the final result. Our greatly disordered humanity is, indeed, full of paradoxes. The Apostle's charge is true. There is something in man's moral condition that makes painful the thought of a personal God when brought very near the soul. How to preserve something of the theistic idea, and yet avoid this disturbing moral consciousness, has been the problem ever since Adam "hid himself from the presence of the Lord God in the trees of the Garden." All history has shown how from this effort came nature-worship, pantheism, thence polytheism and foul idolatry. In this fallen and falling tendency, the divine idea is ever becoming more and more deformed on the one hand, or dimmed on the other,—ever more and more assimilated to ourselves in grossness, or philosophically refined away into an abstraction, an idea, a cause, a power, a bare force, divested, as far as possible, of all moral attributes. And yet there is a struggle against its
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total abandonment, when we are brought face to face with that sharp decision. When it nears that awful verge, humanity—the common humanity, as distinguished from that of the frigid speculative, the common humanity, with its hopes and fears, its weariness and dissatisfaction—starts back with shuddering awe. It cannot take that last plunge, that reckless leap into total darkness. Religion cannot indeed be thought of by it without the accompaniment of fearful ideas; but here is something still more fearful. Much as it may have disliked the moral and retributive as inseparable from the personal aspect of the divine character, it cannot bear the thought of a universe without a creator, without a governing mind, without a providence, without a judge of right and wrong, making an eternal distinction between them, approving the one and condemning the other with an intensity to which the strongest human approval and condemnation can bear no comparison. It cannot part finally with the idea so deeply planted in the human soul, entering into all the mythologies, dramatically and epically represented in the world’s highest ideals, that good must conquer evil, that right must triumph over wrong, that truth must prevail to the discomfiture of error, that there is to be an eschatology, whatever difficulties of place and time may be connected with such a thought—a latter-day development, somehow, and somewhere, that shall clear up the confusion and darkness that now cover the face of nature and the history of man. It may not logically reason out the position, but it feels unerringly that the total loss of the idea of God brings with it an effacement of all these distinctions. There is no virtue, no holiness, no right. There is no truth; it has no reality except as God’s truth, as the emanation of an eternal mind, or its image, as reflected in the finite comprehensions of the human soul. Facts may remain, or those sequences of facts which some call laws, but they represent nothing; they have no meaning, no idea. The intellectual universe is as truly gone as the moral. It is in the latter aspect, however, that the thought most readily comes home to us, and in all its withering desolation: The cosmos, like a vessel tossed in infinite space, driven we know not where on the currents of time, with no hand at the helm, no eye upon the compass, no course assigned or assignable, no reason conceivable why it should not ultimately drift in one direction as well as in another: man, like a bubble appearing for a moment on the top of the nightly wave, mirroring for a moment the heaven of stars above, then vanishing into the void and formless deep. And then, too, there is the terrorliness of nature, when there has wholly departed the belief in any power that can either protect us against it, or in any wisdom that can give us a reason, or furnish the ground of any conceivable reason, why we suffer from it, or why we should struggle with its irresistible forces. It is the thought of a universe without a guardian, without a Father, without anything to shield us from the direst woes that chance may bring, or a nature infinitesimally known in its parts, and utterly unknown in its great whole of power—a nature which we see to be full of the most awful catastrophes as they have appeared in the past, and which, for aught we know, may be immeasurably exceeded in the future. This may be called an overdrawn picture of gloom, but it hardly goes beyond that given by Strauss himself in his latest most melancholy book. It is true that, though having no better hope for himself than that of absorption into nature, he grasps at some idea of progress or order, tending to the good of the race or of the universe; but this, as we shall endeavour to show, he is compelled to borrow from another school, and his use of it is only evidence of his despair. Schopenhauer and Von Hartmann are more bold, or more unshrinking
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in their conclusions. "Far better would it have been for this world," says the former, "if no living creature had ever dwelt upon it." "The universe," says Von Hartmann, "is miserable throughout." What a verification of the Apostle's language: ἀθεοὶ εἰς τὸ κόσμῳ—"Having no hope, and without God in the world."

Men shrink from this when fairly seen in its awful desolation. The old religious fear is more tolerable. Hell becomes less horrible to the thought than such a hopeless atheism. There may be a reason for such an idea of fearful retribution, even if it be true, as some assert, that men have invented it for themselves. It is directly connected with the thought of moral distinctions, with their dread consequences when regarded as truly entering into the divine government. A personal God, not indifferent to right and wrong; if not indifferent, then making an infinite difference—approving the one and condemning the other with an intensity of interest as much greater than that of any human estimate as the ways of the infinite God are above those of all finite intelligences; there is reason in this, even as a possibility; and wherever reason enters, there is alleviation, something on which the soul can rest, finding, as it does, its own highest worth in such a moral destiny, even with all its alarming consequences. The thought of a personal God, not indifferent to sin—this once fixed in the mind and clearly held, the transition is direct to all the most startling verities of the Christian system. Retribution, atonement, grace, redemption, a great perdition, a great salvation, a great and Divine Saviour, all become credible when there is truly realized the idea of sin. They all rise as it rises in the moral estimate, they all fall as it falls. When it goes out, they become incredible. Atheism, or what is morally equivalent to it, the rejection of the personal idea, is the ultimate antithesis of the old churchly belief, and one who com-

To the mere scientist, or the mere speculative thinker of any class, atheism may not show its most frightful face. He is so taken up with himself, so intent upon regarding the universe as declaring the glory of the astronomer or the naturalist, that he has little or no thought for anything beyond. His eyes are holden from seeing that whatever belittles religion, belittles science and philosophy as well, rendering all human knowledge and all human aspiration as aimless and as valueless as it is ephemeral. His absorption in the physical blinds him to the true dignity of man as related to something above him, and transcending nature. In this state of mind, atheistic ideas may not distress him. So, too, the deep-seated, yet almost unconscious fear of a personal Deity may even awaken an instinctive feeling of relief in anything that veils it from the view. We are not afraid of Nature, terrible as she is, as long as the thought seems to screen us from a greater terror. There is a feeling that we can, somehow, take care of ourselves as against her. Her earthquakes, her pestilences, her upheavals, her terrific devastations, that have left such traces in the past, as they may come again in the future—all these carry with them no such dread, either in kind or degree, as that of falling into "the hands of the living God." And yet, with all this, there is an appalling hideousness in blank atheism when it fairly confronts our soberest thought. We cannot composedly resign ourselves to the notion of inevitable chance, introducing all conceivable forms and modes of being—all measure of possibilities being excluded by the absence of any ruling mind, and the consequent impossibility of conceiving any limitations to the rule of contingency. The survival of the strongest, even admitting that some such rule of forces might come in without the chance of re-
versal, may be the survival of the worst. The predominance of certain tendencies in the start must be wholly contingent, if it is wholly mindless, and that character cannot be lost in any subsequent movement. If it is chance in the beginning, it is chance throughout. As a whole, it might have been anything else, although in a tendency once originated, some partial movements may be controlled by others, and thus seem to have the appearance of means and ends. There is, indeed, an effort sometimes made to evade this. Chance is an odious term. The intellect, we may say, repels it, as well as the moral emotions. It is wholly idealless; it altogether eludes our thinking, unless we attempt to transform it in something else. It has been said, therefore, that chance is excluded by the idea of law, and that it is not so much in itself the antithesis of mind, as it is the opposite of method, order, recurring sequence. There has been lately a laboured attempt to prove this; but those who assert it use words without meaning. Law as applied to nature, may indeed be said to be a figure: but is it not one to which we are forced if we would connect with our language any conceptions whatever? No more in the physical than in the moral and the political, can we separate law from the idea of a law-giver; and we must either wholly fall away from such idea, or we must trace it up, through man, through nature, to a pure personal mind. Without such a starting-point, the law itself, if we continue to call it so, the movement, the direction, in distinction from any other movement or direction, is a pure contingency. It is not difficult, we think, to detect the fallacy here. Had chance, among the infinite chances, produced any other state or system of things than that which now exists, it would, as far as we know, have been equally law, that is, equally entitled to that name as given to the sequence of facts. Had it been any other state of things, it would have had series of events capable of some kind of correlation. It would have had near sequences, remote sequences, intermediate sequences, hidden sequences, perhaps, we could not trace, and then they might have been called hidden laws received hypothetically, and afterwards verified, or modified, when there were discovered the intervening steps or links, as we would then call them. But these sequences, these connections with no other discoverable nexus than contiguity, might also have been something else, and no reason can be given why they would not, in that case also, have been laws as well as those that are found. Whatever is, is law, in whatever way events may follow. Law becomes sequence, and nothing more. We only cheat ourselves when we attempt to disguise it under another name. Every effort to get out of this utterly fails, until we connect them with mind, either near or remote, and then alone does this unthinkable conception of chance, τύχη, mere happening, cease to haunt our souls. On the materialistic hypothesis, the very ideas in our minds, through which we seem to recognize something more than sequence in events—such as the ideas of order, relation, causality—are themselves but products of this mindless, godless power, and thus themselves as much contingencies as the outward sequences to which they are applied. Order might have been disorder, if the atomic apparatus of our thinking had been so disposed. The positive philosophy, neither as first set forth by Comte, nor as delusively modified by Spencer and Mill, has any recognition of them as eternal and necessary ideas. And so, as between chance and mind, it has no right to recognize any intervening power. Law has really no place in such a scheme, except as the ghost of that divine idea which the atheistic materialist imagines he has slain.

There have been briefly stated some of the things which may render atheism not only tolerable, but even desirable, for cer-
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tain minds. But, after all, to the sober human thought it is an appalling conception, and men will not long remain under its gloomy shadow. When we are compelled to look the monster in the face, it is all horror. The sternest system of moral retribution ever connected with a theistic creed, challenges a preference. As has already been said, hell is less frightful than a godless nature. There may be a reason for a condition of awful severity. It connects itself with the ideas of justice, of benevolence, of acting for a reason, and that reason the highest good of rational and moral being. We cannot bear to lose these ideas, though feeling that we take them at an awful risk. Our own reason and our own experience are sufficient to convince us of the possibility of something far beyond us here. It is not difficult for us to admit that our own moral state may be a fallen one, or such that we cannot estimate aright the heights and depths of the moral system of the universe. The human mind gets a glimpse of the idea that great glory, great exaltation, are connected with such a view, and that these are necessarily associated with the thought of great peril. Life thus viewed becomes a fearful thing. We tremble when we think in what an awfully serious world we live; and yet there is a fascination for the human mind, even for the depraved human mind, in the idea of an infinite justice and an infinite holiness, though involving the thought of infinite severity towards the unholy and the unjust. Commensurate with it is that other idea of infinite goodness which the rational soul affirms as a necessary attribute in the conception of Deity, even though the sense-evidence of its manifestation may be overpowered by an immense balance of seeming evil in the world in which we dwell, or even did we find ourselves in a department of the universe where nothing could be discerned but unalleviated and uncompensated woe. There is something sub-

limely terrible to man in the idea of this perfect divine holiness. It so condemns us, whilst giving such an awful dignity to our being in its moral relations to such an attribute. It transcends all other moral ascriptions. The Holy One! There is no language of the Bible, no epithet of Deity that has such an awe for us. And yet, as I have said, it has a fascination for the contemplative spirit, even when deeply conscious of its own unholliness. The thought is perfectly conceivable: a human soul, fearful in respect to its own moral condition, trembling even under the dread of condemnation, yet preferring this personal risk to the utter loss of that glorious conception of the ineffable righteousness, so grand even for the intellect, could we separate it from the moral emotion. The "correlation of [forces," the highest power the materialist admits! How it pales before the sublimity of this theistic language: "The Righteous Governor of the Universe." The Holy Only "in whose sight even the heavens are not pure." There is, indeed, a fearfulness in the theistic thought, an awe even in its aspect of beneficence; but it is, at the same time, the ground of all hope, as it is of all human dignity. We cannot do without it. We cannot lower it, though it so condemns us.

But atheism is without hope, without glory, as it is without reason. It has its own terrors, with nothing to calm them. It gives the soul no security against the direst conceivable evils, whilst it takes away every moral ground or reason for believing in any ultimate triumph of truth and goodness. Such a hope illumines the darkest aspect of theism: "Clouds and darkness are round about God, but righteousness and judgment are the foundation of His throne." There is a reason for everything. In the godless view there is a reason for nothing. Every destructive movement in conceivable, possible, and even probable,—only give it time enough, as a class of scientists are so fond
of saying. There may be retrogradations, deteriorations,—if we may use such words where there is no standard according to which they may be reckoned, no hyperphysical measure by which they may be determined. There may be a progress, seemingly such, yet only a progress in horror. There is no security, even, against the direst forms of evil that are feared or fancied as connected with the religious view itself. This awful, unknown nature may have its devil and its hell. As it has produced monsters in the past, so may it continue to produce monsters in the future. It may supersede man by the evolution of a new race, transcending in depravity, as its transcends in strength and demoniac sagacity, the one that for six thousand years—twenty thousand, say some—has made this world a Golgotha of crime and misery. If we follow on the analogy, we cannot refuse to admit that there may be evolved a state of things which shall throw into the shade the enormities of all preceding periods. Take away the ideas for which we are indebted to religion and revelation; view man simply as a product of nature, with no other hopes than nature gives, and we are safe in saying that no one of the geological ages has surpassed in destructive enormity, in irrational waste of life, the human cycle. Had we remained gorillas, the earth would not have been so filled with blood—with crimes against nature exceeding in horror all actions that beasts could commit. My hearers will not mistake me here, nor misunderstand the hypothesis of total and hopeless irreligion on which such statements of human facts and human possibilities are grounded. We may take a step beyond this. Paradoxical as the language seems, nature may produce a false God. Give it time enough and there may come out of the physical evolutions some dire consciousness, corresponding to that awful being whom the infidel imagination gives us in its deformed caricature of the Scriptural Deity—a power vast, malignant, irresistible, having in it the concentrated evil drawn from all the productive forces of the universe. Given a past eternity for nature’s working, she may have long since produced such a being, having his seat of power somewhere in the infinite space, and extending to remotest distances his malignant rule. And so, too, in regard to another life, another state of being for man. Irreligion sometimes boasts that she has slain that chimera of superstition. Man may now eat and drink without that haunting fear of something after death. But neither for this does atheism give security. The human protoplasm may live on, carrying with it the human consciousness, the human identity. It is one of the forces of the universe, and may preserve its individuality in other conditions, or as correlated to other forces. Science can give no security against this, or against any evils its changed physical condition may involve. It may still be true that the conscious sensualist “lifts up his eyes, being in torment”—the torment of an unknown physical hell.

Or we may take another view coming out of that doctrine of atoms to which atheism has run for shelter since the days of Democritus. Although the microscope has never made an approach to this mysterious domain, never having brought to light an atom, or a molecule, or even a molecular combination, yet here, in this utterly unknown region, a certain kind of science finds life, consciousness, memory, thought, imagination, reason, will—all that constitutes personality or individuality in our present state of being. We are what the atoms make us, nothing more. And this, too, their making, resolves itself into site, number, relation—in a word, arrangement of constituent atomic points. We can conceive of nothing else; and here the thinking of the common mind is as clear and trustworthy as that of the most scientific, since to both this atomic world is alike unknown.
All that we can say is that the doctrine gives no security against that dreaded idea that man may live again—may live in pain, in agonies inconceivable. Take time enough, and apply to it the mathematical doctrine of chances, there arises not merely a possibility, but a high probability, growing evermore nearer to an absolute certainty, if this atomic hypothesis of the origin of life have any truth. Of any individual man now existing it says that his spiritual powers are but the results of such or such a combination of these elements of all being. They make him what he is, and he has no other being. From them come not only his flowing body, but his thought, mind, will, consciousness—yea, even what he calls his reason, though that, too, is only position, arrangement, number, as much as his sense or his very flesh. Now, in the infinite tide of surging material being, these atoms, or precisely similar atoms, may come together again. It is extremely probable, on the doctrine of chances, that they will come together again—the when or the where in no way affecting the estimate or the identity of the being. They come together just as they were, whether a moment before, or at a time which the longest decimal notation fails to estimate—they come together at last, and there he is again, the same consciousness, the same memory, or, so far as these constitute identity (and we cannot conceive of it separate from them), the same identical being, carrying with him all the misery of his former existence, enhanced by the absence of all security against ten thousand fold greater misery in the future. There is no hand at the helm of the universe, and there is no telling, no conceiving the horrors into which it may drift.

But there is the idea of progress, say some—progress continually tending towards a better state, towards a higher order, a higher happiness, a higher intelligence—in a word, a higher good. Some such dream meets us, now and then, in the writings of Herbert Spencer. But what is meant here by higher and lower? To determine this, in respect of any movement, we want a standard, a rule, a direction, out of and higher than such movement. If there is nothing transcending nature, nothing outside of nature, nothing for which nature itself exists, how then are we to measure it, or ascertain its tendencies? We are in the balloon; no star above is seen; how know we whither it is going? We have no sighting point for our survey. Progress towards what? This must always remain the question. And then, even if we can get a measure, or fix a direction, what assurance against retrogradations or deteriorations? Everything in the smaller nature, or natures, that fall under the eye of our science, presents the turning or cyclical aspect. Birth, growth, decay, death, dissolution, we can conceive a reason for them as explained by the relation of things to a sphere above nature; we can believe that they have a counteracter, or a regulator, or a compensation, or some clearly-explained end in some higher system of ideas. Without this, however, there is no resisting the analogy that drives us on to extend this law of growth and decay, of cyclical change, to the universal nature as well as to the smaller natures that always exhibit it as far as our induction extends. The whole cosmos may wax old and decay. Scientists were once puzzled with the apparent anomalies of the solar system, such as change in aphelion and perihelion, shortening of orbits in one direction, undue lengthening of them in another, all indications of disorder that might terminate in remediless decay and final ruin. Laplace, it is said, showed the contrary of this—that is, he proved the perpetual stability of the solar system. Apparent disorders had their maxima and minima, and thus the great order would go on for
ever. But, admitting that he had shown this, or something like it, in regard to the solar system as a thing by itself, separated from the universal cosmos, and having its own correlation of forces—admitting that all its apparent irregularities were counter-acting checks to each other, so that none of its members would, by means of them, ever get too far from the sun, and thus be thrown off as wanderers in space, or too near, and thus be drawn into the vortex of its consuming fires—admitting all this, we say, his purely mathematical argument, though holding true of the data immediately before him, did not take into account other disorders, other decays, other redundancies, other retrogressions that might have their causal force in the internal constitution of each member. According to the present nebular and ring hypothesis, they had been for countless ages throwing off their heat, radiating into infinite space, cooling, condensing, diminishing in magnitude, increasing in density, changing their relative distances and attractions. The great central body had, during the same countless ages, been undergoing incalculable transformations. It was, therefore, an argument purely mathematical, purely hypothetical, based on assumed magnitudes, masses, densities, and mean distances, as they are now seen, or supposed to be. It did not take into account—it could not take into account—other disordering influences that might come from the unnumbered bodies floating in infinite space outside the solar system. It overlooked the vaster revolutions and evolutions in which our system and our earth must participate, however slow the changes that might thereby be produced in the relations of its parts, or however imperceptible the motions determinative, at any time, of its own absolute place in the universe. These are views to which the most modern observation is now forcing us. If trustworthy, they give us a glimpse of an immeasurable unknown, in relation to which our science, now so greatly lauded, is truly a smaller thing than was the knowledge of Ptolemy, as compared with that which was revealed in the first discoveries of the telescope. The ancient centre is again unsettled, but the true centre is as far as ever from being fixed. As thus compared, infinitesimal is the enlargement of our knowledge, infinitesimal is any fancied increase in the value of our cosmical speculations. One word, one promise, one whispered hope that we can believe in as coming to us from the Infinite Father, is more than worth it all. We have learned distances, motions,—we have a dream of correlated forces; that is the sum of our attainment. It is almost wholly mathematical. La Place, with his Mechanique Celeste, is as small here as Hipparchus. In one sense he is far behind Pythagoras with his sublime imagination of the "music of the spheres."

But waiving all that as utterly beyond our reach, let us proceed to other and more general considerations. We remember how this view of La Place in respect to the stability of the solar system was hailed by the Christian world. It was, however, on the ground of its furnishing, or its being supposed to furnish, to those who needed it, an argument for a divine idea, a divine care, in the originating and in the adjustment of our solar system. It was the work of the great geometrician, as Socrates styles him. Not so La Place himself. He may have smilingly accepted the gratitude of the pleased religionist, but he saw no hand of God in the cosmos. The heavens told the glory of the French astronomer, not of the Great Architect above. Their interest lay in furnishing the diagram, the black-board, as we may style it, for his mathematical speculations. They were filled only with sines and cosines, tangents, differentials, integrals, infinite series, relations simply of number, figure, distance, motion, space;
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empty of all else. To him this principle of counteracting order, of assumed stability, belonged to nature itself; and that was something he could never prove. An inherent power of recovery, or of rising from a really lower to a really higher state, an inherent rectification of a real disorder, without aid from a plane above the natural—such a property as this no science could ever demonstrate. The mightiest application of the calculus fails here. Mathematical theory and induction are both unable to show that any great section of nature, much less the great whole of nature, is exempt from the principle of growth, maximum, decay—in a word, of a necessary finiteness, which the smaller inductions have invariably proved to belong to every partial nature, from the plant to the growing, decaying, and disrupted planet. The condition of growth seems to necessitate that of decay. The force required to keep an organism at its maximum must be greater than that required to reach it; since all beyond must be an addition, a coming of more from less, which is the same with something from nothing. The coiled spring must first relax its tension, and then return with more or less rapidity in its recoil to its former state. So that which has no other origin than a nebula in its lowest state of material existence, and no other law of its being than the condensation, or the unwinding of that nebula, whichever view we take, forbids the idea of eternal progress, or of unchanging movement in either direction. It must have its cycle, returning through all changes, either to perish, or to make again the same revolution, thus accomplishing a cycle of cycles, in which each maximum is continually less than the preceding, until it goes out, or is lost, or assumes some new form in the great whole of forces, therein to repeat a series of similar perishing revolutions. Whatever grows may decay—must decay. So induction teaches, if it is to be our only guide. Now it is a peculiar feature of the modern scientific infidelity, that it assumes this of the universe. The cosmos grows as well as the fungus. Solar systems, stellar systems, all came out of that lowest state called the nebula. Science can show no leap in the process of growth and decay, no point where perpetuity necessarily comes in, or the analogy permits us to stop short of the idea that there is in nature, even as a whole, a necessary finiteness of force, however vast the extent of space through which its manifestations may be dispersed. It must run round, and finally run out, whether to come up again, or come out again, as the old Stoics maintained in their doctrine of rarefactions, or to be no more for ever. The necessarily infinite alone remaineth ad aternum, whilst all things below the infinite must have the measure and the uses that it appointeth to them. "The grass withereth, the flower fadeth," nature comes and goes, but "the Word of the Lord abideth for ever." All that is not God is necessarily finite, except as He sustains, restores, perpetuates.

The reasoning of Plato here, and to some extent of Aristotle, can never be refuted. I refer to the great argument of the latter philosopher by which he proves the necessity of the ἀδεινηρος, the Immovable, as a principle lying above motion and the movable; in other words, an infinite mind, an eternal thought, as the only ground of stability in the universe. So Plato shows that the existence of antagonisms, or the generation of opposites, or correlations of forces in nature, must come from something above the plane of the physical. For although such seeming equilibriums may be produced, as it were, by partial currents, or counter-acting eddies, in the same movement, yet nature as a whole can never of herself generate a direction above that, or the opposite of that, in which she is tending, and which, unless counteracted or regulated by
a power from without, must inevitably bring her to a suicidal end. It is idle to say that these men, great thinkers as they were, had not science enough to warrant them in making such declarations. The whole question lies above any sphere of science, or fact induction, even were not the comparative difference here between the ancient and modern knowledge the infinitesimal we have shown it to be. The illustrations, too, presented by these old authorities, are as good as any that are furnished by the vocabulary of our modern progress. If genesis, development, says Plato, or what we call evolution, or progressive movement, were ever φύσις, straight onwards, in one direction, it must finally tend to extinction. Whatever the principle, be it rarefaction or condensation, separation or combination, cold or heat, cooling or heating, it must, in the one case, reach a state where all cohesion, all organization ceases, or, in the other, come to a stand in which all life, all motion, terminates in absolute immobility. Or, to use his own most expressive language, "things would cease becoming and genesis would be at an end." In more modern terms, the correlation of forces, if given an eternity to work in, would at last produce an absolute equilibrium, a state of rest which is the maximum of force, even as motion, on the other hand, or regarded as a departure from this state, is ever a spending or letting out of force, and must terminate in the absolute nothingness of inertia. Hence, that the cosmos may live, says the philosopher, there must be at some point or points, a κατάστασις, or turning round, a deviation from the progress or tendency in which it is going, a change from one law or from one movement to another, and this can be no product of that law, or that movement, from which it is turned. There may be such a seeming law of cyclicity, or self-regulating cyclical return, in the partial natures; but in them it must come from other partial natures without, which, at certain points, connect with and counteract, thus causing partial deviations. As applied, however, to a nature regarded as universal, and having nothing outside of it, this idea, of course, cannot be admitted. There, the result of such a right onward movement is demonstratively inevitable. Nothing can save from it but the supposition of dynamical laws, that is, principles of motion and force, utterly different from those our best science acknowledges in physical and cosmical investigations. Gravitation must destroy itself, if there be no principle, higher, remoter, stronger, in the universe.

The perverseness of an atheistic science may drive us to a mode of argument that seems laboured and abstract; but it is in order to meet this perverseness on its own ground. The truth must be something more simple than this—something which the common, healthy mind perceives, as well as the most reflective and logical. It cannot be that God, who made the human intellect, could have intended that the proof of His own existence, of His own intellect, we may say, should be so difficult, or so little obvious, as to allow the soul to have, even for a moment, an excuse for its scepticism. We should never depart from the intuitive idea that in motion, in change of any kind, in the least phenomenal deviation of anything (whether whole or part) from a former state, there is evidence of will somewhere in space and time, of a purpose and a volition without which such deviation never would have been, however many, or however undiscoverable, the connecting links of causation. We should hold to this as a proof preceding any that we draw from the more recondite field of organic life. In truth, once admit motion—self-motion—to be a property of matter, and it is not easy to deny that life also may be such. It is not easy to distinguish between life and self-motion. Hence Aristotle, in the argument
referred to, begins at the beginning. Motion demands a mover, and that ultimately a prime mover, itself unmoved and immovable, or a will originating motion, itself outside of any moving chain of cause and effect. In the same way the argument of Socrates against the atheists in the Tenth Book of the Laws. Motion is proof of soul.

In an after-state, clearer perhaps intellectually, because purer morally, we may wonder at ourselves for ever allowing this intuition to be obscured. Then may we feel, as we have never felt before, the reasonableness of that chiding, though gentle remonstrance: "O ye of little faith, wherefore did you doubt?"

The sceptical scientists are very fond of drawing on time. If any form of "evolution" be insisted on, or of "natural selection," or any adjustment of atoms driven by chance, and after infinite misses and infinite incongruities falling, at last, into something to which we give the name of order—the demand is ever for time, more time.

If we do not see species coming out of species, or any of the half-way transition processes, then science becomes humble again; we are reminded of the limited observations necessarily inadequate for such a vast induction. Only grant time enough, and we can prove the possible happening of anything conceivable. Now this accommodating demand may be turned the other way, and to the confusion of those who are most fond of making it. They would keep it within some bounds of the decimal notation. Billions, trillions, decillions, might perhaps satisfy their very modest hypotheses. But as against them, we may draw at once on the bank of eternity. How long before we reach it, or even make an approach to it, ought an infinite, ever right-onward-moving nature to have passed over the finite, the very finite, progress to which we see she has now arrived? Or, whatever may be the direction she is taking, at what an ancient time in the long-past eternity must she have to come to its ultimatum, if there be no hand to make the turn of which Socrates speaks? How many ages ago must there have been reached the immovable equilibrium or the irrecoverable dispersion? An eternity before our day must this binding or loosing—for motion is ever the spending of force—have brought all things to their maximum of solidity or their minimum of rarefaction; in both of which states all life perishes, all motion and resistance as the very conditions of manifested sentient being. The machine has run down, or run out. It is a consequence of that finiteness which necessarily belongs to everything moving in time and space. At such a juncture, the Platonic myth in the Politicus supposes the hand of Deity again to take the helm. On the hypothesis that excludes such a controlling and restoring idea, nature, or the physical universe, has come to a dead-lock from which there is no renewal. If we take it in one direction, the result, as has already been said, is a balance of forces, a static equilibrium of resistance, which is only another name for absolute rest. If we follow it in the other, the only idea left is that of utter dispersion, which is only another form of absolute inertia. Thus we are driven to the thought of a power outside of and above nature, a power demanded for its conservation and restoration as much as for its primal origin. "Of old hast Thou founded the earth; the heavens are the work of Thy hands. They perish, but Thou remainest. As a garment do they wear out: Thou renewest them, and they are renewed. But Thou art HE (the same), and of Thy times there is no end."

But, aside from any such reasoning, the doctrine of progress, in which the atheistic scientist takes refuge to escape the horror of his own conclusions, or this tendency to a higher and better state which Matthew Arnold describes as "a making for righteous-
ness,” is all a sheer assumption. How do they know whither nature, the universal nature, is going, or whether it be up or down? Certainly not from any induction. The atheist, or scientific atheist, is very fond of talking of the vast extent of the cosmos; he very confidently compares his own views in this respect with what he deems the religious narrowness; but as related to the whole, of which he so presumptuously judges, what is the mighty difference between his knowledge of the universe, as taken in all directions, and that of the most ignorant religionists of ancient or modern times? We speak, of course, comparatively. Franklin's wise ephemeron, drawing his inferences as to all surrounding being from the vernal or autumnal changes in the leaf on which he sits, would present the most apt illustration of this folly. Or we may imagine the tiny insect crawling in the great Haarlem organ. He may be a most scientific insect, possessing the keenest sense, endowed with a vision surpassing all the powers of the microscope. There is nothing in his minuteness at war with the supposition of his having a most mathematical brain, which nature, or the colloca-

tion of the atoms, or some nice adjustment in the correlation of his vital forces, may have bountifully given to him. There he sits, with all the materials for a Mechanique Celeste in the smaller, that La Place possessed for the supposed wider sphere. He is intent on the study of strings and pipes, and the most minute adaptations of the mighty apparatus, so far as his angle of vision can take in an almost infinitesimal part. He sees the valves open and shut; he traces, for an inch or two, the cords by which these effects seem produced; he begins to classify them and to talk of laws, thus turning phenomena into forces, and dignifying mere sequences with the name of causes. His induction may rise to the conception of mightier pipes, of more distant keys, of deeper valves, of hidden strings; but he never in this way gets out of the machine. It is, all through, as far as he can see, adapta-
tion for the sake of adaptation, evolution for the sake of evolution. But what is it all about? Sometimes, as Tyndall occasionally confesses, he may have his hour of weakness. Now and then his cerebral organization may become strangely impressed with the idea of something haunting the machinery, or that there is a “spirit in the wheels”—a blowing, or breathing in the pipes, which none of the sense-causalities before him can explain. There comes the faint consciousness of some vibrating tremor in the vast surrounding apparatus. It startles him with the idea of something greater than he sees. It may be the hope of a grander being, or a sense of danger filling him with alarm. There is something more serious in the machine than he had imagined. Is it a dream—a dream that he is dreaming, it may be—and from which he shall awake to a higher conscious-

ness? There may come, as from a far distance, the faint sound of a mighty music, of a glorious anthem rolling above. Or there may arise in his insect soul, or in some way be given to it, the idea of a higher world, a more real world, to which this intricate valvular apparatus may be subservient, and from which it derives all its value. But this he soon dismisses as utterly unscientific. He returns again to “common sense,” to confidence in his sharp eye, his groping touch. “The things that are seen;” they are the only realities after all. “The things unseen”—all that is supersensual—they belong to the world of phantoms which experimental science—the only science—can never admit.

The illustration is a fair one. From in-
duction alone it is impossible to determine whether this physical apparatus in which we are involved, out of which we are evolved, and into which our seeming individuality is soon to be resolved again, is really tending
to order or disorder, or towards anything we might indulge our fancy in calling higher or lower states of being. The very terms point to something out of the physical, above the physical—something which measures nature, but can never be measured by it.

Such a comparison is unimpeachable as long as we take for its basis any conceivable ratio between the infinitesimally known and the infinite unknown. To vary the illustration, however, let us suppose an almost invisible insect crawling upon the dome of St. Peter's. He possesses a sense of vision keener than the human. His microscopic eye does, indeed, see chasms, and roughnesses, and inequalities, which may disappear to a survey made from a higher standpoint; but what does it tell him of the purpose for which that vast structure was reared? What does it tell him of its transcending spiritual significance? Or, to confine the thought to what might be deemed, in strictness, the more proper scientific field, what does it tell him even of the space or mathematical direction of his seeming progress, or whether he is moving on a surface ascending or descending, concave or convex, or whether, taken as a whole, it may be called plane or spherical, or at what rate the vast arc, to which his short vision can draw no tangential line, may be changing its mighty curvature.

Equally preposterous is the claim that is made to determine, by any scientific induction, the movement and direction of the cosmos in any higher aspect that we may call spiritual, moral, metaphysical, ideal—or even in that lower view which excludes all but the physical as exhibited solely in the phenomena of motion and force. Even if the things immediately around us presented no anomalies or unevennesses, no apparent retrogressions or deteriorations, what help do our second of time and our inch of space give us towards determining any present state, or future tendencies, or final evolution, of that great whole of being of which we form, physically, so insignificant a part? The believer may legitimately connect such an idea of progress with that of a physical world subordinate to a moral probation, and the theatre, ultimately, of a high moral production. This is in true harmony with the thought of the cosmos as the work, through whatever process of origination and continuance, of a personal Deity, infinitely strong, infinitely wise, infinitely just and good. It matters not whether we say this comes from revelation, or has some claim to be regarded as an a priori idea of the human soul, or whether we regard both these supposed sources as substantially the same. If the latter, or the a priori view is preferred, it would denote simply something mirrored in the finite from the infinite mind, or a reflection from that image of God of which the Scriptures speak. On either view, naturalistic, theological, or metaphysical, thought, ideas, are a priori somehow, and somewhere. One position is that they existed in a necessary, an eternal, and an infinite mind, before they came into the human, carrying with them some recognizing glimpse of their necessity and infinity. The other likewise necessitates what may be called an a priori being, but of an infinitely lower kind. It would consist in those arrangements of atoms, and those correlations of forces, which, when brought out in the lucky confluences of immeasurable time, might constitute the individual man. We all had our primeval being in the nebula; we were all born out of it, as it will be to all of us the grave of our existence. But with a priori or necessary ideas in any other sense, the positivist has nothing to do. He denies their existence. He assigns them to the chimera region of metaphysics and theology. He goes by experiment, in a word, by sense, acknowledging no higher source for any human thought. When he talks, therefore, of progress, as Spencer is
compelled to do, or of an inherent "tendency that makes for righteousness," to use some of Matthew Arnold's favourite lingo, he goes entirely out of the sphere to which the fundamentals of his philosophy necessarily limit all human knowledge. He is trespassing on another province of which, at other times he affects to speak with contempt.

It would have been more wise, it may be thought, to have taken for the subject of this lecture a nearer and more threatening form of infidelity. But atheism is the goal to which it all is running, even as all irreligion is a dislike to the idea of a personal God. We may rejoice, however, that it carries its antidote along with it. There is nothing, perhaps, that will ultimately better subserve the cause of religious belief than the last published work of Strauss. After reiterated denials, and long struggles with the vortex into which he saw himself irresistibly drawn, it is pure atheism at last—blank, unqualified atheism. The English scientific sceptics seem drawing back, but Strauss has pushed on to the ultimatum, and it stands before us in all its horrors. Nothing that I have said of the awful desolation of a soul that comes fairly to see what it is to be "without hope, and without God in the world," presents such an appalling picture as he himself has given us after announcing his utter loss of faith in God. All his philosophy, all his logic, all his scholarship, yield their latest fruit, their only fruit, in such an utterance as this:

"In the enormous machine of the universe, amid the incessant whirl and hiss of its jagged iron wheels—amid the deafening crash of its ponderous stamps and hammers—in the midst of this terrific commotion, man, a helpless and defenceless creature, finds himself placed—not secure for a moment, that on some unguarded motion, a wheel may not seize and rend him, or a hammer crush him to powder. This sense of abandonment is at first something awful."

Yes, we may say, not only at first, but evermore, the more it is contemplated, growing denser in its gloom, more suggestive of that fearful language of the Scripture, "the blackness of darkness for ever." In other places Strauss would modify the horror of such a view by throwing himself upon some of those a priori ideas of ultimate order, to which, as we have seen, he and his confrères have no right. But in this terrific passage, he reminds us of that wild, despairing farewell to nature, which the prince of Grecian dramatists puts into the mouth of the Jove-defying Titan, as amidst storm and earthquake he goes down into the unfathomable subterranean deeps:

"ο μητρός ἐμής, σίθας, ὁ πάντων
ἀθικὸν κοιμῶν φάος ἐλώσων,
ἔσορᾶς μ' ὡς ἱκάληκα πάσχω.

O thou, my awful mother earth, and thou, Aetherial sphere unrolling evermore
The common light! Behold ye my dark doom!

There is no escape from the terrible machinery which Strauss so vividly depicts, and all the horrors it involves—these horrors, too, made immensely greater for man from the fact that he has the Prometheus fire of reason to contemplate his inevitable ruin, and just science enough to show him how very little his science avails to save him from these "jagged wheels," or how very little his feeble reforms—opening the way often to a more dire disorder—or his transient "victories over nature," as he calls them, can avert the greatest, and sometimes the least, of her catastrophes. The thought of the immortality of the race, even if there were any hope or consolation in that, is as groundless as any other part of this sad speculation. What do "the merciless wheels" or "ponderous hammers" care for races? Of how many, in the past, has the die been broken and cast away? The race, as well as the individual, may be caught on some of these "jagged points,"
or crushed by the defacing "stamps" of these remorseless evolutions. We fly for refuge to the merciful anthropopathisms of the Bible: "He knoweth our frame; He remembers that we are dust; He careth for us." But what does nature know or care? It is all darkness—all horror. No retributions of religion are so terrible as this atheistic creed; no superstition presents so fearful a ground of alarm; for with these is ever associated some consoling idea of propitiation. A stern Judge, an unyielding moral law, a fearful danger as arising out of a relation having so much of moral dignity—these have in them, for a rational being, more of hope, less of pain and despair, than the crushing thought of having been brought into being, and made to suffer, for no end at all. Whoever sets out on the road that must ultimately lead to this, let him count the cost. Let him consult his guide-book, whatever it may be, to understand what he must come to when he makes his departure from the more serious forms of religious belief for the sake of easier creeds. What has been said will not be in vain, if such an impression shall have been left on any mind.

D A N T E.

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HE two books named below are here mentioned chiefly as an indication of sources from which much of the material for this article has been drawn. In some sense, besides, they are representative books, so far as the subject with which they deal is concerned. Boccaccio's Life of Dante was written only two years after the death of the poet, and seems to have been, therefore, the first of the many productions which found their subject and inspiration in the career and the works of the great singer. So far as we know, Botta is the latest of these biographers and commentators. Each too, may be said to represent a school—Boccaccio the romantic school, Botta the philosophical school of interpretation, as respects particularly Dante's greatest work, the "Divina Commedia." In what sense we make use of this distinction will appear further on.

The books, therefore, whose title we have given in connection with this article, are not named here with any purpose to review them, but only because, from their association with the literature of the "Divina Commedia," they are to a certain extent authorities, and because we are to make it our aim, in part, to mediate between them, with respect to the theory of interpretation they respectively suggest for that immortal poem, and the view they take in certain particulars of Dante himself, and his career. It should be added that Botta's work was written, in great part at least, under a patriotic impulse. He dedicates it "To Italy, which in commemorating the sixth centenary of the birth of Dante Alighieri, celebrates the renewal of its own national life." This significant commemo-
ration took place May 14, 1865; and the association thus of the name of Dante with that of his country was made especially appropriate by the fact that the Italian union, which had then become substantially a reality, had been the dream, the hope, the inspiration of his own life, and its repeated failure the deepest and darkest of all the sorrows that make the story of his great career so unspeakably sad.

Boccaccio's account of the ancestry and the early life of Dante seems to have been mainly followed, so far as its statements of fact are concerned, by subsequent writers. The record of the poet's family, according to this account, goes back to the time when Florence, his native city, was rebuilt some three hundred years after its destruction by the barbarous Attila. This restoration of the city was in the reign of Charlemagne, and was entered upon soon after his elevation to the dignity of the Roman purple. He himself encouraged and promoted the undertaking, "either," says Boccaccio, "because inspired of God, or because urged to it by the prayers of petitioners." Among those commissioned by the emperor to perform this service was a young man, Frangipani in origin, whose name was Elisio. With him originated a family which attained to considerable honour in the new state. One of his descendants, Cacciaguida by name, took a wife from the family of the Aldighieri, in Ferrara. To one of the sons of this marriage the mother obtained permission to give her own family name, so that he was called Aldighieri, which, by dropping a letter, became Alighieri. From this branch of the original Elisian stock the poet proceeded.

He was born at Florence, May 14, 1265. Boccaccio states that previous to his birth, it pleased God to signify to his mother, in a dream, something of the greatness with which her child should be endowed, and that in view of this prophetic indication he received the name of Dante; the significance of the dream being that he should be a giver, or revealer, of wonderful knowledge, "di maravigliosa doctrina datore." Botta, without alluding to this portion of Boccaccio's narrative, which indeed resembles suspiciously the many more ancient devices for investing the birth of distinguished persons with prediction and prodigy, simply says that the Christian name, Dante, is abbreviated from Durante. Those fond of tracing occult prophecies in things of this kind might still claim to discover in the poet's name, even as thus accounted for, something significant and foreshadowing. To few of all the great men of history would the designation be more appropriate—Il Durante, the Enduring.

The life and works of Dante, apart from their importance in literature, are interesting to the student in two ways—the one historical, the other religious. In both his own commanding personality is ever distinctly in view, the central figure not only of the sphere of events amidst which he personally moved, but of the whole movement and history of his age. It is not alone as a poet that he belongs to that illustrious trinity where by universal consent he is placed, and which enrols the names of Homer, Dante and Milton apart from all other, even the greatest, names. Although it is so impossible to rescue from fable and romance any distinct conception of the actual Homer, his writings prove that it was not under a merely poetical inspiration that he sung his great song, but that he was a Greek quite as truly as he was a poet, while we are ready to believe that could he have foreseen how his own individuality would be one day almost lost in his poem, he would have been abundantly consoled by the assurance that his work would endure, and the great names he commemorated be glorious to the latest age. How true a patriot Milton was no one needs to be told, nor how great a part he bore in the political movements of his time.
In studying his career we never lose the man in the poet. We see in him the Puritan statesman as clearly as we do the scholar and the singer. If in politics his part may have been in some sense a subordinate one, his magnificent vindications of those principles which the more prominent actors embodied in deeds and laws, compel recognition of his title to be accounted a leader in those great events, and kindle our admiration even when we feel that in some things his passionate zeal carried him too far. Dante was even more a patriot than either Milton or Homer. His patriotism was the master-passion that ruled him. It was at once the glory and the sorrow of his life; and for this very reason he should be better known and better appreciated than he seems to be by the men of this present age; in which the hope that was, while hope remained, more than any other, the inspiration of his career, that of Italian unity, has become at last an achievement.

The religion of Dante—his theology, so to speak—is scarcely separable from his patriotism. Those more personal experiences which suggest so much of what is properly called devotional poetry, find scarcely any expression in his great poem. Though, as we read, we never lose sight of himself, but have him before us a vivid personality, moving through all the scenes which he pictures so intensely, and though his own thought and his own passion inform and energize the whole, still it is always with religion in its direct association with patriotism that he deals: that false religion of his own age, whose usurpations and iniquities he denounces, and that purer church, whose surpassing splendour was to him the most glowing and enrapturing of the visions of Paradise.

These two considerations, the patriotism and the religion of Dante, kept in mind, along with one other, in which his character reveals itself to us under quite a different aspect, and we have a sufficient clue both to the personal history of the poet and to that mighty allegory which forms the subject of his "Divina Commedia." The circumstance to which we are now to refer, while by no means an unusual thing in human experience, seems to have lent a singular colouring to the life and thought of Dante. Boccaccio treats it quite in the romantic view, and various writers, following him, have done the same. Botta, perhaps, leans too far toward the more philosophical and common-place view. The name of Beatrice is inseparably associated with that of Dante. And with reason; for in his poem he puts her in such relations with himself as that although, in the long journey through the Inferno and the Purgatorio to the Paradiso, she is revealed only as the beatific Lady whom to meet in heaven is the goal and the hope of his toil, still her presence seems to pervade the whole poem, and she is a familiar thought to us long before, in company with the poet, upon the verge of heaven at last we meet her. There can be no doubt that this whole conception grew out of an incident of his boyhood, and the vivid and lasting impression it made.

Boccaccio's account of this incident is as follows:—

It was a common custom in our city (Florence) when the sweet spring-time came again, to celebrate it in social festivals. Along with others, a distinguished citizen, Folco Portinari, upon the first of May, invited his neighbours to a festival of this kind at his house. Among those who came was Alighieri, accompanied by his son Dante, the children of the different families being present with their parents on these occasions. Dante had not yet reached his ninth year. Along with other children present, he occupied himself in plays suited to their age. Among them was a daughter of Folco, named Bice [a name of affection and familiarity for Beatrice], who was not yet quite eight years old, very engaging, quiet and gentle in her manners, beautiful in face, and whose words, when she spoke, indicated a gravity beyond her years. Dante observing her once and again, with all the affection which a child could feel, took her image into his soul in such a manner that he was never able afterward to extinguish or to banish it.
Our author goes on to say that this love for Beatrice continued to be the passion of his life, so that when, at the age of twenty-four years, the beautiful lady died, his grief was so intense that his friends became alarmed about him. He also states that even when Dante himself married, as he did some years later, Beatrice still remained, and to the end of his life continued, the mistress of his soul. He appears also to regard the poem of the "Divina Commedia" as written under the inspiration of this passion, and that it is the literal Beatrice who is celebrated and longed for throughout.

The more philosophical view regards the incident recited above as suggestive of little more than the name which Dante uses in his allegory to symbolize that which he esteems as the noblest and purest object of human desire. Those who hold this view do indeed recognize the incident referred to as connecting itself with the origin and plan of the poem, but they fail, we think, to appreciate the actual measure of its influence. Dante's whole career shows him to have been a man of intense and passionate nature. He not only felt strongly, but the impression made in some marked emotional experience was deep and lasting. Why, as he grew up to young manhood, he did not cultivate the acquaintance of this lady; why he never sought or seemed to expect from her more than a salutation as they occasionally met; why his worship thus was distant and diffident as if toward some superior being; these circumstances are nowhere explained. In what seems to have been his first work, the "Vita Nuova," he tells us something of this singular passion; how, to quote from Botta's summary of the passage, he—

Continued to dream and to love; to gaze at Beatrice from a distance, and to compose poems in her praise; abstaining, however, from naming her, fearful lest he should offend her purity or compromise her honour. He tells us that he attempted to conceal his affection, even by feigning love for another lady, to whom he dedicated the songs intended for Beatrice, and that this fiction went on for several years, and that at last Beatrice refused to salute him when they met. Then he relates that he returned home, locked himself in his chamber, where his lamentations could not be heard, and gave himself up to despair, until at length he fell asleep, with tears in his eyes, like a child that had been beaten. Again, at a wedding festival, he was so overpowered by her presence that he was led away by his friends; and in answer to their inquiries as to what was the matter with him, he replied: "I have set my feet on that edge of life, beyond which no man can go with power to return."

One seems to perceive the signs of a proud, shy, passionate and imaginative soul, investing the object of its idolatry with attributes almost supernal; shutting itself away in stern sorrow from even any dream that its idol might be approached and appropriated, and so receiving into itself an image of excellence and loveliness which dwelt there forever after. At the very beginning, Beatrice would seem to have been to some extent an ideal being. At last she grew to be almost wholly so. She came in the end to represent to him that absolute excellence which is the aspiration of all noble souls. This, for himself, he expected to reach only in heaven. Toward it he was to go by whatever path it should please God to appoint; encountering on his way shapes and powers infernal, and the hot and fierce ordeals of purgatorial fires. It may be supposed that mingled with this was an element of expectation, born of that early passion. A literal Beatrice may have been regarded by him as awaiting him in that world where errors of the heart, like those of the intellect, will be retrieved, and the kindred souls at last know each other. In its simplest and most rudimental form, this may, we think, be taken as the original conception, expanded ultimately in the magnificent fabric of the poem.

In connection with this part of our subject, we may allude to another passage in the more private life of the poet. Two
years after the death of Beatrice, Dante himself married. His wife was Gemma Donati, who bore him seven children. Boccaccio's statements and allusions imply that the poet's married life was no help to him in his studies or his poetical labours. The marriage seems to have been rather the choice of his friends than an inclination of his own. So great was his sorrow at the death of Beatrice, that this expedient was resorted to by them with a view to dissipate the melancholy which had become an occasion of solicitude. Yielding to this advice, as Boccaccio implies, Dante took the lady recommended to him as his wife. After stating this, the author goes on to discourse at some length upon the hindrances philosophers and poets often find in the cares of a family, and especially in the constant presence of a wife wholly out of sympathy with their chosen pursuits. He ends by saying:

However it may have been with others, so at least it was with her who had been given to Dante; so that having once been parted from her he never wished to return to her, and never desired that she should come to him.

He finishes his notices of this matter with the words:

Let no one think that I would conclude, from what is said above, that men ought not to take wives; so far from that, I approve it, but not for all. Those devoted to philosophical pursuits, if they follow my judgment in this, will leave marriage to rich fools, to lords, and likewise to labourers, and will content themselves with philosophy, a wife much better and more agreeable than any other.

This is rather a sour verdict, and might suggest that Boccaccio must have had some uncomfortable marital experiences of his own. And still, those familiar with the personal history of scholars and men of letters will agree that he has only too much reason for what he says.

Dante's separation from his wife was not voluntary, but was occasioned by his exile from Florence, upon political grounds, as will be noticed in its place. During the twenty years which elapsed between that event and his death, in 1321, he seems, with the exception of calling to him his eldest son at one time, to have taken no steps for bringing his wife and children away from Florence, to which the sentence of banishment pronounced against him prevented his own return. This would be mainly accounted for by the fact that during all that time he had no home, save such as the petty Italian sovereigns in whose courts he found refuge might allow him, and no means of support beyond that bounty which these patrons sparingly conferred upon him. Nor in his writings do allusions to his wife anywhere occur; a fact, however, which may also be accounted for by the custom of the times in regard to making in any way public one's domestic affairs. It may be presumed that Dante found in his wife no especial sympathy with the tastes and pursuits which most occupied him; and still it is not necessary to conclude—for which in fact there is no evidence—that there existed between them any estrangement. These passages in his private life, however, may suggest how large a space may have been left in his imagination, and even in his affections, for the ideal being into which the object of his earliest devotion had been transfigured.

Before coming to any more particular consideration of the poem, which in some sense embodies both the thought and the life of Dante, it is important to notice in some detail his connection with Florentine and Italian politics, and especially his efforts to promote Italian unity. As the social rank in which he had been born entitled him to aspire to a share in directing public affairs, he seems to have been educated partly with that view. His teacher was a distinguished man, Secretary to the Florentine Republic, named Brunetto Latini. He was equally eminent in politics and
literature, and by one of his contemporaries is pronounced "worthy of being numbered with the most distinguished orators of antiquity." Under this guidance Dante traversed the whole field of learning as then laid open, save that he seems not to have ever become familiar with either the language of ancient Greece, or with its literature, save in translations; this, however, being in no sense to his discredit, as Greek studies were in that age not deemed an essential part of even the most finished scholarship. Besides the various dialects of Italy, he became a proficient in Latin, French and Provençal. Grammar, rhetoric, history, geometry, music, astronomy, oratory, together with the arts of painting and sculpture, occupied his attention.

As an orator he became highly distinguished, and was accounted one of the most eloquent men of his time. Of Latin authors, Virgil and Cicero seem to have been his favourites, the former especially. Greek writers of antiquity he knew only in Latin translations. Of Homer he must have known little, Virgil seeming to have represented his highest ideal of the epic poet. To all readers of his own "Divina Commedia" this fact is familiar—the bard of Mantua being there made his guide, his mentor, his master in the poetic art. _Lo mio maestro, e il mio autore_, he calls him—"my master and my author;" the latter title being explained in that passage in one of his works (_Convito_, "The Banquet") where he says: "Author signifies any person worthy of being believed and obeyed. And from this is derived the word Authority." We may say in passing that Botta speaks of the work just named, the _Convito_, as "the first philosophic treatise written in Italian prose." It was a commentary upon some of its author's own poems.

Dante appears to have entered upon public life while yet quite young. We first read of him at the age of twenty-four years, taking part in the battle of Campaldino, between the Guelphs, of Florence, and the Ghibelins, of Arezzo. Not long after he was in another engagement, between the Florentines and the Pisans. With these two battles his military career seems to have begun and ended. Whether it was before or after this that he began to take an active part in Florentine politics does not appear. His first notable act in that regard was characteristic. He was in his politics a sincere republican. Accordingly, the constitution adopted in 1266 met his approbation. By this constitution the citizens were divided into guilds, according to occupation, such as that of judges and notaries, physicians and apothecaries, wool-weavers and clothiers, the government being committed to eight magistrates chosen by the guilds in a free election. In order to connect himself with one of these guilds Dante renounced his rank as a nobleman. He chose that of the physicians and apothecaries, being allied to them, not professionally, but through his interest in the study of natural sciences.

He soon became distinguished, and was entrusted with various important functions, among them that of ambassador. In this capacity he visited Siena, Perugia, Venice, Ferrara, Rome, Naples, and, it is said, Paris. After some ten or eleven years of such public service, Dante was, in 1300, at the age of thirty-five years, elected one of the eight magistrates to whom was committed the government of the republic. His personal superiority was recognized by his colleagues, and he became as a sort of necessity, by virtue of his ability and patriotism, practically the head of the government. But trouble was at hand. The party in Florence opposed to the existing authority, began plotting for its overthrow. They made an attempt to engage with themselves the Pope, Boniface VIII., and Charles of Valois, brother of Philip the Fair, king of France, then in Italy with a French army, in a conspiracy to attack
Florence, overthrow the government and restore them to power. Dante was appointed by his colleagues to head an embassy to Rome, with a view to prevent this combination. It seems to have been with a foresight of the consequences, if the government at home were left in the weak hands of his associates, and at the same time a sense of the great moment of the mission proposed, that he exclaimed, when urged to go upon that errand: “If I go, who is there to stay? If I stay, who is there to go?” By the arts of Boniface he was detained at Rome until Charles had time to attack Florence, get possession of it, turn out the party in power, and place the government in the hands of the opposition. One of the first acts of the triumphant faction was to pronounce against Dante a decree of banishment. In the taking of the city, and the disorders that followed, his house was pillaged and burned, his lands “were given up to devastation,” and he himself, from that hour to that of his death, was a proscribed man, in his poverty and destitution having scarcely “where to lay his head.”

In the course of his connection with the management of public affairs, an important change had taken place in Dante’s political views. He began his more active career as a Guelph, that is to say, a member of that party which upheld the pretensions of the Pope as against those of the German Emperor, who claimed the political sovereignty of Italy. This party did not, indeed, favour making the Pope a temporal sovereign, but they would maintain the existing division of the country into distinct republics, with the Pope as in some sort an arbitrator in their differences while their common spiritual head. Dante became satisfied, in due time, that the policy of his party promised nothing for his country but division, disorder, and oppression without end. In leaving them, however, he did not become a Ghibelin, as those were called who favoured the emperor. He adopted a political theory of his own, developed at considerable length in his work entitled “De Monarchia.” He became, as has been well said, “the first Italian.” He advocated the union of all the Italian states under one government. But his plan went farther, and embraced what to us of this age, if now proposed, would seem altogether chimerical, though in his time it would be, if not wholly rational or hopeful, still not so manifestly impossible. It contemplated a union of all the states of the civilized world under one constitution, each being left to the exercise of independent powers within its own special sphere, but all combined for a common object, and recognizing a common political centre; that centre to be, of course, what was the universally conceded centre of the civilized world, Italy. Says Botta:

This plan anticipates, in some measure, the plan adopted by Washington and his comppeers in the Constitution of the United States, differing however in this, that while the American Republic extends to states geographically and ethnologically integrant parts of the same country, the Italian empire, as proposed by Dante, would have embraced all the world, and have placed Italy, in relation to other nations as the sun to the planets, whose influence unites them in their harmonious movements, while it gives them free scope in their appointed orbits.

It was, at least, a noble conception, not unworthy of the imperial intellect that gave it birth. Nor must we fail to notice that in this work, “De Monarchia,” Dante maintains, without reserve, the doctrine that by whomsoever this central and supreme political power should be personally exercised, it must at least not be given to the Pope. He attacks, unsparingly, the Papal pretensions to political sovereignty, or to the possession, in any sense of the word, of a “temporal sword.” He maintains that the functions of the church are wholly spiritual, and that anything beyond this is pure usurpation. It is to his honour that in declaring himself thus, he brought down upon his
head the Papal malediction. The reading of the "Monarchia" was forbidden under penalty of excommunication, and the decree is in force to this day. The book was burned, twenty years after the death of its author, in the public square at Bologna. An effort was even made, though a fruitless one, to have the remains of Dante himself taken up, after they had lain buried at Ravenna for the same length of time, burned, and the ashes given to the winds.

Shortly before his banishment from his native city, Dante had commenced his great poem, the "Divina Commedia." He was then thirty-five years of age. His genius had attained mature development; he was a widely-read scholar; his experience of life and of men had already been large; and he had thought profoundly upon many great subjects. In order that one may not be misled in the interpretation of the sublime epic to which the rest of his life was mainly devoted, it is quite necessary to keep clearly in mind what were the convictions and the feelings most likely to find expression in such a work. Many, we think, have the impression that this celebrated poem is in some sense theological; that the fearful pictures of the Inferno are an allegorical representation of the poet's idea of the fate which awaits the wicked, made more sombre and fearful through the intensity of personal feeling toward certain individuals obnoxious to himself, or whom he regarded as the cause of disaster to his country. The first of the three great divisions of the poem may on this account have, to some readers, even a certain repulsiveness, as exhibiting a view almost ferocious of the theory of future punishment, kindled into still greater intensity by the passion of the poet. This impression may be aided by a peculiarity in the genius of Dante, to which Macaulay calls attention in his essay on Milton:

Poetry (says Macaulay) which relates to the beings of another world ought to be at once mysterious and picturesque. That of Milton is so. That of Dante is picturesque indeed beyond any that was ever written. Its effect approaches to that produced by the pencil or the chisel. But it is picturesque to the exclusion of all mystery. This is a fault on the right side, a fault inseparable from the plan of Dante's poem, which, as we have already observed, rendered the utmost accuracy of description necessary. Still it is a fault. The supernatural agents excite interest, but it is not the interest which is proper to supernatural agents. . . . Dante's angels are good men with wings. His devils are spiteful, ugly executioners. His dead men are merely living men in strange situations. The scene which passes between the poet and Farinata is justly celebrated. Still, Farinata in the burning tomb is exactly what Farinata would have been at an auta da f. Nothing can be more touching than the first interview of Dante and Beatrice. Yet what is it but a lovely woman chiding, with sweet composure, the lover for whose affection she is grateful, but whose vices she reprobates? The feelings which give the passage its charm would suit the streets of Florence as well as the summit of the Mount of Purgatory.

Elsewhere, he says:

However strange, however grotesque may be the appearance which Dante undertakes to describe, he never shrinks from describing it. He gives us the shape, the colours, the sound, the small, the taste; he counts the numbers; he measures the size. His similes are the illustrations of a traveller. Unlike those of other poets, and especially of Milton, they are introduced in a plain, business-like manner, not for the sake of any beauty in the objects from which they are drawn; not for the sake of any ornament which they may impart to the poem, but simply in order to make the meaning of the writer as clear to the reader as it is to himself. The ruins of the precipice which led from the sixth to the seventh circle of hell were like those of the rock which fell into the Adige on the south side of the Trent. The Cataract of Phlegethon was like that of Aqua Cheta at the monastery of St. Benedict. The place where the heretics were confined in burning tombs resembled the vast cemetery of Arles.

This literalness of description in Dante contributes materially to the effect which we just now mentioned. Instead of the sublime vagueness and dreaminess with which Milton invests his pictures of the world of lost spirits, one finds himself confronted with every imaginable form of material horror.
and physical agony, not unfrequently mingling the hideously grotesque with the dreadful and the incredible. Taking it all as representing the poet's idea of that punishment which divine justice metes out in another world to even the worst and the most depraved, or as representing the prevalent ideas of his age upon these subjects, our first impulse, when entering this fearful picture-gallery, is to turn shudderingly away. The simple truth is, as we hope to show directly, that to interpret the poet thus is both to misunderstand him and to do him injustice.

Another peculiarity of this poem is the large use made throughout of the pagan mythology. We know of at least one person who, when he first began to read Dante with close attention, was ready to pronounce his "Divina Commedia" far more pagan than Christian. A heathen poet, Virgil, is the guide, patron, interpreter and friend through all the adventurous journey. As we go on, in company with the two, we continually meet with localities and persons made familiar to us in reading the Æneid, or the fables of the old mythology. Even Milton, as a Christian poet, has been criticized for using so largely in the way of illustration and imagery in his "Paradise Lost," a work whose inspiration seems drawn from the Christian Scriptures, the fabulous legends and persons which, however classical they may be the literature which has enshrined them, are none the less inseparably linked with the "godless, sensual, and devilish" superstitions of an age of an almost universal heathenism. Dante is still more open to that criticism, and, until one gives the subject some careful study, it seems a fault which can scarcely be condoned.

With reference to the second of these points of criticism, it is to be borne in mind that Dante lived at a time when nearly all the literature existing in the world, certainly all the models in literature, were classical and pagan. Although centuries had passed away since the last great Latin author lived and wrote, no other nation, not even the Italian, had as yet produced a literature. The modern world was still in close contact with the ancient world, and the whole thought and spirit of the one took their form and tinge from those of the other. We, in this age, may not realize all the effect of this. Between the world of to-day, and that in which the classic literature of Greece and Rome flourished, there is an immense and ever-widening chasm. It seems to be doubted by many whether it is even worth while to retain amongst us any knowledge at all of that literature; while the small amount of it which still finds place in our courses of collegiate study, some would cast out, as belonging to a past so remote and so little in relation with the present as to make any special study of it a mere waste of time. To judge either Dante or Milton in this aspect, from our own point of view, is to do him the greatest injustice. In writing a great epic poem, at the time in which he lived, it was scarcely possible that Dante should not make large use of that literature which almost alone represented the world's culture of that period, employing its mythological form not for purposes of didactic instruction, but of poetry and allegory.

In respect to the harsh and sombre character of the Inferno, it may be admitted that, although not with any theological intention, popularly speaking, it was still written under the influence of feelings which could not fail to infuse its imagery with a passionate intensity. This first division of the poem was commenced, as stated above, shortly before Dante entered upon his long exile from Florence. Seven cantos had been finished when he left upon that mission to Rome from which he was destined never to return. He left the manuscript behind him, in the care of his wife, who, upon the breaking out of the disorders which followed the
change of government, placed it in a casket and deposited it in a secure place. Boccaccio's account implies that when, some five years after, this fragment was discovered, the authorship was not recognized, and that its merits being at once perceived, it was sent to Malaspina, then Marquis of Lunigiana, who was himself a distinguished scholar. At his court Dante was then staying, and the Marquis showed the poem to him, asking him if he knew whose work it was. Dante, recognizing it, replied that it was his own. He had supposed these cantos lost; but now, in accordance with the earnest request of the Marquis, he resumed, and in the course of his subsequent wanderings, completed it. The poem was therefore written during that portion of Dante's life when he was feeling most keenly his own personal humiliations, brought upon him by the ingratitude and injustice of his countrymen, and feeling also, perhaps more keenly still, the misfortunes of his country, torn by factions, and fallen far from that height of glory upon which it had been his eager hope that she might one day stand. It is not to be doubted that the gloom and the indignation of his own high soul found expression in this first division of his poem; though it is a relief to feel that in the subsequent portions, especially in the Paradiso, the evidence is abundant that there still remained to him dreams, if not hopes, which while they consoled his sorrows, shed into his later song a spirit worthy of the resplendent theme.

Passing, now, to consider more particularly the poem itself, we must observe that its symbolism concentrates in the person of Beatrice. How this lady became to Dante a symbolical, while still remaining a real personage, we have already intimated. In the Convito, which was, as we before said, a commentary upon the poem, he distinctly states that by Beatrice he intends Philosophy; a word which he uses with the same meaning as is given to the word Wisdom in the Proverbs. Speaking of Philosophy as thus symbolized, he says:

How blind are those who never lift their eyes to the contemplation of that daughter of God! She is the mother of all things, for in the creation of the world she stood before the Divine mind. "When the Lord prepared the heavens I was there," she says; "when he set a compass upon the depths; when he established the clouds above; when he straightened the foundations of the deep; when he gave to the sea his decree that the waters should not pass his commandment; when he appointed the foundations of the earth; then I was by him, as one brought up with him, and I was daily his delight, rejoicing always before him."

Other terms which he uses with more direct reference to the ideal Beatrice, as quoted in substance by Botta, could not without an extravagance altogether incredible have been employed of a mortal, however beautiful and good, however transfigured by elevation to the heavenly societies. He calls her—

The true praise of God, the glory of our kind, the fountain of all truth, and the splendour of eternal light. Her beauty none but her Maker can fully enjoy. She is Goddess—the prime delight of primal love. Her eyes are brighter than the stars; to look at them fulfils all desire. Her aspect is that of virtue; it reflects God himself. Possessing her, mankind possesses all things.

Dante's own quotation of that striking passage in Proverbs, given above, suggests that his personification of this highest attainment as Beatrice, if not suggested by, is still entirely in the spirit of those both in Proverbs and in the Song of Songs, where imagery drawn from the lower spheres of knowledge and experience is employed to set forth that which belongs to the very highest sphere of human attainment. A passage from his own writings may confirm this impression:

He is not to be called a true lover of wisdom who loves it for the sake of gain, as do lawyers, physicians, and almost all persons who study, not in order to know, but to acquire riches or advancement, and who would not persevere in study should you give them
what they desire to gain by it. As true friendship between men consists in each wholly loving the other, the true philosopher loves every part of wisdom, and wisdom every part of the philosopher, inasmuch as it draws all to itself, and allows no one of his thoughts to wander to other things.

When, at the summit of the Purgatorial Mount and with Paradise close at hand, Dante meets Beatrice, she chides him that when she was parted from him by death he so forgot her, ceased to make her the object of his supreme thought and desire, and turned to other loves and other aims. Interpreting the symbol as he has himself instructed us to do, we must understand by this a conscious wavering on Dante's part in some earlier portion of his life, in the pursuit of his own ideal; that he had allowed himself to be influenced and swayed by his surroundings and his associations, as a soul resolved upon the highest attainments can never do without sinning against itself and against the object of its nobler aims. How he was recalled from this, the familiar words with which the poem commences show, as also the misery and danger into which his fault had already betrayed him. Midway in the journey of life, he tells us, he found himself lost in an obscure wood. How savage, how rough and hard to encounter was this wilderness, he could not even now recall without a shudder. How he came there it was impossible for him to tell, save that, like one overcome by sleep, he had wandered from the true way. Wild beasts meet him; first a panther, then a lion, then a she-wolf. These are interpreted as representing, respectively, lust, pride and avarice. While seeking to escape from these, and to find his way out of this savage wood, he is met by one "whose voice seemed faint through long disuse of speech." It proves to be the shade of Virgil, by whom he is addressed and informed that he comes as a messenger from Beatrice to conduct him to her presence. So far as the meaning of the allegory is personal to himself, the key to it is here given us, provided we keep in mind Dante's own explanation, as to who Beatrice is. He had wandered from the path leading to the highest wisdom, and is now to be conducted to that supreme attainment, not by any such way as would have been before him if he had kept the true path. The wood into which he had strayed opens upon the steep descent that leads down to hell. That way his road must be. He must encounter infernal scenes and infernal shapes; must see with his eyes the shame and horror into which their own vileness plunges all the wicked, must pass through purgatorial fires, and thus only reach heaven and the supreme good at last.

One discovers here, very plainly, the effect of that religious education which Dante had received; ideas of God's way with men resembling those which in his age universally prevailed — the whole intensified by the poetic imagination, and by those other and still more fervid feelings which here found expression. For in all this Dante is himself a representative person, while his own ordeal represents that of his country.

To this double interpretation (says Botta) Dante refers when he says that the hell of the present life is the alleged subject of the poem: the hell of barbarism in which nations were engulfed; the brutal vices of princes and people; the oppression of the good and the triumph of the wicked; the hell of anarchy and despotism which afflicted his country. And as we regard Italy or mankind in their progress towards union, peace, and civilization, or in the final attainment of their destiny, we find in the Purgatorio and the Paradiso the complementary parts of the grand double epic, which contains at once the moral history of a nation and of humanity.

We have already, we fear, more than exhausted the space proper to claim for this subject, and must hasten to close. We can only allude to the service Dante has rendered to his country while in some sense giving it both a literature and a language. When he began to write, Italy had, properly
speaking, no language of its own. The Latin was still the vernacular of society and of literature, while amongst the common people no less than fourteen dialects, formed from the Latin, with many foreign admixtures, were in use. Out of these Dante constructed a language which, made classic by its use in his writings, has remained unchanged to the present hour. Dante is still, to his countrymen, the model of a perfect Italian style; what can be said of no writer in any other country living even half so long ago as he.

During the fifteen years from the time when Dante resumed his poem until that of his death, he seems to have been more or less occupied with it. Portions of it had been already made public, and his fame as a great poet may be said to have been already established. When he died, however, the thirteen last cantos were found to be missing, and remained so for several months, until discovered at Ravenna by his son Jacopo. Boccaccio relates that Dante appeared to his son in a dream, robed in white, and pointed out to him the secret place of deposit where the missing cantos might be found. He died at Ravenna, September 14th, 1321, at the age of fifty-six years. His remains lay in state in the Polenta Palace for several days, robed in the dress of a Franciscan friar—which had been his own wish—a golden lyre with broken cords at his feet. The funeral which followed was magnificent, and a monument was erected, which the traveller still finds standing at a corner where two streets meet, with a bas-relief likeness of the poet seen through the barred portal.

Such likenesses of Dante as were taken in his later life give him a face peculiarly sad—melancholy and severity somewhat affecting its otherwise noble expression. A painting by Giotto represents him as he was in his youth. We may close our article with a verse or two from Lowell’s fine poem upon this latter portrait:

Can this be thou who, lean and pale,
With such immittigable eye
Didst look upon those writhing souls in bale,
And note each vengeance, and pass by
Unmoved, save when thy heart by chance
Cast backward one forbidden glance,
And saw Francesca, with child’s glee
Subdue and mount thy wild-horse knee,
And with proud hands control its fiery prance?

Ah! he who follows fearlessly
The beckonings of a poet-heart
Shall wander, and without the world’s decree,
A banished man in field and mart;
Harder than Florence walls the bar
Which with deaf sternness holds him far
From home and friends, till death’s release,
And makes his only prayer for peace,
Like thine, scarred veteran of a life-long war!
THE UNCERTAINTIES OF NATURAL AND OF RELIGIOUS SCIENCE.

By Rev. Charles M. Mead, Prof. Theological Seminary, Andover.

SCIENCE is systematized knowledge. There may be knowledge without science; but there can be no science without knowledge. The first condition of science is, that there be known facts. Conjecture and assumption have their place, but not until facts are discovered, of which they serve as a preliminary explanation. The knowledge of the facts does not become science, in the full sense of the term, until conjecture and assumption have given place to certainty respecting the relations and the causes of the facts to be explained. A scientific man may speculate; but his speculation is not science. It may lead him to science, but still it is not science; for it may also lead him away from science.

This is all very simple, and will doubtless meet with ready assent from all; but there are involved herein certain principles and suggestions of far-reaching importance.

1. One of these principles is, that it is the province of science to explain, not some facts, but all facts. Whatever can be known is a proper subject of scientific inquiry. No one questions this. Why, then, should it have been allowed to happen that the term "science" has in point of fact come to be used pre-eminently of the natural sciences; whereas, when other sciences are to be designated, a specific title must be used? Thus we speak, on the one hand, of the sciences of botany, of geology, of astronomy, of chemistry, of mineralogy, of physiology, of physics, and the like; and on the other hand, of the sciences of language, of the mind, of ethics, of history, and of religion. But, if a man speaks of science collectively, he is understood, as a general rule, unless he explains himself, to exclude the latter class of sciences entirely, and to mean simply the natural sciences. Even the term "natural science," or (to use a more correct expression) "science of Nature," is too comprehensive for the thing meant to be described by it: it should be rather called the "science of matter." But this inaccuracy is slight, compared with the other, which, so long as it is allowed to pass current without notice or protest, becomes, whether designedly or not, a means of casting discredit on those sciences which relate to anything besides the mere properties of matter. It is not enough to say that this is only a question of usage. "Words are things." If the natural sciences are generally spoken of as if they only were sciences, a popular impression is produced that this is the fact. Hence those who hold (and there are doubtless few who do not) that there are other sciences than the so-called natural sciences are doing themselves and the cause of truth a positive injury whenever they use the term "science" in this narrow sense. That this usage arises from no inherent necessity of the case is shown by the fact, that, e.g., in German the corresponding word, Wissenschaft, is not used in this limited sense. Usage may be law; but it is often tyrannical law, resistance to which is a duty. Those, therefore, who speak of "science and religion" as if there were or might be an antagonism between them, make an unworthy concession, and indeed do hardly less than stultify themselves, if they also believe that there is such a thing as the science of religion,—
The Uncertainties of Science

Theology is the science of the facts of religion. Now, no fact, or department of facts, can contradict any other fact or department of facts. Still less can we with propriety speak of a science, i.e., the philosophical explanation of one set of facts, as conflicting with the other set of facts. We might as well speak of a conflict between botany and the planet Jupiter, or between comparative philology and the execution of Charles I.

2. Another principle involved in our opening remarks is, that it is the province of science to explain facts, not to explain away facts. Its office is positive, not negative. Patient investigation and classification of actual phenomena and events—this is the indispensable condition of all science. The deduction of general laws and principles underlying the phenomena is a secondary matter. This deduction is indeed the goal of science; but it can never be said to be positively attained, until all the facts to be referred to these laws are ascertained. To be unwilling to believe in the existence of a phenomenon or in the occurrence of an event, despite all evidence for it, is therefore eminently unscientific. Theories are useful, but, when a man becomes so wedded to a theory that he resolutely shuts his eyes to every fact which contradicts it, he ceases to be a man of science: he is a dogmatist. He who refuses even to weigh the evidence for the fact that animals lived on this globe more than six thousand years ago may be acting consistently with his theory of creation: but he is not a lover of truth; he has not a scientific mind. So, when a man says, as a recent writer has said, "Every science assumes that the laws of Nature . . . are never for a moment suspended; . . . an apparent miracle worked before our very eyes will never again carry conviction to an educated man,"—when a man makes this his principle, he avows that he adheres to a theory so tenaciously that no fact can make him give it up, even though the fact occur before his very eyes. In other words, his aim is no longer to explain facts by his theory, but to make facts correspond to his theory. He is therefore not a scientific man, but a dogmatist.

Science, as such, denies nothing, except in so far as established facts are absolutely irreconcilable with alleged facts. It makes no denials except through affirmations. It does not deny even theories, unless it has better theories to substitute for them, or unless facts are found which the theories are incompetent to explain.

3. Science being the systematized knowledge of facts, it follows, further, that no particular department of science can be perfect, until all the facts belonging to it are perfectly known. However complete any system may seem to be, however certain its principles, it is yet liable to be overturned by the discovery of a single fact for which the system has no place. The probability of any such overturn may be ever so small; yet the possibility always exists. But it is not merely ignorance of bare facts which invests a science with a certain degree of imperfection: the relations of all the facts need to be perfectly known in order to make the science absolutely complete. Facts must be known in their causes and consequences, else they are not truly known. In short, the condition of perfect science is omniscience.

This being so, it follows that every science, in consequence of the limitations of human knowledge, must be attended with a greater or less degree of uncertainty,—uncertainty in regard to particular facts, and uncertainty in regard to general principles. There must be an overwhelming presumption, that, in this respect, every science, whatever may be the department of knowledge which it embraces, is analogous to every other. It therefore does not become the adherents of
any one science to make these uncertainties a matter of reproach against other sciences. The weak points in a system may indeed be properly exposed; the various sciences may help one another: for though in many relations distinct, yet they are all interwoven together. "Truth is catholic, and Nature one." It is the privilege of each science to borrow the results of every other; but it is the privilege of no science to interfere with the development, or attack the foundations, of any other.

The antagonism which exists between certain naturalists and certain theologians could not have arisen without a disregard of these truths. It would be useless to try to distribute the blame. No candid man can fail to see that there has been fault on both sides. When theologians stubbornly refuse to believe in what natural science has demonstrated, because some traditional notion of theirs seems thereby to be contradicted; when naturalists, on the strength of a hasty induction, pronounce some theological dogma, or even a whole theological system, to be overthrown,—we cannot but detect in either case an unworthy animus. It is not thus that the cause of truth is advanced.

Accordingly, in considering the Uncertainties of Natural and of Religious Science, my object is, not to set up one of these departments of science as hostile to the other, but to illustrate the resemblance between them in this particular, with a view to certain practical lessons to be derived from this resemblance. If special stress is laid upon the uncertainties of the natural sciences, it will be only because the claim of superior exactness is often urged for them as contrasted with the alleged vagueness of theology. This vagueness is often conceived to be so radical as to stamp all religious science as impossible, and to prove all religion to be a mere product of fancy. It will be the object of the following analogies to exhibit the injustice of this notion.

I. It is said that uncertainty attends the very attempt to define the meaning of religion. What is religion? Is it belief, or feeling, or action? Is it worship, or service? Does it necessarily involve the conception of a God, or not? If it does, is it a sense of dependence on him, or a sense of obligation to him? Moreover, if religion does always involve the notion of a Deity, can it be shown that the Deity is any thing but a notion? Do not the various attempts to prove the existence of God show that there is some ground to doubt his existence? Is it not often confessed by theologians that none of these demonstrations are satisfactory, and that we must ultimately look for the evidence in the immediate intuitions of the soul? And is not this almost equivalent to a confession that every man is the author of his own God?

Let it be granted that absolute precision in the definition of religion, and absolute uniformity in the conception of God, and absolute conclusiveness in the proof of the existence of God, are far from being attained, if not far from being attainable. What then? Is all religion, therefore, a chimera? If so, then, treated in the same manner, how much better off are the physical sciences themselves? What is matter, the various forms and phenomena of which they deal with? Is it that which occupies space? But this is not assented to by all philosophers. And, even though true, how little does this definition tell us of the nature of matter! Moreover, the definition depends for its meaning upon our conception of space. Now this, according to many philosophers, is nothing but a form of thought. And what is to be understood by matter's filling a form of thought? Or, if space is more than a condition of thought, what is it? It cannot be called a thing: that would identify it.
either with matter or with mind, neither of which any one believes it to be. If it is called extension, we come back to the same difficulty; for how can we conceive of extension, except as we conceive of something as extended? We might as well attempt to conceive of attraction as a reality, without any thing that attracts or is attracted. But if space is thought as something extended, then our definition is ruined; for we should be defining matter as an extended thing which occupies an extended thing. Or shall we define matter as that which is perceivable by the senses? But, according to some, the senses are only properties of matter; and then matter would be defined as that which is perceived by matter,—which is no definition at all. Or, if the senses are conceived as the organs of the mind, then the definition simply amounts to this: that matter is something of which the mind receives an impression as being different from itself. We are thus reduced to the merely negative definition: matter is not mind. According to many, this is the best definition possible. The professor who answered his daughter's question, "What is mind?" by the laconic reply, "No matter"; and the other question, "What is matter?" by the answer, "Never mind," is generally held to have been as wise as he was witty.

If, however, we attempt to define matter by defining its qualities, we are no better off. Call matter that which has colour, or hardness, or divisibility, or solidity; and what have you done? You have simply predicated of matter certain properties, which are either mere conceptions of the mind, or else can be conceived as belonging to something objective only as we first conceive the objective thing to be existent. In other words, either we think of the matter before we do of the quality, and therefore matter is not defined to our thought by the definition of the quality: or else we think of the quality before we do of the thing to which it belongs; in which case there is no need of thinking of the thing at all, or at least, the thing is constituted by the quality, is identical with it,—which is the same as to say that it itself is nothing at all; and we are brought to the Hegelian principle, that Nothing and Being are the same. Or shall we say that matter is not a substance characterized by qualities, but is nothing but pure force? Well, this is affirmed by many; but, in the minds of many others, almost the opposite is the truth. Inertia, the absence of force, seems to them rather the essential characteristic of matter; and the force which it exhibits is to them evidence of a mind which is at work upon it. But, again, there are others who deny all distinction between mind and matter. Either, as idealists, they hold mind to be the only real existence, and matter to be a phenomenon of mind; or, as materialists, they hold mind to be a modification of matter. It is not pertinent to our present purpose to criticize these various views: it is enough to mention the simple fact, that the attempt merely to define what the thing is with which the natural sciences have to deal involves us in inextricable difficulties. There is no definition which is not inadequate, or does not assume a knowledge of the thing to be defined. The highest authorities are divided on the question what the thing is, and, indeed, on the question whether the thing exists at all.

Suppose, now, an enemy of the physical sciences should conclude that, inasmuch as the greatest vagueness prevails respecting the nature, and even, in many minds, the gravest doubt respecting the reality, of what these sciences make it their object to discuss, therefore these sciences are utterly without foundation; that none of the conclusions in them can be relied on as certain; that all the elaborate systems which have been built up may prove to be nothing but mere dreams: we should say, that, plausible as his reasoning may seem, it is yet fallacious. In
spite of such objections, we should continue to believe that there is a material world; that its laws and properties may be ascertained; that much substantial truth concerning it has already been evolved, and that much more may yet be evolved, by the patient investigation of the student of Nature.

If this reply is sufficient, why should not the same reply be sufficient when made to the objection against the reality of religion or the existence of a God? What greater diversity of opinion can exist respecting the essence of religion or the nature of God, than exists respecting the essence of matter? What greater difficulty in proving the existence of God, than in proving the existence of matter? If uncertainty—the absence of an absolutely exhaustive definition or irrefragable demonstration—shall be allowed to cast ominous conjecture on the reality or the validity of religious beliefs and feelings, then the same uncertainty puts its withering touch on all the sciences of Nature; and the logical result is universal scepticism.

There is no science which does not begin with assumptions. Even in mathematics, we have axioms which elude all demonstration; and theology, like every other science, must have its postulates. Its province is not to create religion, or even to prove the existence of religion: it simply takes religion as an undeniable, existent fact, and attempts to find the science of it. Even if all such attempts had hitherto been failures, the facts, still remaining, would challenge us to renew the effort.

II. But let us come to something more specific. One of the problems of theology is the beginning of moral agency, and, as closely connected with this, the origin of moral evil. It assumes that all rational beings are responsible to God; and that many, if not the greater part, of them have proved false to their obligations. It generally assumes that the human race, as a whole, has apostatized from God; that every member of it has wilfully violated a divine law. And yet, when theologians come to explain this uniformity, they either trace all sin back to one man, the father of the race, from whom sinfulness flows as a taint through all his descendants; or else they have to assume that there is directly implanted in every child a sinful germ, as sure to develop into actual transgression, as a seed sown, is to grow into a plant.

But, the objection presents itself, how disproportionate the cause to the effect! Can it be that a character of positive guiltiness, such as every adult man is supposed to have contracted, is to be traced to, and is made certain by, the first moral act which he put forth in his infancy? That beginning of moral agency lies beyond our search, if we examine others; and beyond our recollection, if we examine ourselves. And, whatever it was, it was the act of an infant, so limited in knowledge of duty and in sense of moral obligation, that its actions seem hardly distinguishable from that of the irresponsible beast. By what right can we ascribe to it such a tremendous efficacy? Or, if we go farther back, we do not free ourselves from difficulty. How can the sin of the first man account for that of all others? Does not such a theory either exculpate all his descendants from real guilt, or else prove that to be a most unjust moral government, which allows the sin of one man, by a moral necessity, to infect the whole race? And, if we attempt to understand how the first man could have sinned, we are none the less in the dark. If we ascribe the fall to a temptation from a fallen angel, we only remove the difficulty one step back. How could any holy being sin? How can we comprehend the beginning of moral evil? We may as well confess that we cannot comprehend it. The question introduces us to one of the deep uncertainties of theology.

But shall we therefore conclude that the
doctrine of sin in general is involved in the same uncertainty? Shall we say, the fact of sin, as it is manifested now in living men, if it is a fact, must be somehow connected with the original act of sin, and therefore all the uncertainty which belongs to that belongs also to this? Shall we conclude that no such weighty results can have grown out of an accidental or a solitary act, and that sin is no such abnormal thing as men have been wont to call it, but is only part of a great necessary evolution going on in the universe of intelligent beings?

If this is correct reasoning, then it will be equally correct when applied to an analogous case in natural science. What can it say respecting the origin of the material world? It is now in existence, we will assume; but when and how did it come into existence? Was it created out of nothing? But, according to many, such a creation is inconceivable. And, whether conceivable or not, creation is an act of which natural science, as such, can know nothing. No induction of facts leads us to assume it; none of the phenomena of matter point to it; and, if we accept it as a dictum of theology or metaphysics, still it explains nothing. To say that matter was created is only another way of merely saying that it had an origin. But let the assumption stand; let the naturalist have the benefit of this metaphysical dogma. Still he is troubled by such questions as these: Was this creation a necessary act? Was the production of the material world an essential part of an evolution of the divine nature? If so, and if God is eternal, then the creation cannot be conceived as taking place at any definite past time; for however long ago that time may have been, yet an eternity must be conceived to have preceded it, and any development of the divine essence taking place by necessity must have taken place before any time that can be assigned as the time of creation. There is, logically, no escape on this theory from the doctrine of an eternal creation. Was creation, then, a voluntary act on God's part? Then still the question presses itself upon us: Did it take place at a definite past time? and, if so, why not sooner? Was it an arbitrary thing with God to let an eternity pass with no material universe on which to exercise his power and care? If not under a physical necessity to create, was he not under a moral obligation to do so? If in creation he displayed his glory, if it was a desirable thing that he should fill the infinity of space with stellar and planetary worlds, and people them with intelligent beings capable of glorifying him, then ought he not to have done it? And if he ought to have done it at all, then ought he not to have done it as early as possible? Thus we are seemingly driven again to the assumption that the creation must have been co-eternal with God. If, on the other hand, we deny the theory of creation entirely, as the great majority of pagan philosophers have done, and as many besides them also do, then we are still more evidently forced to assume that the universe of matter is eternal. If there is no creative power able to bring matter into existence, then of course, unless matter is eternal, it must be assumed to have brought itself into existence,—which is a simple absurdity. We seem, therefore, every way to be driven to assume that the material world is eternal. But a closer consideration shows that this assumption is involved in as great difficulty as the opposite. For the universe is not a stagnant one. Mighty forces are all the time operating in it. It is undergoing a process of development. The stages of development through which this earth has passed can with greater or less precision be traced by the geologist. If, now, the universe of matter has existed eternally, acted on by no intelligence from without, developed by an inherent necessity of development, then the present stage of
development must have been reached an eternity ago. Go back as far as you will; go till you find the earth in its most primitive, its most chaotic state; go till you reach the point where the development began: yet an eternity still lies behind; and you must assume that the universe, though possessed of an inherent, necessary tendency to evolve itself into the various forms through which it has passed and is yet to pass, nevertheless lay dormant an eternity long, and then at length suddenly began its career of development. But this is nothing less than a contradiction of the theory itself with which we start. Truly, whichever way we turn in trying to solve the problem, we find ourselves "in wandering mazes lost."

But if we leave this phase of the problem, and attempt merely to trace back the history of the universe, not to its origin, but to an indefinite past, we do not stand on much firmer ground. The only scientific attempt in this direction which we need notice is the Nebular theory, propounded by La Place, and held by many eminent astronomers to be the most probable explanation of the process by which the heavenly bodies came to assume their present form and motions. According to this theory, the solar system once existed in the form of an attenuated, cloudy, heated mass of matter, of which the sun was the centre, and which extended to the outer limit of what is now our planetary system. The sun revolved on its axis, and all of its nebulous atmosphere revolving around or with it was cooled and condensed; and, as the condensation continued, the outer part was thrown off in the form of a ring or zone. Then the same process took place with the remainder. Each ring continued to cool and contract, until the whole was condensed into a planet, except that in some cases a part of it took the form of moons revolving around the planet. This theory is advocated as best satisfying all the conditions of the case. It is thought to be favoured, if not demonstrated, by such facts as these; the heated condition of the interior of the earth; the fact that the planets and satellites rotate and revolve in one direction; the peculiar phenomenon of the rings of Saturn; the gaseous state of the comets; the Zodiacal light, judged by many to be a vaporous ring of matter extremely attenuated, and revolving around the sun between the orbits of Venus and Mars; also, and especially, the appearance presented by certain nebulae, of which the different appearances correspond to the different appearances through which our system passed according to the Nebular theory. But, plausible as the theory is, it cannot claim to be established beyond serious doubt. Many nebulæ, which once were supposed to be strictly such, have been by the aid of more powerful telescopes resolved into groups of stars; and this lends probability to the opinion that others might be resolved in the same manner, were it not for their immense distance from us. Moreover, the theory gives no explanation of the fact of the original, central rotation on which the whole process is supposed to have depended. For this, we must have recourse to an external, intelligent force; and if so, then any other phenomenon can as easily be accounted for in the same manner. More positively opposed to the theory is the fact (probable, if not established) that the moons of the planet Uranus revolve in a different direction from that of all the other planets and satellites. The theory also does not account for the direction of the orbits of the comets, nor for their great eccentricity. Furthermore, if every solar system has passed or is passing through such a process, we should expect to be able to see a proportionately larger number of these systems in the earlier nebulous state; whereas, in point of fact,
they are comparatively rare. At the best, it cannot be claimed for the Nebular theory that it is anything more than a theory. So far as the observation of facts leads us, we are authorized only to assert the reality of the present facts. The planetary and stellar bodies are seen in their condensed form, moving according to an almost invariable regularity. If this regularity, this unvarying sameness, leads us to expect and to prophesy its future continuance, then it may also furnish a reason for inferring its past continuance. But if the theory is resorted to because it is assumed that the solar system must have gone through a process of development before attaining its present state, then we come again to this dilemma: Either matter is uncreated and eternal, possessing an inherent and necessary tendency to pass through the forms of development which have culminated in our present solar systems,—in which case the full development ought to have taken place an eternity ago; or matter was created from nothing by an act of divine power,—in which case the notion of development has at that point to be abandoned, and the question presents itself, whether it is metaphysically any easier to conceive of the creation of matter in a nebulous state than it is to conceive of the creation of matter in a planetary state. The Nebular theory, therefore, plausible as it is, is invested with grave difficulties. Whether true or not, it is not yet proved to be true. It is confessedly as yet only a theory; it is one of the uncertainties of natural science.

Yet these systems of worlds have had a history: their present condition is indis solubly connected with their past condition. Suppose, now, some sceptic should arise and say, that, unless he can be made to understand how the present condition of the universe is connected with its past, he will hold his judgment in suspense as to the present fact; suppose that he should attempt, on the ground of the admitted inability of astro nomers to explain conclusively the genesis of the heavenly bodies, to cast discredit on all their sublime discoveries and conclusions,—we should say that a man with a mind so perverted is not fit to hear himself convinced. And yet would not his reasoning be as reasonable as that of one, who, because he cannot be made to see any cause adequate to account for the apparently universal and profound moral depravity of man, should come to the conclusion that the depravity is only apparent, should reject the conclusions of the wisest and best of men, and violently suppress the convictions of his moral sense respecting the obvious and even obtrusive facts of every-day life? Ought he not, rather, to reflect that those baffling questions respecting the origin of evil, the fall of angels, the fall of Adam, the beginning of moral agency, would never have been suggested, had it not been for the evident fact of the immense and universal moral evil now existing? Would men ever have been troubled by these questions, if sin had not been felt to be something abnormal, unnecessary, monstrous?

III. So, if, instead of looking at the past, we look at the future, we find another parallel between religious and natural science. What is to be the issue of this life of ours? The question of the beginning of moral agency and of sin aside, what is to be the end of it? In what is the moral system toculminate? What is to be the course of development in the future life? Is that life to be a mere repetition of this, or is it to be a state of retribution? Is it to be a fixed state, or is it to be succeeded by others in infinite succession? How is it that, in spite of the alleged revelations on this subject, such uncertainty still hangs over it that men resort to all manner of theories,—of existence in a disembodied state, of a spiritual body received after an intermediate state, of a spiritual body received immediately after
death, of metempsychosis, of absorption into Deity, of the ultimate annihilation of the wicked, of the eternal punishment of the wicked, of probation ending at death, of probation ending at the time of the general judgment; while multitudes discard the notion of a future existence altogether, and believe death to be not only the end of the bodily organism, but of the thinking mind as well?

It is indeed true that there is no such mathematical certainty respecting the future life, that a man cannot but believe that the results of moral action in this life must issue in a fixed retribution in that; but shall we therefore transfer the obscurity of the future life into this life, and seek to justify ourselves in blinking the palpable tendencies of virtue and vice, and in living as if present character had no determining influence on future condition? Then we may with equal justice reason similarly respecting the material universe. What is to be its future? Science has done marvels in tracing the laws of the motions of the heavenly bodies. Movements which once seemed to be irregularities are now shown to be regulated by a higher law. The eclipses of the sun and moon can be accurately predicted; the erratic visits of the comets are deprived of their terror; and not only is it shown that the rotations and revolutions of the planets are among the most orderly and calculable of all things, but even what has at times seemed to be a newly discovered irregularity has been, in its turn, subjected to law. The diminution in the eccentricity of the earth's orbit, the constantly increasing rapidity in the revolution of the moon, the disturbances in the motion of some of the planets, the apparent motion of some of the stars, have been shown to be normal consequences of the same agency which keeps the heavenly bodies in their places. Every thing thus seems to point to an eternal continuance of the stellar and planetary systems. And yet astronomy cannot certainly assure us of their essential stability. The fact of the disappearance of some stars formerly known, and of the appearance of others not previously visible, is a staggering fact. Astronomy has no solution for it. If other stars may be blotted out, may not our star, our sun, also suddenly go out in utter darkness? Moreover, if, as is commonly supposed, the aerolites, which are consumed in the atmosphere of the earth, or fall to the earth itself, are really planets revolving around the sun, but arrested in their course by the earth's attraction, then we have here the fact of a disturbance in the movements of the smaller celestial bodies, which makes it impossible to affirm the eternal security of the larger ones from similar catastrophes. The orbit of at least one comet intersects the orbit of the earth. No one can predict with certainty what would be the result, if the possibility of collision which is thus proved should ever become a reality. Furthermore, observations of Encke's comet show that its period of revolution is constantly diminishing at the rate of one day in twenty-five years. This diminution has led many to conjecture that (as is also assumed for other reasons) there is a resisting medium diffused through space. But this medium is an element not taken into account in the theories of planetary revolutions. If it exists, it must exist as a disturbing force, the effect of which, however slow may be the process, must be to retard the revolutions of the heavier as well as of the lighter bodies, and consequently to draw them nearer and nearer to the sun, till at last they are all swallowed up in it.

But these uncertainties respecting the future of our solar system cannot be justly used as arguments against the trustworthiness of astronomical science. On the contrary, it is for the most part by means of that science that we have learned what these uncertainties are. The dangers that threaten the stability of the planetary system are
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themselves suggested by a knowledge of forces that are already in activity. If we knew less about the laws and phenomena of astronomical bodies, we should have less occasion to doubt and to fear respecting their future condition.

Just so, and with equal justice, it may be said, that the doubts which, in the minds of so many, cluster around the problems involved in that momentous question, "If a man die, shall he live again?" are so far from investing theology with the character of uncertainty, that they are rather the products of theological knowledge. Those who know and think and care the least about the present character of the human race are least troubled with doubts respecting its future condition. It is what revelation and religious science disclose in general concerning the inherent tendencies and normal issue of a holy or an unholy life, that starts that multitude of questions about the details of retribution and a future existence. If, because those questions cannot be answered with the certainty of demonstration, theology is charged with vagueness, and declared unfit to be called a science, then, because astronomy has started a multitude of insoluble problems respecting the future of the material universe, it too ought to be denounced as unworthy of our confidence.

IV. But let us turn from the past and the future of the moral world, and look at the present. Christian theology teaches that the human race is divided morally into two classes,—the good and the bad. It teaches that the distinction is a radical one, and that, in however germinal and imperceptible a form the different characters may exist, the difference is yet virtually world-wide.

But a great stumbling-block is this. How, it is asked, can the fact of such a distinction be made out? It may be admitted, that, in extreme cases, differences in moral character become palpable to every observer. Such men as John Howard on the one hand, and Caligula on the other, seem like utter opposites; but, in the great majority of cases, we can trace at the best only differences of degree, each man having his share both of the good and of the bad. Is it not, then, impossible to maintain this theory of a dividing line between the regenerate and the unregenerate? Is there not in the dogma a degree of uncertainty which deprives it of all claim to scientific respect?

Possibly; but, if so, the uncertainty is not without its parallel in the physical sciences. Those sciences have, as one of their chief problems, to deal with the distinctions between the various objects of investigation. Take, e.g., the elemental substances themselves. The ancient division of the elements into water, earth, fire, and air, had the merit of distinguishing things which really seemed to differ; but chemistry, one of the best established of sciences, has overturned all that. It tells us of great similarity where there is great apparent dissimilarity. And in fact, though it has multiplied the number of simple substances, still, in this, its results are not yet final: it cannot be regarded as certain that the number of elemental substances will not be increased by new discoveries, or (as is still more probable) diminished by the decomposition of those which have hitherto been regarded as simple. It is even thought that all the elements may ultimately be proved to be one in essential character, differing only in their relations. The whole atomic theory, on which chemistry rests, is questioned by many. It assumes that all simple substances are composed of atoms,—indivisible particles, aggregated, yet not united, not even brought into actual contact, but separated from one another by an imperceptible ether; and that, according to the degree of that separation between the ultimate particles, the substance is either
solid, liquid, or gaseous. But what is this ether? It too, according to the atomic theory, must be composed of atoms; and why do we not need a new kind of ether to fill up the space between these ethereal atoms, and so on ad infinitum? This ether is something which cannot be detected. Its existence is hypothetical; it is a name for our ignorance. And the atoms, too, are hypothetical: no one ever saw one, or ever can see one. And their indivisibility is hypothetical. If they occupy space (as is commonly assumed), then, even if not divided, they are at least divisible; for what has size may be reduced in size. On this theory, too, the chemical union of two or more substances can be nothing more than an aggregation of the atoms of the different substances; for the theory allows no actual contact: how, then, does chemical union differ from mechanical union? Thus we see, that, the farther science carries us in explaining the fundamental distinctions in material substances, the more numerous are the problems suggested for solution. And the most positive conclusion of all is, simply, that there are apparently differences between the various elements, and that these differences probably inhere in the ultimate atoms of which the elements are severally composed; but that these atoms themselves are unknown.

But if we turn from the chemical distinctions in matter, and consider those which belong to the department of natural history, we are confronted with similar indefiniteness. What is the difference between organic and inorganic matter? The same chemical substances are found in both. Chemically considered, there is no greater difference between marble and an oak than there is between marble and quartz. The minerals pass into the vegetables, and afterwards return to the mineral kingdom. They thus go through a process; but so they do while they remain minerals. Chemical action is all the time and everywhere going on. The process of vegetation is only one of the forms of that action; and though it may be distinguished from other processes, yet why call it something so peculiar that it needs to be assigned to a class distinct from all others? The so-called vital principle which is assumed to underlie the vegetating process—what is it? Is it a material thing? If it is, who will seize and analyze it, or tell us what becomes of it when the plant dies? Does the disembodied vegetable life wander about till it finds lodgment in some new plant? Or is it immaterial? What better evidence have we of this than that all the other forces at work in Nature, forces as powerful as that of vegetation, are immaterial? Perhaps it may be said that they all are; but, if so, why call the principle of vegetation alone vital, as if all the others were dead?

What is the difference between animals and vegetables? Animals, we are told, feed on organic substances, and breathe oxygen, giving off carbonic-acid gas; while vegetables feed on inorganic substances, and exhale oxygen. But yet some of the lower animals emit oxygen gas like plants; and some of them live so deep in the water, that it is not known how vegetable food is possibly accessible to them. Moreover, some animals, as the earth-worm, have been thought to assimilate mineral substances directly; while many plants grow on other plants, and thus feed on organic substances. This, then, hardly seems to be established as an infallible point of distinction. Animals have the power of locomotion; yet not all of them: and, on the other hand, some plants have also the power of independent motion. This, then, is not the specific difference. Animals have sensation. But many of them seem to have little or none. The lower down we go, the less we find of it. In some of them, the existence of a nervous system has not yet been proved; and some plants exhibit what seems as much like sensitiveness as can be
found in the inferior classes of animals. Animals have intelligence. But it would be hard to prove that the oyster or the polypus has any thing more than the instinct of self-preservation; and the plants which have the power of independent motion seem to exhibit as much intelligence as this. Certain it is, that, the lower we descend in the scale, the more do the two kingdoms seem to resemble each other; so that there are some organic structures about which it is still disputed whether they are animals or vegetables. But if there is any doubt about any particular specimens, then there would seem to be doubt concerning the whole theory of a radical distinction between the animal and the vegetable world.

And, if we consider the distinctions among the animals, the uncertainty is equally great. The progress of science reveals similarity where a superficial observation does not find it. Even animals so unlike in appearance as mammals and fish are found to be modelled in physical structure according to the same general type. And, when the animals are examined in their embryonic growth, the resemblance is so great, that, in the earlier stages of it, it is impossible to distinguish the incipient dog from the incipient horse. May it not be the case, then, that, as the various species are alike in being produced from an egg, and gradually diverge from each other as they come to maturity, so, in the infancy of the animal races, there was a resemblance among all the adult individuals, though in the course of ages there has been a gradual divergence. In other words, is it not possible, or even probable, that the differences between the different species of animals are the result of a gradual development rather than the unvarying continuation of a multitude of species distinct from each other from the first? So Mr. Darwin believes; and this is the theory which, we are told, now receives the sympathy of the majority of naturalists.

To be sure, it is as yet confessedly only a theory. Its advocates admit that no clear instance of transmutation of species can be adduced. They confess that geology furnishes no discoverable specimens of a transitional species. They acknowledge that the sterility of hybrids is a weighty argument against the theory. Still they hold it. And an opinion which commands the assent of so many of those having the best opportunity to judge cannot be disposed of lightly. At the best, it must be confessed that here is an uncertainty in natural science.

And, even when we look for a definition of the essential difference between man and the other animals, we do not find the task perfectly easy. Some differences there are in physical structure; but the variations among the several human races are, in this respect, perhaps as great as the difference between the lowest type of the human and the highest of the ape family. Is the difference chiefly a mental one? But some brutes exhibit a wonderful degree of mind, while many men show very little. And mental development is so closely connected with the use of language, that Mr. Huxley conceives it to be possible that "some inconspicuous structural difference may have been the primary cause of the immeasurable and practically infinite divergence of the human from the Simian family." Men deprived of human society, and left to grow wild, become bestial, and seem to lose the power of reason and of speech. Some men are born dumb, and others are born idiotic. May not these be sporadic instances of what was once the general law? It may or may not seem probable that a happy accident to the tongue or glottis of an ape or gorilla was the beginning of that divergence of the favoured animal and of his posterity from his less favoured kindred which has now become, as Huxley expresses it, "practically infinite." Still, accidental peculiarities of structure are sometimes transmitted from parents to
children; and, at all events, the impossibility of the transition in question is not so demonstrated but that it is believed in by many scientific men. Let us at least admit that there is here a scientific uncertainty.

But what then? Even if it is conceivable that men are descended from speechless, irrational brutes; that the brutes are all only varieties of one original type of animal life; that animals themselves, distinguished in some cases with difficulty from vegetables, may have been developed out of them; that plants, in their turn, may have been originally the spontaneous product of the soil; in short, that all the phenomena of life are only a development of the forces inherent in matter,—what then? What though the embryonic dog is indistinguishable from the embryonic child? Shall we therefore ignore the difference between the fully-grown dog and the adult man? Shall we invite dogs to occupy seats at our tables and in our churches, or leave children to gnaw bones, and sleep in kennels? No: to us, after all, the material question is not, How came all these living things to be? but, What are they in point of fact now? The difference between the poppy and the mustard is to be looked for in the grown plant, not in the seed. We do not say, because the seeds are alike, therefore the plants must be; but, because the plants are unlike, therefore the seeds must be. Because the difference between a human being and a baboon is "practically infinite," therefore we reason that the difference must exist germinally, in all its grand significance, even in their earliest embryonic life, and must always have existed germinally somewhere, even in the lowest form of living things from which, if the Development theory be true, the human race ultimately sprung. That which is certain in the matter is, that the dignity and capacity of the soul of man immensely transcends the dignity and capacity of all other earthly things; that which is uncertain relates only to the question how and where this superiority began. There is, in fact, a marked difference between men and brutes, between animals and plants, and between plants and minerals. It does not make that difference less marked or important to drag forward the points of resemblance, to compare the inferior and least known specimens of the two kingdoms, and, from their resemblance to each other, to conjecture that the resemblances may once have been as general as they now are exceptional.

Just so we argue respecting moral and religious character. The difference between holiness and sin is "practically infinite." They are utter opposites. And every man, as a moral being, must be holy or sinful. Is it said that he may be both? In a certain sense, doubtless; for the character is not always found in its ripened form. But in the sense that holiness and sin can mingle together, and form a character radically and permanently indifferent, never! The moral character of a man is as much a unit as is his will, as is his personality itself. In its roots, in its germ, in that which, if unchecked, will grow, and be developed into mature power, the character cannot consist of two diametrically opposite principles; and, as there is no third kind of moral principle, the character of every man must be radically holy or sinful. And when we are told of the mixture of virtue and vice in the same man; when evidence is brought forward to prove that the distinction cannot be so sharp and universal as theology represents,—we can only say that moral character can be known only when it is fully developed: the difference between a saint and a sinner is to be judged by what appears when the central forces of character have had their perfect work. The specimens of character which we see are for the most part in their infancy. It is impossible for us to detect the differences which are only imperfectly expressed in outward forms, and
which are obscured by the disturbing elements which check the natural development. But the differences exist: what they consist in we know; and therefore, though no one of us can judge his brother, yet all men are judged by One who knows the secrets of the heart; and the result of that judgment cannot but always be a confirmation of the Saviour's words, "That which is born of the flesh is flesh, and that which is born of the Spirit is spirit."

V. One more parallel. Christianity not only emphasizes the distinction between holiness and sin; not only defines moral character according to its essential features and its ultimate products; not only confirms and develops the judgment of the natural conscience, that "whatsoever a man soweth, that shall he also reap;" but Christianity also professes to provide a remedy for the disorder and the danger. It offers a Saviour, to whom by faith and love we may be so united that the power of sin shall be broken, and the penalty of sin remitted.

But, it is objected, this offer comes through an historical channel: how can we be sure that the salvation is effective? We have to depend on human testimony respecting the merits and claims of Jesus Christ: how do we know that it is trustworthy? The narratives of the New Testament are exposed to criticism, as not perfectly to be harmonized with one another, and as containing strange stories of miraculous occurrences. Is not mere testimony, mere hearsay, altogether too uncertain a foundation for a faith which concerns a matter of life and death?

So it may seem; but what follows? If nothing is to be accepted on the strength of testimony, then what becomes of our faith in the dogmas of natural science? How much do we know about the science of chemistry, except as we know it through testimony? How many of us have obtained the slightest knowledge of the grand truths of geology by our own observation? Who of us can say, even, that he knows that the planets revolve round the sun, unless his faith in the testimony of astronomers is to him as good as the testimony of his own senses? Truly, if we are to hold our judgment in suspense until we can verify all the dogmas of the natural sciences by personal inspection of the facts on which they rest, those sciences will have to wait long before the world accepts them. Do not the naturalists demand it as a right that, when they have taken careful observations, and made their inductions, we accept their testimony? Are they not indignant when that testimony is rejected or questioned without valid ground? And have they not a right to be indignant? It cannot be then, that, merely because the truths and facts of Christianity are matters of testimony, we are justified in withholding our faith from them.

Is it said that there is this difference—that the facts of natural science, unlike those of historical Christianity, are open to constant examination; that every one is invited, and has opportunity, to verify the conclusions of the adepts? But not all, in fact only a very few, are capable of doing this, though they are challenged to do it. And many facts are such as do not admit of repeated observation and verification. Do we doubt that meteoric stones have fallen to the earth, because we are not able to go to the spots where they are alleged to have fallen, and see them fall again? Do we doubt that islands in the ocean have emerged or sunk, because it is not possible at option to see the process repeated? Do we doubt whether President Lincoln was assassinated, because the number of witnesses was small, and the testimony can now never be corroborated by additional observation?

Is it said that so peculiar allegations as are made in the Christian Gospels need altogether peculiar testimony; that the inherent
improbability of them is great enough to outweigh the historical evidence in their favour? Whether there is such inherent improbability, may be questioned; but, assuming it, do we always doubt improbable things because they are beyond verification? Is it inherently probable that any of the stars which have kept their places for ages, the very models of stability and regularity, should ever disappear? And yet do we doubt that one of the Pleiades is lost? Do we doubt the story (which is only a specimen of many) that Tycho Brahe saw a star in the constellation Cassiopeia, which blazed forth with a brilliancy surpassing that of any of the planets, and then gradually died away from sight, and has never been seen since?

Is it said, however, that these apparent anomalies in nature are, after all, the results of natural forces, and would be seen not to be anomalies if we knew more about them, whereas the evangelical narratives ask us to believe in violations of natural law? And is it said that natural science has demonstrated the impossibility, and therefore the incredibility, of miracles? To this the reply is very easy. In the first place, neither natural science, nor any other science, can prove any event to be impossible, unless it proves the event to be absurd—a contradiction of some other event. To say, e.g., that Jesus Christ rose from the dead, does not contradict the fact that other men do not rise from the dead. In the second place, on this subject of miracles, the theologian has an equal right with the naturalist to pronounce judgment. It involves the question of a Divine will acting through nature, and, if it choose, otherwise than according to the ordinary action of natural forces. To deny the possibility of miracles is to deny the possibility of a Divine intelligence. But natural science does not yet stand on this assumption. The greatest among the teachers of it have found no difficulty in acknowledging a God who rules supreme over the universe of mind and matter. We will not hold the science responsible for the atheistic utterances of some of its rash devotees. We will not believe that, as a body, naturalists will ever so far step out of their province, and so far abandon their own fundamental principles, as to compel us to lose all confidence in them. No: all science is built on evidence. When any fact is alleged, a scientific man will ask for the evidence, not declare that no evidence is admissible.

But it may be said that, though miracles may be conceded to be abstractly possible, yet they are improbable, and that, when, in addition to these accounts of miraculous events, we find in the narratives other improbabilities and discrepancies, we may safely throw aside the whole. Well, if any history has ever been sifted, the history of Christ has been; and no one need fear successful contradiction when he says that the history of no other man or period has stood the test of examination so well. If the canons of criticism which many of those use who assail the credibility of the four Gospels were to be used in criticizing other histories, there would be no history left to us. If, because two historians of the same event do not perfectly agree in some unessential detail, we impugn the credibility of both, as many do in regard to the authors of the four Gospels, then it would be easy to overthrow faith in all history; and not only in all history, but in all natural science. Why, astronomers are not agreed as to the exact distance of the sun from the earth. Shall we therefore conclude that we have no reason for having confidence in any of them? Shall we say that perhaps the sun is a billion of miles off? or that possibly it is no farther from us than the moon? or even that it may be all in our eye? Soberly, this would be no more unreasonable than the course of many in respect to the history of Christ. He, the central figure in the history of the Church,
is as prominently and distinctly defined as the sun in the firmament. As to the grand features of his character and works and claims, there is as perfect agreement in the only original histories of him extant as there is among astronomers respecting the relation of the sun to our solar system. No candid man can deny that mere historical criticism, fairly applied to the problem, whatever it might eliminate as doubtful and debatable, yet could not but leave the character and relations of Christ in their essential features, as they have impressed themselves on the world, undisturbed. No: he who rejects those histories cannot do so on merely scientific grounds. The anterior reason is a dogmatic one. He disbelieves, because he will not believe. He disbelieves, because the claims put forth by and for Jesus Christ are so extraordinary that he will not admit them. Perhaps, probably, the most of those who deny the authenticity of the Gospels will confess that they deny it for that reason. There is to their minds so strong an antecedent improbability of the truth of the narratives, that they require stronger evidence than it is possible for any historical events to have. Be it so: still their objection is not scientific; it is dogmatic. Moreover, this dogmatic objection is outweighed, and more than outweighed, in the minds of others, by what seems to them an antecedent probability of the truth of the Gospels. To those who are keenly conscious of sin; who feel it to be an odious and culpable thing in the sight of God; who desire nothing more than to become rid of its power, and to obtain assurance of God's willingness to pardon and save; who long to know how they may be elevated above the debasing influences of a corrupt world,—to them such a revelation of God as is made in the life of Jesus is the most probable and welcome thing conceivable. It exactly meets their wants. In fact, so far from there being any improbability standing in the way of its acceptance, it is just those alleged improbabilities of the evangelical history which have secured for it a continued and increasing power in the world. This may, indeed, be called a dogmatic reason for accepting the gospel. Very well: let it be called such. It is as good at least as the dogmatic reason for rejecting the gospel: it is enough, at least, to counterbalance and neutralize that. The problem is thus brought back into the scientific arena, where the question to be answered is simply this: Whether Jesus Christ came into the world to save sinners, and whether he has accomplished this object? Tried in this way, if Christianity cannot stand the test and the contest, then no science is sure for another generation. As an historical fact, it rests still on an unshaken basis. It is supported by evidence not only satisfactory, but altogether peculiar. The Church of Christ has stood for eighteen hundred years. She has had to encounter every conceivable form of opposition. She has had to contend with all that learning, inspired by doubt and prejudice and hate, could do to overthrow her; yet she stands to-day as firm as ever. Confident that no new weapons of attack can be forged against her, and

"With salvation's wall surrounded,
She can smile at all her foes."

To conclude: the aim of what has been said has been to show, that, in any department of knowledge, the truths and facts which are certain must be adhered to and insisted on, however great may be the uncertainties with which they are connected; that doubt about the remote relations of a fact cannot be allowed to throw obscurity on the fact itself. It will have been observed, in particular, that the uncertainties in religious science which have been touched upon have for the most part had more or less relation to the fact or the doctrine of sin. This has been designed. For while, on the
one hand, it has been freely confessed that there is much that is obscure, and hard to be understood, in the problems of theology, it may on the other hand, be boldly insisted that these uncertainties are associated with, that in truth, to a great extent, they grow out of, a fact—a fact as certain, as undeniable, as any in the whole domain of natural science; that is, the fact of sin. The testimony of consciousness on this point is as immediate as the testimony of the senses to the existence of an external world. The testimony is so universal and so consentaneous, that even those few who pretend to question it are as unable practically to be consistent in their doubts as are those few who have pretended to question the existence of a world of matter. And this fact of sin is a most momentous fact. It is a peculiarly practical fact. Christianity assumes (what the conscience of the race, benumbed though it is, yet admits) that sin is guilt, and that guilt is punishable. And it addresses itself primarily, yes, only, to those who believe and feel that through sin they are enslaved to a power and exposed to a danger from which they cannot deliver themselves, yet from which they must be delivered, or be for ever miserable. No others can judge it; no others can understand it. It comes to offer deliverance; and, in doing this, it coincides with the plainest dictate of reason and common sense, when it insists on making the consciousness of sin the first thing, the starting-point, in practical and theoretical theology. Let a man begin here; let him go where this plain fact of sin, of culpable, punishable, soul-defiling sin, leads him,—and he cannot go far wrong. Let him examine the claims of Christianity with the feeling—the only normal, right feeling—of a soul keenly conscious of guilt, and needing deliverance from the burden of it, and there will be little danger that the Jesus of the Gospels will be to him a stumbling-block or "a root out of a dry ground." But if, instead of beginning with this obtrusive, pressing, practical fact of his own sinfulness, he starts in his theological inquiries with the speculative questions of the divine existence or of the decrees of God concerning the moral universe, and meditates long and hard on the problems of fate and free will, of Satan's fall, and Adam's sin, and infant morality, and the future life, until at last he finds the doctrine of sin, its origin and consequences, so puzzling that he doubts whether, after all, there is any such thing as sin; if, in his studies of the historical side of theology, instead of beginning with redemption from sin as the great, urgent necessity of the soul, and looking at the claims of revelation as a means of saving the soul from death, he first takes up the history of Samson or of Jonah, or investigates the authenticity of the Pentateuch, or bewilders himself with the varying narratives of the birth of Christ, or with the mysteries of the book of Revelation, until at last he concludes that no certainty can be attained respecting the biblical histories, and that the whole Bible is a confused medley of strange things, then—what is he like? He is like a man, who, because he cannot understand the Aurora Borealis, or the Zodiocal light, or the comets, or the variation of the magnetic needle, or the condition of the earth's interior, or the law of the transition from one species of fossil animals to another, or the exact nature of heat or electricity, or the vital principle, concludes, after fruitless speculation on these knotty points, that nothing can be certainly known about either the heavens or the earth, drags the obscurity of those remote and incidental problems down into the region of certainty, and is ready to hold, with Prospero, that—

"The cloud-capped towers, the gorgeous palaces, The solemn temples, the great globe itself, Yes, all which it inherit, shall dissolve," or even are dissolved, "like the baseless fabric of a vision."
If any man should now complain that I have not reconciled the Bible with the natural sciences, and should ask what I have to say about the Mosaic narrative as related to the great scientific problems of the antiquity and unity of the human race, of the geologic eras, or of the igneous origin of the universe; if he should inquire how I can explain all the discrepancies existing between the different books of the Bible, and how I can prove all the narratives of that book consistent with the character of a divine revelation to man,—then I answer that I have professed to do none of these things; that, in fact, my object has been to show that the settlement of such questions, even if not impossible, is yet not essential to the subsistence either of natural or of religious science; that these questions are the last, not the first, things to be disposed of in the progress of scientific investigation. If the fact of grave discrepancies between biblical and natural science is still thrust upon me as damaging many positions heretofore held by the theologians to be unassailable, then I answer, that, the object of revelation being to reveal God, and to reconcile man to him, there being therefore no contradiction possible between the main object of revelation and the main object of natural science, I am ready cheerfully to assent to any established results of this science. As to the alleged, but doubtful, contradictions, I might indeed say that the progress of investigation may yet throw light, as it has already thrown light, on many of the obscurities of the Bible; that, on some points, perhaps Jewish historians are as trustworthy as the Egyptian and Chinese; that it is not necessary to reconcile the biblical with the scientific doctrine of the unity of the race, until scientific men have agreed among themselves whether Darwin on the one hand, or Agassiz on the other, is in the right; that there is yet much to learn respecting the past history of our globe, the process and the relative rapidity of geologic changes; that, at the worst, the Bible, in many of its representations of geologic and cosmogonic facts, exhibits a wonderful superiority to all other ancient books; and that this superiority has never yet been explained by science on merely natural grounds. I might say this. Yet perhaps it may be as well only to say that I do not know how all these questions are to be answered. But let them be answered however they may be, and as soon as they may be, yet this I do know, that I am a sinner before God, exposed, if impenitent and hardened, to a just retribution; and I know that Jesus Christ has offered himself to me as a Deliverer from sin, and that in him I may have salvation. I know that multitudes have found this deliverance. I know that thousands have been transformed in heart and life by the gospel, and by it alone. I know that the evidence of the efficacy of this plan of salvation, the evidence of the life and redeeming work of Jesus Christ, rests on a foundation which not only cannot be overturned, but which every century is making stronger. And, knowing this, I know that the revelation, of which Jesus Christ is the centre, can contain in it nothing that can be used for its own overthrow. I know that no man, led by conviction of sin to put his trust in Christ, can treat with contempt any part of the book which Christ himself indorsed as testifying of him. I know that, even if there are imperfections in it, even if the enemy of revelation is able to capture some of the distant outposts of the Christian fortifications, yet the central fortress of all is, and will for ever be, impregnable. It is the Rock of Ages.
THE SAN KIAU; OR, THE THREE RELIGIONS OF CHINA.

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THE religious experience of the Chinese is worthy of attentive study. Detached at an early period from the parent stock, and for thousands of years holding but little intercourse with other branches of the human family, we are able to ascertain with a good degree of precision those ideas which constituted their original inheritance, and to trace in history the development or corruption of their primitive beliefs. Midway in their long career, importing from India an exotic system, and more recently coming in contact with Mahometanism and Christianity, we are enabled to observe the manner in which their indigenous creeds have been affected or modified by foreign elements.

In their long experience, each of the leading systems has been fairly tested. The arena has been large enough, and the duration of the experiment long enough, to admit of each system working out its full results; and these experiments are of the greater value, because they have been wrought out in the midst of a highly organized society, and in connection with a high degree of intellectual culture.

In their views and practices, the Chinese of to-day are polytheistic and idolatrous. The evidence of this strikes the attention of the voyager on every hand. In the sanpan, that carries him to the shore, he discovers a small shrine, which contains an image of the river god, the god of wealth, or Kwanyin, the goddess of mercy. His eye is charmed by the picturesqueness of pagodas perched on mountain crags, and monasteries nesting in sequestered dells; and, on entering even a small town, he is surprised at the extent if not the magnificence of temples erected to Chenghwang, the "city Defender," and Confucius, the patron of letters. Heaps of gilt paper are consumed in the streets, accompanied by volleys of fire-crackers. Bonzes modulating their voices with the sound of a wooden rattle fill the air with their melancholy chant; and processions wind through narrow lanes, bearing on their shoulders a silver effigy of the "dragon king," the god of rain.

These temples, images, and symbols, he is informed, all belong to San kiau, three religions. All three are equally idolatrous, and he inquires in vain for any influential native sect, which, more enlightened or philosophical than the rest, raises a protest against the prevailing superstition. Yet, on acquiring the language and studying the popular superstitions in their myriad fantastic shapes, he begins to discover traces of a religious sentiment, deep and real, which is not connected with any of the objects of popular worship—a veneration for Tien or Heaven, and a belief that in the visible heavens there resides some vague power, who provides for the wants of men, and rewards them according to their deeds.

Personified as Lautienye—not heavenly Father, as it expresses the Christian's conception of combined tenderness and majesty, but literally, "Old Father Heaven," much as we say "Old Father Time;" or designated by a hundred other appellations, this august but unknown Being, though uni-
versally acknowledged, is invoked or worshipped only to a very limited extent. Some, at the close of the year, present a thank-offering to the Great Power who has controlled the course of its events; others burn a stick of incense every evening under the open sky; and in the marriage ceremony, all classes bow down before Tien as the first of the five objects of veneration.*

When taxed with ingratitude in neglecting to honour that Being on whom they depend for existence, the Chinese uniformly reply—"It is not ingratitude, but reverence, that prevents our worship. He is too great for us to worship. None but the Emperor is worthy to lay an offering on the altar of Heaven." In conformity with this sentiment, the Emperor, as the high priest and mediator of his people, celebrates in Pekin the worship of Heaven with imposing ceremonies.

Within the gates of the southern division of the capital, and surrounded by a sacred grove so extensive that the silence of its deep shades is never broken by the noises of the busy world, stands the Temple of Heaven. It consists of a single tower, whose tiling of resplendent azure is intended to represent the form and colour of the aerial vault. It contains no image, and the solemn rites are not performed within the tower; but, on a marble altar which stands before it, a bullock is offered once a year as a burnt sacrifice, while the master of the Empire prostrates himself in adoration of the Spirit of the Universe.

This is the high place of Chinese devotion; and the thoughtful visitor feels that he ought to tread its courts with unsandaled feet. For no vulgar idolatry has entered here—this mountain top still stands above the waves of corruption, and on this solitary altar there still rests a faint ray of the primeval faith. The tablet which

* The other four are the earth, the prince, parents, and teachers.

represents the invisible Deity is inscribed with the name of Shangte, the Supreme Ruler; and as we contemplate the Majesty of the Empire prostrate before it, while the smoke ascends from his burning sacrifice, our thoughts are irresistibly carried back to the time when the King of Salem officiated as "Priest of the Most High God."

The two characters yu and hwang, which are prefixed to the title of Shangte, do indeed betray the fact, that the simple grandeur of the original idea has been somewhat affected by the influence of Tauism; still, the other two characters point back unmistakably to the object of China's earliest and purest devotion.

The writings and the institutions of the Chinese are not like those of the Hindoos and the Hebrews, pervaded with the idea of God. It is, nevertheless, expressed in their ancient books with so much clearness as to make us wonder and lament that it has left so faint an impression on the national mind.

In their books of History, it is recorded that music was invented for the praise of Shangte. Rival claimants for the throne appeal to the judgment of Shangte. He is the arbiter of nations; and, while actuated by benevolence, is yet capable of being provoked to wrath by the iniquities of men. In the Book of Changes he is represented as restoring life to torpid nature on the return of Spring. In the Book of Rites it is said that the ancients "prayed for grain to Shangte," and presented in offering a bullock, which must be without blemish, and stall-fed for three months before the day of sacrifice. In the Book of Odes, mostly composed from eight hundred to a thousand years before the Christian era, and containing fragments of still higher antiquity, Shangte is represented as seated on a lofty throne, while the spirits of the good "walk up and down on his right and left."

In none of these writings is Shangte
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THE THREE RELIGIONS OF CHINA.

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The three religions of China were clothed in the human form and debased by human passion like the Zeus of the Greeks. There is in them even less of anthropomorphism than we find in the representations of Jehovah in the Hebrew Scriptures. The nearest approach to exhibiting him in the human form, is the ascription to Shangte of a "huge footprint," probably an impression on some mass of rock. But how far the conception of the Supreme Ruler was removed from gross materialism, may be inferred from that line in one of the ancient Odes, Shangte wu sheng wu hiu—"God has no voice or odour," i.e. he is imperceptible by the senses. And the philosopher Chuhe says in his Commentary on the Ancient Classics, that "Shangte is le," i.e. a principle of nature. Educated Chinese (for instance the celebrated Seu) on embracing Christianity, assert that the Shangte of their fathers was identical with the Tienchu, the Lord of Heaven, whom they are taught to worship.

There is, therefore, no need of an extended argument, even if our space would admit of it, to establish the fact, that the early Chinese were by no means destitute of the knowledge of God. They did not, indeed, know him as the Creator, but they recognized him as supreme in providence, and without beginning or end.

Whence came this conception? Was it the mature result of ages of speculation, or was it brought down from remote antiquity on the stream of patriarchal tradition? The latter, we think, is the only probable hypothesis. In the earlier books of the Chinese, there is no trace of speculative inquiry. They raise no question as to the nature of Shangte, or the grounds of their faith in such a being, but in their first pages allude to him as already well known, and speak of burnt offerings made to him on mountain tops, as an established rite. Indeed, the idea of Shangte, when it first meets us, is already in the first stages of decay. The beginnings of that idolatry, by which it was subsequently almost obliterated, are distinctly traceable. The heavenly bodies, the spirits of the hills and rivers, and even the spirits of deceased men, were admitted to a share in the divine honours of Shangte. The religious sentiment was frittered away by being directed to a multiplicity of objects, and the popular mind seemed to take refuge among the creatures of its own fancy, as Adam did amidst the trees of the garden, from the terrible idea of a holy God. A debasing superstition became universal. Such was the state of things prior to the rise of the Three Religions.

In order to understand the mutual relations of these three systems—in other words, to understand the religious aspects of China at the present day, it will be necessary to give separate attention to the rise and progress of each. We begin with Confucianism.

There are two classes of great men, who leave their mark on the condition of their species—those who change the course of history, without any far-reaching purpose, much as a falling cliff changes the direction of a stream; and those, again, who, like skilful engineers, excavate a channel for the thought of future generations. Preëminent among the latter stands the name of Confucius. Honoured, during his life-time, to such a degree, that the princes of several states lamented his decease like that of a father, his influence has deepened with time and extended with the swelling multitudes of his people. Buddhism and Tauism both give signs of decay, but the influence and the memory of Confucius continue as green as the cypresses that shade his tomb. After the lapse of three and twenty centuries, he has a temple in every city, and an effigy in every school-room. He is venerated as the fountain of wisdom by all the votaries of letters, and worshipped by the mandarins of the
realm, as the author of their civil polity. The estimation in which his teachings continue to be held, is well exhibited in the reply which the people of Shantung, his native province, gave to a missionary, who, some thirty years ago, offered them Christian books: "We have seen your books," said they, "and neither desire nor approve of them. In the instructions of our sage, we have sufficient, and they are superior to any foreign doctrines that you can bring us."

Born B.C. 551, and endowed with uncommon talents, Confucius was far from relying on the fertility of his own genius. "Reading without thought is fruitless, and thought without reading idle," is a maxim which he taught his disciples, and one which he had doubtless followed in the formation of his own mind. China already possessed accumulated treasures of literature and history. With these materials he stored his memory, and by the aid of reflection, digested them into a system for the use of posterity.

Filled with enthusiasm by the study of the ancients, and mourning over the degeneracy of his own times, he entered at an early age on the vocation of reformer. He at first sought to effect his objects by obtaining civil office, and setting an example of good government; as well as by giving instruction to those who became his disciples. At the age of fifty-five, he was advanced to the premiership of his native state; and in a few months, the improvement in the public morals was manifest. Valuables might be exposed in the street without being stolen, and shepherds abandoned the practice of filling their sheep with water before leading them to market.

The circumstance that led him to renounce political life, is worth recording. The little kingdom of Lu grew in wealth and prosperity, and the princes of rival states, in order to prevent its acquiring an ascendancy in the politics of the empire, felt it necessary to counteract the influence of the wise legislator. Resorting to a stratagem similar to that which Louis XIV. employed with Charles II., they sent to the prince of Lu, instead of brave generals or astute statesmen, a band of beautiful girls who were skilled in music and dancing. The prince, young and amorous, was caught in the snare, and giving the reins to pleasure abandoned all the schemes of reform with which he had been inspired by the counsels of the sage. Disappointed and disgusted, Confucius retired into private life.

Thwarted, as he had often been, by royal pride and official jealousy, he henceforth endeavoured to attain his ends by a less direct but more certain method. He devoted himself more than ever to the instruction of youth. His fame attracted young men of promise from all the surrounding principalities. No fewer than three thousand received his instructions, among whom five hundred became distinguished mandarins, and seventy-two of them are enrolled on the list of the sages of the empire. Through these and the books which he edited subsequent to this period, there can be no doubt that he exerted a greater influence on the destinies of the empire than he could have done had he been seated on the imperial throne. He won for himself the title of Su Wang, "the unsceptered monarch," whose intellectual sway is acknowledged by all ages.

Confucius understood the power of proverbs, and incorporating into his system such as met his approval, he cast his own teachings in the same mould. His speeches are laconic and oracular, and he has transmitted to posterity a body of political ethics, expressed in formulæ so brief and comprehensible, that it may easily be retained in the weakest memory. Thus, kuin chienfeng fu tsz fu fu hiungte pung yiu, are ten syllables which every boy in China has at his tongue's end. They contain the entire framework of the social fabric—the "five relations" of
sovereign and subject, parent and child, husband and wife, brother and brother, friend and friend, which, according to the Chinese, comprehend the whole duty of man as a social being. And the five cardinal virtues, benevolence, justice, order, prudence, and fidelity, so essential to the well-being of society, Confucius inculcated in the five syllables, jen dê le che sin.

The following sentences, taken from his miscellaneous discourses, may serve as illustrations of both the style and matter of his teachings:

“Good government consists in making the prince a prince, the subject a subject, the parent a parent, and the child a child.”

“Beware of doing to another what you would not that others should do to you.”

“He that is not offended at being misunderstood, is a superior man.”

“Have no friend who is inferior to yourself in virtue.”

“Be not afraid to correct a fault—He that knows the right and fears to do it is not a brave man.”

“If you guide the people by laws and enforce the laws by punishment, they will lose the sense of shame and seek to evade them: but if you guide them by a virtuous example and diffuse among them a love of order, they will be ashamed to transgress.”

“To know what we know, and to know what we do not know, is knowledge.”

“We know not life, how can we know death?”

“If I should say the soul survives the body, I fear the filial would neglect their living parents in their zeal to serve their deceased ancestors. And if I should say the soul does not survive the body, I fear lest the unfilial should throw away the bodies of their parents and leave them unburied.”

“The filial son is one who gives his parents no anxiety but for his health.”

Filial piety, Confucius taught, is not merely a domestic virtue, but diffuses its influence through all the actions of life. A son who disgraces his parents in any way is unfilial,—one who maltreats a brother or a relative, forgetful of the bonds of a common parentage, is unfilial. This powerful motive is thus rendered expansive in its application like piety to God in the Christian system, for which, indeed, it serves as a partial substitute. It is beautifully elaborated in the Hiao king, the most popular of the Thirteen Classics.

Virtue, Confucius taught with Aristotle, is the mean between two vices, and this theory is developed by his grandson in the Chungyung, the sublimest of the Sacred Books.

The secret of good government, he taught, consists in the cultivation of personal virtue on the part of the rulers; and the connection between private morals and national politics is well set forth in the Ta hio, or Great Study.

This brief tractate is the only formal composition, with the exception of an outline of history, which the great sage put forth as the product of his own pen. “I am an editor, and not an author,” is the modest account which he gives of himself, and it is mainly to his labours in this department that China is indebted for her knowledge of antecedent antiquity.

The spirit in which he discharged this double duty to the past and future may be inferred from the impressive ceremony with which he concluded his great task. Assembling his disciples, he led them to the summit of a neighbouring hill, where sacrifices were usually offered. Here he erected an altar, and placing on it the edition of the sacred books, which he had just completed, the gray-haired philosopher, now seventy years of age, fell on his knees, devoutly returned thanks for having had life and strength granted him to accomplish that laborious undertaking, at the same time imploring that the benefit his countrymen would receive from it might not be
small. "Chinese pictures," says Pauthier, "represent the sage in the attitude of supplication, and a beam of light or a rainbow descending on the sacred volumes, while his disciples stand around him in admiring wonder."

Thales expired about the time Confucius drew his infant breath, and Pythagoras was his contemporary; but the only names among the Greeks which admit of comparison with that of Confucius, are Socrates and Aristotle, the former of whom revolutionized the philosophy of Greece, and the latter ruled the dialectics of mediaeval Europe. Without the discursive eloquence of the one or the logical acumen of the other, Confucius surpassed them both in practical wisdom, and exceeds them immeasurably in the depth, extent, and permanence of his influence.

It is not surprising that when missionaries attempt to direct their attention to the Saviour, the Chinese point to Confucius and challenge comparison; nor that they should sometimes fail to be satisfied with the arguments employed to establish the superiority of Jesus Christ. But the thoughtful Christian, who has studied the canonical books of China, can hardly return to the perusal of the New Testament without a deeper conviction of its divine authority. In the Confucian classics he detects none of that impurity which defiles the pages of Greek and Roman authors, and none of that monstrous mythology which constitutes so large a portion of the sacred books of the Hindoos, but he discovers defects enough to make him turn with gratitude to the revelations of the "Teacher sent from God."

Disgusted at the superstitions of the vulgar, and desirous of guarding his followers against similar excesses, Confucius led them into the opposite extreme of scepticism. He ignored, if he did not deny, those cardinal doctrines of all religion, the immortality of the soul, and the personal existence of God, both of which were currently received in his day. In place of Shangte, "Supreme Ruler," the name under which the God of Nature had been worshipped in earlier ages, he made use of the vague appellation T'ien, "Heaven;" thus opening the way on the one hand for that atheism with which their modern philosophy is so deeply infected; and, on the other, for that idolatry which nothing but the doctrine of a personal God can effectually counteract. When his pupils proposed inquiries respecting a future state, he either discouraged them or answered ambiguously, and thus deprived his own precepts of the support they might have derived from the sanctions of a coming retribution.

We may add, that while his writings abound in the praises of virtue, not a line can be found inculcating the pursuit of truth. Expediency, not truth, is the goal of his system. Contrast with this the Gospel of Christ, which pronounces him the only freeman whom the "truth makes free," and promises to his followers "the Spirit of Truth" as his richest legacy.

The style of Confucius was an ipse-dixit dogmatism, and it has left its impress on the unreasoning habit of the Chinese mind. Jesus Christ appealed to evidence and challenged inquiry, and this characteristic of our religion has shown itself in the mental development of Christian nations. Nor is the contrast less striking in another point. Illius dicta, hujus facta laudantur, to borrow the words of Tully in comparing Cato with Socrates. Confucius selected disciples who should be the depositories of his teachings; Christ chose apostles who should be witnesses of his actions. Confucius died lamenting that the edifice he had laboured so long to erect, was crumbling to ruin. Christ's death was the crowning act of his life; and his last words, "It is finished."
It was a philosophy, not a religion, that Confucius aimed to propagate. "Our Master," say his disciples, "spake little concerning the gods." He preferred to confine his teachings to the more tangible realities of human life; but so far from setting himself to reform the vulgar superstition, he conformed to its silly ceremonies and enjoined the same course on his disciples. "Treat the gods with respect," he said to them, but he added, in terms which leave no ambiguity in the meaning of the precept, "keep them at a distance," or rather, "keep out of their way." A cold sneer was not sufficient to wither or eradicate the existing idolatry, and the teachings of Confucius gave authority and prevalence to many idolatrous usages which were only partially current before his day. Confucianism now stands forth as the leading religion of the empire.

Its objects of worship are of three classes, the powers of nature, ancestors, and heroes.

Originally recognizing the existence of a supreme personal Deity, it has degenerated into a pantheistic medley and renders worship to an impersonal anima mundi, under the leading forms of visible nature. Besides the concrete universe, separate honours are paid to the sun, moon, and stars; mountains, rivers, and lakes.

Of all their religious observances, the worship of ancestors is that which the Chinese regard as the most sacred. As Æneas obtained the name of "pius" in honour of his filial devotion, so the Chinese idea of piety rises no higher. The Emperor, according to the Confucian school, may worship the Spirit of the Universe, but for his subjects it is sufficient that each present offerings to the spirits of his own ancestors. These rites are performed either at the family tombs or in the family temple, where wooden tablets, inscribed with their names, are preserved as sacred to the memory of the deceased, and worshipped precisely in the same manner as the popular idols.

The class of deified heroes comprehends illustrious sages, eminent sovereigns, faithful statesmen, valiant warriors, filial sons, and public benefactors—Confucius himself occupying the first place, and constituting, as the Chinese say, "one of a trinity with Heaven and Earth."

Like Confucianism, Taoism is indigenous to China, and coeval with the former in its origin, it was also coher to the mixed inheritance of good and evil contained in the more ancient creeds. The Tauists derive their name from Tau, "Reason," and call themselves Rationalists, but with a marvellous show of profundity nothing can be more irrational than their doctrine and practice. Their founder, Li-erl, appears to have possessed a great mind, and to have caught glimpses of several sublime truths; but he has been sadly misrepresented by his degenerate followers. He lived in the sixth century B.C., and was contemporary with, but older than Confucius. So great was the fame of his wisdom that the latter philosopher sought his instructions; but, differing from him in mental mould as widely as Aristotle did from Plato, he could not relish the boldness of his speculations or the vague obscurity of his style. He never repeated his visit, though he always spoke of him with respect and even with admiration.

Lautsz, the "old Master," is the appellation by which the great Tauist is commonly known, and was probably given him during his lifetime to distinguish him from his younger rival. The rendering of "old child" is no more to be received than the fiction of eighty years' gestation invented to account for it.

Lautsz bequeathed his doctrines to posterity in "five thousand words," which compose the Tau teh king, the Rule of Reason and Virtue. In expression this work is extremely sententious; and in the form of its composition semi-poetical. It abounds in acute apothegms, and some of its passages
rise to the character of sublimity; but so incoherent are its contents, that it is impossible for any literal interpretation to form them into a system. Its inconsistencies, however, readily yield to that universal solvent—the hypothesis of a mystical meaning underlying the letter of the text. The following passage appears to embody some obscure but lofty conceptions of the True God:

"That which is invisible is called ye,
That which is inaudible is called he,
That which is impalpable is called wei,
These three are inscrutable, and blended in one;
The first is not the brighter; nor the last the darker.
It is interminable, ineffable, and existed when there was nothing.—
A shape without shape, a form without form,
A confounding mystery!
Go back, you cannot discover its beginning,
Go forward, you cannot find its end.
Take the ancient Reason, to govern the present,
And you will know the origin of old.
This is the first principle of Tau."

Some European scholars discover here a notion of the Trinity, and combining the syllables ye, he, and wei, for which process, however, they are unable to assign any very good reason, they obtain yeheuei, which they accept as a distorted representation of the name Jehovah. Lautsz travelled in countries to the west of China, where it was supposed he may have met with Jews, and learned from them the name and nature of the Supreme Being. Whatever truth there may be in these conjectures, it is certain that some native commentators recognize in the passage a description of Shangte, the God of the Chinese patriarchs; and the three syllables, of which the name is composed, are admitted to have no assignable meaning in the Chinese language.

Here we find a connection between the degenerate philosophy of after ages, and the pure fountain of primeval truth. In fact, this very Shangte, though they have debased the name by bestowing it on a whole class of their Dii superiores, is still enthroned on the summit of the Tauist Olympus, with ascriptions more expressive of his absolute divinity than any to be met with in the canonical books of the Confucian school. At the head of their Theogony stands the triad of the San tsing, the "Three Pure" ones; the first of whom is styled "The mysterious sovereign, who has no superior;"
"the self-existent source and beginning," the "honoured one of Heaven."
He is said to have created the "three worlds;" to have produced men and gods, to have set the stars in motion, and caused the planets to revolve. But, alas! this catalogue of sublime titles and divine attributes is the epitaph of a buried faith. The Tauists persuaded themselves that this august Being, wrapped in the solitude of his own perfections, had delegated the government of the universe to a subordinate, whom they style Yu hwang Shangte. The former has dwindled into an inoperative idea, the latter is recognized as the actual God; and this deity, who plays mayor of the palace to a roi faîneant is regarded as the apotheosis of a mortal by the name of Chang, an ancestor of the present hierarch of the Tauist religion. It is painful, after discoursing to them of the attributes of the True God, to hear the people exclaim, "that is our Yuhwang Shangte."

In its philosophy, this school is radically and thoroughly materialistic. The soul itself they regard as a material substance, though of a more refined quality than the body it inhabits. LIABLE TO solution, together with the body, it may be rendered capable of surviving the wreck by undergoing a previous discipline; and even the body is capable of becoming invulnerable by the stroke of death, so that the etherealized
THE THREE RELIGIONS OF CHINA.

form will, instead of being laid in the grave, be wafted away to the abodes of the genii. It is scarcely possible to represent the extent to which this idea fired the minds of the Chinese for ages after its promulgation, or to estimate the magnitude of its consequences. The prospect of a corporeal immortality had for them attractions far stronger than a shadowy existence in the land of spirits; and they sought it with an eagerness amounting to frenzy. The elixir of life became the grand object of pursuit, and alchemy, with its foolish failures and grand achievements, sprang directly from the religion of Tau.

The leading principle of Tauism, of which their dogma concerning the human soul is only a particular application, is that every species of matter possesses a soul—a subtle essence endowed with individual conscious life. Freed from their grosser elements, these become the genii that preside over the various departments of nature. Some wander at will through the realms of space, endowed with a protean facility of transformation—others, more pure and ethereal, rise to the regions of the stars, and take their places in the firmament. Thus the five principal planets are called by the names of the “five elements” from which they are believed to have originated, and over which they are regarded as presiding. The stars are divinities, and their motions control the destinies of men and things—a notion which has done much to inspire the zeal of the Chinese for recording the phenomena of the heavens.

A theogony like this is rich in the elements of poetry; and most of the machinery in Chinese works of imagination is in fact derived from this source. The Liauchai, for example, a collection of marvellous tales, which, in their general character may be compared to the Metamorphoses of Ovid, is largely founded on the Tauist Mythology.

In accordance with the materialistic character of the Tauist sect, nearly all the gods whom the Chinese regard as presiding over their material interests, originated with this school. The god of rain, the god of fire, the god of medicine, the god of agriculture, and the lares or kitchen gods, are among the principal of this class.

A system which supplies deities answering to the leading wants and desires of mankind, cannot be unimportant; but, in addition to the strong motives that attract worshippers to their temples, the Tauist priesthood possess two independent sources of influence. They hold the monopoly of geomancy, a superstitious art which professes to select on scientific principles those localities that are most propitious for building and burial; and they have succeeded in persuading the people that they alone are able to secure them from annoyance by evil spirits. The philosophy of Tau has thus not only given birth to a religion, but degenerated into a system of magical imposture, presided over by an arch magician who lives in almost imperial state, and sways the sceptre over the spirits of the invisible world as the Emperor does over the living population of the empire.

As a religion, Buddhism seems to enjoy more of the popular favour than Tauism; though the former professes to draw men away from the world and its vanities, while the latter proffers the blessings of health, wealth, and long life.

It is rarely that we find a Buddhist temple of any considerable reputation, that is not situated in a locality distinguished for some feature of its natural scenery. One situated in the midst of a dusty plain, not far from the gates of Tientsin, seemed to us, when we first visited it, to present a striking exception to the general rule. Subsequently, however, a brilliant mirage, which we frequently saw as we approached the temple, furnished us at once with the explanation:
of its location and its name. It is called
the temple of the "sea of light;" and its
founders no doubt placed it there in order
that the deceptive mirage, which is always
visible in bright sunny weather, might serve
its contemplative inmates as a memento of
the chief tenet of their philosophy—that
all things are unreal, and human life it-
self a shifting phantasmagoria of empty
shadows.

Sequestered valleys enclosed by mountain
peaks, and elevated far above the world
which they profess to despise, are favourite
seats for the monastic communities of
Buddhism. But it is no yearning after God
that leads them to court retirement; nor
is it the adoration of Nature’s Author that
prompts them to place their shrines in the
midst of his sublimest works. To them the
universe is a vacuum, and emptiness the
highest object of contemplation.

They are a strange paradox—religious
atheists! Acknowledging no First Cause or
Conscious Ruling Power, they hold that the
human soul revolves perpetually in the urn
of fate, liable to endless ills, and enjoying
no real good. As it cannot cease to be, its
only resource against this state of intermin-
able misery is the extinction of conscious-
ness—a remedy which lies within itself, and
which they endeavour to attain by ascetic
exercises.

Their daily prayers consist of endless repe-
titions, which are not expected to be heard
by the unconscious deity to whom they are
addressed; but are confessedly designed
merely to exert a reflex influence on the
worshipper—i.e., to occupy the mind with
empty sounds and withdraw it from thought
and feeling. Tama, one of their saints, is
said thus to have sat motionless for nine
years with his face to the wall; not engaged,
as a German would conjecture, in “thinking
the wall,” but occupied with the more diffi-
cult task of thinking nothing at all.

Those in whom the discipline is com-
pleted, are believed to have entered the
Nirvana—not an elysium of conscious en-
joyment, but a negative state of exemption
from pain. Such is the condition of all the
Buddhas, who, though the name is taken to
signify supreme intelligence, are reduced to
an empty abstraction in a state which is
described as pu sheng pu mie, “neither life
nor death;” and such is the aspiration of all
their votaries. Melancholy spectacle! Men
of acute minds, bewildered in the maze of
their own speculations, and seeking to attain
perfection by stripping themselves of the at-
tributes of humanity!

As a philosophy, Buddhism resembles
Stoicism in deriving its leading motive from
the fear of evil. But while the latter encased
itself in panoply and standing in martial
attitude defied the world to spoil the treasures
laid up in its own bosom, the former seeks
security by emptying the soul of its suscep-
tibilities and leaving nothing that is capable
of being harmed or lost—i.e., treating the
soul as Epictetus is said to have done his
dwelling-house, in order that he might not
be annoyed by the visits of thieves. It dries
up the sources of life, wraps the soul in the
cerements of the grave, and aims to convert
a living being into a spiritual mummy, which
shall survive all changes without being
affected by them.

This is the spirit and these the principles
of esoteric Buddhism, as enunciated by those
members of the inner circle, whose wan
cheeks and sunken, rayless eyes indicate
that they are far advanced in the process of
self-annihilation. In their external mani-
festations they vary with different schools
and countries, the lamas of Tartary, and the
shamans of Ceylon, appearing to have little
in common.

To adapt itself to the comprehension of
the masses, Buddhism has personified its
abstract conceptions and converted them into
divinities, while to pave the way for its easier
introduction, it readily embraces the gods
and heroes of each country in its comprehensive pantheon.

In China, the Nirvana was found to be too subtle an idea for popular contemplation, and in order to furnish the people with a more attractive object of worship, the Buddhists brought forward a Goddess of Mercy, whose highest merit was that having reached the verge of Nirvana, she declined to enter, preferring to remain where she could hear the cries and succour the calamities of those who were struggling with the manifold evils of a world of change. From this circumstance she is called the Tsz'-pei Kwan-yin, the "merciful goddess who hears the prayers" of men.

This charming attribute meets a want of humanity, and makes her a favourite among the votaries of the faith. While the Three Buddhas hold a more prominent position in the temple, she occupies the first place in the hearts of their worshippers. Temples of a secondary class are often devoted especially to her; and in the greater ones she almost always finds a shrine or corner where she is represented with a thousand hands ready to succour human suffering, or holding in her arms a beautiful infant, and ready to confer the blessing of offspring on her faithful worshippers—in this last attitude resembling the favourite object of popular worship in papal countries.

In the Sea-light Monastery, above referred to, she appears in a large side hall, habited in a cloak, her head encircled by an inscription in gilded characters, which proclaims her as the "goddess whose favour protects the second birth." This language seems to express a Christian thought; but in reality nothing could be more intensely pagan. It relates to the transmigration of souls, which is the fundamental doctrine of the system; and informs the visitor that this is the divinity to whom he is to look for protection in passing through the successive changes of his future existence. Within the mazes of that mighty labyrinth, there is room for every condition of life on earth, and for purgatories and paradises innumerable besides. Beyond these, the common Buddhist never looks. To earn by works of merit—which play an important part in the modified system—the reversion of a comfortable mandarinate, or a place in the "paradise of the western sky," bounds his aspirations. And to escape from having their souls triturated in a spiritual mortar; or ground between spiritual millstones in Hades; or avoid the doom of dwelling in the body of a brute on earth; constitutes with the ignorant the strongest motive to deter them from virtue—those and a thousand other penalties being set forth by pictures and rude casts to impress the minds of such as are unable to read.

Buddhism was little known in China prior to the year A.D. 66. At that time the Emperor Mingte, of the Han dynasty, is said to have had a remarkable dream that led to its introduction. He had seen, he said to his courtiers, a man of gold, holding in his hand a bow and two arrows. They recognizing in these objects the elements of Foh, the name of Buddha, as it is written in the Chinese language, and calling to mind a saying ascribed to Confucius, "that the Holy One is in the West," expounded the dream as an intimation that the Buddhist religion ought to be introduced from India. The Embassy thus sent to the West, by imperial command, in quest of a foreign religion, was, it is thought, incited by some indistinct rumour of the appearance of our Saviour in Judea; and it is interesting to speculate as to what the condition of China might have been, if the Embassadors, instead of stopping in India, had proceeded to Palestine. As it is, the success of Buddhism demonstrates the possibility of a foreign faith taking root in the soil of China.

The San Kiau, or Three Religions, have now passed in revision. We have viewed
them, however, owing to the limits of our space, only in outline, neither allowing ourselves on the one hand to follow out those superstitious practices which attach themselves to the several schools like the moss and ivy that festoon the boughs of aged trees, nor, on the other, to enter into a minute investigation of those systems of philosophy in which they have their root.

The fact that each takes its rise in a school of philosophy, is significant of the tendencies of human thought.

The Confucian philosophy, in its prominent characteristics, was ethical, occupying itself mainly with social relations and civil duties, shunning studiously all questions that enter into ontological subtleties, or partake of the marvellous and the supernatural.

The philosophy of Tau, as developed by the followers of Lautsz, if not in the form in which it was left by their Master, may be characterized as physical. For the individual it prescribed a physical discipline; and without any conception of true science, it was filled with the idea of inexhaustible resources, hidden in the elements of material nature.

The Buddhist philosophy was preeminently metaphysical. Originating with a people who, far more than the Chinese, are addicted to abstruse speculations, it occupied itself with subtle inquiries into the nature and faculties of the human mind, the veracity of its perceptions, and the grounds of our delusive faith in the independent existence of an external world.

These three philosophies, differing thus widely in their essential character—one being thoroughly material, another purely ideal, and the third repudiating all such questions and holding itself neutral and indifferent, yet exhibit some remarkable points of agreement. They agree in the original omission or negation of religious ideas; and they coincide no less remarkably in evolving each, from its negative basis, a system of religion; and in contributing each its quota to the popular idolatry.

Confucius "seldom spoke of the divinities," and taught his disciples to "keep them at a distance;" and yet the forms of respect, which he enjoined for deceased ancestors, led to their virtual deification, and promoted, if it did not originate, the national hero worship. Like the modern apostle of positivism, professing to occupy himself wholly with positive ideas,—like him, he was unable to satisfy the cravings of his spiritual nature without having recourse to a religion of humanity.

The Buddhist creed denies alike the reality of the material world and the existence of an overruling mind; yet it has peopled an ideal universe with a race of ideal gods, all of whom are entities in the belief of the vulgar.

The Tauist creed acknowledges no such category as that of spirit in contradistinction from matter; yet it swarms heaven and earth with tutelar spirits whom the people regard as divine.

We see here a process directly the reverse of that which certain atheistic writers of modern Europe assert to be the natural progress of the human mind. According to them, men set out with the belief of many gods, which they at length reduce to unity, and finally supersede by recognizing the laws of nature as independent of a personal administrator. The history of China is fatal to this theory. The worship of one God is the oldest form of Chinese religion, and idolatry is an innovation. Even now new idols are constantly taking their place in the national pantheon; and so strong is the tendency in this direction, that in every case where philosophy has laid the foundation, idolatry has come in to complete the structure.

It is incorrect to assert that any one of the San Kiau is a State religion to the ex-
elusion of the others—though the Confucian
is sometimes so regarded on account of its
greater influence with the ruling classes, and
its marked prominence in connection with
state ceremonials. Not only are they all
recognized and tolerated, but they all share
the imperial patronage. The shrines of each
of the three religions are often erected by
imperial munificence, and their priests and
sacred rites provided for at the imperial ex-
 pense with impartial liberality.

Not only do they co-exist without conflict
in the empire, but they exercise a joint sway
over almost every mind in its immense popu-
lation. It is impossible to apportion the
people among the several creeds. They are
all Confucians, all Buddhists, all Tauists.
They all reverence Confucius and worship
their ancestors; all participate in the "feast
of hungry ghosts," and employ the Buddhist
burial service; and all resort to the magical
devices of the Tauists to protect themselves
against the assaults of evil spirits, or secure
"good luck" in business. They celebrate
their marriages according to the Confucian
rites; in building houses, and in cases of
alarming illness, they ask the advice of a
Tauist; and, at death, they commit their
souls to the keeping of the Buddhists. The
people assert, and with truth, that these
religions, originally three, have become one,
and they are accustomed to symbolize this
unity by erecting San kiau tang temples of
the three religions, in which Lautsz and
Buddha appear on the right and left of Con-
fucius, as completing the triad of sages.

This arrangement, however, gives great
offence to some of the more zealous disciples
of the latter; and a few years ago a memo-
rial was presented to the emperor, praying
him to destroy the San kiau tang, which
stood near the tomb of their great teacher,
who has no "equal but Heaven."

This feeling is only a faint echo of a de-
termined opposition which for ages withstood
the advance of the rival systems, and which
has now been overcome to such an extent
that they hold a co-ordinate place in the
popular mind, and receive nearly equal
honours at the hand of the government.

The effects of this coalition may be traced
in their literature, as well as in the manners
and customs of the people. Of this one
example will suffice, though we might go on,
if space permitted, to show how freely the
later works of each school appropriate the
phraseology of the others, and to point out
the extent to which the general language of
the country has been enriched by a vocabu-
larv of religious terms, chiefly of Buddhist
origin, all of which are incorporated in the
Imperial Dictionary, and pass as current
coin in the halls of the literary tribunal.

In the collection of Tales above referred
to, there is a story which owes its humour to
the bizarre intermixture of elements from
each of the three religions.

A young nobleman, riding out, hawk in
hand, is thrown from his horse and taken
up for dead. On being conveyed to his
house, however, he opens his eyes and gradu-
ally recovers his bodily strength; but to the
grief of his family he is hopelessly insane.
He fancies himself a Buddhist priest, repels
the caresses of the ladies of his harem,
and insists on being conveyed to a distant
province, where he affirms he has passed his
life in a monastery. On arriving he proves
himself to be the abbot; and the mystery of
his transfiguration is at once solved.

The young nobleman had led a dissolute
life, and his flimsy soul, unable to sustain
the shock of death, was at once dissipated.
The soul of the priest who had just expired
happened to be floating by, and led by that
desire to inhabit a body, which some say
impelled the devils to enter the herd of
swine, it took possession of the still warm
corpse.

The young nobleman was a Confucian of
the modern type. The idea of the soul
changing its earthly tenement is Buddhistic.
And that which rendered the metamorphosis possible, without waiting for another birth, was the Taoist doctrine that the soul is dissolved with the body, unless it be purified and concentrated by vigorous discipline.

It is curious to inquire on what principles this reconciliation has been effected. Have the three creeds mingled together like gases in the atmosphere, each contributing some ingredient to the composition of a vital fluid;—or blended like the rays of the spectrum, each imparting its own hue, and all concurring in the production of pure light? Alas! it is not a healthy atmosphere that supplies the breath of the new-born soul in China; and no pure or steady light cheers its opening eyes; yet each of these systems meets a want; and the whole taken together, supply the cravings of nature as well perhaps as any creed not derived from a divine revelation.

The three religions are not, as the natives thoughtlessly assume, identical in significance and differing only in their mode of expression. As we have already seen, it is hardly possible to conceive of three creeds more totally distinct, or radically antagonistic; and yet, to a certain extent, they are supplementary. And to this it is that they owe their union and their permanence.

Confucius gave his people an elaborate theory of their social organization and civil polity; but when they looked abroad on nature with its unsolved problems, they were unable to confine their thoughts within the limits of his cautious positivism. They were fascinated by mystery, and felt that in nature there were elements of the supernatural which they could not ignore, even if they did not understand them. Hence, the rise of Taoism, captivating the imagination by its hierarchy of spirits and personified powers, and meeting in some degree their longing for a future life, by maintaining, though under hard conditions, the possible achievement of a corporeal immortality.

With the momentous question of existence suspended on this bare possibility, Buddhism came to them like an evangel of hope, assuring every man of an inalienable interest in a life to come. It gave them a better psychology of the human mind than they had before possessed; afforded a plausible explanation of the inequalities in the condition of men; and, by the theory of metempsychosis, seemed to reveal the link that connects man with the lower animals on one hand, and with the gods on the other. No wonder it excited the popular mind to the pitch of enthusiasm, and provoked the adherents of the other creeds to virulent opposition.

Taoism, as opposed to it, became more decidedly material, and Confucianism more positively atheistic. The disciples of the latter especially assailed it with acrimonious controversy—denying, though they had hitherto been silent on such questions, the personality of God, and the future life of the human soul.

Now, however, the effervescence of passions has died away—the antagonistic elements have long since neutralized each other, and the three creeds have subsided into a stable equilibrium, or rather become compacted into a firm conglomerate. The ethical, the physical, and the metaphysical, live together in harmony. The school that denies the existence of matter; that which occupies itself wholly with the properties of matter; and that, again, which denounces the subtleties of both, have ceased their controversies.

One deriving its motive from the fear of death, another actuated by a dread of the evils attendant on human life, and the third absorbed in the present, and indifferent alike to hope or fear, all are accepted with equal faith by an unreasoning populace. Without perceiving their points of discrepancy, or understanding the manner in which they supplement each other, they accept each as answering to certain cravings of their inward
nature, and blend them all in a huge, heterogeneous and incongruous creed.

It would be interesting to inquire, had we sufficient space, what have been the intellectual and moral influences of these several systems, separate and combined. They have, it is true, given rise to various forms of degrading superstition, and supporting, instead of destroying each other, they bind the mind of the nation in three-fold fetters; still, we are inclined to think that each has served a useful purpose in the long education of the Chinese people. But in the providence of God, the time has now come when they are offered a better faith—one which is in every part consistent with itself and adequate to satisfy all their spiritual necessities. Will they receive it?

The habit of receiving such contradictory systems has rendered their minds almost incapable of weighing evidence; and they never ask concerning a religion "Is it true?" but "Is it good?" Christianity, however, with its exclusive and peremptory claims, has already begun to arouse their attention, and when the spirit of inquiry is once thoroughly awakened, the San Kiau, or Three Creeds, will not long sustain the ordeal.

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THE TESTIMONY OF THE APOSTLES.


RENAN'S Life of Jesus, which before the Franco-Prussian war had reached in the original its thirteenth edition, besides not a few in its English dress, is now the gospel of the doubting and unbelieving on both sides of the Atlantic, and will remain so till some one bolder or more subtle than he shall displace him, as he displaced Strauss. His book is a charming one in its delineations of everybody and everything but Christ. In his chapter on the original disciples, he gives a very vivid sketch of their respective individualities; and both in his "Life of Jesus" and in his work on the Apostles, he acknowledges the authenticity of the accounts we have of them, the miraculous narratives alone excepted. There is in the Introduction to his "Life of Jesus," one very extraordinary testimony to the truth of the evangelic history, which I cannot forbear quoting.

"I have traversed in every direction the district where the scenes of the Gospel are laid. I have visited Jerusalem, Hebron, and Samaria. Almost no site named in the story of Jesus has escaped me. All this narrative, which at a distance seems to float in the clouds of an unreal world, thus assumed a body, a substantial existence, which astonished me. The striking coincidence of texts and places, the wonderful harmony of the ideal of the Gospels with the country which served as its frame, was for me a revelation. I had before my eyes a fifth Gospel, and thenceforth through the stories of Matthew and Mark, instead of an abstract being who one might say had never existed, I saw in life and movement a human form that challenged admiration."
In fine, Renan treats the entire New Testament history as an unquestionable record of actual historical personages and events, except where the supernatural element crops out in the narrative; thus far, at least, showing himself both a clear-sighted and an honest critic. In point of fact, the historical books of the New Testament have at once so many external proofs and internal tokens of their authenticity, as to leave no question concerning the substantial truth of their narrative of ordinary events, however we may dispose of the abnormal incidents they record.

Resting, then, on the admitted authenticity of this narrative, I propose to draw from the apostles who bear it so prominent a part such testimony as they offer in behalf of their Lord and Master.

In the first place, there is not the slightest doubt that of eleven of these apostles, most or all incurred hardships, losses, perils, persecutions, and sufferings of the severest character, in attestation of their belief in the Divine mission and authority of Jesus; that several of them, as itinerant preachers, devoted themselves for the residue of their lives to the promulgation of this belief, their zeal carrying them into distant lands, and enabling them to overcome natural, social, and national barriers, insurmountable except to the most ardent and self-forgetting enthusiasm; and that several of them, in the same cause, encountered and bravely endured beheading, crucifixion, and other agonizing and ignominious forms of death. These things attest, at least, the sincerity and the intensity of their belief. Sacrifice and martyrdom always prove as much as this. But they do not prove the truth of a belief,—if they did, there would be no end to the shams, contradictions, and absurdities, which, as sealed by the blood of their believers, we should be compelled to recognize as true.

There is, however, this peculiarity which distinguishes the apostles from all other martyrs, even from other early Christian martyrs. The declarations which they maintained at the peril and cost of their lives were not dogmatic articles of faith, but statements of alleged facts, of which they professed to have been eye and ear witnesses. Foremost among, these facts was the resurrection of Jesus from the dead. That they believed themselves witnesses of the reality of his death and of his reappearance among the living, there cannot be the slightest doubt. This Renan admits. He maintains that Jesus really died; that the apostles caught eagerly at the first rumour of his resurrection, which grew from the stealing of his body (it is hard to say by whom, but more probably by Joseph of Arimathaea than by any one else), and from Mary Magdalene's mistaking the gardener for him in the dim dawn and through the mist of her tears; that they so firmly believed this story as to imagine that they saw him repeatedly, by day as well as by night, at Jerusalem and in Galilee, the whole eleven of them at a time; and that this hallucination lasted many days, and, on one occasion, extended to the more than five hundred brethren mentioned by St. Paul. He says emphatically that had the apostles possessed less than the strongest assurance of their Master's resurrection, they could not by any possibility have been the earnest propagandists and heroic sufferers that they undoubtedly were. We thank him for this admission; and indeed no champion of the Christian faith can ask for a firmer basis for his superstructure of argument and evidence than the concessions made all along by this preeminently fair and frank, yet for all this only the more captivating and dangerous, Corypheus of the anti-Christian host.

But the undoubting belief of professed eye and ear witnesses is not in itself sufficient to inspire confidence in their story. If these men were fools or fanatics, their testimony,
though blood-sealed, is of no value. The question for us then is, whether they were persons of sufficiently acute perceptions, clear mind, and sound judgment, to be relied on.

To answer this question, let us look first at their writings. Five of them, Matthew, John, James, Peter, and Jude, are among the reputed authors of the New Testament. As to these writers, we have as good reason for believing in the genuineness of Matthew's and John's Gospels, of John's First Epistle, and of Peter's First Epistle, as we have for believing in the genuineness of Virgil's Georgics, or of Cicero de Officiis. We find them, from the earliest mention made of them, named and quoted as written by their now reputed authors, without any record or intimation of a doubt or question as to their authorship.

I am aware, indeed, that rationalistic criticism does not admit that the Gospels came into being as other books do. The development theory is applied to them, as to the whole realm of living nature. Their genesis is like Topsy's, in Mrs. Stowe's tale,—"I s'pect I grow'd, don't think nobody never made me." But Renan admits that memoranda of our Saviour's discourses written out by Matthew were the nucleus of the Gospel which bears his name. He thinks, too, that the narrative portions of John's Gospel, which he regards as singularly truthlike and accurate, were derived from that apostle, and that the whole book was written by his immediate disciples.

Here let me offer some considerations with special reference to the authorship of the fourth Gospel. As I have said, the testimony of antiquity that it was written by John is unanimous and full. As to his having written the Apocalypse, that testimony is less clear and conclusive. Yet the critics of the Tubingen school maintain that this last book was undoubtedly written by the Apostle John. But it is very certain that the same man wrote the Gospel of John (so-called), the first Epistle bearing his name, and the Apocalypse; for there are several very striking characteristic conceptions and figures, which are both peculiar and common to these three writings, or to the Gospel and the Apocalypse. For instance, the term Logos (the Word) is applied to Jesus in all three of them, and nowhere else; and again, Jesus is introduced in the Gospel under the figure of a lamb; the same figure reappears in the Apocalypse, in almost every vision of the glorified Redeemer, and he is called by this name nowhere else. These are but two instances, to which several others might be added, of peculiarities common to the Gospel and the Apocalypse, and rendering it very certain that, if the Tubingen critics do not err in ascribing the latter to John, he must have written the former.

Yet another consideration strikes me very forcibly in favour of the authorship of the Fourth Gospel by John. True or false, this is the most remarkable book ever written, and has had more power over the human mind and heart than any other, both in determining belief, and in awakening tender, profound, and fervent devotion. The sublimest narrative ever written is that of the raising of Lazarus. The words put into the mouth of Jesus in that scene, "I am the resurrection and the life; he that believeth in me, though he were dead, yet shall he live, and whosoever liveth, and believeth in me shall never die," are the grandest utterances ever heard on earth, and must and will be rehearsed in hope and triumph, by the grave-side, till the last of the dying shall have put on immortality. The recorded communings and intercessions of the night of the betrayal surpass in every element of pathos all human literature beside, and there are at this and at every moment, all the world over, thousands upon thousands of the weary and grief-stricken, who, oft as they read these blessed words,
feel pillowed on the bosom of Infinite Love.

Now, there are but two hypotheses possible. One is, that we have the faithful narrative of what was said and done by the Truth and Life incarnate, transmitted to us by the hand of one who saw and heard what he wrote. If this be so, while it makes no manner of difference which of the apostles wrote the book, no one would venture to doubt its having been written by John. The other supposition is, that the author of this Gospel, by his own genius, without a copy, shaped and filled out in those transcendently glorious and beautiful proportions and tints the figure of Jesus Christ, and from his own fertile brain, spun those discourses into whose depth none can enter without seeming to listen to the very voice of God. If this be true, then the author of that book deserves the place in human gratitude, reverence, nay, adoration, which the Christian Church has assigned to Jesus. He towers up above all other writers, all other men of his age; nay, more, as the greatest mind, the greatest soul of his race. The book is, indeed, superhuman, if he whom it portrays was not so. How then could the name of such a writer have been lost, and his fame transferred to another? It was a name too great to perish, a fame too exalted not to have its enduring record. We are then compelled to accept as our only alternative, our first supposition,—the belief resting on unbroken tradition from the earliest times, that this book, great and glorious as it is, was written by an illiterate Galilean fisherman, and that it owes its superiority to all other books, not to any surpassing ability of the author, but to the Divine life in human form, as to which he only related what had been uttered in his presence, or done under his personal knowledge.

As for the Epistle bearing the name of James, we have evidence that it was generally received as genuine, and was from a very early period read in the churches. As of the two apostles bearing that name, the brother of John died early, this letter must be ascribed to James, the son of Alpheus. We have about the same kind and nearly the same degree of evidence, for the genuineness of the epistle called that of Jude, or Judas,—evidence which would be deemed amply sufficient for any book outside of the sacred canon. The epistles of James and Jude have also characteristics of style and sentiment which ally them to the undoubtedly genuine epistles of John and Peter, and show that they belong to the earliest time and the apostolic school, and not to the next succeeding Christian age, whose few extant writings are of quite a different type.

We have then, undoubtedly, in our hands the writings of some of those men, who, at the risk of everything earthly, professed to have been eye-witnesses of what Jesus said and did. How do they write? Like intelligent, sober, credible men? Or do they in their writings show themselves so stupid and foolish, or so wild and fanatical, that they could easily have been the dupes of pretension or imposture? This question would seem to be answered by the regard which has been paid to their writings in every subsequent age by the foremost men in point of intelligence, good sense, and culture. These writers have generally been supposed, in Christendom, to have been especially enlightened and inspired by God. Whether this be so or not, it is aside from our present purpose to inquire; but the fact that such an opinion concerning them has been held by a large proportion of the first minds of our race is a sufficient proof that their writings are at least free from the tokens of weakness, folly, or infatuation.

This view of their character is certainly confirmed on examination. The books present all the marks of truth, when tried
by the usual tests. The Gospels of Matthew and John contain a great many names, dates, local and historical references; it was a period of very frequent change in the political relations of Palestine,—a period as to which later writers would inevitably have committed gross anachronisms; yet we find in these books only the closest accordance, in geography, chronology, and history, with all the authorities of the time, especially with the minute and circumstantial history of Josephus. Then, too, we have between the Epistles and the Gospels, just the kind of coincidences which we should expect to trace in genuine works. Thus we find in the Epistles not any formal statement of facts, or set rehearsal of the words of Jesus; but we detect in them unmistakable tokens of firm belief in the contents of the Gospels, and what is more, of precisely the condition of mind and character which these contents were adapted to produce. The coincidences between the Epistles and the Gospels are closely analogous to those which we should expect to find between the domestic or friendly letters of statesmen or generals concerned in either war of our independence and authentic histories of the same war.

Then, again, there are no books in the world that show greater serenity and clearness of mind than these manifest. Their style is simple, artless, free from exaggeration, hyperbole, apostrophe, declamation, ambitious rhetoric, outbursts of impetuous feeling. Matthew and John, in describing the marvellous life and works of Jesus Christ, write as quietly and dispassionately as if they were narrating ordinary events. They show no fear that they shall not be believed. They use no forms of strong asseveration. In fine, they write as if they had become so accustomed to experiences on a higher plane than that of common humanity, as to be unconscious of their position,—just as natives of Switzerland might talk and write calmly and unexcitedly about glaciers, and avalanches, and scenes of which the mere thought thrills us with profound emotion.

The Epistle of James is a very remarkable composition. Had it come down to us, with such slight verbal changes as might have been necessary, as a treatise of Plutarch, or Epictetus, or Marcus Antoninus, it would now be regarded as the finest ethical monument of antiquity, and would hold an unrivalled place as a school and college classic. For common sense, shrewd observation of men and things, deep insight, and practical wisdom of the highest order, it may resign all vantage-ground on the score of any sacred associations, and still retain its prestige unimpaired; while it is no less remarkable for the sharp edge and keen point and brilliant sheen of many of its single maxims and apophthegms.

I have said enough about these writings for my present argument,—enough to show you that at least those of the apostles whom we know as authors were not feeble, silly, credulous men, who could have been easily deceived by an impostor, or drawn by a self-deluded pretender into the vortex of his fanaticism; but that they were clear-headed, sober-minded, intelligent, and in every way competent witnesses of the events which some of them record as from their own personal knowledge, and the others recognize as undoubted facts.

Let us now take note of the professions of the apostles, so far as they are specified in the New Testament. Six of them, perhaps more, were fishermen on the little lake of Galilee,—not sailors in any large sense of the word (for they were probably never out of sight of land, or in their boats for more than a day at a time), so that there was nothing in their simple, prosaic life to nurture the imaginative element, or to cherish credulity and superstition, but much that was adapted to educate their perceptive faculties, their powers of observation, and their plain, practical common sense. Hardy, straightforward,
honest men, jostled and jostling on the rough paths of daily life, the weaker sinews of character broken down, the hardier developed by incessant toil, they would have been firm adherents to one who could give them unmistakable credentials of his claims, but not such persons as could be enlisted in the cause of a fanatic, or become the easy dupes of a plausible deceiver. We have in the first chapter of John's Gospel, in a series of conversations whose life-likeness Renan (in an appendix to his last edition) adduces as a token of their authenticity, a very vivid picture of what these men were before they became the disciples of Jesus; and the picture is that of self-respecting, intelligent, thoughtful men—such men as the Hebrew theology and the institutions of Moses were adapted to produce among the labouring classes, but such as were developed under no other type of ancient civilization, nor have yet been formed, except in comparatively small numbers, under the half-pagan auspices of what I fear we miscall Christian civilization.

Of these fishermen, one indeed, Peter, appears to have been ardent and impulsive in his nature. But it is equally manifest that he was testy, petulant, captious, easily offended, and ready sometimes even to find fault with his Master. Such a man as he would have been disgusted with sham and pretension. Had there been aught in the works, words, or daily life of Jesus that was not genuine, honest, pure, noble, he was the very man to take umbrage at it, and to transmute his allegiance into implacable enmity. But his attachment flickers only for a few moments under the natural reaction from a foolhardy courage. A single look from his Master drowns his denial in a passion of tears; and thenceforward none is more prompt and earnest than he to bear testimony, at whatever cost and risk, to the power and love of God as incarnate in Jesus Christ.

Another of the twelve, Matthew, was a tax-gatherer in the service of the Roman government, probably a collector of the imposts on the brisk though petty inland traffic on the Lake of Galilee—gathering tribute from a people that scorned to pay it, and sought every possible subterfuge to evade it. His office could have been borne only by one who was all eye and ear. He was a detective by the necessity of his profession—the last man to be duped either by fanaticism or by imposture. He, too, had more to lose than the fishermen. The hands of all the fiscal agents of Rome, great and small, had viscous palms; and we have intimation of his substantial worldly estate in his making a great feast for the Saviour—an occasion important enough for the Pharisees to know who the guests were, and to carp at them as below the standard of Jewish gentility and purism. His testimony, then, has a peculiar value, both on the ground of his profession, and on account of the heavy sacrifice which his discipleship made inevitably necessary. As for his Gospel, its entire character accords closely with what we know of him. There is something journal-like in its narrative portions, as if it were written by a man of business. It contains more about the Saviour's sayings and doings at Capernaum—Matthew's post of duty—than either of the other Gospels. Moreover, when he speaks of his own house, he calls it the house, as a man generally does when he has a place of business separate from his home. The uniform tradition of the early Church represents his sacrifice for the cause of Christ as lifelong, his service as a missionary of the cross having been first, for fifteen years, in Judea, and afterward in remote regions of the East, and perhaps of the South; for there is some reason to believe that his Christian enterprise carried him as far as Ethiopia.

Another of the sacred college was Simon, the Canaanite, as he is called by Matthew and Mark, Zelotes (or the Zealot), as Luke
styles him, the former being the Syro-Chaldaic, the latter the Greek designation of a sect of Jewish fanatics who pushed their loyalty to the Mosaic ritual and economy to absolute frenzy, regarded the Roman power with the intensest hatred, deemed murder and even stealthy assassination justifiable in defence of the national integrity and faith, and were the foremost agents in producing the condition of things which led to the destruction of Jerusalem and the exile of the Hebrew people—enormities opposed to the ordinary and else invariable Roman policy, but forced upon Titus by the unparalleled obstinacy of these very ultraists, of whom we so strangely find one among the followers of Jesus Christ. The Zealots were literal interpreters of the prophecies that seemed to promise extended temporal dominion to the Messiah, and were in constant expectation of his advent. We know nothing very definite about this man's subsequent life; but the tradition is that he was an indefatigable propagandist of the new faith, and that he finally suffered death on the cross.

That a man of this sort should have been among the apostles indicates, as it seems to me, the reality of the coincidence, claimed by the Evangelists, between the Messiah of the prophets and Jesus of Nazareth. This man was one of those who were all the time watching the Eastern sky for the dawn of the Messianic day, and that a day, as they imagined, of vengeance and of victory. There was not a prophetic sign with which he was not familiar; but only a convergence of these signs, too patent and too full to admit of doubt, could have made a Zealot acknowledge a Messiah in every feature so utterly unlike the mailed and harnessed chieftain of his day-dreams.

This is a point which seems to me deserving of more than a passing notice. The Evangelists relate numerous circumstances of birthplace, birth, parentage, condition, and experience, in which prophecy concerning the Messiah was said to be fulfilled in Jesus. Rationalistic critics represent these coincidences as in part factitious, and in part fictitious. They allege that Jesus did some things in order to simulate the Messiah of the prophets; and that, as to the greater number of those particulars in which he could have had no agency, as about his birth in Bethlehem and his descent from David, the Evangelists coined facts in accordance with predictions. It might seem sufficient to say that, as the coiners of these coincidences risked their lives by coining them, they must before undertaking thus to deceive the world, have accomplished the more difficult task of deceiving themselves. But here we have a specially strong case. A man pledged at once to the most literal interpretation of prophecy and to a line of conduct utterly opposed to the spirit and character of Jesus is so impressed with Messianic tokens that meet in Jesus, as to throw aside his old sectarian convictions, to renounce his former self, to become a new man, and to adhere in life and death to a Teacher and Leader with whom at the outset he could have had nothing in common except reverence for the Word of God in the Hebrew Scriptures.

We come next to the case of Thomas. He was evidently sceptical by nature,—I would even say, by the grace and gift of God, who evidently made use of this trait in his mental character for the strengthening of his own faith, and of that of multitudes who should come after him. The other ten have seen the risen Lord, and have no doubt of his identity. He very naturally thinks it more probable that they have been deceived by some family likeness or casual resemblance in another person than that the Crucified is really alive. He demands to examine the wound-marks, to trace the prints of the nails, the incision made by the spear. He was in the right. His was an honest and reasonable doubt, and we are thankful for it.
His name should never be spoken with less than the highest honour, and had he been the type of a larger proportion of those ministers of religion who have been successors of the apostles, there would be much less of infidelity than there now is. Credulity generates unbelief; and infidelity has no weapons of its own forging that have half the efficacy of those which it picks up among the crazy outworks, built by a faith both blind and timid, around the impregnable citadel of everlasting truth.

There are two kinds of scepticism,—that of the heart and that of the intellect. The former is adapted to make unbelievers; the latter, to make Christians. The former will not look at the hands and the side, because it is determined not to be moved morally and spiritually as they would move the honest soul; the latter insists on seeing the wound-marks, because it wants to know the precise truth, and therefore avails itself of whatever evidence God has given. The scepticism of the heart hates the light, and will not come to the light, least its deeds be reproved. The scepticism of the mind is that which cannot believe without sufficient evidence. It proves all things, and holds fast that which will stand the test. It examines both sides of a question, and adheres to that which imposes the least strain on its belief. Such a mind needs only to have the evidences of Christianity fairly presented, to yield to it entire and cordial faith. Many of the firmest believers, many of the ablest defenders of the truth as it is in Jesus, belong to this class of minds. In this sense, Lardner, Paley, and Butler whose contributions to the Christian evidences are invaluable, and will be so for generations to come, were pre-eminently sceptics. They would not believe, without examining the hands and the side, trying all the witnesses, testing the objections against Christianity with the opposing arguments, weighing coolly and impartially the evidence, real or pretended, on either side; and the result was a faith in Christ, which sight could hardly have rendered clearer or stronger.

God has made many such minds, and they are among the noblest and best of his creation. I have known, you probably have, some extreme specimens of this kind among the most loyal and exemplary Christians. Take a case like this,—I paint from life, an individual as the type of a class. He whom I describe wants for every item of his belief a sold basis of fact, and a superstructure of unanswerable reasoning built upon it; and he will let his faith reach no higher than he can lay this superstructure, as it were, stone upon stone in insoluble cement. He has no relish (and I think him wrong there) for those speculations about spiritual and heavenly things, in which, from a mere hint of holy writ, fancy takes her flight in those higher regions of thought, which, I believe, God has purposely left undescribed, that we may have our free range in them. In the house built on Christ as the foundation, he prefers to live in the lower story, where he can test the strength of the floor and the walls. But so firmly has he by careful examination convinced himself of the Saviour’s redeeming mission, sacrificial death, miracles, resurrection and ascension, that he speaks of them as he would of sunrise, or the phases of the moon, or any of the well-known phenomena of the outward world, as matters long since placed by him beyond question. He conforms his life to these great spiritual facts, as he does to the laws of nature. And when he comes to die, he passes away, not with any glow of ecstasy, but with the quiet confidence of one who knows just where he is going, and has just as firm a belief in the many mansions of the Father’s house as in the several apartments in his own house. This is the style of faith that grows from the honest scepticism which insists on always having sufficient reasons for its belief. It
often has less function than might seem edifying; but if you want valiant soldiers of the cross for times when unbelief is rampant, boastful, and aggressive, these are the men to bear the shock of arms, and come off more than conquerors.

We care not, then, how many there are of the same order of mind with Thomas. The condition of the Christian evidences is specially adapted to their natures. The infidel has much harder things to believe than the Christian, severer difficulties to encounter, contradictions, inconsistencies and absurdities which only a credulous mind could entertain,—from which a natively sceptical intellect is inevitably drawn into the Christian faith. For, if Christianity be not true, we have to believe in numerous well-known effects without any adequate cause; in extensive conditions of mind and of conviction for which there was no basis whatever; in the growing up of confessedly the most perfect system of morality the world has ever seen, in the brain of an illiterate Galilean peasant, in a degenerate nation and a corrupt age, and not only so, but in the brain of one who was either weak enough to imagine, or wicked enough to feign, himself possessed of supernatural powers; in the simultaneous illusion of the senses of multitudes and bodies of men for many successive days, when it was the interest and the wish of those very men to find that false which they were constrained to recognize as true; in the imposition of pretended or imagined miracles upon a hostile people, so successfully that they were compelled to admit their actual occurrence, and (as we have abundant Jewish evidence) imputed them to the aid of Beelzebub, the imagined prince of demons; and in many other things equally incredible and opposed to all recognized laws of belief. The fact is, that not a few of the most noted infidels of modern times have been equally noted for their credulity; and that at the present moment the superstitions hardly less gross than fetichism, which are connected with pseudo-spiritualism, are most rife in the very quarters where the miracles and the resurrection of Jesus are thrown aside as unworthy of credence.

One word more about the eleven, before I pass to the twelfth. These eleven, it must be remembered, were not only witnesses of leading events in the life of Jesus, but were for many months his constant companions, on the road, in the house, on the lake. They knew his whole manner of life,—his modes of intercourse with all sorts and conditions of men,—the degree to which he embodied his precepts of piety, purity, justice, forbearance, and kindness in his daily walk and conversation. They staked their lives on a body of statements, prominent among which was the alleged fact of his faultless and absolutely godlike sanctity and excellence. They must have known whether this was true or not; and that they suffered and died to attest it, proves that they knew it to be true.

I have spoken of eleven only. There remains Judas, by far the most important of all, for whom the Church has been slow to own her debt of everlasting gratitude to the God who makes the wrath and guilt of man to praise him. Judas had the same opportunities with the other eleven for knowing every thing about his Master that could be known. He was employed in a confidential relation, as custodian of the scanty funds of the apostolic family. He was probably from the first a selfish, greedy, deceitful man; our Saviour early and repeatedly intimates his recognition of these traits; and he probably chose him on account of them, that, if malice itself could find aught against him, it might have free scope and full swing.

Judas entered into negotiations with the chief priests and their associates for the ruin of his Master, and
mercenary as he was, he would certainly have effected that ruin in the way most profitable to himself. Now it was only as a last resort that the leading Jews wanted to get possession of the body of Jesus. They felt by no means certain that they could persuade Pilate to kill him, and they dared not kill him themselves. They would have immeasurably preferred to destroy his influence, to detect some imposture in his alleged miracles, or to find some weak point in his character, some damning incident in his life. They were so doubtful how they could dispose of their prisoner, that they offered a very low price for him. But they had large means at their command, and would have given a much greater reward for a surer service. Could Judas have gone to those men with evidence of jugglery, pretence, or exaggeration in the wonderful works reported to have been wrought by Jesus, or could he have proved a single deed or utterance that would impair the reputation of perfect sanctity which Jesus held among a large portion of the people; in fine, could he have borne the slightest testimony against his Master's character, he might as easily as not have made his thirty pieces of silver three thousand,—he might have named his own price, and if there had not been money enough in hand, they would have taken up contributions in all the synagogues to pay it. But there was absolutely nothing secret which could injure Jesus and his cause by being made known. There was nothing for this bad man to betray except the place in the environs of the crowded city where Jesus was going to pass the night,—it being neces-

sary to arrest him by night on account of the large number of friendly Galileans who would have resisted any attempt to apprehend him by daylight. For this mean and paltry service he had a commensurately pitiful compensation.

But even he repents of what he has done. The power and beauty of that blessed spirit, the majesty, meekness, and love of that holy countenance come over him, but too late to recall his deed. He seeks, as so many do in all times, in our time, to escape the contamination of ill-gotten gain by casting it into the temple treasury; and finding no relief, in an agony of remorse and despair he goes and hangs himself, bearing as unequivocal and precious testimony to the truth and purity of his Master in that horrible suicide, as the other apostles bore in their cheerful sufferings and martyrdom for the love of their ascended Lord.

Judas has been strangely overlooked by the Church; no day is assigned to him in the calendar; no account is taken of his services;—yet we could have better spared a better man. We thank God for the life-record of those of the sacred college who followed closest in the footsteps of their Lord; yet while we have the Master, we might not have missed even James, or Peter, or Nathaniel. But we do need Judas, to learn what aspect the Saviour manifested to a subtle, captious, and treacherous witness, and thus to have the testimony of the vilest avarice, meanness, and malice, alongside with that of God and the holy angels, to the truth of his claims, the guilelessness of his spirit, the purity of his life.
INSECTIVOROUS PLANTS: A CHAPTER IN NATURAL THEOLOGY.

By A. T. Bledsoe, LL.D.; Baltimore.

Editor of The Southern Review. U.S.

In the year 1768, Ellis, a well-known English naturalist, sent to Linnaeus the drawing and description of a plant to which he gave the poetical name of Dionaea. This—one of the names of the goddess of beauty—has been very freely translated for popular service, into Venus’s Fly-trap. Though this observation of Ellis is, so far as we know, the first ever made upon the insectivorous plants, the observer saw at once the significance of certain organic peculiarities, and has left to us a record of the fact. That which separates this class of plants from all others in the vegetable world is the wonderful power which they possess of capturing insects and feeding upon them, and this power Ellis mentions in the first description sent to Linnaeus. The plant, he says, “shows that Nature may have some views towards its nourishment, informing the upper joint of its leaf like a machine to catch food; upon the middle of this lies the bait for the unhappy insect that becomes its prey; ... and the instant the tender parts are irritated by its feet, the two lobes rise up, grasp it fast, lock the rows of spines together, and squeeze it to death; ... nor do the lobes ever open again while the dead animal continues there.”

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Here and there, scattered throughout the pages of Scientific Transactions, or in some of the higher kinds of physiological botanies, notices are to be found of the curious habits of some varieties of these plants. But most of them, before the year 1860, were incomplete and lacking in general interest, unless we except an interesting though short account of the habits of Drosera, which Darwin tells us, was published in the Botanisch Zeitung, 1852, p. 540.

Country folk, whose observation is generally much keener than their reasoning powers, had long been aware of the fact that
the leaves of *Drosera* are frequently covered with captured insects, without inquiring what relation these facts bore to the vital functions of the plant. In 1860 Mr. Darwin undertook to investigate this subject; and the results of his investigation we find in the volume under review. This book is devoted, almost exclusively, to the record of observed facts and to their immediate theoretical inferences; his peculiar views of evolution only occasionally cropping out. As an observer of facts Mr. Darwin has no superior, and his power of description is scarcely less remarkable than his power of observation. His style is simple, direct, and lucid; it is, in fact, so transparent a medium of his thought, that it requires an effort to withdraw the attention from the matter and fix it critically upon the manner of his work. He lacks the delicate play of fancy, the perpetual outflow of imagination, which inform Tyndall’s style with such beauty, as well as the brilliant flashes of wit which illumine Huxley’s dryest dissertations; but as a scientific style we feel inclined to award it the highest place.

The member of this curious family of carnivorous plants which has been most closely studied and most fully described, is the common Sundew, or *Drosera rotundifolia*. It is found in many parts of North America, and flourishes in damp, but poor and boggy soil. From the surface of the ground a single stem, or sometimes more than one stem, rises to about five or six inches in height, and bears upon its termination a cluster of delicate snow-white flowers: a varying number of leaf-stalks spread radially out and close to the ground; from the base of the flower-bearing axis a few tiny rootlets, not exceeding an inch in length, reach down and penetrate the damp and peaty soil.

It is the foliage-leaf of the Sundew, as it is of all the insectivorous plants, which makes it so remarkable. These are nearly circular and slightly concave disks, covered with delicate purple hairs, each terminated by a somewhat swollen gland. The glands continually secrete a viscid fluid, which surrounds each one like a drop of dew. This appearance, together with the fact that the secretion is most copious when the sun shines upon it most brightly, has given to the plant the popular and poetic name of Sundew; as though this dew, in contradistinction to the ordinary kind, were condensed by the sun instead of being dissipated by it.

In order to understand the peculiar mechanism of the insectivorous plants, it will be necessary to examine a little into the ordinary functions of leaves and of roots. Plants, as is very familiarly known, imbibe their nutriment in several different ways. They need oxygen, carbon, and nitrogen in order to the building-up of their tissues and of roots. The oxygen and carbon they receive directly from the air. Every plant-tissue, whether it be leaf, stem, root, or flower, is made up of a multitude of minute cells, each having a cellulose wall and protoplasmic contents. Associated with the protoplasm of many of the cells, is a substance known as chlorophyll, which is the green colouring-matter of plants; and by means of this many of the most important chemical combinations necessary to life are effected. Atmospheric air enters the plant tissues by means of the thousand little openings, called stomates, which occur upon the exposed surfaces. The air fills the intercellular cavities of the plant, and comes in contact with the cellulose walls of the cells themselves. Every one of these possesses a power akin to that of respiration, by which it absorbs oxygen, and liberates carbon-di-oxide (carbonic acid). It has long been believed that plants reverse the processes of respiration, by day and by night; that is, that they breathe in carbon-di-oxide by day, and liberate oxygen; while they...
breathe in oxygen by night, and liberate carbonic acid. As a mere matter of result, this is true; but the change is not an effect of mere respiration. Plants, like animals, constantly inhale oxygen, and exhale carbon-di-oxide. This is a process carried on by means of all their cells, coloured and uncoloured. In addition to this the chlorophyll-cells have the power, under the influence of sunlight, of taking in the carbon-di-oxide, of separating it into its constituent elements, of appropriating the carbon and of yielding up the oxygen. During the day this latter assimilating process goes on so much the more powerfully, and its products are so much in excess of those of respiration, that the constant, and gentler, process is completely masked. There is no reversal of the respiratory process in the darkness; it is only that the chemical action of the chlorophyll, under the controlling power of light, is necessarily suspended for the time, and the hitherto unperceived process of breathing may then be detected. These functions, both of breathing and assimilation, go on in the insectivorous as in the other plants.

This, however, is not all that has been found essential to plant life. Nitrogen, as well as oxygen and carbon, is essential to vegetable existence. In ordinary cases, the necessary nitrogen, which plants have no power to absorb from the air, is supplied to the roots in a state of solution and in chemical combination. This is the element which so largely enters into all composites, whether natural or artificial. As we have seen in the case of Drosera (and it is equally true of other insectivorous plants), the roots are extremely small; they are, in fact, totally incapable, from their size if from nothing else, of supplying the nitrogenous element needed. They have a use, and that one essential to the existence of the plant, for it is by them that the necessary water is imbibed. It has been found that some of these plants can be reared very successfully upon wet moss, with no soil whatever from which to draw supplies; and their habitat, where they grow wild, is in miserable, boggy ground, where only the mosses flourish; and these, as is well known, only drink by means of their root-hairs, true roots being wanting to them, while they receive their food entirely from the air.

Nitrogen must therefore be supplied to the insectivorous plant in some other way, and this is done by the absorption of organized animal or vegetable matter. Having a truly vegetable nature, and possessing the organs to perform all ordinary vegetable functions, these curious plants superadd to their vegetable powers one of the most marvellous of animal functions, that of a true digestion and assimilation. The transitions in Nature from form to form are never startlingly abrupt, and even this curious capacity has its representation in other forms of vegetable life. The embryo-plant within the seed lives upon and assimilates formed organic matter till it has sufficiently developed roots to take up its own nutriment, and in its tiny laboratory combine and recombine the inorganic elements of earth, air, and water into organic tissue. The Drosera and its compeers seem to carry on this embryonic life throughout their whole existence, aided by most wonderful functional adaptations to their modes of nutrition. But link them as we may to a higher or lower, to more or less perfect forms of existence, there seem to be nowhere in organic Nature so many sudden transitions and wonderful combinations as we find among the insectivorous plants.

In order to understand the wonderful powers of this plant we must look into the anatomy and physiology of the tiny disk, not over half an inch in diameter, in which such powers reside. The leaf is a slightly concave plate of cellular tissue; it possesses the usual systems of cells—the parenchymal, or ordinary internal cellular system of leaves,
the fibro-vascular bundles or veins, and the upper and lower epidermal or skin-tissues. In all ordinary cases the vegetable hairs or trichomes, which give to many leaves and petals their soft and velvety look, are mere outgrowths of the upper or epidermal layer of cells. The tentacles of Drosera are, however, not mere superficial cells elongated by growth, and so are not strictly trichomes, but would seem rather to be peculiar prolongations of the leaf itself. It is found, by looking through a moderate magnifying power, that the fibro-vascular bundles run up into each gland a tentacle, as they are called, and quite a number of clearly marked spiral vessels occupy the terminal swelling. These spirally marked vessels, which present the appearance of closely coiled springs, long enough to form a cylindrical vessel, form one of the commonest characteristics of leaves, stems, and roots; but are nowhere seen in vegetable hairs. The spiral coils in the Drosera glands are surrounded with several series of elongated cells, which spread out radially where the tentacle springs from the leaf. The tentacles in the centre of the disk are short, and their pedicels or stems are green, as is the disk itself, while the terminal glands are purple. The tentacles are longer towards the edge of the disk, and the extreme marginal ones are greatly elongated and entirely purple; not only is this true of the pedicels, but of the glands as well. The purple fluid filling the cells of the glands must differ in some respect from that in the cells of the pedicel; for upon placing the leaf in hot water the glands become white and opaque, the cell-contents immediately beneath them assume a brighter green tint, while the pedicel-cells turn to a bright red colour.

In addition to the tentacles the disk bears a number of minute papillæ and true vegetable hairs, which can absorb but not secrete. If a small object, either organic or inorganic, be placed upon the centre of the disk, the tentacles touched send out a mysterious impulse toward the marginal glands. The nearer ones are first affected and slowly bend toward the object; gradually those farther and farther off receive the impulse, and they also bend in the same way, till at the end of a few hours the object is closely clasped by the hundred or more tentacles growing upon the upper surface of the leaf. The time required for inflection varies, in consequence of a number of varying circumstances; it depends upon the size of the object, upon the nutritious qualities it possesses, upon the age and vigour of the leaf, and upon the temperature of the air. The movement is, however, quite different from the nocturnal movements, or sleep as it is called, of many plants, and it takes place as readily and promptly by night as by day. If any exciting fluid, such as milk, or an infusion of raw meat, be placed upon the disk, or if one or more glands be repeatedly touched, the tentacles bend over and close upon the disk; while a sudden blow, even though it be quite sharp, produces no effect whatever.

The marginal tentacles, in their normal position, bend back beyond the level of the disk, so that an inflection causes them in folding over to describe an arc of 180°, or sometimes even of 270°. The whole tentacle does not curve when it becomes inflected; the bending part being confined to a small portion just above the base. If the exciting substance be placed on the centre of the disk, the middle glands remain erect; but if it be placed between the centre and the margin, then they turn toward and clasp the object. The leaf in this case shows almost every tentacle in one half bent over, while those in the other half remain in their normal position.

The motion in many instances may be distinctly noted in half a minute after the object has been placed upon the disk. When drops of a nutritious or exciting fluid, such
as infusion of raw meat, milk, or soda, are allowed to fall upon the middle of the leaf, the whole disk becomes incurved and forms a little cup, sometimes round, more frequently triangular in shape.

The secretion of the glands is very viscid, so that it may be drawn out into long threads; and the presence of any object placed upon one of them induces an increase in the quantity: if the object which excites secretion be one capable of affording nutrient to the plant, the secretion not only becomes greater, but it also changes its character. It possesses at all times an antiseptic quality; bits of meat and other substances were left side by side to test this point—the one upon the Drosera disk bathed in the secretion, and the other near it on pieces of wet moss. The former remained perfectly sweet till it was dissolved and absorbed; the other soon decayed and swarmed with infusoria. With substances that do not readily become decomposed the like experiment was tried; cubes of the white of hard boiled egg were used, and when the portion upon the leaf had been dissolved and partially absorbed, that upon the moss was found to be mouldy.

The Drosera secures its prey by means of the viscid secretion of its glands. An insect as it alights is caught by the sticky drops; the pressure of its delicate feet (even in the case of the smallest gnat this is true) soon makes its presence known to the sensitive gland, and inflection takes place. The extreme minuteness of the object producing this effect is almost beyond belief; a bit of hair weighing only the 73,000 of a grain has been known to cause the inflection of the tentacle on which it was placed, while all the others about it remained motionless. This experiment has been repeated so often, and with such precautions, as to render the results absolutely certain.

When an insect alights upon the middle of the leaf, an impulse is sent out from there, and all the tentacles bend over and clasp it. If, however, it alights upon a marginal tentacle, that one bends over till it reaches the second row; the one of these touched takes up the little captive and carries it forward. In this way it is conveyed, by a sort of rolling motion, from margin to centre. As soon as the destination is reached, however, a radial impulse is sent out, and all the tentacles become inflected over their prey. It is not known whether the insects are attracted to these leaves, or whether they alight by chance. In the former case, Darwin says, the leaf may be compared to a baited trap; in the latter, to a trap laid in a run which is frequented by game, but which is not supplied with any bait.

The pressure which induces inflection, it has already been said, is almost infinitesimally small; but in every case which was critically examined, these minute particles which produced the inflection were seen to penetrate the viscid secretion and rest upon the gland itself. The reason for this peculiar kind of sensitiveness is very manifest; the most delicate insect which will serve for food causes inflection and the pouring forth of the digestive fluid, while no effect is produced by heavy falling drops of rain or the strongest current of air.

A very curious molecular motion accompanies the inflection, to which we have already referred as aggregation. When the glands of a young leaf which has never been inflected are examined under the microscope, every cell seems filled with a homogeneous purple fluid, and a constant current of colourless protoplasm is seen to be circulating around the interior surface of the cell-walls; this circulation, termed cyclosis, is a well-known and often observed phenomenon in cell-life. If, after the tentacles have been caused to bend by the presence of some exciting substance, the cells be again examined, a change which is apparent to the naked eye
may be observed. The smooth purple colour has now become flecked and mottled. Under a high power of the microscope the cause may be discovered, and the process in all its stages watched. When by any means a tentacle is caused to become inflected, whether directly or indirectly, the aggregation begins at the glands and travels downward. When the exciting substance is placed upon the gland itself, the motor impulse must, of course, travel down the pedicel to the bending portion; when the excitation comes from the centre of the disk, the motor impulse must travel up the pedicel to the bending portion. But, whichever way the motor is propagated, aggregation always begins at the gland and travels downward.

When subjected to a high magnifying power this process is seen to be in its various stages, first, in most of the cells, a separation of the purple protoplasm into small grains, which coalesce, in their turn, into minute spheres. These unite into one or more irregularly shaped masses of purple protoplasm, which undergo constant changes of form, uniting and dividing, and becoming contorted in various ways. Whenever the exciting cause is removed, the tentacles begin to re-expand, and the minute masses of protoplasm suspended in their transparent fluid medium to redissolve, and finally when the tentacle is fully opened the cells seem again filled with the homogeneous purple fluid. It is curious to observe the aggregation proceed from the gland downward; it flashes the length of a longitudinal cell, then seems obstructed by the end-wall of the cell; penetrates the barrier, flashes along the extent of the cell, again to be obstructed, and again to overcome the obstacle. The redissolution of the purple masses travels from the base of the pedicel up toward the gland, the reverse direction from aggregation, of which it is also the reverse process. In almost all cases inflection and aggregation are associated together, though it is not universally the case.

From the many experiments made by Mr. Darwin it is proved that the tentacles of Drosera remain much longer inflected over nitrogenous than over non-nitrogenous substances, fluid as well as solid; and he gives us also the reason for this fact. Plants, by means of their roots, can only take up such nitrogen as is presented to them in solution. Animals have the means of reducing to solution solid substances and assimilating them. The Drosera, it is found by careful observation, possesses this animal power which is one of the characteristics of true digestion. In the case of animals, the digestion of albuminous compounds is effected by means of pepsin, which is a ferment, and acts only in the presence of a weak acid; neither the pepsin nor the acid alone being possessed of any such power.

The secretion which stands always upon the glands of unexcited Drosera leaves is not at all acid; but when aggregation and inflection are caused by the presence of any exciting object, not only is the secretion greatly increased in quantity, but it is also changed in quality and becomes decidedly acid. Any artificial irritation of an animal's stomach induces, in the same way, an acid secretion. As soon, however, as a portion of the substance dissolved by this acid is secreted in the leaf-glands, the true gastric fluid is poured forth. This vegetable pepsin is capable of digesting the same substances which animal pepsin digests, and is equally powerless upon others.

The movement of the tentacles presents a very remarkable phenomenon, which finds its parallel in animal life. It might naturally be supposed that the motor impulse passed through the fibro-vascular bundles or veins of the leaf, as these anastomose and so form a connected system throughout the leaf; but experiment proves that it is not so. The impulse sent down from a tentacle moves outward, just as the aggregation is seen to advance, radially. It seems to run out more
easily in the line of least resistance; and as
the cells are ranged radially about the foot
of the tentacle, and are longitudinal in form,
there seems no subtler reason needed for the
direction in which the impulse is propagated.
When a tentacle is touched, itself, it always
bends toward the centre; but when the im-
pulse comes from without, the side turned
toward the motor centre contracts, and
bends the tentacles toward that centre.
The highest powers of the microscope do not
reveal the slightest wrinkle or fold in the
contracted portion, even when a tentacle has
been made to describe a whole circumference.
There is manifestly, under such examination,
a transference of some portion of the cell-
contents from the concave to the convex
portion of the bending segment. The motor
impulse as it ascends the pedicels of adjacent
tentacles acts directly upon the bending por-
tion, without first ascending to the glands
and then being transmitted downward.
Some other impulse must, nevertheless, be
transmitted to the glands, for they begin
immediately secreting an acid substance, and
the glands send backward to the base that
mysterious force which causes aggregation.
This is the only phenomenon in the vegetable
world, so far as is now known, akin to the
reflex nervous action of animals.

The most curious fact of all in connection
with these movements, is that made known
by Dr. Burdon Sanderson, who has discovered
that Drosera and Dionaea have a normal
electric current, like that of animals, which
is disturbed by the movement of their leaves
as the current in animals is by their muscular
contractions. Not only are these curious
plants allied to animal life by their powers
of digestion, but also, it would seem, by
something even subtler than this, by mus-
cular contraction and the transmission of a
motive force.

The only sensitive portions of the Drosera-
leaf seem to be the glands, or the cells im-
mmediately below the tentacles: the faculty
of secretion is confined to the glands alone;
but absorption takes place not only in the
glands, but in the minute papillae and vege-
table hairs which cover the surface of the
disk. When a nutritious substance is placed
upon the disk, the folding-in of the tentacles
and the incurvation of the disk itself forms
a temporary stomach, which, like the stomach
of an animal, pours forth at first an acid
secretion, and afterwards, as an effect of
absorption, a ferment which really enables
the plant to take into its own tissues and
assimilate this truly digested matter.

There are a number of other species of
Drosera which have been examined. These
differ more in appearance than in structure
from Drosera rotundifolia. The leaves in
most other species are long, instead of round.
In the Drosera longifolia the apex of the
leaf as well as the tentacles curls over the
captured prey. Drosera Capensis, a native
of the Cape of Good Hope, shows the pecu-
liarity (which we shall see also characterizes
Dionaea) of a petiole with broad leaf-like
margins, which are longer than, and nearly
as broad as, the gland-bearing leaf. It might
be popularly described as a leaf of the
ordinary kind with a gland-bearing leaf
springing from its apex. The petiole has the
power possessed by other foliage-leaves, and
draws a large part of its nutriment from the
air, while the gland-bearing disk has fewer
chlorophyll-cells.

One of the most remarkable facts recorded
of the long-leaved Droseras, is that to be
found in the American Naturalist, Dec.
1873. This was observed and recorded by
Mrs. Mary Treat of New Jersey, of whom
Darwin and other eminent naturalists speak
with great respect. She says that when she
pinned living flies at a short distance from
the leaves, without touching them, the leaf
actually bent toward and seized its prey.
No mention is made in Darwin's book of this
particular observation, though he quotes
Mrs. Treat for other facts, and alludes to
this very article on page 278 in a footnote.

The Drosera binata (or Dichotoma) is a gigantic Australian species, which is of great interest because it forms one of those wonderful connecting links in the series; possessing affinities with the preceding and succeeding form, and being, as it were, an interpreter between them. The footstalk of the leaf, which is somewhat like a rush, is sometimes twenty inches long; the leaf-blade which is narrow, bifurcates once at its junction with the tip of the footstalk, and again two or three times, curling over in an irregular way. The blade being about seven inches long, the whole leaf, including footstalk, measures sometimes as much as twenty-seven inches. The peculiarity of the species is that it unites within itself the characteristics of Drosera, and its nearest of kin the Drosophyllum. Besides the usual tentacles, bearing glands and capable of inflection, which characterize the other Droseras, it has upon both its upper and lower surface sessile glands, consisting of four, eight, or twelve cells, which absorb powerfully; and, upon the backs of the leaves, near the edges, tentacles which secrete the usual viscid substance, but are incapable of bending. These we shall see hereafter are characteristic of Drosophyllum, where they have a marked significance. Like the wonderful mechanism which is bound together in the fins of the fish, or folded away beneath the horse's hoof, and which only finds its true significance when it reaches its perfect development in the marvellous adaptability of the human hand, like this shadowing forth of the higher life in the lower, we see the peculiar mechanism, which is perfected in the Drosophyllum, entering into the structure, apparently without purpose, in this species of Drosera. This gift of a mute but unerring prophecy which we find again and again in Nature, is no mean endowment, but serves to bind into a divine and exquisite harmony the facts of creation, and to make manifest the purpose which runs through them all.

The Drosophyllum is a rare plant, found only, so far as is now known, in Portugal and Morocco. It sends up long narrow leaves from a woody axis, which are concave above and convex beneath. Both surfaces, with the exception of a narrow central channel, are covered with two kinds of glands, corresponding with the dorsal immovable tentacles and the sessile glands of Drosera binata. The taller glands are raised upon pedicels, and are of a mushroom form, having convex umbrella-shaped caps. These tentacles are of many sizes, and are of a bright pink or purple colour. Like the tentacles of Drosera, they are rather prolongations of the leaf than true vegetable hairs. These glands secrete copiously a substance more liquid than that of Drosera. Beneath them, upon the surface of the leaf, are multitudes of minute colourless glands, which show the same internal structure as the tentacles, but which never secrete spontaneously. There is a curious division of labour performed in the Drosophyllum by the two sets of different glands, as we shall soon see. The secretion of the taller glands, unlike that of the Drosera, is equally acid, whether normally at rest or excited by the presence of nutritious matter. When a bit of meat is placed upon one of the upper tentacles, or an insect alights there, the convex surface affords a very insecure resting place, and the drop of secretion being very liquid, generally rolls off, carrying with it the intruder. Its feet, legs and wings are clogged by the liquid, and its struggles only serve to precipitate doom, in the form of other drops which are shaken from the neighbouring tentacles; the trachea of the insect being closed by the secretion, it soon succumbs and dies. The lower glands absorb powerfully, and are excited by so doing to pour forth their secretion, which is of the nature of the ferment given out by the glands
of the Drosera. The secretion of the taller glands of Drosothyllum, whose function it is to catch the prey and supply the acid necessary for digestion, is not increased by the presence of nitrogenous matter. On the other hand, the lower sessile glands only secrete under the influence of the presence of such matter, and they alone possess any marked power of digestion. The marvellous adaptation of the organs to their function, shown by the various modes in which these plants capture and assimilate their prey, seems sometimes almost too wonderful for belief. Each variety has its peculiarity of organs, which are closely related to its peculiarity of function; the reason of each modification is, in almost every instance, perfectly clear, even with our imperfect knowledge of the subject. Drosothyllum, like Drosera, has very small roots, by which it imbibes water only.

Dionæa, or Venus’s Fly-trap, grows principally in the eastern part of North Carolina. A central stalk, or stalks, rise from a radial cluster of leaves; each bears upon its summit a cluster of white-petalled flowers. The foliage-leaves possess a broad leaf-like petiole, the central vein of which—the mid-rib—grows beyond the termination of the petiole, and forms a two lobed leaf of very peculiar shape and structure; the two lobes stand up from the mid-rib at a little less than a right angle, each being slightly curved on its upper side. It is fringed along the upper and outer edges by a row of spines, which are prolongations of the leaf. Upon the inner surface of each lobe there are placed triangularly three delicate filaments (sometimes, though very seldom, the number of these filaments is more or less than three). Under a power of about three hundred diameters, the smaller filament of a Dionæa lobe, which we have examined, measures about two inches; it is a sharply-pointed narrow cone formed of longitudinal cells, and has a clearly marked articulation, which answers as a joint, near the base. These are the only sensitive portions of the leaf; and they are so exquisitely sensitive that the lightest touch would cause, not the filaments themselves, but, both lobes to close instantly, the filaments folding flat, by means of the joint, against the leaf. If a touch, or the presence of some innutritious substance, be the exciting cause, the lobes become curved into a concave form, the terminal spines of their upper edges interlocking like the fingers of two clasped hands, and remain in this position. A concave chamber is thus formed; and just rapidly enough do the spines interlock to retain a large insect, and to allow a very small one to escape. If it be an insect or other nutritious substance which is caught, the leaves do not remain concave, but press against each other throughout their whole extent, so closely as to force out of shape cubes of the white of hard-boiled egg. The muscular contraction is forcible enough to resist any effort to open the lobes; they often tear rather than separate, and flap back with an audible sound when released from the hold, when the attempt to open them has been successful.

The purpose of each of these peculiarities of structure is very clear. Dionæa has no secretion by means of which it can catch its prey; if Drosera is a baited or unbaited trap laid in a run frequented by game, Dionæa is something with which we are even more familiar, a spring-trap, that closes upon the unwary intruder which touches some secret wire. This wire, however, is not baited; the little delicate filaments are only the sentinels stationed to give the signal when an unwary victim is within the power of its captor. Dionæa does not seem to possess anything like the recuperative power of the various Droseras, and the provisions which we find made against a useless expenditure of force are very remarkable. Dionæa, like Drosera, closes alike upon
organic and inorganic substances. The Drosera, we have seen, pours out its acid secretion upon whatever inflects its tentacles (though pepsin is only secreted and exuded when the object is organic), and the tentacles soon unbend when the enclosed object yields no nutriment. There is not even so much loss of time and force as this in the Dionaea. We have already said that the lobes curve about an inorganic object, while they flatten themselves against an organic one. The sessile glands, which cover the surface of the lobes, like those of the Droserophyllum, only secrete after the absorption of some nutritious substance, and then only such glands secrete as themselves absorb. When the lobes unclose after having held some inorganic object, it is found to be perfectly dry, no secretion having taken place. If, however, an insect or bit of meat be clasped between the lobes, they press against it, and each gland touching it is excited to secretion; this secretion, mingled with the dissolved food, flows by capillary attraction between the closely pressed lobes, and in this way every gland is induced to secrete.

The Drosera remains closed over an organic body, which is not too large for it to digest, from forty-six hours to ten days, according to the digestibility of its prey; cubes of albumen and bits of roast meat requiring the shorter time. After the matter has been completely dissolved and absorbed, the tentacles open, and the disks are ready for another meal. The Dionaea, on the other hand, which remains closed not more than twenty-four hours over an inorganic substance, and suffers no exhaustion of the gastric fluid, remains closed for fifteen, twenty-four, or even as long as thirty-five days over an organic substance which it is digesting. When it opens its lobes, the leaf seems torpid, and usually no excitation of the sensitive filaments will cause it to shut again. Another very curious fact, closely related to the needs of this plant, is that inorganic matter placed anywhere upon the disk, if it do not touch the filaments, produces no effect; while organic, whether it touch the filaments or not, causes the lobes to close upon it; in the latter case, however, the movement is slow. It is easy to see how each one of the peculiarities of each plant is meant to subserv a definite purpose. A touch upon a Drosera-leaf produces no inflection; continued pressure, even the most exquisitely delicate pressure, produces the effect of finally bending all the tentacles. Drosera ensures, by its sticky secretion, the persistence of any pressure which will bring it advantage, and closes leisurely upon its victim. Dionaea needs but the lightest touch to induce prompt movement; any leisurely motion in this case would, of course, be fatal to its purpose.

The motor impulse in Dionaea, like that in Drosera, is not transmitted by the fibro-vascular bundles, but follows the line of least obstruction in the parenchymal cells. The mechanism of the movement and its transmission is very mysterious; the bending portion of the lobes lies near the mid-rib, and appears to be due to a contraction of the upper epidermal layer of cells. The filaments, which are so intimately associated with the closing of the lobes, have, it is proved by experiment, nothing to do with its re-expansion. It seems probable from this that the lower cells of the lobes are in a state of tension, which is overcome by a violent contraction, when the sensitive filaments are touched; and that as soon as this contraction is past, and the upper epidermal cells are permitted to expand, this tension allows the lobes to resume their normal position.

There is nothing especially interesting in the account given by Mr. Darwin of the Pinguiculas, except that they seem very remotely allied to the other insectivorous plants, that the two lateral edges of their leaves fold over their prey, and that in a
natural state they seem to live almost as much on organized vegetable as animal matter. In many of the specimens examined, pollen-grains, seeds, bits of leaves, and minute seedling plants were found adherent to the plant and in course of digestion. This is, however, not an exceptional case, as certain vegetable infusions, such as infusions of raw and cooked cabbage, green peas, &c., caused inflection, aggregation, and digestion in all the plants of which we have already spoken. In their natural condition, however, the others do not seem to derive any substantial nourishment from vegetation as Pinguicula does.

There is a very remarkable genus of insectivorous plants found in the Asiatic Archipelago, from Borneo to Ceylon, in tropical Australia, and in the Seychelle Islands. Instead of securing their prey by a voluntary motion of any kind, the *Nepenthes* have a most curious contrivance for entrapping them. We have seen in Dionaea that a prolongation of the mid-rib, or middle vein of the footstalk, is developed into the two lobes which close upon their prey. The leaf of Nepenthes has also an excurrent mid-rib which bears upon its termination a vase-shaped growth, and this forms the pitfall by means of which its numerous victims are captured. The pitcher of Nepenthes is not, like the lobes of Dionaea, a modified leaf; but being carefully watched in its development, it is found to be an enormously developed gland, like those which, in a less conspicuous form, are found upon the tips of various leaves. During the earlier stages in the development of the plant, pitchers are produced in great abundance. In the different varieties (and as many as thirty are now known to science), they vary greatly in size, shape, and general appearance. In size they range from one inch to eighteen inches in height. Those pitchers which grow near the roots rest naturally upon the ground; sometimes, upon those species which do not leaf near the ground, the excurrent mid-rib of the leaf grows a yard long before the pitcher is fully developed so that it may reach and rest upon the ground. The pitchers are surprisingly like our familiar household vessels after which they are named; the termination of the mid-rib is just below what we should call the bottom of the pitcher; above this it bulges out, and after a graceful curve, it contracts and terminates in an oblique mouth, sloping downward from the handle-side to the spout-side. Just where the handle would be united with the rim, a cordate leaf springs up, and stands (at various angles, according to the variety) as a lid to the hollow vessel beneath. The young pitchers are smaller, bulge more, and have smaller and more erect lids than the older ones. Down the outside of the front, run two fringed longitudinal wings; these generally become less conspicuous as the pitcher grows older. The mouth is furnished with a thick corrugated brim covered with honey-glands; this serves to strengthen the mouth, to keep it open, and to lure insects into the pitcher. When the lids are inclined over the digestive cavity, the inner surface of the lid is also supplied with honey-secreting glands; but in *Nepenthes ampullaria*—which Hooker tells us is the only species having the lid thrown horizontally back—there are no honey-glands upon the lid. From its position we can readily understand that honey upon this widely-opened lid would attract insects, and lead them away from, instead of into, the pitcher.

In almost every species the pitchers stand erect; in those which climb high, the excurrent mid-rib often performs the office of a tendril, wrapping one or more times about any suitable support. The internal development of the pitcher of Nepenthes is very remarkable. There are, from the mouth downward, three distinct surfaces: the lid and brim form the attractive surface, and are supplied with honey-secreting glands in
great numbers. These glands consist of an assemblage of cells, imbedded in a cavity of the tissue in which they occur, and are surrounded by a guard-ring of cellular tissue of a glassy appearance. The brim sometimes slopes so as to form a funnel-shaped opening to the cavity below, and sometimes the inner edge is developed into a row of incurved hooks, strong enough, in certain varieties, to hold securely any adventurous bird which had thrust its body sufficiently far into the cavity in search of food.

The second surface is below the mouth; inside this is a smooth opaque surface, which Hooker tells us “is formed of a fine network of cells, covered with a glass-like cuticle, and studded with minute reniform transverse excrescences” (Rep. Brit. Asso. p. 112). The remainder of the interior of the pitcher is the secretive surface; it is a plate of cellular tissue covered with an enormous number of glands, which resemble the honey-glands of the lid, and are set in a depression of the tissue in the same way, only that they are semicircular, with the mouth turned downward, so that all the secreted fluid falls to the bottom of the pitcher. In one variety, *N. Rafflesiana*, three thousand such glands were found upon a single square inch. The fluid-secretion is always acid, of the same nature as the first secretion of *Drosera* after being excited, or the constant secretion upon the mushroom-like glands of *Drosophyllum*. The fluid fills only a small portion of the pitcher. In one not less than five inches in height, which we saw inverted yesterday, not half a teaspoonful of liquid poured out. When the liquid is emptied out of a pitcher which has never received animal food, it collects again, though slowly and scantily. After being separated from the plant the glands continue to secrete, though not vigorously; if, however, nitrogenous substances, such as meat and white of egg, be administered, the secretion is just double the normal amount.

The experiments tried by Darwin upon the *Drosera* and *Dionaea*, were tried with equal success by Hooker upon *Nepenthes*. The results of these experiments show that *Nepenthes* digests animal matter, and secretes a ferment like pepsin. The disintegration of nutritious matter he also found to be three times as rapid in the pitchers as it was in distilled water at the same temperature.

When too large a meal is given to the pitcher, it digests what it can, and then the remainder, which is undigested, becomes putrid. It is of course difficult, in the depth of the pitchers, and beneath the secretion always present, to detect the processes with the same accuracy with which they were observed in the *Drosera* and *Dionaea* leaves. Aggregation, it is found, accompanies digestion, as in *Drosera* and *Dionaea*. The clear green of the cells gives way to a brown and speckled appearance, which under the microscope shows itself to be aggregation.

In some varieties, especially those which are natives of Borneo, the colours of the pitchers are most gorgeous, especially the lid and the border about the mouth. The same devices are thus used to attract insects to this foliage-leaf as are used in the case of flowers: brilliant colour and the presence of honey. One variety has a pitcher with broad, fringed, longitudinal wings, and an exquisitely fluted border about the mouth of a deep rose colour. These longitudinal wings, which generally touch the ground below and run up to the honeyed brim, serve as a guide to the ascending insects. The *Nepenthes* forms the last of the series of plants which are sustained by digestion. There are several other varieties of insectivorous plants mentioned by the authorities, but which have not been examined with sufficient exactness to render them very interesting, and throw no new light upon the subject. We will, therefore not touch upon them.
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Some observations made upon the glandular hairs of various plants, allied and unallied to the Droseraceae, have proved that ordinary glandular hairs possess, in some species, the power of absorbing organic matter. Two species of Saxifraga, which are allies, and one each of Primula and Pelargonium, not allies of the Drosera, were found to absorb nutritious matter by means of their trichomes, and to become aggregated during the process. In the Pinguicula the secretive and absorptive glands are quite manifestly glandular hairs, and not prolongations of the leaf, which possess the power of digestion. The Pinguicula and Nepenthes are very remarkable members of the insectivorous tribe. They are not closely allied to the Droseraceae, which includes in its family circle Drosera, Dionaea, Droso-phyllum, Roridula, Byblis, and Aldrovanda; and yet they possess in common with it the curious power of digestion.

In connection with this point, Darwin says:—"The embryos of some plants secrete a fluid which dissolves albuminous substances out of the endosperm [the stored-up food which is supplied to the sprouting embryo before it has burst the seed-coat]; although the endosperm is not actually united with, but only in contact with, the embryo. All plants, moreover, have the power of dissolving albuminous or proteid substances, such as protoplasm, chlorophyll, gluten, aleurone, and of carrying them from one part to other parts of their tissues. This must be effected by a solvent, probably consisting of a ferment together with an acid" (p. 362). A foot-note supplies an interpolation:—"Since this sentence was written," he says, "I have received a paper by Gorup-Bessanez, who, with the aid of Dr. H. Will, has actually made the discovery that the seeds of the vetch contain a ferment which, when extracted by glycerine, dissolves albuminous substances, such as fibrin, and converts them into true pep-

tones." (Berichte der Deutschen Chem. Gesellschaft, Berlin, 1874, p. 1478.) The presence therefore of acid, and even of a ferment akin to animal pepsin, it thus appears is not present alone in the insectivorous plants, though it nowhere else has received so great development, or performs so important a function.

Beside the plants already described, which receive nutriment from organic matter by a true digestion, there is another class (using the word class popularly, rather than botanically) which derive nourishment by the absorption of decomposed animal matter collected in their foliage-leaves. To this latter kind belongs the American Pitcher-plant, or Side-saddle flower, as it is indifferently called. Between the two general classes stands a wonderful little aquatic plant which partakes of the nature of both.

The Aldrovanda, Darwin says, "may be called a miniature aquatic Dionaea. Stein discovered, in 1873, that the bilobed leaves, which are generally found closed in Europe, open under a sufficiently high temperature, and when touched suddenly close." This little plant is entirely destitute of roots, and floats freely in the water. The leaves are arranged in a whorl about the stem, and each one has a broad footstalk terminating in a bilobed leaf: from the termination of the petiole, just where the leaf is joined to it, four or five rigid projections spring, tipped each with a stiff bristle; these enclose between them the two-lobed leaf, the mid-rib of which is also tipped with a similar bristle. The lobes are formed of a very delicate translucent tissue, and open only about as wide as a living mussel-shell. Each lobe is in form rather more than a semicircle; and the edges of the outer surface of the lobes, which are furnished with points, are doubled inward. The lobe is composed of two very dissimilar portions. When the two lobes are laid flat open, the impression upon the eye is of two complete circles, in-
intersecting each other in such a manner that
the circumference of each touches the centre of
the other. The illusion is increased by the
fact that the apparently overlapping
portion is darker than the others. The mid-
rib, which divides the figure symmetrically,
seems to be the common chord which sub-
tends all the arcs—the two larger and two
smaller ones. The lighter crescent-shaped
outer portion of each circle is covered with
small prominences, crowned with a quadrifid
or four-rayed process, not unlike in ap-
pearance the stellate hairs which clothe
many leaves and give to them their downy
appearance; the inner curve encloses a space
covered with simple colourless glands like
those of Dionæa. Over this darker gland-
bearing surface are found numerous delicate
hairs, the sensitive filaments of our little
aquatic Dionæa; they differ from those of
Dionæa, however, in being colourless, and in
having two joints instead of one. This
inner, and darker, portion, which is composed
of three layers of cells, represents the diges-
tive and motive apparatus of the Dionæa;
while the outer, and lighter, portion, com-
posed of only two layers of cells, possesses
the peculiar characteristic of at least some
species of the second kind of insectivorous
plants. The quadrifid processes do not
digest as the glands do, but they possess the
power of absorbing decomposed organic
matter for the maintenance of the vegetable
organism. It is certainly a most remarkable
fact that a single insignificant plant should
show, upon one tiny disk, the characteristic
organic peculiarities of these two widely-
separated classes of insectivorous plants, and
that the one portion should be separated
from the other by a defined boundary-line.

The Aldrovanda, though the notices of it
are scant and imperfect, serves to introduce
us to a new genus, upon which many obser-
vations have been made, namely, the Utricu-
larias. These are aquatic plants, possessing
an aerial portion which produces the flowers.

A writer in the *Annales des Sciences
Naturelles* gives the following rather fanciful
description of one of these plants, as though
it were two distinct organisms:—"The one
is an aquatic plant, with horizontal leaves
and no root; it can either raise itself to
the surface of the water, or reach its depths;
but the other an aerial plant, turning toward the
heavens, producing flowers on its summit,
and planted upon the first, which serves it
as soil, or rather as roots. Each of these
beings not only accomplishes a special
function in a particular mode, but each
possesses an intimate structure appropriate
to this function and to this mode; and the
difference in this regard is so great between
the two, that when one has submitted to
him isolated fragments of the two axes, he
does not hesitate to assign them to distinct
and widely separated vegetable types."
(Fifth Series, vol. x. p. 59.) Most of the
writers upon the insectivorous plants confine
themselves closely to the leaves, their or-
ganic structure and functions. Any idea of
the plants themselves has, therefore, to be
gathered from various sources; and some
of these descriptions must stand upon their
own merits, having received neither the
disapproval nor sanction of the latest and
most accurate observers. Darwin merely
says:—"The plants float near the surface of
the water, and are quite destitute of roots,
even during the earliest period of their
growth. They commonly inhabit, as more
than one observer has remarked to me, re-
markably foul ditches" (p. 397). "The
leaves" of *U. neglecta*, he goes on to say, "con-
tinually bifurcate, so that a full-grown one
terminates in from twenty to thirty points.
Each point is tipped by a short, sharp bristle;
and slight notches on the sides of the leaves
bear similar bristles. On both surfaces
there are many small papillae, crowned with
two hemispherical cells in close contact"
(pp. 396—7). On the same divided leaf
there are frequently two or three of the
utricles or bladders which give to the plant its name, as well as its chief interest. These are oval sacs, supported on the side by a short pedicel; when mature, they measure about one-tenth inch in length. At the smaller end of the egg-shaped sac there is an opening, guarded by two prolongations of the cellular tissue of the sac; the one called the collar is a thick cellular growth which dips deeply into the cavity of the sac; the other, the valve, forms one side of the slit-like orifice which leads into the bladder; it becomes, at its margin, sharp, thin, and smooth, and rests upon the edge of the collar. Above the orifice, as if to guard it, there are two prolongations of the cellular tissue of the sac, bearing six or seven long, pointed bristles; these are quite enough like the antennae of some of the lower crustacea to justify the name which Darwin has bestowed upon them. On the two sides of the entrance, beside the antennae, are from three to seven long multicellular bristles. The valve can only open inwards, as both collar and valve dip into the cavity of the bladder. There is, of course, a hollow or depression, at the bottom of which lies the slit-like opening. On the lower side are both the stalk-like pedicel, toward the larger end of the oval, and the opening, toward the smaller, guarded by its bristles and antennæ; this lower side, which is flatter than the upper, faces the stem during the early stages of its development; later, however, it is generally found turned either horizontally, or obliquely downward. The bladders, with their bristles and valves, form the trap into which unwary crustaceans and other aquatic small fry are ensnared.

The valve, which is colourless, transparent, flexible, and elastic, is formed of two layers of small cells; two pairs of transparent, pointed bristles arise near the free portion and point obliquely outward; there are also upon its surface numerous glands which have the power of absorption. These are of three kinds, which seem to graduate into one another. They are filled with protoplasm, and the usual tests determine those which have captured insects to contain matter in solution. The bladder itself, within, is covered with crowded masses of four-rayed processes, like those found on the outer crescent-shaped portion of the Aldrovanda lobe. At the junction of the larger, polygonal cells which form the tissue of the utricle, small angular cells are placed, and from these arise the quadrifid processes.

The bladders have been supposed to serve as floats to the plant; but this cannot be the office which they are intended to perform, for branches bearing none, and those from which the utricles had been removed, floated quite as well as those still retaining them were found to do. The real function of the bladders is to catch minute water animals and insects, which serve as nutrient to the plant. Darwin, principally on the evidence supplied him by Mrs. Mary Treat, concludes that the bladders are not sensitive, and that insects force their way into the cavity through the valve-guarded slit, which permits ingress, but not egress. In an article published by Mrs. Treat (Harper's Monthly Magazine, Feb. 1876) since the appearance of Darwin's book, she brings forward the latest results of her investigations, and there states her belief in some sort of sensitiveness in the utricles. Darwin mentions the fact that, more than once, objects placed near the orifice of the utricles suddenly disappeared; but finding that he could not cause any perceptible movement in the valve by touching or brushing it (in imitation of a crawling insect), he concluded the valves to be lacking in sensitiveness. Mrs. Treat says:—“After careful and repeated experiments, I find that the larva has nothing to do with effecting an entrance; if it is caught in the valve, the part that is within the utricle seems perfectly powerless to move, but the part that is outside can
move and wriggle. And it would seem that when a larva as strong as a mosquito was caught, with its head and the first joint of its body sticking out of the utricle, it might escape; but, as far as I have observed, it never does. The chironomous larva, with its more slender body, was not often caught and held in the valve, but occasionally one was caught so. Usually they were carried bodily into the utricle with a sudden quick movement, and they were as often taken in tail first as head first. I have found as many as thirteen chironomous larvae in a single utricle, and all caught within forty-eight hours of each other. There could be no mistake here, for the larvae and plant were introduced forty-eight hours before. Upon two occasions I have found a dead chironomous larva held fast in the valve, and while I was looking, the valve suddenly opened and engulfed the larva with sufficient force to send it to the opposite side of the utricle." The peculiar kind of sensitiveness possessed by the bladders, the point where it resides, and the mechanism of the motion, are still unsolved mysteries. The antennae and bristles are manifestly useful in guiding insectst toward the orifice, for they spread out, forming a funnel-shaped entrance, at the bottom of which is the opening.

The process by means of which the utricles take advantage of the presence of their captured prey, it is proved by repeated experiment, is probably in no sense a process of digestion. The captured animals are generally found as a pulpy mass of decayed matter, through which the jaws and limbs, and sometimes the horny integuments of certain insects, are intermingled. There is reason to think that some substance is secreted which hastens the decomposition. Darwin quotes a statement from the Natural History of Jamaica, by Browne, to show that there is no inherent improbability in his supposition; the milky juice of the papaw, he tells us, causes meat which has been soaked in it to become quite tender in ten minutes, and soon after to become putrid.

However this may be, the decomposed matter contained in the utricles is absorbed by the quadrifid processes which line its interior. A change, hardly less marked than that caused by digestion in the Drosera-tentacles, shows itself in the quadrifid processes, after having been in contact with the decomposed mass. The absorption in this way of matter in solution and decomposed, is much less remarkable in the vegetable world than the digestion of the Droseraceae. It seems to be in this case a transference of the functions of ordinary vegetable roots, to other special organs provided for such plants as have no roots. The aquatic Utricularies of course have their bladders usually filled with water; a small quantity of air is however found in them in most cases. In the older utricles, containing dead and captured animals, air is almost always found; but this cannot be entirely due to decomposition, because it has also been found in young and perfectly empty utricles.

The Utricularia montana lives in the tropical regions of South America, and is generally counted among the air-plants; but there is some reason to suppose that it sometimes grows in the crevices of rocks. In hothouses it is grown in peaty soil. The leaves of this species, instead of bifurcating as in the aquatic varieties, are entire, and grow to about one inch and a half in length. It produces numerous rhizomes, or creeping underground branches, which are not, strictly speaking, roots; these thread-like, colourless rhizomes bear small bladders; they also occasionally swell into tubers. Both of these developments are apparently destined to supply water to the plant, as no stored-up starch or other solid matter is found in them. The bladders grow in great numbers,
sometimes as many as three or four hundred upon a single plant, and are generally found filled with water; though they are subterranean, many insects are captured by them, which undoubtedly afford nourishment to the plant. The shape of the utricles is greatly modified for its underground work; instead of the projecting antennae armed with bristles, they possess unarmed antennae which curve completely around, resting on either side of the bladder, and forming a roof over the depression where the orifice lies, which protects it from being clogged up by the earth, but which still leaves a free passage for the entrance of insects. Within the bladders are a multitude of quadrifid processes, which perform for the plant the necessary absorption of organic matter. The modes of nutrition, beginning with that closely allied to animal digestion, have approached by a descending series to true vegetable nutrition by means of roots, *Utricularia montana* forming the last of the series.

We now come to a genus of insectivorous plants which differ very widely from any that we have yet examined, though touching one or another at certain points. This is the *Sarracenia*: there are eight species of this genus, all similar in habits, and all natives of our Eastern States. Their habitat is in boggy ground, and even in places covered with shallow water; and they are found as far north as Newfoundland, and as far south as Florida. Some years ago its root was proposed as a remedy for small-pox, and it in this way "enjoyed an evanescent notoriety." It is known by several popular names, Trumpet-leaf, Sidesaddle flower, Pitcher-plant, Fly-trap, &c.; but by its botanical name of *Sarracenia* it is perhaps better known than by any of the local appellations: the name was given to it from the fact that Dr. Sarrazen sent the first specimen from Quebec to Paris. The plant, as figured by Prof. Riley, is a cluster of leaves, springing directly from the ground. Some of these are ordinary-looking leaves, the others are long trumpet-shaped tubes covered with an arched hood; the tube is a transformed petiole, the hood a modified leaf. Hooker describes them as having two, or even three varieties of pitcher; but we gather from the descriptions of those familiar with them in their native soil, that these are, in some species at all events, only different stages in the development of similar pitchers. There are eight known species belonging to the genus. Four of these, *S. purpurea*, *S. flava*, *S. rubra*, and *S. Drummondii*, have, in their young state, pitchers with the hoods arched down over the mouth; in a more mature state the hood stands up nearly erect, with its sides so deflected as to shed all the rain-water which it catches, though the rain falling directly into the open receptacle is retained. *S. psittacina* and *S. variolaris* have permanently closed lids, into which no water can fall, though there is an aperture for the entrance of insects.

Dr. Mellichamp, who has perhaps made the closest observations upon *Sarracenia variolaris*, says:—"It is found mostly in our damp pine-lands, occasionally in wet bogs, but it flourishes best on slight elevations on the edges of 'pine-barren ponds.'" "In such situations, with an open grassy pine-land surrounding them, with an abundance of sunlight, and a sufficiency of moisture, these plants are found in large clusters or patches, their yellow flowers and curiously spotted leaves of green or purple presenting an appearance as singular as beautiful. The leaves, which vary in length from one foot to eighteen inches, have certain peculiarities of conformation, the throat being covered by an "arched or vaulted appendage," a sort of upper lid or hood, which extends forward and downward, overhanging the orifice and thus preventing the admission of rain-water; . . . the inner
surface of the hood, or upper lid, is marked on its posterior portion by white translucent spots and purple reticulations, which last extend forward and upward, and again downward, on each side of the rim, for half an inch, or sometimes an inch.”

The interior of the pitcher is very wonderful and beautiful, and may be divided into four surfaces, for the sake of description. The first portion—of translucent spots and purple reticulations, just described—Hooker calls the attractive surface; it occupies the inner surface of the lid, and that part of the pitcher just below the rim; it possesses many stomates, and, in common with the mouth of the pitcher, is covered with honey-secreting glands. The second surface, just below the first, called the conductive surface, is opaque, formed of glassy cells elongated into short conical processes which overlap each other like shingles upon a roof, and turn downward. This surface forms a peculiarly insecure foothold even to insects. The third, or glandular surface, occupies a considerable portion of that part of the cavity of the pitcher which is beneath the conductive surface; this also affords no foothold for insects, and is thickly studded with glands. Below this is the fourth or detentive surface; this portion of the cavity possesses no cuticle, and is studded with innumerable deflexed hairs, which are rigid and glass-like, and converge toward the axis of the lessening cavity, so that an insect which is once caught cannot effect its escape, and by its efforts after freedom only wedges itself more and more firmly in the pitcher.

It is a curious and suggestive fact that Sarracenia purpurea, which has an opened-mouthed rain-receiving pitcher, seems to secrete no honey or other fluid. It is also the only species which has a special glandular surface, and has no glands, as the other species have, upon its detentive portion. Such a concurrence of facts suggests the probability that this variety of Sarracenia either has no proper secretion of its own, or else that it gives it out only after the pitcher has been filled with rain-water. (Rep. Brit. Asso. p. 110.) Sir Joseph Hooker expresses the opinion that pitchers so differently constructed, and with such different tissues as those described above, do not, in all probability, act in the same way. Some of the pitchers appear to serve the purpose of retaining water for the use of the plant; but those with the closed lids have manifestly a different function. The fact that insects are caught, and become decomposed in an abnormally rapid manner, suggests that these plants feed upon the results of decomposition; but the subject has never received the close observation necessary to the determination of all these points. It is therefore impossible to tell whether the glands both secrete and absorb, like the Droseraee; whether they only absorb, like the quadrifid processes of Utricularia; and finally, what it is that they do secrete, whether a solvent or a ferment. The observations made by Hooker were upon cultivated plants, in a climate unlike their native climate, and this fact always somewhat complicates matters.

Dr. Mellichamp supplies us with some very curious facts, which we will now give. On the 22nd of April, he tells us, the plants are blooming freely; the pitchers are, however, at this season, still tender and immature, and show no signs of honey. Many leaves were examined by him which had not yet lifted their lids, and into which, of course, no water could have penetrated; a small amount of fluid, varying from five to fifteen drops, was found in each. This liquid to the taste “was bland and somewhat mucilaginous”, says Dr. Mellichamp, “yet eventually leaving in the mouth a peculiar astringency, recalling very accurately the taste of the root, with which I am familiar.” (Proc. Am. Asso. p. 115.) This is not a little curious, that the pitchers,
which to a certain extent perform the function of roots, should secrete a juice closely resembling that found in the root itself.

In the unopened and immature pitchers there was no trace of insect-life to be found, no appearance of eggs, larve, or animal débris. In the mature leaf, on the contrary, in almost every one of the many hundreds subjected to examination, dead and decaying insects were found packed into the bottom of the tube. In the younger leaves there was only "a small wad of macerated insects, chiefly ants.... over which floated the still, clear, and almost tasteless liquor" (Proc. Am. Asso. p. 110). In the more mature leaves a considerable mass of decaying insects, with the chitinous coats of others, are to be found, reaching to the height of from one to six inches in the tube. In the midst of all this decay and death there are several forms of living insects which are found in the Sarracenia tubes. Of these we shall speak hereafter.

The mode of capture in these trumpet-leaves is very like that in Nepenthes. Down the front exterior wall of the pitcher runs a broad, longitudinal wing, reaching from the honey-bearing rim to the ground. In favourable ground, and with the necessary moisture and sunlight, it is found that honey is secreted, not only about the rim and within the mouth of the pitcher, but down the whole length of the wing. On one occasion Dr. Mellichamp found the border of the wing—"the honey trail"—streaming with honey. This was, however, an exceptionally copious secretion. The honey has been supposed to possess some intoxicating quality, in order to account for the capture of such a number of insects. Dr. Mellichamp's observations do not sustain this assumption. Insects are lured on by the honeyed path from the ground to the brim of the pitcher, and from there to its interior honey-secreting portion. Just below this, as we have said, is the surface covered with soft, downward-pointing hairs. The weight of the insect's body probably presses down the further end of the hairs, as they invariably slip backward when the tube is in a horizontal position; when it is erect, of course the tendency toward the bottom of the tube is even greater. The popular belief—which seems to be entirely unfounded—is that flies walk upon the ceiling or walls by means of a sucker in each foot; what they really possess is a pad covered with many short hairs, which constantly exude a somewhat sticky moisture. This materially assists them in walking upon smooth surfaces; on rougher ground they are aided by their claws. The pubescent surface of Sarracenia offers neither a smooth surface for the adhesion of the pads, nor anything solid on which to fasten their claws. The delicate growth of elongated cells is too deep for their claws to penetrate and take firm hold of the epidermal layer beneath; and this is equally true of many other insects.

A fly, therefore, which has tempted fate so far as to venture inside the pitcher, has small chance of escape; the manner in which he slips and tumbles about in his struggles to save himself, naturally led to the supposition that the honey, or the fumes from the pool below, had produced a sort of intoxication. Dr. Mellichamp made many experiments to determine this point, as a result of which he found that the liquor in a vial, over which flies are suspended in a gauze net, produces no effect, neither does the honey, on which they are allowed to feed outside the tube; we may therefore infer that it is unsteadiness of the feet, rather than of the head, which causes the destruction, in the Sarracenia pitcher, of so many unwary insects. There seems to be, without question, some anaesthetic quality in the liquor itself which mercifully stupifies the victims soon after they are immersed. The drooping hood, and aperture at right angles with the direction of the tube, makes escape
by flight a difficult matter, even to the nimble fly. Dr. Mellichamp hazards the conjecture that the white translucent spots upon the rim and lid of the pitchers are blinds to mislead the insects. He says:—

"Doubtless this may be esteemed a 'vain imagination,' yet, while watching the motions of flies in my first experiments, I have seen them strike against these 'sky-lights' over and over" (Proc. Am. Asso., p. 126).

It is a rather remarkable fact that the honey-loving bee very seldom frequents these tubes; only one humble-bee and one hive-bee have been found among the myriads of insects taken from the Sarracenia tubes, and examined by Dr. Mellichamp.

The insects which live in this miniature charnel-house are of several kinds. The first is a small and glossy moth, the Xanthoptera semicrocea, which is marked with black and pale yellow in rather a striking manner. This little moth possesses the power of walking securely over the treacherous ground which betrays so many of its fellows to their destruction. It is often found in pairs within the pitcher. About the end of April the female deposits her eggs near the mouth, soon after the pitcher has opened; and when the larva hatches, it spins over the slippery pubescence a web, which enables it to move securely over the surface; the larva then frets the leaf from within, the feeding beginning about a month after the pitcher is matured. When small, the larvae "begin to nip a little," says Dr. Mellichamp, "generally about the honey-pastures, or a little lower; but after gaining a little in size and strength, they spin a very fine gossamer-like web just at the mouth of the tube, thus connecting the hood and lower lip, and by which they effectually bar the outlet against all intruders from the outer world. They then go to work in earnest, eating both the anterior and posterior portions of the upper third of the leaf, through the parenchyma, and leaving only the thin epidermis—perhaps the closest cropping in nature. The smaller leaves will sometimes be almost entirely devoured, but in the large ones only the upper third, and in some of these only small patches, chiefly the sugary portions. A cluster of these plants at this season, formerly so erect, and fresh, and green, now looks burnt and blasted, the upper portions of the leaves frequently collapsing and falling down, while all that seems to support them is the excrementitious deposit of the larvae" (Proc. Am. Asso., p. 129). Prof. C. V. Riley tells us that there are two broods of Xanthoptera every year (Ibid., p. 21).

The second species of living inhabitants is still more frequently found in the pitchers, and has received the name Sarcophaga Sarracenia, or Sarracenia Flesh-fly. "By the time," says Prof. Riley, "the whitish efflorescence shows about the mouth of the pitcher, the moist and macerated insect-remains at the bottom will be found to contain almost invariably a single whitish, legless grub or 'gentle.' . . . This worm riots in the putrid insect-remains, and when fed upon them to repletion, bores through the leaf just above the petiole, and burrows into the ground. Here it contracts to the pupa state, and in a few days issues as a large two-winged fly" (Proc. Am. Asso., p. 24). This fly is viviparous, and it deposits its young upon tainted meat or other strong-smelling substances. It is possibly the odious smell of the Sarracenia which attracts it to the pitchers for this purpose. "These two insects," Prof. Riley goes on to say, "are the only species of any size that can invade the death-dealing trap with impunity while the leaf is in full vigour; and the only other species which seems at home in the leaf is a minute, pale mite belonging apparently to Holothyrus, in the Gamasidae, and which may quite commonly be found crawling within the pitcher; and a small lepidopterous leaf-miner, which I have not succeeded in rearing. There must, however,
be a fifth species which effectually braves the dangers of the bottom of the pit; for the pupa of Sarcophaga is sometimes crowded with a little chalcid parasite, the parent of which must have sought her victim while it was rioting there as larva" (Ibid., pp. 22-3).

The physical peculiarities which enable these insects to escape the destruction which seems almost inevitable to others, are partially known. The flesh-fly has a very large pad on each foot, and claws long enough to penetrate the pubescence and fasten on the solid cellular tissue below. The moth possesses long spines and spurs, which enable it to sustain itself in the same way. The larvae have the power, in common with other varieties, of withstanding the solvent power of a fluid which is capable of destroying and decomposing other forms of life; this is not an exceptional power, but is found in numbers of other forms of Muscidae and Oestridae. It has been suggested that some of the insects thus reared in the trumpet-leaves may return the favour by fertilizing the flower, as Sarracenia is not a self-fertilizer; but this is not sustained by observation. Prof. Riley's conclusion is, briefly summed up, first, that Sarracenia is an insectivorous plant; second, that the insects most easily digested and most useful to the plant are ants and small flies, which are lured on by the honey-path, while the larger insects are entrapped by accident, and then fall victims to the mechanism of the pitchers; third, that the only benefit derived by the plants from the capture of their prey, is the liquid manure which is the result of the decay; fourth, that Sarcophaga is a mere intruder and sponges upon its unwilling host; fifth, that Xanthoptera has no function to perform which benefits the plant, but is the peculiar insect enemy of Sarra-
cenia; sixth, and finally, that neither moth nor fly has any exceptional structure not possessed by some allied species, which enables it to brave the dangers of the pitchers.

Hooker suggests it as probable, that "just as the saccharine exudation only makes its appearance during one particular period in the life of the pitcher, so the digestive functions may also be, only of short duration" (Rep. Brit. Asso. p. 110). The notion that birds resort to these pitchers in dry seasons for their water supplies, seems to be due to the fact that they do often tear open the tubes in order to devour their contents. The office of the pitchers, it would seem, is not quite fulfilled in life, for after they wither and fall, the collected nitrogenous matter within them serves to enrich the soil, like ordinary manures.

There is a short and unsatisfactory notice in the Linnæan Society Transactions (vol. xviii. p. 429) of another genus in the family Sarraceniaceae, the Heliamphora. The tube of this plant is in its internal structure like the Sarracenia; it has never, so far as we know, been studied functionally. The chief interest which attaches to it, is the fact that it supplies to the eye at once the link which makes clear the morphology of the modified leaf. Botanists tell us that tubes of the pitcher-plants are metamorphosed petioles, bearing upon their tips leaves, which are the lids. To the uninitiated this is not altogether satisfactory; we want to know just how they know this, whether it is a fact reached after close and careful study, or merely a guess. When, however, we find a form like that of Heliamphora, our faith is wonderfully assisted, and we begin to think that botanists are remarkably good guessers. Here we see a broad winged petiole, or foot-stalk, with its lateral portions curved round till they meet and form a tube, and with the extreme edges turned back again, making the longitudinal exterior wings or honey-path. From the tip of the petiole springs upright a small, deeply concave leaf, which suggests the lid of the Sarracenia-pitcher,
or the still more remarkable hood of the Darlingtonia, the last insectivorous plant of which we shall speak. The Heliamphora, like Darlingtonia, might be called an "insignificant geographical outlier" of the Sarracenia family, for only one species has yet been found, and that in British Guiana, at a height of six thousand feet above the sea level.

The Darlingtonia Californica is found in an equally remote locality: it grows in the spongy sphagnum bogs of the Sierra Nevada, at a height of from five thousand to seven thousand feet above the level of the sea; "in the northern mountains of California," Mr. Canby tells us, "beneath the snows of Mount Shasta." The Sarracenas, we have seen, are found only upon the Atlantic slope of North America, with the exception of one species, which, on the authority of Mr. Canby, is found as far west as Michigan. The Darlingtonia was first discovered by Dr. Brackenridge, of the Wilkes Exploring Expedition, in the year 1842; but the description of it was not considered accurate enough for publication until several years later. The first published description is to be found in the Smithsonian Contributions for the year 1854. The plant, Mr. Canby tells us, has not, so far as he knows, been cultivated with even moderate success. A few months ago there was a fine specimen in the greenhouses of the Agricultural Department at Washington, but a visit there a few days ago, for the purpose of examining it, educed only the discouraging information that it was dead.

The tubes of Darlingtonia, though like those of Sarracenia in some respects, show a marked difference in others. The leaves of this plant, like those of Sarracenia, are radical—that is, they spring directly from the ground. Every description and figure of the plant which we have been able to find, shows all the leaves to be pitcher-shaped. Each tube is twisted upon its axis about half a turn. On a single plant all the pitchers are twisted in one direction; but some plants show a uniform twist of all the leaves to the right, and others of all to the left. Instead of a lid like that of Sarracenia, the upper portion of the tubular petiole itself curves over, forming a dome which arches over the cavity of the pitcher, and so much beyond it that the apex of the dome stands above the inner wall of the tube. It continues to curve around and inward till only a small orifice is left between the lower edges of the curved dome and the inner wall of the tube. From this point, the upper edge of the orifice, springs the leaf. It is narrow at its junction with the petiole, but diverges rapidly, and soon bifurcates into two long, pointed wings. This appendage hangs downward, partially guarding the entrance to the tube. The tube itself is of a green colour, which gradually melts into a yellowish tint as the arched hood is reached. Examined closely, it is found that the change of colour is due to the presence, in the upper part of the pitcher which forms its dome, of large numbers of translucent yellowish spots, lying between the green veins of the petiole, just as we have already found the white diaphanous spots on Sarracenia lying amid the purple veins. The wings which flare out from the mouth of the orifice are brilliantly coloured, of a red tint; on the inner surface they are covered with short, stiff bristles pointing toward the orifice. Down the outside of the curved tube, opposite the mid-rib, is a longitudinal wing like that in Nepenthes and Sarracenia. Evidently it is morphologically the doubling back of the two adjacent edges of the petiole, as in Heliamphora. This longitudinal projection does not probably serve as a lure, because, in the first place, there is no adequate evidence to prove that it possesses honey-glands, and in the second place, the insects found by Prof. Riley in the tube are flying insects, to which a honey-path, from the ground to the orifice, would be useless.
The swallow-tailed appendage, however, gives traces of honey, and the vaulted roof beneath the dome has distinctly observed honey-glands. This appendage is in every way fitted to attract the peculiar prey of Darlingtonia, and to decoy them into the pitcher, where escape is next to impossible.

The pitchers are found, like those of the other genera belonging to this family, packed with insect-remains, which are covered with a clear fluid secreted by the glands. Descriptions of new and strange forms, with which no analogy can be found, are very puzzling; we will therefore risk a tedious repetition, in order to make clear the form and mode of capture of the Darlingtonia pitchers. Mr. Lemmon, as quoted by Mr. Canby, says:—“The plant, I assure you, is a fly-trap of the most successful kind. The petioles are often thirty inches high, inflated and growing larger at the apex, where they swell into a thin, bladdery, transparent hood, projecting out over the wing of the petiole, and pierced by a round orifice beneath, and the true leaf pendant, like a swallow's tail, from the outer edge of the hood. Within this hood is secreted a saccharine fluid, which is very attractive to insects. The inner side of the inflated petiole is clothed with long, stiff hairs, pointing downwards. Several inches of the bottom of the tube are filled with a clear fluid (secreted by the leaves, it must be), and I have always found any leaf of age to contain a large quantity of insects or their remains in it. While bringing home plants in my buggy to see if I could cultivate them, the 'Jack Hornets' crowded into them so that I had often to slit the leaves with a knife, or turn them over, to let those escape that were above the water.” (Proc. Am. Asso. p. 68.)

Like the Sarracenia, the odour of this plant is very offensive.

The most remarkable fact in Darlingtonia, Hooker tells us, is, that it shows in its own person a curious combination of the two pitcher-forms found in the different species of Sarracenia. In its infant form, he says, “it has narrow, twisted, trumpet-shaped pitchers, with very oblique open mouths, the dorsal tip of which is drawn out into a long, slender, arching scarlet hood that hardly closes the mouth.” (Rep. Brit. Asso. p. 111.) The slight twist in the tube causes them to turn in every direction; these capture only very small insects, and correspond to the tubes in the first class of Sarracenia. Before maturing, however, the plant bears much larger sub-erect pitchers, also twisted, with the lip produced into a large inflated hood—and so on, giving a full description of the tube, which has already been given here; these, he says, correspond with the pitchers in the last-mentioned species of Sarracenia.

The flower of the Darlingtonia is solitary, growing upon a tall stem, having a general, external look, in the uncoloured plates, like a double daffodil, and growing to a height of three or four feet. There are five long overhanging green sepals, and five brightly coloured petals, each of which has a notch upon either side. In the centre of from twelve to fifteen stamens hangs the ovary, which is bell-shaped; occupying the position of clapper to this bell, is the style, which parts into five curved stigmatic surfaces. From the relative position of the stigmas and anthers of the flower, it cannot be self-fertilizing; the pollen developed in the stamens could not possibly fall upon its own stigmatic surfaces, and fertilization by insect agency is therefore necessary. The following quotation from Hooker suggests a close connection between the floral and foliar arrangements of this curious plant:—“Looking at a flowering specimen of Darlingtonia,” he says, “I was struck with a remarkable analogy between the arrangements and colouring of the parts of the leaf and of the flower. The petals are as highly coloured as the flap of the pitcher, and between each pair of petals is a hole (formed by a notch in the opposite margins of each) leading to
the stamens and stigma. Turning to the pitcher, the relation of its flap to its entrance is somewhat similar. Now, we know that coloured petals are especially attractive organs, and that the object of their colour is to bring insects to feed on their pollen or nectar, and, in this case, by means of the hole to fertilize the flower; that the object of the flap and its sugar is also to attract insects, but with a very different result, cannot be doubted. It is hence conceivable that this marvellous plant lures insects to its flowers for one object, and feeds them while it uses them to fertilize itself; and that when this is accomplished, some of its benefactors are thereafter lured to its pitchers, for the sake of feeding itself." (Rep. Brit. Asso. p. 111.)

Wonderful and interesting as these plants in themselves are, possessing, as they do, the most varied and delicate and ingenious contrivances for the capture of their prey, and the most complex organs for digesting it; yet they derive their chief interest from the relation in which they stand to other organisms. They seem to form a connecting link between the two great organic kingdoms of Nature. Belonging truly to the vegetable world, they are yet in many points allied to the animal creation. Each new fact, or class of facts, which is added to the scanty sum of human knowledge, possesses an intrinsic worth which justifies the search for it; but besides this, it has been the incentive and the reward of that intellectual striving which is in itself so good and noble a thing.

Beyond all this, every fragment of truth has another and an added value; it is one of the stones needed for the uprearing of that mighty temple which, in its unfinished state, may be, perhaps, the abode of the moles and the bats, but which in its completeness shall be the temple of the Lord our God. Each new physical fact adds another note to the grand choral symphony of praise in which the works of God are for ever sounding forth the glory of their Creator. The old Pythagorean fable of the "harmony of the spheres," which only the ears of their master could hear, shadows forth a divine truth, but shadows it forth faintly and partially. The old exclusive philosophies, thank God! have passed away; it is not the Master alone who hears the divine truth, but all who are his. The ears which shall hear the full chorus when—

"Earth, with her thousand voices, praises God," are not alone those of the wise and the mighty, but those which have been purified from their earthliness by the touch of our loving Lord.
BEHOLD THE MAN! A PICTURE MEDITATION.*

Transcribed from the German of Dr. Franz Delitzsch, by Jessie Young.

What a fair country is this Galilee!

No wonder the Romans described it as the most beautiful of all lands. But what is all this external loveliness in comparison with the beauty of a soul in which the divinity is mirrored, and what is all the glory of this world to the heavenly world of love, made known by Him from the mountain-pulpit of Hittin.*

My heart is ready to burst with joy that I am found worthy to look upon Him. Would that He would come! Oh God, make mine eyes clear to see Him distinctly, and to describe Him plainly as He is, without adding to, or taking from, the truth.

Behold: a crowd approaches—a mass of human beings, some old, some young, but the majority of them poor; some are lame, some are maimed in various ways, and amongst the number are many blind persons, who have to be dragged along over stock and stone. Each one of this motley Christ in His humiliation, but in His glorification. White and ruddy are to the Shulamite, whose own complexion is embrowned by the sun, a great beauty. Even in the present day, the Bedaween women are termed “the black,” and Arab females resident in cities “the white,” “Hawârâyth.”

* Kurun Hattin (the Horns of Hattin) is the name of the saddle-shaped mountain with two peaks, one higher on the eastern, and the other on the western side, which is frequently called “The Mount of Beatitudes” and is always identified in Latin traditions with the scene of Our Lord’s Sermon on the Mount. The exact pronunciation of the Arabic name approaches rather to Hittin than Hattin. The fertility and beauty of the shores at the head of the Lake give colour to the derivation of its name from “The Princes’ Garden.”

ERERE, between Cana of Galilee and Kefr Kenna, will we remain a little space, here will we await His arrival. We will take our station on this path between the fields gay with corn-flowers, for He must needs pass along this way in order to cross the plains and valleys and blooming meadows which lie between Tiberias and that Lake of Gennesareth which He has already so often visited. But are we certain to recognize Him? Nay, how should we fail to do so, when the voice of the Shulamite reaches us across a thousand years, exclaiming “My Beloved is white and ruddy, the CHIEFEST AMONG TEN THOUSAND.”†

* In Farrar’s Life of Christ, vol. i. page 308, the following footnote appears: “The general idea of this chapter, and many of its details, were suggested to me by an exceedingly beautiful and interesting little tract of Dr. F. Delitzsch, called Sehet Welche ein Mensch. Ein Geschichtsgemälde Leipzig, 1869.” Some may perhaps consider that both Dr. Delitzsch and I have given too much scope to the imagination; but, with the exception of one or two references to early tradition, they will scarcely find an incident, or even an expression, which is not sanctioned by notices in the Evangelists.” At the request of several correspondents as well as for its own beauty we give a translation of the tract Dr. Farrar refers to.—Editor of T.Q.

† Where the Shulamite calls her Beloved “white and ruddy,” old writers see an allusion, in the white to Christ’s spotless purity, and in the ruddy to His bleeding wounds. But Solomon is not a type of

“Sweet it was, when here below
Jesus lived, and field and plain
Traversed with his lowly train,
While with balm for every woe
Fell his words like soft spring rain.”—Schenkendorf.
and miserable crowd is urged by one wish, that of outrunning the others. The whole village of Rimmon, which lies between Cana and Kenna, is in motion,* every inhabitant appears to have turned out, and the crowd formed by the eager residents who have thus forsaken their homes, is swelled by the dwellers in all the country side. The words, "Go to Kenna, to Kenna! that is where He will next halt!" are a signal for a violent rush forward. In eager pursuit, scarce thinking whither they go, the crowd press forward on all sides. An old man, leaning on crutches, falls down exhausted upon the ground. "Forwards! forwards!" cries a female voice, "He is a Baalnès," (miracle-worker) "of whom the world has never seen the like," says one. "Nay, He is more than that," says another, "Malca Meschicha! Malca Meschicha!" ("King Messias") chimes in a third. "Tame! tame!" ("Unclean! unclean!") rises from the hoarse throat of many an unhappy leper, intent only on the healing of his own dire disease.

The cause of all this excitement is, after all, merely curiosity and self-interest and the superficial sort of enthusiasm commonly felt by the vulgar for any very remarkable person. Is this what is to usher in the approach of the long-expected One? The impression made on one's mind by the idea is a repulsive one.

But, lo! an unusual and remarkable-looking company of men and women are now beginning to appear in sight on the summit of yonder gentle declivity. Four persons come first in view, their step is tolerably rapid, but ever and anon their glances are turned back instead of forward. These four are followed by five others, two on each side of a central figure, on whom their eyes continue rest with an expression of reverence amounting to adoration, while at the same time they press upon Him with such tender clinging that they scarcely leave Him room for free movement of His limbs in that narrow pathway. Four others follow at the heels of these five. Three out of the group are evidently straining their ears to catch every word which may drop from the lips of Him who forms their centre. The fourth, who carries a kind of bag under his arm, appears less attentive to what is passing around him than absorbed in his own thoughts. This singular procession, however, is followed by many smaller groups and isolated individuals—too numerous, indeed, to be counted, and all evidently jealous of losing a single word from those lips, and eager to obtain the nearest possible place to Him on whom they are all intent, even the place where they are least likely to be disturbed by the noises of the crowd. The whole cavalcade is closed by a small company of women,* three walking together, followed by two others, and all of them veiled, each speaking to the others in familiar confidential conversation, yet each turning her eyes in one direction, even towards Him who is evidently the lodestar the whole company of men and women are following. Our eyes, too, are riveted upon Him who is the centre and moving spirit of the whole assembly.

He is not arrayed in silk and fine linen, like those that are in kings' houses, nor does He wear the long robe of the Pharisee. On his head is a white sudar;† fastened under the chin with a string, and hanging

* Imagining our Lord to be coming from Cana of Galilee, the scene of His first miracle, by Kefr Kenna, across Lubigje in an easterly direction towards Tiberias, on His way to the Lake of Gennesareth, He would necessarily pass Rimmon, now called Rummâne.

† Those artists who represent our Lord bareheaded labour under a mistake. It was forbidden to pray with head uncovered, and the priests in the Temple were always required to keep theirs covered. It grew consequently to be considered not only unbecoming but almost indecorous to go with no covering on the head.
down over His shoulders, and over His tunic, a garment covering the whole person, down to the hands and feet, has been thrown a blue tallith,* with the prescribed blue and white thread tassels at the four ends, so closely folded and held together that the grey under-garment with its red stripes is scarcely visible, while the feet shoed, not with shoes, but with sandals,† are but rarely seen. The costume is neat and dignified but not in any way showy or striking. But now let us approach a little nearer, so as to catch a glimpse of the much-honoured Teacher and Leader Himself.

He is a man of middle height, and youth has in Him not yet given place to age, the youthful purity and sweetness of His face being as a rose, yet not a red but a white one, blended as it is with the decision and maturity of manhood. His complexion is fairer than that of those around Him, His companions, and the multitude about Him being bronzed, like most Orientals.¶

His skin, on the contrary, is white, appearing yet more so, even under His white sudar, on account of His pallor and the absence of all hues of health. His features are not of the pure Hebrew cast, but rather a combination of the Jewish and Grecian types. It is a regularly-formed face, sweet and gracious, but inspiring reverence not less than love and confidence. The eyes are bright,* but their brilliance is tempered with a sweet, mournful tenderness, and their otherwise too dazzling beams seem to reach us through a mist of tears. He stoops a little, but His movements are neither awkward, like those of many of the Rabbins, nor rough, like those of the peasants about Him, but full of natural dignity and grace, like those of a king who cannot be disguised though attired in the garb of a poor man. Such is Jesus. Yes, thus is He presented to our gaze by evangelist, prophet, and apostle. And in truth, who has not often experienced what it is to be in the company of some one who at first strikes you as insignificant-looking, plain, and unattractive, but who, when you have grown to know him better, produces on you an impression totally the reverse? The nobility within makes itself visible even through the homely exterior—his eyes appear to you as the mirrors of a soul that is in covenant-relation with God, and his whole form grows transfigured in

* We cannot, of course, absolutely affirm that we are correct as to the colours usually worn by Our Lord, but that His Tallith was not generally white may be inferred from Matt. xvii. 2.; and that it was not red, like the garment of the Conqueror described in Isaiah ixiii. 2, we may judge from the declaration that He had not come into the world to condemn, but to save it. At the same time we have reason to imagine that Our Lord's attire contained the three sacred colours, blue, white, and scarlet; red would therefore be introduced, though sparingly. His perfect obedience to the law induces one to believe that He must have worn the fringes prescribed by Moses, though we have no certain knowledge. See Numbers xv. 38.

† That He wore sandals fastened with straps or thongs instead of shoes of fine leather, we may infer from Matthew x. 10; Mark i. 7; vi. 9. Compare also Acts xii. 8.

‡ Rabbi Ishmael says in Negaim p. 1, “The Children of Israel are as the wood of the box-tree, not black and not white, but of an intermediate tint.” In the ancient Egyptian remains, the Egyptians are represented red, the negroes black, and the inhabitants of Canaan and Syria of a lightish-brown hue.

¶ That He wore sandals fastened with straps or thongs instead of shoes of fine leather, we may infer from Matthew x. 10; Mark i. 7; vi. 9. Compare also Acts xii. 8.

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your sight into the translucent vehicle of a spirit so sanctified by the Holy Ghost that nothing impure or defiling could endure its presence. So must it have been with Jesus. It is probable that no one who saw Him for the first time noticed anything very remarkable either in His form or features. There was neither stateliness of figure nor unusual beauty. But those who had the divine happiness of becoming intimate with Him soon saw the royal glance shine out from eye and brow, and felt ere long compelled to say, in the words of "the song for the sons of Korah," "Thou art fairer than the children of men"; and to add, in the rapturous language of John, "And we beheld His glory, the glory as of the only-begotten of the Father, full of grace and truth."

And who, too, has not occasionally met one on whose countenance suffering has left such a visible imprint, in careworn brow, and face marred with lines, and eyes that have lost all their brightness, that he has involuntarily exclaimed, "Surely it must have been merited suffering that brought about all this"; and then has discovered so much divine patience and submission to the cross, and trust in the Father, even when He smites, in this child of sorrow, that he has grown to see God's hand-writing in every line on the brow, and the grey of a glorious dawn in every glance of sadness, and the dew-drops that mirror heaven in every tear. So was it with Jesus. He who only took a superficial glance at Him, and who merely saw in Him "the man of sorrows and acquainted with grief," felt repelled by the traces of terrible soul-conflict he beheld in Him, and "hid as it were his face from Him," esteeming Him "to be smitten, stricken of God, and afflicted." But those who came to know Him better, and who had been taught the awful mystery of His having taken all the sorrows and sins of His people upon His heart and conscience, and who knew also that "the zeal of God's house" had consumed His frame as with a fever,—they, and such as they, felt and ever feel constrained to yield Him in return such a love as would impel them to any sacrifice, while in the words of repentant Israel they exclaim, "The chastisement of our peace was upon Him, and with His stripes we are healed"; echoing, too, the acknowledgment of John the Baptist, "Behold the Lamb of God, that taketh away the sin of the world." Yes, thus, O Saviour, was it with those who were permitted the joy of beholding Thee when here upon earth. Now Thou art no longer subjected to the conditions of this our transitory existence, for Thou art exalted far above the highest heavens, but yet Thy humiliation has an everlasting existence in the Word which testifies of Thee; and inasmuch as we read with rapture of how Stephen saw Thee when his eyes were failing in death, amid the stones of his enemies; and how Paul beheld Thee when Thou didst appear to him before Damascus, smiting down to the earth the breather of threats against Thy people: and how Thou didst manifest Thysel[o] unto John in Patmos as the Lord of the Seven Churches of Asia, with the seven stars in Thy hand, and walking in the midst of the seven golden candlesticks; so do we read with a sacred and reverential curiosity how Thou didst, when here upon earth, walk up and down the land of Israel, abiding now on this, now on that side of Jordan's storied waters. And we feel it impossible to resist the desire which possesses us to unite in one picture the scattered fragments of Thy portrait sketched out for us in prophecy and exhibited more clearly in the Gospel narrative. We long to have brought before us as a living reality that sacred humanity into which, from the intensity of Thy sympathy with Thy people and with all humankind, Thou didst descend with Thy disciples upon the Mount of Beatitudes. We hang upon Thy lips from whence issued the words of life: with Simon Peter
we fall down before Thy knees; with the woman that was a sinner we kiss thy feet; with the long-diseased sufferer we seize the border of Thy garment; we see thy hands stretched out once again towards Thy disciples, as when thou didst say "Behold My mother and My brethren;" we gaze with them into the depths of Thy large eyes as Thou didst lift them up to heaven; and we deem that Mary blessed, who was honoured by being counted worthy to pour the precious ointment upon Thy head. Thou art the Begotten of God and of royal race, and yet, out of love to us, Thou didst consent to be a Man of Sorrows and the poorest of the poor. Oh Son of God! Oh Son of the King! make yet clearer to us this picture of Thy poverty which has become our riches, this picture of Thy sufferings which have become our salvation; yes, make them yet clearer to us through Thy Spirit bringing all things to our remembrance and that leading into all truth which Thou hast promised to Thy disciples. Nor do we err in putting up such a prayer. Those words of St. Paul, "Wherefore henceforth know we no man after the flesh; yea, though we have known Christ after the flesh, yet now henceforth know we Him no more," present, rightly understood, no opposition to this desire of ours for fuller knowledge of the humanity of our Lord. For the Apostle's meaning here is that the Christian faith with the duties it enjoins upon us is not to be determined and judged of after the national life, subject to the Mosaic laws, led by Christ while here below, but according to the spiritual life raised far above all the conditions and accidents of our earthly existence, which He is now living at the right hand of God. It is not, however, thereby to be understood that we are wrong in wishing to obtain a distinct and vivid representation before our mind's eye of what the Lord was like during the period of His sojourn here below. It is, indeed, by no means an easy task to weave together into one homogeneous pattern, to unite into one picture, the various scattered glimpses and features which we obtain by means of both Old and New Testaments of the Incarnate Son; for there will ever remain, when we contemplate and endeavour to comprehend this unique and mysterious personality, so much that we are unable to fathom, grasp, or even approach; that it is difficult indeed to tear aside the veil of mystery, and embody in words the stray hints that Scripture gives us as to the true human side of the nature of Jesus. But as far as may be done we are not only justified in making the attempt, but in duty bound so to do. The painter, the historian, the poet, as well as the divine, may legitimately use every effort to bring this sublime conception closely and clearly before us, provided always it be done in a spirit of love and reverence, without which, it is needless to say, it would be profanity to handle a subject so delicate, so Divine.

Messiah's image is the image of a king. But since the time when David, a type of his infinitely greater descendant, rising, as he did, through ignominy and persecution to a throne, wrote his prophetic psalms, there has ever been a distinction in the idea of the Messiah, between the glorious reward and the preceding sufferings, or, to use the language of dogmatic theology, between His humiliation and His glorification. The kingly majesty breaks through the "Ecce Homo" image like the blood-red clouds of morning. He is sick and poor, and falls a victim to a cruel and shameful death.

It is not easy to picture our Divine Lord as having been, while here upon earth, subject to bodily sickness. And in point of fact the New Testament narrative represents Him always as the wonderful Healer of diseases and never as Himself sick. We are never told (and it appears highly improbable) that during that brief space of three years allotted for His public ministry, He was
ever laid aside by any definite illness. But we cannot doubt that everything both external and internal to which our own frames are subject was permitted to shake and disturb His frame, for was He not in every respect like unto ourselves, sin only excepted? “In all things it behoved Him to be made like unto His brethren, that He might be a merciful and faithful High Priest: that in that He Himself hath suffered being tempted, He might be able to succour them that are tempted.” There needed no judicial murder to slay Him—there was pain sufficient to wear Him out, zeal to consume Him, exertion to over-tax Him, sickness to lay Him low, without the Cross of Calvary being necessary to His death. He must have frequently been wearied out and exhausted, as any man must have been who spent whole nights in prayer, denied himself the briefest interval of rest, and devoted every energy of his soul and body to the duties of his high vocation. He was sick of love—consumed by the fire of His devotion to God and man. He, the sinless, the spotlessly pure, had no need of any other passion to consume Him than this, which was “as a burning fire shut up in His bones.” The ardour of an eternal Being’s affections, when brought into contact with the physical weakness of a mortal, became too intense for the frail human tenement. Probably it was not merely His sufferings upon the Cross which crushed Him who was to be our Bread of Life into the bruised “Corn of wheat,” which, had it not fallen into the ground and died, would have abided alone, but which, if it died, would bring forth much fruit. Probably Christ’s delicate, highly-organised frame was well acquainted with physical suffering in various forms. In “the Golden Passional,” as Polycarp Lyser terms that incomparable chapter, the 53rd of Isaiah, we are told that “He was full of pain and sickness,” that “He hath borne our sicknesses and carried our sorrows,” and that “it hath pleased the Lord to bruise Him with sickness.”* We are accustomed to read these words without consideration, and to picture the Divine Sufferer with the physique of a stalwart hero, forgetting that He humbled Himself so deeply as to say, “I am a worm and no man,” and that the voice of prophecy depicted Him as One capable of exactly sympathising with every form of suffering in that human kind for which He came to be the Atonement. The ancient synagogue comprehended these prophecies more accurately than we ourselves do. The Jews of old recognized the idea of a suffering Messiah, and said of Him that links of iron would be fastened round His neck—that He would be crushed to the earth, that God would heap as it were mill-stones upon Him in the burdens of His calling and the pangs He must endure in expiation of sin, and that His bodily frame would wear itself out in tears and suffering. Their traditions go so far as to put into the mouth of Elijah, when questioned by Rabbi Joshua Ben Levi as to how Messiah is to be known when He comes, the following answer: “He sits at the gate of Rome (the kingdom of this world which oppresses the people of God) among the poor and the sick, healing and binding up wounds.”

The types and prophecies of the Old Testament also represent the Expected One as a poor man. The same being who, in the 40th Psalm, says “In the volume of the Book it is written of Me,” says later on in the same Psalm, “I am poor and needy, yet the Lord thinketh upon Me.” And the same king, in whom Jerusalem, the daughter of Zion, was to rejoice, who is called in Zechariah ix. “just and having salvation,”

* Delitzsch has, of course, quoted these passages from Luther’s German version, which gives quite a different sense from our own. The ancient Rabbins were led by a similar mode of interpretation to infer that the Messiah would be afflicted with leprosy.—Translator.
July 1876.

**A PICTURE MEDITATION.**

is yet, on the other hand, "lowly and riding upon an ass." On an ass, and not upon a war-horse. "You believe," said Sapor, King of Persia, ironically to the Jewish teacher Samuel, "that your Messiah will come riding on an ass. I would rather have a dapple-grey horse kept in readiness for him in my stable." And that by the Rabbins this riding upon an ass was regarded as a voluntary self-humiliation is evident from a remark in an ancient Midrash, which says that it will provoke the laughter of unbelieving Israel. And the passage in the 53rd of Isaiah, "He made his grave with the wicked and with the rich in his death," is understood by them to signify that His life through poverty, indignities, and shame wore on till it reached the climax of a death so painful as to comprise in itself many deaths, after which His glorification would commence.

Yes, the Lord Jesus was poor in this world's goods; we read, indeed, that He was received as a guest in the house of Matthew, in Galilee, and in that of Simon at Bethany, and elsewhere; and we have every reason to suppose that He ate and drank such things as were set before him, according to His own injunction to His disciples. But what constituted His usual diet when the pressure of His disciples upon Him allowed Him leisure to eat, and when He was not intentionally fasting? Bread, with the occasional addition of a little fish, appears to have constituted His ordinary food. Even the forty days which elapsed between the Resurrection and the Ascension witnessed no interruption to these habits of simplicity. Broiled fish and bread furnished the breakfast which He gave to the seven apostles at the sea of Tiberias, and a broiled fish and part of an honey-comb was all the disciples had to offer the Risen One at their own homes. Such was the Galilean frugality* in which the Saviour of Mankind and His little band of poor and humble followers lived. The disciples when hungry contented themselves with rubbing ears of corn in their hands; and if tradition is to be relied on, so ascetic did Peter, James, and John become in their habits, that they discontinued the use of animal food, and took to a diet entirely vegetable. "Poverty is as becoming to a Jew," says an old proverb of the Holy Land, "as red housings (according to other translations a red rose) to a white horse." The disciples of Christ were thus genuine representatives of the old Israelitish habits as followed by their Master. And in what sort of dwelling-place did the Saviour make His abode? A saying of the early Church states that "Bethlehem gave Him birth, Nazareth educated Him, Capernaum lodged Him." If, indeed, he had a residence in Capernaum, it is not to be imagined that the house was His own property. Most likely it was one lent Him for a season by some hospitable friend. This most honoured dwelling was probably a kind of mission-station from which He carried on His work of evangelizing Galilee. Strictly speaking "He had not where to lay His head." Under no roof did He here rule as master of the house. Even the family home at Nazareth, supposing it to have been Joseph's own property, Jesus could only have shared with His numerous brothers and sisters. Not a foot of ground belonged to Him. He literally possessed nothing beyond the clothes He wore.

On one occasion, when crossing over the Lake of Gennesareth, He, being weary, fell asleep on a pillow in the hinder part of the ship, but oftener His only bed was the hard ground of the wilderness. We read that after exhausting Himself with unremitting labours all day, He went, instead of seeking a night's lodging, into a desert place to refresh Himself with communion with His Father, and He continued all night in prayer to God; but even there He was not left un-

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* The Galileans are described in the Talmud as being poor.
disturbed: His disciples and the multitude discovering His whereabouts and following him into this retreat.* The mountains seem to have been His favourite locality for thus passing the night in prayer. The Transfiguration, that solemn consecration anticipatory of His death, was such a night-scene. He continued instant in prayer, whilst His disciples were unable to resist the inclination to sleep, and in answer to these prayers He was wonderfully strengthened to meet the death which was before Him. And what income had He with which to meet the daily exigencies of life? What Peter afterwards said: "Silver and gold have I none," was equally true of his Lord, who, when He was asked for the tribute-money, had to work a miracle in order to obtain the didrachmas demanded of Himself and Peter. We on no occasion read of a poor person applying to Him for alms—it was distinctly known to all that the means of help at His disposal were not monetary. But at the same time neither do we read of assistance being proffered Him, either out of the Tamchui or public alms-dish or from the Kuppa or alms-box. He was raised above the necessity of having His wants supplied by public charity, above dependence on the benevolence of the community. He was poor, but His poverty differed in this from that of this world's paupers, that He did not receive what was merely the gift of ordinary charity, but accepted only the voluntary offerings of a dutiful affection, which in His humiliation had not lost sight of His greatness. From these offerings of an adoring love the wants of the Lord and His immediate followers were supplied. Instead of a purse, use was made of the Glossokomen, i.e., basket or bag, which was entrusted to the keeping of Judas Iscariot. When, on the night previous to the crucifixion, the traitor went out after the utterance of Christ's words, "what thou doest, do quickly," in order to accomplish his work of darkness, the disciples thought Jesus had said this because as Judas was the bearer of the Glossokomen something was to be purchased for the feast or given to the poor. For it was a precept current among the Jews that even the poorest in the community was not exempt from the bestowal of some alms. An annual subscription of at least a third of a shekel was expected from every one, and assistance was especially required by the poor at the season of the Passover, because at that solemnity four cups of wine were enjoined by the law to be used at the feast. This duty was fulfilled by the Lord Jesus, but through the hands of others, for to bestow alms personally and directly was unworthy of Him. He spent what was better than copper and silver.

Yes, "though he was rich, yet for our sakes He became poor, that we through His poverty might be made rich." His birthplace was a cavern which commonly served as a stable. A manger constituted His cradle. His mother offered for her purification a pair of turtle-doves, the cheap sacrifice permitted to the very poor. Gifts brought by strangers from a distant land paid the expenses of the flight into Egypt. On His return He resided in the despised Nazareth, a little country town far from all the great high-roads both of land and water.*

He travelled through the country in the poor attire of an itinerant teacher. With the words "Blessed are the poor in spirit," did He begin His ministry, and He announced it as one of the principal signs of the new epoch now commencing that "to the poor the Gospel was preached,"—Only

* "In the midst of Galilee," writes the missionary Zeller, "about seven miles from Acre and the Mediterranean, lies Nazareth in its secluded basin among the hills just above the Plain of Jezreel, the old city occupying the western slope of the hill. On the terrace above may have stood the synagogue Christ visited every Sabbath."
three years after the commencement of His ministry was He sold by one of His own disciples for thirty shekels, the price of a slave. Roman soldiers offered ironical homage mingled with blows to the mock king of the Jews, with the cry of "Behold the Man." Pilate led Him forth, scourged and attired in robes of a masquerade royalty, to a populace, who, under the influence of their fanatical leaders, replied with cries of "Crucify him! crucify him!" Thus came it about that He was sentenced to that death with which, in the Latin Comedies, slaves are constantly threatened, and which was reserved for the very worst and vilest criminals. Thrust forth from the camp of Israel, delivered over to the Gentiles, and made a curse for us, He was nailed to the stake of infamy; His raiment was torn off from His body, and four Roman soldiers divided these spoils under His own dying eyes, and cast lots for His outer garment. Thus hung He between Heaven and earth, an object of contempt to His enemies, though to all who loved Him most glorious and divine. The "wine mingled with myrrh," the usual gift of the humane ladies of Jerusalem to a criminal about to be executed, in order to dull his sufferings,* He refused, contenting Himself with vinegar; and when He had received that vinegar which loosened His tongue which through thirst and exhaustion was cleaving to His jaws, He cried, "It is finished," bowed down His head and gave up the ghost. But even after death His self-abnegation for our sakes was not ended. His sacred corpse, pierced with a spear, poured out blood and water, living fountains for His holy church.

So for our sakes has He taken all upon Him, and for us has sacrificed all. Obedient unto death, He has fulfilled God’s everlasting design of mercy, His blood has made atonement for our sins, by His stripes we are healed. His dead body is the seed-corn of redeemed humanity.

Let us gaze into those eyes which death is dimming that with Him all our selfishness may die. Let us embrace those death-chilled feet and so quench our worldly desires. Let us learn how to love from this example of Love incarnate and crucified,—Love which for us, who so little deserved affection, so readily consented to bleed and die.

There is much that in this world passes under the name of love which but little deserves that appellation. Least of all is it entitled to be called Christian love. Attachment to those to whom we are united by the ties of kindred and choice, to those who are in every way entitled to our affection and esteem, and who are prodigal of their love in return, is well in its way, but is not the special kind of love of which Jesus has set us so divine an example. If you would love as He loved, you must love men not because they deserve love, but because they need it; you must love contrary to the impulses of your nature; you must love by preference the poorest, most ignorant, most sinful; aye, love them till your love has drawn them out of their wretched condition. That love which is awakened by the attractive qualities of the person beloved is not necessarily sinful, but it is not divine; it is inspired by self, and, so far from being capable of rendering us happy, it prepares for us future disquietude, because it places us in a state of servile dependence on the creature. But, happy in itself, whether it finds a response in another’s breast or not, is that love which is not idolatrous but self-abnegating, being willing to take all the wants, both spiritual and temporal, of its neighbour into its own life, the love of compassion and divine sympathy, even that which led the Son of God to exchange heaven for the depths of our misery.

* The custom was founded on Proverbs xxxi. 6.
An Indian poet says of the Musa palm,* which bends down, so weak, yet so obedient, beneath its exuberant fruitage, that it stoops to kiss that mother-earth which brought it forth, patiently bearing meanwhile the strokes of the axe. So is it with Christian love. The love of Christ crucified is the soil from which it springs. To that native soil does it thankfully bow down its fruit-laden head. It loves Jesus above all, loves all in Him, loves Him in all, loves Him especially in the poor and needy—"His little ones"—hoping at last to hear the joy-bringing words of the King, when He comes in His glory to judge the world:—"I was hungry and ye gave Me meat, I was thirsty and ye gave Me drink, I was a stranger and ye took Me in, naked and ye clothed Me, sick and in prison and ye came unto Me."

Yes, oh Jesus! Thy love is our life, let it also be our pattern—we desire to love the poor and afflicted, because in our poverty and misery Thou didst first love us.

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**HEBREW POETRY.**


MORE than one-third of the Old Testament is poetry. This fact is concealed, and much of the beauty of the Bible lost to many readers by the uniform printing of poetry and prose in our popular Bibles. The current versicular division is purely mechanical, and does not at all correspond to the metrical structure or the laws of Hebrew versification.

The poetry of the Old Testament is contained in the "Poetical Books," which in the Jewish canon are included among the "Hagiographa" or "Holy Writings," namely, Job, the Psalms, the Proverbs, Ecclesiastes, and the Song of Solomon. Besides these, the Lamentations of Jeremiah, and most of the Prophets, are likewise poetic in sentiment and form; and a number of lyric songs, odes, and prophecies, are scattered through the historical books.

The poetic sections of the New Testament are the "Benedictus" of Zacharias, the "Magnificat" of the blessed Virgin, the "Gloria in Excelsis," the "Nunc dimittis" of Simeon, the Parables of our Lord, the Anthems of the Apocalypse, and a number of poetic citations scattered through the Epistles.

Sometimes the prose of the Bible is equal to the best poetry, and blends truth and beauty in perfect harmony. It approaches also, in touching the highest themes, the rhythmical form of Hebrew poetry, and may be arranged according to the parallelism of members. Moses was a poet as well as an historian, and every prophet or seer is a poet, though not every poet is a prophet. The same is true of the prose of the New Testament. We need only refer to the Beatitudes and the whole Sermon on the Mount, the Parables of our Lord, the Prologue of St. John, the seraphic description of love by St. Paul in the thirteenth chapter of Second Corinthians, and his triumphant...
paean at the close of the eighth chapter of Romans, which, in the opinion of Erasmus, surpassed the eloquence of Cicero.

In this wider sense the Bible begins and ends with poetry. The retrospective vision of the first creation, and the prospective vision of the new heavens and the new earth are presented in language which rises to the summit of poetic beauty and power. There can be nothing more pregnant and sublime in thought, and at the same time more terse and classical in expression than the sentence of the Creator:

"Let there be light! And there was light."

Is there a loftier and more inspiring conception of man than that with which the Bible introduces him into the world, as the very image and likeness of the infinite God? And the idea of a paradise of innocence, love, and peace at the threshold of history, is poetry as well as reality, casting its sunshine over the gloom of the fall, and opening the prospect of a future paradise regained. Then, passing from the first chapter of Genesis to the last of the Apocalypse, how tender and affecting is St. John's description of the New Jerusalem—the inspiring theme of all the hymns of heavenly home-sickness from "Ad perennis vitae fontem" to "Jerusalem the golden," which have cheered so many weary pilgrims on their journey through the desert of life!

Hebrew poetry has always been an essential part of Jewish and Christian worship. The Psalter was the first, and for many centuries the only hymn-book of the Church. It is the most fruitful source of Christian hymnody. Many of the finest English and German hymns are free reproductions of Hebrew psalms; the 23rd Psalm alone has furnished the key-note to a large number of Christian hymns, and the 46th Psalm to Luther's masterpiece: "Ein' feste Burg ist unser Gott."

As among other nations, so among the Jews, poetry was the oldest form of composition. It precedes prose, as youth precedes manhood, and as feeling and imagination are active before sober reflection and logical reasoning.

Poetry and music were closely connected, and accompanied domestic and social life in seasons of joy and sorrow. They cheered the wedding, the harvest, and other feasts. They celebrated victory after a battle, as the Song of Moses and the Song of Deborah: they greeted the victor on his return. The shepherd sung while watching his flock, the hunter in the pursuit of his prey. Maidens deplored the death of Jephtha's daughter in songs, and David the death of Saul and Jonathan, and afterwards Abner. Love was the theme of a nobler inspiration than among the more sensual Greeks, and the Song of Songs celebrates the Hebrew ideal of pure bridal love, as reflecting the love of Jehovah to his people, and prefiguring the union of Christ and his Church.

In a wider sense all true poetry is inspired. The civilized nations of antiquity, particularly the Greeks, regarded it as a divine gift, and poets as prophets and intimate friends of the gods; and all the ceremonies, oracles and mysteries of their religion were clothed in poetic dress. There is, however, a twofold inspiration, a divine and a satanic; and the poetry which administers to pride and sensual passion, idolizes the creature, ridicules virtue, and makes vice attractive, is the product of the evil spirit.

The poetry of the Hebrews is in the highest and best sense the poetry of inspiration and revelation. It is inspired by the genius of the true religion, and hence rises far above the religious poetry of the Hindoos, Parsees, and Greeks, as the religion of revelation is above the religion of nature, and the God of the Bible above the idols of the heathen. It is the poetry of truth and holiness. It never administers to trifling vanities and lower passions; it is the chaste and spotless priestess at the altar. It reveals
the mysteries of the divine will to man, and offers up man's prayers and thanks to his Maker. It is consecrated to the glory of Jehovah and the moral perfection of man.

The most obvious feature of Bible poetry is its intense theism. The question of the existence of God is never raised, and an atheist—if there be one—is simply set down as a fool. The Hebrew poet lives and moves in the idea of a living God, as a self-revealing, personal, almighty, holy, omniscient, all-pervading, and merciful Being, and overflows with his adoration and praise. He sees and hears God in the works of creation, and in the events of history. Jehovah is to him the Maker and Preserver of all things. He shines in the firmament, He rides on the thunderstorm, He clothes the lilies, He feeds the ravens and young lions, and the cattle on a thousand hills. He gives rain and fruitful seasons; He is the God of Abraham, Isaac and Jacob, of Moses, David, and the prophets. He dwells with Israel, He is their ever present help and shield, their comfort and joy. He is just and holy in his judgments, good, merciful and true in all his dealings. He overrules even the wrath of man for his own glory and the good of his people.

To this all-pervading theism corresponds the anthropology. Man is always represented under his most important moral and religious relations, in the state of innocence, in the terrible slavery of sin, or in the process of redemption and restoration to more than his original glory and dominion over the creation. Hebrew poetry reflects in fresh and life-like colours, the working of God's law and promise on the heart of the pious, and every state of his experience, the deep emotions of repentance and grief, faith and trust, gratitude and praise, hope and aspiration, love and peace.

Another characteristic of Bible poetry is the childlike simplicity and naturalness with which it sets forth and brings home the sublimest ideas to readers of every grade of culture who have a lively organ for religious truth. The scenery and style are thoroughly oriental and Hebrew, and yet they can be translated into every language without losing by the process—which can not be said of any other poetry. Greek and Roman poetry have more art and variety, more elegance and finish, but no such popularity, catholicity, and adaptability. The universal heart of humanity beats in the Hebrew poet. It is true, his experience falls far short of that of the Christian. Yet nearly every phase of Old Testament piety strikes a corresponding chord in the soul of the Christian; and such are the depths of the Divine Spirit who guided the genius of the sacred singers that their words convey far more than they themselves were conscious of, and reach prophetically forward into the most distant future. The higher order of secular poetry furnishes an analogy. Shakespeare was not aware of the deep and far-reaching meaning of his own productions, and Goethe said that the deepest element in poetry is "the unconscious" (das unbewusste), and that his masterpiece, the tragedy of Faust, proceeded from the dark and hidden depths of his being.

The peculiarities of Hebrew poetry culminated in the Psalter, the holy of holies in Hebrew literature. David, "the singer of Israel," was placed by Providence in the different situations of shepherd, courtier, outlaw, warrior, conqueror, king; that he might the more vividly set forth Jehovah as

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* Not less in relation to the most highly cultured minds than to the most rude—not less to minds disciplined in abstract thought, than to such as are unused to generalization of any kind—the Hebrew Scriptures, in the metaphoric style, and their poetical diction, are the fittest medium for conveying, what is their purpose to convey, concerning the Divine Nature, and concerning the spiritual life, and concerning the correspondence of man—the finite, with God—the Infinite. Isaac Taylor on "Spirit of Hebrew Poetry," p. 50.
the Good Shepherd, the ever-present Helper, the mighty Conqueror, the just and merciful Sovereign. He was open to all the emotions of friendship and love, generosity and mercy; he enjoyed the highest joys and honours; he suffered poverty, persecution, and exile, the loss of the dearest friend, treason and rebellion from his own son. Even his changing moods and passions, his sins and crimes, which, with their swift and fearful punishments, form a domestic tragedy of rare terror and pathos were overruled and turned into lessons of humility, comfort, and gratitude. All this rich spiritual biography from his early youth to his old age, together with God's merciful dealings with him, are written in his hymns, though with reference to his inward states of mind, rather than his outward condition, so that readers of every different situation or position in life, might yet be able to sympathize with the feelings and emotions expressed. His hymns give us a deeper glance into his inmost heart and his secret communings, than the narrative of his life in the historical books. They are remarkable for simplicity, freshness, vivacity, warmth, depth, and vigour of feeling, childlike tenderness and heroic faith, and the all-pervading fear and love of God. Professor Perowne of Cambridge, in his excellent Commentary on the Psalms, of which a third edition has appeared, gives the following truthful description of David:

"As David's life shines in his poetry, so also does his character. That character was no common one. It was strong with all the strength of man, tender with all the tenderness of woman. Naturally brave, his courage was heightened and confirmed by that faith in God which never, in the worst extremity, forsook him. Naturally warm-hearted, his affections struck their roots deep into the innermost centre of his being. In his love for his parents, for whom he provided in his own extreme peril—in his love for his wife Michal—for his friend Jonathan, whom he loved as his own soul—for his darling Absalom, whose death almost broke his heart—even for the infant whose loss he dreaded—we see the same man, the same depth and truth, the same tenderness of personal affection. On the other hand, when stung by a sense of wrong or injustice, his sense of which was peculiarly keen, he could flash out into strong words and strong deeds. He could hate with the same fervour that he loved. Evil men and evil things, all that was at war with goodness and with God—for these he found no abhorrence too deep, scarcely any imprecations too strong. Yet he was, withal, placable and ready to forgive. He could exercise a prudent self-control, if he was occasionally impetuous. His true courtesy, his chivalrous generosity to his foes, his rare delicacy, his rare self-denial, are all traits which present themselves most forcibly as we read his history. He is the truest of heroes in the genuine elevation of his character, no less than in the extraordinary incidents of his life. Such a man can not wear a mask in his writings. Depth, tenderness, fervour, mark all his poems."

In its religious character, as just described, lies the crowning excellency of the poetry of the Bible. The spiritual ideas are the main thing, and they rise in richness, purity, sublimity, and universal importance immeasurably beyond the literature of all other nations of antiquity.

But as to the artistic and aesthetic form, it is altogether subordinate to the contents, and held in subserviency to the lofty aim. Moses, Solomon, and David, Isaiah, and the author of Job possessed evidently the highest gifts of poetry; but they restrained them, lest human genius should outshine the divine grace, or the silver pitcher be estimated above the golden apple. The poetry of the Bible, like the whole Bible, wears the garb of humility, and condescends to men of low degree in order to raise them up. It gives no encouragement to the idolatry of genius, and glorifies God alone. "Not unto us, O Lord, not unto us, but unto Thy name give glory."

Hence an irreligious or immoral man is apt to be repelled by the Bible; he feels himself in an uncongenial atmosphere, and is made uneasy and uncomfortable by the rebukes of sin and the praise of a holy God. He will not have this book to rule over him
or disturb him in his worldly modes of thought and habits of life.

Others are unable to divest themselves of early prejudices for classical models; they esteem external polish more highly than ideas, and can enjoy no poetry which is not cast in the Greek mould, and moves on in the regular flow of uniform metre and stanza. And yet these are no more essential to true poetry than the music of rhyme, which was unknown to Homer, Pindar, Sophocles, Virgil, and Horace, and was even despised by Milton as "the invention of a barbarous age to set off wretched matter and lame metre, as the jingling sound of like endings, trivial to all judicious ears, and of no true musical delight." This is indeed going to the opposite extreme; for although rhyme and even metre are by no means necessary, especially in the epos and drama, they belong to the perfection of lyric poetry, which is the twin sister of music.

If we study the Bible poetry on its own ground, and with unclouded eyes, we may find in it forms of beauty as high and enduring as in that of any nation, ancient or modern. Even its artless simplicity and naturalness are sometimes the highest triumphs of art. Simplicity always enters into good taste. Those poems and songs which are the outgushing of the heart, without any show of artificial labour, are the most popular, and never lose their hold on the heart. We feel that we could have made them ourselves, and yet only a higher order of genius could produce them.

Where is there a nobler ode of liberty, of national deliverance and independence, than the song of Moses on the overthrow of Pharaoh in the Red Sea? Where a grander panorama of creation than in the 104th Psalm? Where a more charming and lovely pastoral than the 23rd Psalm? Where such a high view of the dignity and destiny of man as in the 8th Psalm? Where a profounder sense of sin and divine forgiveness than in the 32nd and 51st Psalms? Where such a truthful and overpowering description of the vanity of human life and the never-changing character of the holy and just, yet merciful God, as in the 90th Psalm, which has been styled "the most sublime of human compositions, the deepest in feeling, loftiest in theologic conception, the most magnificent in its imagery?" Where have the infinite greatness and goodness of God, his holiness, righteousness, long-suffering and mercy, the wonders of his government, and the feeling of dependence on Him, of joy and peace in Him, of gratitude for his blessings, of praise of his glory, found truer and fitter embodiment than in the Psalter and the Prophets? Where will you find such sweet, tender, delicate, and exquisite expression of pure innocent love as in the Song of Songs, which sounds like the singing of birds in sunny May from the flowery fields and the tree of life in Paradise? Isaiah is one of the greatest of poets as well as of prophets, of an elevation, a richness, a compass, a power and comfort that are unequalled. No human genius ever soared so high as this evangelist of the old dispensation. Jeremiah, the prophet of sorrow and affliction, has furnished the richest supply of the language of holy grief in seasons of public calamity and distress, from the destruction of Jerusalem down to the latest siege of Paris; and few works have been more effective than his Lamentations. And what shall we say of the Book of Job, the Shakespeare in the Bible? Where are such bold and vivid descriptions of the wonders of nature, of the behemoth and leviathan, and of the warhorse "who paweth in the valley and rejoiceth in his strength, who swalloweth the ground with fierceness and rage, who saith among the trumpets Ha, ha! and smelleth the battle afar off, the thunder of the captains and the shout of war?" What can be finer than Job's picture of wisdom, whose price is far above rubies? And what a
wealth of comfort is in that wonderful passage, which inspired the sublimest solo in the sublimest musical composition, those words graven in the rock for ever, where this holy outsider, this patriarchal sage and saint of the order of Melchisedec, expresses his faith and hope that his Redeemer liveth and will stand in the last day on the grave, and that he shall see Him with his own eyes on the morning of the resurrection!

The times for the depreciation of Bible poetry have passed. Many of the greatest scholars and poets, some of whom were by no means in sympathy with its religious ideas, have done it full justice. John Milton thought "no songs comparable to the songs of Zion, and no orations equal to those of the prophets." Sir William Jones came to the conclusion that aside from all inspiration, the Scriptures contain "more true sublimity and more exquisite beauty than could be collected from all other books!" The genial Herder, who was at home in the literature of all ages and nations, praises Hebrew poetry as "the oldest, simplest, sublimest," of all poetry. Goethe calls the book of Ruth "the loveliest epic or idyl which has come down to us." Humboldt bravely mentions the name of God in his Cosmos, judges the Hebrew descriptions of nature to be unrivalled, and the 104th Psalm to be a miniature picture of the whole universe. Thomas Carlyle declares the book of Job to be "the grandest thing ever written—a noble book, all men's book, with sublime sorrow, sublime reconciliation, oldest choral melody as of the heart of manhood, so soft and great as the summer midnight, as the world with its seas and stars!"

We now pass to the different kinds of Hebrew poetry. It may be divided into lyric, didactic, prophetic, and dramatic poetry. The first two are the prevailing forms. The third may be regarded as a branch of didactic poetry, or perhaps better, as a substitute for epic poetry. The fourth is not to be confounded with the Greek drama, and is in close connection either with the lyric or didactic. Hence many writers admit only these two.

The absence of epic poetry in its proper sense is due to the fact that the revealed religion excludes mythology and hero-worship, which control this kind of poetry, and that it substitutes for them monotheism, which is inconsistent with any kind of falsehood and idolatry. The real hero, so to speak, of the history of revelation is Jehovah himself, the only true and living God, to whom all glory is due. And so He appears in the prophetic writings. He is the one object of worship, praise, and thanksgiving, but not the object of a narrative poem. He is the one sovereign actor, who in heaven originates and controls all events on earth, but not one among other actors, co-operating or conflicting with finite beings. Epic poetry reproduces historic facts at the expense of truth, and exalts its hero above merit. The Bible poetry never violates truth.

There are, however, epic elements in several lyric poems which celebrate certain great events in Jewish history, as the Song of Moses, and the Song of Deborah; although even here the lyric element preponderates, and the subjectivity of the poet is not lost in the objective event as in the genuine epos. The Book of Ruth has been called an epic by Goethe. The Prologue and Epilogue of Job are epic, and have a truly narrative and objective character; but they are only the framework of the poem itself which is essentially didactic in dramatic form. In the apocryphal books the epic element appears in the book of Tobit and the book of Judith, which stand between narrative and fiction, and correspond to what we call romance or novel.

Lyric poetry, or the poetry of feeling, is the oldest and predominant form of poetry among the Hebrew as all other Semitic nations. It is the easiest, the most natural,
and the best adapted for devotion both private and public. It is closely connected with song, its twin sister. It wells up from the human heart, and gives utterance to its many strong and tender emotions of love and friendship, of joy and gladness, of grief and sorrow, of hope and desire, of gratitude and praise. Ewald happily describes it as "the daughter of the moment, of swift, rising, powerful feelings, of deep stirrings and fiery emotions of the soul."

Among the Greeks the epos appears first; but the older lyric effusions may have been lost. Among the Hindoos they are preserved in the Vedas. Lyric poetry is found among all nations which have a poetic literature; but epic poetry, at least in its fuller development, is not so general, and hence cannot be the primitive form.

Lyric poetry contains the fruitful germ of all other kinds of poetry. When the poetic feeling is kindled by a great event in history, it expresses itself more or less epically, as in the battle and victory hymns of Moses and Deborah. When the poet desires to teach a great truth or practical lesson, he becomes didactic. When he exhibits his emotions in the form of action and real life, he approaches the drama. In like manner the lyric poetry may give rise to mixed forms which appear in the later stages of literature.

The oldest specimen of lyric poetry is the song of Lamech to his two wives. It has already the measured arrangement, alliteration, and musical correspondence of Hebrew parallelism. It is a proud, fierce, defiant, "sword-song," commemorating in broken, fragmentary utterances the invention of weapons of brass and iron by his son Tubal Cain (i.e., lance-maker), and threatening vengeance.

Moses wrote the sublime song of victory after the overthrow of Pharaoh, which sounds throughout all the history of Israel, and is connected in the Apocalypse with the final triumph of Christ's kingdom. Moses wrote also that sublime farewell song which celebrates Jehovah's merciful dealings with Israel, the parting blessing of the twelve tribes, and the 90th Psalm, called "A Prayer of Moses, the man of God," which sums up the spiritual experience of his long pilgrimage in the wilderness, and which proves its undying force at every death-bed and funeral service.

The Song of Deborah, from the heroic period of the Judges, eight centuries before Pindar, is a stirring battle song, full of fire and dithyrambic swing, and breathing the spirit of an age of disorder and tumult, when might was right.

Another specimen of female poetry is Hannah's hymn of joy and gratitude when she dedicated her son Samuel, the last of the Judges, to the service of Jehovah. It furnished the key-note to the "Magnificat" of the Virgin Mary after the miraculous conception.

The reign of David was the golden age of lyric poetry. He was himself the prince of singers in Israel. His religious poetry is incorporated in the Psalter. Of his secular poetry the author of the Books of Samuel has preserved us two specimens, a brief stanza on the death of Abner, and his lament for the death of Saul and Jonathan. The latter is a most pathetic and touching elegy, full of the strength and tenderness of the love of friendship. His generosity in lamenting the death of his persecutor who stood in his way to the throne, enhances the beauty and effect of the elegy.

Lyric poetry flourished during the reigns of David and Solomon, then declined with the decline of the nation, and revived for a short period with the restoration of the temple and the theocracy, when the harps were taken from the willows to accompany again the songs of Zion. It is altogether improbable that the Psalter contains hymns of the Maccabean age, as Hitzig conjectures. The canon was closed long before (B.C. 450).
The "Magnificat" of the Virgin Mary, the "Benedictus" of Zacharias, and the "Nunc dimittis" of Simeon are the golden sunset of the Hebrew psalmody, and the dawn of Christian hymnody.

The Psalter is the great depository of the religious poetry of the Jewish Church, and the inexhaustible fountain of devotion for all Christian ages.

To lyric poetry belong also the Lamentations of Jeremiah, the most extensive elegy in the Bible. They are the funeral dirge of the theocracy and the holy city, which is personified as a solitary widow weeping bitterly without a friend or comforter. The ruin and desolation, the carnage and famine, the pollution of the temple, the desecration of the Sabbath, the massacre of the priests, the dragging of the chiefs into exile, and all the horrors and miseries of a long siege, contrasted with the remembrance of former glories and glad festivities, and intensified by the awful sense of Divine wrath, are drawn with life-like colours, and form a picture of overwhelming calamity and sadness. Every letter is written with a tear, every word is the sob of a broken heart. Yet Jeremiah does not forget that the covenant of Jehovah with His people still stands. In the stormy sunset of the theocracy he beheld the dawn of a brighter day, and a new covenant written, not on tables of stone, but on the heart. The utterance of his grief, like as the shedding of tears, was also a relief, and left his mind in a calmer and serener frame. Beginning with wailing and weeping, he ends with a question of hope, and with a prayer.

These Lamentations have done their work effectually, and are doing it still. They have soothed the weary years of the Babylonian Exile, and after the return they have kept up the lively remembrance of the deepest humiliation and the judgments of a righteous God. On the ninth day of the month of Ab (July), they are read year after year with fasting and weeping by that remarkable people who are still wandering in exile over the face of the earth, finding a grave in many lands, a home in none. Among Christians the poem is best appreciated in times of private affliction and public calamity; a companion in mourning, it serves also as a book of comfort and consolation.

The poetic structure of the Lamentations is the most artificial in the Bible. The first four chapters are alphabetically arranged, like the 119th and several other Psalms, and Proverbs xxxi. 10—31. Every verse or stanza begins with a letter of the Hebrew alphabet in regular order; all the stanzas are nearly of the same length; each stanza has three nearly balanced clauses or members which together constitute one meaning; chaps. i., ii., and iv. contain twenty-two stanzas each, according to the number of Hebrew letters; the third chapter has three alphabetic series. making sixty-six stanzas in all. Dante chose the terza rima for his vision of hell, purgatory, and paradise; Petrarca the complicated sonnet for the tender and passionate language of love. The author of Lamentations may have chosen this structure as a discipline and check upon the intensity of his sorrow—perhaps also as a help to the memory. Poems of this kind, once learned, are not easily forgotten.

Didactic poetry is the combined product of imagination and reflection. It seeks to instruct as well as to please. It is not simply the outpouring of subjective feeling which has its own end and reward, but aims at an object beyond itself. It is the connecting link between pure poetry and philosophy. It supplies among the Semitic nations the place of ethics, with this difference, that it omits the reasoning and argumentative process, and gives only the results of observation and reflection in a pleasing, mostly proverbial, sententious style, which sticks to the memory. It is found in the Proverbs and Ecclesiastes. Many Psalms
are also didactic, and the book of Job is a didactic drama.

The palmy period of didactic or gnomic poetry is the peaceful and brilliant reign of Solomon, which lasted forty years (B.C. 1015—975). He was a favourite child of nature and grace. He occupies the same relation to the Proverbs as David to the Psalter, being the chief author and model for imitation. He was the philosopher, as David was the singer of Israel. The fame of his wisdom was so great that no less than three thousand proverbs were ascribed to him.

According to a rabbinical tradition Aristotle derived his philosophy from the Solomonic writings which Alexander the Great sent him from Jerusalem.

The usual word for a didactic poem is Miskal—a likeness, similitude, comparison; then in a wider sense, a short, sharp, pithy maxim, sententious saying, gnome, proverb, couched in figurative, striking, pointed language. A proverb contains multum in parvo, and condenses the result of long observation and experience in a few words which strike the nail on the head and are easily remembered. It is the philosophy for the people, the wisdom of the street. The Orientals, especially the Arabs, are very fond of this kind of teaching. It suited their wants and limits of knowledge much better than an elaborate system of philosophy. And even now a witty or pithy proverb has more practical effect upon the common people than whole sermons and tracts.*

The Proverbs of the Bible are far superior to any collection of the kind, such as the sayings of the Seven Wise Men of Greece, the Aurea Carmina, attributed to Pythagoras, the Remains of the Poetae Gnomici, the collections of Arabic proverbs. They bear the stamp of divine inspiration. They abound in polished and sparkling gems. They contain the practical wisdom (chochma) of Israel, and have furnished the richest contributions to the dictionary of Proverbs among Christian nations. They trace wisdom to its true source, the fear of Jehovah. Nothing can be finer than the description of Wisdom in the eighth chapter, where she is personified as the eternal companion and delight of God, and commended beyond all earthly treasures.

The description of the model Hebrew woman in her domestic and social relations (in the acrostic form) has no parallel for truthfulness and beauty in all ancient literature, and forms the appropriate close of this book of practical wisdom; for from the family of which woman is the presiding genius, spring private and public virtue and national prosperity.

"The Book of Proverbs," says a distinguished modern writer, "is not on a level with the Prophets or the Psalms. It approaches human things and things divine from quite another side. It has even something of a worldly, prudential look, unlike the rest of the Bible. But this is the very reason why its recognition as a Sacred Book is so useful. It is the philosophy of practical life. It is the sign to us that the Bible does not despise common sense and discretion. It impresses upon us, in the most forcible manner, the value of intelligence and prudence, and of a good education. The whole strength of the Hebrew language, and of the sacred authority of the book, is thrown upon these homely truths. It deals too in that refined, discriminating, careful view of the finer shades of human character, so often overlooked by theologians, but so necessary to any true estimate of human life. 'The heart knoweth its own bitterness, and the stranger does not intermeddle with its joy.' How much is there, in that single sentence, of consolation, of love, of forethought! And, above all, it insists over and over again, upon the doctrine, that goodness is 'wisdom,' and that wickedness and vice are 'folly.' There may be many other views of virtue and vice, of holiness and sin, better and higher than this. But there will always be some in the world who will need to remember that a good man is not only religious and just, but wise; and that a bad man is not only wicked and sinful, but a miserable, contemptible fool!"

The poetic structure of the Proverbs is
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that of Hebrew parallelism in its various forms. They consist of single, double, triple, or more couplets, the members corresponding to each other in sense and diction, either synonymously or antithetically. Delitzsch calls them two-liners, four-liners, six-liners, eight-liners. The first section contains exclusively two-liners. Besides there are a few three-liners, five-liners, and seven-liners, where the odd line is either a repetition or a reason for the idea expressed in the first lines.

To didactic poetry belongs also the fable and the parable. Both are conscious fictions for the purpose of instruction, and differ from the myth, which is the unconscious popular product of the religious imagination. But the fable rests on admitted impossibilities, and introduces irrational creatures to teach maxims of secular prudence, and lower, selfish morality; while the parable takes its illustrations from real life, human or animal, with its natural characteristics, and has a much higher aim. It is therefore far better adapted, as a medium of instruction, to the true religion. "The fable seizes on that which man has in common with the creatures below him; the parable rests on the truth that man is made in the image of God." The former is only fitted for the instruction of youth, which does not raise the question of veracity; the latter is suited to all ages.

There are no fables in the New Testament, and only two in the Old, viz., the fable of Jotham: the trees choosing their king, and the fable of Jehovah: the cedars of Lebanon and the thistle. The riddle (parable) of Ezekiel introduces two eagles as representatives of human characters, but without ascribing to them human attributes. The parable occurs occasionally in the Old Testament, was cultivated by Hillel, Shammai, and other Jewish rabbis, and appears frequently in the Gemara and Midrash. It is found in its perfection in the Gospels.

The parables of our Lord illustrate the various aspects of the kingdom of heaven (as those in the Synoptical gospels), or the personal relation of Christ to His disciples (as the parable of the Good Shepherd and that of the Vine and the Branches, in the Gospel of John). They conceal and reveal the profoundest ideas in the simplest and most lucid language. They are at once pure truth and pure poetry. Every trait is intrinsically possible, and borrowed from nature and human life, and yet the composition of the whole is the product of the imagination. The art of illustrative teaching in parables never rose so high before or since, nor can it ever rise higher.

Prophectic poetry is peculiar to the Bible. Heathen nations had their divinations and oracles, but no divinely inspired prophecy. Man may have forebodings of the future, and may conjecture what may come to pass under certain conditions; but God only knows the future, and he to whom He chooses to reveal it.

Prophecy is closely allied to poetry. The prophet sees the future as a picture with the spiritual eye enlightened by the Divine mind, and describes it mostly in more or less poetic form. Prophetic poetry combines a didactic and an epic element. It rouses the conscience, enforces the law of God, and holds up the history of the future, the approaching judgments and mercies of God, for instruction, reproof, comfort, and encouragement. Prophecy is too elevated to descend to ordinary prose, and yet too practical to bind itself to strict rules. Ezekiel and Daniel, like the Apocalypse in the New Testament, use prose, but a prose that has all the effect of poetry. The other prophets employ prose in the narrative and introductory sections, but a rhythmical flow of diction in the prophecies proper, with divisions of clauses and stanzas, and rise often to the height of majesty and power. The sublime prayer of Habakkuk is a lyric
poem, and might as well have a place in the Psalter.

The greatest poet among the prophets is Isaiah. He gathers up all the past prophecies to send them enriched into the future, and combines the deepest prophetic inspiration with sublimest and sweetest poetry.

The earliest specimens of prophetic poetry are the prediction of Noah, the blessing of Jacob, the prophecies of Balaam, and the farewell blessing of the twelve tribes by Moses. The golden age of prophetic poetry began with the decline of lyric poetry, and continued till the extinction of prophecy, warning the people of the approaching judgments of Jehovah, and comforting them in midst of their calamities with his promise of a brighter future when the Messiah should come to redeem his people and to bless all the nations of the earth.

Dramatic poetry embraces the Song of Songs and the Book of Job. The one is a lyric drama or melodrama, the other a didactic drama.

The "Song of Songs," or Canticles, presents the Hebrew ideal of pure bridal and conjugal love, and canonizes the noblest and strongest passion which God implanted in human nature before the fall, and which reflects his own infinite love to his people, and Christ's relation to his church. It consists of a series of monologues and dialogues by three different persons, King Solomon (the Peaceful), Shulamith, and the maidens of Jerusalem. It is full of the fragrance of flowers, the beauty of spring, the singing of birds, and loveliness of love.

The Book of Job is didactic drama, with an epic introduction and close. The prologue and the epilogue are written in plain prose, the body of the poem is poetry. It has been called the Hebrew tragedy, but differing from other tragedies by its happy termination. We better call it a dramatic theodicy. It wrestles with the perplexing problem of ages, viz., the true meaning and object of evil and suffering in the world, under the government of a holy, wise, and merciful God. The dramatic form shows itself in the symmetrical arrangement, the introduction of several speakers, the action or rather the suffering of the hero, the growing passion and conflict, the secret crime supposed to underlie his misfortune, and the awful mystery in the background. But there is little external action in it, and this is almost confined to the prologue and epilogue. Instead of it we have here an intellectual battle of the deepest moral import, mind grappling with mind on the most serious problems which can challenge our attention. The outward drapery only is dramatic, the soul and substance of the poem are didactic, with all the Hebrew ideas of divine Providence, which differ from the Greek notion of blind Fate, as the light of day differs from midnight. It is intended for the study, not for the stage.

The book opens, like a Greek drama, with a prologue, which introduces the reader into the situation, and makes him acquainted with the character, the prosperous condition, the terrible misfortunes, and the exemplary patience of the hero. Even God and his great antagonist, Satan, who appears, however, in heaven as a servant of God, are drawn into the scenery, and a previous arrangement in the divine counsel precedes and determines the subsequent transaction. History on earth is thus viewed as an execution of the decrees of heaven, and as controlled throughout by supernatural forces. But we have here the unsearchable wisdom of the Almighty Maker and Ruler of men, not the dark impersonal Fate of the heathen tragedy. This grand feature of Job has been admirably imitated by Goethe in the prologue of his Faust. The action itself commences after seven days and seven nights of most eloquent silence. The grief over the misfortunes which, like a
succession of whirlwinds, had suddenly hurled the patriarchal prince from the summit of prosperity to the lowest depths of misery, culminating in the most loathsome disease, and intensified by the heartless sneers of his wife, at last bursts forth in a passionate monologue of Job, cursing the day of his birth. Then follows the metaphysical conflict with his friends, Eliphaz, Bildad, and Zophar, who now turn to enemies and “miserable comforters,” “forgers of lies, and butchers of vanities.” The debate has three acts, with an increasing entanglement, and every act consists of three assaults of the false friends and as many defences of Job (with the exception that in the third battle, Zophar retires, and Job alone speaks). After a closing monologue of Job, expressing fully his feelings and thoughts in view of the past controversy, the youthful Elihu, who had silently listened, comes forward, and in three speeches administers deserved rebuke to both parties, with as little mercy for Job as for his friends, but with a better philosophy of suffering, the object of which he represents to be correction and reformation, the reproof of arrogance, and the exercise of humility and faith. He begins the disentanglement of the problem, and makes the transition to the final decision. At last God Himself, to whom Job had appealed, appears as the judge of the controversy, and Job humbly submits to His infinite power and wisdom, and penitently confesses his sin and folly. This is the solution of the mighty problem, if solution it can be called.

A brief epilogue relates the historical issue, the restoration and increased prosperity of Job after this severest trial of his faith, and patient submission. To the external order corresponds the internal dialectic development in the wave-like motion of conflicting sentiments and growing passions. The first act of the debate shows yet a tolerable amount of friendly feeling on both sides. In the second, the passion is much increased, and the charges of the opponents against Job made.

In the last debate, Eliphaz, the leader of the rest, proceeds to the open accusation of heavy crimes against the sufferer, with an admonition to repent. Job, after repeated declarations of his innocence, and vain attempts at convincing his opponents, appeals at last to God as his judge. God appears, convinces him, by several questions on the mysteries of nature, of his ignorance, and brings him to complete submission under the infinite power and wisdom of the Almighty.

The Book of Job, like the Iliad of Homer, the Divina Comedia of Dante, and the dramas of Shakespeare, stands out a marvel in literature, without a predecessor, without a rival. It is of the order of Melchisedec, “without father, without mother, without descent,” but with “the power of an endless life.”

Much has been written about the form of Hebrew poetry, the parallelism of members so-called, the strophic divisions, the traces of alliterations and rhymes. But all attempts to reduce Hebrew versification to a regular system have failed. The poetry of the Bible is not fettered by rigid laws of rhythm and metre; it is free and elastic, ever adapting the diction to the thought, the body of words to the soul of sentiment. The spirit lords it all. And this is one of its chief advantages, and subserves its universal mission. The Bible poetry is translatable above all other poetry ancient and modern. It can be transferred into any language almost literally, without losing its beauty and power. Homer, Dante, Petrarch must be reproduced by a poetic genius in the heroic metre, the terza rima, the sonnet, to be enjoyed; and even then they lose in the process. But the Psalter, Job, and Isaiah are essentially the same in the Hebrew, Greek, Latin, English, and German Bibles; they carry the same power and comfort to readers of the present day as they did hundreds of years before Christ, and will do to the end of time.
The Supernatural as Evidence.*

By the Very Rev. B. Payne Smith, D.D., Dean of Canterbury.

In every age there are certain great movements of human thought, which, more or less, influence the convictions of men in the mass, and carry them on to conclusions which, but a few years before, would have seemed altogether improbable. Sometimes it is very difficult to account for these movements. There has been often no master-mind leading the way: whatever works have been written have rather been the result of the wave of thought passing over that small portion of the world which thinks, than the cause of the wave. As far as cause can be traced, the new movement is a reaction, a recoil of mind, from that which has gone before, whether in the way of dissatisfaction at the sloth and inactivity of the previous age, and at its being ignobly content to have no high aspiration, no lofty sense of the nobleness of man's mission, or of a rebound from overstrained dogmatism and principles urged on to an extent which made them practically a burden and wearisomeness too great for men to endure.

The latter is perhaps the more common origin of new developments of thought, and is a power larger and more constantly at work than we are apt to imagine. But the explanation of the movements of the mind in our own time is rather to be sought in the meanness of the last century. Upon the whole, it was not a time of high purposes, though the War of Independence on the one side of the Atlantic, and the resistance to the despotism of Napoleon on the other, show that it was not wanting in great practical results. But as the present century advanced, the old lethargy which had enveloped the minds of the English-speaking race gave way. Some men became intensely active in working for practical reforms; others set new modes of thought in motion; and everywhere there was an eager desire for thoroughness, and for probing the principles of things to the very bottom. The old argument of "continuance"—that a thing should still exist because it had existed—gave way to an intense realism, which would let nothing exist unless it could prove its right to existence. Utilitarianism became the order of the day, and that poetry which often gilds a sleepy age, and makes it dwell at peace in a dream-land of repose, vanished before the energy of men keenly alive to the necessities and imperfections of the present.

It is this intense realism that has made men restless and ill at ease at having to believe in miracles. A miracle stands on entirely different grounds from the whole present order of things, and is out of harmony with the main current of our thoughts. There have been ages when men lived for the future, when the present was neglected, and things unseen were the realities which engrossed their thoughts. When we read the accounts of the trials for witchcraft in New England a century or two ago, we find not the accusers only, but the accused, full of ideas of the preternatural. What they saw had but slight influence upon them; what they imagined had alone power over their minds. We, on the contrary, live in the present. The turn of our minds is to verify everything. We call for proof, and whatever can not be proved we reject. It

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is not merely miracles which we treat thus, but most of what the last century regarded as historical realities. The intense historical activity of the present day, which has rewritten for us the annals of Greece and Rome, of the Church and of England, of the great eras of Spain and the Netherlands, besides special studies of great value, has its origin in that same spirit for searching and proving which leads so many to reject miracles.

It is altogether unfair to lay the rejection of miracles to the charge of physical science. The leaders of science are as thoroughly realistic as our historians and men of letters, but not more so. They are themselves phenomena of an age which perpetually asks What is? They inquire into the conformation of the earth and its constituents; into the motions of the heavenly bodies, and the laws which govern them, with the same eagerness to find out present facts, and the explanation of them, as animates the historian and the practical reformer. Old beliefs in our day can no more stand their ground than old laws and old customs, unless they can prove their right to stand by an appeal to present usefulness. It is of no use to appeal to anything else. In the present state of men's minds, if a thing does not fit in to the present, it seems to have no right to exist at all.

But if the progress of physical science has little to do with the dislike to the supernatural, the rapid increase of material wealth, and the advance made in everything which tends to present comfort and enjoyment, have much to do with it. We are living in an age when the present is full of enjoyment. By our large ascendency over the powers of nature, the earth yields us its treasure with a bountifulness never known before. Our homes are replete with comforts and luxuries little dreamed of by those who went before; and the secret forces of nature are pressed into our service and do our bidding. Side by side with this subjection of nature there has grown up a greatness of material enterprise hitherto unknown. Vast projects are undertaken and persevered in, before which the greatest merchant princes of antiquity would have quailed. There is a grandeur of conception, a nobleness of purpose, an unsfiching courage in many of the commercial undertakings of the present day, which, though gain may be their final object, yet give them a dignity and a poetry that make them for the time enough to conceal the deep cravings which are man's peculiar endowment, and which mark him out as a being destined for no common purposes.

Yet this present greatness of material things dwarfs many of man's higher gifts. Its influence begins early. Even in education it makes men aim chiefly at utilitarian objects, and at too early results. Parents do not care for anything which does not lead directly and at once to profit and pay. Whatever develops man's thinking powers, and aims simply at making him better and nobler in himself, is thrust aside. It would take too much time; defer too long the quick harvest of gains; might make men even indifferent to worldly prosperity, and unwilling to sacrifice everything to material wealth. Or, at all events, it lies out of the circle of men's every-day thoughts. Life is an eager race, with boundless prizes for all who press onward and upward. In so active a contest, with every energy on the stretch, and every exertion richly rewarded, it is no wonder if the present is enough; and in its enjoyment men thrust from them indignantly everything that would interfere with and render them less fit for the keen struggle after earthly success.

It is this spirit which makes it so difficult for men to believe in the supernatural. The purpose of miracles, and their whole use and intention, hold so entirely distinct a place from that which is now the main purpose or the mass of men, that they will hear no evi-
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dence for them, nor stop calmly to consider whether they may not after all hold a necessary place in the order of things, and be as indispensable for man’s perfectness as is this present activity. What too many do is to put aside the consideration of them entirely. They have a sort of notion that miracles contradict the laws of nature, and are therefore impossible. Without perhaps denying the historical accuracy of the Gospels in the main, they yet suppose that they were written by credulous men in a credulous age, and that if cool observers had been present, they could have explained on natural grounds all that took place. Probably they do not think much about the supernatural at all. They have plenty to occupy them; have no spare time; find their lives full of interest; they rise early to their labour and late take rest; and so are content with a general feeling that, whatever may be the explanation of man being what he is, and of the world being what it is, time will reveal it, and that no obligation lies upon a busy man to inquire into abstruse questions, with no present profit. When business is over and old age has come, then it will be his duty to make his peace with Heaven. And he will do so in the ordinary way, as other men do. Religion is a thing relegated to the background for the present; in due time he will attend to it as a practical matter, in the same way in which he will attend to the making of his will.

This thorough realism of the nineteenth century, intensified by the vast facilities of combined action and mutual intercourse, which make us live constantly in one another’s company, would banish all care and thought of the future from our minds, if it were not that the belief in the existence of a God and of a future life is an undying conviction of our nature. It is a necessary part of ourselves to look forward. No present gains or successes can content us. We turn always to the future, and that with an eagerness which would make life unendurable if we were forced to believe that life were all. The doctrine of annihilation may be professed, but can never really be believed; for it violates the deepest instincts of our hearts. And thus compelled by the very constitution of our natures to believe that there is a God, and that we exist after death, religion itself becomes a very real thing, and supplies a real need. The existence of a God and the immortality of man are not doctrines which need proving. They are intuitions, innate ideas, which may and do gain form and shape from advancing knowledge, but which grew out of the soul itself. Over the savage they have little influence, but civilized and thinking men can never be complete and entire unless these deep instincts of our inner being have their needs fully met and satisfied. In a man who stands perfect and complete, the necessities of the future must be as fully and entirely recognized and supplied as the requirements of the present. He must have a religion.

Now religion is either natural or revealed. Not that these two are opposed. The revealed religion which Christians profess contains and gives new authority to all the truths of natural religion, while extending itself far beyond them. Natural religion is a dim feeling and groping after God as manifested in his works, and a distinguishing of right from wrong, so far as the indications of a righteous government existing now, and the laws of our own nature, and the marvellous gift of conscience, enable us. In revealed religion we have fuller knowledge: knowledge of God’s attributes, not merely as far as we can trace them in his works, but still more as they are manifested in his dealing with man, as made known to us in revelation itself: knowledge of man, both as regards his present state and his future hopes; more exact knowledge, too, of right and wrong, the appeal now lying not to the varying codes of human morality, nor even
to the inner conscience, which, as a faculty capable of education and development, is no rigid rule, but one which bends to every state of things, and adapts itself to every stage and degree of human progress and decay. Under a revealed religion the appeal is to an unchanging law of Truth. Morality has at last a settled basis, and man a fixed standard by which to judge his actions.

It seems almost supererogatory to show that natural religion does not suffice for man’s wants. We know of no one who has definitely asserted that it does. Even Kant, though he appears to think that Christianity might now be dispensed with, yet distinctly holds that natural religion, without the teaching of Christianity, would not even now have been enlightened enough, or pure enough, or certain enough, to guide man’s life. But the whole state of the heathen world before Christ came, and now wherever Christianity is unknown, is proof sufficient of the utter powerlessness of natural religion. The Greek world, with its marvellous taste in art and appreciation of the beautiful, was yet intensely wicked. The state of things at Rome under the Empire was so foul that modern pens would blush to describe it. What natural religion is where civilization does not exist, the condition now of savage tribes proves clearly enough. We will touch therefore only upon one point, that of progress. Apart from Christianity, there are at most in the world the very faintest indications of progress; usually none at all. In no form of natural religion, in no heathen religion, was there anything to lead man onward, or to make him better. At best, as under Mohammedanism, or the system of Confucius there was stagnation. And when, as in the case of so many of the older civilizations of the world, decay set in, there was no recuperative force. Man sank steadily and hopelessly. In the Old Testament first do we find the thought of progress. A nation is there formed for a high and unique purpose; and to shape it for its end it is placed in a special and immediate relation to God, and is taught by messengers sent directly by him. Under this special dispensation, its one business was to grow fit for the work prepared for it; its one motto, progress. In the New Testament, progress is the central thought everywhere present; but no longer now for one nation—it is progress for all mankind. It is a new kingdom that is proclaimed, and all who enter it are required to put away old things, and become new. It belongs to men who have left their previous condition far behind, and who, forgetting what is past, “reach forth unto those things which are before.” And special stress is laid everywhere upon the duty of bringing all men into this new kingdom, and of Christians being the purifying salt which is to preserve the whole world.

The means by which Christianity thus renovates mankind, and becomes the moving force of all modern and real progress, is partly that it alone proposes to us principles so perfect that at the utmost our approach to their realization is a very distant one. The complete abnegation of self, the treatment of others with that justice, liberality, and love with which we should wish ourselves to be treated, and a holiness as absolute and entire as that of God himself—such principles, while practically aiding us in our upward course, yet set us a standard which, as a matter of fact, is unattainable. How often is this misunderstood! Men contrast our Christianity with what is set before us in the Gospels, and, either in mockery or in grief at the disparity, assert that our state is practically a mere heathenism. But while there is ample room for lamentation that Christians are content to remain so very much below the standard set them, yet, so far as there is progress toward it—so far as it can be said truly that this generation is in a higher stage than the last was, and is training the youth to
attain in the next to a still nearer approximation to Christian perfectness, so far Christianity is doing its work. Not merely its work on individuals—these constantly, even where the general state of things is bad and low, it raises to a high degree of virtue and holiness—but its work on the mass. If nationally we are making no progress, then our Christianity is not having its proper work, and, in an age which judges by results, is not proving its right still to exist. But even at the worst no Christian nation is hopeless: heathen nations sank without hope. Christian nations have again and again risen from the lowest degradation.

But Christianity tends to progress not merely by the high ideal it sets before us, but by its power over men's sympathies. This power resides mainly in the human nature of Christ, but only when viewed in its relation to his Godhead. As the great proof of the Father's love to man, it does arrest our feelings, dwell upon our imagination, and inspire our conduct with motives such as no other supposed manifestation of the Deity to man has ever produced. Christ Incarnate is not merely the realization of the high standard of Christianity, and the model for our imitation, but acts also as a motive power, by which men are roused and encouraged to the attempt to put into practice the principles of the religion which Christ taught.

If there be a God—and the man who denies it contradicts the intuitions of his own being—it is religion, and revealed religion only, that gives us adequate knowledge of his nature and attributes. If there be a future—and the very instincts of our souls testify that there is—again it is revealed religion only that tells us what the future life is, and how we may attain to it. Yet necessary parts as both these beliefs are of our nature, men may bring themselves to deny them. For a time they can put them away. But if there be a present—and this is just the one thing in which the nineteenth century does thoroughly believe—even then, granting only this, if this present is to have any progress, and is to move onward to any thing better; if there is to be in it any thing of healthful and vigorous life, this, too, is bound up with the one religion, which has satisfactory proof to give that it is revealed; proof that it did come really from Heaven; and proof that it is the one motive power of human progress. If the light of nature hitherto has been insufficient to secure virtue or raise men toward it, that light will not suffice now, even though it has been fed and strengthened by centuries of Christian teaching. In asserting this, Kant asserted too much. Neither Christians nor Christian communities have as yet risen to any thing like a high general standard of morality, to say nothing about holiness; remove the high ideal and strong motives supplied by the religion of Christ, and there would result, first stagnation, and then decay. An “enlightened self-love” never yet successfully resisted any carnal or earthly passion. Christianity has effected much; the contrast between heathen and Christian communities is immense: but it has not raised men yet to its own standard, nor even to a reasonable fair standard of moral excellence.

Now, grant but the possibility of there being a God; grant but the possibility of there being a future, as there must necessarily be a connection between man's future and his present, and as our idea of God forbids our excluding any existent thing from connection with him, then at least a revelation would be useful, and as God must be good, there is no antecedent improbability in his bestowing upon man what would be of use and benefit to him. You must get rid of God—must resolve him into a sort of nebulous all-pervading ether, with no attributes or personal force or knowledge (the Pantheists do this beautifully, and call God cosmic force)—you must
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get rid of a future life, and account yourself simple phenomena, like the monkey, and ascidian jelly-bags, from which you are supposed to be descended, with no connection with the past, no reason for your present existence, mere shooting-stars in the realms of space, coming from nowhere, and going nowhere, and so only, by the extinction of these two ideas from your nature, can you make a revelation improbable. Even then your position is open to grave doubt. We can understand the law of evolution; and if the law be proved, though as yet it is unproved, it would involve us in no religious difficulties, provided that evolution really worked toward a solid end. Accustomed everywhere else in nature to see things fitted to their place, and all things so ordered that there is a use for every thing, we could understand the meanest thing in creation rising upward in the scale through multitudinous forms and infinite periods of time, if finally there were some purpose for all this rising. The plan is vast and marvellous. It can be justified only by some useful end. And such an end there would be if, after vast ages of development, the tiny atom ended in becoming a reasonable and responsible creature, with some purpose for all this vast preparation, because capable of still rising upward, and of "becoming partaker of the divine nature." But if the law of evolution stops at man without a future, then its product is not worthy of it, and so purposeless a law, ending in so mean a result, falls to the ground as too grand in its design for so bare and worthless an object.

Yet even this is but part of the argument; the evidences in favour of Christianity have a collective force, and it is upon them as a whole that one rests secure. But we may well contend that if Christianity is necessary for our present well-being; if the advance of society; if the removal of the bad, the vile, and the sorrowful in our existing arrangements; if the maintenance and strengthening of the noble, the earnest, the generous, and the pure, are bound up with Christianity, as being the only sure basis and motive toward progress, then, at all events, religion can show cause enough for existence to make it the duty of men to examine the evidence which it offers in its proof. Nineteenth-century men may decline to listen to arguments which concern only things so remote as God and the future. Have they not built railways, laid the Atlantic telegraph, found out the constituent elements of the sun through the spectrum, and gained fortunes by gambling on the stock exchange? What can men want more? Well, they want something to bind society together; even the worst want something to control in others those passions to which they give free play in themselves. No man wants society to grow worse, however much he may do himself to corrupt it. But the one salt of society, the one thing that does purify and hold it together, is religion.

Now antecedently there is no reason why God might not have made natural religion much more mighty and availling. As it is, nothing is more powerless in itself, though useful as an ally to revelation. Religion or no religion means revelation or no revelation. Reject revelation, and the only reason for not rejecting natural religion is that it is not worth the trouble. If religion, then, is a necessity of our present state, this means that revelation is a necessity. We are quite aware that even revealed religion does not explain all the difficulties of our present state. There is very much of doubt suggested by our philosophy to which Christianity gives only this answer, Believe and wait. It is, in fact, rigidly careful in refusing to give any and every explanation of things present except a practical one: in the most marked way it is silent as to the cause of our being what we are, and as to the nature of the world to come. It tells us that we do not
now see the realities themselves, but only reflections of them in a mirror, and even that as an enigma. Hereafter it promises that we shall see the things themselves, and understand the true nature and exposition of the enigmas of life. Meanwhile it gives us every practical help and necessary guidance for the present. Judged thus by practical results and by its working powers, it is a thing indispensable. Without it man is imperfect, and society has nothing to arrest its dissolution, or arouse it to a struggle after amendment. Reformation is essentially a Christian idea. That a state should throw off its ignoble past and start on a new quest after excellence and right is possible only where there is a religion strong enough to move men, and noble enough to offer them a high ideal. Reform movements have therefore been confined to Christian states; and for the individual, his one road to perfection has been a moving forward toward God.

Upon this, then, we base our argument for miracles. The universal instincts of men prove the necessity of the existence of religion. Without it the promptings of our hearts, compelling us to believe in a God and to hope for a future, would be empty and meaningless; and this no human instincts are. There is no instinct whatsoever which has not in external nature that which exactly corresponds to it, and is its proper field of exercise. And, in the next place, natural religion, though in entire agreement with revealed, is, as we have shown, insufficient for the purposes for which religion is required. Finally, there is the phenomenon that the revealed religion which we profess does act as a motive to progress. Christian nations—in morals, in freedom, in literature, in science, in the arts, and in all that adorns or beautifies society and human life—hold undoubtedly the foremost place, and are still moving forward. And in proportion as a Christian nation holds its faith purely and firmly, so surely is its course onward. It is content with nothing to which it has attained, but sees before it the ideal of a higher perfection.

Now a revealed religion can be proved only by that which involves the supernatural. No proof can rise higher than the order of things to which it belongs. And thus all that can be proved by the elaborate examination of all created things, and the diligent inquiry into their conformation and uses and instincts, and the purposes for which each organ or faculty was given; yea, even the search into man's own mind, and all the psychologic problems which suggest so very much to us as to the purposes of our existence—all this can rise no higher than natural religion. They are at best but guesses and vague conjectures, and a feeling and groping after truth. Nothing of this sort could prove to us a revealed religion. For how are we to know that it is revealed? In order to its being revealed, God must be the giver of it. And how are we to know that it is He who speaks? Its strength, its value, its authority, all depend upon its being the voice of God. No subjective authority can prove this. The nature of the truths revealed, their adaptability to our wants, their usefulness, their probability—nothing of this would prove that they had not been thought out by some highly-gifted man. We must have supernatural evidence—something pledging God himself—before we can accept a religion as revealed.

We shall see this more clearly if we reflect upon the nature of the obedience, which we are required to render to a revealed religion. Its authority is summary, and knows no appeal. It is God who speaks, and there is no higher tribunal than his throne. Take, for instance, the Ten Commandments. Essentially they are a republication of the laws of natural religion,
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excepting perhaps the fourth commandment. But upon how different a footing do they stand. The duty of not killing is in natural religion counteracted by the law of self-preservation, and in heathen communities has been generally very powerless, and human life but little valued. Even in fairly civilized communities murder was not a crime to be punished by the state, but to be avenged by the relatives of the murdered man. This even was the state of things among the Jews when the Ten Commandments were promulgated, and Moses, by special enactments, modified and softened the customs which he found prevalent, and which did not distinguish between wilful murder and accidental homicide. Natural religion, therefore, gave no special sanctity to human life, but regarded only the injury done to the family of the sufferer. The divine commandment has gone home straight to the conscience. It has made the shedding of blood a sin, and not merely an injury. Accordingly, Christian states have recognized the divine nature of the law by punishing murder as a public offence, instead of leaving it to be dealt with as a private wrong.

A revealed religion therefore claims absolute power over the conscience as being the direct will of God. No question of utility or public or private expediency may stand in its way. It must be obeyed, and disobedience is sin. But plainly we ought not to yield such absolute obedience to anything that we do not know to be the law of God. Man stands too high in the scale of existence for this to be right. Were it only that he is endowed with a conscience, and thereby made responsible for his actions it is impossible for him to give up the control over his own actions to any being of less authority than that One to whom he is responsible. But a revelation claims to be the express will of that very Being, and therefore a sufficient justification of our actions before His tribunal. Surely, before we trust ourselves to it, we may fairly claim adequate proof that it is His will. The issues are too serious for less than this to suffice.

But, besides this, when we look at Christianity, the nature of its doctrines brings the necessity of supernatural proof before us with intense force. It teaches us that God took our nature upon him, and in our nature died in our stead; and, as we have pointed out before, the strength of Christianity, and that which makes it a religion of progress, is this union of the divine and human natures in Christ. He is not merely the “Man of Sorrows,” the ideal of suffering humanity—and a religion that glorifies a sinless sufferer may do much to alleviate sorrow and sweeten the bitter cup of woe—but He is much more than this. It is only when that sinless sufferer is worshipped as our Lord and our God that we reach the mainspring which has given Christianity its power to regenerate the world.

But now could such a doctrine be believed on any less evidence than that which directly pledged the divine authority on its behalf? The unique and perfect character of the Jesus of the evangelists; the pure and spotless nature of the morality he taught; the influence for good which Christian doctrines have exercised; the position attained by Christian nations, and the contrast between the ideals of heathenism and of Christianity—all this and more is valuable as subsidiary evidence. Some of it is absolutely necessary to sustain our belief. Even miracles would not convince us of the truth of a revelation which taught us a morality contrary to our consciences. For nothing could make us believe that the voice of God in nature could be opposed to his voice in revelation. It is a very axiom that, however it reaches us, the voice of God must be ever the same. But these subsidiary proofs are but by-works. They
are not the citadel, and can never form the main defence. A doctrine such as that of God becoming man must have evidence cognate to and in para materia with the doctrine itself. Thus, by a plain and self-evident necessity, revelation offers us supernatural proof of its reality. This supernatural proof is twofold, prophecy and miracle.

Now these two not merely support one another, but are essentially connected. They are not independent, but correlative proofs. It was the office of the prophet gradually to prepare the way for the manifestation of the Immanuel upon earth. In order to do so effectually he often came armed with supernatural authority. But a vast majority of the prophets had no other business than to impress on the consciences of the people truths already divinely vouched for and implicitly accepted; and such no more needed miracles than the preachers of Christianity do at the present day. But among the prophets were here and there men of higher powers, whose office was to move onward toward the ultimate goal of the preparatory dispensation. Such men offered prediction and miracle as the seals which ratified their mission. In general men could be prepared to receive so great a miracle as that set forth in the opening verses of John's Gospel only by a previous dispensation which had brought the supernatural very near to man. If the Old Testament had offered no miracles, and had not taught the constant presence of God in the disposal of all human things, the doctrines of the New Testament would have been an impossibility.

But we shall understand their connection better when we have a clearer idea of the true scriptural doctrine of miracles. The current idea of a miracle is that it is a violation of the laws of nature, and as the laws of nature are the laws of God, a miracle would thus signify a violation by God of his own laws. This is not the teaching of the Bible itself, but an idea that has grown out of the Latin word which has supplanted the more thoughtful terms used in the Hebrew and in the Greek Scriptures. "A miracle," miraculum, is something wonderful—marvellous. Now no doubt all God's works are wonderful; but when the word is applied to his doings in the Bible, it is his works in nature that are generally so described. In the Hebrew, especially in poetry, God is often described as doing "wonders," that is, miracles. But the term is not merely applicable to works such as those wrought by him for his people in Egypt and the wilderness, but to a thunder-storm, and to his ordinary dealings with men in providence, and in the government of the world. But this term wonder is not the word in the Hebrew properly applicable to what we mean by miracles, and in the New Testament our Lord's works are never called "miracles" (Σαίμαρα) at all. The people are often said to have "wondered" at Christ's acts, but those acts themselves were not intended simply to produce wonder; they had a specific purpose, indicated by the term properly applicable to them, and that term is sign.

This is the sole Hebrew term for what we mean by miracle; but there are other words applied to our Lord's doings in the New Testament which we will previously consider. And, first, there is a term which approaches very nearly to our word miracle, namely, ῥεπάς, portent, defined by Liddell and Scott, in their Greek Lexicon, as a "sign, wonder, marvel, used of any appearance or event in which men believed that they could see the finger of God." But, with that marvellous accuracy which distinguishes the language of the Greek Testament, our Lord's works are never called ῥεπάς in the Gospels. The word is used of the false Christs and false prophets, who by great signs and portents shall almost deceive the very elect. The populace, however, expected a prophet to display these portents, and Joel had pre-
dicted that such signs of God's presence would accompany the coming of the great and notable day of Jehovah.

In the Acts of the Apostles our Lord is said to have been approved of God by portents as well as by powers and signs, the words literally being "Jesus of Nazareth, a man displayed of God unto you by powers, and portents, and signs;" but the portents refer to such things as the star which appeared to the magi, and the darkness and earthquake at the crucifixion. Exactly parallel to this place are the words where God is said to have borne witness to the truth of the apostles' testimony "by signs, and portents, and manifold powers, and diversified gifts of the Holy Ghost," the description being evidently intended to include every manifestation of God's presence with the first preachers of the Gospel, ordinary and extraordinary, in providence and in grace, and not merely the one fact that from time to time they wrought miracles.

But the term portents is freely applied to the miracles wrought by the apostles, being used of them no less than eight times in the Acts, and also once in Romans, and once in the Corinthians. In every case it is used in connection with the word signs. The two words, however, express very different sides of the apostles' working, the term sign, as we shall see hereafter, having reference to the long-previous preparation for the Messiah's advent, while portents were indications of the presence with them of the finger of God.

In the Synoptic Gospels, the most common name for our Lord's miracles is δύναμις, powers. Full of meaning as is the word, it nevertheless is not one easy to adapt to the idiom of our language, and thus in the Gospels it is usually translated "mighty works." Really it signifies the very opposite of miracles. A δύναμις is a faculty, or capacity for doing anything. We all have our faculties—some physical, some mental and moral—and these are all strictly natural endowments. We have also spiritual faculties, and these also primarily are natural endowments of our inner being. The teaching therefore of this word δύναμις, powers or faculties, is that our Lord's works were perfectly natural and ordinary to him. They were his capacities, just as sight and speech are ours. Now in a brute animal articulate speech would be a miracle, because it does not lie within the range of its capacities, and therefore would be a violation of the law of its nature; it does lie within the compass of our faculties, and so in us is no miracle. Similarly, the healing of the sick, the giving sight to the blind, the raising of the dead—things entirely beyond the range of our powers, yet lay entirely within the compass of our Lord's capacities, and were in accordance with the laws of his nature. It was no more a "miracle" in him to turn water into wine than it is with God, who works this change every year. Nor does John call it so, though his word is rendered miracle in our version.

His language, as becomes the most thoughtful and philosophic of the Gospels, is deeply significant. He does not use the term δύναμις, faculty, at all, but has two words, one especially his own, namely, ἔσχον, a work; the other, the one proper term for miracle throughout the whole Bible, σημεῖον, a sign.

Our Lord's miracles are called ἔσχον, works, by John some fifteen or more times, besides places where they are spoken of as "the works of God." Now this term stands in a very close relation to the preceding word, δύναμις, a faculty. A faculty when exerted, produces an ἔσχον, or work. Whatever powers or capacities we have, whenever we use them, bring forth a corresponding result. We have capacities of thought, of speech, of action, common to the species, though varying in the individual; and what is not at all remarkable in one man may be very much so
in another, simply because it is beyond his usual range. But outside the species it may be not only remarkable but miraculous, because it lies altogether beyond the range of the capacities with which the agent is endowed. And so, on the contrary, what would be miraculous in one class of agents is simply natural in another class, because it is in accordance with their powers.

Now had our Lord been merely man, any and every work beyond the compass of man's powers would have been a miracle. It would have transcended the limits of his nature; but whether it would necessarily have violated the laws of that nature is a question of some difficulty. Supposing that man is an imperfect being, but capable of progress, the limits of his powers may be indefinitely enlarged. Those who hold the theory of evolution concede this, and therefore concede that there is nothing miraculous in a remarkable individual being prematurely endowed with capacities which finally and in due time will be the heritage of the whole species. It is the doctrine of the Bible that the spiritual man has a great future before him, and the prophets of old, and the apostles and early Christians, endowed with their great gifts, may be but an anticipation of what the spiritual man may finally become. Still, among the "works" of our Lord and his apostles, there is one which seems distinctly divine, namely, the raising of the dead. Gifts of healing, of exciting dormant powers, such as speech in the dumb, of reading the thoughts of others' hearts, may be so heightened in man as he develops under the operations of the Spirit that much may cease to be astonishing which now is highly so. But the raising of the dead travels into another sphere; nor can we imagine any human progress evolving such a power as this. We cannot imagine man possessed of any latent capacity which may in time be so developed as naturally to produce such a result. So, too, the multiplying of food seems to involve powers reserved to the Creator alone.

But the Gospel of John does not regard our Lord as a man prematurely endowed with gifts which finally will become the heritage of the whole species; it is penetrated everywhere with the conviction that a higher nature was united in him to his human nature. It shows itself not merely in formal statements like the opening words of the Gospel, but in the language usual with him everywhere. And so here. Our Lord's miracles to him are simply and absolutely ἔργα, works only. But, as we have seen before, they are also divine works, "works of God." Still in Christ, according to John's view, they were perfectly natural. They were the necessary and direct result of that divine nature which in him was indissolubly united with his human nature. The last thing which the apostle would have thought about them was that they were miraculous, wonderful. That God should give His only-begotten Son to save the world was wonderful. That such a being should ordinarily do works entirely beyond the limits of man's powers did not seem to John wonderful, and hence the simple but deeply significant term by which he characterizes them.

Yet such works were not wrought without a purpose; nor did such a being come without having a definite object to justify his manifestation. If wisdom has to be justified of all her children, of all that she produces, there must be some end or purpose effected by each of them, and especially in one like Christ, confessedly the very highest manifestation of human nature, and, as we Christians believe, reaching far above its bounds. Now John points this out in calling our Lord's works σημεῖα, signs. It is devoutly to be hoped that in the revised translation of the New Testament this term will be restored to its place, instead of being mistranslated miracle, as in our present version. Really, in employing it, John was only fol-
The supernatural as evidence.

Following in the steps of the older Scriptures, and the unity of thought in the Bible is destroyed when the same word is translated differently in one book from its rendering in another. However wonderful may be God's works, they are not wrought simply to fill men with astonishment, and least of all are those so wrought which lie outside the ordinary course of natural laws.

A sign is more and means more than a miracle, for it does not stand alone, but is a token and indication of something else. Thus John's word shows that our Lord's works had a definite purpose. They were not wrought at random, but were intended for a special object. What this was is easy to tell. The Old Testament had always represented the Jews as holding a peculiar position toward the Godhead. They were a chosen people endowed with high privileges and blessings, but so endowed because they were also intended for a unique purpose. They were the depositaries of revelation, and in due time their Torah, their revealed law, was to go forth out of Zion to lighten the whole Gentile world. This promise of a revelation extending to the whole world was further connected with the coming of a special descendant of Abraham, and prophecy had gradually so filled up the outline that a complete sketch had been given of the person, the offices, the work, and the preaching of the great Son of David, to whose line the promise had subsequently been confined.

But how were people to know when he had come? The prophets had indeed given some indications of the time, especially Daniel, and so clear were their words that all the world was expecting the arrival of some mighty being, in whom magnus ab integro seculorum nascitur ordo, and an entire transformation of the world should take place. But how, among many claimants was he to be known? He might come, perhaps, as a conqueror, and by force of arms compel men to submit to his authority. But no! Prophecy had described him as the Prince of Peace; nor was his kingdom to be of this world, but a spiritual empire. Now, if we reflect for a little, we shall see that there is no obligation incumbent upon men to accept, or even examine, the claims of any and every one professing to be the bearer of a revelation from God. Before this duty arises, there must at least be something to call our attention to his claims. Mere self-assertion imposes no obligation upon others, unless it have something substantial to back it up. Life is a practical thing, with very onerous duties, and few, like the Athenians of old, have the taste or the leisure to listen to and examine everything new. The herald of a divine dispensation must have proof to offer that he does come from God, and such proof as pledges the divine attributes to the truth of his teaching. This is the reason why the Old Testament dispensation was one of signs. On special occasions justifying the divine interference, and in the persons of its great teachers, in two ways, supernatural proof was given of God's presence with his messengers in a manner superior to and beyond his ordinary and providential presence in the affairs of life. The divine omniscience was pledged to the truth of their words by the prediction of future events; and His omnipotence by their working things beyond the ordinary range of nature. The two Old Testament proofs of a revelation were prophecy and miracle. We can think of no others, and nothing less would suffice.

As we have said, the whole of the Old Testament looked forward to the manifestation of a divine Person, in whom revelation would become, in the first place, perfect; in the second, universal; and, thirdly, final. As being a final revelation, prophecy, which was the distinctive element of the preparatory dispensation, holds in it no longer an essential place, though it is present in the New Testament.
in a subordinate degree. But miracle must, in the bearer of such a revelation, rise to its highest level; first because of the superiority of his office to that of the prophets. For he was himself the end of prophecy, the person for whose coming prophecy had prepared, and in whom all God's purposes of love toward mankind were to be fulfilled. The office of Christ as the bearer to mankind of God's final and complete message involves too much for us lightly to ascribe it to him. And no merely natural proof would suffice. We could not possibly believe what we believe of him had he wrought no miracles. We could not believe that he was the appointed Saviour, to whom "all power was given in heaven and earth," for man's redemption, if he had given no proof during the period of his manifestation on earth of being invested with extraordinary powers. But we go further than this. Perhaps no one would deny that the sole sufficient proof of such a religion as Christianity must be supernatural. We assert that no revealed religion whatsoever can be content with a less decided proof. The sole basis upon which a revelation can rest is the possession by the bearer of it of prophetic and miraculous powers.

For a revealed religion claims authority over us. If it be God's voice speaking to us we have no choice but to obey. Our reason might not approve; our hearts and wills might detest what we were told; yet if we knew that it was God's voice, we must sadly and reluctantly submit to it. But it would be wrong in the highest degree to yield up ourselves to anything requiring such complete obedience unless we had satisfactory proof that God really was its author. And no subjective proof could be satisfactory. The purity of the doctrines of Christianity, their agreement with the truths of natural religion, their ennobling effects upon our characters, and the way in which they enlighten the conscience—all this and more shows that there is no impossibility in Christianity being a divine revelation: the perfection of our Lord's character, the thoroughness with which Christ's atonement answers to the deepest needs of the soul, the way in which Christianity rises above all religions of man's devising—all this and more makes it probable that it is God's gift. But at most these considerations only prepare the mind to listen without prejudice to the direct and external proofs that Christianity is a revelation from God. The final proof must pledge God himself to its truth. But what are the divine attributes which would bear the most decisive witness? Surely those which most entirely transcend all human counterfeits—omniscience and omnipotence. Now these are pledged to Christianity by prophecy and miracle.

The first had performed its office when Christ came. All men were musing in their hearts upon the expected coming of some Great One. His miracles, his works, the products of his powers, were the signs that prophecy was being fulfilled. The two must not be separated. Our Lord expressly declares that but for his works the Jews would have been right in rejecting him. His claims were too high for any less proof to have sufficed. But the nature of his works did put men under a moral obligation to inquire into his claims; and then he sent them to the Scriptures. The miracles were thus not the final proof of Christ's mission. Had they been such, we might have expected that they would still be from time to time vouchsafed, as occasion required, even to the end of the world. The agreement of Christ's life and death and teaching with what had been foretold of the Messiah is the leading proof of his mission, and having this, we need miracles no more. Christ's works called men's attention to this proof, and made it a duty to examine it. They also exalt his person, and give him the authority...
of a messenger accredited from heaven; but the Old Testament remains for all ages the proper proof of the truth of the New. Miracles were signs for the times; Prophecy is for all time, and as Christianity no longer requires anything especially to call men's attention to its claims; Prophecy is proof enough that it is a message from God.

The more clearly to set this before our readers, we repeat that prediction was the distinctive sign of God's presence under the Old Testament dispensation, and miracles subordinate. Revelation was then a growing light, and was ever advancing; and thus the prophets were ever preparing for the future. It was only on special occasions that miracle was needed. But when revelation became perfect and final in the person of One who, according to the terms of prophecy, transcended the bounds of human nature, it was necessary that miracle should rise in him to its highest level, both because of the dignity of his person, as one invested with all power, human and divine, and also as the proper proof at the time of his being the Son, the last and greatest, therefore, whom the Father could send; and, finally, to call the attention of men to his claims, and compel them to examine them. For this reason they were called signs. But as soon as the dispensation thus given could force its claims on men's attention by other means, and its divine Founder had withdrawn, miracles necessarily ceased, as being inconsistent with man's probation. Look over the list of Scripture names for miracles, and ask what one would be appropriate now? Of what would they now be signs? Of what person would they be the proper faculties? For whom now would they be suitable works? The whole scriptural theory of miracles is contravened by the supposition of miracles being continued after Christianity had once been established. What history teaches us, namely, that they were rapidly withdrawn is alone consistent with what we gather from Scripture concerning them.

They were an essential part of the proof at the time, and have an essential use now. For we could not believe what is taught us of Christ if he had not been accredited by miracles. But the proper evidence for the truth of Christianity now is that of prophecy, not as existing any longer in living force, but as manifested in the agreement of the long list of books forming the Old Testament with one another; and still more in the fulfilment of the Old Testament in the New. It is a proof in everybody's hands, and open to every one to examine. The proof of miracles requires, of course, large historical evidence, and not every one possesses Bishop Stillingley's "Origines Cause," or even Paley; but every Christian has his Bible, and in it will find the proper proof now of its truth.

In its proper place and degree, the supernatural remains essential to the proof of a divine revelation. We could not accept a revelation, or give it the authority over our conscience due to the direct voice of God, unless we had indubitable proof that it was God's voice. The supernatural can only be proved by the supernatural. If, then, a revelation was necessary as well for the present progress of mankind as for their future perfectness, miracle was also necessary, and the believer in revelation cannot possibly discard it from its place among the evidences.

Necessarily, therefore, from first to last, the Bible is a book of miracle. Miracle is present not as an accident, separable from the main thread, but is itself the very essence of the narrative. The facts of the Old Testament were the basis of the faith of the Jew. They were so as being miracles, and because, as such, they involved certain dogmatic propositions concerning the Divine Being and his relations to themselves.

Miracles in the present day are at a dis-
THE SUPERNATURAL AS EVIDENCE.

Our men of science have so well studied the laws of the material universe, and shown us so clearly the existence there of a calm, unbroken, unvarying order, that our minds, enamoured of so grand a truth, are impatient of any truth or theory rising above these material laws. Thus the controversy whether Christianity is true or not really turns upon miracle. The close and exact examination of all the facts of Holy Scripture which has marked our days has served only to confirm men's belief in the authenticity of the sacred writings. Our increased knowledge, especially that obtained from the cuneiform inscriptions corroborative of the Old Testament history, and from similar unquestionable authorities contemporaneous with the New Testament records, has well nigh swept away every so-called historical difficulty; while subjective criticism has not merely failed in substantiating any case against the several books of the Bible, but has done very much to place them upon a surer basis. At no time was the external evidence in favour of Christianity, or the argument drawn from prophecy, so clear and so little liable to objection as at the present day. And this is no slight matter. A host of eager and competent critics have examined with unfavourable intentions the whole line of our defences, and the result of their operations has been to show how thoroughly tenable it is in every part.

Thus the whole attack is now thrown upon miracle. Miracle is roundly asserted to be contrary to the whole course of nature, and to be a violation of that grand law of invariable order which we find everywhere else throughout the universe. In this way a sort of induction is drawn against miracle. Wherever we can examine into the causes of phenomena, we always find them the products of forces acting according to unchanging laws. Whole regions of phenomena, which were once supposed to be under the sway of chance, have now been reduced to order, and the causes of them made manifest. Men of science have entered one field after another, and have added it to their domains, by showing what laws govern it, and how those laws work. With some show of reason therefore they affirm that law prevails everywhere, and that where at present it can not be shown to prevail, we may yet be sure of its presence, and convinced that the patient investigations of science will in due time demonstrate its sway. And therefore miracle, as being a violation of these universal laws, is not merely, they say, contrary to that experience of men of which Mr. Hume spoke, and upon which he founded an argument repeatedly shown to be untenable, but of an induction drawn from a vast field of observation and scientific inquiry. In miracle, and miracle alone, science finds something which contradicts its experience. The examination of this most important objection will complete our inquiry.

The proposition contained in this objection, when we consider it, seems a most true conclusion as regards the material universe. All material things apparently are governed by general laws, and it is probable that scientific men are quite right in endeavouring to show that even in creation all things were produced by law. For our own part, we can not imagine a perfect Being like the Deity working except by law, and therefore we read all theories about evolution and selection, and the formation of the solar system by slow degrees out of a vast nebula, and the like, with no prejudice regarding them, however intended, simply as attempted answers to the question, In what way—by what secondary processes—did God create and shape the world? If, after reading the arguments, we conclude by thinking them often ingenious rather than true, and put the book down with the Scotch verdict, "Not proven," we do not therefore think that science is on the wrong track, nor doubt that all these inquiries do in the main give us juster
views of God's method of working. But miracle seems to us to belong to another field of thought, and to be outside the domains of science. For we venture to ask, Is the material universe everything? Is there nothing but matter? nothing but dull, inert particles, acted upon by material forces—attraction, repulsion, affinity, and the like? What is force? What is law? If there be a God—a perfect, omnipresent Being—then law has to us a meaning. It is his will, working permanently and unchangeably because he is a perfect and omnipotent worker. We can understand force. It is his presence, acting upon and controlling all things, but always in the same way, because he changes not. To believe in universal order without a universal will to order all things, to believe in universal laws without a universal lawgiver, is to us an absurdity. *Ex nihilo nihil fit.* In a world where every effort has a cause, who and what is the cause of all? Who but God? And who sustains the world now but he who first made it?

But it is not the office of science to inquire into the being and attributes and nature of this First Great Cause. Science is solely occupied with the secondary processes. When it has reached the law, it has done its work. It is not the business of science to examine into the law as such, but only into the mode of its operations. Whose is the law, what power sustains it, how it came into being—all this lies outside the domain of science. Thus science never rises above material things; and by remembering this—by remembering that, after all, the field of science (of course we mean physical science) is limited—we see that an induction made in its proper field does not justify any conclusions in fields outside its limits.

Let us take the case of man. Science, looking at him in his physical aspect, tells us that he consists of several pounds of salts and earths, combined with a larger number of gallons of water. It tells us by what chemical affinities these commonplace materials are held together, how they operate upon one another, by what processes the waste is renewed, and by what a mass of curious mechanical contrivances man's body, considered as a machine, performs its operations. If we ask how it comes to think, science tells us much about the brain; how like it is to a galvanic trough, and by what an elaborate, threefold apparatus of nerves it sends its commands to every part of the body. But when we ask how it is that the brain does consciously what the voltaic battery does unconsciously; how it is that these earths and salts when combined into a man, know that they are a man, we get only the unmeaning answer that it is the result of organization. But give science all the bottles in a chemist's shop, and it can not organize a sentient being out of them. In fact, it owns itself that life is a mystery. It can tell how life works, but not what life is. Life is as much beyond the reach of science as is God. It knows the laws of life, but no more.

Man, therefore, when considered only physically contains more than science can master. But is life the only mystery in man? Why does man think? Why does he speculate upon his own actions? Why muse upon the purpose of all things here below? Of all beings upon this earth, man alone is self-conscious. He alone knows that he exists; he alone feels that he exists for a purpose, and can and does consciously interfere with other things in order to shape them to his own ends. He alone has not the mere rudiments, but the full gift of a conscience, which is always interfering with him, and giving him endless annoyance, because it will pass judgment upon his actions, and condemn much that he does.

Now it is in connection with this higher world that miracle has its proper place. It distinctly has reference to man as a being in whom there is more than mere material forces
at work. Prove that there is nothing more in man than salts and earths and water, and there would be no place for miracle. Now physical science stops at proving this. The most skilful analyst could get nothing more out of man than salts, earths, and water; but then, confessedly, he labours under this disadvantage, that he can not begin his analysis until life, and with it the sentient soul, has withdrawn from the machine. All he can examine is the residuum only. We want some science therefore which can examine man while he is alive, and report upon him. For physical science is not the sole science. There are other sciences, and each is authoritative only upon its own domain. The psychologist, who examines into the workings of man's inner nature, is quite as worthy of a hearing as the physicist, who examines into the materials out of which he is composed. _Ne sutor super crepidam_—a homely but wise motto, which a rising and progressive study, such as is physical science, in the hours of its first triumphs, is in danger of neglecting. After all, a man of only one science tries to see with only one eye, and to walk with only one leg. Before we can form a true estimate of the question that so deeply concerns us—What is man's place and work and purpose in the world?—we must include a far wider induction than that offered by physical science.

If, as the instincts of our nature teach us, there be a God; if man be more than a very highly-organized machine; if within him there be an immortal soul, and before him a future life, then miracle is essential to his well-being. It is the sole possible proof of conscious relation between man and God. Man could not be sure that God had spoken to him, had revealed to him any knowledge requisite for his use, had entered into covenant relation with him, without miracles. We know nothing in physical science to disprove this relation. Suppose that we find a stage elaborately constructed and adorned. No theory, however true, of the manner in which the stage was constructed, no examination of the mechanical laws by which it is still kept in being, will justify us in concluding that it was not intended for some further purpose. Nor, because the boards are all safely nailed in their place, does it follow that actors may not enter upon it, higher in nature than the boards, and capable of spontaneous motion. Nor, because we have never seen the builder, does it follow that he did not erect the stage on purpose that these actors might play upon it their parts. Geology, chemistry, astronomy, so far from proving that the world had no purpose, and that the actors upon it have no freedom and no responsibility, rather suggest the contrary. They teach us what a vast amount of skill, patience, wisdom, and goodness has been expended in forming the stage. _Quorsum haec?_ What was the object of all this? What the end? Oh! but some physicists answer, We reject teleology. That is, we reject something which lies beyond our province, and on which we have no authority to speak. They tell us all about the stage, and then, instead of saying frankly, We have done our part, Plaudite (and richly they deserve our applause), they tell us, Be satisfied with the stage. It is very pretty, very nicely constructed, but utterly meaningless. An elaborate universe without a purpose, is a poor, mean thing, unworthy to exist. It would be a disgrace to a man to erect a noble structure without a purpose: there are many buildings in England called So and So's Folly, because erected without a sufficient purpose. Let us beware of ascribing such child's play to that Power which called the universe into being.

No. The more we consider man, and the more we learn about him, and about the world which he inhabits, the more sure we are that he is no fortuitous concurrence of atoms, but the chief and culminating
point, in whom, and in whom alone all the
skill and wisdom and long patience dis-
played in the formation of the world find
their purpose and their justification. The
wonders of physical science all lead up to
this. There are some among its teachers
who would persuade us that the universe is
a mere curiosity shop, fitted to raise our
wonder, but never reasonable, because no-
where the product of mind, or controlled
by mind. But the very harmony which
they find in nature, and the calm reign
of law, prove that mind does pervade all
nature. Without mind there can be no
harmony; without a universal mind no uni-
versal law. But grant that mind may exist
as well as matter, and you grant the possi-
bility of this world having a purpose—a
purpose which, as we have shown, can be
realized only in man. But to realize this
purpose man's finite mind may need con-
verse with the universal, the infinite mind,
and, if so, miracle is justified by this
necessity.

Thus, then, miracle is not contrary to
nature, but rises simply above the sphere of
mere material forces. And it is untrue and
unphilosophic to regard it as such an inter-
ference by God with his universal laws as is
a violation of them. We daily interfere
with the material laws and forces of nature,
but we never violate them. The stone
thrown into the air interferes with the law
of gravitation, but does not violate it. And
if God be an intelligent and moral worker
like man, only in a superior and perfect
degree, he, too, must be capable of bending
the powers of nature to instantaneous obe-
dience to his will, or he could not do what
man can do. His own laws he could not
violate, because they are his laws; but his
interference with them would necessarily be
what we call a miracle, something which the
ordinary operations of nature could not
produce; something which transcends na-
ture, and goes utterly beyond it. If a
sheep possessed the power of reasoning
upon its own actions and those of man,
the latter would seem to it absolutely
miraculous, because they so entirely exceed
its own powers. Yet to man they would
be no miracles, but the ordinary exercise
of his powers. And so what we call
miracles are not miracles to the Deity,
and therefore the evangelists call them in
Christ simply δυνάμεις, his faculties; and
John calls them ἐργα, works, only the
natural products of his faculties; yet not
wrought without a purpose. They were
also σημεῖα, signs, tokens indicating that
something was done, which man was there-
by required to examine and observe; and
living as the Jews did under a preparatory
dispensation, they were signs that the ful-
ness of time had come, and the final dis-
pensation was being ushered in.

In conclusion. Without supernatural evi-
dence there can be only natural religion.
Revelation is itself a miracle; and its very
object is to tell us things which we could
not otherwise know. Such things can not
be verified as we verify the facts of science.
No man hath or can see God. No man can
tell us by experience what is the state of
the soul after death, for from that bourn
no traveller returns. Yet some knowledge
of the relations of the soul with God may
be absolutely necessary for our moral and
spiritual well-being. Now the utter failure
of natural religion convinces us that it is
necessary. And therefore we feel no diffi-
culty in the belief that God, in creating the
world such as it is, and placing man upon
it such as he is, and under such circum-
stances as those in which we find ourselves,
did from the first purpose this reasonable
interference with the material laws of his
own framing, by which he grants man the
only sufficient proof that he is willing to
enter into covenant relations with him. If
the physicist reply that such action on God's
part is inconceivable, we answer that he
also must conceive of some such action. Students of physical science deal in long numbers, but these numbers are as nothing compared with the eternity past. Work back with the geologist, and you come at last to a first beginning of matter. Looked at by the light of mental science, the eternal existence of matter is impossible. To the metaphysician, matter is but a phenomenon of mind. Confining ourselves, then, to our universe, what a momentous change was that in God when he passed from the passive state of not willing to the active state of willing the existence of our system! Grant that by his fiat he called into existence only an atom, out of which by evolution all things here below have sprung, what a stupendous act it was, and how entirely it placed the Deity in relations, and, to speak with all reverence, under obligations from which he was free before! For the Creator is under the obligations of justice and love to his creatures. He made us, and not we ourselves. But he neither was nor is under any moral obligations to his material laws. They abide in power and might because he abideth continually. And miracle simply means that he, the Creator, has from time to time, under the operation of a higher law, given us the necessary proof that he does love us, and that certain messengers, chosen from among men, had authority to teach us truths which concerned our peace; and that, finally, by “powers and portents and signs, he has manifested and displayed Jesus of Nazareth in the midst of us” as “a leader and Saviour, to give repentance unto his people, and the remission of sins.”

Miracles, then, were no after-thought, no remedial process to set right what had gone wrong before. They form an essential and necessary part and condition of the intercourse between the universal mind of God and the finite mind of man, and that intercourse was necessary for man’s good. Why man is just what he is, and why the state of things in which he finds himself is what it is, we can not tell. We can only reason from facts as we find them. But man being such as he is, we assert that the world would be a failure without miracles; for either man would exist without a purpose, or, having been placed here for some purpose, he would not know with sufficient certainty or clearness what that purpose was, and therefore would neither have the means of effecting it, nor even any obligation laid upon him of trying to accomplish what his Maker had willed in his creation.
BIBLICAL NOTES: THE CHERUBIM.

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Among the Articles of minor importance which are found in our Dictionaries of the Bible, and which have the quality of unsatisfactory treatment, perhaps none are more conspicuous for this quality than those headed by the word "Cherubim." The quality of treatment results in large measure necessarily from the nature of the subject treated. The symbolism of the Hebrews, like that of all other nations, is obscure in itself, while the evidence necessary to clear up this inherent obscurity is at the best only scantily to be obtained. There are also not wanting readers who will readily believe that those writers, who by long study acquire most profundity in the interpretation of symbolism, are sometimes, for that very reason, less apt to seize the correct interpretation. The questions of the cherubim are more or less questions of symbolism. They are therefore, as a matter of course, somewhat difficult questions.

But the difficulty has, as it seems to us, often been unnecessarily increased by the failure to observe a very plain and important distinction between the earlier Mosaic cherubim and the "living creatures" of prophetic vision. Such a distinction is warranted by the evidence of the text and by the nature of the case. It should be clearly made and faithfully maintained. The nature of the case warrants the distinction. We should not expect that the work which followed a fixed pattern, and was wrought in enduring metal, or as tapestry, would correspond to the ideal productions, which can shift with every new phase of the vision, and which by their nature, both in regard to construction and function, invite constant change. Nor does the text of passages, which furnish to the critical student his evidence as to the facts, fail to corroborate the impression derived from a consideration of the nature of the case. How clearly indicated in the text is this distinction between the earlier cherubim of the artisan's handiwork and the later cherubim of the prophet's vision, our following examination will, we hope, make apparent.

It would be the usual way of procedure in such inquiries as the present, and at the same time a pleasant and safe way, could we begin by ascertaining the derivation of the word, the subsequent contents of which it is our purpose to examine. But unfortunately this word has thus far resisted all the power of that great solvent, modern philology. The older writers, among whom may be mentioned Origen and Jerome, were all satisfied with a derivation of the word which give it the meaning "abundance of knowledge," so that even Aquinas could write, "the name seraphim is given from their fervour, as belonging to love; but the name cherubim is given from their knowledge." The modern writers are satisfied each one with his own derivation, but with that of no one else. It is likely that most of those who make domestic and amatory use of the word "cherub" little suspect what trouble its dignified but obscure original has given to scores of philologists and commentators. Investigation, however, reveals this consoling fact, that no theory of its symbolism can well be adopted which will not find support in some one at least of the many meanings which have been discovered for the word. One
learned German whose theory of the thing itself would seem to demand a meaning hitherto unventured for the word, has called it a *crux interpretum*, and summarily dismissed the investigation. We may well follow the example which Bähr set us in his Symbolik.

But if we may not know what the word "cherub" originally meant, is it possible for us to discover what the thing cherub was? On this point our knowledge can be at the most only partial, and in some specialities only such knowledge as consists in an acquaintance with conflicting opinions, amongst the claims of which it is difficult or impossible to make a satisfactory choice. We shall surely, however, escape much confusion and error if we keep constantly in mind the two following considerations.

And first of the two stands the consideration to which we have already directed attention. We are sharply to distinguish between the "living creatures" of Ezekiel's vision and the cherubim which overshadowed the ark, adorned the curtains, and clung upon the walls of the tabernacle and temple. The latter were fashioned in enduring metal or wrought as tapestry by those who were acquainted with Egypt's temples and palaces. The former passed, repeatedly shifting and fleeting, before one who was surrounded with Assyrian symbolism. The latter, in so far as they are ideal forms realized in wood, gold, and tapestry work, are historical, objective. The former, though they have some points of union with the latter, and thus in some of their elements of composition share in the real, still, as a whole are unhistorical, subjective, and never actualized in any known image or painting. As the former pass before the prophet in his inspired vision, they change and unfold new elements. They serve his purpose, and then vanish, except so far as they obtain for themselves a fixed form in the record of the vision. But they cannot be used, even to prove the conventional form of the cherubim in Ezekiel's time, on the supposition that any such conventional form was in existence—a supposition which may seem warranted from the fact that the prophet attributes to his "living creatures" the "face of a cherub." Much less can they be used to settle questions arising in the discussion of the Mosaic cherubim. To treat these strange, changeable creatures of the prophet's vision as though they were historical realities, and, having determined their supposed form and meaning, force them back through many centuries to obscure an account which though meagre is otherwise tolerably plain, is the usual method of investigation.

The reasons for giving such prominence to the distinction between the "living creatures" of Ezekiel and the cherubim of the tabernacle and temple will show themselves more fully in the progress of the discussion. It is enough at present, to say that the intent of the description of the cherubim in the two cases is entirely different, and that the things described, in their nearest approaches to similarity, are quite unlike,—certainly in form, and probably also in original and significance.

The second consideration which will assist in avoiding error and confusion is common to all questions of criticism. As we pass from what is plainer to what is more obscure, we are not to let our dubious attempts at a solution of that which is by its nature obscure throw a shadow back over the conclusions which taken by themselves seem trustworthy. Why the cherubim of the artisan's handiwork and the cherubim of the prophet's fantasy should *not* differ in original, in form, and in significance, we are not prepared to say. That the two *did* differ in all three particulars, the evidence clearly shows. To treat the two under one heading is somewhat like writing two Articles under one title.

Bearing these considerations in mind,
we have to answer three questions of main importance: What was the form of the cherubim? What was their significance? And whence was their origin?

I. To the question, What was the form of the cherubim? Meyer replies, we may make our "answer by asking the counter question, How does a thing look that has no fixed form?" To this reply Bähr agrees. According to the latter author, the cherubic figure might have one, two, or four faces, two or four feet, one or two pair of wings, and might have the bovine or leonine type as its base. Beginning with the cherubim of Ezekiel's vision, he proves their changefulness of form, and, arguing from these short-lived, ideal existences to the forms which stood in real image-work for centuries, asserts the same characteristic of the Mosaic cherubim. These are, in brief Bähr's reasons: The cherubim in tapestry-work could not have been conceived like those on the ark, because the latter were statues, the former rather paintings. This would be a more decisive reason, if the forms of the cherubim over the ark had been as complex as the forms of those seen in the prophet's vision; but having only one face, as Bähr himself admits, it is hard to see why there must have been any more difference between the inwrought and upright cherubim than must be in the case of any other form, represented now in statue, now in painting. This hints are, it is true, slender evidence, yet all the evidence we have, unless we admit the statement of Ezekiel (i. 10) to stand in proof as to the form of the cherubim in Moses' time.

But "it lay in their nature to have no fixed form, and therefore no fixed representation of form." This is the cherubic nature only according to Bähr's theory; and to what lengths his theory carries him remains to be more clearly seen in the subsequent part of our discussion. These reasons seem to us unsupported and little satisfactory.

1. The truth with regard to the form of the Mosaic cherubim—and only with regard to it need changes of form puzzle us—is, we think, that it was a fixed form, and remained the same in all representations throughout history. We are not, however, on this account, to attempt to fix the details of the form any further than we have evidence.

Their general aspect and proportions were probably human,—"Speciemaximam partem humana," as says Gesenius in his Thesaurus. To this view, however, there is no direct testimony, so far as the Mosaic cherubim are concerned. The cherubim of Solomon's temple, standing ten cubits high upon their feet, stretched out their wings so that they reached the same distance from tip to tip, which equality of proportion is that of the perfect human form. Of the cherubim standing upon the mercy-seat, which was two and a half cubits in length, and raised by the ark to the height of a cubit and a half (Ex. xxv. 17; xxxvii. 6), it may be said that the two with their pedestal are in best proportions if they are admitted to have had those of the human form. These hints are, it is true, slender evidence, yet all the evidence we have, unless we admit the statement of Ezekiel (i. 10) to stand in proof as to the form of the cherubim in Moses' time.

The historic cherubim, except possibly those on the walls and doors of Solomon's temple, had only one face. For of those upon the "mercy-seat," or, more properly, "cover" of the ark it is said: "Their faces shall look toward one another, toward the mercy-seat shall the faces of the cherubim be" (Ex. xxv. 18 sqq.; xxxvii. 9). Of those in Solomon's temple, we are told (2

* See Keil and Delitzsch, Pent. ii. p. 170.
Chron. iii. 13) that "their faces were inward" or toward the house.

Spencer and others have argued, from Ezek. i. 10 compared with x. 14, that the distinctive face of the cherubim of Moses, as well as of Ezekiel, was that of the ox; but the conclusion is unwarranted.

The cherubim are always represented with wings, when any explanation accompanies the mention of them. Those in the tabernacle stretched their wings toward each other "on high," "covering" (or, as the Septuagint translates the passage, σωκίατόντες εἰς) the lid of the ark. The huge forms of the temple were ten cubits high, and "stretched forth" (1 King vi. 27), or "spread out" (1 Chron. xxviii. 18) their wings, and with their faces in one direction so covered (Sept. περιεκάλυπτον εἰς) the ark.

The cherubim in the temple had feet (2 Chron. iii. 13) upon which they stood; but of those in the tabernacle nothing in this regard is said.

Gesenius thinks* that they had hands as well, and cites Gen. iii. 24 in proof, as though these guardians of abandoned Eden held their weapon; but this seems to be decidedly more of inference than the text will support, especially since the sword is represented by the Hebrew as turning of itself.

The cherubim of Solomon's temple were, as their great size made necessary, constructed of olive-trees overlaid with gold, and are called "image-work" (2 Chron. iii. 10, opus statuarium, Vulgate, and so Gesenius; ἐρυγόν ἐκ ξύλων, Septuagint). According to Gesenius and De Wette, those of the tabernacle were formed in like manner; but this conclusion is by no means universally received. The Hebrew word used to describe the construction of the cherubim of the tabernacle (Ex. xxv. 18), is rendered by some, as in our version, beaten, or "solid work"; but by others, among whom is Gesenius, opus tornatum, or "turned work"; by the Seventy, χρυσόπερπετά, "worked in relief," or "chased work"; and by Bähr, opus ductile, with which the Vulgate agrees. Meyer and others assert that they were of one piece with the "mercy-seat;" but Bähr, with more of probability, contends that they were only indissolubly joined to it. "Of the mercy-seat," our version reads, "shall ye make the cherubims."

In the tabernacle these same forms were wrought upon the curtains (Ex. xxvi. 1; xxxvi. 8), and upon the vail before the oracle (Ex. xxvi. 31; xxxvi. 35); while in the temple they were found upon the walls of the holy place (1 Kings vi. 29). Upon the doors of the oracle and of the temple they are carved with palm-trees and open flowers. They appear also upon the borders to the bases of the sacred lavers, and on the plates of the ledges—mingled, in the former case, with lions and oxen, and in the latter, with lions and palm-trees. Thus mingled, the cherubim of the temple, unlike those of the tabernacle, bear witness to the influence of foreign workmen. Hiram, as a Tyrian sculptor, "did not scruple," says Stanley, "to introduce bulls in the greater laver, and bulls and lions and cherubs in the lesser, probably as the emblems of the two chief tribes." It is often assumed, because the cherubim upon the walls of Ezekiel's ideal temple have two faces, one "of a man" and the other of a "young lion," that those upon the walls of Solomon's temple were also double-faced. But at this point we are again warned not to force details of the temple seen in vision upon the temple built in stone, wood, and gold. If the cherubim of the historic temple had had two faces, it is not likely that the historians would have failed to mention such an anomaly in their form. Besides, we should not expect two-faced cherubim, with one face "the face of a lion," mingled with lions

* See Thesaurus, in loco.
upon the sacred lavers. In the cherubim of Ezekiel's temple, where they are represented as paintings upon a flat surface, only two faces of the four could, as a matter of course, well appear; but the other two are, according to Hengstenberg, Lightfoot, and others, to be considered as existing, though not in sight. The faces which are described as in sight are the two most important among the faces of the cherubim of prophetic vision.

It appears, then, to be tolerably clear that the form of the Mosaic historic cherubim, the component parts of which can be only partially described, was in its totality one and definite, and that this form was retained without considerable change throughout Jewish history. Herder has even understated the truth, when he says that the forms wrought in the tapestry and upon the walls, both of the tabernacle and temple, were probably the same as those which rose over the mercy seat above the ark.

We shall soon, after making the attempt, discover that it is impossible to reconcile the forms of Ezekiel's vision with those which have been thus far described, and which were the tangible results of the workman's hand. The two have few points in common. Nor is it necessary to attempt the reconciliation. The "living creatures" of Ezekiel never had any existence outside of the prophetic vision, changed the ideal form of that ideal existence like the shifting costume of the theatre, and passed away with the fading of the vision. We have no need, then, to hold the opinion that the form of the cherubim varied in various times. The form of the cherubim, so far as the figures wrought in metal and tapestry are concerned, seems to have remained the same. The only variation which appears is between the cherubim of the artisan and the cherubim of the seer, and also among the several forms of this latter sort of cherubim. Nor need we be forced by this gratuitous attempt to reconcile things normally different into the opinion—which has already been mentioned, and is credited by Meyer, Bähr, and others—that the cherubim never had any fixed, conventional form. If its delineation varied even in unimportant details, we have no evidence for the assertion that it did thus vary. It does not follow, however, from what has just been said, that we are to go to the other extreme of fixing for ourselves those details upon the nature of which we have no evidence. "The complete delineation of the Mosaic cherubim," says Winer, "is for ever to be renounced."

When Solomon's temple was finished, assembled Israel, chiefs of fathers and people, looked on while the priests "brought up the ark of the Lord," and brought it in "unto his place" under the wings of the gigantic cherubim. Whether the smaller figures, which had crouched over the ark in the tabernacle, remained upon it in the temple of Solomon, we are not told. But they probably had already disappeared, no mention being made of the more important cherubim, while a minute account of what was done with the staves is given; and all the sacred relics having gone from the inside of the sacred chest. It is also to be noted that two pair of cherubim over the ark would seem incongruous.

2. The form of the cherubim of vision differs almost completely from that of the Mosaic cherubim, and changes its own details according to the demands of the prophet's imagination.

From the time that the gigantic cherubim received the long wandering ark to a resting-place beneath their outspread wings, no further historical mention is made of them. If the eighteenth Psalm is, as Ewald supposes, Davidic, and the eightieth belongs to the exile, then only in the prayer of Hezekiah (2 Kings xix. 15) and in Ps. xcix. 1 (written perhaps in the time of Chaldean oppression) is even incidental and figurative mention made of the cherubim, until the prophecy...
of Ezekiel introduces to us, under the same name, a very different thing.

The recognition of the essential difference in form, significance, and origin, between the Mosaic cherubim and the cherubim of the vision will alone prevent confusion. This difference we find more clearly set forth in Ewald's note on Ezekiel and in Winer's *Realwörterbuch* than elsewhere; from the latter of which we quote the statement: "We cannot understand how the mere fancy of this prophet, if only he held fast in general to the original type of the Mosaic cherubim, should not have been freely handled in the carrying out of its forms." How fast the prophet did hold to this type, and how much freedom there was in details of form, a comparison of the two representations will show us. We cannot expect the same simplicity and consistency in the delineation of the forms of vision as of historic reality, and as a matter of fact we do not find them.

The "living creatures" of Ezekiel's vision are thus described: "They had the likeness [probably the upright posture (?)] of a man"; "Every one had four faces and every one had four wings"; "Their feet were straight feet" (translated in the Septuagint, καὶ τὰ σκίλη αὐτῶν ὀρθά; the Hebrew word meaning, in this place, straight, as opposed to curved); "and the soles of their feet like the soles of a calf's foot," which the Seventy render, καὶ περιστροφὴ οἱ πόδες αὐτῶν. They "sparkled like the colour of burnished brass." "And they had the hands of a man under their wings on their four sides"; of which wings we read that "two of every one joined to another, and two covered their bodies." "And they four had the face of a man and the face of a lion on the right side, and they four had the face of an ox on the left side; they four also had the face of an eagle." "Wheels" full of eyes, a "firmament," a "throne," "the likeness of a man above upon it," accompany these strange creatures, and almost make an integral part of them. Surely it would need a cunning workman in metal and tapestry to delineate these forms, were their complexity the only difficulty which he had to overcome. They are, however, not only complex, but also changeful.

In that wonderful tenth chapter, these beings, which had before been called "living creatures," are again described, with some changed and some entirely new details, and are thereupon called "cherubims." At the fourteenth verse of this chapter, the four faces are again enumerated; but now "the first face was the face of a cherub," and the face of "an ox on the left side" had disappeared. This fourteenth verse is, however, omitted in the Septuagint as edited by Tischendorf, though it is not without manuscript authority. What is meant by "the face of a cherub," in this connection, it is not easy to determine. The opinion of Spencer and others, that this interchange proves the face of an ox to have been the distinctive cherubic face, is now generally abandoned.* May not the expression be held to show that there was a distinctive historic "face of a cherub," and thus disclose touches of the real in this imaginative compound? At any rate, this phrase, and the one which attributes to these living creatures the likeness of man, are the most certain elements of the old Mosaic cherubim considered as contributing anything besides a name to this new compound. The latter phrase is, however, restricted by Ewald to the common intelligence of man and these cherubim. In this tenth chapter, where the word "cherubim" occurs twenty-one of the something like eighty-five times in all, we are also told that their whole body, and their backs, and their hands, and their wings, as well as the wheels, were full of eyes round about. Well may Gesenius say, "Pro ingeniiluxuriaet nimia fereuber-

* See Bahr's Symbolik. i. 313.
tate," has the prophet constructed them. Well may we say, with more emphasis than Winer, "Thus executed, one will not easily recognize the form of the Mosaic cherubim."

Indeed, strictly speaking, they cannot thus be executed at all; and Ewald is certainly right in claiming that the whole of this compound, as Ezekiel thought of it, cannot be represented in drawing or plastic, but only in the imagination of the prophet. Why, then, should the discussion of the subject be perpetually confused by assuming the essential similarity of the cherubim of Ezekiel's vision and the cherubim of the tabernacle and temple?

II. From the inquiry into the form of the cherubim, we now turn to consider their significance. This question and the question of their original throw a slight mutual light or shadow one upon the other. The question of significance is one hard to decide; and though Bähr, who asserts that even the commonest materials and measures of the tabernacle were symbolic, may be sure in every instance, we must be content to know less.

1. As to the significance of the historic cherubim, the first passage in point is Gen. iii. 24, where they are, according to Gesenius and most others, mentioned as guardians of Eden. Indeed, this mention of them leads Herder to conclude that they were a sort of Hebrew griffin. According to Bähr,* however, they are set as beings of abounding life, to inhabit, and not to guard, this garden of life. The plain import of the text is that their office was that of guardians. There is another allusion to these guarding cherubim of Eden, which cannot well be passed by. In Ezek. xxviii. 14, the king of Tyre is called "the cherub of extension that covereth" (wrongly rendered, in our Bibles, "anointed cherub," but "cherub extentus," in the Vulgate); because according to Gesenius, he guards his treasures as the cherub "covered with his wings and protected radiant gems in the holy mount of Eden." With a fierce joy does the prophet say to this guardian cherub, the king of Tyre: "Thou hast sinned, and I will destroy thee, O covering cherub, from the midst of the stones of fire."

We next find the cherubim set up by Moses over the ark of the covenant. Were the chronological relation of these two passages—Gen. iii. 24 and Ex. xxv. 18 sq.—known beyond doubt, we might feel more ready to assert or deny that the cherubim in both instances symbolize the same thought. Their watchful posture, with wings overshadowing, and faces toward the mercy-seat, seem still to indicate the guardian, and to be constantly saying: "Procul, O procul est profani." And since both records, by whomsoever first written, were doubtless put together by the same hand, we should expect such similarity of office. We conclude, then, that the earliest significance of the cherubim was that of simple guardianship.

But when once placed upon the ark their significance was necessarily farther expanded and defined. They are now enveloped with the visible glory of Jehovah; on them he sits or rides, from between them he speaks or shines forth; and they become, by an easy and natural transition, his throne, his place of most intimate self-revealing. "The cherub became among the Hebrews," says Ewald, "the token of the holy place, where Jehovah, as it were, has descended, and man feels his nearness more intimately than elsewhere."* "I will commune with thee from above the mercy-seat, from between the two cherubims," was God's promise (Ex. xxv. 22) to his servant Moses. Of this promise there is recorded one fulfilment (Num. vii. 89). Jehovah's distinctive epithet becomes, "He that sitteth the cherubim" (our version, "dwelleth between"). The presence of the ark of the Lord of hosts, which sitteth

* Symbolik, i. 351.

* Die Propheten, ii. 342.
the cherubim" was to vanquish the Philistines. Of "the God of my rock" David sings: "He rode upon a cherub, and did fly." The cry of the exiled and oppressed is: "Thou that dwellest between the cherubims, shine forth" (Ps. lxxx. 1); and his exultation is: "Jehovah sitteth the cherubim, let the earth be moved." It is to the Lord of Hosts, God of Israel, who sitteth the cherubim, that Hezekiah sends up prayer for succour. As these quotations prove, no break occurs in the thought. And the same forms have the same significance in the Temple of Solomon as in the ancient tabernacle.

According to Bähr,* cherubim are connected with Jehovah's throne, because, being creatures of most perfect life, they are the most perfect disclosures of his life, and thus belong to the throne, the place of highest disclosure. Upon the walls and veil of the temple they find place, because here is a state of high life, a miniature Eden, "where everything blooms and is green as in Eden." The plain historic connection is much preferable to this profundity in the interpretation of symbolism.

The importance which attaches itself to the cherubim is not because of their original, intrinsic, and hidden symbolism, but because the cherubim above the ark were to the Hebrew mind, as shrouded in the Shekinah, connected by inseparable association with all that was most occult and most awful in Jehovah's self-disclosure. Being placed there, with perhaps the original significance of guardians, they simply acquired by their place the added significance which we find them possessing in poetry and prayer. If those golden forms had not first raised their wings aloft to overshadow the ark of the covenant, Jehovah would never have been called, "He that sitteth the cherubim." The cherubim receive this part of their symbolism from their place, not impart to the place the prior acquisition of their symbolism.

The expression "chariot of cherubims" (1 Chron. xxviii. 18) probably refers to the movable character of the ark and its apparatus of cherubim, upon which Jehovah is represented as sitting.

2. If we inquire, now, into the significance of the cherubim of Ezekiel's vision, we shall incur all the perplexity which is wont to attend the interpretation of prophetic symbolism. These "living creatures," and through their influence the cherubim of Moses' time, have been found to mean many things, from the vassals or "thunder-steeds"* of Jehovah to the most intimate disclosures of his own being and attributes. De Wette understands them as symbols of the strength, power, and wisdom of God and of his nearness. But Bähr, applying his cherubic theory, decides that they are called "living creatures" as possessing creature life, κατ' ἐξοχήν. Being the most perfect creatures, they are the most perfect disclosures of God and divine life. The number four is the "signature of the creation, especially in so far as it is a witness and disclosure of God." In particular, the ox is a symbol of the "generative and creative power"—a point it costs him much trouble to prove, and to the knowledge of which he admits that the Hebrews themselves had not attained. The lion, on account of his monstrous strength and irresistible power, and, conditioned on these, his frightfulness, is the symbol of the same characteristics in Jehovah. The eagle, as bird of greatest speed and far-sight, indicates the "unbounded life-power" and "all-seeing eye" of Jehovah. As man is in spirit above all creation besides, he fitly stands the symbol of Jehovah's absolute spirituality, or more particularly, wisdom. Thus much for the separate parts. In its totality the cherub, as before said, symbolizes "creation in its

* Symbolik. i. 372.

* So J. D. Michaelis in his "De cherubis equis tonantibus," though his view was founded mainly upon Ps. xviii. 10.
highest stage, an ideal creation, and is thus a witness and disclosure of Jehovah himself.” Gesenius, with far more probability in his favour, says these four united in one signify in part the strength, in part the speed, of these ministers of Jehovah.

Though we can offer no detailed explanation of these strange forms, and doubt whether any very occult symbolism belongs to their consideration, and so whether any such explanation in detail is possible, yet we may venture upon one or two suggestions.

Is, then, the state of the prophet’s mind such as to search out all these hidden meanings of details, and combine them into one whole so symbolic that each element of that whole must be thought to symbolize something? Has he not rather caught up the forms of remote memory and present sensation, bound them into one strange, indescribable, and changeful whole, and little regarded a meaning for each part, or even for the whole, any further than such meaning was connected with one or two main purposes?

Are these cherubim, if symbolic, to be recognized as symbols of Jehovah at all? We are told, that “upon the heads of the living creatures was the likeness of a firmament,” and “the likeness as the appearance of a man above upon it,” “the likeness of the glory of the Lord.” Thus enthroned upon the “living creatures,” the glory of Jehovah carries the prophet about in sacred vision, and discloses to him strange things, until (Ezek. xi. 24) he is brought back into Chaldea, and the mission of these “living creatures,” these four-faced cherubim, seems accomplished.

In all this there may be some trace, so far as significance is concerned, of the cherubim above the ark, which were at once the guardians and the throne of Jehovah’s glory. While, however, the symbolism of the historic cherubim was largely a historic growth due to the position which they originally had in the midst of the Shekinah, these cherubim of the vision seem to have been constructed with a view to serve the seer in his vision, and therefore are by their very nature symbolic. The majesty, movement, or universal presence, and the universal insight of these ministers of Jehovah are the characteristics most clearly symbolized by their construction.

III. The third question, Whence had the cherubim their origin? yet awaits us.

And to this question, as well as the preceding questions, only a partial answer can be given.

Thus much, however, is clearly manifest: The imagination of the constructor, be he artisan or seer, is very largely, if not wholly the source whence issue these forms, now wrought in metal and tapestry, and now projected in the air. There is no proof which can be adduced to show that the Hebrews thought of the cherubim as having any antitype in real existences, except that taken from Gen. iii. 24. And in this place it is most likely that the author should not be understood according to the most literal interpretation.

Among the forms which swarm upon the temples, tombs, and palaces of the ancient world there are many which might more or less vividly recall the cherubim; but there is no one form so closely like theirs, even in more prominent characteristics, as to lead all to agree that this is the one sought, and no other. The search for an individual origin is unsuccessful, for the data are insufficient. The usual method of procedure in the discovery—of which method Hengstenberg’s argument is an example—is somewhat as follows: Find first some form more or less remotely like the “living creatures” of Ezekiel, and leaving out such of their elements as you choose, according to the form you have selected, assume that by just these omitted elements did the Mosaic cherubim differ from the cherubim of the vision, and, thus differing, agree with your theoretic
original. This argument, however, is open to the objection that the closeness of resemblance—which is made the basis of argument—is the very thing which destroys the conclusion. For the little we know of the form of the Mosaic cherubim goes to show that they were almost the least possible like the "living creatures" of the prophet.

1. But with regard to the origin of the Mosaic cherubim; if it be unsafe, by comparing your selected form with the strange compounds of a later day, to reason that because it somewhat resembles them, it must exactly resemble something of by-gone centuries which, however, resembles them scarcely at all—if this be unsafe, any more secure method is scarcely attainable.

If the exact original of the Mosaic cherubim cannot be ascertained, shall we conclude that the cherubim were originated by the Hebrews themselves? The variety and kind of work which was done by the artisans of the tabernacle certainly seems to indicate that they were far from being incapable of creative art. And doubtless they fashioned at the first somewhat freely the forms which by their work became afterwards fixed for all Jewish history. But the analogy of the other constructions of these artisans seems to point us to Egypt for the original of the Mosaic cherubim. As a simple, pastoral folk, without religious ceremony and occult symbolism, the Hebrews had gone among a nation as unlike themselves as possible. And when after centuries they were made a nation themselves, we find everywhere in their tabernacle and its copy, the temple, in their priesthood, sacrifices, ark, and details of furniture, clothing, and ceremony, abundant witnesses to the impressions which the land of their bondage had made upon them. "That the cherub as such," says Hengstenberg, "aside from its significance which includes a real original Jewish element, did not spring up on Jewish ground appears probable from the merely scattered notices of it which are found." And again: "We are especially guided to the Egyptian origin of the cherubim, since of all the people with whom in ancient times the Israelites were closely connected, only among the Egyptians are compound animals found in history."

But if from Egypt the Hebrew cherub came, which one of its many symbolic animal forms is the exact original? Bahr declares* that he has examined all the forms in the "great French work" and not one of them resembles the cherubim in anything except the wings. But the sphinx is oftenest pointed out (so Spencer and Hengstenberg). Of it Wilkinson says:† "The Egyptian sphinx was usually an emblematic figure representative of the king, and may be considered, when with the head of a man and the body of a lion, as the unison of intellect with physical force. Besides the ordinary sphinx, compounded of a lion and a man, was one with the head of a ram, another with the hawk's head and lion's body, and the asp-headed and hawk-headed sphinx with wings." Even if it were trustworthy to infer the exact original of the Mosaic cherubim through the descriptions of Ezekiel, a creature with four heads, one that of a lion, another that of a man, is not remarkably like a sphinx with a lion's body and a man's head. And Bahr judiciously remarks "if we admit the sphinx to have been part man and part lion, yet the eagle and ox are wanting, so that it no more resembles the cherub than the griffin of India which was part lion, part eagle." Something more to the point is to be found in Creutzer,‡ who, after speaking of the Egyptian ark or boat, says: "On a pylon of the great temple at Philae such a boat has a head of Isis and some other remarkable ornaments, which I pass by for brevity's sake, to call to mind some parallels.

* Symbolik, i. 358. † Ancient Egyptians, i. 226. ‡ Symbolik, i. 249.
with Hebrew festival rites. Four priests
bear it on poles, and a small temple which
stands in the boat is, as it were, 'shadowed'
with winged figures. Before goes a boy
with a smoking frankincense censer. Here
Lancret compares the Biblical account of the
ark, which the Levites in linen clothing
carried on staves of shittim wood: nor
does he forget to mention the cherubim.'
Wilkinson as well says:* "Some of the
sacred boats, or arks, presented the sacred
beetle of the sun, overshadowed by the wings
of two figures of the goddess Thmei, or
Truth, which call to mind the cherubim of
the Hebrews." From this or some similar
original, somewhat freely handled, we
believe that the Mosaic cherubim were
derived. At any rate, such similarities and
probabilities are the best answers that can
be given to the inquiry into an Egyptian
origin for the historic cherubim.

2. The imagination of the prophet is the
most potent factor in the construction of
Ezekiel's cherubim. They are therefore
quite distinctively the result of the fancy
of an individual, rather than a historic
growth. "All the beings," says Ewald,
"which he remembered as sacred com-
panions of divine things, formed themselves
in his mind into a new, wonderful whole,
as though his imagination roamed abroad
to conceive and depict in the most extra-
ordinary way the highest that can be
conceived or described."

It is to Assyria instead of Egypt that we
are to look for whatever historic elements
are comprised in the prophet's conception
of the cherubim. And Assyrian art was
characteristically given to forming images
of the Divine out of various and seemingly
incongruous animal forms. "The imagery,"
says Stanley, "that Ezekiel sees is that
which no one could have used unless he had
wandered through the vast halls of Assyrian
palaces, and there gazed on all that Assyrian
monuments have disclosed to us of human
dignity and brute strength combined, the
eagle-winged lion, human-headed bull."
"The resemblance," says Layard, "between
the symbolical figures I have described and
those seen by Ezekiel in his vision, can
scarcely fail to strike the reader." "It will
be observed that the four forms chosen to
illustrate his description, the man, the lion,
the bull, and the eagle, are precisely those
which are found on Assyrian monuments as
religious types. The 'wheel within wheel,'
mentioned in connection with the emble-
matical figures, may refer to the winged
circle or wheel representing at Nimroud the
supreme deity. These coincidences are too
marked not to deserve notice, and do
certainly lead to the inference that the
symbols chosen by the prophet were chosen
from the Assyrian sculptures." According
to Spencer it was a Rabbinical saying that
four things are highest in the world: the
lion among wild beasts, the ox among
cattle, the eagle among birds, the man among
all.*

Should it seem that the present Article
adds one other to the unsatisfactory attempts
which have been made to treat this subject
of Biblical Antiquities, we cannot do more
to save its reputation than add the informa-
tion of the learned Josephus: τὰς ἐκ ἐρωμαῖς
οἴνοις ὑποῖα τω̣ς ἦςαν εἰπεῖν οἷς ἤκακασαι
dύναται.

* Ancient Egyptians, l. 271.

* Spencer's de Leg. Heb. iii. 5. 4. 2.
MORTAL OR IMMORTAL?

By Professor Samuel M. Shute, Washington, D.C.

WELVE centuries ago, Paulinus, a Christian bishop, stood in the presence of Edwin, the Anglo-Saxon king of Northumbria, and pleaded with him to abandon the Pagan faith of his forefathers, and adopt the religion so beautifully illustrated in the life of his Christian queen Ethelberga. The king was a man of generous impulses, frank, courageous, and disciplined by manifold and severe trials. He had tested the unsatisfying pleasures of kingly honours, and longed to attain some sure resting place for the tried and troubled spirit which so keenly felt its helplessness, but which knew not whither to look for strength and light. Paulinus prevailed so far as to receive the royal promise that, the subject being worthy of the most careful consideration, the king would request his counsellors to meet the bishop at the royal residence, to hear his words of instruction; to discuss the claims of the new religion; and then to decide for himself and his people.

The council convened, eagerly listened to the facts presented, admitted their reasonableness and importance, and, like earnest men, whose hearts were athirst for truths which would yield them solid ground of comfort during the storms of life, decided to adopt the new religion. During the discussion of the question, one of the king's counsellors urged the propriety of receiving the new faith upon the ground that it poured so copious a light upon the terrible darkness of the grave, and pictured in such plain language the destiny of the soul. He closed his plea in the following impressive words:

"The present life of man, O king, seems to me, in comparison with the time which is unknown to us, like the swift flight of a sparrow through the room where you sit at the feast in winter with your counsellors and commanders, and a cheerful fire in the midst, while the storms of rain and snow prevail without. The sparrow, I say, flying in at one door and out at another, whilst he is within, is, for the moment, safe from the wintry storm; but, after a short space of fair weather, he immediately vanishes out of your sight into the dark winter from which he had emerged. So this life of man appears for a short space; but of what went before, or what is to follow, we are utterly ignorant. If, therefore, this new doctrine contains something more certain, it seems justly to deserve to be followed."

Mr. Emerson opens his brief, but exceedingly interesting, chapter on "Immortality" with a reference to this scene enacted in the council chamber of the old Anglo-Saxon king, and quotes it as the starting-point in his plea for the future life.

In times like these, when the same truths which Paulinus presented are either doubted or disparaged, or denied by many of the descendants of those sincere and earnest questioners—although they are the more highly favoured heirs of twelve long centuries of Christian learning, civilization, and refinement—it is interesting to know what one who has been proclaimed to be "a seer of the interior realities," and whose influence

is widely felt over cultured minds, thinks of this momentous question which "gives such grandeur to the passing hour."

In its spirit the Emersonian argument is Platonic, although it is entirely destitute of the logical forms which are constantly presented in the Phaedo. It is a kind of lyric prose-poem, pulsating in every sentence with a belief so buoyant that the most flexible syllogistic forms could not restrain it.

The thesis is not, according to Mr. Emerson's view, susceptible of proof. "There is a drawback to the value of all statements of the doctrine; and I think that one abstains from writing or printing on the immortality of the soul, because when he comes to the end of his statement the hungry eyes that run through it will close disappointed." So sure is he of the incompetency of logic to deal with this high theme, that he says: "I am a better believer, and all serious souls are better believers in the immortality than we can give grounds for"; and he assures us that "Wordsworth's 'Ode' is the best modern essay on the subject."

Emerson's statements are, we are inclined to think, more positive and emphatic than those of Plato, not so much, perhaps, because the modern seer holds the intuition more tenaciously, as that, living in an age in many respects far in advance of that of the Greek, he is enabled to collect his proofs from more extended fields of knowledge and experience; and, what is especially not to be lost sight of, these proofs have absorbed a subtle yet certain strength from their growth under the vitalizing sunshine of a divine revelation. There is no halting or misgiving in the jubilant faith of Emerson in any single sentence of his chapter. His position is that, as soon as a man begins to think seriously, he finds in his soul some belief "in the life beyond life"; that "there never was a time when the doctrine of a future life was not held"; that in the minds of those men whose depraved moral lives engender scepticism on this question, "there is a slaughterhouse style of thinking"; that the belief in immortality is "elemental"; and that the "Master of the universe" has built it into the "structure of our minds." Furthermore, that "everything is prospective, and man is to live hereafter"; that "the soul does not age with the body, but on the borders of the grave the wise man looks forward with equal elasticity of mind or hope"; that "life is rather a state of embryo, a preparation for life. A man is not completely born until he has passed through death." And so the lyric sentences of this "seer" roll on until they culminate in the grand affirmation that our "intellectual action not promises, but bestows a feeling of absolute existence," so that "we may feel the immortality of the mind, as it were, by touching."

Mr. Emerson lays, as the foundation of his proofs for the future life, the common consensus of the race. Savage and civilized; ignorant and learned; polytheist and monotheist, have alike believed it. It is true that most men shudder at the thought of death; but this is due rather to the dimness of their spiritual vision than to a want of confidence in the doctrine. It is "the fear of the young bird to trust its wings." The robust and healthy sentiment of the soul is, rather, that uttered so exultingly by Montesquieu: "Je suis charmé de me croire immortel comme Dieu même."*

On this common belief of men everywhere in the personal after-life, Mr. Emerson rears the superstructure of his proofs. There is, for example, our delight in the permanent. Day and night; seed-time and harvest; the ebb and flow of seas; the waxings and wanings of the moon; the far-reaching stellar, solar, and cometary revolutions, all sing the song of their divinely appointed stability. All great natures love this permanent feature of the universe. To them it is "a type of the Eternal." But if this

* Penseés Diverses : De la Religion.
mark of permanence is written upon all objects in the universe, surely the soul which can investigate these objects, their qualities and relations, must itself be dowered with the gift of permanence. Mr. Emerson insists upon it with the utmost earnestness, that this delight in the vast, the permanent and the strong, is an unmistakable proof of the soul's immortality; that "these long-lived and long-enduring objects are to us as we see them, only symbols of somewhat in us far longer-lived"; and "that our passions and endeavours have something ridiculous and mocking if we come to so hasty an end." To suppose that these intellectual and emotional and moral faculties which we possess, trained by so many wonderful appliances, capable of accomplishing so much, yet under the present arrangement of affairs accomplishing comparatively so little, find their issue in the eternal silence of the grave, is about as reasonable as to affirm that parents, who at vast cost and pains have educated their children to be adepts in the different arts, would, as soon as they had become ready to produce a master-piece, "call out a file of soldiers to shoot them down." Indeed, all the experiences which men so carefully and laboriously garner up, indicate a conviction which any thoughtful mind must yield its assent to, that there are in the universe "immense resources and possibilities proper to us on which we have never drawn."

And yet, admirable as this chapter is in many respects, its closing paragraphs detract somewhat from its worth, inasmuch as they leave a doubt in the mind of the reader whether Mr. Emerson, after all that he has so emphatically uttered, really holds the doctrine of a personal immortality, at least in the sense in which the ordinary mind supposes it to be taught in the New Testament Scriptures. His language is: "It is strange that Jesus is esteemed by mankind the bringer of the doctrine of immortality. He is never once weak or sentimental; he is very abstemious of explanation, he never preaches the personal immortality." It is barely possible that Mr. Emerson wishes us to understand from the former part of this quotation, that the doctrine of a future life was believed long before Christ began his ministration; and by the latter, that he did not teach the resurrection of the identical body that is placed away in the grave. But so consummate a master of language would hardly express these two facts in words like those which we have quoted. Yet, if they really signify what, upon their very face they clearly seem to mean, then it is evident that they are in direct conflict, not only with all the teachings of Christ and the apostles touching the immortality of the soul, but also with that fundamental consensus of the race upon which Mr. Emerson has built up his admirable proofs in favour of the future life. The vast majority of men who believe in the life to come, believe in it as a life for each individual being, essential to its personal identity and necessarily so in order to receive its due reward or punishment. This was clearly the belief of the representative men whose names he mentions, and whose words he cites as confirmatory of the positions which he assumes and illustrates. It was evidently the view of Schiller, of Michel Angelo, of Bacon, of Montesquieu, of Franklin, of Van Helmont, and of Ruskin—all of whom he presents as strenuous advocates of the truth of immortality.

If our personality is not immortal; if this being which we call ourself, and which, through its peculiar experiences, we know to be distinct from every other being in the universe, does not continue such throughout all the future ages, then, when Mr. Emerson asks us in such glowing words that—

I have a house, a closet, which holds my books, a table, a garden, a field; are these, any or all, a reason for refusing the angel who beckons me away, as if there were no room or skill elsewhere that could reproduce for me as my like or my enlarging wants may require?—
he is simply taking advantage of our absorbing interest in his theme to deceive us by a jugglery of words. To be absorbed into the Infinite Spirit, as the falling raindrop is swallowed up in the far-stretching sea, is not to be possessed of a personal immortal life, and is, therefore, as the plain understanding looks at it, no immortality at all. To ask us to believe that the soul is immortal; to press the statement home on the understanding by argument, by satire, by illustration, by the golden sayings of poet, painter, critic, and philosopher; and then, while the whole nature thrills responsive to the proofs, to attempt to win us to an acceptance of the post scriptum that He who was the Life never taught a personal immortality, is simply to ask us to assent to the dogma of a spiritualistic pantheism; and especially when the demand is accompanied by the statement that the growing spiritual man is—

Rising to greater heights, but also rising to realities; the outer relation and circumstances dying out, he enters deeper into God, God into him, until the last garment of egotism falls, and he is with God,—shares the will and immensity of God. . . It is not immortality, but eternity; not duration, but a state of abandonment to the Highest, and so the sharing of His perfection.

It is possible that we do Mr. Emerson injustice in the view which we have taken of his language. If so, most gladly would we acknowledge our error. But the language seems too plain to be mistaken.

And yet, notwithstanding the protest which we make against the closing paragraphs of the chapter on "Immortality," we are inclined to think that a special value attaches to it, apart from its mere argumentative force. As a man of intellectual power and clear insight, Mr. Emerson ranks high in the estimation, not only of many cultured minds in this country, but also of a large number in England. Dr. Tyndall and Mr. Conway place him among the foremost of living thinkers, and attribute to his opinions somewhat of oracular prescience.

It is not too much to hope, therefore, that what is really valuable in this chapter of his on the future life will exert a salutary influence on the rapidly developing doctrines of some of the most influential leaders in the fields of literature and science, in the direction of a horrid materialism. Better even a spiritualistic pantheism, if that really be the doctrine hinted at in the concluding portion of this chapter, than the repulsive alternative of pure materialism, and the dust and corruption of the grave, as the final abyss of all the race's aspirations and prayers for something better than this life can give us.

Mr. Conway, in a lecture recently delivered in the City of New York, on the "Relations of Literature and Science to Revealed Truth," made the statement, that he was intimate with all the leaders of "free thought" in England; that he had frequently discussed with them the great problems of life; and that scarcely one of them held, as certain, the doctrine of a personal immortality. According to their view, the natural proofs in its favour furnish but slight foundation for its support; and the most they seem to hope for, if they really hope for that, is a remembrance of longer or shorter duration in the minds and hearts of those with whom they have been intimately associated; or, at best, in the case of a select few who have won a national and an international distinction by great literary works or scientific discoveries, a somewhat longer tenure of fame in the memories of scholars. These men, sad as it is to contemplate, like a former generation of French materialists to whom Fénélon refers, are so infatuated with the thoughts of their mental frailty, that, "Ils sont charmés de cette doctrine pleine d'horreur; ils ont un goût de désespoir." The number of those who thus disparage or deny the natural proofs in

* Traités Divers : L'âme de l'homme est immortelle.
favour of a future life, and who attach less
authority to the teachings of Christ and the
apostles on this vital question than they do
to the opinions of Mr. Emerson or of Mr.
Huxley, is, it is true, small, compared with
the host of competent scholars who firmly
believe and earnestly inculcate the doctrine.
Yet it cannot be denied that some of that
small number are influential leaders of a
restless and ever-aggressive public opinion,
which finds its highest intellectual and spir-
It cannot be denied that some of that
tal nourishment in the discussions of
Sunday free-thinking Lyceums, and in the
fascinating but fatal pages of the Westmin-
ster and other less scholarly Reviews. To
affirm by Mr. Emerson is quite as much the
fashion, with many enthusiastic minds, as to
affirm by the Messrs. Arnold and Huxley;
while the more thoughtful of the coterie
would, doubtless, listen more reverently to
the seer-like sayings of the former, than to
those of the latter. For these considera-
tions, therefore, we indulge the hope that
this brief monograph upon “Immortality”
will, at least, bring a pause to the head-
long haste with which many have thrown
from them their early hopes of the
future life, if it does not win them to a
more rational consideration of those natural
proofs which, to the clear insight of Mr.
Emerson, are so amply confirmatory of the
doctrine.

But it is evident to any mind that has
maturely considered the subject, that a com-
pletely satisfying trust in the reality of a
personal immortality—such a trust as will
stand proof against the shocks of the most
dogmatic materialistic teachings of these
times, as well as against the piercings of
those keener shafts which smite us amid
the gloom, and coldness, and corruption of
the dear ones of our homes and hearts as we
tearfully bury them out of our sight—must
rest upon something more cogent and over-
powering than any mere natural proofs,
however numerous, and logically deduced,
and skilfully wrought into the most attrac-
tive forms of human speech. The best
equipped minds of all the generations have
reverently and persistently struggled with
the question. In that memorable prison-
house at Athens, where the westering sun-
beams fell through the grated window on
the brow of him who was so royally putting
off the mortal to be clothed with the im-
mortal garb; in the Tuscan gardens, near
Rome, where the great orator, almost broken
in heart, mourned the sudden taking from
him of his idolized daughter, Tullia; in the
blood-stained cells of the Conciergerie, where
Vergniaud and his Girondist brethren re-
viewed, in the cold, gray twilight of the fatal
dawning which beckoned them to the guillo-
tine, the proofs upon which they might stay
their souls for a desired rest beyond the
clouds; in the lecture-rooms of Germany
and France; as well as in the universities
of England, and the seminaries of our own
country, this one momentous question,
which men cannot put away from them and
for ever shut out from thought, has been
earnestly discussed.

Yet the metaphysics of Plato, basing the
hope of immortality upon the doctrine of
Contraries, as well as the recently published
and remarkable argument of those distin-
guished physicists, Professors Tait and
Stewart, reared on the physical foundation
called the principle of Continuity, alike fail
in satisfying the understanding, and in dis-
missing its grim spectral doubts. And if
the reason yield its feeble assent while under
the phosphorescent light of the subtle argu-
ments, it comes back from the wearying
labours of the outward life, still burdened
with the anxious misgivings of one seeking
rest, yet finding none. The natural proofs
are to most men, in the hours of their
keenest agony, only what they were to that
Roman who frankly opened his soul to the
gaze of his friend and said: "Nescio quo modo,
dum lego, assentior, quum posui librum et
Let then the natural argument have its force, such as it may be. The common consensus of the race, the stimulating ideas of vastness, or permanence, and of strength, as symbols of the Eternal Mind, and subordinately as symbols of our own; the clear want of adequacy in the present exquisite arrangement of things to completely satisfy the longings of the spirit; with whatever else the ingenuity of men may devise in favour of the truth—are all well enough as far as they go. Yet they lead us but a little way into the dark valley; and they enable us to discover no clear light beyond. To make the valley luminous, and to empower us to behold with an unwavering confidence the radiant home on the farther side, a light “that never shone on land or sea” must come to us. The opened heavens alone can give it. The truth must be revealed, not argued out. He, who is the Resurrection and the Life must break the awful silence, and speak the word, and furnish the proof which shall assure us of our destiny. This is the “something more certain” which King Edwin’s judicious counsellor so eagerly desired, and which assures us in majestic words, and with equally majestic proofs, that the human soul, so brief in its sojourn here, and so like the sparrow resting for a moment on the dim borderline between the darkness from which it suddenly came, and the darkness into which it quickly went, is “of the immortal race of God,” and destined by a power which ever makes good its pledges to an immortal career of weal or woe. From the tomb of Lazarus, and from the sepulchre of Christ, we hear the completely satisfying words,—“I give unto them eternal life, and they shall never perish”; “In my Father’s house are many mansions; if it were not so I would have told you. I go to prepare a place for you. And if I go and prepare a place for you, I will come again and receive you unto myself; that where I am, there ye may be also.” And in the inspired vision which fell upon the soul of the apostle in Patmos, the Holy Ghost assures us that, in that new home which awaits the believing spirit, “there shall be no more death, neither sorrow, nor crying, neither shall there be any more pain; for the former things are passed away.”

* Cicero: Tusculane Disputationes.
THE LETTER TO DIOGNETUS.

By E. DE PRESSENE, D.D., PARIS.

The "Letter to Diognetus," which has come down to us without the name of the writer, is one of the most precious treasures of Christian antiquity. It evidently does not belong to the first century, for it has not the apostolic impress; and the manner in which Judaism is condemned in toto is characteristic of the conflicts of the following age.

We might suppose the writer to be a Marcionite, having cast off the vain speculations of Gnosticism; a Paulinist somewhat extreme in his reaction against the synagogue, who failed to distinguish, as Paul did, between the Judaism of the prophets and that of the rabbis. The ardent enthusiasm of the unknown writer for the new religion renders him unjust to that which preceded it. He thus bears to us a sublime echo of the school of Ephesus, of that doctrine of love which was the final utterance, and, as it were, the legacy of the apostolic age. The ardor of the writer for the new religion renders him unjust to that which preceded it. He thus bears to us a sublime echo of the school of Ephesus, of that doctrine of love which was the final utterance, and, as it were, the legacy of the apostolic age. The ardor of the writer for the new religion renders him unjust to that which preceded it. He thus bears to us a sublime echo of the school of Ephesus, of that doctrine of love which was the final utterance, and, as it were, the legacy of the apostolic age.

The "Letter to Diognetus" was designed to establish the claims of Evangelical religion in the pagan mind. The writer pursues a historical method. He shows what was the part filled by this religion in the history of humanity, and how it was the divinely-prepared climax of the long and obscure period extending from the fall of man to the coming of Christ. Passing by the apologetic point of view, and all that relates to the delineation of the Christian life, we shall endeavour to show what was the doctrinal idea of this writing. Religion is presented to us in the two-fold character of a revelation and a redemption. True to the genius of Greece, the writer dwells mainly on the first character. To dispel the darkness of ignorance, to enlighten the human mind by the true knowledge of God, is the essential object of the Gospel and of the Word, of whom the Divine Book is the perfect manifestation. Truth is for Christians neither an earthly discovery nor a perishable doctrine; nor again, is it the depository of mere human mysteries. "The Almighty God, Creator of all things, the Invisible God, has sent it down from heaven. His holy and incomprehensible Word has come among men,

• We do not refer to the last two chapters, which are an evident interpolation.
and sought a fixed abode in their hearts."*  

Before His coming none had succeeded in finding the knowledge of God, as is proved by the gross worship of idolatrous nations, and by the vain imaginations of the philosophers.† Judaism receives no higher need than paganism, for if it had some knowledge of the true God, it yet imagined that He had need of material gifts, and offered to Him sacrifices of blood. The true light, then, came only with Jesus Christ. This light does not merely illuminate the reason, it warms the heart and saves the lost sinner. Christianity is a redemption, while it is also a revelation, or rather it is the revelation of redemption. "God has not hated us; He has not been mindful of our wickedness; He has borne with our sins, and has given His own Son as the price of our redemption, 'the just for the unjust.' Righteousness alone could cover sin. O sweet exchange, by which the iniquity of many is hidden by One who is righteous, and the righteousness of one justifies many sinners!"† No exact doctrinal statement can be drawn from these words; they contain the simple affirmation of the salvation of mankind by the work of Jesus Christ. His righteousness has covered our sins, and has redeemed us. The writer goes no further. There is no trace in the "Letter to Diognetus" of a satisfaction of the Divine anger; for God, it is said did not hate us. The Son, then, had not to endure a curse which had no existence; He has simply covered us with His holiness as with a shield. The idea of sacrifice, properly so called, is not grasped by the author. Hence the severity of his condemnation of the Jewish sacrifices. He even goes so far as to regard them as superstitious acts, by which the Jews sought to purchase by a gift the favour of God.* Evidently, if the writer had admitted an expiation in the true sense, he would have connected the work of Christ with the sanguinary rites of the old covenant. It is not possible to fill up this gap in the system, except by additions from other sources. The substitution of the Righteous One for sinners is clearly taught, but not His direct condemnation by God in the sinner’s stead. The death of the Son is a proof of the love of the Father for us, and nothing more. The Cross speaks only of love and of holiness. We do not pretend that this explanation is adequate, but it is the explanation given by the "Epistle to Diognetus."

The idea of God is therein developed altogether according to the thought of St. John. Omnipotence and omniscience are not the primary attributes of the Deity. God is more than the Most High and the All-Wise. He is, in his essence, love. "To gain the mastery over one’s neighbour, to crush him in his weakness, to acquire wealth and do violence to inferiors, none of these things bring happiness to man; it is not thus he can imitate God. These things have no affinity with the Divine Majesty. If thou Lovest thou shalt be the imitator of His mercy."† In creating, He has no other motive than the good of His creature; the creature is therefore of a work of His love, and His glory is to be loved. He has been ever the same; He cannot change now or in future time; He will be always kind, good, incapable of anger; He alone is good.§

The "Letter to Diognetus" affirms in explicit terms that the Word is neither an angel, nor one of those beings who govern terrestrial things, or to whom is entrusted

* "Letter to Diognetus," chap. 3.  
† Ibid., chap. 10.  
‡ Ibid, chap. 9.

† Ibid., chap. 8.  
‡ Ibid, chap. 9.
the administration of the heavenly world; but that He is the Creator of heaven and earth.* The Word is thus distinct from every creature. The writer does not enter further into the Divine ontology, and he even seems to confound the second and third persons of the Trinity in the passage which we have quoted as to the dwelling of the Word in the human heart. The Son knew the purpose of the Father to save the world; He was one with Him in the mystery of the eternal love. Although, as we have seen, the "Letter of Diognetus" rejects all the culture of the ancients, not recognizing in it one gleam of truth, it does not nevertheless assume a radical opposition between the human and divine nature. No; man is a divine being, who, by love, has such a participation in the character of his Creator, that he becomes God. Every benefactor is in truth the God of those whom he has benefited.†

Faith is the inward eye which sees God. Moral freedom is eloquently asserted, in opposition to Gnostic fatalism. "The Son was not sent, as might be thought, to rule with a rod of iron, and to inaugurate a reign of terror. No; he came in clemency and gentleness. God sent Him, like a king sending his son, who is also a king; for He sent Him as a God among men to save and to persuade, not to do violence, for violence is not of God."* How, in truth, can love be other than liberty? This respect for human freedom explains the delay in the mission of the Redeemer. A moral correspondence was needed to be established between Him and the race of man. He came when mankind had had time to prove experimentally its own wretchedness and powerlessness to save itself.

Such a theology cannot favour a system of external authority. Hence all the episcopal pretensions so largely advanced at this period are not even adverted to. The whole Christian life is placed under the law of liberty. The writer has formed too poor a conception of the providential character of the old law, to desire to assign it any place in the gospel economy. He treats with ridicule the prescriptive observance of Sabbath and fast. The current of his thought, as well in its weakness and faultiness as in its truth and strength, is such as to alienate him absolutely from all hierarchical and sacramental tendencies: he is rather led to a mysticism full of stern moral purpose. This pure and gentle breeze was not strong enough to fill the sails of the vessel. The paramount influence must necessarily belong to more positive and aggressive schools. The "Letter to Diognetus," remains an isolated monument, towering grandly over all that surrounds it. —Heresy and Christian Doctrine.

* Aὐτὸς τὸν τεχνίτην καὶ δημιουργὸν τῶν θεῶν ("Letter to Diognetus," chap. 7.)
† Θεὸς γίνεται τῶν λαμβανόντων (Ibid., chap. 10.)

Note.—We regret we have not room for our Summary of "Foreign Theological Intelligence."—Ed. T. Q.
IBLICAL COMMENTARY ON THE
PROPHECIES OF EZEKIEL. By
CARL F. KEIL, D.D., and Professor of
Theology. Translated from the German
by the Rev. JAMES MARTIN, B.A. 2 vols. Edin-
burgh: T. & T. Clark; London: Hamilton, Adams
& Co.

Although Keil has not the imaginative power of
Delitzsch or Lange, and therefore, may seem to some
to be a little dull, his commentaries are generally
orthodox, learned and sober. The work before us will
be found particularly valuable for its scholarly trans-
lation of the Hebrew text, and which has been so
successfully rendered into English that the ordinary
reader has now a new and thoroughly complete
reading of this ancient Jewish prophet. This is no
small advantage, as some passages of the Authorized
Version are almost unintelligible, and others fall far
short of the force and grandeur of the original.
The English reader will also find great help to a
clearer understanding of the text in the expositions,
although, perhaps, at first sight he may think the
work too much overladen with critical learning to be
useful to him. Some of the views advanced will
doubtless be demurred to. Thus for instance, on
page 235, vol. I, Keil strongly affirms that there is
and must be a preaching of the Gospel in Hades.
He maintains the opinion as to the meaning of
I Peter iii. 18—20, which Dr. West so elaborately
endeavour to refute in the Article entitled "The
Spirits in Prison," which appeared in this Journal,
vol. I, page 580; and on page 415, vol. II. Keil
makesthesomewhat局面statement that the
binding of Satan predicted in the Apocalypse "began
with the fall of heathenism as the religion of the
world, through the elevation of Christianity to be
the state-religion of the Roman Empire, and that it
will last so long as Christianity continues to be the
state-religion of the kingdoms which rule the world."

In reference to the question concerning the restora-
tion of Israel to Canaan, Keil is opposed to the
literal interpretation of the prophecy, and adopts the
symbolico-typical view, "because the assumption of
a restoration of the Temple and the Levitical, i.e.,
bloody sacrificial worship is opposed to the teaching
of Christ and his Apostles." The whole subject is
ably discussed, and at considerable length at the
close of the work. To Biblical students this com-
mentary will be very valuable for the thoroughness of
its scholarship. The author's acquaintance with the
history and literature of the ancient nations with
whom the Covenant People were brought into con-
tact, subjects upon which modern investigations have
thrown so much light, has enabled him to explain
many allusions and statements of the prophet which
have hitherto been regarded as dark and perplexing.

Bible Lands: their Modern Customs and Manners,
illustrative of Scripture. 2 vols. By HENRY J. VAN-
LENNEF, D.D., with Maps and Woodcuts. London:
John Murray.

The following notice of this work appears in The
Princeton Review, the leading organ of the Presby-
terian Church of America:—

"It will take its place by the side of Dr. Thom-
son's The Land and the Book, not in the way of
rivalry, but by adding new observations and illustra-
tions, the fruit of a life-long experience by one who
grew up amid those sacred scenes, and spoke the
language of the land. The style is simple and per-
spicuous; the descriptions are animated, minute and
graphic: the whole arrangement of the work is simple
and clear. With no parade of learning, it rests upon
minute and careful observations. It is so written,
that all may read it to their satisfaction and profit.
The illustration of scriptural passages and allusions is
made prominent on almost every page, and a new
sense of the reality of Scripture history is impressed
upon the mind of the reader.

The first part of the work is devoted to the "Cus-
toms which have their origin in the Physical Features
of Bible Lands;" the second, to "Customs which have a Historical Origin." Both are traced out in
detail, with pertinent illustrations and descriptions.
In the case of those lands, the present explains the
past more than is possible in any Western nation, for
there the past lives in the present. The races, the
men and women, the habits of domestic and social
life, the buildings, the arts, as now existing, carry us
back to ancient times. In an appendix there is a
good selection of Oriental Proverbs. There is a full
index of Scripture Texts, and one of Subjects. The
illustrations are profuse and well executed."

A careful examination of these volumes enables us
cordially to endorse the critical judgment recorded
above. It is our deliberate conviction that for the
understanding of what may be called the "Interior life" of the Holy Land, there is no work equal to it. Ministers and preachers generally will find it invaluable; and it should be in every Sunday School teacher's library, and in every Christian family.


The translator gives the following account of the principles on which he has proceeded: "The text of the Benedictine edition has been followed, but the head lines of the chapters are taken from the edition of Bruder, as being the more definite and full. After carefully translating the whole of the book, it has been compared, line by line, with the translation of Watts (one of the most nervous translations of the seventeenth century), and that of Dr. Pusey, which is confessedly founded upon that of Watts. Reference has also been made in the case of obscure passages, to the French translation of Du Bois, and the English translation of the first ten books, which was published in 1660. The references to Scripture are in the words of the Authorized Version, wherever the sense will bear it, and whenever noteworthy variations from our version occur, they are indicated by references to the old Italic version, or to the Vulgate. In some cases where Augustine has clearly referred to the Sept., in order to amend his version thereby, such variations are indicated. The annotations are, for the most part, such as have been derived from the translator's own reading. Two exceptions, moreover, must be made. Out of upwards of four hundred notes, some forty are taken from the annotations in Pusey and Watts, but in every case these have been indicated by the initials of the writers. Dr. Pusey's annotations consist almost entirely of quotations from other works of Augustine. A textual index has been added, for the first time to this edition, and both it and the Index of Subjects have been prepared with the greatest possible care."

For the future this will be the standard edition of this great religious classic, for there is no other to be compared with it.


"The work," says Dr. Bickersteth, "which bears the above title has long been known as an invaluable storehouse of wise and thoughtful counsels, conveyed in language of singular force and beauty. For some time it has been out of print, and the compilers of the present edition are entitled to the thanks of the whole Christian community for having undertaken its republication." With this we fully concur. "Cecil's Remains" was one of our greatest favourites many years ago, and very glad we are to see that the present volume is something more than a reproduction of the old, dear and precious as it was. The whole work has been classified under distinct headings, and fresh matter has been added, taken from other writings of this distinguished divine; a copious index, also, has been provided, affording the utmost facility of reference.

Bible English: Chapters on Old and Disused Expressions in the Authorized Version of the Scriptures and the Book of Common Prayer; with Illustrations from Contemporaneous Literature. By the Rev. T. Lewis O. Davies, M.A. London: George Bell and Sons.

There are large and expensive commentaries on Holy Scripture which are not so helpful to the understanding of the text as this small volume. There is not a page that does not contain evidence of wide and careful reading, and all concentrated on the explanation of our grand old Saxon Bible and our Book of Common Prayer. We give the following passage, taken at random, as a specimen of the book:

"Very serious practical results have followed from the rendering of 1 Cor. xi. 29, 'He that eateth and drinketh unworthily eateth and drinketh damnation to himself.' It had been well if, in this place, the translators had swerved from the Bishops' Bible, and in the text, instead of only in the margin, follow the Rheims version, which is more accurate, 'eateth and drinketh judgment to himself.' A reference to the succeeding verses will show that the apostle is speaking of temporal chastisements, not of eternal perdition. No doubt, in any case, the words convey a solemn warning against a wilful profanation, or even a formal and careless reception of the Holy Sacrament; but the text in its present guise, cited as it is in the Exhortation in our Communion Office, has prevented many faithful but trembling souls from fulfilling their Saviour's command, lest, not being duly prepared, they should unwittingly commit an unpardonable sin. The rendering was never a happy one, but formerly 'damnation' was not, as at present, almost exclusively confined to the sense of eternal punishment. Thus in Chaucer's 'Knighte's Tale' (1177):

For wel thou wost thyselfen versely,
That thou and I be damned to prison
Perpetuel.'
Wiclif's translation of S. John viii. 10, 11, runs thus: 'No man has condemned thee! . . . nether I shall condemn thee.' Augustine Bernhard, dedicating some ofLatimer's posthumous sermons to the Duchess of Suffolk, states that the reformer generally preached twice every Sunday 'to the great shame, confusion, and damnation of unpreaching prelates' (Lat. i. 320); and Bishop Hooper writes, 'I damn not the law, that is good; but these thieves that abuse the law;' and again he speaks of the unjust magistrate who 'for lucre or affection dammeth him the law qulteth, and saveth him the law condemneth' (i. 467, 472). 'Judge' is often used for 'condemn;' e.g., 'Out of thine own mouth will I judge thee, thou wicked servant' (St. Luke xix. 22); and again, 'Let not him which eateth not judge him that eateth' (Rom. xiv. 3). Bishop Sanderson, in a sermon on this last text, observes: 'To judge, as it is here taken, is as much as to condemn; and so the word δικαιοσύνη often taken in the worse sense for δικαίωμα. . . . It is a trope for which both in this and in divers other words, we are not so much beholden to good arts as to bad manners. Things that are good or indifferent we commonly turn to ill by using them the worst way; whence it growth that words of good or indifferent signification in time degenerate so far as to be commonly taken in the worst sense' (ii. 14). And thus in this case a word signifying 'condemnation' has taken the place of 'judgment,' and this substitute has again been commonly misunderstood to mean that everlasting damnation' from which there is no appeal and no escape.


This little book is not only intended to be a protest against atheistic materialism, and a recognition of the government of the Universe of Matter by an all-pervading Mind, but is designed to establish the theory that God, the ruling Mind in Nature, so far from having forsaken the earth, and left it to the operation of a system of laws, is the actual present Worker in the organic world around us. This theory is not new; but the argument is ably stated, and the illustrations, which are chiefly drawn from Nature and the Bible, are happily chosen and effectively applied.


This volume contains much original and suggestive thought, condensed into a small compass, upon subjects that must ever be deeply interesting. The author wisely avails himself of the light of science, as well as that of revelation, in discussing these great themes; and thus has succeeded in producing a book which, though small, clears away much theological fog, not to speak of foolish superstition, and gives us as clear views perhaps as it is possible to attain to upon matters that so far transcend our present observation and experience. It is a book to inspire a thoughtful reader with comfort and hope.


The subjects discussed in this volume are embraced under the following general topics: The Meditative Spirit, and the Deep Things of God; The Nature and Scope of the Deep Things of God; The Revelation of Spiritual Realities; The Personality of God; The Light of the World; The Fatherhood of God; The Providence of God; The Kingdom of God on Earth; The Christian Immortality. The author proceeds upon the principle, that while we are not to ignore the element of profound mystery in the Divine ways, the deep things of God, searched by the "Spirit of Truth," and revealed to the apostles of our Lord, are depths of light and not of darkness, immense fields of light and life, and not abysses of contradictions and inscrutabilities. He maintains that these deep things must not be confounded with the "secret things" that belong to God, but should be viewed as among the "things revealed." Hence his prime object in these essays is to prove that the deep things of God send floods of light through and round the great provinces of spiritual thought and action. We fully agree with him that these themes demand fresh treatment, in view of some of the aspects of "modern thought"; and we also agree that Christ, as the "Light of the World" is in advance of all the ages, and that where the modern spirit discovers and diffuses true light Christ accepts its services. We sincerely wish that the divines of all churches would take similar ground in reference to the controversies and conflicts that are now raging around us. Of the manner in which the author has executed his task we can speak in the highest terms. If he does not bring before us new truths he presents the old under fresh and beautiful aspects. An independent thinker, and yet thoroughly reverent to the Word of God, he makes the reader feel that faith in the truths of the Gospel is the highest act of human reason, yes, that in which it reaches its true glorification.

This volume substantially consists of three articles on Messianic Prophecy, contributed to the Studien und Kritiken, in the years 1865 and 1869. At the time of their appearance they excited much attention and many having earnestly desired that they should be rendered accessible to a wider circle of readers, the author has consented to their publication in a separate volume. He discusses his subject under three general headings, each embracing topics of great interest. The first section is devoted to an examination of the origin of Messianic Prophecy; the second, to a consideration of the historical character of Messianic Prophecy; and the third to an investigation into the relation of Messianic Prophecy to New Testament fulfilment. The subject is a great one, branching off into many lines of evidence, all tending to show the Divine inspiration of Holy Scripture, and the Messiahship of Jesus of Nazareth. No thoughtful person can read this work without feeling that Prophecy, as a preparatory revelation concerning Christ and His Kingdom, both in its historical reality, and in its true and wonderful nature, manifests the glory of the educating wisdom of God. We need only add that the translator has done his work very satisfactorily.


The translation of this work was originally undertaken with the author's sanction, by the Rev. W. Clark, Vicar of Taunton, who edited the first volume. That comprises Book I. and II. of the German text, with the Appendix on the Apostolical Canons, bringing the history down to the close of the first Ecumenical Council at Nicea in 325; the present volume carries it on, through the next six books, to the period immediately preceding the opening of the third Ecumenical Council at Ephesus in 431. This volume takes up and completes the record of the Arian controversy. It is a work of immense learning and labour, and, when finished will indeed deserve to be called the classical work on the history of the Councils of the Church. The translator has executed his task most creditably and here and there has added notes which will be very serviceable to the student.


These Sermons are what they profess to be, for children, and suitable to them. They are short, simple, pointed, free from all sect prejudice theologically and ecclesiastically; abounding in anecdotes, and admirably illustrated by the pencil of Mr. Tresidder. Let those who wish to prove their excellence, do what we have done, read them to their children.


It is only fair to the author to state that his work is intended for "young Churchmen," and therefore is written from a Churchman's point of view; but we doubt the wisdom of assuming as unquestionably true, that Peter was Bishop of Rome; that the names of his successors are known; that the three orders of clergy are indispensable to the existence of a church, etc. For these "young Churchmen" may one day learn that these are points which are not only disputed but entirely denied by some of the ablest scholars in Christendom; and this discovery may shake their faith in that which is undisputed and valuable. Apart from this, this history is a very meritorious performance; avoiding the more technical details of Synods and Councils, the author fixes attention upon their prominent features and presents each great question at issue vividly, and with power. Another excellent feature in this work is the combination of the secular history of the period with the history of the Church, thus using the one to elucidate the other.


A serial, the weekly circulation of which exceeds seventy-two thousand, and more than twelve thousand in monthly parts, is independent of criticism; but if our good word should bring it under the notice of any who have not yet seen it, we shall be pleased; for among all the cheap magazines for Christian families there is none better, and in some respects, none so good. In saying this let no one suppose that we endorse all the theological utterances of Dr. Talmage's sermons, or approve of the spirit which occasionally breathes through portions of those discourses; but we feel assured that no one could take up this volume without being impressed with the wonderful variety and excellence of its contents generally.

These Lectures, eight in number, discuss subjects which are now exciting much attention, not only in this country, but throughout Christendom generally. The first and second are devoted to an examination of the following proposition: The Priesthood not an order in the New Testament. In confirmation of this, the author endeavours to show that there is no such Priesthood acknowledged in name; that there is no such Priesthood acknowledged in office: that there is no such Priesthood acknowledged in specified qualifications; and that such Priesthood is precluded by the whole genius of the Christian dispensation. The third Lecture is devoted to an examination of the alleged orders and lineage of the Priesthood, under which the author raises the question of apostolical succession, and by many quotations from writers ancient and modern, more especially from great divines of the Church of England, endeavours to show that there is no ground whatever for such an assumption, and also how detrimental the assumption is, when its inevitable connection with the Church of Rome is duly estimated. The fourth, fifth and sixth lectures are taken up with an inquiry into the subjects of Priestly functions at the Altar, at the Lord’s Supper, and in Consecration and the Real Presence. The seventh and eighth lectures contain a thorough and searching inquiry into the matter of the Priest and the Confessional; to all which the author has added the usual apparatus of Notes verifying his statements and justifying his inferences. These Lectures are characterized by learning, ability, and candour; and remembering that they are written from a nonconformist point of view, in which all sacerdotal claims are not only ignored, but utterly repudiated, it is perhaps the ablest and most complete work on the subject in the English language.


These Lectures, eight in number, deal with the following subjects: First: The time Christianity appeared, including an estimate of the time; details of heathen and Jewish civilization, and early recognition of Christianity in its contact with Judaism and philosophy. Second: Historical beginning of Christianity, including first movement of the Gospel in Europe; St. Paul’s place in the Christian history; the Western progress of the Gospel by means of St. Paul; and monotheism not a speculation. Third: The New Life from Heaven, including vitality of the Gospel felt in the world; Powers of the world to come felt in the Church; anxious Moral Questions still remaining; and origin of the Second Letter to Corinth. Fourth: Previous questions as to probation, including S. Paul’s position; and the apostle’s first, second, and third Theses. Fifth: The Christian Economy in relation with the universe, including the Development thus far wholly ethical; the thought of God, and that it cannot be Unitarian; internal Economy of the new creation and present preparation for the Future. Sixth: Times of the Transition, including state of the Church and the World; New Features of the Times as to Judaism; Principles of Association among Christians, and co-existence of the old and new creations. Seventh: “Let us go on to perfection,” including the idea of our perfection in Christ as our Priest; how the Priesthood of Christ reaches us now; Christ carries on His Priesthood in His Church. Eighth: The “kingdom that cannot be moved,” including the perfecting the individual subjects of this kingdom; the Church’s present order provisional, but should be sufficient; Christianity not provisional as to its essence, but unworlidy.

This is a masterly production. It embraces not only a history of St. Paul’s life, but a thorough exposition of his teaching, and of the relationship of that teaching to the Gospels, and to the inspired writings of other apostles. To many, however, the Continuous Sense of the speeches and epistles of St. Paul will be the more valuable part of the work; but scholars will know how to prize the many learned notes with which it abounds, both on the margin and at the close of the volume; and which throw so much light on some of those sayings which St. Peter describes as “hard to be understood.” Would that all our theological students, both in the Church of England and among the Nonconformists, were disciplined in such lore; the race of great divines would not become extinct.

The Antiquities of Israel. By Heinrich Ewald, late Professor of the University of Göttingen. Translated from the German by Henry Shaen Solly, M.A. London: Longmans.

Biblical scholars need not be told that Ewald, with all his learning and genius, is arbitrary and capricious, and that, while no writer has done so much to trace out the history of the Covenant People, and to throw light on the sacred documents in which that history is recorded, his work is marred by those un-
sound principles of historical and literary criticism to
which he unhappily committed himself. The work
before us is very valuable for the vast amount of
information which it embodies upon all points per-
taining to the laws and customs of the Jewish nation,
much of which has been inaccessible to the English
reader. But it must be read with caution in all points
pertaining to the relationship supernaturally estab-
lished between God and the chosen nation.

The Assyrian Eponym Canon: containing Transla-
tions of the Documents, and an Account of the Evidence,
on the Comparative Chronology of the Assyrian and
Jewish Kingdoms, from the Death of Solomon to Nebu-
chadnezzar. By George Smith. London: Samuel
Bagster & Sons.

In this volume Mr. Smith has endeavoured to satisfy
a general desire, among all persons interested in
Biblical and Assyrian history, to have, in as complete
a form as possible, the translations of the Assyrian
Canon and the accompanying historical dates and
inscriptions. In the preparation of this work he
examined over a thousand fragmentary Assyrian his-
torical inscriptions, and has quoted, in the body of
the book, more than three hundred Assyrian docu-
ments. He is by no means satisfied, however, that
he is perfectly correct in all his conclusions, but candi-
didly acknowledges that he holds himself ready to
change them whenever satisfactory evidence shall
justify him in doing so. That part of the book which
will more especially interest Biblical students is
Chapter VI., in which all Assyrian notices of Pale-
tine and Jewish history that have been brought to
light are recorded. In Chapter VII. we have a sum-
mimg-up of all that is at present known as to the
comparative chronology of Assyria and Palestine.
The book is beautifully got up, and affords remark-
able proof of Mr. Smith's indefatigable industry,
and wondrous power of deciphering those ancient
monuments.

Catalogues of the London Editions of Bibles, Prayer-
books, Lectionaries, Services, &c. With specimens of
Types. Joseph Frowd & Co., London Bible Ware-
house, 53, Paternoster Row.

If any of our readers should want any one of the
above-mentioned books, we advise them to procure a
copy of this catalogue before purchasing anywhere
else, and we believe they will thank us for our advice.
Our business at present, however, is to call attention
to the Theological Student's Bible, published by this
firm. It has a wide margin for MS. notes or skeleton
sermons, and is printed on paper specially prepared
for writing on; the space for notes is separated from
the text by a red line, and the pages are numbered
throughout. An alphabetical index is attached to
enable the student to group notes on special subjects
under their respective headings, and blank pages,
numbered, which may be used for any purpose, are
provided at the end of the volume. We cannot
imagine a more useful or beautiful copy of the
Scriptures, and as a present to theological students
and ministers, nothing could be more acceptable or
valuable.

We have pleasure in calling attention to a bijou
dition of the Book of Common Prayer, which, while
containing everything without abridgment, may be
comfortably carried in the waistcoat-pocket. We
believe it is the smallest copy that has ever been
published, and yet so clear and distinct is the type
that it can be read without the slightest difficulty.
It is an exquisite gem, and taken in conjunction
with the smallest Bible in the world, issued by the
same publisher, both may well be regarded as triumphs
of art. Our readers will please to notice that the
publisher is Mr. Henry Frowde, Oxford University
Press Warehouse, 7, Paternoster Row, London.

Cory's Ancient Fragments of the Phoenician, Cartha-
ginian, Babylonian, Egyptian, and other Authors. A
New and Enlarged Edition, the Translation carefully
revised and enriched with Notes, critical and ex-
planatory, with introductions to the several Frag-
ments. By E. Richmond Hodges. London: Reeves
& Turner.

This is a beautiful reprint of a work which was so
scarcely that a copy of it could not be obtained, as we
ourselves can vouch for. The first edition appeared
in 1826 and the second in 1832, since which no new
dition has been offered to the public, and as the
work was often sought for by students of antiquity,
the publishers deserve the grateful acknowledgments
of all such not only for bringing out this new edition,
but for producing it in so handsome a form and under
such able editorship. It constitutes a fitting supple-
ment to the fragments which have been exhumed from
the mounds of Nineveh, and from the tombs and
mummy-pits of Egypt. The editor of the present
dition has rendered important service not only by
what he has added, but by what he has wisely omitted.
He also has explained Hebrew, Assyrian, Greek,
Phoenician, and Egyptian words wherever they occur,
and refers the student to those authorized translations
of cuneiform and hieroglyphic texts from which addi-
tional light may be obtained so far as these Frag-
ments are concerned.

Ray Palmer is a Congregational minister in America, known in this country as the author of the beautiful hymn commencing, "My faith looks up to Thee," and other sacred pieces. He tells us that he has so often had requests from various persons at home and abroad for the correct text of his contributions to the service of Christian song that he has felt constrained to prepare this complete and accurate edition of them. To a large number of persons many of the pieces in this collection will be new, for some have not been published before, and others are not known out of America. As might be expected, they vary very much in merit, and yet there is not one that is not worthy of preservation. In an appendix, the author gives us an account of the circumstances under which the hymn, mentioned above, called "The Standard American Hymn," originated. The reader will also find it referred to in the article entitled "Hymns and Hymn Singing," which appeared in this Journal, vol. i., p. 295. Christian families will find this volume a very valuable acquisition to the literature of sacred song.


These lectures, six in number, embrace a great variety of important topics, under the following general headings: Christological Axioms; The Patristic Christology; The Lutheran and Reformed Christologies; The Modern Kenotic Theories; Christ the Subject of Temptation and Moral Development; The Humiliation of Christ in its Official Aspects; and an appendix of Notes covering nearly a hundred pages. It is a long time since we have met with a theological work so much to our taste as this; a work every way worthy of the name of the great divine to whose memory these lectures have been founded. The author possesses remarkable analytical power; he plucks the heart out of a system or theory, and presents it in a few paragraphs or sentences. In no other volume can the reader find so concise and yet thorough an examination of the different views that have been held in the Christian Church from time to time concerning the various aspects of our Lord's humiliation: and the spirit of candour and catholicity which pervades the work deserves the highest praise. He classifies the different theories concerning the death of our Lord under five forms of inquiry: 1. The prophetic theory, which is substantially the view held in common by Socinus, Robertson, and Ritschl. 2. The sympathetic theory, which was first formerly pronounced by Abelard, and which has found in Bushnell its most distinguished modern expositor. 3. The theory of redemption by example, the view entertained by many of the Fathers, and which in recent times has been advocated under various forms by Schleiermacher, Irving, and Maurice. 4. The theory of redemption by Christ's self-imputation of sin, or by perfect confession of sin. Its principal advocate is McLeod Campbell. 5. The last theory is the Catholic one, of redemption by substitute, which, in addition to the subjective imputation of sin to Himself by Christ, and to the imputation of sin to Him by believers in their prayers and praises, teaches, over and above, a corresponding objective imputation of sin to the Redeemer by the Supreme Ruler of the world, the ground at once of Christ's action in imputing human sin to Himself, of our action in imputing our sins to Him, and of God's action in imputing righteousness to us. We have pleasure in giving the closing paragraph of this great work:

"While advocating the last-named theory, still entitled by comparison to be called the Catholic, I have not found it necessary to repudiate as utterly false all those preceding. I have been able to recognize each in succession as a fragment of the truth, one aspect of the many-sided wisdom of God revealed in the earthly ministry of His eternal Son. In this fact I find great comfort with reference both to my own theological position on this great theme, and to that of many who occupy a different position. For, on the one hand, it is a presumption in favour of the Catholic doctrine that it does not require to negative rival theories, except in so far as they are exclusive and antagonistic; and, on the other hand, one may hope that theories which have even a partial truth will bless their advocates by the truth that is in them, connecting them in some way with Him who is the fountain of life, and initiating a process of spiritual development which will carry them on to higher things. It is not impossible, it is not even uncommon, to grow to Catholic orthodoxy from the meagrest, even from Socinian, beginnings. Such was the way in which the apostles themselves, the first inspired authoritative teachers of the faith, attained to the elevated view-point from which they surveyed Christ's work on earth, when they had reached the position in the Church which their Lord designed them to occupy. Their first lesson in the doctrine of the Cross did not rise above the watchword of the Socinian theory, 'the righteous One suffering for righteousness' sake, and setting therein an example to all His disciples;' and not till long after did they attain insight into the meaning of the baptismal name given by the Baptist to Jesus: 'The Lamb..."
of God that taketh away the sin of the world.'
Let this fact ever be borne in mind by all to whom
that name is fraught with peace and provocative of
ardent love, and it will help them to maintain an
attitude of patience, hope, and charity towards
many who reject with determined unbelief, yes, with
bitter scorn, truths dear to their own hearts."

This is the general name of a series of Lectures,
ine in number, projected, evidently, to refute the
infidelity so audaciously propounded at the Belfast
Meeting of the British Association, under the lofty
name of Science. Little did those 
seems think when,
with haughty scorn and contempt of the religious
faith and feelings of the Christian Society which had
opened its doors to give them hospitable reception,
they proclaimed their Godless philosophy, that
their attacks would only lead to a greater
confirmation of Christian truth, and to the
exposure and condemnation of their atheistic mate-
rialism. But so has it ever been since the beginning.
"We can do nothing against the truth, but for the
truth's sake;" or, to quote the favourite motto of the late
Sir William Hamilton: "Truth, like a torch, the
more 'tis shook, it shines." Christianity arose in
storms and tempests, but in spite of all, the little
sapling flourished, and became a great tree, and the
attacks of modern infidelity, however fierce, will only
help that tree to take deeper root in the heart of
humanity and thus to bring forth more precious
fruit. These lectures are admirably adapted to the
purpose for which they were designed, and ought to
be widely circulated, especially amongst those likely
to be influenced by the assumptions of a "science,
falsely so called."

The Expositor. Edited by the Rev. Samuel Cox.
Vol. III. London: Hodder and Stoughton; Strahan
and Co.
We learn, from the preface to this new volume,
"that the venture has already won a success which
outstrips the expectations of those who started it;
so that there is no longer any need for kindly critics
to express the somewhat damaging and depressing
hope 'that it may meet with such a measure of
success as will encourage the editor and publishers to
go on with it.' We are glad to know this, and wish
for the work still greater success and usefulness. The
list of contributors to this volume is such as any
editor might be proud of, and we have no doubt his
promise will be fulfilled, that "no pains shall be
spared to make it more worthy of public approval
and support."

Thoughts on Art, Philosophy, and Religion: Selected
from the Unpublished Papers of Sydney Dobell. With
Introductory Note. By John Nichol, M.A., LL.D.,
Professor of English Literature in the University of
Mr. Dobell was not only a poet of no common
order but also an original and profound thinker on
many subjects which poets generally are not supposed
to take much interest in. We had the pleasure of
his acquaintance, and often wished for some Boswell
to note down the remarks which he made on
subjects kindred to those noticed in this volume.
Had it not been that for many years his life was
little better than a continuous fight against death, he
might, and we believe would, have produced a work
worthy of his high genius and culture, which would
have immortalized his name as a great religious
philosopher. Although he never professed to hold a
definite religious creed, he was intensely Christian in
spirit, and rejoiced whenever he could find in any
one any element of truth or goodness. Readers of
this choice volume should bear in mind that many
parts of it are fragmentary, and were not written
with a view to publication; and this especially applies
to the thoughts under the heading "Theoretic" and
"Ethical." The following remarks on the difference
between Catholicism and Protestantism are eminently
characteristic of him:—
"Catholicism is (potentially) great, beautiful, wise,
powerful, one of the most consistent and congruous
constructions man has made; but it is not educational
and will therefore die; nay, must be killed as per-
nicious in proportion to its excellence. Protestantism
is narrow, ugly, impudent, unreasonable, inconsistent,
incompatible: a babel of logomachy and literalism:
a wrangling club of half-thinking pedants, half-taught
geniuses, and untaught egotists of every type: the
nursery of conceit and fanaticism: the holiday ground
of all the 'fools that rush in.' But it is educational,
and therefore it will live; nay, must be fed and
housed, cared for and fought for, as the sine qua non
of the spiritual life of man."
We beg to tender our best thanks to Professor
Nichol, for his deeply interesting introductory note
evidently a labour of love, and for the admirable
manner in which he has edited this volume.
RATIONALISM.


At the threshold of all enlightened investigation of religious truth lies the question, What are the sources of knowledge? On this first and fundamental question, opinion is divided. We may leave out of the account, for the present, the Eastern Church, which has now for a thousand years exhibited few signs of intellectual life, and these mostly in the shape of occasional outbreakings of polemical fervour against its great rival in the West. Proud of its illustrious teachers of the patristic age,—Chrysostom, the Gregories, Basil, Athanasius,—and of those ancient councils which were truly called œcumenical, the Greek Church haughtily denies the claim of the Romish bishop to more than a titular and honorary precedence, yet agrees with the Latins in recognizing tradition and church authority. Turning to Western Christendom, we find three parties in reference to the question already stated—the Roman Catholic, the evangelical Protestant, and the Rationalist.

The Roman Catholic and the Protestant have common ground. They both acknowledge a supernatural, divine revelation. They both admit an authoritative teaching, objective, or outside of the individual. They both profess that all this teaching, all of Christian truth that has been revealed from heaven, is to be traced back to Christ and His apostles. It is only since the Reformation, to be sure, that the Roman Catholic Church has thus limited its doctrine of tradition. In the middle ages, tenets were not unfrequently attributed to a post-apostolic revelation. This is done, for example, by Gerson, in the case of the Virgin’s Immaculate Conception and the Assumption; and by Occam in regard to the dogma of Transubstantiation. But the prevailing and established theory now is, that the tradition which is the supplement of Scripture includes only apostolic teaching orally transmitted. The Church defines, declares, the faith; discerns more and more of its meaning, but adds nothing to the original deposit. But the Roman Catholic interposes, between the individual and Christ, the Church; that is, the Visible Body organized under the hierarchy of which the Roman Bishop is the head. This is the radical, defining characteristic of their system. In keeping with it, the Church is held to be at once the infallible custodian and infallible interpreter of both Scripture and tradition,—the written and the oral teaching of Christ and the apostles. This last position, together with the theory of the Church that underlies it, the Evangelical Protestant rejects. He may allow that the oral teaching of the apostles, if we could get at it, would be as authoritative as their writings; but he denies that any safe and sure channel has been provided for its transmission. And, even as to Scripture, he denies that the Church in any age is an unerring expounder. Hence all that part of the Roman Catholic creed which he cannot find confirmed in the Scriptures he discards. Tenets, which, if they claim any support from the Bible, rest on alleged obscure intimations of Scripture, are not admitted to be a part of the Christian faith. There is truth in the well-known aphorism, “The Bible, and the
Bible alone, is the religion of Protestants!" It is perfectly consistent with this position to hold that the logical implications of the primitive teaching are more and more unfolded to view in the progress of society; that the ethics of the Gospel are developed in new directions and applications; that Christian life is a commentary on Christian truth. We may allow some grains of truth in the mystical and ideal conception of the Church’s authority which Möhler and other liberal Catholics have undertaken to set up: but, when all reasonable concessions have been made, there remains a radical antagonism.

The distinguishing note of Rationalism is the rejection of authoritative teaching, the disbelief in supernatural revelation. Whatever special view he may take of the Bible, whether he adopt the low estimate of Thomas Paine, who said that he could write a better book himself; or the higher estimate of those who pronounce it a lofty product of human genius,—the Rationalist denies that the Bible is in any proper sense the rule of faith. The prophets and apostles teach with no authority that does not belong to them in common with all poets, and philosophers, and preachers. There is nothing properly miraculous either in the origin of their doctrine, or in the evidences that support it. This is the common ground of Rationalism in all of its various types. The Atheist, the Pantheist, and the Deist unite in this negation of the supernatural as connected with the origin of Christianity and the Christian system of doctrine.

I am aware, that, in so general a classification, there must be embraced under the term Rationalism dissimilar phases of character and opinion. There are Rationalists in fact, but not in spirit. If there is positive and downright infidelity at one extreme, there is an approach to faith at the other. There are men—a numerous class in these days—who can believe only as they can assimilate religious truth; who seek for it, therefore, with an earnest heart, though under a cloud of doubt. Could they discern the harmony of Christian truth with their intellectual and moral nature, could they set this truth in a close and vital relation to the soul, they would be satisfied. This immediate, living perception is what they most crave. For such, as we may hope to indicate, there is a way out of their present position. Were the principle of division some other than the one we have chosen,—which is the position taken with reference to the sources of knowledge,—they might fall into a different category; but, as long as their criterion for judging and ascertaining what is true in religion remains a purely subjective one, they adopt the distinctive rationalistic principle.

Modern scepticism and unbelief, or the whole movement which in its different phases and stages is termed Rationalism, is often charged by Roman Catholic theologians upon Protestantism. It is unjustly declared to be the legitimate fruit of the Reformation. The ancient foes of Christianity in the field of thought—Celsus, Lucian, Porphyry, and the rest — were heathen writers, standing outside of the Church. In the mediaeval age, scepticism came mostly from the Arabic schools in Spain, and was prevented from gaining a foothold through the efforts of Aquinas and other great teachers of the thirteenth century. But before the Reformation, through the disgust that arose against the scholastic theology, and through the influence of classical and literary studies engendered by the revival of learning, widespread tendencies to scepticism had become rife in the southern nations of Europe. Neander, in an essay read before the Berlin Academy, quotes a remarkable sentence from a letter of Melancthon in which the keen-sighted reformer says that far more serious dis-
turbances (*longe gravius tumultus*) would have ensued had not Luther arisen to turn the studies of men in a new direction. The Reformation was a powerful religious movement, that was strong enough to stifle the germs of scepticism far and wide, and that made itself felt with most wholesome results within the Catholic Church itself. The rise of men like Fénelon, and the Jansenists must be ascribed to the indirect agency of the Protestant Revolution; but the humanistic spirit, with the sceptical turn that accompanied it among the Latin nations, continued in France. In the seventeenth century, if Luther's Bible was the popular book in Germany, Plutarch's Lives had a like place in France; and the spirit to which I have referred found expression in the genial scepticism of Montaigne. Without doubt, the decline of religion in the Protestant churches, the incessant controversies among them, and especially the partial sacrifice of the Protestant spirit of liberty in an excessive zeal for creeds, are partly responsible for the infidel re-action that followed. The Protestant scholasticism of the seventeenth century had an effect like that of the Catholic scholasticism of the fourteenth. But the Deism of the last century found the most welcome reception in France. Voltaire was not bred a Protestant. Owing to causes, among which the degeneracy of Protestantism as compared with the spirit of piety and freedom that belonged to it at the outset was one, Deism obtained a foothold in Germany and England as well as in the Catholic countries. As Neander truly remarks, the spirit that characterized Deism, if logical, and consistent with itself, must lead to the rejection of the supernatural altogether. Pantheism, which identifies God with Nature, is, therefore, the natural successor of Deism; although the forms which Pantheism took were due to the course of philosophical speculation of which they were the immediate product.

At the present time, scepticism and unbelief are far from being confined to Protestant lands. Rehan is the name most frequently coupled with that of Strauss. Wherever there is intellectual activity in Catholic countries, scepticism, either hidden or avowed, is prevalent. We have seen lately in Spain how the hatred of the ecclesiastical system of the Roman-Catholic Church takes the form of a rejection, and even denunciation, of all revealed religion.

Evangelical Protestantism puts no tyrannical yoke upon reason. It does not concede that any contrariety exists between the Christian faith and reason. When Augustine affirmed that faith precedes knowledge, he meant that Christianity is a practical system, adapted to practical necessities of the soul, and must, therefore, be applied or experienced before it can be comprehended. It is a case where insight follows upon life; where one must *taste* and see: but that good reasons can be given for the act of Christian consecration in the soul, and good evidence in behalf of the truth that is then received, he, and the schoolmen who followed him in this religious philosophy, fully believed. It was the maxim of Socrates and Plato even, that men must be improved before they can be instructed. Pascal was not a sceptic in his philosophy, as some of his critics have charged: he maintained that faith is reasonable, though not reached by a chain of reasoning; and this because it is an act of the soul, obeying its higher intuitions. Hume, Gibbon, and other free-thinkers of the last century, caricatured the position of Christian theology, when they ironically, with "the grave and temperate irony" which Gibbon says that he learned from "The Provincial Letters," spoke of the truths of religion as received by faith alone, in the absence of, or in the face of, unanswerable arguments. What, then, in the view of the evangelical Protestant, is
the place of reason? First, he allows and
claims for the human soul a native recog-
nition, however obscure it may have become
through sin, of the verities of natural
religion,— God, freedom, accountableness,
imortality. Secondly, he concedes the
necessity of establishing the supernatural
origin of the gospel, and of the mission of
Christ, by competent evidence. Christ and
the apostles, in preaching to Jews, naturally
took for granted that groundwork of reli-
gious beliefs which was accepted by their
hearers. They had only to evince that
Jesus of Nazareth was the Messiah. Yet it
is remarkable how frequently in the dis-
courses of Christ—how habitually, it might
be said—an appeal is made directly to the
moral and spiritual nature. How constant
is the recognition of those primary convic-
tions which are inwrought into the soul by
its Maker! He rebukes men who can pre-
dict the weather from signs in the sky for
not interpreting aright the signs of the
times, and for not deducing from phenomena
that fell under their own observation the
proper inference; and he adds to this cen-
sure the memorable words, “Yea, and why,
even of yourselves, judge ye not what is
right?” In preaching to the heathen, the
apostles argued the case. They set forth
the truths of natural religion, which the
heathen in part acknowledged; and then
they proceeded to establish by testimony the
facts of the life, death, and resurrection of
Christ. It was, throughout, an appeal to
the intelligence of their auditors. So it
has been since among all considerate
defenders of the Christian faith, as the
copious library of Apology will bear witness.
Thirdly, it is requisite to investigate the
question of the authorship of the books
which enter into the canon, wherever honest
doubts arise on the subject. The authority
of the Church on this point a consistent
Protestant cannot admit. The Church, as
an historical witness, is entitled to speak.
The reception, by the early Church, of books
as apostolic, is certainly a strong, and in
many cases a conclusive, argument in favour
of so regarding them; but the Church, like
other witnesses, must submit to be cross-
examined. We discard from the Old Testa-
ment canon the so-called apocryphal books,
because we know from ancient testimony
that they formed no part of the Scriptures
that were used by Christ and the Apostles,
—no part of the Hebrew canon; and we
charge the Church of Rome with being
uncritical in incorporating them into the
Bible, and pronouncing them, as it does in
the Creed of Trent, a part of Holy Scripture.
Jerome taught the reformers, on this matter,
what Augustine with his defective scholar-
ship did not know. But the Protestant is
equally bound not to shrink from the in-
vestigation of the New Testament canon
whenever he is fairly challenged to this
work. Thus in the fourth century, as Euse-
bius tells us, there were several books in
regard to which the Church was divided in
opinion; some regarding them as apostolic,
and others taking the opposite view. At
this time, zeal for uniformity was stronger
than zeal for independent study; and the
doubtful questions were disposed of without
much inquiry. At an earlier day, the state
of things was different; for there did not
exist in the second century that indifference
to the genuineness of books, and ready
credulity, which Strauss and many other
infidel writers falsely attribute to the early
Church. But the Church of the fourth and
fifth centuries, on these particular questions
to which I have referred, was rather uncriti-
cal. Not that the doubt which Eusebius
reports is at all conclusive against the books
in question; but it is one sufficient reason,
if there were no other, why there should be
candid and fearless investigation: and so
Luther and the first reformers held. For
the settlement of the canon the enlightened
Protestant will demand historical testimony,
in the shape both of internal evidence and external authentication, of such a nature as to convince the unbiassed judgment. Fourthly, he admits that no amount of evidence can justify belief in propositions that are either self-contradictory, or in conflict with known truth. He admits, that, if such doctrines were to be found in the Bible, it would so far detract from the authority of the book, and might disprove the supernatural origin of the Christian system. But, just here, the evangelical Protestant interposes a protest against the rash, superficial, and sometimes flippant assertion, that doctrines are irrational because they are in some respects mysterious, or because they clash with somebody's scheme of philosophy. There has been an infinite amount of confident but shallow denial of Christian doctrine on grounds which a change in the reigning philosophy renders obsolete. Rationalism may often be left to confute itself. For example, the old Kantian Rationalism, which, in common with the Anglo-French Deism that went before, cast out the doctrines, which, like the Trinity, it could not square with its own preconceived ideas, was, for this very reason, treated by Hegel and his associates of the speculative school with great contempt. The professors who had supposed themselves to have reduced Christianity to a rational system, by eliminating mysteries and trying every thing by the touchstone of common sense, found themselves charged by the more advanced school with a deplorable want of philosophic grasp. Theories of religion and philosophy which are easy, which present no hard problems, no unanswered questions, no vistas that the eye cannot explore, find ready credence for a while; but they are short-lived, because flat and insufficient. A "Christianity not mysterious" can take but a feeble hold of the convictions of men. Fifthly, the evangelical Protestant is free in the interpretation of the Bible. He is bound to no view of a passage simply because it is traditional. Whatever light antiquarian and philological study may throw on the pages of the Bible, he is thankfully to accept. The text, the translation, the exegesis, are fixed by no authority which supersedes the exercise of private judgment. Protestantism, on the one hand, vindicates the importance of learning as an aid in the interpretation of the Scriptures; and, on the other hand, asserts for the humblest individual, provided he be endued with an honest heart, the power of arriving at the general sense of the Bible, and of attaining the knowledge that is requisite for the guidance of life.

The true relation of philosophy to faith, of reason to revelation, it is not difficult to define. Philosophy was styled by Anselm the ancilla, or handmaid of religion. The office of philosophy was conceived by the schoolmen to be that of elucidating and establishing the contents of faith. That truth which faith lays hold of, reason demonstrates. This did not, of necessity, imply a degradation of philosophy; since the schoolmen, one and all, held that faith has an independent root of its own in our moral and spiritual nature, and is, in the highest sense, reasonable. But the limited scope allowed to philosophical investigation, without doubt, hampered its development. With Descartes the new era began. It was recognized that philosophy may and must start with the data of consciousness, and erect its own structure with entire independence; taking nothing for granted, and borrowing nothing from other branches of knowledge. And here we come to the precise distinction between philosophy and Christian theology, and, by consequence, to the real relations of reason and faith. Christianity is an historical religion. Unlike the philosopher, the theologian proceeds on the basis of historical facts. These facts—the
life, miracles, death, resurrection, of Christ—constitute the starting-point of theology. We know that a sound philosophy must harmonize with them, or find room for them, because we know that they are well attested, and truth is not in conflict with itself. When, therefore, a new scheme of philosophy is broached which is incompatible with the Christian faith, we conclude that it must be to that extent false. Yet an inquisitive Christian mind will not be satisfied until it has detected the particular fallacies and errors which enter into such a system: in other words, it will not be satisfied fully until a theoretical has been added to the practical refutation of it. For example, the German philosophers after Kant, inspired largely by Spinoza, brought forward pantheistic systems claiming to solve all problems, and explain the universe. These systems involve the denial of a supernatural revelation, because they deny the supernatural altogether; and, of course, they rule out the facts of Christianity. This was clearly seen when Strauss applied the Hegelian principles to the discussion of the gospel history, and when Baur did the same with reference to the origin of Christianity and of the New Testament writings. It is plain, that when the facts, the reality of which is thus impugned, are established, the philosophy at variance with them is overthrown; yet the confutation is not radical and complete until the philosopher is met on his own ground, and convicted of unfounded assumptions or reasonings. Then his edifice is subverted from the foundation. The generality of Christians are not called upon to undertake such a work: it belongs to thinking and educated men. There is many a spectre in regard to which the unlearned Christian has a right to say, when it crosses his path, "Thou art a scholar, Horatio: speak to it!"

If Rationalism is taken in the broad sense, in which it is equivalent to disbelief in revelation, it is found in three forms,—Atheism, Pantheism, and Deism; Atheism, being, for the most part, an explicit or disguised Materialism. The critical attacks on the Scriptures, dating from Semler, would form properly a distinct chapter in the history of Rationalism; yet, as they have sprung from a philosophical principle or bias, they might be placed under the head of Deism or Pantheism. The Rationalistic critics of the school of Kant belong under the former head; those of the school of Hegel, under the latter. It is not my purpose to treat the subject historically, but to characterize briefly types of Rationalism which now present themselves to observation.

First, there are those systems which utterly deny or ignore the religious nature of man. The most prominent of them is the so-called positive philosophy, in the form in which it was propounded by its founder. Mr. J. S. Mill maintains that either Theism or Atheism may be held in consistency with positivist principles. This position, M. Littré, the leading disciple of Comte, earnestly combats. Comte was an avowed Atheist. This is the proper inference from the doctrines of his system. Religion is declared to be an excrescence upon human nature; or rather, it is one of those fancies or delusions which belong to the childhood of the race, and vanish with the development of intelligence. Comte makes the incredible mistake of looking for the prime origin of religion in an effort of the understanding to explain the phenomena of Nature. Religion he makes the result of the personifying instinct, which at the outset endues all things with personal life. The errors involved in his famous generalization, according to which mankind pass through the successive stages of religion, metaphysics, and positivism, have been frequently exposed. We are concerned at this moment with the stupendous mistake which
he commits of ignoring the relation which religion has to conscience and the deepest feelings of the soul. One would think that a simple survey of the operation of religion in the world, the mighty power it has exercised in human society, the wide space it fills in human history, would be sufficient to convince a man that it arises from native, profound, ineradicable sentiments and tendencies of the soul. Even the evil that religion, when unenlightened, has caused in the world,—the strife and bloodshed and misery,—might teach one that the principle or sentiment from which all these baleful effects grow is an indestructible element of human nature; otherwise the poet would not have had occasion to write the familiar words,—

"Tantum religio potuit suae malorum."

Religion is rather to be compared, in the source and extent of its influence, with the social tendency. Some who have called themselves philosophers have said that society is artificial; the natural condition of man being that of seclusion and solitude, and social existence being a device to avoid certain inconveniences, and secure certain comforts. This theory, if it ever found serious acceptance, was long ago given up. It is acknowledged that the individual by himself is not complete; that we are naturally, as well as by grace, members one of another. Solitude is, therefore, one of the shortest roads to the mad-house. The marvellous gift of language, the instrument of social intercourse, is the testimony of Nature that we exist for this end; for it is hardly probable that this wonderful power was given us that we might indulge in soliloquies. Place a human being in utter solitude; suppose him to be ignorant that other beings like himself exist: the sense of loneliness, the vague but intense craving for social converse, the deep yearning of his soul, testify that he is out of his element. That he has lost a part of his being. There is a nisus, an unfulfilled exertion, a searching, unresting desire. So it is in respect to religion. The state of man without religion, without God, is similar. Our belief in God does not appear at first in the form of a deduction, in the form of a proposition, but in the form of trust, reverence, fear, gratitude, supplication,—in the form of dependence and obligation; in the same way that the social instinct makes itself manifest in the child reaching out and groping for another. Psychology is too often defective in failing to state, or even to consider, the propensities of the spiritual nature, on which, after all, human experience and history so much depend. The evidences or arguments for the being of God call out and meet an inward testimony of the soul, of the character which I have indicated. There is an inward nisus, as in the eye when in quest of light. There is a gravitating of the soul towards the Being who reveals himself in the consciousness and in the law that is written on the heart. Men like Pascal have been called sceptics, only because they found belief, not on external proofs, but on the intuitions of the spirit.

It cannot be denied that those systems which go under the general designation of Positivism,—whether their advocates call Comte their master, or, abjuring him, claim to be followers of Hume, or to follow nobody,—have strong affinities, not to say a logical relationship with Materialism and Atheism. Mr. Herbert Spencer holds to the relativity of knowledge—the sceptical doctrine which comes down from the Sophists, that nothing is known as it is in itself; that is, that nothing is truly known—and from this false principle he deduces the corollary that God is utterly unknown. What he or it is, it is impossible to say. But religion is the communion of man with a personal Being; and, if God cannot be affirmed to be a person, religion is no more. Mr. Huxley
giving to albumen, the old term for the material substance that enters into living beings, the sounding name of “protoplasm,” avows his belief that what we call the soul is the product of a certain disposition of material molecules. But then “matter” itself is said to be only a name for states of consciousness; and the same is true of “spirit.” Matter and spirit are identified in a sort of idealism that denies both, or asserts both to be imaginary. By this unexpected turn, he saves himself from the dogmatic assertion of what Sir William Hamilton likes to call the “dirt-philosophy,”—the philosophy, namely, which teaches that the rational soul is made of dirt, or that both are the same in substance. Mr. Huxley professes to build on Hume. He speaks of metaphysics in a tone of supercilious contempt; yet, like the rest of the extreme empirical school, he is unable to find a basis for induction, or any real authority for the generalizations of his own science. He raises the question, How can we predict the future? how can we know from our past experience that the next stone we throw into the air will descend to the earth? Casting away all metaphysical theories, he proceeds to assign two reasons: First, all the stones that have been thrown up have fallen. But the question is, How can we infer from this fact that the same thing will happen? On what ground can we infer the future from the past? Plainly he does not advance an inch in solving the question. His second ground is equally remarkable: we have no reason to the contrary, but every reason to expect that it will fall; that is to say, we believe that the stone will fall for the reason that there is every reason to expect it will! In this puerile style does our great foe of metaphysics handle a philosophical question. And yet, in his own department of investigation, he is, doubtless, an able observer and a learned man. Mr. Mill is not so wary; still, in his opposition to an à-priori and spiritual philosophy, and in his zeal for the empirical tendency, he barely saves himself from pronouncing the human mind merely a series of sensations: he offers no explanation of the way in which he can know that any other being exists but himself, and can find no theory of induction which does not involve a plain paralogism.

In the field of history, the empirical school has found a representative in Buckle,—a writer who has dipped into a multitude of books, but brings to his ambitious enterprise no thoroughness of learning in any single department; who starts with the principle, that every new fact is the necessary product of antecedent facts, and that both Providence and free-will are a delusion, and count for nothing. The machinery of physical laws, either material or intellectual, takes the place of personal agency. History is a drama where the actors are automatons, and through which runs no divine plan. All that gives interest and pathos to the story of human affairs vanishes at the touch of this pretentious but contracted philosophy. It is pleasant to hear the masters of historical study on the Continent, as De Tocqueville in France and Droysen in Germany, utter their warm protest against the narrow theory of Buckle, to say nothing of the inaccuracies of his narrative. On both these points, the ultimate verdict of all considerate scholars will be the same.

Secondly, there are those—many of whom are not to be reckoned under the class last named—who deny the miracles of Christianity. This unbelief must be traced ultimately to a want of faith in a supernatural order. It springs from a lurking scepticism respecting the primal truths of religion, which may yet be received through the force of a traditional impression. But the disbelief in miracles belongs to many who have not abandoned the belief in a personal God, and have no thought of questioning
the truth that man has a rational soul. There is a Deistic as well as a Pantheistic infidelity. The Epicurean view of the universe, in which the Deity, though admitted to exist, is kept aloof from the world, and not allowed to concern himself in human affairs, much less to interpose supernaturally, is not wholly banished from the world. The real alternative is Atheism or Pantheism on the one hand, and Christianity on the other; but this is not at once perceived.

That the apostles testified to the miracles recorded in the New Testament, that they could not be deceived, and were not liars, is a position which all the modern assaults of sceptical criticism have left unshaken. The impregnable character of this position is every day becoming more manifest. It was admitted by Strauss, Baur, and their associates, that the apostles testified to the resurrection of Jesus; but Strauss would fain establish the point, that they did not thus testify to the other miracles described in the Gospels. The early date of the synoptical Gospels absolutely precludes the supposition of Strauss. If the resurrection is counted a myth, no possible explanation of the origin of it can be given, unless, at the same time, it is supposed that the disciples had witnessed such miracles before as would account for their expecting it as a possible and probable event. But, if the prior miracles are credited, there is no longer a motive for seeking to resolve the resurrection into a delusive vision or dream of fancy. Moreover, it is evident that the miracles are so intertwined in the life of Jesus with his words and actions, that no consistent conception of that life, as it went on from day to day, can be formed in case the miracles are excluded. Deny the miracles, and you cannot explain the disciples' belief that Jesus was the Messiah; you cannot explain his own undoubted words in consistency with the hypothesis that he was honest; and you cannot explain the narratives which embody the testimony of eye-witnesses. It is remarkable that the leading advocates of the mythical hypothesis have felt obliged to give up, to a great extent, their favourite theory, and to resort to the hypothesis of a conscious deception by the New Testament authors, whom they unsuccessfully strive to bring down into an age later than the apostolic. Renan, too, is forced to adopt the notion of a pious fraud on the part of the Founder of Christianity and his chosen disciples, because he cannot escape from the fact of contemporaneous testimony to the miracles, which yet his narrow philosophy cannot allow. It is very characteristic of the whole method and spirit of Renan, that he should require, as an indispensable condition of faith, the performance of miracles at Paris before a council of savans. The moral relations of a miracle, apart from its character as an act of power, he seems utterly to overlook. He might as reasonably ask, that before believing in the facts recorded by Eusebius of the devoted heroism and endurance of Christian women and children, who, in the Roman persecutions, died for the faith, some persons of like condition should consent to go through the same sufferings before a French commission: not that the evidence by which miracles must be established is the same in kind and degree (this is not the point); but, in both cases, the events are such as occur under the proper moral conditions and surroundings.

It may be said, generally, that, of all the recent writers upon the gospel history, there is no one who makes greater pretensions to critical impartiality than Renan; and yet there is no one who is more obviously under the sway of subjective standards and prepossessions. One of his principal objections to the discourses of Jesus recorded in John is, that they do not suit his taste; which reminds one of the lines which Goethe puts
into the mouth of the old Rationalist Bahrdt,—

"Ein Gedanke kommt mir ungefähr,—
So red’te ich wenn Ich Christus wär."*

But even Renan involves himself, by his concessions, in a dilemma, where he is forced either to admit the miracle, or impeach the veracity of the Founder of Christianity and his chosen disciples.

The whole course of sceptical criticism, if attentively followed, is seen to be leading really to the inevitable conclusion, which will be at length extorted from reluctant minds, that the miraculous events which are set down in the Gospels actually took place.

Thirdly, there are those who admit the historical truth of miracles and the fact of revelation, but deny that the Scriptures are inspired. A distinction is to be made between revelation and inspiration. It is quite possible to hold that Jesus performed miracles, and rose from the dead; to hold that God, who at sundry times and in divers ways spoke unto the fathers by the prophets, hath in these last days spoken unto us by his Son: and, at the same time, to disbelieve that supernatural guidance was given to the minds of the sacred writers. They were left, it may be said, to comprehend and interpret the revelation by the unaided light of their own understanding. This is not an infidel position: it admits fully the supernatural origin of the gospel; it allows that the great transactions occurred which constitute the historic basis of revealed religion. God has made himself known to men otherwise than in the stated order of nature; but the view to which I refer leaves us no authorized interpretation of the facts,—no surety that the prophets and apostles did not mistake their import: it leaves, in a word, no authoritative teaching. Whatever varying forms the doctrine of inspiration may assume from the hyper-orthodox view, that the words are dictated, down through all the grades of opinion, evangelical Protestantism holds and cannot surrender the tenet that the Bible is somehow the rule of faith. There is an objective standard,—not one, if you please, that dispenses with the need of study, of comparing Scripture with Scripture, of considering the circumstances of each writer, of having regard to the progressive character of the revelation,—but still an objective standard, exalted above the conjectures and speculations of the individual,—a divine testimony,—an umpire to end the strife. Inspiration is the means to this end. Christ told his followers that they would, after his death, understand what they could not comprehend before; they would be guided to a true interpretation of what they could not explain in his life and death; they should be led into all truth in regard to him. He directed them, when they should be arraigned before hostile magistrates, not to hunt up arguments and devise rejoinders, but they should have given them what they should say. Intuition, under the illumination of the Spirit, would supersede contrivance. In short, they were to be, and were qualified to be, competent expositors of the gospel: and their teaching was to have a normal authority; it was to be the supplement and further unfolding of his own divine instruction. Inspiration, therefore, is a truth concerning which the evangelical Protestant cannot be indifferent; it being the source and safeguard of authoritative teaching.

Rationalism, through all of its numerous and conflicting schools, affirms the full competency of the human mind to discover religious truth for itself. Underneath the Rationalistic creed there lies this principal assumption. The great fact that is overlooked is the fact of sin, and the influence

* "Up comes a thought I did not seek,—
If I were Christ, thus would I speak."
of sin upon all parts of human nature. The truth that human nature is not in its normal condition, and that sin has darkened the perceptions of the soul, is avowedly or unconsciously set aside. The Pelagian theory lies at the root of Rationalism: this lies at the bottom of its denial of the need of external authoritative instruction, of an enlightening and quickening influence upon the mind from without. The consequences that flow respectively from the acknowledgment and the virtual denial of the Christian doctrine of sin can hardly be overstated. This doctrine is the one great postulate of the gospel: "They that are whole need not a physician, but they that are sick." It affirms, against Manicheism and Dualism in whatever form, that moral evil belongs to the human, creaturely will, and comes not from the Creator; but, with equal earnestness, it asserts the deep and universal dominion of evil among men. There has been a separation of mankind from God. We behold a state of things which compels us either to deny that evil is, and to call evil good, or to assume a mysterious catastrophe, of which revealed religion itself gives, and professes to give, but an imperfect explanation. But, whatever mysteries hang over the origin of sin, two things are certain: one is our personal responsibility for what we are in character,—a responsibility to which conscience, the highest witness, clearly testifies; the other is the baleful effect of sin, not only on society, not only on the pursuits and purposes of the individual, but also on the spiritual perceptions. It is a department where the bent of the will affects the perception of the intellect; where mind and heart share a common disaster. How is it possible to look abroad on the world, and see what men are, even when placed under the most favourable conditions; to review the course of history, and notice what men have done,—their conduct to one another, their governments, their literature, their amusements, their social customs, their religions even,—how is it possible for one to look within himself, and interrogate his own soul, and not acknowledge this great fact of sin,—acknowledge that a malady has infected mankind, differing from any other disease only in this, that it emanates from the will, and involves guilt? How is it possible to ignore a fact which all deep thinking men, heathen or Christian, have united in deploring,—a fact which Seneca declares almost in the language of Paul? The human mind, as an organ for the discernment of God and divine things, is not in the condition in which it would be had sin not perverted its powers. Vague and doubtful apprehensions need to be enlivened and confirmed by the voice of One who speaks as one having authority. It is not truth alone that the human soul needs, but redemption through One who is himself the truth. But communications of truth respecting God, and our relations to him, will form an essential part of the process which has for its end the restoration of men to communion with God. The Pelagian view of things appears, at the first glance, to be the easiest. It avoids a number of very difficult questions which theology has not yet succeeded, and perhaps never will succeed, in solving. The trouble is, that it omits to recognize or take into the account vast facts which force themselves upon observation at every turn. How well has it been said that sin is the one mystery that makes everything else plain! Superficial views on the subject of sin, where the views are not absolutely false and anti-Christian, lie at the foundation of most of the current infidel theories. A truly profound and just view of this subject is the one grand corrective. Every system of Pantheism assumes, and must assume, what the healthy moral sense of every man denounces as a falsehood,—that the entire course of this world is
normal, and conformed to the ideal; that baseness and perfidy, and every form of selfishness, are well, and even divine, in their place. It is no wonder that Spinoza and Hegel betray some uneasiness at what are the necessary ethical implications of their systems. Every system of Deism likewise assumes that man is able, without aid from above, to acquaint himself, as fully as he needs, with God, and to deliver himself from the yoke of evil. The Author of revelation says the whole truth in a word, "Thou hast destroyed thyself; but in me is thy help."

Let full justice be done to the position of the Rationalist: his doctrine, in the most refined form, is that of the supremacy of reason and the moral sense. There is force and plausibility in the statement; but let one consideration be noted. Suppose that I am driven to the admission that reason and the moral sense within me are not quenched, but perverted and obscured; and suppose that, in Christ, I recognize one in whom, being sinless, reason and the moral sense are clear and perfect, so that his eye sees moral truth with an infallible discernment; suppose that my conviction of his superiority in this respect is deepened with every day's contemplation of his character and teaching, and that, the more I assume the temper of a disciple, the more is my moral sense quickened and clarified through contact with his spirit: why shall I not recognize him as the authority, in this province, of morals and religion? In this act of trust, do I not establish, rather than subvert, the supremacy of reason and conscience? Be it remembered, also, that this relation to Christ is not one that supplants the exercise of my intelligence and moral sense; but it is one that rectifies, and at the same time constantly develops, elevates, and educates, these powers of the soul. We call him Lord and Master; and so he is: but he does not call us servants, but rather friends; for all things that are made known to him he reveals to us. The relation of dependence is ever turning into that of fellowship and friendship, of sympathy and personal insight.

Let a man discern the surpassing excellence of Christ, and the germ of faith is within him. Remember that there is an order among things to be believed. You are conscious of sin and moral weakness; you have lost that filial relation to God which is the birthright of human nature; but you are struck with the perfect excellence of Christ as he is described in the Gospels. Here is a character that more than fills out your highest conception of nobleness and virtue; here is One whose filial communion with God sin has never broken. This character of Christ is the witness to its own reality. It is no product of imagination: the records that exhibit it could never have been framed by invention. But how about the supernatural facts of the history? They, too, are upheld by the power of this human, and yet superhuman, excellence. You feel that the works of Christ are no more wonderful than his words and his life, and that he himself is the greatest wonder of all. Who but he can be the Reconciler? Whose hand can I take but his? But he proposes to bring us out of our separation from God, and rescue us from the fate which sin has brought upon human nature. He is at once the instrument and the first example of redemption; for in his own person, having overcome sin, he overcomes death. He is the power of life to all who come to him, infusing into them his own holiness and peace, re-connecting them with God, saving them from death. It is a legitimate progress, then, from the first living perception of the excellence of Christ to a personal trust in him as the Saviour, and to a discernment, also, of the inner rationality of the method of redemption. Difficulties respecting this or that portion of the Bible may be left to take care of
themselves, provided they are not obstacles in the way of a practical acquaintance with Christ. Even the Bible is not to be interposed between the soul and Christ. He was preached and believed in before the New Testament was written, and to those who knew little or nothing of the Old. Salvation is by faith in him. Believing in him, we stand on safe ground, from which all questions, even such as relate to the Scriptures themselves, may be studied. No loyal disciple need fear the displeasure of his Master on account of intellectual difficulties which he is doing his best to solve.

It should not be overlooked that Christianity is more than theory or precept: it is fact; it is a great act of love and sacrifice,—an act of God himself. For this reason, it can never be thought out by an *à priori* process, or brought under the category of necessary truth. As sin can never be explained in the sense of being reduced under the category of cause and effect, like a physical event, for the reason that sin is a free act, so it is with redemption. In its very nature it is historical; hence philosophy can never bring it into a chain of necessary conceptions. Christianity is something which reason does not evolve out of itself, but which must be received like any other great historical transaction in which free-will plays the essential part.

In dealing with Rationalism, let it be observed that it is vain, as well as wrong, to attempt to check the freedom of investigation in any province of knowledge. In regard to the beautiful sciences of Nature, the rapid progress of which is a leading characteristic of the present age, this remark is especially pertinent. Let the investigation of second causes in Nature be carried as far as possible, and let there be no hinderance put in its way. A jealousy on the part of students and ministers of the gospel with reference to these branches of study is equally unmanly and futile. At the same time, it deserves to be remarked, that, just now, the tendency to speculation is more rife among physical philosophers than among metaphysicians; and theories of Nature are brought forward which have a very slender basis of facts to rest upon, and which evince a wide departure from the Baconian method. Those philosophers must not be tenderly sensitive if their theories are subjected to a rigid criticism by theologians, who, to say the least, are, equally with them, trained to habits of logical analysis.

We must be excused for not showing the deference to guesses that is properly paid to established truth. Again: it is unjust to charge the clergy and theologians with a standing opposition to new discoveries in physical science. It would be strange if the Christian Church, which has educated the European nations, reduced their languages to writing, founded their schools and universities, saved the ark of learning in the midst of a deluge of barbarism, were to be found uniformly an obstacle in the path of scientific progress. The fact is, that almost all new discoveries which subvert traditional opinions are looked upon at the outset with distrust, and meet with opposition. This opposition is far from being peculiar to theologians, even in the case of physical discovery. Resistance often comes from the men of science themselves. Galileo, the old example of ecclesiastical intolerance, had his contest to wage with them. There was the scientific professor at Padua, who could not be induced to look through the glass, and see the moons of Jupiter. Why is not more eloquence expended against the narrowness and bigotry of scientific men themselves in respect to new truth in their own department? And, if so much progress is claimed for the physical branches, why may not some progress be permitted in the understanding of the Bible from age to age? Once more it must be said, that the natural
and physical sciences, beautiful and useful as they are, often claim, just at present, a higher relative place on the scale of studies than justly belongs to them. The study of matter, even the study of living beings below man, and of his material organism, must ever stand in respect to dignity, as an instrument of culture, second to the studies that relate to the mind. "The proper study of mankind is man." Man, and the products of his activity,—language, history, literature, art,—are the grand, fructifying studies. The opposite view must be withstood, because it can only prevail in alliance with materialistic tendencies and influences. The study of material Nature is lauded as being an observation of the thoughts of God, and an examination of his works, instead of the works of man. But the human mind is the great work of God, being his image. More is to be learned from the mind of Shakspeare, concerning God its Creator, than can be gathered from the astronomic system,—infinitely more. We would not disparage physical studies; let them be encouraged, fostered, cultivated, to the utmost: but there are loftier, more inspiring, more edifying branches of study than these. The natural and physical sciences do their best work in the way of mental culture when they are pursued by men who bring to the study of Nature an ideal element that flows into the mind from other fountains. Humboldt, though not belonging to the first order of genius, and not to be compared with men like Kepler, Newton, and Leibnitz, is, nevertheless, an example of the warming and widening influence of literary studies upon a devotee of science. He caught something from the genius of his brother, who was probably the abler man of the two.

But Rationalism must be met in the field of argument. To this end, apart from the intrinsic interest and value of these studies, the physical sciences must be so far pursued by the student of the gospel as to qualify him to judge of the theories and deductions that bear closely on natural and revealed religion. The two classes of scholars need to know more of one another, and of the wide fields of research in which, respectively, each of them is most at home. Then the naturalist will not ignore the vast range of facts and data that do not lie within his own circle and a like benefit will accrue to the theologian.

The theologian must not set his face against new truth in his own branch. Revelation is complete, but not our understanding of it. Let us not mistake the outpost for the citadel. Let us not imagine that the Christian faith is imperilled by every proposed modification of received opinions. The effect of historical, philological, and scientific study, is to bring out in bolder relief the human element in the Holy Scriptures. It is more and more felt that "we have this treasure in earthen vessels." If the result is, that traditional formulas are somewhat altered, and new statements must be framed in their place, let it not be supposed that all, or that anything, truly valuable, is lost. Be it ever remembered that "the letter killeth; the spirit giveth life." Much may be conceded, respecting the Bible, that was once denied; and yet it is left an infallible and sufficient rule of faith. There is a power in the Bible to quicken the soul; to meet our deepest necessities; to satisfy us when all other sources of wisdom and comfort fail; "to find us," as Coleridge has aptly expressed it: and this power, made manifest in all ages, and among all conditions of men, is the evidence of its divine origin, and a pledge, that, whatever peculiarities indicative of its human origin likewise may come to light, it will never lose its hold upon mankind. A good way to make infidels of sharp-sighted and thoughtful men is to identify the truth of the gospel with untenable formulas respecting the Scriptures;
to make, for example, Christianity stand or fall with the exactness of a genealogical table. Richard Baxter felt this, even in his day. Never was there a louder call for the utmost candour and fairness in dealing with the difficulties and objections of inquiring minds, whose perplexities find little relief in much of the current and traditional teaching. Where there is no settled hostility to the Christian faith, an irenical, conciliatory spirit on the side of its defenders is eminently called for. “Prove all things, hold fast to that which is good,” is the motto for the times. It was a Church father—Tertullian, I believe—who said that it was tradition that nailed Christ to the cross.

Nevertheless, the tenor of the foregoing remarks will prevent surprise at the observation, that the most effective antidote to the influence of Rationalism is found in direct appeals to the moral and spiritual nature. There is a testimony within, if it can only be called forth. Sometimes the inward witness is awakened by the experiences of life. Robert Hall said that he buried his materialism in the grave of his father. But another providential agent for effecting this result is the prophet’s voice. Men are raised up in sceptical times when the higher spiritual nature of men seems dormant, and when the understanding has taken the throne of reason,—men whose office it is to appeal with a direct and vivifying power to the intuitive function of the spirit. Among the heathen, this work was done by Socrates, in opposition to the Sophists. He taught men to find within themselves, in their own moral intuitions, a certainty which nothing could shake. In modern times, in Germany, when a barren Rationalism had paralyzed faith, it was Schleiermacher who recalled men to religion. The high privilege was given him to awaken his contemporaries to a sense of the indestructible character and sacred authority of religion. His errors, whatever they may have been, should never prevent us from recognizing the greatness of the service which he rendered. There is no truly earnest preacher, who speaks from a living experience, who is not carrying forward an effective war against Rationalism. Robertson of Brighton, referring to the cry of John the Baptist to the Pharisees and Sadducees, “Who hath warned you to flee from the wrath to come?” raises the question, how such words could be addressed with any hope to Sadducees, who did not believe in a wrath to come, or in any life hereafter. But, says the preacher, when they heard the prophet say, “Who hath warned you to flee from the wrath to come?” they knew that there was a wrath to come. There are responsive chords in the soul, which the truth, when simply asserted with the earnestness of a living conviction, sets in vibration. Arguments are sometimes necessary and useful; but they may be superfluous, and even harmful. A striking statement that brings truth in direct contact with the spirit, a declaration that comes from insight and experience, may do what reasoning fails to accomplish. A single utterance, which I call, for the want of an equally expressive term, prophetical, will sometimes dissipate doubt in a moment, and develop a conviction which intellectual inquiry alone might never awaken.

In Germany, it was an orthodox Rationalism that paved the way for the heterodox. Theologians took their propositions from the creed, or reasoned them out by processes of logic, but forgot to set them in a living relation to the wants and aspirations of the soul; or they dwelt on the ethical side of the gospel, to the neglect of the properly religious elements, in which the originality and power of Christianity chiefly reside. Let not the lesson be lost upon us, who are going through an experience not unlike that through which Germany has, in a sense, already passed.
There is one final test to which irreligious as well as religious systems are subject; and that is, their influence on society. The Christian religion is the life-blood of the social body. That gone, decay and moral death inevitably follow. Jesus called his followers “the salt of the earth,” “the light of the world.” They were the light of the world because he is the Light of the world, and their light is kindled from him. Let Materialism prevail, and, as surely as effects follow causes, the appetites of sense and earthly passions will gain an undisputed ascendancy, and overturn at last the social fabric. Let a less gross form of Rationalism supplant faith in the verities of the gospel, and a like appalling result will ultimately, though it may be with closer pace, ensue. History unites with reason in teaching, that, when the restraints and incentives that flow from religion are lost, there is no power adequate to control the selfish propensities that demand indulgence. If men are made to believe that they are merely animals, they will, in the end, behave like the brutes. If they are persuaded that they are destitute of a free and responsible nature, they will act without a conscience. If they reject the truth of a righteous moral government, they will sin without fear. If the religion of Christ is treated as a human invention, the regenerating power that lies in the gospel is wanting. By this last stern test, every irreligious and anti-Christian system which is not otherwise overcome must be tried. Supernatural Christianity has been tried as a reformatory agent in millions of individuals, and in society at large. We know what the gospel can do when it is cordially received. We are not ignorant of what may be expected if Atheism, or Pantheism, or a Christless Deism, should prevail. The fate of the civilized heathen nations of antiquity is instructive: so is the history of modern nations which have given themselves up to infidelity. Apart from argument, there remains, then, the great test of experience, “By their fruits ye shall known them.”
BENEDICT AND THE BENEDICTINES.


A LONG WAY between Rome and Naples there rises above the town of San Germano a mountain crag overlooking the valley of the Liris—

The river taciturn of classic song,*
crowned with the white walls and gleaming windows of a building, which, at first sight, the traveller might mistake for a palace or a castle. It is Monte Cassino, the cradle of western monasticism, the capital of the Benedictines for over thirteen hundred years; the most ancient and most illustrious monastery in Christendom.† At its base are the ruins of a city going back to the dim times of the Volsci, with an amphitheatre of the days of the Caesars, and the villa of Varro, who in learning and piety was a Pagan Benedictine of the best type. From its top opens a prospect of Italian beauty, with the river creeping across the hazy plain, the valleys scarped in soft lines in the northern and eastern hills, with the snow-covered Apennines shining in the remoter horizon. Not far are Arpino, where Marius and Cicero were born, and Aquino, the birth-place of Juvenal and Thomas Aquinas. Here, remote from cities and travelled resorts, on its isolated hill, is the home of a society whose antiquity, whose history, whose members, whose wealth, learning and literary treasures, and whose numerous progeny give it a singular eminence. Its church surpasses every other in Italy, even St. Peter's itself, in elegant and costly decoration. Its library was the ark in which some of the richest treasures of ancient literature survived the dark ages. Its archives, with eight hundred original documents, furnish abundant material for ecclesiastical diplomacy and archeology. And it was here, nearly five hundred years after Christianity had come into Italy, and two centuries after it had been legalized by Constantine, more than a hundred years after Honorius had decreed the extinction of Paganism, and the destruction of its temples, and after Theodoric the Goth had interdicted its exercise in Italy under penalty of death, it was here, on this little mountain in Campania, that the ancient religion found its last refuge, as if to survey the vast domain which the new faith had taken from it, and to breathe its expiring sigh over the loss. While everywhere else in Italy the old idolatry had disappeared, here, on this lofty height, so near the metropolis of Christendom, early in the sixth century, there was an ancient temple of Apollo still undestroyed, and a grove where the peasantry still made sacrifices to gods and demons.

It was to this spot, it was perhaps in order to attack and vanquish this abomination, that Benedict fled from the retreat he had tried to find in the gorges of Subiaco. There, among the wild and picturesque Sabine Hills, ascending the course of the Ani as it hollows its path from fall to fall among the rocks, he had thirty-five years before taken refuge as he made his escape from the world whose attractions he dreaded. The son of a noble

* "Rura quae Liris quieta
Mordet aequi taciturnus amnis."—
Horace, Ode I., 81.
† Les Monastères Benédiction d'Italie ; Souvenirs d'un voyage littéraire au dela des Alpes ; par Alphonse Dantier. Ouvrage couronné par l'Académie Française. Deuxième édition.
house of the town of Nursia, born in the year 480, and spending his boyhood in study at Rome, he had taken early disgust at the profligate manners of his companions, and before he was fifteen, if we may credit his biographer, Gregory the Great, he had resolved to renounce all prizes of the world, and try the discipline of solitude and penance. For three years he buried himself in a cave among the cliffs of Subiaco, indebted for his hair-cloth shirt and dress of skins, and scanty fare, to a monk from a convent near by, who alone knew his place of concealment; and there he led the outward life of a wild beast, and, as he conceived, the inward life of an angel. He suffered inward torments and outward vexations. The legend goes that he conquered his unchaste thoughts by rolling his naked body in a bush of thorns till the blood came. The monks of Vicovaro importuned him to take the rule of their house, and then, weary of his austerity, tried to poison him in the wine of the Eucharist. He returned to his cavern, where he could find better company in himself. *Habitavit secum,* says Gregory. But the fame of his sanctity had drawn a multitude of monks around Subiaco, who are soon gathered into a community, and Benedict is their superior. It had also exposed him to trials, and brought him enemies, the usual penalty of any kind of excellence. His good name, and even his life is assailed; lewd women are introduced into his monasteries; his efforts to maintain strict discipline are thwarted; and he resolves to abandon the spot sacred to him by so many years of conflict. He is nearly fifty years old; but he perhaps cherishes in his soul the hope of better success in a new experiment. He carries in his bosom, it may be, the germs of the reform he is to start, of that institute he is to establish, and moves in the consciousness of a great purpose and a great destiny, towards a new retreat among the hills of Campania. It is not unlikely that report had come to him of the lingering Paganism of the place, and that he went as a missionary to drive idolatry from a haunt where the negligence of the church, and the ignorance of the people had allowed it to remain so long. * M. Dantier adds the somewhat practical reason, that the land belonged to Tertullus, the rich father of Placidus, one of his young companions, and that the donation of it gave Benedict undisputed possession of a spot for his little colony and his new experiment.† Dante, in one of the fine passages of the Paradiso, hears Benedict tell the story of his success:

That mountain, on whose slope Cassino stands,
   Was frequented of old, upon its summit,
   By a deluded folk, and ill-disposed;
And I am he who first up-thither bore
   The name of him who brought upon the earth
   The truth that so much sublimateth us.
And such abundant grace upon me shone,
   That all the neighbouring towns I drew away
   From the impious worship that seduced the world.‡

Benedict came into the world in the dark and troubled times when the Barbarians were invading Italy. His life nearly synchronizes with the period of the Gothic rule. The Roman empire, after five hundred years of glory and shame, expired just before Benedict was born, when Odoacer stripped Augustulus of the purple, and sent him into exile. The Roman literature came to a brighter close in Boethius, who, imprisoned in the tower of Pavia, was writing his immortal Consolation of Philosophy, five years before Benedict forsook the height of Subiaco. While he was laying the foundations of the order which has done so much for the scholarship of Christendom, Justinian was silencing the voice of philosophy in the schools of Athens; and, it may be added, the Code of Justinian, more potent and enduring even than the Rule of Benedict, was published in the very

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* Beugnot, Destruction du Paganisme, II. 287.
† Dantier, I. 154.
‡ Paradiso, Canto XXII; Longfellow, 563.
year, 529, in which Monte Cassino was founded. It was amidst the invasions of this barbaric life, which was pouring its fresh blood into the veins of a decaying world, it was amidst the terrors and despairs of that age of dissolution, that monasticism came into the West, and was organized for its great service. The Count de Montalembert couples the two together:

In order [he says] that the church should save society, a new element was necessary in the world, and a new force in the church. Two invasions were required—that of the Barbarians from the North, and that of the monks from the South. The Roman empire, without the Barbarians, was an abyss of servitude and corruption. The Barbarians, without the monks, were chaos. The Barbarians and the monks united, recreated a world which was to be called Christendom.*

There were monks and monasteries in the West long before Benedict. They were in the East before they were in the West. Monasticism is a child of the Orient. It does not belong to Christianity alone. It is in human nature. It is Pagan as well as Christian. Eight hundred years before St. Anthony, Buddha turned ascetic and hermit, and established a monasticism more ancient and more enduring than the Christian. The Indian Yogi and the Mussulman Fakir are spiritual relations of the Coptic hermit and Symeon Stylites. It is born of weariness and disgust of the world; of remorse or of misfortune; of the conflict with moral evil which it is vainly thought can be easier waged in solitude; of the inclination for a life of seclusion, of contemplation, of freedom from social bonds or temptations; of the asceticism so natural to the human heart, which thinks to find virtue and perfection, and to earn heaven at last, by personal austerities, by chastising the body, and isolating the soul. It began in the simple asceticism which at first without separating from society condemned itself to silence, to fasting, to celibacy. Soon the ascetae re-

tired into the woods and the deserts, becoming anchorites in lonely cells and hermitages. In time, from whatever cause, perhaps from very weariness of solitude, they drew together, building their huts in neighbourhood, with some sort of community; and at last coming under one roof, forming closer association, and becoming cenobites, as the name indicates, having a common life, and finally a common rule and an established order. This ascetic tendency, beginning in solitude and ending in a separated society, of course was fostered by circumstances; as in Egypt by the climate and geography, by the indolence, the gloomy fancies they engender, and the facilities for life out of doors; by the persecutions on the one hand and the corruptions on the other of the Roman Empire; the noblest spirits sometimes in their despairs flying out of a world falling to pieces into refuges of peace and prayer, and when the privilege of martyrdom was passed, seeking its crown in the desert and the cave, in self-torture and spiritual suicide. It was not Christianity any more than the condition of society itself which drove men out of it. There was no energy, and no field for it. With the fall of the empire, and the devastations of the Barbarians, with oppressive taxes and idleness and public wretchedness, and the disturbance of life, men had nothing to do but turn monks. In the storm and general shipwreck, they were glad of a harbour where they could abandon all hope of this world for the sake of a future; where at least the idle could live, where even common spirits could win the honour of sanctity, and where poverty would be without want, and wear even a badge of sacredness and honour. They emigrated from a world vexed by noises and strifes, and which offered them nothing, into some land of seclusion and silence, where they could be quiet and alone, and let the world go as and where it would. Times came when the monk turned into an

ambitious priest, or a zealous missionary, when the monastery mixed itself with the movements of the world outside. But originally the monk was a layman, willing to forego the excitements and gains of life for the sake of escaping its distractions or corruptions; desiring to dismiss all hopes or fears of anything here below, that in quiet he might wait for what is to come hereafter. Monachism was a reaction from secular life, which, always burdeousome to some spirits, was in the fourth and fifth centuries so full of desolations and miseries that there seemed no remedy but in flight from a world ruined beyond salvation.

It was then that Christian monachism came into the West out of Egypt, its native country. There, as early as the Decian persecution, in the middle of the third century, Paul of Thebes had begun the life of an eremite, and there under the inspiration of St. Anthony’s example, before a century had passed, the deserts from Nitria to the Thebaid were populous with anchorites and cenobites, as populous, it has been said, as the cities themselves.*

“Go,” says the golden-mouthed doctor of Constantinople, “to the Thebaid; you shall find there a solitude still more beautiful than Paradise, a thousand choirs of angels under the human form, nations of martyrs, armies of virgins, the diabolical tyrant chained, and Christ triumphant and glorified.”†

Athanasius had known the solitaries of the Egyptian deserts, had been the friend, as he became also the biographer, of Antony; and it was Athanasius who was to be the missionary of monasticism to the West. Twenty years, five times during his episcopate, he was in exile. Twice he had taken refuge and found enthusiastic welcome in the Thebaid, and three times he had been a fugitive in the West. In 340 he came to Rome, bringing monks with him, and the report of a new form of religious life. His story took effect. Monasticism began to spread, and found apostles and defenders. Not only Basil and Gregory and Chrysostom in the East, but Ambrose at Milan, and Augustine in North Africa, and Martin of Tours, himself a monk before he became bishop, and Jerome, spending his last years in a monastery at Bethlehem, gave it sanction and impulse. In Rome it touched some enthusiastic spirits. But it was opposed to the habits and the passions of Roman society, not yet emancipated from Paganism, and often provoked contempt and indignation. The patricians preserved the easy manners of Paganism after they relinquished its doctrines, and the populace kept their prejudices, and to both the monks were detestable. Jerome relates that at the funeral of Blesilla, a nun whose days were thought to be shortened by excessive fasting, the people threatened to throw the monks into the river.‡ “In the cities of Africa,” says Salvian, “and more especially in Carthage, no sooner did a man in a cloak make his appearance, pale, and with his head shaved, than the miserable infidel populace assailed him with curses and abuse.” It took a different stamp from the more practical genius of the West.† There were fools and follies enough, but not so many as infested the monasteries of Egypt and Syria. No saint of the pillar was known in the Latin Church. At the end of the fifth century these spiritual retreats had sprung up everywhere, in the glens of the Apennines, in the heights of the Jura, in the lonely islands of the Mediterranean coast, in the remote wilds of Ireland and Wales. There were monks and monasteries, but no organization, no uniform discipline—in a word, no monastic order. At first, and for two

* Gibbon quotes Rufinus (c. 7, Vita Patrum, p. 461).

"Quanti populi habentur in urbibus tanta pena (pene) habentur in desertis multitudines monachorum." Dec. and Fall, c. xxxvii.

† Chrysostom on Matt., Hom. VIII.

centuries, the monks were simply laymen, and the monasteries were lay associations, under no ecclesiastical engagements. They made their own laws. Their spirit was one of liberty and religious exaltation. Some of them wandered at will, religious vagrants and vagabonds. The West did not follow the extravagancies of monasticism in the East, neither did it altogether avoid them. The door of the cloister in the East or West was not shut against folly, pride, hypocrisy, even avarice and luxury. Such men as Augustine and Jerome, ardent advocates and propagators of monachism, found occasion to denounce its excesses.

With the world outside of the monastery full of confusion, amidst the dissolving of the empire, and the fearful agitations of society, should there not be confusion within? The storms of the time cast into the monasteries all kinds of spirits, and especially such as were distracted, wretched, excited. They were asylums for the wounded rather than the well, for the eccentric rather than the sane. They were societies containing the prolific germs of good and evil, and with an undreamed future before them, but needing order and organization. If they were to be saved from degeneracy and ruin, if they were to withstand the storm and preserve civilization, they must gain a compact and firm order. They were not a clergy, subject to episcopal authority. Their law, their discipline, their organization, must come out of themselves. The reformer, the organizer, the legislator of monasticism, must be a monk, and that monk was Benedict.

He had fourteen years of life remaining, in which he laid the foundations of Monte Cassino which have endured so long. He purified the spot of its Paganism, became an apostle and missionary of religion to the populations around, and spread cultivation over the barren hillsides, built the Abbey which three times destroyed and rebuilt has held its place for thirteen hundred years; and above all, founded that moral edifice, that code of monastic rules, under whose shelter the monks of western Europe lived and died through so many generations. His sister, Scholastica, born on the same day with himself, had followed him to find a retreat near his own, where they met once a year, and dying within forty days of each other, in the year 543, they were buried side by side in a tomb which is still shown under the high altar of the church of Monte Cassino. It belonged to the habit of the time, and above all of the monkish literature, to surround its saints and heroes with an atmosphere of marvel. There are legends enough about St. Benedict, which need not be repeated, which need not be believed, such as invested with wonder every man who awakened the enthusiasm of his age. We may not believe them, our critical philosophy may pronounce them incredible and impossible. But they were believed. Gregory the Great, writing his biography fifty years later, related them for facts. Where there is smoke there is fire. Such legends are the poetry of history. But they spring out of real virtue and sanctity and heavenly communion, out of the faith, the reverence, the admiration at any rate, which believe the saint to be honoured of heaven, and crown his head with the aureole which is just as beautiful and golden for being imaginary and unsubstantial. It is not in the legendary story of Benedict, even with the gilding of fable washed off, so much as in the rule he established, that his real spirit and inner life is disclosed. If his life had consisted only of the wonders told of him, his name would have perished long ago.

Hitherto the monks had been guided by rules like that of St. Basil, imported from the East, by vague traditions, and by such records as were to be found in the lives of the Fathers of the Desert. A fixed form and a fixed rule were now to be given to
the monastic life. The code which Benedict wrote for his own house became the accepted law of the monks of the West for centuries. It is divided into seventy-three chapters. It turns the cloister into a voluntary prison, and a prison for life. For it established the permanence of the monastic order by the vow of stability which it required. This was the great innovation which changed and fixed the monastic life into an institution. Before, whatever moral obligation held the monk to his monastery, there was no formal engagement. The society lacked the cohesion which it took from the solemn and perpetual vow now required. A novitiate, indeed, was allowed. The perpetuity of vows required it in any wise legislation. Where there is no retreat there ought to be the chance of previous deliberation. The applicant was left outside for some days to test his perseverance. He was then put under instruction in regard to the difficulties and hardships of his new vocation. If after two months he persevered, the entire Rule was read to him, with the closing words: “This is the law under which you wish to enlist; if you can keep it, enter; if you cannot, depart freely.” This was to be repeated three times before the close of the year. He is then informed that he is about to lose all power of disposing of himself, or of laying aside the Rule which he now accepts after sufficient deliberation and trial. Then, says the Rule:

Let him who is to be received promise in the oratory, before God and his saints, the perpetuity of his stay, the reformation of his manners, and obedience. Let a deed be made of his promise, in the name of the saints whose relics are deposited there, and in presence of the abbot. Let him write this deed with his own hand, or if he cannot write, let another, at his request, write it for him, and let the novice put a cross to it, and with his own hand deposit the deed upon the altar.*

The monk was to leave everything behind, abjuring family, society, country, property; renouncing his own will in the pledge of absolute obedience, extending, in the strong language of the Rule, even to things which are impossible. With the abdication of will, of personality itself, there went, of course, the renunciation of all individual property. All things were to be in common.

It is especially necessary [says the Rule] to extirpate from the monastery, and to the very root, the vice of any one possessing anything in particular. Let no person dare to give, or receive, without the order of the abbot, nor have anything of his own peculiar property, not a book, nor tablet, nor a pen, nor anything whatsoever; for it is not permitted them even to have their own body and their own will under their own power.*

In fact, individuality was completely abolished, the will abdicated, self sacrificed in favour of obedience, absolute and without reserve. In fact, it was spiritual slavery of the worst kind. “That,” says M. Guizot, “is the fatal present that the monks made to Europe, and which so long altered or enervated its virtues.”† While the government of the monastery was an absolute despotism, it was despotism tempered by the liberty of election, and even by the privilege of advice. The abbot was to be elected by the free choice of the monks, and he was elected for life. He was also to take counsel with them in all matters of importance, though his decision was to be final and supreme.

The monastery was a prison, but an industrial prison. The great reform which Benedict introduced into the monastic institute was the ordination of labour. “Laziness,” says his Rule, “is the enemy of the soul, and consequently the brothers should, at certain times, occupy themselves in manual labour, at others in holy reading.” It accordingly regulated minutely the employments of every hour of the day, according to the seasons. Seven hours were appointed for manual labour, and two for reading.
"If," says the Rule, "the poverty of the place, or the harvest, or any necessity keep them constantly at work, let them not be vexed; for they are truly monks if they live by the labours of their hands, as our brothers the apostles did. But let all be done with moderation, for the sake of the weak." The regulations for reading illustrate the spirit of the Rule:

During Lent, all shall receive books from the library, which they shall read, one after another, all through. Especially let one or two ancients be chosen to go through the monastery at the hours when the brothers are occupied in reading, and let them see if they find any negligent brother who abandons himself to sleep, or to talking, who in no way applies himself to reading, but is useless to himself and distracts others. If one of this kind is found, let him be reprimanded once or twice; if he do not amend, let him receive correction, in order to intimidate the others. On Sunday let all be occupied in reading except those who are selected for various functions. If any one be negligent or lazy, so that he will neither meditate nor read, let some labour be required of him, so that he may not be left to do nothing. Let some employment be imposed for the weak and delicate brothers, so that they may be neither lazy nor oppressed with severe work.

Such distribution of time, giving so much to labour and so little to study, Benedict probably felt to be required by the circumstances of the monasteries of that age. They were agricultural colonies in their way, settling in uncultivated places, reclaiming the land, tilling the soil—the agricultural missionaries and teachers of Europe. In time, when by industry and by donations these communities had mastered nature and become rich, these prescriptions were modified, the hours of manual labour were reduced, as they were also changed to the transcription of books and other literary tasks.*

Having regard to their hard labour in the fields and at their trades, perhaps also to rougher men and harsher climate, he spared his monks some of the mortifications practised in the East. They were to be allowed a pint or more of wine a day, and the abbot was at liberty to deviate from the rules in regard to food and drink, according to the season of the year and the amount of labour, as he was required to have respect to the necessities of the sick and infirm, of old men and of children. He also repressed the love of gain by requiring that the monks should sell the products of their industry at less price than secular labourers. The monastery must be so constructed that the mill, the bakery, the garden, and the whole internal economy could be carried on within the walls, so as to break up the vagabond ways into which so many monks had fallen, and to complete their seclusion from the world.

M. Guizot speaks of the character of good sense and mildness which marks the Rule, and adds: "The moral thought and general discipline of it are severe; but in the details of life, it is humane and moderate; more humane, more moderate than the Roman law, than the barbaric laws, than the general manners of the times."* Benedict himself intended it should be as moderate as the object of monastic life would allow. He says, in closing the preamble to his Rule—

We must then institute a school for the service of the Lord, in which we trust nothing harsh or burdensome will be established. If, however, anything a little severe, on reasonable grounds of equity, be enjoined for the correction of vice or the preservation of charity, do not in sudden alarm fly from the way of salvation. It is always narrow at the beginning, but walking some time in the way of obedience and faith, a man's heart dilates, and runs with unspeakable sweetness of love in the way of God's commandments.

The Rule of Benedict has been praised by popes and princes; by Gregory the Great, who believed it to be inspired; and by Charlemagne, who caused inquisition to be made if there were any other order in his empire; by Louis le Debonnaire, who recommended it to his son as a manual of govern-

* Dantier, L., 198.  
* Hist. of Civ., II., 80.
ment; and by Cosmo de Medici, who read it, as he said, for its good lessons in the administration of his states and the government of his people;* by Bossuet, who called it an epitome of Christianity; and by Guizot, whose words have just been quoted; by the councils which have recommended it; and by the monasteries without number which have adopted it. Says Sir James Stephen:

The comprehensiveness of thought with which he so exhausted the science of monastic polity that all subsequent rules have been nothing more than modifications of his own; the prescience with which he reconciled conventual franchises with abbatial dominion; the skill with which he at once concentrated and diffused power among the different members of his order, according as the objects in view were general or local; and the deep insight into the human heart, by which he rendered myriadsof men and women, during more than thirty successive generations, the spontaneous instrumentsofhis purposes—these all unite to prove that profound genius, extensive knowledge, and earnest meditation, had raised him to the very first rank of uninspired legislators.†

That Benedict expected for its such fame, and so wide a sway; that he supposed he was making a Rule for an innumerable progeny to spring out of the loins of his single house, and for ages to come, there is little sign.‡ It contains no reference to an association, or great order, such as sprung out of it. If it is elastic enough in scope for its subsequent growth, its future could hardly have been anticipated. Like all founders of great institutions, doing the duty of his time in the simplicity of faith, and establishing a strict and wise order for his own house, he built it better than he knew, and laid the foundations of many generations. He simply sowed a seed in the ground, and it brought forth fruit, not according to the foresight of man, but according to the will of God.

And yet his Rule contained in itself the reason of its success. It was written after long experience with the class for which it was made, and was the fruit of earnest thought applied to the problem of organizing monastic life into permanent and useful form. The practical, organizing genius of the West found its expression and instrument in Benedict, who found a growing world of monasticism waiting for its law, and had the wisdom to enact and try it. He committed it to missionaries, who went forth to plant it in new fields, in Sicily and in Gaul, on the heights of Soracte, and the isles of the Adriatic. More than all, it may be, within a half century, in 590, a Benedictine monk, the first of his order, came to the See of Rome, in the person of Gregory the Great. He did not forget his order. He never ceased to be a monk. He not only wrote the Life of Benedict, but gave the sanction of his supreme authority to his Rule. He guaranteed the freedom of monasteries and the inviolability of their property. The Rule and the order of Benedict might have lived and triumphed had there been no Gregory; but they felt the influence and the help of his mighty hand.

His own house was not to escape the calamities of a violent age. The Goths had spared it. A year before he died, by some strange freak of curiosity or superstition, Totila, the last and not the least of the Gothic sovereigns, reversing the victories of Belisarius, on his way through central Italy, sought out the saint of Monte Cassino. The story goes that the barbaric king was awed by the presence and softened by the words of Benedict, who even foretold his conquest of Rome, his reign of nine years, and his death in the tenth. The Goths disappeared, and the Lombards came in their turn. Their coming was in ravage and terror, and the home of the Benedictines did not escape. In 589 it was sacked, and the monks fled. They found refuge in Rome, where, under

* Dantier, I., 201. † Essays, 236.‡ In a single passage it prescribes a difference in the style of the monastic dress, according to country or climate, and the prescriptions for food and medicine refer to the expectation of having monasteries elsewhere.
Pope Pelagius II., they built a monastery near the Lateran, remaining there one hundred and thirty years. After so long a time the sanctuary on Monte Cassino was rebuilt, receiving great endowments, and by its wealth tempting the Saracens to destroy it in 884, the autograph copy of Benedict's Rule being at that time irrecoverably lost. In 1349 it was shattered by an earthquake, to be restored in 1365 by Urban V. Towards the end of the seventeenth century it was rebuilt in its present form, with a magnificence before unsurpassed; and on the 19th May, 1727, was consecrated for the third time by a Pope, Benedict XIII.

The community has passed through fortunes of equal interest with those of its residence. It has had illustrious inmates and illustrious guests. Its abbots have been princes of the realm. In its palmy day the abbot was first baron, and it held feudal privileges and rights. It was involved in the great strife between the papacy and the empire; and when Hildebrand, who had, as cardinal, assisted at the dedication of its basilica in 1071, retired from Rome to die at Salerno, he halted at the tomb of Benedict, and in his last hours nominated the Abbot Didier, afterwards Victor III., for his successor. It had opened its gates to Charlemagne, and Carloman, the son of Charles Martel, came here as a monk to find relief from the cares of empire. Its decline began in the political strifes of the Middle Age, in which it became more or less involved. The order of St. Benedict was too closely associated with the Roman pontificate not to share its waning fortunes. Monte Cassino was at the summit of its power during the time of Gregory VII., and it declined with the papacy. Its decadence was marked in the second half of the fifteenth century. The mendicant orders, with their militant spirit, were coming into competition with the Benedictine, to contract its dominion; and increase of wealth tempted strong hands to lay hold of religious houses when they could. Commentatory abbots took the place of those elected by the chapters, and in 1454 Monte Cassino yielded to this abuse. In Canto XXII. of the Paradiso, Benedict says to Dante—

And now my Rule
Below remaineth for mere waste of paper.
The walls that used of old to be an abbey
Are changed to dens of robbers, and the cowls
Are sacks filled full of miserable flour.
But heavy usury is not taken up
So much against God's pleasure as that fruit
Which maketh so insane the heart of monks.
For whatsoever hath the church in keeping
Is for the folk that ask it in God's name,
Not for one's kindred or for something worse.*

In commenting on the first line of this extract, Benvenuto gives a description of Boccaccio's visit to the library of Monte Cassino, in the last part of the fourteenth century. He says:

To the clearer understanding of this passage, I will repeat what my venerable preceptor, Boccaccio of Certaldo, pleasantly narrated to me. He said that when he was in Apulia, being attracted by the fame of the place, he went to the noble monastery of Monte Cassino, of which we are speaking. And being eager to see the library, which he had heard was very noble, he humbly—gentle creature that he was—besought a monk to do him the favour to open it. Pointing to a lofty staircase, he answered, stiffly, "Go up; it's open." Joyfully ascending, he found the place of so great a treasure without door or fastening; and having entered he saw the grass growing upon the windows, and all the books and shelves covered with dust. And wondering, he began to open and turn over now this book and now that, and found there many and various volumes of ancient and rare works. From some of them whole sheets had been torn out, in others the margins of the leaves were clipped, and others were greatly defaced. At length, full of pity that the labours and studies of so many illustrious minds should have fallen into the

* "A l'époque de sa splendeur, elle comptait au nombre ses domaines, 2 principautés, 20 comtés, 440 villes, bourgs ou villages, 250 châteaux, 335 manoirs, 25 ports de mer, et 1362 églises."—Dantier, I, 6, note.

* Paradiso, XXII., 74-84. Longfellow, 564.
hands of such profligate men, grieving and weeping he withdrew. And coming to the cloister, he asked a monk whom he met why those precious books were so vilely mutilated. He replied that some of the monks, wishing to gain a few ducats, cut out handfuls of leaves, and made psalters, which they sold to the boys; and likewise of the margins they made breviaries, which they sold to women. Now, therefore, O scholar, rack thy brains in the making of books.*

However Decameronian this story may appear—and M. Dantier is inclined to accuse both Dante and Boccaccio of prejudice—there is probably truth in it.† Still,

* Quoted by Edwards, Memoirs of Libraries, I., 271, from Valery, Voyages historiques, etc.

† In the "Atlantic Monthly" for February, 1875, Mr. Longfellow prints an exquisite, pictorial poem, describing his visit to Monte Cassino. He found the librarian incredulous about this story.

"Boccaccio was a novelist, a child
Of fancy and of fiction at the best;
This the urbane librarian said, and smiled
Incredulous, as at some idle jest."

It may be added that, under the supervision of Father Tosti, this little community, now reduced to about twenty persons, is engaged upon a catalogue of the manuscripts in their library. It is to be completed in five volumes, the first of which is already issued, and has been received by the Public Library in Boston. It gives chromo-lithographic specimens of the writing, the initials, coloured rubrics and ornamentation of the various manuscripts, with detailed descriptions and copious extracts. Eight hundred pages are devoted to forty-four manuscripts, which shows how thoroughly the work is done. In the Preface, Father Tosti gives a short account of the growth of the library, and closes with some mention of some of the more distinguished visitors in his time. Among them is Mr. Longfellow, to whose name is attached this note: "Hae carmina in tabularia, sua manu exarata, reliquit:

Lives of great men all remind us
We can make our lives sublime;
And departing, leave behind us
Footprints in the sands of time."

He could have hardly selected, in all literature, a verse more appropriate for such a visit than this one of his own.
and twelfth centuries.* There is a manuscript of Origen on the Epistle to the Romans, with an inscription indicating that it was in use in the middle of the sixth century.†

It is a mistake to suppose that the monastery is a university, a centre of active intellectual life. Occasionally there has been a monk of intellectual force like Thomas Aquinas or Anselm. But Dr. Newman claims and with good reason, I think, that literary pursuits are a fall and departure from the pure, primitive idea of a monk. He is to mortify his reason as well as his flesh. He retires to a convent not to search after truth, not to wrestle with the secrets of God, but to find repose. If he studies, it is in paths that do not distract, and which are well trodden. It is as much to keep out of idleness, as to discover truth. Says Dr. Newman:

The object of the monks was rest and peace; their state was retirement; their occupation was some work that was simple as opposed to intellectual, namely, prayer, fasting, meditation, study, transcription, manual labour, and other unexciting, soothing employments. Such was their institution all over the world.‡

Such is the history of the Benedictines at Monte Cassino, and everywhere. Here is a society thirteen hundred years old, with seclusion and silence, and a library, and what has it produced? It has transcribed books, it has preserved manuscripts, and occasionally some work of historical investigation has been done. It has added little to the intellectual treasures of the race. And yet it has done service for others in its time. It has preserved what it did not create. The monks could copy what they could not produce. They were the printers of the middle age, reproducing with the pen, illuminating with the pencil the Scriptures, the writings of the Fathers, and the Greek and Latin classics, and thus performing an invaluable service at a time when nobody else could or would do it. When a copy of the Bible was worth a king’s ransom, when the literature of the ancient world was in danger of being lost, it was the Benedictines in the Scriptorium of their abbeys who kept the lamp burning which without them had gone out. And then the abbeys and churches themselves, their very ruins, tell what the Benedictines did for the architecture of Europe. Nearly every cathedral in England is a Benedictine foundation. At Rome, San Paolo-fuor-le-mure, with its magnificent basilica, belongs to this order. And it was for the Benedictine convent of San Sisto at Piacenza, that Raphael painted the Madonna at Dresden, “which enchants the world.”

It is reserved for the cradle of the Benedictine order at Monte Cassino to be its grave. The first, it is also the last in the splendid line, and has the singular fortune to outlive its innumerable children. While Benedict was yet alive his Rule began its victorious career. The year he died, his faithful associate, Maurus, had crossed the Alps, and planted the first monastery of his order at Glanfeuil, in the centre of France. Before the end of the century Augustine had planted the Benedictine standard at Canterbury, and the marks of the order are seen in the two Universities, in twelve cathedrals, and in abbeys, beautiful for situation, and enchanting even in their ruin. The monasteries of an earlier or of an independent foundation accepted the Rule of Benedict. It supplanted and absorbed the Rule of St. Columban, the Irish missionary to France. For six centuries Latin monachism, while it was undivided, belonged to Benedict. And when decay and corruption came, as they did come with opulence and repose, and re-

* For an account of the Library, see Dantier, I, 21–42.
† Donatus gratia Dei presbyter proprium codicem Justino Augusto tertio post consulatum ejus, in sedibus B. Petri in Castello Lucullano infirmus legi, legi, legi.
‡ Historical Sketches.
form followed, as it did follow, when nobler spirits like Romuald and Bernard arose, the variations took new names, but were still his. The houses of Clugny, Camaldoli and Vallombrosa, the Carthusians and Cistercians, with their separate founders, still venerated Benedict as the patriarch of them all.

The panegyrists of this illustrious order [says Dr. Newman] are accustomed to claim for it in all its branches as many as thirty-seven thousand houses, and besides thirty Popes, two hundred Cardinals, four Emperors, forty-six Kings, fifty-one Queens, one thousand four hundred and six Princes, one thousand six hundred Archbishops, six hundred Bishops, two thousand four hundred Nobles, and fifteen thousand Abbots and learned men.*

In comparatively recent times the Benedictine name has flashed forth with new splendour. In the seventeenth century it revived more than its pristine literary glory in the congregation of St. Maur. At this house, in Paris, gathered a company of scholars whose labours make an era in letters. Their editions of the great writers of the church are a monument of industrious and careful scholarship such as the world has never seen. Their researches in archaeology and history, their indexes, prefaces, memoirs, and dissertations, have the homage of all grateful ecclesiastical scholars. At a period of the richest literary fruitfulness the quickening influence invaded this quiet retreat, and it took its part in the harvest which enriched France in the reigns of the Great Louis and his predecessor. One hundred and five writers belonged to this illustrious congregation, and contributed to its treasures. Not the least of their works is the annals of their ancient order, which is no mere piece of hagiology, but a grand accumulation of historical materials gathered from all the Benedictine ages. They unearthed the legends of the middle age, and meaning to serve their church, really exposed its follies to the unbelieving generation which followed. Mabillon discussed the worship paid to unknown saints, and tried to discriminate the sanctity and to reduce the number of the large and rather mixed company whose relics were hallowed by the church. But he gave great offence at Rome. The learning of Montfaucon rivals the learning of Mabillon, and Ruinart and Achery and Martene and the rest, shed a glory on the house of Maurists, at St. Germain des Pres, great in its way as that which illustrated in the same generation the house of the Cistercians, the home of the pious Jansenists of Port Royal.

It has come to this. Whether man is developed out of an Ascidian mollusk or not, the monasticism which begins with St. Antony, who could not read, and despised a book, has travelled the long journey to Mabillon, the master of learning. The same system that produced Antony issued in Anselm and Abelard. It is difficult to put together in the same class the religious troglodytes in a cave in Upper Egypt, and the pale scholars who walk under the shades of Vallombrosa, or the stately cloisters of St. Denis or Westminster. But there are two monks. There are canonised fanatics and paupers and idiots, and there are missionaries like Boniface, and scholars like Alcuin, and saints like Bernard, and reformers like Savonarola and Luther. And there are two sides to monasticism, as well as a principle at bottom by which it is to be finally judged. There are the unquestionable services, the great Providential uses of this institution in ages of darkness and violence; services to learning and religion, to agriculture and art, to the overthrow of Paganism, to the diffusion of the Gospel, to the discipline of Christianity for its conquests among barbarians; the industrial, the missionary, the educational, the moral influences which went out from the monasteries through ten centuries to mould the civilization, the thought,
the religion of Europe. Here is this great historical institution, with its degeneracies and its reforms, with good in it and evil in it, certainly filling a large place in the church, in the entire life of the middle age. That place was good and useful cannot be honestly denied. It is impossible, too, not to be touched with admiration for the nobler spirits who in cloisters have renounced everything else for the sake of the soul, that they might see the face of God; for the superiority to mortal cares and fears and passions, and for the generous self-denial and heroism even which in so many instances illuminate the monastic annals. In a busy and out of doors age let us appreciate the value of the monastic principle of separation from the world. The highest and best things of the world have been born in solitude, and there the noblest spirits have been nurtured. Not for the highest religion only, but for education, for study, for clearness of thought, for fertile production, there must be at least periodical seclusion.

And yet the monastic institution is to be judged as a whole, not by the learning and sanctity of the few, not by its temporary uses in an evil time, not by the advantages of seclusion, not even by its ideal alone. It was opposed in the beginning for reasons of religion, of political economy, of patriotism. It has been finally suppressed by the consent of civilized nations for its mischiefs and corruptions. Founded on a vow of poverty, it accumulated wealth, not always by right, to be used often for self-indulgence. Founded in a plan of industry, it degenerated often into indolence, and in some of its orders made mendicity a virtue. It has withdrawn an immense force from the productive industry of the world, spent much of it in idle dreaming, in fruitless self-inspection, in impotent prayer, in injurious charity. It is fatal to domestic and to patriotic virtue, for the monk has no family and no country.

The monk's theory of life, of God and goodness, is not a true, it is a false theory. The world is not such, life is not such as he dreams. It is a slander on the Maker of the world that he did not make it to live in, to be good in it and not out of it. It is a false theory of the world, which is bad enough and miserable enough, a sick world and a dying world, and yet is God's world, and a good world, to be used and not despised after all. It is a slander on the holy name of Christ Jesus, who did not flee, but boldly bore up against the evil of the world and conquered it, that any of his followers must do otherwise, or that they follow him while they do otherwise. It is a slander on God that he is Lord of the soul and not of the body; that he has set them at necessary war; that the soul is God's, and the body the devil's. It is a false theory of virtue that there is an aristocratic and a democratic kind of it; that there are select spirits who are under a special rule, and who are to strike for a more perfect life, while they retire to pray for the rest of mankind who are incapable of it; that there are two orders of men, when there is really only one, and that the monk in his cell, obeying God, if he does, is any better than his brother, just as virtuous, and using his time a great deal better and to the world's advantage in earning his dollar a day in making shoes. It is contrary to the theory of true religion, which is that the way to do the evil world good, to make it a better world, is to live in it. If the life withdrawn from the world into the monastery is good life, it is not wanted there, but it is surely wanted in the midst of human sin and sorrow.

A poor-house is useful, and the monastery is a poor-house in its original intention. But to exalt poverty to a virtue is at war with the interests of society, and brings no necessary purification or salvation to the soul. Charity is good, and the monastery dispensed charity. But the wealth used in charity was acquired, some of it at least, as
the price of sin and under the constraint of terror, and it has been distributed for the perpetuity of pauperism. Prayer is good, and retreats for prayer may be useful. But if prayer promotes indolence, if it degenerates into formality, if it takes the place of duty and righteous service, its benefit is doubtful, and a society organized only for that may be a mischief. Whatever Providential uses it has served, they have been temporary. Whatever call there may ever have been for it was local, and surely the time for it has passed away. What is good in the sixth or the tenth century, may be worse than useless in the nineteenth.

The monk had notice of ejectment long ago. A new world has arrived, and the monk has no place in the busy, free, industrial civilization of to-day. Italy at last, the home of the Benedictine, dismisses him as useless, needed neither for learning, charity, nor religion. Fifteen hundred years ago Athanasius came to Rome to preach monasticism, and now after fifteen hundred years, after so long a time, the Parliament of Italy comes to Rome to suppress its religious orders, and to sequestrate even the ancient house of the Benedictines to the uses of religion, charity, and education, but after the methods of a new, perhaps a more secular, less religious age.

It is not an altogether sentimental regret which wishes that at least this ancient home of so much which is historical, binding the Christian ages together, might be spared. Its buildings must remain, its archives and library ought not to be scattered, and there seems to be no political or other necessity for the dispersion of this small company of gentlemen and scholars who may be at least the guardians of the cradle and the tomb of their ancient order.

Will the monk ever come back? Will a new Benedict be called to organize an institute to last through another thirteen hundred years? It is too soon to say that the world, that Christianity has outgrown asceticism and the monastic life which springs from it. Times of exhaustion, of convulsion may come, very different from these of labour and of liberty. Fanatic or ascetic impulses may sweep through the church. The spirits who in every age, even in our own time, find some charm in monastic life, may multiply. The spirit which produces monks may never die. But the tendency of modern society, the spirit of reformed, advanced Christianity, is opposed to any general development of monasticism, and it is only in a sporadic way that the religion, the civilization of the time, of the future, is likely to issue in an institution so antiquated and practically extinct.
THE FIRST CHAPTER OF GENESIS.


It has been the opinion of many biblical critics during the last six score years, that the Book of Genesis was not written by the author of the Pentateuch; but rather compiled by him as an introduction to his own writings. Two principal documents, or sources, seem to have been used by Moses in this compilation, embracing accounts of the creation and fall, the deluge, the dispersion of nations, agreeing in a striking manner with the early traditions preserved in sundry profane writers. Those disposed to regard the Book of Genesis with reverence, as the compilation of a divinely illuminated man, look upon these traditions recorded by him as the true versions, giving us the realities; those who wish to disparage the Bible, assume that the first book of Moses is of no more value than any of the traditions of the Etrurians, the Chaldeans, or the earlier Aryans. The latter class seize upon the anthropomorphitic character of many passages in Genesis to show, as they think, that the writers had no higher conceptions of the Deity than those held by any of the pagans. To this the defenders of Moses reply, that we must consider the extreme antiquity of these fragments, that they far antedate Moses, and were addressed originally to a people more rude and uncultivated than the earliest Hebrews. Those people must be addressed in their own language and in their own style of speech, else they would not comprehend the lesson. These fragments in Genesis contain, each, a lesson well worth learning, and which can be conveyed to rude, uncultivated people, even at the present day, in no paraphrase so well and so forcibly as in the biblical form.

This general line of defence and of argument will not avail, unless it be directly and distinctly applied to the individual cases. Let us take up, therefore, the first of those two apparently contradictory accounts of the creation with which the book opens, and see if we can discover the divine lesson which it contains. At some future time we may endeavour to show that the second account is equally wonderful,—that it needs only a generous and appreciative interpretation to show that it was, for the age in which it was given, the best possible form in which the great lessons of our moral freedom and our responsibility to God could possibly have been given. But at present we will confine ourselves to the consideration of the first account, which includes the whole of the first chapter, and ends with the word "created" in the fourth verse of the second chapter; and endeavour to show the correctness of Professor Benjamin Peirce's view, that this chapter contains in itself, just as it stands in our ordinary English translation, demonstrative evidence, first, of its extreme antiquity, secondly, of its absolute perfection of thought and adaptation to man,—thus proving that the original author was divinely illuminated, as well as Moses who made it the introduction to his books of the law.

The late Professor Agassiz was accustomed to deny that he ever indulged in hypotheses. He thought that he studied the phenomena to be considered until they revealed to him their own meaning, and that, until this reve-
The first chapter of Genesis.

The first chapter of Genesis was made, he held his mind in entire suspense, without making any tentative hypotheses. Most men will think that Agassiz must have deceived himself in this matter; and that the truth was, that his mind was so clear and so rapid in its action, as to reject the untenable hypotheses as soon as suggested, thus allowing them no time to impress themselves on his memory. To us it seems impossible for a finite mind to proceed in any other way in the interpretation of nature or of literature than by hypotheses and verification, in a manner analogous to that of the good old "rule of false," so unwisely discarded from modern treatises on arithmetic.

We will, therefore, proceed in this manner in our examination of the first chapter of Genesis. It gives us, in some sense, a cosmogony. Shall we suppose that it was intended to be a literal narrative of events? If so, then the second chapter was probably written with the same view; yet the two chapters, taken as narratives of events, appear in contradiction to each other. In a compilation made by the chosen lawgiver it is not probable that this would occur. Moreover, as a literal narrative of events, its pertinence as an introduction to the Mosaic law is not very apparent. Dr. Palfrey's hypothesis that everything in the Book of Genesis is inserted because of some valuable bearing upon the religious doctrines or the moral lessons of the Mosaic law, commends itself to our judgment as having an overwhelming probability in its favour. The first thing, therefore, to be looked for, is a revelation of the unity and omnipotence of God. Now this chapter has, above its narrative of events, a religious sublimity, which has made it reverenced wherever read. Jews and Christians have alike clung to it, as worthy to have come from inspiration; heathen critics have praised it, and atheists have been reclaimed by it. About forty years ago, a Chinese boy, in one of the suburbs of Canton, threw away the idols of his family, became an atheist, and ran away to America. In the city of New York he supported himself as a porter, and spent his Sundays in the streets, or on the shores of Hoboken. Curiosity led him one day to look into a church, and he was astonished to find no idols there. He asked, the next day, an explanation of his employer, who replied by simply putting a Bible into his hands. The first chapter of Genesis converted him; he became a Christian, studied and was educated, and returned a Christian teacher to China. He was in the same class with us, in 1839, and we bear joyous testimony to his good sense, ability, and character; and to the genuineness, so far as men could judge, of the conversion wrought in him by this first chapter in Genesis.

This account of the creation is very old. The Hebrew scholars tell us that the language in it contains marked archaisms, which set its date far antecedent to the age of Solomon, and even to the age of Moses. But without recourse to Hebraists, the English translation testifies emphatically to an extremely early date. For this is an account of the creation—a speculation on the cosmogony; yet it contains no philosophical or technical forms of expression, it betrays nothing of the style of a school; it must have been one of the very first of human speculations on such subjects. The simplest and most sublime message that can be given to man is to announce to us the existence of God. The revelation of his being is a necessary prelude to the promulgation of his law; just as the promulgation of his law necessarily precedes the mission of a Saviour, authorized to announce the terms and arrange the means of forgiveness for sin. Let us, then, make the hypothesis that this is the message of the present chapter; and, in order to put the hypothesis to the severest test, let us make what may be deemed an extreme and extravagant hypothesis,—let us suppose, for a
time, that to some very early prophet, like
Enoch, the seventh from Adam, the injunc-
tion was given to proclaim to mankind the
doctrine that God is the absolute Creator of
the material universe and all its forces, and
that from his will all the tribes of animate
beings, including man, sprang to life; let us
farther suppose that, in fitting and illu-
minating the prophet for his task, the whole
course of nature from the beginning to the
end was unveiled, and all the discoveries and
inventions of man, and the speculations of
philosophy, down to the present day were
shown to him. Now if this hypothesis ex-
plains all the facts in the case, and if there
is no fact to be found inconsistent with it,
then it is fair to infer that so much of the
hypothesis as may be found necessary to ex-
plain the facts is true; and this inference
will be greatly strengthened if the hypothesis
extends farther, and explains facts not at
first taken into view; also if the imagination
in vain seeks any other explanation.

In the first place the prophet would
naturally seek to say that God is the
Creator of matter and its forces. But in
what terms can he do this? No speculations
have as yet discussed the origin of matter;
there is no word signifying to create; the
arts have not sufficiently advanced to make
a distinction between material and product,
and there is no word for matter; neither
have the sciences reached the state in which
the forces of nature were named. Of course,
in addressing men the language of men
must be used, and the prophet having no
words by which to express his ideas, and
being forbidden by the necessity of making
himself intelligible from coining words, must
use periphrases. He endeavours to declare
that God was the Creator of matter by saying
that God shaped the heavens and the earth,
and the earth was waste and empty, and
darkness lay over its abysses, and the breath
of God brooded over its waters. This
representation of the forming of a formless
earth is the nearest approach to a declaration
of the creation of matter that the language
of that early day could make. Then, in
order to declare God to be the author of all
the forces of nature, and that he holds them
under his control, what resource is there but
for the prophet to select the most striking
of those forces, and to say, God made that,
and thus imply that he made all the rest,
that would hereafter be discovered. He
chooses light, the most striking and wondrous
of all to the untutored eye, most wonderful
in itself, in its revelations and its sugges-
tions, and declares, God said light be, and
light was. The emphasis throughout the
whole chapter is upon the divine name; the
proposition to be conveyed being not so
much that God said, as that it was God who
said—a distinction which the rude language
could not make. All things sprang from his
foreknowledge and his will,—this is the
prophet's meaning; it is only the poverty of
the uncultivated language of the time which
forces him to express himself in this way.
God saw that the light was good; that is,
he predestined it for its multiform uses in
the economy of vegetative and animal life,
and in the development of the human in-
tellect. And it was he who separated the
light from the darkness; he retained the
control of the force which he had created,
and appointed of his foreknowledge the
alternations of day and night. In like
manner with all the forces of nature after-
ward to be discovered in scientific research,
—heat, electricity, galvanic currents, chemi-
cal affinities, actinic rays, whatever they
were,—they came at God's command, they
were foreseen by him as good, and designed
for their uses, and they are retained in his
power of guidance. How could the prophet
say this to the rude people of his early
time better than in those sublime words
selected from their unpolished language, to
shine, nevertheless, as undimmed brilliants
throughout all ages: "God said let there be
light, and there was light. And God saw
the light that it was good, and God divided
the light from the darkness, and God called
the light day, and the darkness he called
night; and the evening and the morning
were the first day.”

Every utterance of a mind filled with
great thoughts is boldly figurative, and the
figures are bold in proportion to the intensity
of the speaker’s emotion, and to the poverty
in words expressive of his thought and feel-
ing of the language which he is using. Thus
it appears that our prophet, uttering the
grandest truths that can enter a finite mind,
and naturally led by his subject, after the
delivery of his proposition, to speak of day
and night, is thereby induced to continue in
the bold figure of describing the creation
as a series of days’ works. He does not
bring the figure forward offensively, as has
been often done by his interpreters, he does not
distinctly affirm that the creation was the work
of six successive days, but simply divides his
description of creation into six periods, by
adding at the close of each important divi-
sion of his subject the poetical refrain, And
it was evening and it was morning on that
day. These days of creation are not, then,
to be considered as periods of time, short or
long, any more than if the prophet had said,
“In the first place God created matter and
its forces, in the second place he made the
heavens above,” etc., we should consider
creation as having been accomplished in six
successive portions of space. The six periods
are neither periods of space nor of time, but
are logical divisions in the survey of the
universe, which the prophet makes in the
fulfilment of his mission,— to make a com-
prehensive and exhaustive statement of the
fact that all things, past present and to come,
visible and invisible, are the workmanship
of God.

Having thus declared, in the first place,
God to be the Creator of matter and its
forces, the prophet would naturally turn to
the heavens, and say that they were the
work of the same God. In doing it he
must use the Hebrew words: they called it
a firmament, which uphold the clouds and
stores of rain, and the prophet simply says,
God made that firmament; without imply-
ing it to be hard and hammered out, any
more than we imply that it was heaved up,
by calling it heaven. In the third place he
would naturally turn again to the earth, and
declare its arrangements of seas and conti-
nents to be his work, and intellectually de-
signed by him for the use of man; God
gathered the seas, and raised the dry land,
and saw that it was good. He also gave
the earth its fertility, and adapted its grass
and herbs and trees to their future uses, and
saw that it was good—that the adaptation
was perfect. All the work of Ritter and
Guyot, all the arguments of the Bridge-
water Treatises, and the Graham Lectures,
are thus foretold in these brief sentences of
the Book of Genesis.

In the fourth place, continues our early
prophet, he who made the heavens and the
earth adapted their relations to each other
—the sun to give light and warmth, and the
change of seasons; the moon to light the
night; the two to furnish the means of chron-
ology, signs and seasons, days and years.
He made, also, the stars, whose uses it will
be left for far distant generations to discover;
but God saw that it was all good; he foresaw
and foreordained the uses that even the stars
will have in distant ages. This prophecy has
been in our days fulfilled, and the stars have
given to man, in the latter half of this
nineteenth century after Christ, some of
the grandest opportunities for intellectual
triumphs that have ever been achieved by
human genius.

In the fifth place, he goes on to say, it was
God who gave the sea its myriad creatures,
that swim in the depths beneath, or on the
surface, or fly over its waves; and he saw
from the beginning that it was all good—
that all these creatures also were adapted to each other, to their place, and to the future uses, corporal and intellectual, of man.

Then, in the sixth place, it was God also who created the tribes of earth, from the least to the greatest, in all their variety, each with its own nature, and capable of perpetuating its kind; and it was he, also, who created man in his own image, capable of understanding and using all these works; it was he who gave us dominion over all things, and pronounced all things very good—perfectly adapted to the future needs of that human race which he had placed on the earth to rule and use it. The long course of history, slowly developing the exceeding richness of man's nature, has, at the same time, developed the divine fulness of this most ancient prophecy, declaring that God in the beginning made a grant of terrestrial sovereignty to man, and pronounced the whole universe adapted to his needs. One knows not which most to admire in our nineteenth century, the mastery which the human intellect is acquiring of the intellectual revelations of nature, or the discovery of new and useful properties in the various forms of matter.

The prophet's task is accomplished; he has made a complete and exhaustive statement of the great truth entrusted to him; he has announced God as the Creator and Controller of matter and its forces; whether in the heavens or on the earth; whether in the earth and seas, or in the plants and animals; whether in the lower animals, or in man, who is created in his Maker's image, and set to have dominion over all things below. The prophet's burden is delivered, and he feels the joy of rest. He adds, therefore, one more thought; God, the Creator of all, has not exhausted his power in his work, he ended voluntarily,—he rested on the seventh day, not because his power was exhausted, but because he chose; and he blessed the seventh day and hallowed it: he enjoys now the sight of the things which he has made.

Interpreted in this way, there is not a phrase in the whole account which militates against the hypothesis that it was uttered from the highest divine inspiration; that is, by a man to whom the whole truth in both science and theology had been revealed; nor is there a phrase which is not explained by the hypothesis that the sole emphasis is to be placed upon the divine name,—that the sole intent of the account is to reveal the one truth that in the beginning God created heaven and earth.

But if the account came thus by a higher inspiration than that of genius, we shall probably find, on examination, that there are other meanings in this passage; a greater wealth of meaning than the prophet himself was aware of. The doctrine of manifold meanings in the scripture is dangerous; and we do not propose to advocate it. The word is written to convey one thought and feeling, and is to be quoted as authority for that one end only. Nevertheless, such is the richness of God's wisdom, that if he inspires a man to speak, that speech will partake somewhat of the marvellous character of the works of nature, which always subserve multiform purposes. It is a great triumph of human ingenuity to contrive, occasionally, a tool that shall combine in itself several uses. But the substances of nature are usually applicable to multifarious purposes; the tools of nature serve many ends; as the tongue is used in tasting, chewing, swallowing, speaking, as a delicate organ of touch, etc. If, therefore, we find that in this account of the creation there are, besides its main meaning, as expounded above, sundry secondary meanings, each obvious, just, and true, it will confirm our faith in the divine inspiration of this pre-Mosaic speech.

But the history of Jewish and Christian literature is full of attempts to draw from this chapter meanings of various kinds, scientific and religious. It is not necessary, and would not be profitable, for us to refer
THE FIRST CHAPTER OF GENESIS. [T. Q.

to them in detail. The Jewish doctors found abstruse philosophical meanings in single words and single letters, nay, even in the parts of letters. John Scotus Eriigena, the first great light in advance of the revival of learning, found in it evidence of his grand theory of the division of nature; insisting that the chaos was no chaos, but only a potential cosmos, the ideals of creation intrusted by the Father, for execution, to the Son, who is the Beginning, from whom the Book of Genesis is named. In our own day, Arnold Guyot, and others, have sought to find modern geology confirmed here, and Tayler Lewis has given a grand exposition of the Six Days as Time Cycles, arguing chiefly on philological grounds. None of these attempts, to make a secondary meaning become primary, have, in our judgment succeeded farther than to show the language capable of bearing the secondary meaning, and thus giving an indication of its wonderful richness. The primary meaning attached to it by Peirce, as we have now endeavoured to set it forth, being the grandest meaning capable of being put into human speech, and most perfectly according both with the language of the chapter, and with its position as the introduction to the books of the Law, the history of the revelation through Moses, must be accepted as the primary meaning; and the secondary meanings then become of interest only as revealing the inspired character of the account; that it is many sided, like a work of nature, and implies a divine fulness of wisdom, consciously or unconsciously held in the writer's mind.

Two of these secondary meanings are especially worthy of notice, since they do not involve subtilities of thought, or minute attention to words and verbal constructions, but are patent on the face of a translation; the first is the natural suggestion that the six days are not only in the logical order of the prophet's thought, but in the actual chronological order of events; the second is, that the prophet anticipates, and as it were heads off, all the subterfuges of an atheistic spirit.

First, then, the six days, although primarily but six divisions in the prophet's order of thought, actually represent six periods of time. If the mathematicians finally allow the nebular hypothesis to stand, as they seem of late years inclined to do, then there was chaos antecedent to the cosmos. And modern discoveries rapidly tend toward the conclusion that all the known properties of matter are but modes of motion, so that the first act of creation must necessarily have been that the Spirit of God moved upon the face of the waters. Another discovery of our nineteenth century is, that in every form of matter known to us, there is actually light as well as heat—absolute darkness is as unknown as the absolute zero of heat. It has been so from the beginning; and when creation flashed into being, light was the first created beam. In the very language, therefore, in which this earliest prophet announced God to be the Creator of matter, and of all the forces which govern it, there is, we might say, an implied knowledge of the great physical discoveries of the present day.

Moreover, if the nebular hypothesis is finally established, in spite of the difficulties surrounding certain portions of it, then the heavens were made before the earth; the nebulous mass separated into stars before it divided into planets, and it divided into planets before the planets became cool enough to form into continents and seas and became inhabitable. Here, then, the logical order of the second day is the chronological order of the nebular hypothesis; another instance in which this earliest religious teacher anticipates the boasted discoveries of Herschel and La Place.

Then, if the modern physiologists and geologists are right in their interpretation
of the facts of nature, the third division of this chapter was actually next in the order of time. The glowing mass of the earth cooled, the steam was condensed into seas, the upheaval of the continents followed, and the protruding rocks were covered, above and below the water line, with vegetation. And, now, also, comes, in its proper order of time, according to modern scientific theory, the relation established between the sun and moon and stars, on one side, and the earth upon the other. The atmosphere cleared, by the condensation of the seas, of its former perpetual clouds, allows the rays of these bodies to come in upon the thin crust of the earth; and the sun's heat becomes, according to Peirce's acute observation on the direction of mountain ranges and coastlines on the globe, the efficient cause determining the form of the more fully developed continents, and a perpetual witness that the obliquity of the ecliptic, and the main relations of the solar system, have not been changed since the birth of time,—since God established them on the fourth day of creation.

The fifth and sixth day's work, prove, also, according to the modern discoveries of geology, to have been not only natural steps in the progress of the seer's thought, but actual steps in the order of terrestrial development. The sea was first filled with living things, swimming in its depths or flying over it, and afterward came the land animals, and as the crown of the series came man. Nay, even the seventh day's rest stands approved by the results of modern investigation, for not a trace of progress or development, or of the appearance of new forms upon the earth, can be found by the most ardent evolutionist in any rock-records since the appearance of man upon the planet,—a fact which a firm believer in development endeavoured once to explain to us, by assuming that the development of all the lower orders was arrested by the presence of man as the head of the series. Sweep man from the planet, he said, and the development would again go on till man were reproduced. We may be excused for thinking the first chapter of Genesis more rational than such a speculation.

Again, this chapter may bear, as another secondary meaning, an interpretation which makes it an answer, in advance, to all the subterfuges of an atheistic or an idolatrous heart. In this light it might almost seem that the prophet had foreseen all the various speculations in which men would indulge concerning the origin of the universe, and had said, "I will anticipate them all, and in my declaration of the being of the one Almighty God, I will show to all those who deny him and turn from him, that I foresaw their errors, and lifted up my voice in the beginning to warn them from the paths that lead to destruction." "The fool hath said in his heart," there is no God,—matter is eternal, all things move on by the forces inherent in the original substance of which all is composed. Against this oldest form of atheistic speculation comes the clear announcement, "In the beginning God created the heaven and the earth"—created the very material of which they are made, and it was from his command that the forces of nature sprang. The atoms thereof are in his hand to all generations, and they never disobey his word. And the next utterances are against the oldest forms of idolatry. Jupiter, the aether, the air, have been confounded with each other and regarded as the givers of rain and of fruitful seasons, and worshipped with sacrifices of thanksgiving and supplications for continued prosperity. But, says our prophet in advance, it was God who created the firmament, and when the clouds drop fatness, it is at his command; that is, it is of his foreordaining law. Give your thanks to him who can hear and accept the offering; give them not to the unconscious creatures of his power. The earth, also, has
been worshipped as the mother of all things; her divine bounty is manifest in the fruits that she pours forth; and, under various names, Terra and Cybele have received thanks and sacrifices. As if foreseeing this future idolatry, the first chapter of Genesis announces that it was God, the Creator of the earth, who gave her her power of bringing forth grass and herb and tree for the service of man, and that it is to him alone that we should give thanks for all these mercies.

Most plausible among the forms of idolatry is the worship of the heavenly host. Men who beheld the sun shining, and the moon walking in brightness, have been secretly enticed, and they have yielded to the persuasion that these were indeed gods. All literature, all mythology, is full of traces left by this worship of the stars of heaven. But in the earliest age of the world is this clear truth uttered, to forbid every future form of the worship of the sun and stars, that it was God who created them and appointed their revolutions in the sky, to mark our days and months and years, our seasons and our hours, for us; that the grand host of heaven is, after all, only one of God’s gifts to man.

Other men have been seduced by the mystery of animal life into the idolatrous worship of bulls and rams, of crocodiles and cats and ibises; and these, too, among nations of the highest of ancient civilizations. And it might seem that this was one of the reasons why the prophet commissioned so long before Moses to proclaim the unity and omnipotence of God, should, foreseeing this foul apostasy, leave it clearly on record that men had been warned against this criminal folly, and had been distinctly taught that the life in these animals is but the gift of the one God, who made all these creatures, not as objects of human worship, but for human uses; that God has given to man complete dominion over all sublunary things—given him a grant to use for his own purposes all things below, animate and inanimate.

But the human heart is deceitful above all things and desperately wicked, who can know it, who shall anticipate all its errors? The crude atheism of the materialist passes away, the various forms of fetishism and idolatry are outgrown, and a highly cultivated, and speculative nation begins to inquire into the foundations of faith. They behold the science of their times, seeking the causes of outward phenomena, gradually lead to the perception of a unity in the forces of nature—to the perception that there is, indeed, but one Cause of the universe. By what name shall they speak of this one Original Cause of all causes? It is evident that no human intellect can understand this Cause, and by searching find out the Almighty, or tell out his wonders. Some, in their contemplation of this insoluble mystery are moved to declare that the First Cause is wholly unknown and unknowable, and that we can predicate of it no attributes whatever; and here they would have us rest. Others would say that the First Cause builds the universe, as the soul of an animal builds its body—it is a principle or power of growth, evolving itself ever in more and more complex forms, by a necessity of its own nature, and herein lies the insoluble mystery presented to our speculations. Others add that this soul of the universe, struggling out of brute matter into vegetable forms, struggling with more energy into the bodies of the animal kingdom, working ever upward and climbing for something higher, reaches its fullest development in the human frame, and attains self-consciousness first in man’s brain. According to this view an honest man is, not only the noblest work of God, but is himself the highest god that has yet come into being. Such is the extreme into which the conceited human intellect runs, in endeavouring to reason concerning the nature of the Deity. In the full-blown state
of this egotheism a man becomes conscious of himself as being identical with the First Cause of all things; and may think of himself as causing plants to grow, and rain to fall, of leading the march of the hosts of heaven, and calling the stars to their posts of duty. Strange as this folly may seem to the ears of common sense, it passes for wisdom and high philosophy among some highly cultivated and very acute metaphysical thinkers.

To us it seems sadder than atheism; it just as effectually takes the sun out of heaven, and puts an immoveable rock over the mouth of the sepulchre; it takes all the light of love and joy out of human life, and substitutes this insane self-conceit for filial and fraternal love. We recoil with horror from these conclusions concerning the nature of the universe and the soul, and say, the First Cause is greater than all which he has made; inscrutable in his attributes though he be, those attributes must include power and wisdom and love, for the universe contains them and their manifestations; the world is the embodiment of wisdom and love through power; and the only power we know is the power of will. The answer to which our reason thus attains is simply the truth which the first chapter of Genesis was written to announce, that there is one God, whose fiat is the cause of all that is. But mark how the eye of the prophet who wrote it seems to have pierced through the long ages of idolatry in every form, and through the misty clouds of speculation which have arisen since the seventeenth century, and detected this pernicious outgrowth of the Hegelian philosophy in our time, and uttered, fifty centuries in advance, his protest against the blasphemous folly; saying, that creation was a voluntary act of God, and that he, of his own pleasure, created man in his own image. We are not the creators of God, the highest conscious beings, and alone in our knowledge of the laws of the universe; but we are the creatures of God, made in his image, gifted with power of thought to apprehend partially his designs; with affections to feel feebly what his love is; with power that we may, in our works of labour and art, rise into awe at his omnipotence. Our powers are faint images of his, not his the weak dilution of ours.

Finally, the announcement of the seventh day's rest may be considered as a caveat against the atheism referred to in the Epistle of James, and drawn from a consideration of the unvarying constancy of the operations of nature. All things seem capable finally of reduction to constant laws of periodic return to their former condition, giving thus a suggestion that the universe may be eternal, and undergoing an eternal series of evolutions from some necessity inherent in its nature. If, in the olden days God created the things that now appear, why do we not see him now creating, at least occasionally, some things. No act of creation has ever been observed; the law of secondary causation is unbroken; each state of the universe flows directly from a previous state; thus it will be for ever; thus it has been from eternity; and "there is no occasion for the hypothesis of a Deity." The prophet, foreseeing, apparently, this form of atheism, meets it in advance, by saying, God rested on the seventh day,—he voluntarily ceased from acts of creation, for reasons of his own, which we may not fathom. Yet, as he pronounced creation very good, that is, useful in the highest degree, it is lawful for us to observe that a creation in which miracles are of rare occurrence, and the usual course of events, flowing from strictly invariable laws, is very seldom broken, is far better adapted as a school in which to develop the mind and the soul of man, than a creation could be in which miracle was too frequent. The sublime lessons given by the laws of the universe have been the means of all the development which
has brought the light of the nineteenth century out of the darkness of preceding ages; those laws are not yet exhausted; the progress of discovery is, indeed, more rapid now than ever before; but all scientific study of the order of the physical universe is necessarily based on faith in the inviolability of physical law. The rest of God's seventh day has thus become the source of all the intellectual and spiritual blessings that exalt man above the beasts; while the benefits of the first six days' work are shared by us with the mute creatures.

This then, in brief, is the exposition given by Professor Peirce to the first chapter of Genesis. The hypothesis that it is an express revelation from God, the utterance of truth by a prophet who spake with a wisdom above the reach of human endeavour, is absolutely required to explain the combination of so much knowledge of modern discoveries and modern speculations with the self-evident fact of its extreme antiquity. That antiquity is avouched to us by the language, which although treating of the highest possible themes, is neither poetical nor philosophical, but simply descriptive of phenomena, as they appear to the uneducated eye. That knowledge of human science and human philosophy, in their latest development, is shown by the order of time in which the events are arranged—in making motion the beginning of creation, and light the first effect of motion; in making the earth covered with plants before the sun and planets, of still earlier creation, were visible from its surface; in making animals subsequent to plants; in making man the last comer upon the planet; and in making a distinct denial of every form of pantheistic and of atheistic theory, down to our own day. Its primary object is not to describe the times or places or succession of the acts of creative power, but would simply lead us to bow in grateful adoration before the one God, whose will is the cause of all that is, and whose loving-kindness, looking upon the whole, pronounced it very good—all adapted for beneficent ends to the creatures whom he had made in his own image.
LUCIUS ANNÆUS SENECA:

THE LAST OF THE STOIC PHILOSOPHERS.

By Rev. John F. Hurst, D.D., President of Drew Theological Seminary.

Seneca's Relation to Ecclesiastical History.

LUCIUS ANNÆUS SENECA was the last great representative of the Stoic philosophy. To the student of the philosophical and religious relations of paganism to Christianity, his writings—although they reflect in a measure the decadence of the post-Augustan period—are of more importance than those of any Greek or Roman author. For this there are two reasons. First, because his philosophy is the final and hopeless exhibition of the inability of the pagan mind, after its long but futile attempt both to solve the mysteries of our being and to establish safe rules of conduct; and, second, Seneca's moral philosophy embodies the unconscious and mysterious approach of pagan wisdom to Christianity. It was, to the Roman world of thought, the Baptist preparing the way for a system mightier than any it had known.

Here, too, we find some explanation of the fact that no man has ever received from his fellows, both of his own and later times, a more diverse judgment than Seneca. The Roman authors who describe him, taking Tacitus or Quintilian as examples, were generally unfavourable, though Juvenal dared to express a preference of him to Nero, the Roman emperor:—

"Libera si dentur populo suffragia, quis tam Perditus, ut dubitet Senecam preferre Neroni."

Early Christian writers, as Jerome, Lactantius, Augustine, and Tertullian, refer to him in terms of high commendation. Augustine speaks of his being conversant with the apostles, and Jerome says he deserves to be ranked among the saints. Lactantius, who elsewhere calls him a "divine pagan," thus...
gives him a rank above all the Stoics: "Seneca, who was the sharpest of all the Stoics—how great a veneration has he for the Almighty!" Indeed, so warm was the admiration of him by the primitive Church, that the tests of historical criticism were forgotten, and he was regarded as practically a Christian, if not an intimate friend and an admirer of Paul himself, during the closing period of his life. The Roman Catholic Church has always held him in high veneration, and at the Council of Trent he is referred to as one of the Fathers of the Church. The French critics, as a rule, have been extremely favourable to him. Montaigne prefers him to Cicero, and, in his "Defence of Seneca and Plutarch," thus acknowledges his great obligation to the two: "The familiarity I have had with these two authors, and the assistance they have lent to my age and to my book, which is wholly compiled from what I have borrowed from them, oblige me to stand up for their honour." Diderot reverses his previously unfavourable judgment, and passes a high eulogy upon him. Rollin, often called the French Quintilian, commends the variety of his attainments, the depth and exactness of his philosophy, the wealth of his imagination, and the general purity of his style. The most recent criticism, such as that of Zeller in Germany, and of Martha and Aubert in France, partakes more of the judicial spirit, and praises and blames according to the requirements of justice.*

Personal History.

Marcus Aurelius Seneca, the father of Lucius Annaeus, was a native of Spain, and belonged to the strong and rich Roman colony of Corduba, (Cordova,) which was planted on the banks of the Baetis (the modern Guadalquivir) by Marcus Marcellus when prætor in Spain. It was afterward elevated to the dignity of Colonia Patricia, by which it had the privilege of sending senators to Rome. The family were of the equestrian order, and possessed considerable wealth. Helvia, the wife of Marcus Aurelius Seneca, was a woman of many endowments of mind, and is frequently alluded to in the writings of her son. Lucius Annaeus was born at Corduba about B.C. 7. He had two brothers, the older being Marcus Annaeus Novatus, (afterward changed by adoption to Junius Gallio,) and the younger, Lucius Annaeus Mela, who became the father of the celebrated poet Lucan. Martial thus speaks of this triple character of the family: "Et docti Senecae tres memoranda domus." The family removed to Rome when Lucius Annaeus was about two years of age. His youth was passed during the reign of Tiberius, and he enjoyed all the literary and social advantages which the station, wealth, and personal care of his father, himself an orator of great culture, could afford. He made a visit to Egypt, probably of considerable length, while his uncle was prefect of that province. To this fruitful episode in Seneca's life are due the frequent references in his writings to that country, particularly in his "Natural Questions;" and very likely he was the real author of Nero's organization of an expedition for the discovery of the sources of the Nile—the first attempt in history to solve the mysteries of that wonderful river. Livingstone, Barth, Baker, Rohlfs, Speke, and Schweinfurth, have only followed in Roman footsteps.

The studies of Seneca were first in the department of eloquence and the affiliated sciences. But he exhibited gradually a taste for philosophy, from which the persuasions of his own wife were not strong enough to alienate him. His father, likewise, was loath to see his talented son devote himself to a class of studies then in decline, and not promising either political or social advancement, and used his influence to have his son become an advocate. Seneca, how-
ever, seems to have had a large measure of liberty, for he enjoyed the instructions of the best Roman interpreters of the Greek philosophy, such as Papirius Fabianus, Attalus, Demetrius, and Sotion. Of this last he was very early a disciple, as he says in one of his epistles: "Modo apud Sotionem puér sedi." So great was the influence of the Pythagorean philosophy, as represented by Sotion, upon him, that he became an ardent believer in the transmigration of souls, and proved his faith for a time by becoming a vegetarian, as the eating of animal food could be hardly less than parricide to one of that belief. The first public labours of Seneca, however, were according to the wishes of his father, for we find him exercising the functions of the public advocate, acquiring a just celebrity for eloquence, and even producing his first literary fruit in this department. The same paternal influence is also perceptible in Seneca's becoming a candidate for the quaestorship or treasurership, in which he was successful. During his incumbency of this office he became an object of jealousy on the part of the Emperor Caligula, who grew angry with him on the sole ground that the young orator pleaded too ably one day before the Senate in his presence. That emperor was only prevented from putting him to death by representation of one of his mistresses that it was hardly worth while, as Seneca was a hopeless consumptive, and would soon die at all events. Caligula was succeeded by his uncle, Claudius, and the latter was in power but a short time before his wife, the corrupt Valeria Messalina, who became jealous of the favour shown by her husband to his niece, the beautiful Julia, took her revenge by charging Seneca with an illicit intrigue with the latter. The result was, that Seneca was banished to the island of Corsica, where he remained eight years.

This exile was a transitional period in Seneca's mind and life. He had been married, and had two children. His wife, whose name is unknown, was now dead. He married a second time, his wife being Paulina. One of his children, a boy, died twenty days before his father's exile to Corsica. The other, Novatilla, was committed by her father to the care of his mother, Helvia, with these words: "Fold her to your bosom; she has lost her mother; she seems to have lost her father. Care for her. Love her for me." Once in Corsica, Seneca betook himself closely to the study of his much-loved philosophy. This proved to be a productive period of his life. Of his lonely home he had nothing good to say. He satirized everything about him, and thus complained that Corsica was poor in everything—but exiles:—

"Barbarous land which rugged rocks surround,
Whose tortuous cliffs with idle wastes are crowned,
No autumn fruit, no tillth the summer yields,
Nor olives cheer the winter-silvered fields:
Nor joyous spring her tender foliage lends,
Nor genial herb the luckless soil befriends;
Nor bread, nor sacred fire, nor freshening wave;
Nought here—save exile, and the exile's grave!"

Polybius, now the favourite at court, lost his brother, and Seneca addressed him from his lonely Corsica an epistle on "Consolation," in which he shrewdly combined the good advice of bearing patiently what we cannot escape, with fulsome adulation of Claudius Caesar. But this flattering proved quite unnecessary, for either it was never reported to the emperor by Polybius, or, if that man had the temerity to do it, it had not the slightest effect upon his master to recall the philosopher from exile. Now came Messalina's day of retribution, for, having formed an illicit alliance with the young and handsome Caius Silius, she died a wretched fugitive, and Agrippina, the daughter of Germanicus, succeeded her as empress. This latter made use of her influence with the emperor for securing the return of Seneca from exile. It was a stroke of policy on
her part to gain popular favour for herself and her son, Domitius, (Nero,) for Seneca was a great favourite in Rome, and no more adroit management could have been adopted by the empress for the accomplishment of her plans. The life of Seneca henceforth became intimately connected with Nero. He became pretor, and the tutor of young Nero. Tacitus, who is the chief authority for what we know of the life of both Nero and his preceptor, thus states the purposes of Agrippina: "Agrippina obtained for Seneca a revocation from exile, and with it the pretorship, favours which she supposed would be well pleasing to the public on account of his signal eloquence and accomplishments; besides her own private views, namely, the education of her own son, Domitius, under such a master, and the use they should make of his counsels, both to obtain the empire and to govern it." Agrippina secured the death of her husband by poison, and now the great plan of her life was successful—her son, Nero, became Roman emperor. Farrar says of her absorption in the interests of her son: "Whatever there was of possible affection in the tigress nature of Agrippina was now absorbed in the person of her child. For that child, from its cradle to her own death by his means, she toiled and sinned. The fury of her own ambition, inextricably linked with the uncontrollable fierceness of her love for this only son, henceforth directed every action of her life. Destiny had made her the sister of one emperor, intrigue elevated her into the wife of another. Her own crimes made her the mother of a third."*

Claudius was no sooner dead than Seneca, true to his temporizing character, made him the object of his keen satire, and at the same time bestowed fulsome eulogy on the young Nero. This ruler did, indeed, promise well until his seventeenth year, but soon afterward he manifested a restiveness and recklessness that gave Seneca good ground for fearing that his imperial disciple might any moment become his oppressor. Agrippina prided herself on her influence over her son; but when she found that he had become weary of his wife, Octavia, and formed a secret alliance with the freedwoman Acte, her indignation became violent and public, for she was shrewd enough to see that this change in Nero was fatal to her own share in the empire. She directed her hostility particularly at Seneca and Burrhus, the joint tutors of Nero, who, according to Tacitus, did what they could to restrain the vices of the young emperor, and saw only evil in the general influence of his wicked mother.* The mother, out of revenge for her son's throwing off her influence, threatened to bring forward Britannicus, the son of Claudius, as the real heir to the throne. Nero now needed to act promptly, and the result was, as there is every reason to believe, that the speedy death of Britannicus was caused by Nero, who was then only in the first year of his wretched reign. Imputations have been cast by various writers—Merivale among the rest—upon both Burrhus and Seneca as probable accomplices; but there is no proof that such was the fact. This much is certain, however, that Seneca soon afterward wrote his "Essay on Clemency," dedicating it to his pupil, Nero, in which he extols that virtue as especially beautiful in rulers, and represents Nero as a remarkable illustration of it.

This essay possesses for all Protestants a singular interest, and we must digress a moment to narrate its association with the Reformation in France. Francis I., king of France, was a relentless persecutor of the Huguenots, and after his return from Spain, whither he had been taken as a prisoner by Charles V., after the battle of Pavia, was as hostile as ever to his Protestant subjects. Calvin, then a young man of twenty-three,


* "Annales," xiii., 2, etc.
had been labouring on a commentary on
Seneca's "Essay on Clemency." He was a
great admirer of the Roman Stoic, and to
reproduce for his own countrymen one of his
essays was his first work, in which he engaged
after turning his back upon his preferments
and faith of Roman Catholicism. He was
amazed to find so little attention paid to
Seneca, and resolved to do his part to supply
the want. "He was annoyed," says Merle
d'Aubigné, "that the world had not given
him the place he deserved, and spoke of him
to all his friends. If one of them entered
his little room and expressed surprise at
seeing him take such pains to make the
writings of a pagan philosopher better known,
Calvin, who thought he had discovered a ton
of Gospel gold in Seneca's iron ore, would
answer: 'Did he not write against supersti-
tion? Has he not said of the Jews, that the
conquered give laws to their conquerors?'
When he exclaims, 'We have all sinned, we
shall all sin unto the end!' may we not
imagine that we hear Paul speaking?"* He
was mourning the death of Berquin and
other Protestants, and feared that many more
would fall. He knew that the king was pas-
sionately fond of new books, and he hoped
that this literary venture of his would find
its way into his hands, and that he might be
influenced by its sentiments, especially where
Seneca urges Nero to mild measures, showing
him that any other course is not only futile,
but also impolitic and injurious. Such words
as these, from Seneca, were now uttered in
the ears of Francis I.: "Clemency becomes
no one so much as it does a king. You
spare yourself, when you seem to be sparing
another. We must do evil to nobody, not
even to the wicked; men do not harm their
own diseased limbs. It is the nature of the
most cowardly wild beasts to rend those who
are lying on the ground, but elephants and
lions pass by the man they have thrown
down. To take delight in the rattling of
chains, to cut off the heads of citizens, to
spill much blood, to spread terror wherever
he shows himself—is that the work of a king?
If it were so, far better would it be for lions,
bears, or even serpents, to reign over us!"
This was Calvin's first production, or, as he
called it, "the firstlings of his print," and
was dedicated to one of his early associates
of the Mommor family, Claude Hangest,
Abbot of St. Eloi, April 4, 1532, with these
accompanying words: "This, with all that I
possess, belongs of right to you; for I was
nurtured as a child in your house, and in-
structed into the same studies with you."
The young man had only the common expe-
rience of novitiates in authorship, for he
found no publisher willing to undertake the
doubtful enterprise of issuing it. He resolved
to publish it at his own expense, scanty as
his means were; but when the printing was
completed he said: "Upon my word, it has
cost me more money than I had imagined."*
His money was gone, and to his friend Daniel
he again wrote: "I am drained dry, and I
must tax my wits to get back from every
quarter the money I have expended." The
young author's name on the title-page was
Calvinus, and henceforth Cauvin, the family
name, became, in literature and theology,
Calvin. He wrote to Daniel on the 23rd of
May: "At length the die is cast; my Com-
mentary on Clemency has appeared." Shortly
afterward he wrote: "Write to me as soon as
possible, and tell me whether my book is
favourably or coldly received. I hope that
it will contribute to the public good." As
to the effect of the work on the king's mind,
nothing is known. "Did the king read the
treatise?" asks Merle d'Aubigné. "We
cannot say. At any rate Calvin was not
more fortunate with Francis I. than Seneca
had been with Nero."

We now return to Seneca's life. Agrippina

* "History of the Reformation in the Time of
became an object of just suspicion on the part of her son, Nero, and the question was only one of time which should succeed in ridding the world of the other. A report was brought to Nero one night that Agrippina was plotting for his overthrow by the substitution of Plautus on the throne. The charge was unjust, and Agrippina was successful in having her accusers condemned, and herself restored to the favour of her son. The calm lasted four years, the end of which marked the completion of Nero's golden age—"the famous Quinquennium"—during which Seneca and Burrhus had been the actual rulers, and the affairs of the government had been administered with an ability and success that commanded universal admiration. But now Nero broke loose from all restraint, the occasion being another charge that Agrippina was plotting against her son. Nero promptly resolved upon his mother's death, and his plan was worthy of his general inhumanity; for he arranged that a pretended public reconciliation between his mother and himself should take place at Baiae, but that the bolts of the vessel on which she should return to her retreat should be loosened, and his victim drowned. She escaped death by water, but shortly after fell by the blows of assassins. Anicetus was the first to strike her, and she replied: "Strike my womb, for it bore Nero." Her supreme passion for her son's ruling, continued however, to the last, and it is said that she uttered the words: "Occidat dum imperet"—Let him slay me if he only reign! Recently an attempt has been made to justify Nero against the charge of matricide; but the deliberate judgment of Tacitus, Josephus, Dion, and Suetonius, is unequivocal in the admission of his guilt.

What part did Seneca play in these scenes of blood? On this subject the opinion of his contemporaries was divided. First, there were many who believed that he was cognizant of the attempt of Nero to drown his mother. The weight of testimony here is in his favour. Even Dion admits that "there was no proof of Seneca's complicity in the imputed crime of Nero." Second, it was alleged that Seneca was an abettor in the murder of Agrippina at the hands of Anicetus and his soldiers. This is not proved, and the probability is against it. There is no likelihood that he attempted to dissuade Nero from the crime, for he was pretty sure that "if the son did not kill the mother, the mother certainly would kill the son." Tacitus reports that Seneca not only charged Nero with the crime, but repudiated all share of responsibility for himself. But no amount of charity can acquit Seneca of writing Nero's statement to the Roman Senate, that Agrippina did fall by her own hand. This was not only false, but amounted to a direct connivance at the crime.

It was now Seneca's turn to become involved in hopeless difficulties. Nero having become weary of his wife, Octavia, determined to substitute Poppea for her. It was this woman who, by "her tears, her blandishments, and even her sarcasms," was the real author of Nero's murder of his mother, for the great aspiration of her life was to become empress, and she knew that so long as Agrippina lived this hope could never be realized. In Nero's proposition to cast aside Octavia and take Poppea as his wife, he was gently opposed by Seneca. The nobles, long jealous of the philosopher, now found it easy to alienate the emperor's mind from him. Seneca saw his danger, and offered to surrender his just wealth to his master, and withdrew from the city, pleading his delicate health and love of study. Nero gave no formal consent, but Seneca lived in comparative retirement. The enemies of Seneca reported to Nero that the philosopher was a participant in Piso's conspiracy. Seneca succeeded in disproving all share in the plot but again begged permission to retire, for Nero's burning of the city and persecution
of the Christians, and the great prevalence
of social disorders and crimes, proved that
the old teacher no longer had the slightest
influence over him. Again his request was
denied. The conspiracy of Piso now assumed
threatening proportions, and charges were
brought against Seneca with greater plausi-
bility. Nero resolved on his death. The phi-
losopher was found at his villa, Nomantanum,
in the society of his beloved wife, Paulina.
He heard his sentence with stoic calmness,
and begged only the privilege of making some
additions to his will. This was refused.
For the particulars of his death we are in-
debted to Tacitus. The philosopher said
to his friends, that since he was disabled
from requiting their benefits, he bequeathed
them that which alone was left him, yet
something more glorious and amiable than
all the rest—the pattern of his life. He
begged them not to weep for him. He im-
plied his wife to "moderate her sorrow, to
beware of perpetuating such a dismal sorrow,
but to bear the death of her husband by
contemplating his life spent in a steady
course of virtue, and to support his loss by
all worthy consolations." But Paulina would
not be comforted, and attempted to put an
end to her life. Seneca, seeing her deep
devotion, gave his consent in these words:
"I have laid before thee the delights and
solaces of living; thou preferrest the renown
of dying. I shall not envy thee the honour
of the example. Let us equally share the
fortitude of an end so brave; but greater
will be the splendour of thy particular fall."
At the same moment the two had the veins
of their arms opened. Seneca's blood flowed
very slowly, and then he ordered the veins
of his legs to be opened. His sufferings
becoming intense, he persuaded his wife to
withdraw to an adjoining room, lest the
courage of each might fail by witnessing the
agony of the other. Nero ordered that
Paulina's death be prevented, and so her
wounds were bound up. She lived but a
few years, in feeble health, her greatest joy
being the memory of her husband. But no
clemency was visited upon Seneca. His
death coming too slowly, he requested his
friend and physician, Statius Annæus, to
administer poison to him. This was un-
necessary, for it failed to act upon his thin
body. He then had recourse to a hot bath,
but this failing, he was removed to a vapour
bath, or *sudatorium*, where he expired amid
the fumes. His secretaries and slaves were
about him, and on them he sprinkled water,
with the formula of a libation: "To Jove
the Liberator!" His body was burnt pri-
vately, without any funeral ceremonies, ac-
cording to the arrangements he had made
when in the splendour of his power and full
enjoyment of his great wealth. Some
writers, as Sicco Polentone, who have ima-
gined that Seneca was a Christian at heart,
represent that his final words were an invo-
cation to Christ, and that he baptized him-
self with the water of the bath. But this is
only a beautiful fiction.

**Estimate of Seneca's Life and Character.**

Seneca cannot be judged properly without
a careful regard to the times in which he
lived. Every great character reflects his
period. This reflection need not be that of
the prevailing sentiment. Sometimes, as in
the case of great reformers, it is that of a
protest against it. Even then, however, it
is the reflection of the protest which the
better spirit of the age bears within itself.
Martin Luther, one man standing out in
antagonism to his contemporaries, was but
the embodiment and reflection of Europe's
aspiration of reform for three centuries.
Seneca's chosen field was that of a moral
teacher, and it is unreasonable to expect
that, with only a pagan culture, and that
at a time of Rome's moral decadence, he
should exhibit either in his personal life or
philosophy such an example as we could
fairly expect from the simpler and purer Roman days, to say nothing of any Christian period. No age has surpassed that of the Caesars, particularly the later ones, in splendid iniquity. Horace could well say: "The age of our fathers, worse than that of our grandsires, has produced us, who are yet baser, and who are doomed to give birth to a still more degraded offspring." Juvenal, fifty years later, could affirm: "Posterity will add nothing to our immorality; our descendants can but do and desire the same crimes as ourselves." Farrar, in referring to this testimony of contemporary witnesses, groups the evil characteristics of the times of Seneca under five heads: 1. The violent contrasts in social condition; 2. Atheism and superstition; 3. Excessive luxury; 4. Deep sadness; and, 5. Boundless cruelty. It was in the midst of such a civilization that Seneca lived and wrote, and the wonder is that we find so much in him that contrasts favourably with the spirit and life of his times. His genius, position, and the wishes of his father, first brought him within the circle of the political maelstrom. He frequently strove, later, to escape all contact with political life, and we must suppose his efforts sincere. We fully believe that the most unfavourable opinion of Seneca's complicity with Nero's guilt can apply only to the latest period of his life, when he found himself involved in the meshes of that emperor's cruel policy. Lipsius well exclaims: "How happy would Rome have been if Nero had continued to follow the advice of Seneca as he began! For what could be more commendable than the earlier years of his life, while under the direction of Seneca?" That he was a willing party to any wrong act, even his most severe critic, Dion Cassius, seems hardly to believe; but that he was a party at all was both his crime and misfortune, and from the two there is no possibility of acquitting him. The most that can be done is to give him the benefit of a careful weighing of the palliating circumstances which surrounded him. Much stress has been laid upon Seneca's enormous wealth. Tacitus refers to it, but declares that Seneca's wealth had no effect upon his temperate, and even austere life: "Seneca, with a diet exceedingly simple, supported an abstemious life, satisfying the call of hunger by wild fruit from the wood, and of thirst by a draught from the brook." The philosopher began life with great wealth, and after his return from exile, and during his tutorship of Nero, there came vast accessions to it from the hands of that ruler. He had treasures in other lands, as Egypt and Britain, and, like his wealthy contemporaries, derived immense revenue from money at interest. Tacitus nowhere charges Seneca with guilt in the acquisition or retention of it. Seneca, even requesting Nero to take from him his fortune, used the following noble language: "Order the auditors of thy revenue to undertake the direction of my fortune, and annex it to thine own; nor shall I by this plunge myself into indigence and poverty; but, having only surrendered that wondrous opulence which exposes me to the offensive blaze of so much splendour, I shall redeem the time which at present is employed in the care of pompous feasts and gardens, and apply it to the repose and cultivation of my mind."

The misfortune of Seneca's career was his tutorship of Nero, and while in the early exercise of this office he used every means to guard his pupil against wickedness. Later, however, when he could no longer control him, he seems not to have hesitated to approve of the misdoings of Nero. He was, perhaps, still in the hope that, by this means, he might moderate the violence of the youthful despot. But this was no sufficient ground for vacillation, or for practical approval of wrong, even though exile or death was the certain penalty.
The position which Seneca occupies as a philosopher is not that of an originator so much as an expounder. We must content ourselves, here, with merely indicating his relation, as a philosopher, to his times, and his position as a believer in the Divine Being and in the moral laws which He has imposed upon the universe. While Seneca adopted the general principles of the Stoic system, he by no means adhered strictly to them, but seems to have reserved to himself the large rights of the eclectic thinker. The Roman mind was not at all adapted to the repose and equanimity which form a fundamental element in Stoicism. It was only after popular liberty was lost, when the government became a thing that lay within the reach of the most ambitious and unscrupulous, and morals became corrupt, that we find any tendency to fall back upon the resources of the mind itself. Says M. Aubertin:

The establishment of the empire, while pacifying eloquence and suppressing liberty, did not enfeeble philosophy. It gave it, on the other hand, a higher importance, a less uncertain credit, and more faithful partisans. In the general abasement, in the mental waste and the incurable ennui where so soon the ardour of the noblest souls was chilled, philosophy, the sole consoler amid this fearful disgrace, offered to the conquered, if not an impossible hope, at least a refuge and an indemnification. Hence, says Horace, the faithful interpreter of the delights of the contemporary mind, it became “the work of all the days, of all the ages, and of all the conditions.” This world, grown old and condemned, there found its remedy and salvation. Philosophy gathered up the fragments from the irreparable shipwreck of liberty.*

How this change in the condition of Roman political life involved a new employment of the mind, and that in the direction of Stoicism—the last resort in sorrow for every unchristian heart—has been very strongly stated by a writer in the “Westminster Review.”—

* “Sénèque et Saint Paul,” p. 103.

In the age of Seneca the fashionable Epicureanism of the earlier empire had been supplanted by the philosophy of the Porch. Roman independence had been destroyed; Caesar sat like an embodied destiny on the throne of the world, the terrestrial correspondent of the overruling Fate, the great cosmical unity, the generalized expression for the irrevocable order and irrevocable succession of individual or collective causes, in which men were inserted at the hour of their birth. A philosophy that encouraged political action could not but give offence. The true wisdom was to conquer the troubles of life by silent endurance; the true compensation for the abandonment of power or place was to be sought in retirement, resignation, the inward serenity which can neither be given nor taken away. The Stoical disincarnation to a public career, or any form of political activity, tended, with more or less consciousness, toward the ideal of Apollonius of Tyana, who announced that he had no interest in the republic, but lived under the rule of the gods. From criminal preoccupation, from enervating luxury, from the satiety, the danger, and corruption of the times, the young, the ardent, the aspirant to a higher life, turned away to seek a refuge in the internal resources of the Stoical retreat, a predisposition typifying the ultimate separation of the temporal and spiritual power. Stoicism thus became a religious philosophy, a code of moral precepts, of prudential regulations accommodated to the various exigencies of life. Of this school of practical wisdom and pious speculation, Seneca was for a considerable time the distinguished chief.*

Between Cicero and Seneca this Stoic philosophy took root in Rome. The period was resplendent with a group of minds that seem to have derived all their inspiration from Greece, and yet to have comprehended well the moral needs of their own day. Says M. Aubertin:

Leaving Cicero, and coming right to Seneca and his neo-Stoical contemporaries, what do we find? A philosophy abundant in new perspectives and of vast consequences. The basis of doctrine has undergone a transformation. The spiritualism of these philosophers has a character of mystical exaltation, impassioned raving, and religious enthusiasm unknown to the author of the Tusculan orations. Whence comes this new character, marked by such visible characteristics? It is the natural result of the labour of these eighty-six years that separate Cicero and Seneca. . . . The latter has left us a lively picture

* Vol. for 1867, pp. 71, 72.
of these fruitful years; he is full of the reading of his masters; he hears their voice, cites fragments of their discourses, and reproduces their opinions with that vividness of imagination which is the dominant faculty of this remarkable mind."

These philosophers did not neglect metaphysical study, but their taste lay chiefly in the department of morals. Seneca, while he was a careful gleaner from his immediate Roman predecessors, and always cites them in support of his opinions, went far beyond any of them in the development of his system.

Seneca's view of Deity is essentially that found in the Stoic system in its best state. There is a supreme God, who is the soul of the world. He has operated on matter as organizer, not as creator. Matter is eternal, but disordered, and only waited for the divine soul to bring it into harmony. Matter has no soul; it is simply inert and passive, and subject to the power of God. God is the divine reason, placed in the world. While God has made the world out of pre-existent matter, he has not been able to change its essence. This accounts for the reign of evil, for matter has essentially an evil principle. God has supreme control over human affairs. He descends to men, and dwells with them. Our condition is fully known to him. It is to him that we live, and to him that we must approve ourselves. We must so live that God will see only good in us, for he sees just what we are. "There is no need," says Seneca to Lucilius, "to lift your hands to heaven, or to pray the exile to admit you to the ear of an image, that so your prayers may be heard the better. God is near thee; he is with thee. . . . A holy spirit resides within us, the observer of good and evil, and our constant guardian. As we treat him, he treats us. At least no man is without God. Can any one ever rise above the power of fortune without his assistance? It is he that inspires us with thoughts, upright, just, and pure. We do not, indeed, pretend to say what God; but that a God dwells in the breast of every good man, is certain."* This universe could only be restrained from ruin by the presence of God. The least events and the lowest lives are known to him. We must, therefore, submit fully to God. Our condition may be wretched, but this is sometimes a necessity for our discipline. God could relieve us from misery, but then that would not always be best. We are in a condition which requires training and the highest culture.

Seneca, in his entire ethical system, went far beyond his times. "He seems," says Gillett, "as if by a flash of intuition, to apprehend the moral relations of men, and the proper aims and duties of human life. He sets himself up as a teacher—not an example, for he confesses his imperfections and deficiencies—and his words are memorable alike for their terseness and their worth. That he stood aloof from Christianity—that the vigour of his years had passed before he could have had any knowledge of Christianity—adds to our surprise."† The ethics of Seneca are based upon God's identification with the universe and his presence in human life. Here belongs the brotherhood of man. We are not isolated in any sense, for the whole family of humanity is united by the bonds of a common origin. Nature made us relatives when it begat us from the same materials and for the same destinies. It planted in us a mutual love, and fitted us for a social life. What is a Roman knight, or freedman, or slave? These are but names that spring from ambition or injury. Our country is the world, and our guardians are the gods. Slavery, therefore, is to be condemned as a crime against God. "Seneca," says Lecky, "has filled pages with exhortations to masters

to remember that the accident of position in no degree affects the real dignity of men; that the slave may be free by virtue, while the master may be a slave by vice; and that it is the duty of a good man to abstain not only from all cruelty, but even from all feeling of contempt toward his slaves."* All exhibitions of a man's rights to make another suffer are cruel in the extreme. Gladiatorial contests, therefore, have no possible apology. Such amusements are "brutalizing, savage, and detestable." Man must imitate the natural world, where each has his right, and his own part to play. In nature we find apparent disturbances and irregularities. Earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, and violent storms, would seem to be abnormal. But this is not the fact. They are only the evidences of the reign of cosmic law. To show this order in nature was the design of the "Natural Questions" of Seneca, perhaps more than any other work of antiquity the direct forerunner of Humboldt's "Cosmos." That work of Seneca was valued by Montaigne more highly than any other, because of its having been written in old age, after the temptations to the enjoyment of popular and imperial favour had ceased. We close our reference to Seneca's philosophy by citing the general view, as just as it is forcible, of a writer, already referred to, in the "Westminster Review":—

Free from the superstitions of the populace, exalted above the illusions of Stoical orthodoxy, replacing the multiplicity of gods by the unity of the divine nature, and substituting for external worship the spiritual adoration which lies in the knowledge of God and the humble imitation of his perfection, Seneca, as a competent authority observes, holds a foremost rank among those who represent in its highest purity the elevated moral conception which classical antiquity attained. True to the old Stoical traditions, he yet gave predominance to the religious point of view, introducing into his teaching a difference in degree that was almost a difference in mind. Hence his theology became more human—his deity more personal. Contemporaneously with the missionaries of a new faith, he insisted on the necessity of obedience to the will of God, of a life in harmony with the divine nature, of the presence of God in the soul of man, of the slave as well as the free, of self-surrender to the Providence that orders the world, as the ground of all internal freedom and peace. The practical character of his morality, his conviction of human weakness and imperfection, his lessons of mercy and forgiveness, his doctrine of forbearance and indulgence to human infirmity, his ideal of the married life, his estimate of true friendship, his spirit of universal love and divine impartiality, at once attest the nobleness of his moral aspirations, and illustrate the mutual approach of the wisdom of the Greek and Roman world, and of the enlarging piety of a less exclusive Palestine. The work that Seneca endeavoured to do, however imperfectly, must always have a profound interest for the student of that great religious revolution which formed a crisis in the history of the human race, not only on general grounds, but because, to borrow the remarkable expression quoted by M. Martha from the eloquent Tertullian, it was "testimonium animae naturaliter Christianae."*

WORKS OF SENeca.

Seneca's writings have not all been preserved. We have the greater part, however, and from those still extant we can well appreciate Quintillian's statement concerning him, "that he treated on almost every subject of study; for both orations of his, and poems, and epistles, and dialogues, are extant."† It is not probable that any leading work of Seneca has been lost, for being a great favourite in the early Church, the interest in his writings served to preserve them, while those of less favoured Roman authors were neither copied nor cared for. The list of his works, as given by George Long in Smith's "Dictionary of Greek and Roman Biography and Mythology," forms the basis of our catalogue.

1. De Ira. This was addressed to Novatus, and was one of Seneca's earliest works. 2. De Consolatione ad Helviam Matrem Liber. Written to his mother

* "History of Morals," vol. i. p. 324.
† "Inst. Orat." x, § 129.
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During his banishment to Corsica. One of his purest and best works. 3. De Consolatione, ad Polybium Liber. Composed in the third year of Seneca's Corsican exile. Diderot and others maintain that it is not by Seneca, because it is unworthy of him. But the external evidences are too strong. 4. Liber de Consolatione, ad Marciam. Written after Seneca's return from exile, and designed to console Marcia for the loss of her son. Marcia was the daughter of A. Cremonius Cordus. 5. De Providentiae Liber. “A Golden Book,” says Lipsius. Seneca proves here that Providence has a power over all things, and that God is always present with us. 6. De Animi Tranquillitate. Written shortly after Seneca's return from banishment, when he was praetor, and had become Nero's tutor. The object is to discover the true means by which peace of mind can be attained. The author, surrounded by all the splendours of the court writes as one very ill at ease. 7. De Constantia Sapientis, seu quod in Sapientem non cadit Injuria. Addressed to Serenus, and founded on the Stoic doctrine of the wise man's impassiveness. Lipsius says of it: “This book betokens a great mind, as great a wit, and much eloquence; in a word, it is one of his best.” 8. De Clementia ad Neronem Cesarern Libri duo. There is too much flattery in this work. It is here that Seneca relates the anecdote of Nero's unwillingness to sign a sentence of execution, and his exclamation: “I would I could neither read nor write!” The second book is incomplete. 9. De Brevitate Vitae. Written to Paulinus, and recommending the proper employment of time and the best means to derive wisdom from our life. 10. De Vita Beata. Addressed to his brother, L. Junius Gallio, and pleading that there is no happiness without virtue, though health and riches have their value. The conclusion is lost. 11. De Otio. Sometimes joined to De Vita Beata. 12. De Beneficiis. In seven books, addressed to Aebucus Liberalis, and explaining the way of conferring a favour, and the duties of the giver and recipient. 13. Epistolar Morales. One hundred and twenty-four, written to Lucilius, and consisting of moral maxims. Composed for the most part in the latter period of Seneca's life, and comprising his moral reflections after losing imperial favour. 14. Apocolocyntosis. A satire on the deceased Emperor Claudius. It is a play on the word pumpkin, and means pumpkinification, or the reception of Claudius among the pumpkins. 15. Questiones Naturales. In seven books, addressed to Lucilius Junior, dealing with questions of natural history, and comprising copious extracts from various Greek and Roman authors. 16. Tragedies. Ten tragedies are attributed to Seneca by various Latin writers, Quintilian among the number. (Inst. Orat., ix, 2, § 8.) They bear the following titles: Hercules Furens, Thymestes, Thebais or Phænissa, Hippolytus or Phaedra, Oedipus, Troades or Hecuba, Medea, Agamemnon, Hercules Oetena, and Octavia. As the titles indicate, the subjects are mostly from the Greek mythology. They are written in Iambic senarii, interspersed with choral parts, in anapaestic and other metres. None of these tragedies are adapted to the stage, and were never intended for that purpose. They were designed for reading or recitation, after the fashion of the Roman rhetorical training. Moral sentiments abound in them all, as with every thing that Seneca wrote.*

* The Editio Princeps of Seneca was issued in Naples, 1475, in folio. The edition of J. F. Gronovius, (Leyden,) 1649—58, is in 4 vols., 12mo.; that of Ruhkopf, (Leipzig,) 1797—1811, 5 vols., 8vo. The French writers, as stated above, probably through the impulse of Montaigne, have bestowed great attention on Seneca, both in textual criticism and translation. Lagrange's version is the best. In England, the first edition of The Worles of L. Annum Seneca, both Morall and Naturall, translated by Thomas Lodge, appeared in London in 1614, with a Latin dedication.
RELATIONS OF SENEC A AND ST. PAUL.

To the student of sacred and ecclesiastical history the question of the relations of Seneca and St. Paul is one of the most interesting connected with the boundary line between Christianity and the pagan philosophy. The coincidences between the writings of the two are among the unsolved problems of literary history. Every writer on the subject concedes them to be striking, and those who do not admit an acquaintance have difficulty in explaining the parallelism. The most common solution of the latter class is thus expressed, by the writer already referred to, in the "Westminster Review": —

This resemblance is only one among many instances of the drift of the common consciousness under the same impelling winds of motion, to a similar or analogous intellectual and moral deliverance. The common thought, the common feeling, the common misery, the common aspiration — in a word, the common development of the human mind, had manifestations unlike, yet not all unlike, in Greece and in Judæa; and Saul of Tarsus and Seneca of Rome, each in his own way, acknowledged the smiting presence of the new light that was dawning on a half-expectant world.

Of the co-operative character of the writings of St. Paul and Seneca as great moral teachers, Merivale thus speaks: —

Far different as was their social standing-point, far different as were the foundations and the presumed sanctions of their teaching respectively, Seneca and St. Paul were both moral reformers; both, be it said with reverence, were fellow-workers in the cause of humanity, though the Christian could look beyond the proximate aims of morality and prepare men for a final development on which the Stoic could not venture to gaze. Hence there is so much in their principles, so much in their language, that agrees together; so that the one has been thought, though it must be owned without adequate reason, to have borrowed directly from the other. But the philosopher, be it remembered, discoursed to a large and not inattentive audience; and surely the soil was not all unfertile on which his seed was scattered, when he proclaimed that God dwells not in temples of wood or stone, nor wants the ministrations of human hands; that he has no delight in the blood of victims; that he is near to all his creatures; that his spirit resides in men's hearts; that all men are truly his offspring; that we are members of one body, which is God and nature; that men must believe in God before they can approach him; that the true service of God is to be like unto him; that all men have sinned, and none performed all the works of the law; that God is no respecter of persons, ranks, or conditions; but all, barbarian and Roman, bond and free, are alike under his all-seeing Providence.*

The early faith of the Church attached much importance to the acquaintance and friendship of these two men — the one representing all that was vital, aggressive, and hopeful in primitive Christianity, and the other all that was truthful and worthy in the latest Stoic philosophy. We can, therefore, look upon the production and wide circulation of a spurious correspondence of fourteen letters between them as only natural results of a fond desire to see in the pagan mind a willing acquiescence in revealed truth, on the first propagation of it, in the metropolis of the world. "From the age of St. Jerome," says Lightfoot, "Seneca was commonly regarded as standing on the very threshold of the Christian Church, even if he had not actually passed within its portals. In one Ecclesiastical Council at least, held at Tours in the year 567, his authority is quoted with a deference generally accorded only to Fathers of the Church. And even to the present day, in the marionette plays of his native Spain, St. Seneca takes his place by the side of St. Peter and St. Paul in the representations of our Lord's passion."† Jerome took note of this correspondence in the following language: "Quem non ponerem in catalogo sanctorum, nisi me illæ epistole provocarent que leguntur a plurimis, Pauli ad Senecam et Seneca ad Paulum."‡ This,

† "Epistle to the Philippians," pp. 296, 276, 3d ed.
‡ "Vir. Illust." 12.
of course, decides nothing as to the authenticity of the letters; but the credulous spirit of the whole mediaeval Church was only too ready to adopt this revered father's language as a strong indorsement of the correspondence. The internal character of the letters is thoroughly decisive of their spuriousness. The barrenness of thought, the impurity of the style, the errors in matters of fact, and especially the frequent violations of historical and chronological accuracy, prove them unworthy the place they have occupied in ecclesiastical literature. Of all writers, the French have manifested most confidence in the authenticity of the correspondence; and in cases where they have not gone to this extreme, they have discussed the question with an animation and wealth of research that have attracted the admiration of the learned world. The most complete treatise on the subject is that of Fleury. This author, while claiming that Paul and Seneca were on intimate relations, concedes the improbability of the correspondence, on the ground of its being "a composition of very inferior grade, a sort of school-boy exercise, abundant in rhetorical excesses, couched in very poor language, now containing borrowed expressions from Tacitus, and now others from the existing version of Paul's epistles."* Fleury enriches his treatise by a description of the whole literature of this special subject,† and by his excellent bibliography of the manuscripts and editions containing the alleged correspondence between St. Paul and Seneca.‡ The most recent French writer on this subject is Charles Aubertin, who enters into the full criticism of the contemporary philosophy, and concludes not only that the correspondence is without any claim to authenticity, but that Seneca's writings no more prove him to have been a Christian than do the works of Plato, Cicero, and other Greek and Roman philosophical and moral writers prove them to have been followers of Christ. Lightfoot points out the untenability of Seneca's parallelism with St. Paul on the ground of the former's frequent priority to Paul's writings, the existence of the same parallels in previous authors, the many fallacious coincidences, and the depth of the opposition of his tenets to those of Paul.* However, Lightfoot thus concludes that there are many coincidences which cannot be explained on these grounds:—

But after all allowance made for the considerations just urged, some facts remain which still require explanation. It appears that the Christian parallels in Seneca's writings become more frequent as he advances in life. It is not less true that they are much more striking and more numerous than in the other great Stoics of the Roman period, Epictetus and M. Aurelius; for though in character these later writers approached much nearer to the Christian ideal than the minister of Nero, though their fundamental doctrines are as little inconsistent with Christian theology and ethics as his, yet the closer resemblances of sentiment and expression, which alone would suggest any direct obligations to Christianity, are, I believe, decidedly more frequent in Seneca. Lastly: after all deductions made, a class of coincidences still remains, of which the expression "spend and be spent" may be taken as a type, and which can hardly be considered accidental. If any historical connection (direct or indirect) can be traced with a fair degree of probability, we may reasonably look to this for the solution of such coincidences. I shall content myself here with stating the different ways in which such a connection was possible or probable, without venturing to affirm what was actually the case, for the data are not sufficient to justify any definite theory.†

The weakest part of Lightfoot's criticism, is his endeavour to show that these coincidences are due to the Semitic origin of Stoicism, and that Tarsus, especially, being a seat of Stoic philosophy, Paul became acquainted with that system, and used the religious vocabulary of the Stoics in his epistles, or "found in the ethical language

† Vol. i, pp. 2—9.
‡ Vol. ii, pp. 283—297.

† "Epistle to the Philippians," pp. 300, 301,
of the Stoics expressions more fit than he could find elsewhere to describe in certain aspects the duties and privileges, the struggles and the triumphs, of the Christian life." Lightfoot really attributes the remarkable coincidences between Paul and Seneca to Paul's using Stoical terminology, a thing which cannot be admitted for a moment. Had there been no Stoa there could have been, just as easily, the great structure of the Pauline theology. Paul used the Greek language, with all its charm of imagery and subtle force, as the vehicle of his thoughts; but he placed no dependence, in the constructive part of his theology, on the poor resources of any system of pagan philosophy. It was Seneca, and not any other writer of his entire school, or of all paganism, who used, in the same sense as Paul, such words as flesh, angel, Holy Spirit, and offspring of God.

It is not at all improbable that Paul and Seneca were acquainted with each other. Paul long had in mind a visit to Rome, and regarded that metropolis as a point of departure for missionary labours in Spain, if not in the north (Romans i. 13; xv. 23, 24), and we cannot suppose him to have been without interest in the prevailing religious thought of the time and place. This would account for an independent interest in the best contemporary moral writer, Seneca, and would make their meeting no undesirable event on the apostle's part. Seneca, too would be equally interested in the man who stood at the head of the new faith, and of whose writings he might well have had some knowledge. Once, when an important crisis had arrived in Paul's ministry, in Corinth, and when the issue of an important Jewish persecution of him had to be decided by the governor of Achaia, to whom appeal had been made, the result was favourable to Paul; for, after the Jews had made their charge, and Paul was about to open his mouth in his own defence, this governor or deputy, Gallio by name, regarded it unnecessary, and dismissed the charge in these words: "If it were a matter of wrong, or wicked lewdness, O ye Jews, reason would that I should bear with you; but if it be a question of words and names, and of your law, look ye to it: for I will be no judge of such matters." The result was, he drove them from the judgment-seat. Now who should this Gallio be but Seneca's own brother, M. Annaeus Novatus, who took the name Junius Annaeus Gallio on passing by adoption into another family. Farrar, not without good ground, says: "We can easily imagine that Gallio was Seneca's favourite brother, and we are not surprised to find that the philosopher dedicated to him his three books on 'Anger,' and his charming little treatise 'On a happy life.'" * Seldom has a brother paid to another such a tribute as Seneca thus pays to his brother Gallio: "I used to say to you that my brother Gallio (whom everyone loves a little even people who cannot love him much) was wholly ignorant of other vices, but even detested this. You might try him in any direction. You began to praise his intellect—an intellect of the highest and worthiest kind . . . and he walked away! You began to praise his moderation; he instantly cut short your first words. You began to express admiration for his blandness and natural suavity of manner . . . yet even here he resisted your compliments; and if you were led to exclaim that you had found a man who could not be overcome by those insidious attacks which every one else admits, and hoped that he would at least tolerate this compliment because of its truth, even on this ground he would resist your flattery; not as though you had been awkward, or as though he suspected that you were jesting with him, or had some secret end in view, but simply because he had a horror of every form of adulation." † Must we not suppose

† "Questiones Naturales," lib. iv.
that the relations between two such brothers were very intimate.* And is there not excellent ground for the conjecture of Schell, in his Histoire de la Littérature Romaine:

"In all probability the pro-praetor, in his correspondence with his brother, had mentioned this Jewish teacher, who had preached the Gospel for eighteen months in the capital of his province!" It must also be borne in mind that the most striking parallels between Seneca and St. Paul occur in the later works of Seneca, such as his De Vita Beata and De Beneficiis, both of which were composed after A.D. 61—the year when Paul arrived in Rome—and, above all, in his epistles, written near the close of his life.† When Paul arrived in Rome he was placed in charge of the prefect of the Praetorian Guards, who allowed him to dwell in a private house with a soldier, who kept him in sight, and gave him liberty to see his friends. Now this prefect was none other than Burrhus, whom we have already mentioned as an intimate friend of Seneca, and associate of the latter at Nero's court.

† Fr. Ch. Gelpe, Tractatiniunctula de familiaritate quae Paulo apostolo cum Seneca philosopho intercessisse traditur, verisimilima. Lips., 1813. 4to. Quoted in "New Brunswick Review," Feb., 1855

M. Schell well asks, "to suppose that their conversation would have turned upon this bold and eloquent Jewish teacher, who, on account of new religious opinions, had been persecuted in Palestine, and had appealed to the tribunal of the emperor? Would not Seneca have been curious to see and hear this extraordinary man?" We do not regard it necessary to suppose that any special intimacy existed between the Christian Paul and the Stoic Seneca, in order to account for parallelism in their writings; the tradition, deep-rooted, and often repeated through many centuries, is at least very significant. Or, as De Maistre says: "The tradition concerning the Christianity of Seneca, and on his relations with St. Paul, without being finally decisive, is nevertheless far more than nothing, if one connect with it certain other presumptions."* Seneca's mental altitude and achievements prove him to have been ready for at least a guarded interchange of opinions with Paul, and it may well have happened that the influence of the philosopher at Nero's Court had weight in securing such delay of the Apostle's trial as resulted later in the latter's liberation, and in his making one more missionary tour.

* "Soirées de Saint Petersbourg, IXth Entretien."
THE MILLENNIUM AND THE ADVENT.

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HAT there is to be a millennium, and that there is to be an advent, is generally admitted by Christian people. That the millennium and the advent sustain very definite and very important relations, is the general conviction. That one must precede, that the other will follow, is freely conceded. But will the advent precede the millennium? or will the millennium precede the advent? This is the vital question to be determined, and this issue must be squarely met. Will the Lord come to introduce the millennium? or will the millennium prepare for the coming of the Lord? In some form or other the thoughtful mind propounds this inquiry, and in some way this very serious inquiry must be answered. Until this point is settled, there is but little use for inquiry or disputation about any other relating to the general subject. The settlement of this cardinal question determines many others.

We do not purpose to enter upon a very extended argument in our investigation of this specific point. We choose, rather, after a plain statement of two or three important facts, to put the inquirer on the track of the needful information, that he may be assisted in coming to the right conclusion. And, with reference to the specific question to be settled, we affirm as follows:—First. There is not a passage of Scripture, literal, figurative, or symbolical, which treats of the millennium and its relation to the advent, that teaches, indicates, or in any manner represents the millennium as preceding the advent. Second. There is not a passage, literal, figurative, or symbolical, which speaks of the advent and its relation to the millennium, that represents the advent as subsequent to the millennium.

Now, these two very important facts settle, if not the principal question at issue, at least this not unimportant fact, that the now prevalent belief in a millennium previous to the advent is without Scripture authority. Since, as before stated, there is not one passage that speaks of the millennium and its relation to the advent, or of the advent and its relation to the millennium, which teaches directly or indirectly, by its immediate connections or its parallels, or in any manner whatever, the post-millenarian doctrines that are now so generally prevalent.

And yet, in the nature of the case, questions of order and relation must be decided by the authority which treats of order and relation. Isolated revelations—if there be such—cannot decide questions of relative order, unless—of which there is no example—the specific revelation should relate to the specific point to be established.

There is no dispute about the fact of our Lord's second advent. There is no dispute about the fact of a coming millennium. There is no dispute about the fact that the two great events sustain important chronological relations. The whole disagreement, as it respects the cardinal questions, is concerning the relative order. Is the millennium before the advent? Is the advent before the millennium? This is what should claim our attention first of all. A multitude of minor questions must be determined by this question of relative order.

This point must be decided, not by con-
jecture, nor by unauthorized statements, but by Divine revelation. Human authority is of little account in deciding questions of this nature. If the Lord has not spoken relative to this matter it will be useless for man to speak. If he has spoken, "Thus saith the Lord" must be deemed decisive.

Thus far we have treated the subject on the purposely-assumed logical ground that the Scriptures have not determined the question at issue; thus leaving one side of the controversy as much without Divine authority as the other, and making it, therefore, a matter of logic, learning, and research. On this assumption, it would appear that the manifest advantage would be with the pre-millennialists, for these several reasons: First. The post-millennialists being the witnesses, we prove that the pre-millenarian belief was primitive in the Christian Church. And our advantage in this respect is equal to the probability of the truth being primitive, and not error, in the Church apostolically founded, guided, and instructed. Second. Our advantage, on this assumption, still further appears from the fact, that authentic history, and still preserved formulas of belief, show that pre-millennial views were primitive in the reformed Protestant Church. After the Church came out from the communion of Rome, renouncing the human traditions, the manifold perver-
sions of the Word of God, and the unauthorized assumptions of the Papacy, and planted itself squarely upon the teachings of the Bible; then, as we have abundant testimony to prove, the Primitive Protestant Church, deriving the great foundation doctrines directly from the Word of God, was quite generally, if not universally, pre-millenarian in respect to this point of relative order. And our advantage in this respect is equal to the improbability that such men as God raised up, and wonderfully qualified for the reformation of the Church, should generally, perhaps universally, mis-

understand their diligently studied Bibles in respect to this vital question of relative order. Third. On this assumption of equality, so far as it relates to direct revelation, our advantage as pre-millenarians is to be estimated as equal to the improbability that nearly all the chief founders of the subdivisions of the primitive Protestant Churches—the theological giants of those heroic days—should be led into essential error on this vital question of relative order.

It will not be denied by those who have faithfully investigated this matter, that many, probably most, of the principal founders of the English, the Scotch, the Congregational, and the Baptist Churches, and the larger portion of the Westminster Assembly, were decidedly millenarian; or, as we are using the term, pre-millenarian, in their belief and teaching. Luther, Calvin, Knox, Wiclif, Melanchthon, all gave expression to convictions which showed that they looked for the advent before the complete subjection of the world to Christ. They seem to have apprehended the advent as very near. Not the prospect of the immediate triumph of the Church, but the fearful ravages of the Man of Sin, impressed them that the day of the Lord was near. And this was evidently scriptural. Charles Wesley, the sweet singer of Methodism; Fletcher, the matchless po-
lemic; and Coke, the father of Methodist missionary enterprise, all looked for the advent before the millennium.

And thus we might go on, almost indefi-

nitely, and show conclusively that, on the assumption that the Bible leaves the question undecided as to the relative order of these two great events, the pre-millenarians evidently have the advantage of their opponents as to the probabilities of the case. It would invalidate all the axioms relating to the primitiveness of religious truth, in reference to the manifest illumination and providential guiding of those whom God has raised up for
reformative purposes in his Church; and it
would conflict with all history and mental
philosophy, as exhibited in innumerable
instances, if we should be obliged to con-
clude that in the Primitive Church, in its
first utterances of cardinal truths, as de-
developed from the Word of God, radical
error, and not essential truth, was primitive.

Since the great perversion and corruption
in Eden, down to the latest development of
heterodoxy, corruption of primitive truth,
and not truth developed from corruption,
had been the history of human kind. God
may indeed reform and reclaim his people
when they err and wander, and bring them
back to original truth and virtue. But to
assume that God suffered the Primitive
Church to be established in essential error,
and thus suffered the principal branches of
the Church in later times to be founded in
essential error, in respect to the momentous
question under review, is sufficiently alarm-
ing and humiliating, to say the least.

Having said so much, on the assumed
ground of scriptural equality between the
two sides of this great question, and of the
advantage which pre-millenarians have over
their opponents, on the supposition that the
Bible leaves the question of relative order
undetermined, we purpose now to abandon
that merely assumed position, and boldly
take the ground that this great question of
the relative order of the millennium and the
advent has been authoritatively decided by
the Word of God; not by one passage only,
which, if it were clear, would settle the
whole controversy, but by passages literal,
figurative, and symbolical, almost without
number. And we do not forget that the
Word of God is to be understood, not as
any of us might wish, hope, or endeavour to
make it appear; but fairly, consistently, and
according to its Divine adaptation to impress
the unsophisticated mind.

"To the law and to the testimony." The
question to be settled being one of order and
relation in respect to the two great associ-
ated events, the coming of the Lord and
the coming of the millennium, it is necessary
to determine the point by Scriptures that
relate to these two events in their associated
order. A text merely proving the millennium,
since it proves as much for one side as the
other, proves nothing in respect to the
point now under discussion. Sometimes
reference is made to explicit revelations of
the millennium, without regard to the con-
nections and parallels of the passage, and it
is assumed that these isolated and frag-
mentary passages, since they prove the mil-
lenium, settle the questions of relative
order. The eighth verse of the second
Psalm, the ninth verse of the eleventh
chapter of Isaiah, and half a dozen texts
of similar nature, which, indeed, prove the
fact of the millennium, and are, therefore,
in this respect, just as favourable to one
side as the other, appear to be stereotyped
arguments on the post-millennial side, and
are quoted with a frequency and a con-
fidence which leave no doubt concerning the
convictions of those who refer to them, as
authoritative judgments in the great ques-
tion in dispute. Whereas, the careful ex-
amination of these isolated quotations will
demonstrate the fact, which seems to have
escaped the notice of many, that these texts
either prove nothing at all relative to the
great question in controversy, or else—
which is usually the case—by their im-
mediate connections, or their manifest par-
allels, distinctly prove the pre-millennial
doctrine concerning the relative order of
the two principal events.

The portions of Scripture which relate
to these two great associated events, and
which are relevant to the argument, there-
fore, because they indicate the relative order
of the events, are very numerous, explicit,
and, by their connections and parallels, easily
interpreted, in strict accordance with the
established usages and laws of literary cri-

But as it would unduly extend this article to quote in full all the passages which we might be disposed to examine, in order to fix the meaning of isolated and fragmentary texts, by carefully considering their connections and their parallels, the thoughtful readers, who are willing to give this important subject a little attention, are desired to read what immediately follows, with their Bibles open to the chapters and passages referred to:

1. The eleventh chapter of Isaiah is by all, perhaps, admitted to refer to the millennial state of the world in connection with the kingdom and reign of Christ. It exhibits,
   (1.) The manner in which millennial blessedness is brought in. (2.) The state of the world and its inhabitants during the happy period after it is fully established. (3.) The conversion and restoration of Israel and Judah in that day. Verses 10—16 refer to this latter event. Verses 6—9 describe the state of millennial blessedness. Verses 1—5 describe the manner in which the millennial state is introduced. This examination will determine what is the testimony of inspiration concerning the vital point of relative order which we wish to ascertain.

Connected inseparably with this disputed point are the two conflicting theories of introducing the millennium: the one, by the increase and triumph of grace, by which the whole world is converted; the other, not specifying how far grace will ultimately triumph, but at a certain period introducing Christ, not as the priestly successor of Aaron, occupying the intercessional throne, but as the royal heir and successor of David, ruling upon the Davidic throne, and, as a sovereign, divinely sceptered, ruling, judging, rewarding and punishing.

Taking these two theories of the introduction and establishing of the millennial dispensation, as the necessary concomitants and exponents of the two theories of the relative order of the advent and the millennium, Which one of them is sustained, and which disproved by the eleventh chapter and ninth verse of Isaiah, interpreted by its connection? By carefully reading the chapter it will be seen that Christ is present, not to save sinners, as he is now doing in heaven, but to judge and to destroy them. (Verse 4.)

Christ is present in his royal relations to David, the son of Jesse, exercising his regal authority and power among the nations, and judicially smiting and destroying the wicked. (Verses 1—5.) And in this manner he brings in the millennium. With which of the two conflicting theories does this representation agree? Is the millennium introduced, without the personal presence of Christ, by the spiritual triumphs of the Gospel until all are converted? Or is it introduced, in connection with the personal presence of Christ, not then converting his enemies to friends, and saving them, but finding them enemies, treating them as enemies, judging and destroying them as enemies? In short, does the millennium introduce Christ at the close of it? or does he appear at the beginning of it, and reign during the continuance of it? What does this millennial prophecy, interpreted harmoniously with itself throughout, teach us concerning this vital question of relative order respecting the advent and the millennium?

2. We turn now to the Second Psalm, a portion of the Scripture which is more frequently quoted, perhaps, against the pre-millenarians than any other passage in the Bible. It is conceded by all that this psalm, especially the eighth verse, describes the kingdom of Christ upon the earth, and this eighth verse seems to be regarded by the opponents of pre-millenarianism as a triumphant demonstration of the complete spiritual subjection of the whole world to Christ by the Gospel. No one can reasonably object to the interpretation of a text by its intimate connections and evident parallels. This we now proceed to do, with
reference to the great question now under
consideration. Which of the two conflicting
theories is favoured by the second Psalm?

Here we notice, first of all, King Messiah,
not on the priestly throne in heaven, exer-
cising the offices of mediation and interces-
sion, as the high-priest before the throne,
but as the Lord’s anointed king, throned
upon the holy hill of Zion; not to save the
disobedient among the nations, but to rule,
judge, and violently destroy them. (Verses
5—9.) And thus making this psalm parallel
with the many other prophecies of his judicial
procedure in ruling and preparing the world
for his universal kingdom. According to this
psalm, he first appears as the appointed king
in Zion. The jealous rulers of the unsubdued
nations become excited and enraged. What
becomes of them? Do they submit to
Christ, yield to his Gospel, become his
friends, and finally obtain salvation? Or do
they continue in hatred and rebellion until
the time of mercy expires, and then perish
under his judicial wrath? The question has
manifest pertinency as an exhibition of the
method by which the result is brought about,
which we all agree to call the millennial
state. What is the testimony of the Holy
Ghost, by the mouth of David, in this psalm?
It exhibits the period of “the wrath of the
Lamb.” (Verse 12; compare Rev. vi. 16.)
The wicked rulers and judges of the earth
are exhorted to “kiss the Son, lest he be
angry, and ye perish from the way, when his
wrath is kindled but a little.”

And yet this very psalm, or a disconnected
fragment of it, rather, is the perpetual resort
for proof of the whole world’s spiritual sub-
jection to Christ through the Gospel, and
that the world will be converted before the
coming of Christ! Whereas, in the first
place, there is no such universal conversion
to Christ indicated in this psalm; but,
instead thereof, a terrible and universal
destruction of his enemies is signified. And,
in the second place, Christ, as king upon the
hill of Zion, is distinctly represented as
having already come; as being personally
present, ruling, judging, and destroying his
enemies in his hot, judicial displeasure. And
this signifies universal conversion to Christ!
This means the spiritual subjection of the
wicked world, and the ushering in of the
millennium before the coming of the King in
Zion!

Permit us to inquire, Does this breaking
with a rod of iron, this dashing in pieces as
a potter’s vessel, this vexing them in his sore
displeasure, this being angry with them, and
causing them to perish from the way when
his wrath is kindled—does all this indicate
a work of love and salvation? Is this the
moral triumph of the Gospel? Would any
one ever receive—did any one, could any one
ever receive such an impression from these
terrible threatenings and this awful imagery,
if he had not a previously-formed and a
fondly-cherished dogmatic theory that de-
manded this violence to all the recognized
rules and usages of literary criticism, and
this unparalleled perversion of the natural
teachings of verbal statements and symbolic
imagery? Is there an admitted example in
any book, except the Bible, where such ter-
rible imagery and verbalism are ever used to
indicate a reformative, merciful work of
grace, and not of judicial wrath and severity?
If such be the appropriate expression of love
and mercy, what would be the legitimate ex-
pression of the opposite? Furthermore, if
this imports mercy and redemption, why is it
held up as a warning to wicked kings and
judges, lest it should be visited upon them,
and they should perish under his wrath?

The true parallel of the second Psalm is
Rev. ii. 25—27: “But that which ye have,
hold fast till I come. And he that over-
cometh, and keepeth my works unto the
end, to him will I give power over the nations:
and he shall rule them with a rod of iron;
as the vessels of a potter shall they be broken
to shivers: even as I received of my Father.”
Now, it is the teaching of the Word of God that the saints are to "reign with Christ;" that "the saints shall judge the world;" that when the Lord shall return from his "journey into a far country, to receive for himself a kingdom, and to return," charging the servants whom he leaves behind, "Occupy till I come," (Luke xix. 12—27 ;) it is the Scripture doctrine that the faithful servants will, at their Lord's return, "having received the kingdom," "enter into the joy of their Lord," which is more definitely explained, "have thou authority over ten cities."

But when and where is this governmental association with Christ, as the returned King, to be realized? Not "now in this time," (Mark x. 30), but in the "palingenesia," (Matt. xix. 28), "when the Son of man shall sit on the throne of his glory" (Psalm ii. 6), when the twelve apostles shall "sit upon twelve thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel." Can anything be plainer than this? Is not this a manifestly just and natural method of interpreting the Word of God by its immediate connections and evident parallels? The bearing of this argument upon the question at issue is unmistakable. We boldly affirm, after due examination, and after weighing well the statement, that there is not a passage in the Bible relating to the great question in this controversy, interpreted fairly by its associations and parallels, that does not distinctly indicate the pre-millennial, or, as we prefer to call it, the pre-millennial, theory of the relative order of the millennium and the advent, and that does not as distinctly disprove the theory of the opposite.

We have thus far considered some of the passages most relied upon apparently to sustain the anti or post-millenium theory, and have shown, from their connections and parallels, that the true millennial, or, as we prefer to call it, the pre-millennial, theory of exposition is not only legitimate, scriptural, self-consistent, and logically demonstrative; but that it is the only interpretation possible for those passages, without doing violence to literary axioms, Scripture precedents, and the legitimate impressions of symbolical imagery and common verbalism. And we are genuine Protestants, believing that the Bible was intended for the people; for those who mainly rely upon the legitimate impression which the language and imagery of inspiration produce upon the uncorrupted mind.

If there is anything more unmistakably revealed than another, respecting the state of the world at the advent, it is this: that it will take the world by surprise. "As a snare shall it come on all them that dwell on the face of the whole earth. It will come as a thief in the night. When they shall say, Peace and safety, then sudden destruction cometh upon them, as travail upon a woman with child, and they shall not escape." The advent will not be when it is generally expected, but when it is not. Now this must be accounted for, for it is unmistakably revealed. And which of the two theories is best adapted to explain it? Let us suppose that the pre-millennial theory is generally prevalent at that decisive epoch, and that the advent is considered imminent, and is daily watched for and expected. Would the world then be overtaken by the advent unexpectedly? Certainly not.

Let us suppose, on the other hand, that a false theory is generally prevalent at that epoch; for example, that the advent is not to occur until after the millennium, whereas it takes place before. Would not this general misapprehension of the true order of the events completely explain the predicted fact as to the unexpectedness of the advent? Which, then, of the two theories is the more likely to be the true one? Would the general prevalence of essential error, respecting the relative order of events, be the best preparation for the primal event? Again, would the general prevalence of true impressions, as to the relative order of events,
be the occasion of general unpreparedness for the primal event? Certainly not. Which, then, of these conflicting theories gives the rationale of the undeniable fact?

Do post-millenarians dissent from applying this simple test to the pre-millenarian side of the question, and consent to apply it to the advent subsequent to the millennium? Consider the logical consequences: 1. It would not then be a question of relative order, as it is now. For, as the advent did not occur at the beginning of the millennium, it must, of course, occur at the end of it; and it would then be a question of belief or disbelief of the Word of God; inasmuch as the advent is predicted to take place either at the opening, or at the close of that dispensation. 2. The general unpreparedness of the world at that time, as the supposition is, would show that general disbelief of what is distinctly revealed in the Word of God will characterize the close of the millennium.

As it would be impossible to compress within the limits of this article the examination of a tithe of the passages of Scripture which we deem decisive in settling this great controversy respecting the relative order of the millennium and the advent, we must be content with the consideration of only a few, and these chiefly from the sayings of our Lord Jesus Christ. It will be remembered that we are not discussing the general subject of the millennium, nor the general subject of the advent, nor the numberless collateral and more or less dependent questions which are usually treated in connection with the general theme. All these are more or less important in a general discussion, but they are purposely excluded from this. The settlement of the great question now under immediate review will necessarily dispose of many of the collateral issues.

How did our Lord represent the relative order of these two great events? While it must be admitted by all that he did not use the term millennium, yet it will not be denied by any that he often referred to a coming state or dispensation, when, as all, perhaps, will agree, the millennial prophecies will be fulfilled. His kingdom will come, and his will shall be done upon earth as it is in heaven. He will gather out of his kingdom all things that offend, and them which do iniquity. The righteous shall yet shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their Father. The meek shall inherit the earth. The apostles will yet sit upon thrones, judging the twelve tribes of Israel. The obedient and the faithful shall yet enter into the joy of their Lord. We are not now called upon to give the precise signification of these various representations of the coming glory and blessedness of the true disciples. Perhaps even millenarians might not exactly coincide in their views of the particulars included in the general representation of the coming felicity. But the good time coming must include the restitution of all things which God hath spoken by the mouth of all his holy prophets since the world began. It must then embrace the millennial blessedness promised to the Church in this world. To suppose that our Lord overleaped and overlooked the millennial state, as of too little consequence to be referred to, and contemplated only what we usually call heaven, or the eternal state, will not be admitted by any true millenarian of either of the two kinds contemplated in this article.

With this restricted view of the general subject, let us for a little consider the great prophecy respecting His coming, and the end of the world. [Not kosmos, but aion.] Leaving untouched innumerable topics, which might unnecessarily detain and embarrass us, we consider only these:—

1. Here is a chain of prophecy that stretches through the whole breadth of this dispensation, beginning chronologically with the first persecution of the infant Church,

* Matt. xxiv., and parallels.
and extending down to the coming of the Lord at the end of the aiôn, when the Master returns to reward the watchful and the obedient, and to punish the disobedient and the disbelieving.

2. There is not the slightest indication of any such condition of general virtue and blessedness as the Scriptures authorize us to expect in that age, dispensation, or state that we denominate the millennium.

3. Instead of all becoming holy and harmless, the unfaithful and the unbelieving continue so until the end, and are found by the returning Master eating and drinking with the drunken, and smiting their fellow-servants, and screening themselves with the plea, “My Lord delayeth his coming.” Is there any millennium here?

4. The days of persecution, distress, and tribulation continue until the last; so that the signs of the Lord’s coming follow “immediately after the tribulation of those days.”

5. The day of the Lord, or the coming of the Son of man, overtakes the unbelieving, unwatchful, unprepared generations by surprise, as they are eating, drinking, marrying and giving in marriage, as the Noachian flood came upon the wicked antediluvians and took them all away. The Lord will come “in flaming fire, taking vengeance on them that know not God, and that obey not the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ” (2 Thess. i.8), as the fire-storm fell upon Sodom and consumed them in their lusts.

6. There is not in all this broad prophecy, that covers the whole dispensation, extending down to the end of the aiôn, [as long as the Gospel commission continues, Matt. xxviii., 20,] the slightest intimation of such a state of the world, or of the Church, as the millennial prophecies give us reason to expect.

7. Closing up the long-continuing aiôn, during which wickedness and the wicked continue until the end, the Lord suddenly comes to reward and to punish.

Thus have we explored the whole breadth of this dispensational sea. Launching out on the first advent side of it, we have sailed in search of the millennial isle; but we have not discovered it. We know where it is indicated in the modern charts; but we have traversed every Scripture parallel of longitude and latitude in that vicinity, and have not found it. We have found the second advent on the farther coast; but there is no island of Paradise this side of it.

Is there any millennial indication beyond the advent?

1. We find, in connection with the advent, a gathering together of the elect from the four winds of heaven. So here we have the proper subjects of the expected blessedness.

2. We find them redeemed from all the tribulation which afflicted them through all the Gospel aiôn until the close of it. The Lord has added to his description of the signs of the advent these words of instruction and cheer: “And when these things begin to come to pass, then look up, and lift up your heads; for your redemption draweth nigh.” So here we have assurance of the good things that follow.

3. That state is of the nature of a kingdom. When the Son of man is revealed from heaven, coming in his glory, he will sit upon the throne of his glory, and speak and perform as “the King.” This will be in perfect accord with all the prophecies of the millennium; for it is almost invariably represented as a kingdom—the Son of David reigning upon David’s throne. “The Lord God shall give unto him the throne of his father David.” Luke i.32. See, also, the whole of the eleventh chapter of Isaiah, and the almost innumerable parallel passages.

4. Then our Lord is careful to fix the time of the introduction of the kingdom, showing that it is not to be expected until the period of the advent: “So likewise ye, when ye see these things come to pass, know ye that the kingdom of God is nigh at
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Is not this the period when "the kingdom and dominion, and the greatness of the kingdom under the whole heaven, shall be given to the people of the saints of the Most High, whose kingdom is an everlasting kingdom, and all dominions shall serve and obey him?" Dan. vii. 27.

Is not this indeed the fulfilment of that petition which the Lord has put into the heart and mouth of the Church, "Thy kingdom come; thy will be done on earth, as it is in heaven?"

5. So here we find the saints associated with the Lord, after his advent, possessing the kingdom, which comes in connection with the advent. Here is the consummation of the millennial prophecies, relating both to the King and the happy subjects of his dominion. They do not go to find the kingdom; it comes to them, in fulfilment of prophecy, and in answer to the petition in the Lord's prayer. The kingdom is "under the whole heaven." When the kingdom comes, the will of God is done "on earth, as it is in heaven." Now the saints "reign with him." Now "the saints shall judge the world." Is not this the Bible millennium?


Let us continue sitting at the feet of the divine Teacher. With reverential docility let our ears be attentive to the words of his lips. Lord, we would know unto what the kingdom of heaven is like. Not the kingdom of heaven in heaven, but the kingdom of heaven upon earth: the kingdom in that stage or dispensation when Thy will is done on earth as it is in heaven. We would understand the relations of the kingdom to the present dispensation; the origin of the present admixture of good and evil in the kingdom; whether this state of things will continue until the end of the present economy, [aiōn], or whether, previous to the end, all the wicked shall become obedient to Thy commands, and all wickedness be cleansed away. Speak, Lord, for Thy servants are waiting to hear.

"The kingdom of heaven is likened unto a man which sowed good seed in his field: but while men slept, his enemy came and sowed tares among the wheat, and went his way. But when the blade was sprung up, and brought forth fruit, then appeared the tares also. So the servants of the householder came and said unto him, Sir, didst not thou sow good seed in thy field? from whence then hath it tares? He said unto them, An enemy hath done this. The servants said unto him, Wilt thou then that we go and gather them up? But he said, Nay; lest while ye gather up the tares, ye root up also the wheat with them. Let both grow together, until the harvest; and in the time of harvest I will say to the reapers, Gather ye together first the tares, and bind them in bundles to burn them: but gather the wheat into my barn."

We now notice several items of special interest in this parable of the kingdom.

1. It illustrates the kingdom from the first to the last, and through the whole extent of the present dispensation.
2. It is the kingdom of Christ: "The Son of man shall ... gather out of his kingdom," etc., v. 41.
3. It is the kingdom (1) under Christ as Mediator, reigning as such in heaven, and continuing as such until the "end of the world." [Aiōn.] (2) Then, at the end of the age or dispensation, it is the kingdom, as it is to be administered under a new economy, where destruction to the wicked (v. 42,) and not salvation, and complete deliverance and glorification for the "children of the kingdom," will be secured," v. 43. 4. It is the kingdom, then, in two dissimilar dispensations, the one, mediatorial and preparative; the other, regal and judicial, v. 41.

5. It is the kingdom upon the earth, where the enemy sowed the tares (38), and where the judicial executions will be administered, v. 41.
6. This parable of our Lord is by
himself interpreted item by item, showing (1) the Divine method of interpreting parables of this class; and (2) giving distinctly the literal meaning of each figurative statement. We need not copy the particulars of our Lord's interpretation of this remarkable illustration of the kingdom. If it is not familiar to the reader, let him carefully read verses 36—43.

Now is there, or is there not, this side of the "end of the world," [aiōn] any indication of such a millennium as we find portrayed in the prophecies, and such as we are accustomed to embrace in the prayers and faith of the Church? There certainly is not. Is there, or is there not, subsequent to the "end of the world," [aiōn] indication, or proof even, of the complete manifestation and establishment of the kingdom, including the entire cleansing of the kingdom from "all things that offend, and them that do iniquity," (v. 41), and the gathering into it (v. 30) of the "children of the kingdom," and their glorious happiness? v. 43. There certainly is. What, then, is the relative order of the millennium and the advent? The Lord himself being the teacher, is the millennium before or after the advent? Or, changing the phrase, is it during or after the aiōn that was introduced by the Son of Man sowing the Gospel seed?

How forcibly this and other similar parables of our Lord remind us of the eschatology of the prophecies of the book of Daniel! Take, as a specimen, the eleventh chapter, considered in its relations to the twelfth.

1. Here is a prophetic representation of the doings of certain rulers, especially of one whose ambitious and wicked proceedings continue until the close of the prophetic periods. The angel upon the waters declared that it should be for "a time, times, and a half; and when he shall have accomplished to scatter the power of the holy people, all these things shall be finished." 2. "And at that time shall Michael stand up, the great Prince which standeth for the children of thy people: and there shall be a time of trouble, such as never was since there was a nation even to that same time; and at that time thy people shall be delivered, every one that shall be found written in the book."

Then follows the account of the resurrection: "Some to everlasting life, and some to shame and everlasting contempt." And they that be wise shall shine as the brightness of the firmament; and they that turn many to righteousness, as the stars for ever and ever."

3. The prophecy associates chronologically just the same great events which our Lord's parables and many other portions of the Scriptures do in descriptive eschatology. (1.) "The time of the end." The finishing of the prophetic periods; the "time, times, and a half;" the 1260, the 1290, and the 1335 days. (2.) The continued wickedness of the wicked until "that time;" the persecution of the "holy people;" the season of unparalleled tribulation; the final deliverance "of every one that shall be found written in the book;" the resurrection of "them that sleep in the dust of the earth." (3.) And this associates it with the coming of Christ; for the dead will not be raised until he comes to judge the quick and the dead at his appearing and his kingdom. (4.) Then follows the reward and glorification of the faithful, who "shine as the brightness of the firmament," and "as the stars for ever and ever." (5.) And this corresponds with our Lord's declaration, as it respects the period and the associated events. "Then shall the righteous shine forth as the sun in the kingdom of their Father." (6.) Now the prophet, with every one whose name is written in the book, after his "rest," shall "stand in his lot at the end.

* We do not detain the argument to explain how completely this may be harmonized with the doctrine of a twofold resurrection, with an interval between.
of the days.” Now, bringing the prophetic narrative to the question at issue, when do the “holy people” experience deliverance from the oppressor? When do they attain the glory and blessedness of shining as the firmament in the kingdom? Is it a millennium before the advent? or is it in connection with, or immediately subsequent to, the advent? The answer cannot be otherwise than confirmative of pre-millennialism.

We select for examination another of our Lord’s parables of the kingdom. The parable of the pounds, in the nineteenth chapter of Luke, is strikingly pertinent to the discussion now before us. Our Lord undoubtedly had reference, as an illustration, to the method by which Herod the Great obtained the kingdom of Judea. He went to Rome for the purpose of obtaining the title and kingly authority from the emperor. He received the kingdom at Rome, not to exercise his kingly office there, but to return to the country from which he departed when he went to Rome, that he might reign as king over the provinces chiefly inhabited by the Jews. “And as they heard these things, he added and spake a parable, because he was nigh to Jerusalem, and because they thought that the kingdom of God should immediately appear.” The parable, it seems, was intended to correct their erroneous impression. “He said therefore, A certain nobleman went into a far country to receive for himself a kingdom, and to return. And he called his ten servants, and delivered them ten pounds, and said unto them, Occupy till I come.” Now, here we have: 1. The purpose of our Lord [assuming that he refers to himself] in going to the “far country,” that is, to heaven. It was to “receive for himself a kingdom, and to return.” He did not expect to find the kingdom located in the “far country,” or to exercise his regal authority there. He was to “return” to the locality from which he went, to exercise his kingly office where his provinces and his subjects were. 2. How long before he might be expected to return for the purpose of reigning in his kingdom? The answer is as follows: First. He wished to correct the misapprehension of the Jews, “that the kingdom of God should immediately appear.” Second. He “went into a far country,” and the natural inference is that it would be a considerable space of time before he would return. Third. In the similar parable of the talents (Matt. xxv.), where the man travelled “into a far country,” it is said, “After a long time the Lord of those servants cometh, and reckoneth with them.” Fourth. It was in reference to this very coming, or return of the absent Master, that the evil servant said in his heart, “My Lord delayeth his coming.”

We may safely assume, then, that this parable of the Pounds, as well as the parable of the Talents, was intended to illustrate the condition of things during the entire continuance of the economy of Divine government from the departure of our Lord to his return again. Still claiming the natural inference, we perceive that his receiving the kingdom in the far country, whither he went to obtain it, as Herod received the kingdom of Judea at Rome, whither he went to obtain it, does not imply that the kingdom is located there, or that he exercises his kingly prerogatives there. We learn from the parable that “when he was returned, having received the kingdom, then he commanded these servants to be called unto him, to whom he had given the money,” and to whom he had said, “Occupy till I come;” and then he began to exercise his regal prerogative by judging, rewarding, and punishing. And this is precisely in accordance with our Lord’s unfigurative representation of the case, in the description of his second advent, in application to himself of his own parable of the talents in Matt. xxv. 31—46.

Now, taking our Lord’s representation of
things during the entire period of his absence, following it down to the very day of his return, observing that the evil and the good continue until the end, and that toil, trial, and the stern duties of self-denial and watchfulness are still imposed upon the faithful until the Master returns, and that it is not until then that the faithful "enter into the joy of their Lord," and are called to share the government with him (Luke xix., 17, etc.), we ask, with all sincerity, Where is there any indication of millennial rest, exaltation, or glory, previous to the return of the Lord? We certainly do find unmistakable indications of the long-expected rest and blessedness after the advent, but nothing of the kind before. Receiving, with childlike docility, the impression which our Lord's parables, explanations, and personal applications naturally produce upon the unbiased mind, what is the relative order of the millennium and the advent? Is the millennium first? No. Is the advent first? Yes, most distinctly.

Here the direct Scripture argument must be closed; but we do it with great reluctance. It is, indeed, an act of severe self-denial. There are passages in the Psalms, in Isaiah, Jeremiah, Ezekiel, Daniel, Hosea, Joel, Zechariah, the Gospels, Acts, Romans, First and Second Corinthians, First and Second Thessalonians, First and Second Timothy, Hebrews, Second Peter, Second John, Jude, and Revelation, in which the relation of the advent and the millennium, as it respects the question under discussion, is very clearly indicated, and the analysis of many of these passages, contemplated in the light of their immediate connections and manifest parallels, would still further exhibit the scriptural strength of pre-millennialism.

It will be understood, of course, that this discussion has but a single point in view: the relative order of two associated events. It is not an argument to establish the fact of either; both are assumed. With anti-adventists, if there be such, and with anti-millenarians, if there be such, we have nothing to say. To those who perceive and recognize, as revelations of the sacred word, both the advent and the millennium, as more or less related events, our argument is addressed. There has been so much confusion of thought in reference to these two great Scripture revelations that many, doubtless, if they do not reject them entirely, are, nevertheless, but little impressed with the reality and importance of them. And there has been so much of mal-exegesis of these Bible teachings that it would not be surprising if many should be found entirely destitute of confidence in any theory of interpretation. And it must be unmistakable to all that the thrilling interest which the primitive Christians seem to have felt in these two momentous anticipated events, as considerations of immediate practical value, has, to a large extent, been eliminated from the convictions and sensibilities of the now existing Church.

May it not be worthy of the most serious consideration of the Church, whether we have not in this very evident fact the true rationale of the often-predicted representation of the ultimate unbelief and unpreparedness of the world, and of the Church, even, for the advent when it shall occur? Is there any other way to explain what the Scriptures have so often and so distinctly stated in respect to the state of the world when the Lord shall come?

Will more than five of the ten slumbering virgins be found with their lamps trimmed and burning when the Bridegroom shall finally appear? Will there not be "scoffers, walking after their own lusts, and saying, Where is the promise of his coming," at the time when he shall actually come? "When the Son of man cometh shall he find faith on the earth?" Shall he find the faith of his coming to vindicate his elect as he has promised? Will he find the faith of the
importunate widow, as exhibited in the parable?

The commentators who formerly understood the coming here referred to as in some way applying to the destruction of Jerusalem, were quite confident that it indicated that very little faith would be found in the earth, or in the land, as they chose to restrict it, when, as they interpreted it, Christ should come to inflict judgments upon the Jewish nation. But as this utterly unsupported theory of explaining this coming of the Son of man may be regarded as being now almost universally abandoned by the chief commentators, and as our Lord must be understood as referring to his own personal coming to vindicate his elect, why should we not interpret his language in the same way in respect to the question of faith?

It is remarkable that some who understand our Lord to refer to his literal coming, and that this coming will be post-millennial, are compelled to apply the declension of the faith to a falling away at the close of the millennium. And consistency would require that the innumerable other passages which indicate the wickedness, the unbelief, and the unpreparedness of the Church and the world for the second coming of the Lord should be applied in the same manner, thereby showing that the millennial state will terminate in the most fearfully disastrous manner to the Church.* The little Horn,

(Dan. vii., 21, 22), according to this, immediately succeeding the fourth beast-empire, and continuing the cruel persecutions of the saints during the entire ante-advent dispensation, must then indicate that at no period previous to the advent will this world be brought into the foreshadowed millennial blessedness. The prophet affirms, "I beheld, and the same Horn made war with the saints, and prevailed against them; until the Ancient

nial dispensation, and culminate only at the close of it. 3. And according to this, there is, in fact, no millennium at all, such as the Scriptures warrant us to expect, and such as the Church has for many ages been praying and looking for.

Whereas, on the other side, the wickedness at the close of the millennium, according to the twentieth chapter of Revelation, does not relate to the redeemed and glorified Church at all, and is not of the nature of an apostasy from the true faith. The Church is "the camp of the saints," and the "beloved city," and has no part in the declension and rebellion. Revelation xx, as other portions of the Bible, represent that there will be two distinct classes of inhabitants in the world during and at the close of the millennium. First. The glorified saints living in the resurrection, or the translated state. Second. The nations of the earth living in the natural—perhaps Edenic—state, prosperous and populous during the whole period of the millennial dispensation. But as Satan is bound at the beginning of that period, so that he may not go out to deceive the nations, and, consequently, they will not be subjected to the probational temptations and tests that seem to be, for some good purpose, God's order in the government of responsible beings, both human and angelic; at the close of that dispensation, for reasons satisfactory to Infinite Wisdom, Satan will be released for a little season, and suffered to go out and deceive the nations, that they may be subjected to the probational tests of character as were angels in their first estate, and as was man in Eden.

This statement of the case is much less objectionable than the other for the following reasons: 1. The governmental principle involved in the case is in accord with the analogy of God's dealings with men and with angels at other times. 2. It does not involve the safety and felicity of the fully redeemed, who are defended and delivered by the direct interposition of God. 3. It allows for a real millennium, according to the plain teachings of the word of God, and the hope of the believing Church.
of Days came, and judgment was given to the saints of the Most High; and the time came when the saints possessed the kingdom." The prophet plainly shows that this coming and this inheriting of the kingdom by the saints are not to be expected before "the time of the end," which he carries forward to the termination of all the prophetic periods until the resurrection (chap. xii., 1—3, 13), when Daniel shall "stand in his lot at the end of the days."

Now, where is the millennium during this whole period? Must all this prophetically symbolized wickedness and persecution be a post-millennial development? What a sad ending to a glorious millennial promise and beginnings, if indeed it be post-millennial.

And in the same manner must we understand the Apostle Paul in his Second Epistle to the Thessalonians, if the Horn of Daniel's prophecy and the Man of Sin of Paul's epistle be post-millennial. For it is manifest that the apostle was then speaking of the coming of the Lord, which the Thessalonians mistakenly supposed was near. It is undeniable that he was speaking of the coming of the Lord that will be associated with the resurrection of the dead, the transformation of the living, and the gathering together of the saints unto him. And the whole purpose and structure of his argument prove that it was this identical parousia of which he had spoken in the first epistle, which the excited Church mistakenly anticipated as at hand, and which he undertook to show was not then at hand; and it was the same coming that he affirmed would not occur until the Wicked One should be revealed; it was the same coming—using the same word—which will certainly take place while the Wicked One is still practising his deceivableness of unrighteousness in them that perish, and at which advent the Wicked One shall be destroyed.

Now the point is this: 1. We have the parousia—the personal coming of the Lord. 2. When this glorious coming occurs, the Wicked One, with all his malign deceitfulness, is at work among the people and prospering. 3. This "falling away," and this revealing of the Wicked One, were given as proofs to the Thessalonians that the day of Christ was not at hand, but would be delayed until this predicted state of wickedness should be witnessed; and the whole structure of the argument shows that this consummation of wickedness would be developed from causes and tendencies which were actually working at the time the epistle was written, (chap. ii. 6, 7.) 4. The inevitable conclusion must be this: If the wickedness that originated in apostolic times shall continue until the advent, and the advent is post-millennial, then the Man of Sin, the lawless one, the wicked deceiver, with all his lying power and wonders, will continue during the whole period of the millennium!
But what sort of millennium is this? Is this all that the Church has been encouraged to expect; Is this all that the prophecies, types, and symbols indicate of the millennial state of the world?

The same line of argument, with the same result, could be pursued with reference to the Antichrist of St. John's epistles, and with respect to the Harlot of Babylon, in the Book of Revelation. Indeed, the Scriptures abound with passages of the same import; and the general tenor of the Word of God is to the same effect. Now, if this be so, does it not indicate very distinctly, from the nature of the case, the premillennial advent of the Lord, to prepare the world for the millennium?

There is another line of thought that has manifest pertinency to the question under review. The Scriptures, especially the New Testament, abound with admonitions and comforting assurances to true believers, in view of a coming deliverance from the persecutions and afflictions of the present state, and of relief and rest from the burdens of the common Christian life. The persecuted, the afflicted, and the weary are encouraged to look for a change that shall insure to them the blessedness that the present dispensation does not afford. To the persecuted Thessalonians there was a promise of "rest;" not when the millennium shall be brought in, but "when the Lord Jesus shall be revealed from heaven with his mighty angels, in flaming fire taking vengeance on them that know not God, and that obey not the Gospel of our Lord Jesus Christ, . . . when he shall come to be glorified in his saints, and to be admired in all them that believe in that day."

Now it is certain that such rest and blessedness are promised to the people of God in the millennium state. And it is also certain that we naturally look to the deliverance that is nearest to us, and first in order of time, when we indulge our anticipations of relief and blissfulness. If the millennium is before the advent, why should it be entirely overlooked in the anticipations, and the hoped-for relief be expected in an event that will not occur—if it be post-millennial—until after a thousand blissful years shall have passed away? If the advent be premillennial, we can easily understand why the advent should be looked for as the period of rest and blessedness; but not otherwise. To comfort the Thessalonians, the apostle did not point them to the expected subjection of the world to Christ, but went on to describe the parousia of the Lord, the attending resurrection and transformation of the saints, and says, "Wherefore comfort one another with these words."

And again, speaking of the same general theme, he adds, "Wherefore comfort yourselves together, and edify one another, even as also ye do." In this light we can see a reason for the "patient waiting for Christ."

We may also discover the propriety of directing the mind of the Church, not to the millennium, but to the advent, as the period to be greatly desired. "Be patient therefore, brethren, unto the coming of the Lord." "Be ye also patient; establish your hearts: for the coming of the Lord draweth nigh."

In the same line of thought we can discover the propriety of warning the unbelieving and the undutiful, by an appeal to their fears, in view of the consequences which result at the coming of the Lord. It was held up to their startled apprehensions as an event that might occur most unexpectedly, overtaking them in the midst of slumber, revelry, or the stupor of unbelief. Not to cite the many instances of this style of warning and appeal, we have only to recur to some of our Lord's parables, and to his most solemn utterances of this nature in the Mount Olivet prophecy. If our Lord understood that at least a millennium of time must elapse, after this world is con-
verted to himself, before his second advent would occur, we are not able to understand how he could have represented it as imminent, so as to become a warning to all generations of wicked men.

Indeed, assuming that the advent is post-millennial, unto whom do these warning appeals apply? Do they intend to excite apprehensions without the slightest reason to expect what is apprehended? Certainly, if the advent is post-millennial, no one who lives before the beginning of the millennium, and no one who lives during the first ninetenths of it, can have the slightest reason to apprehend the coming of the Lord. And all these warnings and exhortations to be found in readiness for that event, as something that might overtake us now, in the midst of the present relations and duties of life, cannot in the least appertain to the present dispensation, but belong exclusively to that remote and last generation that shall people the world at the close of the thousand years. With what consistency, then, can these appeals be made to the ante-millennial generations? Must not men be entirely reconstructed, mentally and morally, before rational results from such appeals can be rationally expected? Can a post-millenialist, with any show of sincerity, or any appearance of propriety, pray, preach, and exhort as our Lord did, with reference to the uncertainty, imminency, or the immediate practical use of the advent of the Lord?

Is not this glaring inconsistency of teaching that the real advent is post-millennial, and yet that the advent is to be prepared for, and constantly watched for, as an event that might occur at any moment, the real source of the mal-exegesis that interprets the coming of the Lord as being in some way associated with the destruction of Jerusalem, or with the coming of death, or some unusual occurrence, that may not in the slightest degree be a manifestation of Christ? This irresponsible method of harmonizing post-millenarian doctrines with pre-millennial Scripture teachings has done immense disservice to Scripture exegesis. It is encouraging to know that some of the latest and best expositions of the Bible are distinctly pre-millennial in sentiment. The former unfortunate method of "Jerusalemizing" every reference to the coming of Christ that seemed to be in conflict with post-millennial theories, has, we are impressed, about had its day. And, as for the "double-sense" method of exegesis, by which the doubtful application is shuffled from one thing to another, so as to find something that might be assigned as the thing intended, that too likewise, we opine, is less influential now than it was a generation since. Literal language interpreted literally, figurative language interpreted by the literal, and symbols explained by familiar laws, so as to be as definite as the symbols of sound, relation, or quantity, this, we apprehend, will more and more characterize the future expositions of the Word of God.

In other words, the Bible will be allowed to speak for and interpret itself. It will be assumed that inspiration has adapted Divine revelation to our common human nature; that it is not to be wrested from the natural impression which its language is calculated to make upon the common mind. During the first two centuries, while the Scriptures were expounded with literal simplicity, more than in subsequent times, pre-millennialism was the general belief of the Church, and the coming of the Lord was deemed a not distant event. This statement will not be denied, probably, by any who have acquainted themselves with the history of Christian doctrines from the beginning.

In the third century the learned and very ingenious Origen introduced an entirely new method of expounding the Scriptures, which more and more prevailed, until a new faith, founded in new theories of exegesis, became generally prevalent, and the primitive doctrine concerning the coming of Christ and
the millennium was brought into disrepute, and became the exception; and not, as at first, the general belief. Not learning, but imagination; not common sense, but platoonic speculation, robbed the Church of her primitive simplicity and her original premillenarian faith.

Among the very eminent authors who have fully indorsed the true millenarian doctrine, we are pleased to add the illustrious name of Bishop Butler, whose profound and unanswerable "Analogy" is a sufficient testimonial to his erudition and mental superiority. Speaking of the peculiar character of the Bible, as being "a kind of abridgment of the history of the world, in the view just now mentioned, that is, a general account of the condition of religion and its professors during the continuance of that apostasy from God, and the state of wickedness which it everywhere supposes the world to lie in," he remarks:

But it seems to contain some very general account of the chief governments of the world, as the general state of religion has been, is, or shall be, affected by them, from the first transgression, and during the whole interval of the world's continuing in its present state, to a certain future period, spoken of in both the Old and New Testaments, very distinctly, and in great variety of expression: "The times of the restitution of all things;" "when the mystery of God shall be finished, as he hath declared to his servants the prophets;" "when the God of heaven shall set up a kingdom which shall never be destroyed;" "and the kingdom shall not be left to other people (as it is represented to be, during this apostasy), but judgment shall be given to the saints, and they shall reign;" "and the kingdom and dominion, and the greatness of the kingdom under the whole heaven, shall be given to the people of the saints of the Most High,"

After giving a full expression of his conviction, that the promised restoration of the Jews will yet be literally fulfilled, under the power and government of Jesus their Messiah, he adds:

Things of this kind naturally turn the thoughts of serious men towards the full completion of the prophetic history, concerning the establishment of the everlasting kingdom among them—the kingdom of the Messiah and the future state of the world under this sacred government.*

Butler was a literalist, and he looked for the kingdom of God, under the kingship of Jesus the Messiah, to be established upon the earth, according to the literal import of the millennial prophecies. This was "the faith once delivered to the saints," which we are exhorted earnestly to contend for.

We may be indulged with an illustration, strictly scriptural, and more or less analogical. Light is a common illustration of the coming blessedness which shall gladden the heart of Zion. And it may illuminate the question of the relative order of the advent and the millennium. If Christ be the light that glorifies his Church with meridian splendour, shall that long-anticipated day precede and introduce the Sun at the evening? Or shall there be heard in the morning of that day, as the night-shadows flee before the dawn, the animating voice that rouses the benighted, slumbering Church, saying, "Arise, and shine; for thy light is come; and the glory of the Lord is risen upon thee! For, behold, darkness shall cover the earth, and gross darkness the people. But the Lord shall arise upon thee, and his glory shall be seen upon thee." Isa. lx, 1, 2.

This is the vital question at issue. This is the first thing to be decided. Christ is indeed himself the Sun. All light beams forth from him. But our Sun is at so great a distance now that he is only "the bright and the morning star." As the morning star, he heralds and hastens the dawn. But it is yet comparative night. Darkness covers the earth, and gross darkness the people. How is the long-promised day to be brought in? Must not this bright morning Star come so near as to be our Sun? Will not


* Ibid., p. 271.
the Sun of righteousness arise, with healing in his wings? Is not the truly converted soul the millennium in miniature? And is not this miniature millennium brought about in the soul by taking heed to the glimmering rays, “as unto a light that shineth in a dark place; until the day dawn, and the day-star arise in the heart?” This is, indeed, the great question: Shall the day introduce the Sun, or shall the Sun introduce the day? Shall the Sun rise and appear in the evening, or in the morning? It is a question of relative order. Let it be decided by the teachings of the literal, the figurative, and the symbolic prophecies. Let the parables of our Lord and the admonitions of the apostles be deemed decisive. Let the primitive faith of the Church, and the natural order of things, be fully considered. Then, after candid, deliberate investigation, what is the answer?

Perhaps we cannot better close this article than by giving an extract from the writings of the learned and very eminent Dr. Alford, the Dean of Canterbury:

One thought may, perhaps, have been in some minds as they have been reading these lines, and it is this: Will not the Lord’s coming, to most of us, in all probability, be the day of our own death? And would it not be more profitable to be preparing us for that, than to speak to us of an event which may be far distant, and probably will not come on the earth in our time at all?

To this question there are two answers—answers which ought to be ever impressed on a Christian’s mind. First. The view of things proposed by the inquirer is not that taken in Holy Scripture, which is the rule and pattern of our teaching. There we do not hear anything of preparation for death. I doubt whether one text can be found in which we are exhorted to make such preparation, as such. But the constant note, the continually recurring exhortation, is, to be prepared for the Lord’s coming. So that if we would teach as God’s word teaches, as our blessed Lord and his apostles taught, we cannot do as the inquirer would have us.

Our second answer goes to the reason of the thing, and in fact gives the account and lays open the foundation of the former. He who is prepared for the Lord’s coming is necessarily also prepared for his own death. The greater includes the less. He who so lives, so thinks, so speaks, so works, in his daily life, as to be ready for the sign of the Son of man in heaven, and the voice of the archangel and the trump of God, will not be found unready when the summons is heard in a softer tone, and comes with more previous warning. If he can meet the Lord amid the flaming heavens and the gathering dead, he will not be loath to obey his call when its dread reality is tempered with all gentle and kindly alleviation—with the gradual approaches of sickness and infirmity and the tender solaces of loving friends and watchful attendants. But, on the other hand, he who has forgotten his Lord’s coming, and has simply been careful about his own dismissal, will ever be too liable in the lesser thing to have neglected care for the greater; and he will also be well-nigh certain to have lowered his standard of attainment, and narrowed his sympathies unworthily; in taking thought for himself, to have forgotten the great Body of which he is a member; in minding his own safety, to have forgotten the glory of his Lord—nay, his very Lord himself. For—and with this thought we will draw to a close—there is nothing that so much takes a man out of himself; nothing that so much raises and widens his thoughts and sympathies; nothing that so much purifies and elevates his hopes, as this preparation for the coming of the Lord.—*Good Words*, Jan., 1863.
LUCRETIUS.

By Prof. Harrington, Wesleyan University, Middletown, U.S.

The new phases of materialistic philosophy, and the persistent prominence given to it by its modern advocates, naturally turn our attention to the old philosophers and their theories with increased interest. With a somewhat cometary regularity, or irregularity, these materialistic doctrines blaze out afresh along the sky of human history, and alarm for awhile the timid and the faithless, and then fade away until new conditions cause them to reappear. It may not be easy to calculate their cycles, but they seem to have a real periodicity, and illustrate the truism that there is nothing new under the sun. They are no new fires kindled among the everlasting stars of truth, but only the old embers fanned to fitful brightness by some unusually vigorous breath. From Democritus, the so-called father of the atomic philosophy, to its latest expositor, who does not hesitate to "prolong the vision backward across the boundary of experimental evidence," the lights of that philosophy have gone down in that unknown abyss which stretches beyond the horizon of demonstrable fact. They have paused awhile on the verge of experimental evidence, but have plunged at last into the shoreless gulf of speculative theory. Restless spirits, to whom mystery is intolerable, they have striven in every age to wrest from the Almighty the secret of creation. They have stretched out a long, eager arm into the darkness if haply they might touch the finger of God. Baffled in their blind groping, they turn fiercely upon that universal instinct that recognizes a divine hand in the origin of the world, and endeavour to banish the Deity from the universe.

It is a significant fact that the limit of the materialistic philosophy has been one and the same in all ages. Its apostles have marched up one after another to the same barrier, and have failed to force it. Apparent progress has been made, but too often only apparent. Like gold fishes in the glass, men have swum round and round, always hemmed in by the cold, adamantine walls through which they could see aggravatingly delightful worlds impossible to visit. Phenomena have, indeed, been carefully observed. Physical science has unfolded and explained more clearly the motions and properties of matter, and the formulas of force. The processes of nature have been more minutely investigated. Facts have multiplied, and many errors in regard to material operations have been exposed. Important generalizations have been determined in the realm of physical law, and in the relations of matter and force. The knife of anatomy and the experiments of physiology have revealed the functions of every organ in the whole field of animal life. Even psychical questions have been grappled with; some new light has been thrown upon this border realm of absolute mystery. But the old problems that have defied the thought of the ages still wait for a solution. When men inquire for the origin of matter and how it is constituted, or for the origin of force and how it operates, the sphinx is dumb. When they attempt to get behind the phenomena of heat, electricity, and magnetism, they are challenged by a sentinel they cannot bribe or
force. When an inevitable law of association is announced, or an unfailing alternation of antecedent and consequent is established, some unsatisfied questioner asks who established the law and who rendered the alternation unfailing. It is easy to uncover the brain and the nervous system and place them in juxtaposition with sensation and thought, but who can trace the connection between them? The facts of consciousness are as vivid to us as ever, but what explanation of them does it give to say that they are the "result of the play of organism and environment through cosmic ranges of time?" And what are evolution, natural selection, protoplasm, and differentiation of species but new terms for old ideas; thickets into which modern philosophy plunges its head, and fancies it has escaped the eternal riddles that are ever on its track?

The philosophy of Lucretius, in its essential features, in its merits, which have stood the test of centuries, and in its failures, which are common to all who have followed him, is the prototype of all subsequent materialistic philosophy. It foreshadows opinions that still prevail, and forms a basis of physical science that its masters have but slightly modified. It fails, as all similar theories must fail, in accounting for the origina of that power that governs matter, and in reconciling fatalistic causation with conscious free-will.

Five hundred years before Christ, Leucippus had promulgated the atomic theory. He and his disciple, Democritus, enthroned Chance as the combiner of material atoms, discarding the νοῖς of Anaxagoras, which that philosopher, before the time of Democritus, had placed at the head of all things. But it was Epicurus whom Lucretius adopted as his model and teacher. He estimates his master as a man who "surpassed the human race in his genius, and extinguished every intellectual light as the risen sun quenches the stars." His system had been before the world a hundred and fifty years. It was as the expositor of this system that Lucretius, about 50 b.c., published his poem De Rerum Natura. His design was not to defend the system nor extol his master, but, primarily, to free the minds of men from the fear of death and the fear of the gods, the greatest of human ills. This was to be done by unfolding the true aspect and laws of nature. If these could be correctly understood, death would cease to be an evil, and the gods would become only an ethical necessity without objective relation to the world either to punish or reward.

The grand difference between Lucretius and the philosophers of our day is in their methods. The former announces his theory and unfolds its applications. The latter reverse the process, and develop their theory from the inductions of investigation. The one is born of the brain, the other of the eye and hand. They are co-extensive in their scope, coincident in their essentials, but different in their details and processes. As might be expected, the bolder method involves more mistakes in scientific fact, but its moral bearings are the same, and are uttered without concealment.

Some condensed outline of his philosophy may be desirable before attempting to trace more elaborately a few of its doctrines and their relation to modern science. A fundamental proposition is the eternity of matter. It is impossible that something should come from nothing; equally impossible it should be reduced to nothing. The universe is a real existence, and absolutely dual in its nature. Body and space, or matter and vacuum, are the two essential duals in its nature. Body and space, or matter and vacuum, are the two essential duals in its nature. Body and space, or matter and vacuum, are the two essential duals in its nature. Body and space, or matter and vacuum, are the two essential duals in its nature. Body and space, or matter and vacuum, are the two essential duals in its nature. Body and space, or matter and vacuum, are the two essential duals in its nature. Body and space, or matter and vacuum, are the two essential duals in its nature. Body and space, or matter and vacuum, are the two essential duals in its nature. Body and space, or matter and vacuum, are the two essential duals in its nature. Body and space, or matter and vacuum, are the two essential duals in its nature. Body and space, or matter and vacuum, are the two essential duals in its nature. Body and space, or matter and vacuum, are the two essential duals in its nature. Body and space, or matter and vacuum, are the two essential duals in its nature.
ball and exact cube to the most jagged and various irregularity, and are so small that air, light, and heat are formed by their combinations. He gives us no comparative statement of their size, as one modern author does, who thinks that "if a drop of water were magnified to the size of our globe, the molecules composing it would be magnified to sizes varying from the size of shot to the size of billiard balls"; but as even the invisible "idols" of the invisible gods are formed from these atoms, they must be sufficiently small and fine to satisfy any reasonable theorist. The pores are absolute vacuum; yet no void exists in first beginnings, or atoms, although they are conceivably made up of parts. Each atom has intrinsic powers of motion, and all are continually in motion however they may seem to be at rest. Even in a lump of iron oscillation goes on with as great speed as in their freer motions through space; a theory perfectly anticipating that of Prof. Tyndall when he says of the particles of iron in mass, "there is space between them, they collide, they recoil, they oscillate." The atoms have three motions; they descend naturally in right lines and parallel, rebound from concussion, and are capable also of an exceedingly slight oblique direction. Their velocity is inconceivably great. Having been in motion from all eternity, they have combined to produce the infinite forms of matter that have partly perished and partly survive. This third kind of motion, an inconceivably small declination of the atoms, is essential to all combinations of matter. As Lucretius denies that the heavier could overtake the lighter, this minimum of oblique motion was his only resort. Denying a sentient first cause, he must devise some theory for the collision and consequent aggregation of matter. It has been alternately derided and defended. It is easy to laugh at it, but not so easy to invent a better.

Such is the physical theory of Lucretius. It is substantially the theory adopted by the atomic physicists of modern times. For long centuries Lucretius' atoms, void, and matter remained as he left them, the unchallenged elements of the cosmic universe. The world was busy with a visible chaos, and amid the whirl of the social elements that were developing, human history had no time to speculate on the unseen and unknown. It was content with the Christian dogma of creation by fiat, and did not care to go beyond the Mosaic genesis for its origin, or the Petrine theory for its destiny. The ablest divines and the profoundest thinkers derided or persecuted those who questioned the literal Scripture record, and made martyrs of such men as Galileo and Bruno for daring to entertain a physical theory of their own. About the middle of the seventeenth century Gassendi, dissatisfied with the prevailing scholastic philosophy, revived the Lucretian doctrines, and attempted to harmonize his ethics, as well as his atoms, with the principles of Christianity and the discoveries of modern science. From his day to the present the reaction has gone on, and science has been vaguely groping and floundering amid cosmic mazes, atomic whirls, and infinitesimal maelstroms, searching in vain for some self-originated law of order and development that governs all phenomena. The discrepancies of the different physical theories not only show the futility of such labour, but the hopelessness of discovering the secret of creation. Atoms, molecules, mounds, bubbles, ring-vortices, and centres of force, are the various names given to the "first beginnings" of gross matter. On the one hand, we have the voidless *plenum* of Descartes, filling all the universe at first, and then self-broken into balls, dust, and snake-shaped fragments that knot themselves into the different forms of matter; on the other, the universal fire-mist of Laplace, whirling its liquid billows
into suns and planets, that harden and fall with mathematical precision into their eternal orbits. Leibnitz declared a vacuum to be inconsistent with the perfection of God. He believes in atoms, but not those of Lucretius. Hobbes derives the consistency of matter from motion; Descartes from rest. Lucretius taught that hardness and elasticity are the indefeasible properties of matter; modern teachers make them result from motion. To the atoms of “solid singleness,” according to Lucretius, there have been added by the philosophers of modern times atoms resulting from the motion of a fluid, and those capable of exerting force at a distance. Newton thought that force had a real existence apart from matter; Hobbes adopted the old axiom, that matter cannot act where it is not. The theory of Lucretius made the atoms move in rectilinear and parallel lines; Lesage thought they had a chaotic motion in all directions. And, as the upshot of all the physical theories in regard to our own earth and the human race, two diametrically opposite conclusions are reached: one, that the whirl of atoms will one day reach their climax of evolution and development, and the worn-out earth and the effete human race will dissolve into their original atoms; the other, that there is an unlimited progress for earth and man for which a more and more glorious destiny is in store through unending ages.

But it is the psychical problems and the various phenomena of mind which are treated in the theory of Lucretius that excite us the most curious interest. What origin and destiny for man does he derive out of atoms and space? and how are the movements of the mind, the play of the passions, and the determinations of the will, developed from his material “first beginnings?” Has he solved the riddle of the ages, and uncovered the mechanism that generates its own force and imparts it to all the myriad developments that exhibit an unseen energy? And are development and conservation of force, the two great discoveries of modern science, really new discoveries, or merely a restatement of the theory of Lucretius on these two points?

The theory of Lucretius is essentially and necessarily a theory of development. It simply assumes atoms and void, and out of these constructs the universe solely by automatic development. He does not shrink from the assertion that every fact in the world can be thus accounted for. Inorganic matter in all its forms and properties, organic nature in all its stages and varieties, humanity with all the phenomena of body, mind, and soul, even necessity and free-will, are all self-wrought from atoms of “solid singleness,” and he grapples boldly with the mighty task of explaining the problem and tracing the processes. In the scope and range of the development theory there certainly has been no advance in modern times. It covers the whole ground of development both actual and possible. The great difference between Lucretius and the school of Spencer and Darwin is, that the former boldly cuts loose at the outset from Deity, while the latter seem to shrink from subjecting either themselves or their theory to the odium of so bold an announcement. The former says there is no God, and therefore the world is a development; the latter say the world is a development, and therefore there is no God. With the one it is a postulate, with the others it is inference. The modern scientist of this school shrinks, it may be, from the grossness of statement and the breadth of detail which the father physicist makes, but under a refined adaptation of the same principles to the so-called religious prejudices of the age, he softens their repulsive features, dresses them in the glittering garments which the looms of experiment and observation have so attractively woven, and quietly bids the world
march on in such company to blank atheism. It indicates his fear of the religious element in man's nature when, after leading him up to the dark threshold, and seeing him start back from it, he declares with an air of injured innocence that he is not responsible for the logical consequences of his doctrines. But it does not make it any easier for common men to plunge into the abyss, even though so brave a man as Prof. Huxley, as in his recent Belfast address, professes his willingness to be "so landed." If he could satisfactorily bridge the gulf between the black shores of his theory and the shores of the divine, instead of asserting that there is none, he would suffer less disquiet from the charge of fatalism that lies against him. Lucretius acknowledges that there lurks in the heart of man "a secret goad," in view of death and a future world. But he meets it consistently. "Man makes his moan that he has been mortal, because he sees not that after real death there will be no other self to remain in life and lament to self that his own self has met death. But a greater dispersion of the mass of matter follows after death, and no one wakes up upon whom the chill cessation of life has once come."

"The fundamental truth of all philosophy," according to Herbert Spencer, is the "Persistence of Force." Other scientists have it the Correlation and Conservation of Force. It is claimed as the great discovery of this century, as the Indestructibility of Matter was of the last. But both these doctrines were foreshadowed, nay, even announced, by Lucretius. The modern theory is thus stated by Dr. Youmans—

Power or energy can neither be created nor destroyed. Though ever changing form, its total quantity in the universe remains constant and unalterable. Every manifestation of force must have come from a pre-existing equivalent force, and must give rise to a subsequent and equal amount of some other force.

Compare this with the language of Lucretius:

The abundance of matter was never more closely massed, nor separated by larger spaces; for it has neither additions nor loss. And so the bodies of first beginnings have the same motion now as in time gone by, and will always hereafter move in a similar manner. And the things which have been accustomed to be begotten will be begotten according to the same law, and will exist and grow and become strong according to the decrees of nature. Nor can any force change the sum of things; for there is no beyond into which any kind of matter can escape out of the universe, nor out of which some new force can arise and burst into the universe and change the whole nature of things and their motions.

Motion, then, and atoms are constants in his theory of the universe. The mean density of the universe is constant and the mean motion is constant. Each atom maintains an unaltered velocity. The modern doctrine is that the total energy is constant, but may be variously distributed, and that all energy is ultimately due to motion, which latter point is not conclusively proved. Now when we remember that, according to Lucretius, absolutely all phenomena are the product of atoms and motion; that heat, light, electricity are not independent elements but results; we see how nearly the ancient and modern theories correspond. Unelaborated by the brilliant experiments of modern times, it may be, and open to the charge of having been reached by thought alone; yet the ideas are the same, and the boasted discoveries of to-day are really two thousand years old.

It is in the application of correlation to the various phenomena of life that modern science makes its boldest ventures and its highest claims to original discovery. Here is the magic key that is to unlock all the mysteries of psychology and sociology; of vitality, mind, and will; of social life and universal history. The mechanism, for it is pure mechanism, of a laugh or a tear could be understood if our eye were keen enough. The diamond is no more surely crystallized
light than the soul is finely organized matter. Emotions and passions could be changed into bone and muscle as easily as coal into gas, or steam into ice, if we only knew enough. Faith is only the etherealized form of a good dinner and an easy chair. An angry man is a Leyden jar of force overcharged, and oaths, grumbling, or slamming the door are simply ways of restoring the equilibrium. Phosphorus is condensed brainpower. The kidneys are the thermometer of mental activity, and the alkaline deposits there are the mercury that gauges its freezing or boiling point. Congresses and parliaments, religious organizations, and all social movements and phases, are only the conversion of force on a comprehensive scale, easily enough understood if we could only fathom a little better the laws of social dynamics. And those laws are only modifications or applications of the principle of correlation and conservation of force. The ebb and flow of the sea of human life is as regular and inevitable as the tides under the sway of the moon. Storm on the Atlantic and the storm of civil war in Spain are alike under material law. In the progress of knowledge "Old Probabilities" will not merely predict the weather changes, heat and cold, drought and rain, tempest and whirlwind; but political revolutions, changes of fashion, financial panics, and all the fluctuations of social virtue and vice. All that ails a murderer is that his heart is charged a little too highly with force. A savage is only an undeveloped incarnation of force. The irresistible law of force has whirled the Hottentot into barbarism and the Anglo-Saxon into civilization. Christianity and fetishism are alike physical results depending upon different operations of the same law. A man sets his face heavenward for the same reason that the needle points to the north pole. He prays for the same reason that a flower opens toward the sun. A nation bursts into revolution just as a magazine of powder explodes at the touch of fire.

We might multiply such illustrations to any extent. That they are the logical consequences of the theory amplified by Lucretius, and adopted and explained by its modern expositors, and are no play of the imagination, may be seen from their own language. Says Dr. Carpenter:

How this metamorphosis takes place; how a force existing as motion, heat, or light, can become a mode of consciousness; how it is possible for aerial vibrations to generate the sensation we call sound, or for the forces liberated by chemical changes in the brain to give rise to emotion; these are mysteries which it is impossible to fathom. But they are not profounder mysteries than the transformation of the physical forces into each other.

Says Dr. Youmans:

Man and society, therefore, as viewed by the eye of science, present a series of vast and complex dynamical problems, which are to be studied in the future in the light of the great law by which we have reason to believe all forms and shades of force are governed. The dominion of this law, characterized by Faraday as the highest in physical science which our faculties permit us to perceive, is not limited to physical phenomena; it prevails equally in the world of mind, controlling all the faculties and processes of thought and feeling. Star and nerve tissue are parts of the same system; stellar and nervous forces are correlated.

Says Herbert Spencer:

The sole truth which transcends experience by underlying it is this, the persistence of force. To this an ultimate analysis brings us down, and on this a rational synthesis must be built up.

Says Prof. Tyndall:

And grotesque in relation to scientific culture as many of the religions of the world have been and are; dangerous, nay, destructive, to the dearest privileges of freemen as some of them have undoubtedly been, and would if they could be again, it will be wise to recognize them as the forms of a force mischievous if permitted to intrude on the region of knowledge over which it holds no command, but capable of being guided by liberal thought to noble issues in the region of emotion, which is its proper sphere.

Now in view of these doctrines here quoted, it is certainly a very pertinent question
of Mr. Tyndall, "Is there not a temptation to close to some extent with Lucretius when he affirms that nature is seen to do all things spontaneously of herself without the meddling of the gods?" And we are tempted also to inquire how far modern science differs either in its principles or motions from those of the ancient heathen poet who undertook to free men's minds from the fear of the gods and the fear of death, the two greatest ills, by materializing soul and body, men and gods alike?

A few specimens from Lucretius on several points will show how far his doctrines accord with those now defended, and what products he derives from atoms and force. Take first the origin of life:

To come to another point, whatever things we perceive to have sense, you must yet admit to be all composed of senseless first beginnings. I do not assert that the sensible and sensations are forthwith begotten out of all elements without exception which produce things; but that it is of great moment, first, how minute the particles are which make up the sensible thing, and then what shape they possess, and what, in short, they are in their motions, arrangements, and positions, some of which conditions we find in woods and clods; and yet even these, when they have, so to speak, become rotten through the rains, bring forth worms, because bodies of matter driven from their ancient arrangement by a new condition are combined in the manner needed for the begetting of living creatures.

Evidently the philosophers of the British Association who "discern in matter the promise and potency of every form and quality of life," and who make "the phenomena of physical nature as well as those of the human mind have their unsearchable roots in a cosmical life," are uttering no new doctrines.

The theory of mind and soul given by Lucretius is curious and consistent. Mind and soul are one nature, but mind bears the same relation to soul that the head does to the body. The mind "has a fixed seat in the middle region of the breast; all the rest of the soul is disseminated through the whole body, and moves at the will and inclination of the mind." The velocity of this motion proves that it is made up of "seeds exceedingly round and minute." Atoms possess a power of moving in proportion to their smallness and smoothness. Honey is more sticky than water, and moves more slowly because its ultimate particles are larger. How fine these particles are is also shown from the fact that at death the body loses nothing in appearance or weight. But just as the flavour of wine or the aroma of a perfume disappears, so the mind and soul disappear from the body, and are alike the withdrawal of exceedingly smooth, fine, round atoms. Body and soul, however, are mutually dependent. "With first beginnings so interlaced from their earliest birth are they formed and gifted with a life of joint partnership, and it is plain that the faculty of the body and of the mind cannot feel separately, each alone without the other's power, but sense is kindled throughout our flesh, and blown into flame between the two by the joint motions on the part of both."

Those who have read the automatic theory of Prof. Huxley will see that it is only a modification of these ideas. He sums up his discussion by saying: "The only conclusion, then, at which there seems any good ground for arriving is that animals are machines, but that they are conscious machines, and what applies to brutes applies in its fulness and entirety to man.

See now Lucretius' theory of volition. It presupposes "idols" or images which are thrown off from all bodies, or are "spontaneously begotten." These exist in multitudes, and float everywhere like shadows over the landscape.

Now how it comes to pass that we are able to step out when we please, and how it is given to us to move about our limbs, and what cause is wont to push forward the great load of this our body, I will tell. I say that idols of walking first present themselves to
our mind and strike on the mind; then the will arises, for no one begins to do any thing until his mind first determines what it wills. From the very fact that it determines such a thing there is an image of that thing. When, therefore, the mind bestirs itself in such a way as to will to walk and step out, it strikes at the same moment the force of the soul which is spread over the whole body throughout the limbs and frame; and this is easily done, since the whole is held in close union with the mind. Next the soul in its turn strikes the body, and thus the whole mass by degrees is pushed on and set in motion. Then again the body becomes also rarefied, and the air, as you see its nature is, being always so nimble in moving, comes and passes in great quantity through the opened pores, and is thus distributed into the most minute parts of the body. In this way, then, by these two causes acting in two ways, the body, like a ship, is carried on by sails and wind.

Has Prof. Huxley made any change or improvement upon this when he says that animals "act mechanically, and that their indifferent states of consciousness, their sensations, their thoughts, their volitions, are the products and consequences of the mechanical arrangements; that molecular changes in the brain, which answer to what Haller called *vestigia rerum*, and which David Hartley termed *Vibratiuncles*, give rise to those emotions which in ourselves we call volition?"

It would be interesting had we space to compare the theories of Lucretius with those of modern scientists in relation to the various phenomena of sensation, and we should be struck with their great similarity. For instance, Prof. Tyndall’s recent utterances in regard to the nature of sight are almost identical with those of Lucretius. It would be interesting also to trace the details of his development theory, a little more specific, to be sure, than the Darwinian, but all the more meritorious, if bold guesses at the truth are the test; how wombs grew, attached to the earth by roots, and when the infants were born, kind mother earth nursed them with suitable milk; how the race went on through naked beastliness, skin-clothing, and cave-houses up to intelligence and luxury; how language was a natural necessity, just as for a calf to butt before it has horns, or panthers to scratch before they have claws; how the idea of worship crept into men’s minds; how the different arts and inventions became known; and many other things which are carefully and consistently elaborated from his two foundation principles. But enough has been said to show the relation of his theories to those of modern science, and the influence of his work on modern thought.

As to the atheistical tendencies of such a philosophy, it seems difficult to see how it can be otherwise. If there are gods they are no more than etherealized men, and utterly disconnected with the universe. If the doctrines held by both Lucretius and his followers of this age be correct, that spirit cannot exist apart from body, then an incarnation is impossible, and the New Testament Christ is a mightier myth than all the rest; unless, indeed, it can be somehow shown that matter in its grosser forms may become the habitation of matter more highly etherealized, whose ordinary properties become entirely neutralized by taking up such a residence in another body.

If the physical theories of ancient and modern philosophy come to the same thing—if they are one in essentials and differ only in modes and formulas—why is it not the more manly and honourable course for the philosophers of our own day to imitate the honesty of Lucretius also, and inscribe plainly on their books, "There is no God, and death is an eternal sleep." Lucretius does not hesitate to affirm his conclusions: "Death, therefore, to us is nothing; concerns us not a jot, since the nature of the mind is proved to be mortal." "The nature of the mind cannot come into being alone without the body, nor exist far away from sinews and blood." "The nature of things has by no means been made for us by divine power, so great are the defects with which it
is encumbered." These doctrines are formally announced at the outset of his argument, and continually elaborated in all his books. He claims them as the legitimate deductions of the materialistic theory and sufficient reasons why it should be adopted. If modern materialists would be equally bold, they would more nearly measure up to their great prototype. It is to be feared that under the profession of truth-seekers, they (some of them at least) are either consciously or unconsciously the enemies of the truth. It may be a noble and brave sentiment that the only question for any man to ask is, "Is this true, or is it false?" and that "Logical consequences can take care of themselves." But to assume that it is the truth that men are automatic machines is quite another thing. Prof. Huxley may be brave enough to risk the logical consequences of his belief in that assumption, wherever it may land him; but the Christian world for a while longer will prefer that theory which is stated by a wiser man: "The king's heart is in the hand of the Lord as the rivers of water; he turneth it whithersoever he will;" and if both be mysterious, they will still have a choice for the divine rather than the human.

The atomic philosophy seems to have been strangely fated to force its disciples into materialistic atheism. And yet their wide difference of purpose and conclusion seem to show that such a tendency is not wholly due to the philosophy, but largely to the disposition, of its advocates. Epicurus used it as a convenient theory to justify a life of indolence and voluptuousness: "Let us eat and drink, for to-morrow we die," was the sensual maxim that should govern human life, for that is all the life man lives. Lucretius seizes the theory as the ultimate principle of physical order that governs all the events of human life, but especially banishes from it the grim spectre of death, and the dread of the divine vengeance in a future world. Bacon and Newton could adopt it without finding it inconsistent with the Christian faith in which they died. Hobbes and Schelling, and following them, in their tendencies, if not in their declarations, a whole host of modern materialists, are willingly landed either in materialistic or ideal atheism. For Lucretius we see some ground for exercising charity. He was an observer of Roman corruption in the last days of the republic. His feet touched the gory stream which Marius and Sylla had opened in the streets of the Eternal City. He had looked upon her spectacles, her social debauchery, and the mockery of her superstitious worship. It was but natural for him to be disgusted with the falsehood and cruelty that seemed to be the fruit of such a religion, and to seek a substitute which would secure order without caprice and a release from the grossness of idolatry. In the regularity and constancy of atomic movements he found his god, and destroyed the sting of death in a soulless hereafter. But what charity can be had for those who in the centre of the nineteenth century, and with the history of Christianity behind them, either openly or covertly, use the theory of Lucretius to rob themselves and the world of Christ?

To those whose time or inclinations forbid the reading of Lucretius in the original, Munro's translation, from which the most of our quotations are made, will furnish an excellent substitute. Many ingenious applications of his philosophy are there elaborately wrought out, affording interesting parallels to the deductions of modern science. Aside from its moral design, the poem has great literary merit. It is one of the noblest specimens of the Latin tongue. It moves on with the stately grandeur becoming to so profound a theme, and yet charms us with the most winning grace. Its opening lines picture Mars in the lap of Venus. Both deities govern the inspiration of the poem, the one with his clashing arms and martial
tread, the other with her gliding grace and
gentle movement. The dry, hard march of
argument is tempered by the music of
rhythm, and its monotony is broken by the
novelties of the imagination. Some of his
tropes are of singular originality and expres-
siveness. He tells of the hues that are dis-
played by the "golden brood of peacocks
steeped in laughing beauty;" of "snake-
handed elephants;" and of India "fenced
about with an ivory rampart." The logic of
his philosophy is vitalized by the enthusiasm
of conviction and the energy of an absorbing
purpose.

Tradition asserts that he was a suicide at
the age of forty-four. No authentic records
corroborate the statement, and it is hard to
believe it. Yet such an end harmonizes with
his philosophy; and if his own arguments
had freed him from the fear of death and the
gods, it might have been a relief to him to
escape from the corruption and turmoil of
his age to the unconscious whirl of his
original atoms.

THE RELIGION OF THE FUTURE.

By Rev. T. D. Woolsey, D.D.

T is the doctrine of the New Testa-
ment that the dispensation which
was introduced by Christ is to con-
tinue until the end of the world. The whole
strain of the New Testament shows this;
and such passages, especially, as "of His
kingdom there shall be no end," "He must
reign until He hath put all enemies under
His feet," "this gospel of the kingdom shall
be preached in all the world for a witness
unto all nations, and then shall the end
come," are proofs, with many others like
them, that the Founder of Christianity and
His disciples regarded it as the final act of
God's moral system for the human race. The
very nature of Christ's religion would be
enough of itself to demonstrate that it must
be, if true, not a stage in a progress, but the
ultimate form of religious truth and thought,
the last of God's economies, the fruit which,
when fully ripe, is followed by the plant's
death and the end of the year. As the com-
pletion of whatever was imperfect in Judaism,
as intended for all mankind and claiming for
itself to satisfy the religious wants of all, it
cannot be superseded by any new form of
truth, or supplemented by a later and im-
proved revelation. All the progress of
mankind until the end of time and all the
hopes of mankind are treasured up in it, if
its claims are just. When it shall have done
its work, the present condition of man on
earth shall come to an end, and a state of
things wholly new, a state of retribution,
shall succeed.

There are many persons in the present age
who refuse to admit these pretensions of
Christianity. It is not to be the universal,
nor the ultimate religion of the world. In
some respects it may have been a very great
improvement on whatever of religious doc-
trine preceded it, and it has carried the
nations of Christendom to a higher state of
culture than was ever before reached; but
it is like all other religions in having no his-
torical basis and no divine authority. The
progress of the world hereafter will consist in
setting aside the exclusive claims of Christ,
in retaining all that in his moral precepts which will endure the storms of time, and in giving the guidance of the future to science and human insight. The religion of the future will be a religion with all that is peculiar to Christianity cast away, while something of its spirit will be retained, and with the help of this spirit, without a revelation, the coming ages will reach the point of perfection that is attainable by man.

The enemies of Christianity are divided among themselves. As Atheists, Pantheists, and Theists—the latter of various classes—they even oppose and sometimes denounce one another. Of this irreconcilable difference of opinion, however, we intend to make no use. We will suppose that the Theists are at length to triumph;—that they who receive the doctrines of an infinite God, and a divine plan in governing the world, and who hold to a system of morals something like that of Christ, are to gain the day over all other thinkers;—that the destinies of the world are to be put into their hands; that the religion of the future is to be as they shall shape it. Their way of thinking, we will suppose, has had its perfect work.

The reign of Christianity is over. That religion which soothed sorrows and inspired hope, which took up man amid the despair of decaying antiquity, was his only protector through the middle ages, and led on modern civilization; which has encouraged philosophy to reproduce the thoughts of God; which has given security to states by its lofty morals, and exalts the poorest of men by awakening the feeling of human brotherhood and the sense of human rights; which has controlled and modified art and letters,—that religion, we say, is fallen, its stronghold of facts is demolished, its miracles, whether to be explained historically or not, are discarded as inconsistent with the laws of the Universe, its Christ is only a man, its God has retired behind the curtain, never to reveal himself in human affairs. He spoke not to the fathers by the prophets. He speaks not to us by His Son. He will never speak to mankind. Men must do the best they can without Christ and without a Gospel.

Let us make the most favourable supposition the case admits of,—that these foes of Christ's religion are sincere, earnest, philanthropic men, haters of all injustice and of all falsehood, that they begin their work of destruction with the purpose of introducing something better, and really believe that the progress of man can only be reached through their systems of thinking. Let us suppose too that unbelief creeps over the Christian world, not all at once like a stroke of paralysis, but by a slow undermining of the foundations, by an abandonment of one point after another. The Christian faith ceases not at once to be respected or admired, but becomes by degrees conscious of its weakness, loses hope, retreats from the more educated to the less, lingers longest with the poor, the widow, the afflicted who have no weight in the world, and at length dies out and is forgotten, to be counted among the many religions, which she herself drove away from among mankind.

Now, we ask what the world will do without a positive, historical, revealed religion. Let the religion of the future, as we will call the rival of Christianity, start on its career with all veneration for the spirit of the Gospel; can that veneration last? What doctrines will be left to rear their heads above the deluge of unbelief? What motives in favour of religion will survive the decay, the extinction of Christianity?

We propose to attempt to answer some of these questions in a spirit of candour, to look at some of the disadvantages, which will of necessity attend on such a religion, and to consider what prospects it can have of spreading over and of bettering mankind.

And here let it be permitted to us to say
once for all, that we compare the resources and powers of the Gospel with systems of Theism, but that, if what we are about to urge has any weight, it will be still more weighty in the comparison between Christianity and Pantheistic religions. The point again towards which we turn our remarks is not directly the truth of the religions placed side by side, nor directly their services to mankind, but rather to find out whether any religion, which lays no claim to be a revelation, even although holding fast to a personal God, can fulfil the offices of a religion for the world, and whether, if it cannot, progress or civilization can take its place.

I. Our first position is that the absence from a religion of historical facts is a very great weakness, or in other words that the supposed religion of the future, being unable, as it must be, to take the form of facts and of history must be without a very great source of power.

Christianity is historical in its very nature, and cannot, as we maintain, be torn apart from history, without both ruining the religion and belittling the whole story of the world, for the system of redemption through Christ is a progressive work going on in the world of men, and culminating in the manifestation here below of the Son of God. The religion being a story, and a story concerning God, its evidences, it is quite natural to suppose, must not merely make an appeal to the moral judgments and sentiments, but, like all other story, must depend on the veracity of witnesses, on the truth of facts in the outer world. Moreover, as religion is a practical thing, as its highest aim ever must be to be taken up into the lives of men and hence to interweave itself with all action and all history, it must exhibit life, or truth, conviction and principle in action, before our eyes,—that is, it must be historical.

All this the great founder of Christianity and his first followers were aware of, more so perhaps than any of their successors in the following ages until the present time. He sent them forth as witnesses, they took this attitude before the world and felt that this was their leading vocation. Their view of the strength of the Gospel was justified by their success. It spread, by the simple telling of a story, even among the most prejudiced, among the Jews to whom a suffering Christ was a stumbling block, and among the Greeks to whom a new religion, bursting in upon the events of the present world, was a thing not so much as dreamed of. It is true that it contained a system of doctrines, a philosophy suited to man's wants, to his convictions, to his deepest nature, but it is equally true that the philosophy could not have existed separate from the facts and that by the facts it was recommended, impressed, and established.

To this force of the historical element in religion the systems of heathenism bear testimony.

On whatever principle we account for the religions of nature, it is evident that their mythologies and their worship indicate a desire to bring the Deity out of the region of abstract thought, to represent him to the human senses and in contiguity with man, to call him within the limits of space and time. The great interest, the great charm of heathenism consists in its mythology, as India, Greece, Scandinavia, and even the new world bear witness: if its views of the Divine Being had not taken the form of a narrative, if the Gods had not been represented as living and moving and acting among men, it would have lacked the power to fascinate and in a measure to satisfy the human soul. The Romans, who had at first a sober religion without image worship and with a scanty mythology, to a good degree deserted their earlier and vaguer system for the more beautiful, more copious, more imaginative fables of the Greeks. Upon mytho-
logy worship in a considerable degree depends; the sacredness of particular spots, the reasons for particular rites, the character of the rites themselves, are all to be referred to ancient and venerated traditions. Poetry too and art are shaped by mythology, they draw their materials from its fables, they act originally as its handmaids. And, when heathenism decays, as decay it must, the overthrow grows out of philosophical views and historical criticism rejecting the narratives handed down from ancient times. All these and many like considerations show that religion would appear dead and barren to mankind if it assumed an abstract philosophical form, that it would not come home to the soul or have a sway over the life.

Even the decay of heathenism in the Roman empire, that strange time when the old religion tried to brace itself up against the spread of doubt and of Christianity, indicates a longing for the appearance again of the Deity amid human events; the magic rites, the mysteries, the theurgic processes by which men sought to come into communication with the spiritual world, were, as it seems to us, so many testimonies of human nature that the Gospel by means of its narrative form, that the economy of our religion from the first by its history, is most wisely accommodated to human nature and human wants, so that they who expect much from a religion of mere abstractions must be most signally disappointed.

And this experience of mankind under heathenism and Christianity makes it probable that the nature of man itself, rather than anything so variable as the style of culture and of knowledge, pronounces a historical form to be necessary for the sway of religious ideas among mankind. This is made more than probable by several considerations. Our nature, except when under strict philosophical training, of which few are capable and from which many turn away in disgust, revolts from abstractions and delights in concrete realities. We are made to take pleasure in personal existences and in their actions. Our sentiments need some object on which they can fasten. Reverence is not content with existing as a vague feeling, but seeks for some reality which may be the object of worship. The feeling of dependence needs to have that on which we are dimly conscious of depending body itself forth in some apprehensible form. Thankfulness implies the purpose of a known personal object to confer a benefit, and so all our feelings go forth only towards distinctly apprehended personalities. But personalities evidence and manifest themselves through actions which have to do with life and the world. So also the imagination is distressed—so to speak—if it cannot give form to the invisible and the ideal. The Christian religion could not hold its ground in the world but through a personal attachment to Christ. How then can a religion, with no attraction derived from history and personal power, expect to be met by human sympathy and to spread through mankind.

But again a religion which has no history must be destitute of the power of life and example.

Life, considered in relation to religion, is the embodiment and test of doctrine or principle. Example is an illustration or acting out of principle in a particular case, and implies an influence on the imitative nature of man. Nothing gives so much power or weakness to a man as his life. Nothing tests a religion so much as the way in which it moulds the life of men. The life of Christ is the central power in Christianity. The treasury of the Church is the good lives of all faithful Christians, not because they can do more than they ought, as the Romanists supposed, but because they act just as they should. The blood of the martyrs is the seed of the Church, not so much because they dared to die for what they prized, as because there lay behind the mar-
tyr’s faith a life that rose above the ordinary level. If Christianity had not put on a living form, if it could not have passed at once from high and loving precepts into the shape of pure men and women, we should not be defending it now. Forgiveness might have sounded sweet in precept, but if Christ and his dying disciple, Stephen, had not forgiven, where would the humanity of the world have been at this time?

It seems certain then that the strength of Christianity, as of Judaism before it, lay in its history, in the lives which it formed, and especially in that one life which it set up as a perfect model. But for facts in the life of Jesus, the cloud of witnesses would not have surrounded us, the host of shining ones would not have arisen in our sky. Mere precept, although invested with celestial authority, can effect little; an abstract standard of character, not realized in the life, will be almost destitute of power for the great mass of mankind.

But the man whose religion, as he thinks is to control the future, may ask whether it cannot become the “heir of all the ages;” whether all that has been good and pure in the lives of men, under the Gospel and under heathenism, cannot be collected and used for the good of mankind. Why may not Christ, with his saints, stand on the calendar of that religion, even as the heathen emperor, Alexander Severus, built a temple to Christ, and counted Him among his Gods. Meanwhile, he will say, the religion itself will be forming its own examples of a higher than Christian virtue, and setting them up for the veneration of all future time.

What success this proposed religion may have in the way of making godly and finished lives we do not propose now to consider. But this is certain, that a great part of the glory of Christian lives must then be effaced and lost. For Christ will have become a self-deceiver, and the view of his own character under which he acted was false.

You cannot separate his consciousness of a peculiar relation to God from his life itself, and you cannot separate the life of his followers from a faith in him as divine, and from the power of those truths which he taught, and which, on the supposition, have turned out to be false or to be without divine authority. Either, then, veneration and respect for the character of Christ and of the best Christians will in a good degree cease, or it will be accounted a thing of small importance, whether that be true or false which controls the life, since falsehood has attended the development of the noblest characters known to the world.

II. The supposed new religion of the future must be a religion without authority, a religion constructed by human reason alone. The Christian religion claims a twofold divine authority; it is from God and by God,—it is a revelation contained in inspired writings. Even if you gave up the latter source of authority, you would not cut all its connection with heaven, unless the claim to inspiration be part and parcel of the revelation itself. Nor is the Christian religion solitary in advancing such claims, but all over the world, wherever religions have sprung up, they have declared themselves to be disclosures of the Divine will. Nor is it important to our argument to decide whether these religions have been the product of imposture, or of the myth-making power, or of a self-deluding enthusiasm. If impostures, they confess a need of some authority beyond their inventors. If the offspring of a myth-making age, they clothe themselves in the garb of revelation from an instinctive sense that religion ought to wear such a dress. If they grow up in an individual mind of large imaginative power, the same craving for a connection with God and for an inspiration from Him is manifest.

It is further evident that the reception of religion in the world, has much depended
upon faith in its divine origin. That Christ was a teacher come from God was an essential element of his power, without which many would have refused to listen to His words, and few, if any, would have followed Him. The churches founded by the apostles were founded on faith in a divine interruption of the natural order of things. And so the written word is indebted for no small part of its power, for the attention originally given to it in spite of its defects of composition, for the hold it has had on the best minds of the world to a belief that it is in some way authorized to give the news of a plan of God, which man's own faculties could not discover, that it contains facts and truths above nature and above the reach of reason. And hence, if at any time the evidences of the Christian religion lose their hold on the faith of any age, the religion itself is abandoned. We are now thrown back upon reason; we must decide between different schools of philosophy, or follow our inward light, or be tossed on the uncertain waters of scepticism. And the need of divine authority for the guidance of our faith and conduct is felt by many of the strongest minds to be so great, that it is only with extreme reluctance, and by a kind of necessity which is harrowing to the soul, that they blow out the light that was their guide and commit themselves to the direction of reason. They feel when they reject the Gospel that some authorized guide, some standard of truth, some charter, speaking pardon, spiritual help and hope, would be divinely precious.

The contrast between Christianity, as authorized to make God known to men—not indeed shedding full light on every side, but satisfying and stimulating without suppressing reason—and a religion of man's devising, is one that reaches to the very foundations of the soul's life. Religion in the soul would shrink into pitiably small dimensions without the guidance and authority of a supernatural revelation. What is to become of faith in spiritual realities, in what God thinks of conduct, in what He is and how He will treat men, if the Scriptures are of "private interpretation," if Christ spoke without authority, if no one hath come down from heaven to tell the world of heavenly things? What will trust find to lean upon, if the "great and precious promises" are of human origin? Where will repentance go for refuge if there is no assurance of pardon? How will the soul be made strong enough to resist sin, if there is no certainty of divine assistance? How can such a hope of heaven as reason can establish, fortify the erring against earthly trials and help them to die in peace? In short, since every religious feeling, every virtue, all morality, all practical benevolence are now maintained, as Christian experience demonstrates, by the voice of God in His word, will there not be an end of all these things, and must not religion become so uncertain, so weak, when Christ shall be given up, as to have next to no power over human life and society? Without divine authority, evidence and motive power are taken away from religion, and without these what can it do for the good of man? Nay, without assurance concerning those great questions that perplex unaided reason, will not the main energy of human thought be turned towards the problems of philosophy and away from practical virtue? Can a religion drawn up out of man's own soul satisfy his reason? Will there not be eternal questionings, as there were among the old philosophers? Will not the main strength of the greatest minds be spent in finding out truth, instead of reducing it to practice and using it for human improvement? At present to a very great extent Christianity satisfies the cravings of the soul by its truth and by its evidence. What can any other religion which claims no such authorities bring into the world save doubt, restlessness, self-
dissatisfaction, and wandering, unsuccessful efforts after rest?

To make the immense importance of divine authority more apparent, let us briefly sketch the progress of subjective religion, as we find it arising and increasing under the Gospel. In the first instance there is a recognition, founded on positive precepts, of a divine law reaching to the thoughts and intents of the heart. This the moral sense approves and adopts as its rule, but what would become of the standard of action, if the outward authority were to be disregarded and denied? Is it not certain that the divine requirement, as things are, originates and sustains all the convictions of the necessity of a religious life, and awakens a sense of want and a sense of sin by which the soul is led to God? Then again in the pathway of our return to God we are met by positive assurances of danger on the one hand, and positive offers of forgiveness on the other, without which it is certain that religion on the Christian plan could not begin to exist. And the terms of forgiveness, contained in these revelations which the Gospel makes, are the outward resting place on which the peace of the soul through a long life reposes. What assurance can it find within itself or in the plan of the world large enough to fill the place of this authority? Then the whole of internal religion is obviously maintained by declarations of scripture, some of which, singly, have afforded more comfort than all the reasonings and self-encouragements of unaided minds since the world began. A life of inward morality and of holiness is built on the Scriptural exhibition of God and His holiness. A life of benevolence is a following of the precepts, and of the lives which are precepts, that the Scriptures afford us. A life of hope needs distinct statements, and these must embrace both worlds. A life of unworldliness and self-renunciation needs promises to support it in its weakness, lest it should have given up everything to gain nothing. And so whatever aspect religion presents to us in the soul, whether it consists in escaping from sin, or in reconciliation of heart to God, or in acts of morality or of philanthropy or of piety, or in the development of certain feelings, or in the formation of a certain character, it needs throughout and actually uses the support of the Scriptures, as the guide of faith, the directory of life, the support of every feeling of the heart. What must happen then, when this revealed word shall have been abandoned, when its former influence shall have ceased, when its light shall have faded away from the world's atmosphere, but that religion must lose its hold on the world, must dwindle down into a feeble, sickly, timorous thing, looking every way for help to itself, if it do not quite expire?

But it will be said by a portion of those who hope to see a new universal religion rise up on the ruins of Christianity, that their faith is in a certain sense from God, and is attended with authority from Him. Every good man, every man who walks according to the inward light, is in a sense an inspired man. Christ had with him more truth than any other human being, because He was better than any. Thus there is a kind of natural inspiration of the human race, which is slowly perfecting truth, eliminating errors, bringing man from the outward and historical, from the claims to divine authority—proved now to be unreliable, and yet for a long time serving as stepping stones in human progress—to the pure ultimately recognized inner light of the soul.

There is much of beauty and attractiveness in such a theory as this, but it cannot stand the test of truth and sound philosophy. It takes no account of the weakness of human reason, as demonstrated by the history of opinions,—of the vain efforts, for instance, made by the Greek philosophers to attain to
theological truth, and of their hopeless diversity of views ending in scepticism. It takes no account of the subsequent history of philosophical thought, which has failed down to the present time, notwithstanding all the efforts of highly gifted minds, in the idealistic and pantheistic schools, to reach any assurance in regard to any doctrine of religion. It takes no account of the diversities of opinion, into which men of insight have been or may be led, either from confounding their insight and the conclusions of their understandings, or because insight itself, at least in the present condition of human nature, is an unsafe guide. It demands that a man should be good in order to have a true insight, but how is he to be good except by truth which insight discovers, and how is he to be followed by those who have no such clear insight as his? Would Christ have been a lawgiver and an example for mankind, if he had spoken out his own private feelings, without any claim to divine authority? The theory then will at length discover that it is decking itself in the robes of Christianity, that its illumination and insight are really borrowed from the Gospel, that whenever it shall succeed so far as to destroy faith in a historic revelation, at once darkness and distrust will begin to creep again over the minds of men whom Christianity had somewhat enlightened.

This theory moreover discloses its own inconsistency and falsehood by the position which it takes in regard to Christ. The wisest, best, humblest, most unselfish of men, as is conceded, he made the most stupendous mistake in regard to himself, and brought it about that this mistake became engrafted on his religion, nay—that it gave to his religion its distinctive character and its power in the world. So much light with so much darkness, such lofty purity united to such false claims of exaltation above the measure of a human being—this was the wisdom and excellence, this the insight of Jesus Christ. If he had insight and nothing more, is not his insight wholly unreliable, since he failed to see into himself?

III. The supposed religion of the future will of necessity have a very limited range of doctrines.

Religious doctrine is the measure and sum total of the motives which a religion can bring to bear upon character. If the doctrines are false or immoral, they will form perverted or defective characters; if scanty, they will have little effect on character; if merely metaphysical and not ethical, they will have no effect on character whatever. It has been claimed by the friends of Christianity that it is intensely practical, that its grand truths or doctrines, especially those which are connected with its grand facts or history, have a direct and most healthy bearing on human life, that it contains enough of truth to finish human character on all its sides, and that, when believed, it actually forms characters of the highest excellence. The question then is how much loss of power over human nature will arise from a rejection of the most important and distinctive doctrines of Christianity; by the side of which question stand others already answered, how much power will be lost by losing the vital force of a historical religion, and how much will be lost by losing the authority of revelation and throwing men back upon the results of human speculation.

It is impossible at this time to predict what shape the doctrines of the new religion of the future will ultimately take. But thus much we can say, that if it should start with a certain apparatus of doctrines, part of them will at length be broken or not used at all, and that owing to the influence of Christian education, which its advocates cannot now escape, its motive power and seeming excellence will be greatest at first, and will be growing less and less afterward.
But let us try to form a candid estimate, as far as probabilities will allow, of the amount of truth and motive that will be within the reach of this religion of the future, and that can be used in endeavouring to give finish to moral and religious character.

First, whatever is especially Christian, as distinguished from natural religion and from the conclusions of human reason, must be given up. The doctrine that the word became flesh—that God sent His Son to redeem men from sin—will be looked upon as a fable, as an unaccountable claim on the part of Jesus or an unauthorized addition to His teachings. Thus, His relations to God and to man being put on a wholly different basis, He ceases to be a great personage governing the world's history, and sinks into a teacher who mistook His own nature most fearfully, and from whose most authentic doctrines very much must be lopped off. That this alone would make a revolution in the world, greater than any since the birth of Christ himself, cannot be questioned. Oh! what other throne, what dynasty of high-born kings reaching through ages and famed through the world, could fall, which man might not forget in a century! But this kingdom over hearts, this invisible sway of Christ beginning in the self-consecration of the soul and ending in the entire renovation of society and of government, when can it cease to be regretted? Oh! what lapse of time, what changes in outer things will prevent the world from bleeding at every pore through a feeling that it has lost its guide and the pledge of its stability!

Secondly, the doctrine concerning God and His providence must be reduced to its lowest dimensions. Whether the reigning form of this new religion will cling firmly to the personality of God, as a cardinal point, and drive Pantheists as a heretical sect beyond its pale, cannot be distinctly anticipated. But suppose its standard doctrine to be that human nature within itself, apart from proof, contains a recognition of a deity, when we come to the doctrine of providence and of spiritual influence, the ground is more uncertain. To a providence, in any such sense that any interruptions of the common course of physical law can be admitted, it cannot subscribe, for it rejects all the miracles of the past. And thus it can scarcely teach, with any show of consistency, that prayer can in any way affect the order of things, or be an argument with God for bestowing blessings on the worshippers.

Moreover, without a positive revelation, that speaks of a God near at hand and around His creatures, it is increasingly hard to put faith in that high doctrine, for every advance of science thrusts Him to a more remote distance. He has left the reins on the neck of time, and inhabits His eternity as a vital energy, without concern or pity for man. What check can the religion of the future apply to this tendency to shut God out of the visible and actual present? Must it not succumb to the relentless blows of science, and lose its faith in a hand guiding the world, since positive and natural religion together find it so hard to furnish strong enough antidotes against scepticism?

The doctrine of spiritual influence, for ought that we can see, it may with consistency admit. But who can tell whether such influences can be hoped for, since they proceed from the free will of a sovereign, who has made no promises either in an external revelation or to the soul? May they be prayed for? What encouragement is there even to begin to pray, much more to persevere in it, when everything is so uncertain? May it not be the appointed lot of man to struggle alone against internal evils, as he must by the law of his nature against outward? In this state of uncertainty there will not be much prayer, and without Divine help the hope of improving the character will decline. Does not this
single consideration show that a great part of practical religion will be cut up by the roots?

Thirdly, the doctrine concerning man which Christianity has taught us will need great modification. If the Gospel’s view of sin could be retained without its remedial provisions, if a sense of guilt with no assurance of forgiveness could settle upon souls under the new religion, as now, mankind would cry out against it in desperation, they would flee away from leaden clouds of death which let no rays of hope through, or would wander, if not desperate, into all kinds of heathenish ways of propitiating God. Will it be said that the glimpses which we catch without revelation of the Divine clemency and forbearance would be enough of an assurance for sinning men? We answer, that they might satisfy a weak sense of sin but could not comfort a deep one. The sense of sin then, as of a malady at the root of our nature for which each one of us is responsible, would very much fade away. God never having by any revelation from heaven disclosed his wrath against all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, what sufficient evidence would there be that sin is a very great evil, how would it be seen to alienate the soul from Him, what reason would there be to dread His frown? Nor is it unlikely that sin would be regarded as a transitional state in the necessary progress of human nature. And it seems likely that the efforts against it would be confined principally to the rectification of society, to the removal of ignorance, to the relief of the lower classes, on the ground that human nature is not bad, that evil emanates from society and can be effectually obstructed and dried up by outward reformations. However this may be, it is certain that by some anaesthetic process what we call a sense of sin would be benumbed. But is it not evident that the cost of this would be immense? Must there not ensue a weakening of the very foundations of morality? Could the family, could society endure this? Will the religion of the future be able to endure it? Will not faith in God, and faith in unalterable morality, in holiness and justice, stand or fall together with faith in sin? Must there not then be a further plunge of a demoralized world into Atheism?

Fourthly, the doctrine concerning the last things will very probably be an open, unsettled question. Only a glance at the history of opinion down to the most recent times is enough to show that man has in vain sought to solve the problem of the immortality and future destiny of the soul. But let the religion of the future pronounce a decisive word on these high doctrines; how little will it gain since it has no new proofs to bring forward, and has nothing but human insight to rest upon. And then, a future state being admitted, are there to be rewards and punishments? May sin, here, affect our state in that future life? If it may, we need some help from God, which the religion does not make sure. If it may not, of what value is the future life in relation to conduct? What is the future life in that case but a barren fact standing a great way off? Thus, whether we consider the uncertainty in which the religion must remain concerning a future life, or the slender use it makes of this doctrine in the way of a motive and of elevating man above worldly things, it will be found quite indifferent whether the doctrine be retained or discarded; at the best, it will be an appendage of no importance.

The whole of what we have said thus far, and especially the consideration of the slender stock of truth at the disposal of the religion of the future, makes it clear that the motive power of such a religion, its influence on life and character, must be exceedingly small. Some room will be left for reverence, and for the sense of dependence; thankfulness also may be awakened to a degree, although...
crippled by doubts concerning Providence. But how narrow will be the reach of trust, how feeble the vigour of hope, having no promises to feed upon; how poor a part will be played by faith in things unseen! And if the doctrine of immortal life gives an immense amplitude to human action, enlarges our sense of our own importance in the universe, and adds untold force to the reasons for improving our character, how lame will all efforts at moral excellence be, how small the motive, how trifling the issues of conduct, when this great truth shall be feebly held or quite discarded!

But in lieu of all other considerations touching this point we urge that the new religion will have no fuel for love towards God, that the harmony of the human and divine soul will be nearly impossible. The justice of this remark will stand in a clear light if we consider what excites the emotion of love,—of love, we mean, as involving complacency, confidence, and general harmony of spirit,—and how it differs from some other feelings that play a part in religion. The feeling of reverence will be aroused according to the laws of our nature, although we may have a very dim perception of the power that we revere. So the sense of dependence implies indeed an object on which we depend, but gives no light in regard to the qualities of that object. But love needs for its existence some sort of disclosure or revelation of the feelings and character of the object towards which it goes forth. Between man and man love cannot arise, unless one party has a manifestation of the character and feelings of the other. We cannot love an unknown person, nor love on conjecture, nor love an intellect. It is the same in the case of the Divine Being. There must go before all love to him some conviction of his moral excellence, and as love is reciprocal, some assurance that he can love in return. And hence, again, there must be some persuasion that he can regard sinners with favour in spite of their sins. The history of heathenism, the convictions of our own sinful natures, will show us that a sense of guilt without an assurance of pardon must drive men from the face of God; they will show us the justice of those words, "We love Him because He first loved us."

Now then if the Gospel which pretends to be a revelation of God's character and of his mercy is to be abandoned as untrue, what room is left for man's love to him? He has become an unknown God; how can we love him of whose character we know little, and of his feelings towards us, next to nothing? Will it be said that something within us leads us irresistibly to conceive of him as absolute moral perfection? Were we to grant this, which the diversities of human religions do not justify, yet love requires more, it demands some knowledge of the relations between Him and ourselves, and how do we gain any information on this point from our insights and instinctive judgments? If our nature assures us that he loves the good, must it not equally reveal to us his alienation from the morally evil? How then with our conscience of sin can we love him whom we have offended, love him of whose pardon we have no assurance, love him in whose sight our nature is unholy? Love, then, in its highest and noblest forms must be a stranger to the religion of the future. If love to God is the crown of our character, if to call such a sentiment into life constitutes one of the chief glories of Christ's religion, as well as one of the great sources of its strength, must not a religion that knows little of God, and nothing of forgiveness, be incapable of forming beautiful lives? Must it not perish and become despised from its very weakness?

In short, the religion will be of this earth, getting next to no influence from the unseen life beyond this world, or from the unseen life above this world. It lacks, therefore, the power of faith and the possibility of a life of faith. Can the age when it shall be
established fail of being intensely worldly, and epicurean? Think of the art and literature of such an age: think of the spirit they must breathe; think of the loss of motives for morality and a religious life at which we hinted just now. Can such a prospect fail to excite deep alarm?

IV. We remark very briefly that the new religion of which we speak will be without the strength derived from a church and its institutions.

The Christian Church of the present, with all its faults and weaknesses, is the salt and the light of the world. As holding, preserving, and spreading the faith of Christ, as built on the feeling of brotherhood, and on trust in a common Saviour, as bound together by social worship, sacraments, a ministry and a discipline, and as containing in itself a self-reforming power, it is one of the bonds which bind mankind together, and on it the hopes of mankind in a great measure rest. Its influence extends far beyond its own pale, and beyond the religious interests of man; it originates or aids every effort to make him wiser, happier, and more manly.

What now can take the place of the Church, or compensate man for its fall, as fall it must, if the old historical religion is abandoned? What common hopes, what common object of reverence or love will the new religion have to offer to its professors, nay, what common faith can it supply them with, except a few meagre shreds not large enough to cover the nakedness of reason? It must have worship, but what kind of worship? That in which sentimentality and taste take the lead, with the fewest, the weakest appeals to religious feeling. Will it introduce prayer into its public services, when the question of an answer to prayer is unsettled, or denied; or thanksgiving, when a Providence is doubted, and blind law accounts for all things? Can it have institutions? Institutions of a historical origin are out of the question, because the religion has no history from which to draw them. Institutions made for the sake of having them it can invent, but how weak the hold on the mind of man of such institutions, how small their venerableness! What can it have or find to replace the sacred supper? Compare the fellowship pertaining to such a dead skeleton of a religion with membership in Christ. Compare its preaching on a narrow round of dogmas with the inexhaustible themes of the Christian pulpit. Must not, in fact, morality take the place of religion in the pulpit, and religious doctrine be no more looked to as suggesting the great motives of action! Compare the probable zeal for its propagation with that resulting from the nature of the Gospel, and from the command of Christ, “Go ye into all the world.” Can there be much zeal for its diffusion, especially as long as its friends maintain that the systems of heathenism involve all the essential truths of religion? Wherever we turn, then, we discover its weaknesses, we cannot find one element of power. It will make no place for itself in the affections of human souls.

V. If these things are so, human progress must cease, and civilization, whenever the world shall throw away its faith in revealed religion, must decline.

We seem to ourselves to have shown, that, whether the form, the evidence, the substance, the motive power, or the social influences of the new rival of Christianity be taken into view, it is wholly weak and unreliable. Can the destinies of mankind be safely entrusted to a religion without facts, without authority, with a minimum of doctrines, and with no institutions at all? Must not the advancement of society in all that is good, cease, if Christianity is to lose its hold over the faith and love of men. If a large factor be thrown out of the account, must not the product be greatly lessened?

There is but one answer to this question: such a decline must take place, unless, in the
future, other influences are to make up for the diminished power of religion? Just this, we suppose, is what many thinkers anticipate, who have rejected the claims of Christianity. We apprehend that, as a class, those who have looked upon bare Theism as the heir and successor of the Gospel, do not put very much of dependence upon this predicted religion of the future; we conceive that it is expected to take its place as a handmaid and not as a mistress, while civilization, or progress, is looked upon as the coming Queen of the world. The bitter taunt of the Greek poet is to be fulfilled, who makes his sophist say, that vortex or whirl has expelled Jupiter from his throne; God is to cease to reign and Progress will take his place.* This doctrine of progress may adopt the form of a fatal development, or that of a free advance in accordance with a divine plan. The first form, or that which it must assume in a pantheistic theory of the world, does not now concern us. The other form, or that which a Theist, who rejects the scriptures, can embrace, will be something like this: that, in the course of time there will be such an accumulation of knowledge, such a lifting up of man above nature, such improvements in government and legislation, such refinement diffused through society, that even in the lowest classes, the propension will be towards sobriety, honesty, chastity, and kindness. And so a very little influence from religion, very little knowledge of God, or concern about him will give all needed aid to the advancement of mankind.

A theory of human progress like this deserves, on account of its importance, an extended examination; we must content ourselves, however, with two or three remarks that bear on our subject more immediately: we observe, then,

1. First, that facts do not justify the hope of such a progress; we mean, that the improvements which have been made in society must be ascribed chiefly to Christianity; that advances in physical science have no great weight in bringing about moral ones; and that ameliorations of governments and of society can scarcely begin, cannot be permanent, without the aid of religion.

It is apparent that a benevolent feeling aroused by the Gospel has, in fact, had very much to do with modern reforms; with reforms, for example, in prison discipline, in the houses, habits, and privileges of the poor, in promoting temperance, in putting an end to the slave trade and to slavery, in sending light to the ignorant, in endeavouring to spread the spirit of peace. Christ’s religion has in fact taken the lead in schemes for the benefit of society, and it will be scarcely maintained that, while thus at the head of this blessed movement, it has crippled or suppressed other benevolent forces, which can take its place when it shall become extinct. For where are they? Were they in action when the Gospel overcame heathenism, and were they put in the background by it as by some jealous monarch? On the other hand, without the Gospel the field, and the energy of benevolence will be vastly lessened. The field will be earthly relations almost exclusively. The energy will be paralyzed, when the conception of God’s kingdom on earth, when faith in Divine influences shall be discarded, when the doctrine of a future life shall be disbelieved, or just clung to, amid the waves of uncertainty.

Again, the advance of science does not, in fact, secure the advance of society, notwithstanding all the efforts of Christians and other benevolent persons. As far as the past can teach us, science may add indefinitely to its stores, while society continues corrupt or degenerates. There are armies of thieves and of reprobates, worse than heathens, within sound of the voice of the great lecturers of Paris. Officers of preventive and of correctional police have plenty of work to do in all large cities, both in Europe and this fre
land. In some respects the dangerous classes in large towns are worse than they were. They know more, and are more excitable. Their knowledge, having nothing to do with rules of conduct and the meaning of life, being in fact such as a class of men without religion would gather, makes them craftier, more able to combine, more able to evade justice.

Nor is there any necessary connection between the advance of science and the improvement of political institutions. Even the theory of politics may be conformed to true science in a nation, while yet the body politic may have no power to govern itself or to shake off abuses. The moral energy, the spirit of self-sacrifice, the courage to attempt reform in the right way, the hope of success, the healthful tone of opinion in society concerning justice,—all these and other sources of national health are far less dependent on the state of science than on religious and moral influences. Nations, in order to grow great, or become free, or remain free, must, like single men, have strength of character, and this is mainly from moral and religious culture, or from a certain simplicity of life which is lost in high cultivation.

2. But, in the second place, theories of human progress like that at which we are looking, misconceive of and underrate the power appropriate to religion in the civilization of the world, and also give an exceedingly earthly view of life.

They misconceive of the civilizing power of the Gospel. At least they seem to conceive of Christians as thinking that religion of itself, without the aid of any other agencies, is the sole source of human improvement and civilization. But the true and received statement is that religion controls the forces which mould and refine the soul and society. It is the main-spring or the governing wheel which gives motion, and it also regulates and harmonizes all movement. It is in harmony with all truth and in sympathy with all improvement, but it acts not only through its own direct invisible power, but through the laws of nature, of the soul, and of society. It looks on the science of nature with favour, because this is an exposition of the thoughts of God, and thus science has a strong healthy growth under its fostering influence. It sends the individual's thoughts within, and thus aids the science of the soul. It makes him aware of his rights and his duties, and thus helps to build up a true philosophy of man in the State, as well as a just society. It elevates his feelings and purifies his taste, and thus gives wing to true art. It is the foe of vice, and thus of all ignorance and of all oppression. But its glory lies in making "all things new," not without other agencies, but through its control over them, and through its sway over the individual soul.

Again, in such theories of civilization the power of the Christian religion seems to be greatly underrated. In the first place, a due value is not set upon that which is distinctively Christian, as compared with that which belongs to Judaism and to natural religion. The history of Christian art, the examination of religious experience, if we look to no other sources of proof, will show us that the great sway over life and society proceeds from that which is new in Christianity, from Christ in His person, life, and work, from forgiveness of sins and redemption, from the doctrine of the Holy Spirit, from the judgment and the future state. Take all this away, and you take away, if we are not deceived, nearly all that constitutes the superiority and the glory of Christian civilization.

But again, such theories contemplate the civilizing forces of Christianity as standing side by side with those of literature, art, science, law, and government. Tariffs, roads, and printing presses are held to be as original and as efficient benefactors of society as bibles and sermons. But this seems to be a very serious mistake, which grows out of
another, still more fundamental, concerning
the nature of man,—an assumption that he
is unaltered, that he has all power within
himself without the aid of new truth from
heaven to elevate his condition. Is it not
evident that the system of practical forces
which make up the Gospel, must, if believed
and loved, govern the will, heart, and life of
the individual, and that through the ame-
lioration of the individual all civilizing
influences will be either perfected or ori-
ginated? What the Gospel has done or can
do in the way of benefiting society, the
institutions it founds, the science it warms
into life ought not surely to be alleged as
reasons why we can get along at some future
day without the Gospel. The Gospel is not
the schoolmaster who leaves the grown up
pupil to be guided by his own reason; it is
the leaven hid in the meal until the whole
mass is leavened.

The conservation of society can be en-
trusted only to moral and religious forces.
If religion has no moving, preserving, check-
ing, or balancing power, or if, as is true of
heathenism, it is itself immoral, then art,
literature, whatever promotes the advance of
society, is paralyzed or corrupted; and there
comes on a decline of society, as in Greece
after Alexander and in Rome under the
emperors, without hope of recovery from
any internal power. On the other hand, if,
as is true in the case of Christianity, the
religion is ethical in the highest sense, in the
sense not only of teaching morals, but of
enlarging the conception of what is right and
supplying the highest motives for the enno-
blement of character, then there is a foun-
dation laid on which society, with all its
interests, can rest, and there is opportunity
for all that progress which is possible in con-
sistency with the condition of man.

We are now prepared to say, that if the
influences from the Gospel should be with-
drawn, a most earthly civilization, one having
its own doom written on its forehead, would
take the place of that which Christianity
has been the leading agent in forming.
Suppose, for instance, that all thinkers
should lose faith in the immortality of the
soul. Is it not evident that with the
abandonment of this one truth the concerns
of the present world would begin to assume
a new relative importance, that all mo-
tives drawn from a life to come would be
feeble, that self-gratification must rise in
value, and self-denial fall, that all the
aspirations of man must droop and wither?
Is it not evident that something of that
mingled frivolity and despair which Atheism
engenders, and of which heathen society,
especially in its decay when its faith is lost,
gives us examples, would brood over the
world? For how could civilization fail to
decline, when frivolity blighted the taste
and deprived the moral judgments, and
when despair, the sense of the emptiness of
life, took away the stimulus from all noble
endeavour

3. Finally, in one very important respect
the very progress of society demands the
assurances and supports of positive Christian
truth. As knowledge and refinement in-
crease, the standard of character tends to
rise, and along with it will deepen the feel-
ing of responsibility and the pain of falling
below the standard. A sense of imperfection
—or of sinfulness, if we may call it so, as keen
as any other sense and more indestructible,
will then be in vigorous exercise. How is
this sense to be satisfied without a Gospel?
Heathenism has had its method of satisfying
the consciousness of sin, its reconciliation of
man and God, in which lay no small part of
its strength. Christianity has its method,
and herein lies much of the service which it
has rendered to mankind. But naked Deism,
the religion of human insight and natural
reason, says nothing of pardon and redemp-
tion, nothing of a helping, life-giving spirit.
In this respect it occupies a much weaker
position than that which is taken by the
systems of necessary development. They legitimately deny the reality of moral evil. It has for them no existence, because the will is not free, or because sin, being a necessary stage for finite minds, is not objectively evil. But a system, in which a personal God is a central principle, cannot extinguish the sense of sin or deny its reality. Nay, the further the true refinement of society is carried, the higher the standard of character is raised, and the vaster the creation is shown to be by science; so much the more grandeur and glory are spread around the throne of God. Sin, then, tends to enlarge in its dimensions before the eye of a refined age which has not thrown aside its faith in the moral attributes of God. But Deism has nothing to satisfy this sense of sin but baseless hopes and analogies drawn from the unexplained dealings of God. If God ought to forgive because the best conceptions of human virtue includes forgiveness, He ought to have indignation against sin because that too enters as an element into our ideal of perfect character. And how terrible that indignation! What distance so vast as that between the Infinite One, inhabiting His dwelling place of holiness, and a soul conscious of selfishness and of impurity! The course of things, if Deism should be the ultimate form of religion, would be something like this. As long as the recollections and influences of Christianity survived its fall, earnest souls would hope on, they would stay their soul-hunger on the milk drawn from the breasts of their dead mother. But a new age would toss about in uncertainty, if not in despair; or else, throwing aside their Deism which brings before their wearied minds the unsolved problem of the relations of sinning man to a holy God, they would hunt after peace in the fields of Atheistic or Pantheistic philosophy. Civilization with God but without Christ leads to a terrible dilemma. If the sense of sin remain, the life of all noble souls will be an anxious, gloomy tragedy. Or if that burden so crushing is thrown off as in a life struggle, then the standard of character will fall and the sense of sin grow faint to such a degree that the pardon from God craved in heathenism will not be needed, and the utmost frivolity will be reached of life and manners. In either case the progress of civilization will be stopped; the world of the future will be doomed; and the "religion of the future" will turn out to be a miserable raft, unfit, after the shipwreck of Christianity, to carry the hopes and the welfare of mankind down the ages.
“GOD IN HUMAN THOUGHT.”*

By Henry A. Nelson, D.D., Geneva, N. Y.

This is the significant title of a work lately published, the product of extensive and careful reading and of much patient and candid thinking. Its author has shown great ability to enter into the thoughts of men in various ages, and of various cultures, civilization, and religions, with a generous sympathy, which enables him to find their true contents, and to report them to his readers without distortion and without exaggeration. A calm, scholarly, philosophic tone is maintained naturally and without effort; therefore, without ostentation and without rigidity. The author converses with the sages of antiquity, the thinkers of all times, with a respectful candour, most similar to that of Paul at Athens. No wonder, then, that he has so generally found them “seeking the Lord, if haply they might feel after Him and find Him.”—Acts xvii. 27.

The better minds among all peoples have solicitously and carefully “felt after” “the GOD”; the best of them have been aware that “He is not far from every one of us.”

This conviction has possessed not only the most gifted, but also the simple and lowly, who have been sincere and teachable, obediently listening for any divine voice which peradventure might whisper to them—Yes,

“In even savage bosoms
There are longings, yearnings, strivings
For the good they comprehend not;
. . . . Feeble hands and helpless,
Groping blindly in the darkness,
Touch God’s right hand in the darkness,
And are lifted up and strengthened.”

* God in Human Thought, or Natural Theology traced in Literature, Ancient and Modern, to the time

It is not the purpose of the present writer to review Dr. Gillett’s work, by the reading of which he has felt his own mind not a little refreshed and enriched. He only takes occasion to express some thoughts on the great theme (the Being of God), considered from a point of view which this book suggests.

A theologian of the last generation called his readers to an instructive meditation “on the duty which is laid upon men by the probability, or even the imagination, of a God.”

One who does not know that there is a God, when first the question, whether there is, visits him—when first the bare “imagination of a God” springs up in his mind—instantly becomes subject to a distinct obligation to test that imagination—to find, if he can, the true answer to that question. Enjoying daily benefits, enjoying a conscious being, which (it just now occurs to him) may, perhaps, be gifts of a beneficent Creator, it behoves him at once to inquire whether they are so. That he does not know to whom he is indebted, nor whether to any one, may not be a fault; but if he does not care to know, then is he culpably ungrateful. If his heart is right, if he has the right moral disposition, he will not be satisfied until he has ascertained whether there is a God.

Was ever a mature human mind in that position? It is not easy to imagine the

† Chalmers’ Nat. Theol., vol. 1. chap. II.

of Bishop Butler; with a Closing Chapter on the Moral System, and an English Bibliography, from Spenser to Butler. 2 vols. oct. By Professor E. H. Gillett, of the University of New York. May be obtained of Dickinson and Higham, Farringdon-street, London.
thought of God coming as a new thought into any mind in its maturity. The extensive researches of Dr. Gillett in the literature of various nations and ages (the authentic records of "human thought") find God in it everywhere.

There have been many thinkers who have raised and pursued the question, whether this idea has any objective reality corresponding to it—whether God is, a real Being, or not. But has any one who has raised that question, ever spoken of a time when he had not that idea, or informed us when it first came into his mind?

The question which is put to us, is not whether we will admit the belief in God into our minds on the presentation of a convincing proof that He is, a real Being, but whether we will cast that belief out of our minds on account of finding it unsupported by evidence and unreasonable.

Every one of us, when first he finds himself capable of thought, finds himself in possession of this belief. He may be called upon to examine its validity, to decide whether it is a belief which is fit to be retained. He may value the possession, but be too honest to keep it without a good title; or he may find it an uncomfortable possession, and so be led to inquire whether he can honestly be rid of it. But no one of us can remember when he came into this possession, or look back to a time when he did not have it. We have had this belief as long as we have had any belief at all. When any experience whatever stirs our consciousness of this belief, we find it at the very bottom of our minds, underlying every other belief. Whatever shakes this shakes them all. Ceasing to believe this, it is not easy to see how we could continue to believe anything.

This subjective condition of our own minds is a fact which we cannot omit to consider in a philosophical investigation. It is, indeed, the very first fact which we come upon in such an investigation. Like all other facts belonging to the subject, it has a right to be accounted for in any theory which offers itself to our acceptance. It is an unquestionable fact. It is a fact for which we need no testimony. It lies in the consciousness of each one of us. It is competent to challenge, for insufficiency, any theory which cannot make room for it and take it in.

We are not seeking to evade the obligation of testing the validity of this belief. We accept this obligation, and we inquire in what state of mind it behoves us to enter upon this investigation.

Some there are, who stand ready to demand that we be free from all prepossessions and all preference in the matter. They allege that our "traditional" or "hereditary" belief in God is a prejudice, or bias, from which we must free ourselves before we can enter in a really scientific way into the inquiry, whether God is. The mind must be cleared, say they, of all predilection, of all predisposition to believe in God. At the beginning, and at every subsequent step, of the investigation, we must take care lest the wish should be father to the thought, lest the heart's conscious want of God should delude the intellect into the belief of Him. Let us have the investigation in the "daylight" of reason. This is brain-work, not heart-work.

We do not hesitate to pronounce this an extravagant and unreasonable demand. It is impartiality gone to seed. It is candour gone mad. It is self-control ossified. The same false philosophy which demands this has soaked into our jurisprudence, at that point where the demand for impartiality in judicial investigation has been carried to such excess, that, virtually, ignorance and stolidity become prime qualifications for jurors. There is scarcely a graver question at present for the philosophic statesman than this: How can trial by jury (the safeguard so long of the citizen against
governmental tyranny and against malicious accusation) be saved from its present tendency to become most conspicuously the safe-guard of the criminal against punitive justice; the more effectual, the more flagrant and daring his criminality may be.

The truth is, that every investigation presupposes an investigator. No human investigator is a being of mere intellect. Power to think does not exist apart from power to feel. Human intelligence cannot be wholly disdier from human sensibility. The brain and the heart pulsate with the same blood.

Neither is it true that either the power or the accuracy of the intellect is in proportion to the want of sensibility. Absence of feeling is not favourable to vigour or accuracy of thinking. Excess of feeling, morbid feeling, or want of feeling, is a hindrance or disturbance of thought. There is a normal balance of feeling and intelligence which assures the best results of both.

He who has lived all his life in the enjoyment of an estate, with no question of the validity of his title, if now that question is seriously raised, cannot go into the investigation with entire indifference as to the result. If you have long confided in a friend, with no doubts as to his integrity and fidelity, and now he is accused of a crime, or of treachery, or of baseness, which should forfeit your esteem, certainly, you cannot divest your mind of all existing impressions, and pursue an inquiry as to that friend's character, with no preference and no wish concerning the result of it. Yet, who will say that a just man is unable to hold all such feeling in due subjection, so that it shall neither blind him to the evidence, nor disable him to accept the result which the evidence shall justify? Who will say that a man of quick and keen sensibility may not still be a man of such calm judgment and so just, that he will be able to weigh the evidence fairly, and promptly to surrender an estate to which his title is proved invalid, or to renounce a friendship which he finds unworthy, at whatever cost of interest or a feeling, in the one case or in the other?

Shall we be required to investigate a question which involves all our religious hopes the reality of our immortal being, and of the God whom we adore and trust, with no feeling of interest or preference as to the result to be reached? Shall we be asked to enter into the question, whether there is a God, not caring whether there is?

A mind that could be indifferent to such an issue must be monstrously disqualified for any investigation.

We go further and say, that at the beginning of many important investigations, there already exists a reasonable presumption on one side or on the other, and it is essential to a right investigation that this presumption be rightly recognized. "On which side is the burden of proof?" is always a preliminary question. Thus, in our criminal jurisprudence there is always a presumption in favour of the accused; and in litigation for property there is a presumption in favour of him who has long held undisturbed possession.

In this grandest, deepest, foremost question of all, is there, or is there not, a reasonable presumption, on one side or on the other? Where lies the onus probandi? If there is a question here to be argued, whose question is it? Who has the obligation to make out his case?

We will not press this to any extreme. But we refuse to begin such an inquiry as this under the unfair assumption, that God is an immense improbability, for whose admission into human belief we are humbly to beg. We cannot treat the idea of God as a new invention soliciting an acceptance. The question is not whether we will admit the belief in God into our minds, but whether we will cast it out of our minds. No doubt, it is a traditional belief, a hereditary belief.
It has come down to us from our ancestors, and they are honourable ancestors. There is a reasonable presumption that they possessed it, and that we have inherited it, legitimately. Nevertheless, we will not hold it dishonestly. Show us that our title to this inheritance is not valid, and we will give it up.

It behoves us, as philosophers, to inquire with equal caution, whether our minds may not be or become subject to prejudice in the opposite direction — a prejudice or bias against belief in God. It is no harsh judgment of human nature which suggests that a human mind may be interested to evade that sense of indebtedness and of obligation, which is inseparable from the belief in God. One may even be conscious that, on the supposition of a God, living and reigning, he himself is delinquent toward him—is an offender against him. One may be in a state of mind which makes him unwilling to have a God to reign over him, and on whom to be dependent. We do not charge this upon all who are questioning whether there is a God. We believe that there are honest souls, agonizing in that inquiry, anxiously “feeling after the God,” and “longing, yearning, striving” to find Him, like “infants crying in the night, crying for the light, and with no language but a cry.” Feeble as they, but happier, we would fain lift their groping hands, and help them “touch God’s right hand in the darkness.”

Not in harsh accusation, but in friendly and honest admonition, we suggest, that no man is competent to pursue rightly the inquiry, whether there is a God, who is not wholly willing that there should be, and willing to be in subjection to Him, and in dependence on Him. Any unwillingness would be an improper bias, unfitting the mind for impartial investigation.

Having this belief in our minds, at the beginning of our inquiry our question is, whether a candid examination of the evidence will compel us to give it up and cast it out of our minds, as a prejudice or a superstition. Doubtless, right education and competent investigation do constrain men to give up beliefs which have had imemorial possession of them. Some have grown up in the belief of goblins and witches, and in their educated maturity have found valid reasons for abandoning such belief as sheer superstition. We may be too slow to do this, too unready to yield to clear evidence that inherited beliefs are illusions. But there is also an opposite danger. When a mind has made some such discoveries—has been forced, with bitter pain, to cast away as worthless some early, fond beliefs, outgrowing them as childish delusions—there is a liability to become morbidly distrustful to all that was early learned, of all old beliefs, and to lose the power of holding fast even to those which thorough investigation would verify. He was not a wise student of finance, who, finding several counterfeit banknotes in his possession, hurled his wallet, full of currency, into the sea. The psalmist confessed that he “said, in his haste, ‘All men are liars,’”—when, doubtless, he had been disgusted with the falsehoods of some. It is both hasty and foolish to despise all that we have always believed, because we find that we have had some erroneous beliefs. There is still a considerable presumption in favour of those beliefs which we have found in possession of our minds, and the minds of all our fellows. We ought not to relinquish them until we have fairly and fully considered the evidence on which they rest, and have found it insufficient to support them.

What is it which has rid our minds of the belief in goblins and in witches, which possessed many intelligent and candid minds of former generations? It is simply this: that we have found more reasonable ways of accounting for all the phenomena which
used to be regarded as proofs of their existence. Physical science has emancipated us from such superstition. Is our belief in God a superstition, from which physical science, in its further progress, will emancipate us? Some of its votaries appear to think so; by no means all of them. Only a few avow such an expectation. To most minds this would be something very different from emancipation. It would not be making us freemen, but making us orphans. Still, if we are orphans, by all means let us know it. When the question has come into our minds, whether we have a Father in Heaven, we cannot be happy without settling it.

Let the theistic belief be stated in clear terms; and let us attend candidly to any reasons, which may be presented, why we should abandon it.

It cannot be better stated than in the words of the most ancient Christian creed: "I believe in God, the Father Almighty, Maker of Heaven and Earth."

This assumes the real objective existence of "heaven and earth," i.e., of the world we live in, and the other worlds among which it revolves, the whole multitude of orbs which are visible to us, and whose magnitudes and distances our modern science demonstrates to be so amazing. It assumes that these objects, and this vast and wonderful system of forces and operations, which we call nature, do really exist. It assumes also the real being of ourselves.

Both these have been questioned. But can they rationally be questioned? Is it rational to demand, or to seek, proof of them? Is a mind which requires proof of these capable of reasoning, or in a condition to be reasoned with?

Says President Hopkins: "No man can believe anything with a certainty greater than that with which he believes in his own existence; and, if we may suppose such a case, he who should doubt of his own existence would, in that single doubt, necessarily involve the doubt of everything else."* We may add, that such doubting could never be cured by argument, for it would have no basis on which argument could begin. A slough which has no bottom cannot be filled: it must be bridged over. There is no use in wasting any gravel in it.

Dr. Hopkins says again, on the same page, "that, generally, the evidence of the senses is the ground of entire certainty to the mass of mankind. To them 'seeing is believing,' and they can conceive of no greater certainty than that which results from this evidence." In this, are not "the mass of mankind" rational? Can individuals among them give more conclusive proof of insanity than by losing this belief?

It certainly is possible for minds to become affected with doubts as to the validity of such fundamental beliefs, and of all beliefs. We have known a little boy, who had not yet heard anything of Hume or Berkeley, to become involved most distressingly in such questions as these: "I have often slept and dreamed; and in my dream, I seemed to see about me objects as real as any of these. I woke from that dream, or seemed to wake, and to find that what I had dreamed was—nothing. How can I be certain that I am not dreaming now, and shall by and by awake? How do I know that I shall wake at all; that all life is not a dream, and all objects—nothing?" Such a bewitched child was not to be reasoned with. He needed diversion; he needed rest of brain; nay, he needed a sturdy wrestle with some rough play-mate.

Doubts, whether the things which we see and handle are real things; whether the persons we converse with are real persons; whether the ground which we walk upon is real ground; whether we, ourselves, who walk and talk and look and doubt, are real

* Lowell Lectures on the Evidences of Christianity, p. 27.
persons, who really do all these things, or really doubt whether we do them;—these are not rational doubts. Nothing can be more irrational.

Dr. Hopkins speaks justly of a "sickly and effeminate habit of doubt," in which he thinks that some persons "indulge themselves." Strange, silly indulgence! Those who are tempted to it would perhaps be saved from it, if they could know how "sickly and effeminate" it appears, and how pitiable, to such healthy and sturdy thinkers as that New England teacher.

Assuming, as all sound minds must assume, the reality of ourselves, and of the objects of our sensible perception, assuming the real existence of "the heavens and the earth," can we rationally cast out of our minds their old belief in God, the maker of them? If we do abandon this, what shall we take in the place of it? Something else we must take. There are minds which do not sufficiently consider this. As a material body cannot leave its present position in space without taking some other position, so a mind cannot abandon its present position in thought, without taking some other position. Bodily or mentally, we cannot go away from where we are, without going somewhere else. The discontented boy who said, "I would run away, only I don't know the way any further than Grafton," was a more prudent boy than some, to whom that thought does not occur until after they have started. It evidently has not yet occurred to some people who are discontented with their "hereditary" beliefs, mainly because they are hereditary, and, therefore, not new nor startling. We shall do such people a real service (whether they have any beard on their cheeks or not), if we can induce them to inquire, seriously, whether there is any better house to move into, before they move out of the old one, "in which their mother nursed them, and in which she died"—and any better land than the old farm, on which their father toiled so honestly and lived so thriftily.

When you give up believing "in God the Father Almighty," what will you believe in? Open your dictionary to the word "atheism," and you will find it defined, "the disbelief or denial of a God." It will be hard to find any living atheists under that definition. Chalmers and Christlieb, and others, have sufficiently set forth the absurdity of such denial. No finite person can be competent to affirm, that in no part of the universe is there evidence that it has an intelligent maker. No one who has not visited and explored all worlds, can know that on some of them there may not be a standpoint at which God would be manifested to him in irresistible and glorious evidence of his real and awful being. So far as we know, the unbelievers of our time and land agree with our Christian theologians in declaring such denial of God an absurdity. Taking the dictionary definition of "atheism," they, not unreasonably, refuse to be called "atheists." They do not deny that there is a God; they do not know whether there is. Some of them say that it is impossible to know, but how this is a more modest pretension than that which is involved in the denial of God, it may be difficult to show. At any rate, they do not deny that God may exist. Theirs is not disbelief, but unbelief. It would help precision of thought on this question, if (as some writers have proposed) we should agree to designate the positive denial of God by the term anti-theism, and reserve the term atheism to describe the unbelief of him who insists that he finds no evidence of a God—whose "verdict on the doctrine of God is only that it is not proven—not that it is disproven." We have no disposition, however, to force this name upon those whose unbelief it seems to us etymologically best fitted to designate, since it is offensive to them, and we even hold it a good and hopeful sign that it is so. But this is our question:
Shall we give up our old belief in God for this unbelief, which its advocates are unwilling to let us call atheism, and for which, besides that, our language does not yet afford us any distinctive term? This unbelief certainly eliminates God from the problem of the universe as decisively as disbelief. It does not allow us to assume a "maker of heaven and earth," an intelligent contriver and framer of the world and of nature. How then shall we account for them? For we cannot get rid of this question; it will for ever knock at the door of every mind that has not answered it.

Shall we say that the world is eternal? No one can suppose it to have existed eternally in its present condition. Small knowledge of geology and physical geography suffices to make such a thought impossible.

"Men may come, and men may go, But I flow on for ever."

So the river is made to say in a song which some of our maidens sweetly warble. It will do for a song. The continuous flow of the stream is in impressive contrast with the brief lives of men, who, in successive generations, come and go on its banks; but the simplest know that it is not "for ever." The "father of rivers" has not been flowing eternally down the continent. This the steady eye of the physical geographer perceives hardly more quickly or clearly than that of the illiterate boatman, who sees its turbid torrent perpetually laden with the soil of its crumbling banks, and "reckons" that it would wash all Missouri and Kansas down to the Gulf—"only give it time enough." No one making any pretensions to science entertains, for one moment, so crude a hypothesis as the existence from eternity of the world in its present state, the present cosmos. Probably there are, however, students of science, of no mean attainments, who do entertain the hypothesis of an eternal succession of cosmical periods, each and all presenting only the results of impersonal forces working blindly, although in such marvellous order. Every such theory is a mode of pushing the question evermore back, further and further, without answering it, more learned perhaps, but not more really scientific than that rude pagan cosmology, which sets the earth upon the back of a tortoise, and makes the tortoise stand on a serpent, and leaves the serpent to wriggle. There is no such hypothesis which is capable of being thought through.

To assume that the substance of the world is eternal, and only its phenomena perpetually changing, is to assume what certainly is incapable of proof; and, if it should be granted, we should still need an eternal mind, an eternal intelligent being, to account for the phenomenal changes which the assumed eternal matter undergoes; and this would still be God, the "maker of heaven and earth." An eternal canvas would not account for a complex picture, expressing ideas and illustrating history. A river flowing eternally, if that could be, would not account for mills on its banks with curiously contrived machinery, nor for steamers plying, up stream as well as down, on its waters.

Shall we say that man is eternal?—not the individual, of course, but the race, the succession of generations? Can this have been from eternity? Assuming the succession to be just such, all the way, as we see it now, no one imagines that to be possible. An eternal series of human generations is a manifest absurdity. An eternal succession of men, each one of whom was begotten by a man living before him, cannot be rationally thought. Every least-instructed mind sees at once that the first member of such a series cannot have had one before him, from whom he came. A dynasty may be very ancient, but its first king did not inherit the crown.
How is it at all an escape from this difficulty, to suppose a development of man from a lower order of beings, and that from a still lower, and so on backward indefinitely? Agassiz's latest affirmation was, that this hypothesis has no adequate justification in ascertained facts; but if it were granted, what then? An ascending series must have a first term as surely as a level series. Some of these railroad coal-trains are very long. When one of them is crossing the street just before you, and you are in haste to fulfill an appointment, you may be guilty of only a pardonable extravagance, if you call it "interminable." Of course, you expect that to be understood as rhetoric, not science. You know that if you wait, patiently or impatiently, the last car will pass. Would you be any less certain of this, if you noticed that each car was laden with poorer coal, and built of rougher timber, and run upon clumsier wheels than the one before it.

If Mr. Darwin should induce us to believe that our pedigree runs back, not through a level series of men, but through a series descending backward, through apes, cats, frogs, oysters, jelly-fish, we should still demand the pedigree of the ancestral jelly; and it would be no less difficult to give it, or to account for that marvellous being in which these present nations lay in solution, than to account for such an Adam and Eve as Moses wrote of. Indeed, we understand Mr. Darwin to affirm that a race developed, as he holds ours to have been, must have a creator as surely as on the Biblical theory—a creator whose efficient and wise will fittingly put into the primordial substance all its prodigious potency.

And that last word reminds us of Mr. Tyndall's Belfast address, especially its unlucky sentence about discerning* in matter "the promise and potency of every form of life." He has been criticized with not too great severity; for, in speaking of things so sacred, careless speech is wicked. Yet, it would be unchristian to refuse his words the most favourable construction, or to deny him the privilege of amending them. A very significant amendment it is, which appears in a later edition, where that phrase is toned down to "the promise and potency of all terrestrial life." This amendment seems designed to rescue the utterance from the interpretation (most natural in its original form) which would make it a "confession" of atheism. In this amended form it at least does not deny an eternal power and intelligence, by which the primal matter was made and endowed with that wondrous "promise and potency." Surely, the belief in matter thus created, in atoms impregnated with such potency, made capable of development into such a universe, would most abundantly justify "our professed reverence for its Creator."

Surely, the eagle is no less a wonder of creative skill when the elements of his being are diffused in the semi-liquid contents of the egg-shell, than when, in the full glory of his living powers, he screams from his aerie, or cleaves the sky with his daring wings. If back, beyond "the boundary of the experimental evidence," as we terrestrials are able

* It was, indeed, a marvel, that one so trained to scientific accuracy, so familiar with studies which forbid affirmation beyond the limits of observation and so strenuous an advocate of that method of thought, should profess to "prolong the vision backward across the boundary of the experimental evidence." It was passing strange that such an one should launch a huge guess upon that wide sea, with the pretentious name discern painted on her stern. But this mistake has been sufficiently censured, and we cannot doubt that it has long since been "discerned" by its acute author.
to discern it, some seraph scientist does clearly see a formless protoplasm, into which the Creator has so breathed that it is sure to develop ("never so many millions of ages hence") into a mighty race of intelligent creatures, we need not doubt that that seraph there finds as high proof of the Creator's power and wisdom as in this race, whom he now sees calculating eclipses and inventing the telegraph, and working out the mighty social and moral problems of this world's history.

Mr. Tyndall does not deny that matter, with all its known and all its supposed "potency," may have been originated and endowed by a creating intelligence, "a Being standing outside the nebulae, who fashioned it as a potter does his clay, but whose own origin and ways are equally past finding out." But we are not aware that he avows any positive belief in such a Being. We think there is an inadvertence in the language just quoted from the preface of his address. It assumes that the Being, who "fashions the nebulae," himself must have had an "origin." Does the scientist's mind refuse to admit the idea of a Being who was not originated—who did not become, but eternally IS? Yet, if he denies this to the "Being standing outside the nebulae," he will have to claim it for the nebula. Is one of these assumptions any more scientific than the other? Right here is a point, not sufficiently noted, in which it belongs to "the modesty of true science" to confess the utter and hopeless insufficiency of science. We use the term, science, here with the limitation which such writers as Mr. Tyndall put upon it, meaning physical science. This science relates to the ongoing system of nature. It accounts for facts by finding antecedent facts which are causes. It does not, and cannot, account for the beginning of a system of causation. Its causation is a pendent chain of many links, the connections of which, one with another,
We have spoken of a morbid intellectual condition—the pitiful debility of doubt. There is also a morbid moral condition which sadly enfeebles and obscures spiritual visions. The pure in heart see God. These morbid conditions, the intellectual and the spiritual, are often blended, and are likely to aggravate each other. Who of us all can claim to be wholly free from either? Quite truly says Mr. Tyndall, "Christian men are proved, by their own writings, to have their hours of weakness and of doubt as well as their hours of strength and conviction, and men like myself share, in their own way, these variations of mood and tense." In respectful, brotherly sympathy, we take the hand of this eminent student of nature, thanking him heartily for all the wealth of information which his diligent observation has brought us from her rich fields, and we humbly join him in this serious introspection. Our own mental states are not to be disregarded in estimating the results of our observations, any more than the variations of the needle may safely be ignored by the mariner. Most honourable to our scientist is the fidelity with which he records his own experience:

"I have noted," says he, "during years of self-observation, that it is not in hours of clearness and vigour that this doctrine (atheistic materialism) "commends itself to my mind; that in the presence of stronger and clearer thought it ever dissolves and disappears, as offering no solution of the mystery in which we dwell and of which we form a part." This ingenuous testimony deserves the thoughtful regard of all Mr. Tyndall's disciples and fellows. That self-observation is by no means peculiar to him, and it calls attention to a field of observation which, in the interest of true science, ought to be more amply explored. Let us, fellow-seekers for truth, bring together, in such frank disclosures, the results of our personal self-observation. Till more of such testimony is recorded, we may not be warranted to affirm, but we are very confident, that Mr. Tyndall's experience is like that of every man who makes such honest and attentive self-observation. Their hours of doubt are hours of weakness; hours of strength are their hours of conviction. "Not in hours of clearness and vigour" does atheistic materialism satisfy any mind. It is an illusion which, in the presence of "stronger and clearer thought, ever dissolves and disappears."

The earnest and patient study of "God in Human Thought," to which Dr. Gillett's work is so helpful and so stimulating, is, we believe, the most urgent need of human thought in this age. Subtle arguments to prove that God is, a real Being, may have been needed, but it is questionable whether they have not been much overdone. There are minds in which doubt of the great and fundamental reality would never be awakened, except by finding some mind superior to themselves seeking to support its belief by argument. If argument must be used, the simplest and most direct should be preferred. A sound and healthy mind, in this world and life, knows that God is not far from him, as surely, and with as little dependence on subtleties of argument, as one knows that his wife is not far away when he comes home at evening, weary and worried, though she be not at that moment visible. He knows by the order which he sees in the sitting-room; the warmth which glows from the hearth; the refreshment that waits upon the table; the unmistakable fragrance of care and love which fill all the air of the home.

A mind that is unhealthily fond of subtleties, and not content with knowing obvious things, but will ever be trying them with cunning questions, needs not so much to be argued with, as to be confronted with, the sturdy reality. Such a youth in his teens, walking with a school-mate of much more
mature mind and of exceptionally large and powerful frame, challenged him to an argument to prove the reality of his own being. Instead of the duel of dialectics which the boy had coveted, the robust and straightforward man drew back his hand and heavy fist, and dealt him a blow which sent him reeling across the gutter, and he staggered back to walk more modestly, not only along that village pavement, but on his path of thought and life, more modestly and more wisely.

Minds which, in moral perverseness, are hiding away from God—not wishing to retain Him in their knowledge—cannot be convinced by reasoning about Him. They must be made to hear Him. His holy commandments must be thundered in their souls, and made to reverberate in the hollow depths of their disingenuous spirits. And those troubled minds, sincerely loving the God of their fathers, but startled and bewildered by the challenge of unbelievers to “show cause” why their belief in Him should not be taken away; honest souls, who find themselves led to the very edge of faith, and who look down thence with utmost horror into the abyss of atheism and feel dizzy, how shall they be assured that only their poor heads are whirling, and not the old rock they stand on? By letting plummets of speculation down into that abyss? Never! Let them wrap themselves in the mantle of prayer and cover their faces in thoughtful silence.

“To their obedient hearts the small voice of stillness” shall whisper—GOD.

THE UNITY OF THE BIBLE.

By Rev. W. F. Bainbridge, Providence, R. I.

The Christian Bible is made up of many parts. It is most noticeably divided into the Old and New Testaments. These sections are in turn compiled, the former from thirty-nine, and the latter from twenty-seven separate writings. The nearly forty authors manifest every variety of qualification for literary labours. Their work extended over the long period of sixteen centuries. They wrote in many lands, and in different languages. We find among their productions a great deal of history and prophecy and song, of biography and ethics and theology. They contain the sayings of good men, and the sayings of bad men; the words of God, and the words of malignant spirits from the world of darkness. Indeed, in whatever direction we contemplate the Bible, there seems an endless diversity. It would be difficult, if not impossible, to conceive of a volume bringing together within the same compass a greater amount of dissimilarity as to subject, style, and circumstance.

The question naturally arises, whether the Christian Bible is really one book, thoroughly permeated with an all-inclusive, and all else exclusive unity? To this question the volume itself gives perfectly satisfactory answer. In manifold ways it declares that it is one harmonious and complete book, an organic and finished whole, an unique and ultimate creation of the Divine mind. In the light of the testimony of the volume itself, the ingenuous mind, it would seem, cannot fail of the impression that all the
parts of Sacred Scripture are united in closest intimacy and kinship, that the thought of unaided men has never produced such a masterpiece of living unity amid inexhaustible diversity, and that it would be more easy to rest in the conviction that the Bible had been written in one country, under one mind, by one pen, and at one time, than that it is merely a collection of religious productions, made one by custom and the printer’s binding.

A study of the Bible, in the interest of this question of unity, has more than a mere literary and artistic value. It will decide very largely the estimate in which the volume will be held, the moral power of its sway over the believer’s conduct and life, and the force felt in that solemn prohibition with which the book of the Revelation is closed, but which is generally thought to refer to the entire volume of the Sacred Scriptures: “If any man shall add unto these things, God shall add unto him the plagues that are written in this book: and if any man shall take away from the words of the book of this prophecy, God shall take away his part out of the book of life, and out of the holy city, and from the things which are written in this book.”

Its Analogical Unity.

The Scriptures bear upon their face a striking resemblance to every general aspect of nature. In whatever direction the mind looks out upon the creation, as it is left from the divine hand, it observes endless diversity wrapped up in all-comprehending unity. There are innumerable plants and animals, but they are all bound together by a minute cellular construction. The organs of plant-life seem endlessly confused in their first appearance; but careful observation detects a mathematical spiral regulating the arrangement everywhere. To the superficial and unreflecting mind there seems to be no order in the distribution of colours throughout the vegetable world. And even Mr. Ruskin, in his “Lamps of Architecture,” can assert that “while in nature the boundaries of forms are elegant and precise, those of colours, though subject to symmetry of a rude kind, are yet irregular—in blotches.” Nevertheless there are laws of the beautiful, only, indeed, partially understood, that unite all the colouring of the vegetable kingdom into one harmonious system. What were till lately regarded as mere casual coincidence of floral colour are coming to be understood as nature’s fidelity to the strictest aesthetic principles. And while the diversities in the association of colour are being discovered as more and more numerous and complicated, the all-comprehending unities are gradually unfolding themselves, these unities in turn pointing toward a supreme law of harmony, even as all unifying laws of astronomy centre in that of gravitation. At first, there are few subjects that confuse the mind more thoroughly than the numerous and diverse mineral substances which form the great mass of the earth’s crust. Even Paley was obliged to confess that he saw no traces of order in a stone. And perhaps the most reflecting minds of the present day would have continued not to dream of any regularity among inorganic objects, had not Abbé Haüy dropped his beautiful specimen of calcareous spar, and noted that all the shivered fragments of the original prism had the same rhomboidal form. And it almost belongs now to the common stock of knowledge to recognize that all the wonderful diversity of crystalline form in nature is bound together by a still more wonderful uniformity. These outlooks will suffice to give the general aspect of nature. Everywhere the first impressions are confusing. In all directions there is infinite variety, and long and patient toil is required before the human mind apprehends the all-pervading unity. If, then, God was to furnish man
with a volume of complete religious instruction, it should be presumed that he would form one after the analogy of all his other formations. It should be presumed that he would give us a volume whose unity would not stand out upon its surface for the recognition of any impromptu superficial thought, which would not seem to be one as readily as a geometry, or history, or book on moral science, but whose connection would reveal itself to the studious and ingenuous; at first, in scattered and imperfect recognitions of intelligent order, and then in more and more vivid apprehension of the grand and all-inclusive theme of the divine Author. It should be presumed that God would provide a book that would correspond as a literary creation to the diversified unity which characterizes every other department of creation.

Its Authoritative Unity.

The history of thought, that comparatively new field of science, and to which of late a gratifying number of exceedingly valuable contributions have been made, has much to reveal that is curious and instructive in respect to the tone or air of thought, as well as in the directions of its variation of judgment, and of its argumentative processes. At one time, thought, such as that along the line of material science, has maintained the bearing of humility and self-distrustful caution, but at another its carriage or mien is that of vanity and presumption. Indeed, all literature, of every range of subject, and of every period of the world, may yet find a new, and one of the most valuable of classifications, in the variety of the tone or air with which the authors have carried themselves all the way from the caution of Lord Bacon, to the imprudence of John Stuart Mill; from the strong common sense of Thomas Reid, to the frivolity of Auguste Comte; from the reverence of Sir William Hamilton, to the irreverence of David Hume; from the dictatorial spirit of Confucius, to the subservient spirit of a Baden Powell; from the sensuality of a Mahomet, to the purity of an elder Edwards; and from the censoriousness of a Ruskin, to the generosity of an Agassiz. All men who have contributed to our world’s literature, have not only ranged themselves as naturalists, and metaphysicians, and theologians, or as belonging to the German, and French, and Scottish schools, but they have also classified their writings as pompous or deferential, dictatorial or suggestive, conscientious or unscrupulous, reverent or irreverent, and in many other ways, according to the tone, mien or spirit with which they have thought, and committed their thoughts to paper. This is equally true of the various authors whose writings are collected within the volume of the Sacred Scriptures. Each one has left the impress of his own peculiar style. Each one carries about his own distinctive look, or aspect. But, above all the peculiarities that thus distinguish one from another, there is a single grand all-inclusive characteristic of general bearing or deportment of thought and expression that sets them off from all other authors, in a class by themselves. There is one feature that runs through them all, that cannot remain undiscovered even upon the slightest acquaintance, and that cannot be found in any other known literary production. This peculiar feature is of an authoritative type. Every Bible writer speaks with a tone of characteristic authority. They do not carry themselves with the air of a king, but rather of a king’s ambassador. They seem conscious of occupying before men the highest representative rank conceivable. But evidently the dignity does not affect their minds and communications, as honourable preferment always affects to some degree the carriage of thought and expression of other men. All their sympathies and tastes and companionableness
remain the same toward the various classes of people with which they were identified before becoming honoured above all others of the human race. They were as accessible and communicative subsequent to their wonderful inspiration, as they ever had been among the brickyards of Egypt, or the pasture fields of Judea, or the fishermen's boats upon Gennesareth. They maintain the attitude of the most dutiful service, and yet it is not a cringing service. They bear themselves as only the mediums of authority, and yet they are continually weighed down with a sense of tremendous personal responsibility. They argue, but do not rest on argument. They appeal to conscience, but do not rest even there. They seem conscious of the immediate presence and oversight of One whose being and nature are the foundation of all argument, and whose watchfulness is full assurance. The doctrine of divine inspiration may or may not be accepted, but there is the undeniable feature or bearing to all, the spirit of thought and style of language throughout the Sacred Scriptures, which inspiration is brought forward to explain. Each writer moves on with all the assurance of Cæsar, when he crossed the Rubicon in his march upon Rome, and yet there is no self-assertion, or assumption of personal superiority, no air of false pretension. The bearing of command, and the mien of obedience are adjusted to a perfect harmony. The one is not laid aside for the other, as occasion requires, according to universal habit among men, but both attitudes are preserved by every Bible author, so that ever in thought and word and action it is the commanding one who obeys, and at the very same time the obeying one who commands. This prevailing and characteristic feature of the Scriptures must be classified as one of the important links which form a unit of the whole.

Its Religious Unity.

Throughout the entire volume a religious purpose is preserved, as distinct from philosophical or speculative or scientific or ethical purposes. From beginning to end the single aim is to reveal God to man, and to bring man under subjection to God. From this design nothing causes the writers to swerve by even so much as an hair's breadth. Considerations, personal, social and political, continually crowded upon them, well calculated to divert their attention, at least occasionally and incidentally, from the simple purpose of leading men to reverence God and obey his will; and yet with unparalleled fidelity, they successfully resisted every such wayward influence, and remained religious, and religious only, to the end.

It is not meant to say that philosophy and science and ethics exclude religion; for many a work profoundly philosophical has been thoroughly pervaded with the religious spirit; and beside much of the anti-Christian science of to-day there stand rival books filled with Christian sentiments; and by far the best and most numerous of our ethical treatises are of pious parentage, born of minds and hearts submitted to the will of God as revealed in Christ Jesus. But it is one thing to carry along the two ideas together, as of philosophical speculation and of practical godliness; and another thing to be so thoroughly absorbed in the aim of revealing God to man in both doctrine and life, as to be utterly unconscious of any scientific associations.

It is in this latter sense that all the Bible writers are plainly religious. They undertook no other task than to unfold to sinful men whatever they understood to be the divine will. Their lines of thought ranged alongside all of the most inviting fields of the theoretical, but they not only refused utterly to be diverted by the speculative and unpractical, they seemed even to be sublimely unconscious of the diverting influence. Many
historical facts of thrilling interest were occurring contemporaneously with each of their several lives, but they mention a trivial incident of some person, or family, or tribe, because of its contribution to their religious purpose, while mighty revolutions and dynastic changes, as irrelevant, are unnoticed. And there seems to be no effort at this caution. Their flow of silence is as perfectly easy and natural as the current of their communications. This all-exclusive and all-inclusive singleness of purpose, stands out perfectly unique in human literature. The Scripture writers seem to have a monopoly of this highest style of consistency. All other authors are to some degree afflicted with double vision. Moralists are ever watching some theory, while endeavouring to direct men in the better paths of life. Historians are ever hampered with a national bias, while seeking to portray, in utmost fidelity, the facts of human progress. Novelists are ever careful of their reputations, while striving to set forth in varied ways the lessons of earth’s teeming experiences. And theologians are always conscious of system, even among the most earnest efforts to reveal to sin-darkened understandings “the way, the truth, and the life.” Not a sermon is ever delivered, but that the closely observant mind will detect a cautious defence of some theory, a conscious wariness amid the most faithful and enthusiastic presentations of the truth. But all this universal caution, this wariness, seems entirely absent from the Bible writers. They appear to be lifted up into a sublime unconsciousness of any necessity to stand guard over their thoughts and words. Their religious purpose so thoroughly absorbed them that they moved about in it in perfect freedom, as in their own native element. There was no more need of a manifest effort at limitation, than for a covering over the ocean, or an artificial protection along the shore to keep the fish in the water. Each of the Scripture writers seem plunged into a vast sea of religion interest, and there made to feel perfectly at home. By an instinct, as natural as breath, they avoid the shoals of bare ethics, the dry sands of speculation, and the profound depths of mystery. And this characteristic wonderfully unifies all the contents of the Bible. This common feature sets them aside from all other literature, and most fittingly collects them in one volume.

Its Methodical Unity.

Each writer has first the truths he has been selected to communicate, wrought out, as far as possible, within his own experience. Then, when they have become clear in his own mind, and warm in his own heart, and not till then is the task assigned of committing the divine revelation to writing. In this is certainly to be found a feature of Bible authorship that stands out in strong contrast with much of the hasty, inconsistent, and immature literature of the present day. It has become customary, the instant a new idea or theory has occurred to any man’s mind, for him to assume at once the advocacy of it before the world, as one of the most self-evident truths or plainest deductions of reason; and, if he has any access to a publisher’s room, he will be seen immediately carrying thither his manuscript, of which he is loth to deprive the multitudes for a single day. Men cannot wait to test thoroughly their supposed facts, or to mature their views of life; hence the vast accumulation of almost worthless scientific books, and the still larger mass of poetical and fictitious trash. But this was not the method allowed in Scripture authorship. Neither Moses, nor Solomon, nor Paul, nor John, nor any of the other inspired writers, came to their vastly responsible tasks hastily and immaturely. With each of them there is a restraint and a reserve until their fulness of time, that is really wonderful and unparalleled. If only one or two of them
were enabled to hold back, until their views of God and of man's duty had become perfectly correct and thoroughly practical, clear to the mind and familiar to the experience, it would be a surprise to those acquainted with the leading characteristics of the world's literature. But when this feature plainly appears upon the face of all the thirty-nine books of the Old Testament, and of all the twenty-seven books of the New Testament, the surprise becomes amazement, and the candid mind exults in the discovery of a new and important bond of unity to the sacred volume.

Another striking feature of their method should be noted. It is emotional rather than intellectual. The logic is not so much that of the mind as that of the heart. The prevalent method among human productions, and it may be said to be the universal method in efforts to unfold new truth, is the dialectic. Premises are laid down and conclusions reached, propositions stated and regular syllogisms formed. Deference to the emotional nature is made incidental, either scattered along conveniently, or made the hortatory conclusion, after it is supposed that the truth has been apprehended and the convictions have been formed. But this process is reversed or inverted in all the sacred writings. It is uniformly taken for granted that a man's heart, in God's sight, is of more consequence than his head; that it is of far greater moment that God should be loved than that he should be fully apprehended doctrinally; and that there is a better way than cold logical argument to lead the wandering affections of mankind back to their true and eternal home. The method of the sacred writers does not, however, fail to recognize dialectics, any more than their faith to regard the inexorable demands of reason. But all their language is that kindled by the glow of affection, and uniformly its direct aim is the heart of man. Explanation is deferred until attention has been brought to the fact, which is itself calculated to stir the emotions. Where the mind would naturally indulge in logical inferences, recurrence is made again and again to the simple heart-thrilling statement. Frequently broad chasms of argument are bridged by a single span of affectionate testimony, wrought out from personal experience. And this feature, also, of method, preserved with the most perfect consistency through all the Bible writings, contributes an additional bond of unity, which cannot be lightly esteemed.

Its Moral Unity.

There seems, at first view, a great break between the moral teachings of the Old and of the New Testaments. This apparent diversity is the most conspicuous as regards the sexual relations. Laxities are allowed under the former dispensation, that do not receive the slightest countenance under the latter. It is thought to be impossible to see any kinship between the bigamy of Abraham and the monogamy of Peter, or between the polygamy of Jacob and the celibacy of Paul, or the incest of either Lot or Judah and the lofty ideal of the married life held up by Christ and His apostles before their followers.

But it must be remembered that the history of the patriarchs goes back nearly twenty centuries from the commencement of the Christian era. Their moral light was far from being as bright as that, under which the first churches were planted by the apostles, and their companions. They lived in the early dawn of the better day succeeding the antediluvian night. It would be very unjust to gauge their conduct or to measure their views by the high standard of the Christian moralist, even as it would be altogether too severe to judge the sexual thoughts and sentiments, at all times and under all circumstances, of the very best of present Christians, by that trans-
parent purity of mind and thorough spirituality of feeling which pervade the ranks of the redeemed in heaven.

In the most flagrant instances named, which are the most flagrant of the Old Testament record, there is a very gratifying contrast with the heathen morals, by which the patriarchal system was surrounded. It was the natural sexual desire versus the unnatural; procreation versus mere animal gratification; and more or less consciously there was through all the laxity, a feeling out after the true ideal of marriage. Abraham took Hagar to wife, not under the influence of the prevailing heathen licentiousness, but at the prompting of a mastering desire for the promised heir. And surely this, and this only, led his wife Sarah to make the suggestion, and arrange for its execution. Moreover, the great mistake was not allowed by the Lord to pass without correction. Ishmael, the child of Hagar, is at last set aside by Isaac, the true offspring of Sarah. All the circumstances connected with the four wives of Jacob, lift his polygamy far above the gross beastliness which prevailed throughout the world around him. He first sought a true union of heart, and resolved not to be thwarted in his long-cherished purpose by the treachery of Laban and his daughter Leah. But Rachel bore him no children, so it came to pass that the procreative desire overmastered his truer marital ambition, Bilhah taking the place of Rachel, as also Zilpah subsequently took the place of Leah. It is very plain that the controlling motive in all this was not lust, but a far higher and more Christian desire. Yet God did not leave the error without rebuke. Rachel was afterward remembered, and the highly honoured Joseph became the standing protest against Jacob's polygamy. A greater difficulty, however, confronts us when we consider the incest of Lot with his two daughters, and that of Judah with Tamar, his daughter-in-law.

Here, at first thought, there seems an inevitable break with the moral instruction and examples of the New Testament. But two considerations should not be forgotten in measuring the criminality of these sins. Lot's incest stood over against the sodomy, with which, doubtless, he and his daughters had become shockingly familiar; and the corresponding act of Judah was in strong contrast with the abominable onanism of his son. Moreover, Lot was drunk at the time of both his sins, at the solicitation, it must be remembered, of daughters frenzied with the thought of the extinction of their people; and Judah was utterly unaware of his relationship to the supposed harlot who had tempted him, and whose motive in all her deception, it must not be forgotten, was principally the desire for offspring. And all this distinction, with the evident advance upon the accompanying heathen morality, was emphasized by the destruction of Sodom while Lot was preserved, and by the violent death of Onan while Judah was kept alive.

As thus a careful examination of the apparent discrepancies between the moral instructions of different parts of the Bible upon the subject of the relation of the sexes will show that there are no real discrepancies, but that everywhere there is the same high ideal of married life struggling forth from more or less ignorance and weakness; so it will prove from a candid contemplation of all the other great moral questions which are treated in the sacred volume, that the instruction is always the same in principle, only adapted to a variety of individuals and of circumstances. Thus, upon the subjects of revenge, of slavery, and all others; and, if so, the comprehensive moral unity which pervades the sacred writings is a strong additional evidence of the integrity of the volume.

Its Doctrinal Unity.

Ever since the completion of the canon, a superficial criticism has been found throwing
out now one, and now another of the collated books or parts of books, on the ground of the diversity of their doctrinal teachings. And a modern disposition is abroad to practically erase or expunge the whole of the Old Testament, because its doctrines are not those of the New Testament. But a more thorough examination will reveal the perfect consistency of all the religious teachings of the Bible. The Book of Genesis, as truly as that of Revelation, represents God as personal, and never confounds Him with blind law or force. He has thoughts and feelings, and expresses them in language. He lays His commands upon his creatures, and accompanies them with threatened rewards and punishments. He walks in the garden in the cool of the day, superintends the construction of the ark, and enters into solemn covenant with Abraham. God's supremacy over all things is also the teaching of every portion of Scripture. All nature is represented by the earlier as well as by the later writings as entirely under His control. The lesson of the brimstone and fire from the Lord out of heaven upon Sodom and Gomorrah, is as plain in its teaching as that of Christ's speaking to the waves upon the Sea of Galilee. The holy horror with which God ever contemplates sin, is by no means a doctrine of the New Testament only. The record takes us back to God's feelings immediately upon the eating of the forbidden fruit, and we see there the same loathing and repulsion of sin that was evidenced by Christ's dealings with the Pharisees, and by his driving the money changers out from the temple. To the benevolence of God, Moses and the prophets bear witness, as well as Christ and the apostles. John records the Master as saying to Nicodemus: "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in him should not perish, but have everlasting life." But two thousand years before upon Sinai, at the time of the renewal of the two tables, it was proclaimed, doubtless by the same voice: "The Lord, the Lord God, merciful and gracious, long-suffering, and abundant in goodness and truth, keeping mercy for thousands, forgiving iniquity, and transgression and sin." The sacred writers are also uniform in their representation of the moral condition of man. His state is that of thorough alienation from God. He is not merely unfortunate, but guilty. And wherever the idea of salvation is approached, it is in the light only of divine grace. Always the way of life for the sinner is the way of combined justice and mercy. Justice is met in substitutionary sacrifice, and then pardon is granted as a sovereign boon. The same might be said of the doctrines of the Trinity, of the immortality of the soul, of the resurrection of the body, and, indeed, of all the prominent doctrines of Christianity; whatever traces we find of them scattered throughout the Old Testament, and there certainly can be found traces more or less prominent of nearly all of them, we discover no essential difference, no substantial correction of view in later statements, no other variation than that to be noted in the next following section of this paper. And, if there is this essential agreement in all that sixty-six writers, reaching over fifteen hundred years, have to record, upon the grandest themes that have ever been canvassed by human thought, then certainly there is added one most important bond of relationship to all the contents of the Bible.

Its Progressive Unity.

While all the doctrines of the sacred writings are essentially consistent in their various representations, there is, from the beginning of the volume to its close, a constant unfolding of doctrine into greater clearness, permanency, and universality. And this is to an extent, as would be expected,
if the various books have faithfully recorded the progressive apprehensions of revealed truth, along during the fifteen centuries covered by the canonical writings. Any carefully gathered volume of essays; as upon politics since the time of Plato, or upon sculpture from Phidias to Canova, or upon astronomy from Hipparchus to Newton, or even upon Voltaic electricity, from Galvani to Faraday, or upon physiology and comparative anatomy, from Harvey to Cuvier; any judicious collection of treatises upon these subjects, scattered along at intervals in their authorship, would show an order of progressive instruction upon the science or the art. Still, all such secular literature, fails very far to equal that of the Bible, in the steady march of its unfolding, in its victory over all opposition, and in its ability to accomplish the most under the greatest embarrassments. Astronomy had to throw aside entirely Ptolemy’s theory of epicycles, but Revelation was not called upon to make a corresponding sacrifice of any of the writings of Moses, Bishop Colenso to the contrary notwithstanding. Chemistry had to utterly cast off almost all the instructions of the alchemist and of the spagyric art; but the sacred oracles have met no such necessity respecting the wisdom of Solomon or the experimental lore of David. And crystallography was compelled to cancel Pliny’s view that “the pyramidal points of quartz are not all of the same kind,” and substitute Haüy’s theory; but the divine instruction of the Holy Scriptures has never been required to erase either the one hundred and tenth Psalm, or the fifty-third chapter of Isaiah. The progress of Bible doctrine has not been from failure to success, from mistaken hypothesis to advanced and correct views; but from a success up to the full measure of its time, to a deeper and broader success corresponding to the advance in its surrounding conditions. It has not been the human mind manufacturing a system of truth, continually altering and perfecting it; but the divine mind planting within the soil of earth-born creatures a measure of wisdom that is from above, and then attending to its growth for fifteen centuries, until it had reached its maturity. The progress of Bible doctrine is like the progress in other departments of truth, and yet unlike in that while they are all more or less artificial, this is perfectly artless; that, while they have often to retrace their steps, this is a natural growth, constantly forward toward higher conceptions and wider ranges of influence; and that, while they often entangle themselves in darkness, which has frequently been embarrassing for ages, this progress of Bible doctrine has never itself involved human thought in any practical difficulty, has never been called upon to contend with any obscurity except that produced by foreign influences.

The progress thus to be distinguished in the sacred writings, may be particularized in respect to the nature of God. His holiness, in its basal relation to all his other attributes, comes out with ever increasing clearness from the scene in Eden to the vision upon Patmos of the throne in heaven, and the ceaseless exclamation of the throng before it, “Holy, holy, holy, Lord God Almighty, which was, and is, and is to come.” His tri-personality, while only intimated in the Old Testament, or at the most obscurely revealed, comes out in the most conspicuous light in the teachings of Christ and his apostles. The Fatherhood of God, though clearly to be inferred from many passages in the older writings, is a thought that wonderfully grows upon the reader, as he advances into the gospels and the epistles. The Fatherhood of God, though clearly to be inferred from many passages in the older writings, is a thought that wonderfully grows upon the reader, as he advances into the gospels and the epistles. The Fatherhood of God, though clearly to be inferred from many passages in the older writings, is a thought that wonderfully grows upon the reader, as he advances into the gospels and the epistles. The Fatherhood of God, though clearly to be inferred from many passages in the older writings, is a thought that wonderfully grows upon the reader, as he advances into the gospels and the epistles. The Fatherhood of God, though clearly to be inferred from many passages in the older writings, is a thought that wonderfully grows upon the reader, as he advances into the gospels and the epistles. The Fatherhood of God, though clearly to be inferred from many passages in the older writings, is a thought that wonderfully grows upon the reader, as he advances into the gospels and the epistles.
while the preachers of the former dispensation represented the way of grace as the only salvation, those who preached in the later times, under a larger outpouring of the Holy Spirit, were much more simple, clear and satisfactory in showing man how he may become reconciled to God, and an heir of heaven. They were privileged to point directly to the great archetypal Lamb himself, who taketh away the sins of the world. For them the veil of the temple had been rent, the sacrifice once for all had been made upon the cross, and the Comforter had come as never before to take of the things of Christ and show them unto the disciples. In all this progress of doctrine throughout the sacred oracles, so wonderfully vital, persistent and soul-satisfying, there cannot fail to be seen a binding together principle, that must go far toward settling the conviction that all the commonly received writings of the Holy Scriptures form one complete book.

*Its Christ Unity.*

The Incarnate Logos is more than a doctrine of the Bible. He is its life; and from the beginning to the end its only life. While avoiding the extreme of mysticism, the devoutly studious mind cannot resist the impression that Jesus Christ has thrown himself into the volume of divine inspiration, in a more full and complete sense than the hero of any other story or the subject of any other biography has ever been represented in human literature. More vitally and comprehensively is the Lord Redeemer the sum and substance of the entire Scripture theme, than Mahomet of the volumes of Washington Irving, or than Paul of the celebrated work of Conybeare and Howson, or than the apostles of Neander's History of the Planting and Training of the Christian Church. Never has man, in his most successful authorship, secured anything like such a living representation of his subject, as have the inspired writers in their delination before the world of Jesus the Christ. It is his record in all their history, his music in all their song, his glory in all their beautiful imagery. He gives the meaning to all their ceremonialism, the direction to all their worship, the warmth to all their attachments. His hands guide them through all their mysterious thoughts, his arms uphold them when sinking under their heavy weights of responsibility, and his eyes look ahead for them to the end of time. They rest all their commands upon his authority, all their arguments upon his reason, and all their awakenings of hope upon his anchorage. All the lives that they live, as well as all the lives that they record, are not reckoned from any centres within themselves, but by their nearness to or distance from the revealed God. They have no other philosophy of civilization but Christ, no other science of history, no other statesmanship. They all, more or less distinctly, anticipated the great idea of Dionysius "the Little," and dated everything before and everything after from the birth of the Saviour. They made him the grand central sun of the entire moral universe, and contemplated all events as revolving at greater or lesser distances around him. Everything that preceded him was a preparation for his advent, and all that was to follow him was to contribute more or less directly to the establishment of his sovereignty over the hearts of all mankind. They contemplated Christ as the fulfilment of all the prophecies and types of Judaism, and all the quenchless longings of heathenism. In the one they saw religion preparing for man, and on the other man preparing for the Christian religion. Not as clearly were all these facts appreciated as they have come to be in the clear light of modern historical knowledge, but, to a controlling extent in their labours upon the sacred Scriptures, all the writers appreciated that the revealed God was the centre of all things, the end of the old and the beginning.
of the new. Let any portion of the Bible be expunged, and the complete presentation of Christ would receive a material injury. It would be felt that the body was a maimed body, that some limb or other function was wanting to this incarnation. If the Psalms were not in the canon, the book would be crippled upon the experimental side of the Old Testament religion. If the historical portions succeeding the Pentateuch were lacking, the volume would be imperfect in its revelations of God preparatory to his personal advent. If we had no Acts of the Apostles, the followers of the Redeemer would understand far less their Master's will concerning the planting and training of his churches. And if the Epistles were not to be found, the Scriptures would be very unintelligible concerning much of the application of Christ's teachings to the various needs of his followers, and regarding much of the practicability of his indwelling life with his people at all times and under all circumstances.

Here then is the resting place for the inquiring mind. The problem of Scripture diversity is completely solved in Christ. Other explanations help, but this alone satisfies. Acknowledge Christ as related to the whole Bible, and it is as the acknowledgment of the heart as connected with the entire circulation of the blood. When we take Calvary as a point of view, it is as when we leave the tortuous and bewildering streets of old Boston, and, ascending to the dome of the Capitol, look down from that high elevation upon the great city. As, then, at last, we see the bearings of all the prominent sites, and in a few moments have order brought out of all our former confusion; so from Christ Jesus we finally learn why Moses wrote, and David sang, and Isaiah prophesied, and Paul preached, and John indulged in his celestial visions. From the high uplifted Cross an essential unity is seen to comprehend all the various parts. Bewilderment gives place to admiration at the completeness of the design, the fitness of each successive part to its assigned place, and the success with which every thought and word that is irrelevant is avoided. All Mosaic legislation, all prophetic anticipations, all Jewish history, and all apostolic instruction centre in Christ, drawing motives from his heart, illumination from his mind, and assurance from his power. All the chronology and history and mysteries of the Bible find their turning-point in the great Prophet, Priest and King. Christ is everywhere in the Bible, even as oxygen is everywhere in the atmosphere, its all and in all of vitality. Its mass of fragments, so separated by subject and time and method, becomes, as thus only, "One in Christ Jesus."

Many have gazed at the grand old Cathedral in Strasburg, and received the leading lesson of its architectural design. In huge proportions the sanctuary towers upwards before us, and its spire is the highest in the world. Innumerable Gothic adornments are spread over every surface, and sculptures, statues and bas-reliefs throng upon the walls, even as the people around the doors. But a strange incompleteness is manifest everywhere. Each window and door, each moulding and entablature, each cornice and pediment, each bas-relief and statue seems waiting for something above to finish it, and unite it in perfect symmetry to the grand structure. Instinctively the eyes of the beholder creep upward from one incompleteness to another, till they rest upon the all-surmounting Cross. And so with the sacred Scriptures, God's far grander building; they ever seem incomplete and disunited until they are recognized as all surmounted by the Cross, and the one chorus of all their voices is heard in the immortal stanza of Sir John Bowring:

**In the cross of Christ I glory,**
**Towering o'er the wrecks of time;**
**All the light of sacred story**
**Gathers round its head sublime.**
If it be true in a general sense that the race is a unit in its life and progress; that every age is the inheritor of the whole past, and starts enriched by the acquisition and matured by the discipline of all time; it is also true that every age has its individual life to live, its individual training and experience to undergo. It has its own theories to form and put in practice; it has its own views, its own moral temperament and mental cast. Hence the abiding mystery that enshrouds the human condition—encompassing existence as an island is encompassed by the waters of an unknown ocean—presents varying aspects to mankind in different ages of their mental history. Each age confronts it from the stand-point of its own idiosyncrasy; is struck by the aspect that appeals most directly to its own feeling; seeks the solution that will satisfy the demands of its own mind, and cannot be entirely content with the solutions of former ages, because no former age has seen the problems precisely as it sees them, none has put precisely the same questions which it is led to put, or at least has not put them in precisely the same form.

The present is a deeply inquiring age; an age remarkable for high and widely diffused culture, and so peculiar in kind and degree are its intellectual demands that the results of former research and the formulas of past conclusions seem to it peculiarly inadequate to those demands. At many points we have broken with the past, and we are thrown into a temporary confusion. Beliefs are shaken; convictions unsettled; there is a clamour of contrary cries; we feel ourselves adrift on the flux and reflux of uncertainty.

Thus it is, to come to our present point, that the question of Immortality, in spite of Plato and the New Testament, is to-day a vexed question with many, and the old doctrine of future life widely doubted, disputed and denied. As we all know, the doubt and disbelief on the subject is largely owing to those materialistic tendencies and habits of thought which have grown up under the influence of the modern study of nature. There is no need to enlarge on this point. It is a thrice-told tale. In these days scarcely anything is said in the intellectual world which does not bear some reference to that triumphant advance of physical science which has marked this century, like the fifteenth, as a great era of awakening for the human mind. We have entered deep within the arcana of the natural world, discovered its methods and surprised its secrets. Patient study of facts prepares the way for large inductions, mechanical action is traced to its dynamic sources, and the minds of men swell at the wider vision of the universe that greets them from the heights they have attained. Now this intense activity and immense achievement may be viewed with pure admiration or with pure dislike and dread, but to the impartial observer two things are evident; that it brings some present evil, and that it brings prospective good.

The evil comes from the one-sidedness. The scientist will know nature, and nature only, and hence the step is short to holding
that there is nothing else to know. He believes in what he calls the "scientific method," and he believes in no other, contempting every other mental process as fanciful theorizing, and the subjects they are concerned with as coinage of the brain. He appropriates the general term, science, to the results of his own labour, and this exclusive claim has long since gone by default. Christian believers acquiesce in it, and are content to admit with the poet:

We have but faith, we cannot know,
For knowledge is of things we see.

Thus the notion strikes deep and spreads wide that the sensuous and the material are synonyms for the real and the true. Men's consciousness of their own spiritual nature grows dim within them, and their ancient faith in spiritual realities is slipping from their grasp. Religions interest them as creations of the "mythic consciousness," records of their mental childhood, but religious doctrines are as devoid of practical interest as speculations on lunar politics would be, for the modern nature-worship knows no gods but blind matter and brute force. Looking upon themselves as merely finer animals, these men are content to trace their pedigree to the ape and seek no other ancestor; and, stranger still, they are content to say, "That befalleth the sons of men which befalleth beasts; as the one dieth, so dieth the other." Physiology is their passion; thought and feeling are molecular changes of the nervous centres; the basis of life is solely physical, and the belief in it, apart from that, a dream. Knowing only and caring only for the human carcase, they see a matter-mote rise up by an easy process of evolution into a monkey, and thence into a man,—as man live its little day, then die, disintegrate, dissolve into the matter-mote again. They look forward to their own extinction with calmness, and even in some cases with something of enlightened pride. They see themselves "blown about the desert dust or sealed within the iron hills," and the prospect does not chill or sicken their hearts.

In view of this strange aberration of the scientific mind, in which the understanding tramples out the instinctive sentiments of the soul, it may well be asked where we find the prospect of any good to come from modern science? We answer, in the settled conviction that all deep intellectual movement is ultimately intellectual advance. All roads lead to Truth. The progress may be on lines that seem to return upon themselves, but it is progress still. For all its retrogressive windings the river bears on surely to the sea. This popular materialism cannot last. It is a back-water in the great river of progress, and it is even now on the ebb. We can discern a break between the unthinking masses and their thoughtful leaders. While the one, exulting in their new-found "freedom" of thought, are eager to throw off their old convictions and with them their hope of immortality, the others proceed more cautiously. They will not decide the point; they go no further than to call immortality an open question, one not proved nor disproved. For their earlier principles are changing colour under their eyes. The new materialism even drops its old name. Prof. Huxley tells us: "I am no materialist; I believe that system to involve grave philosophical error." Mr. Spencer tells us that the facts of existence may be described indifferently in terms of materialism or in terms of idealism, but that, for his part, he prefers the latter. Physical science in fact has advanced from perception to thought. It is no longer satisfied with salts and stones according to their appearance; it inquires what they are. It has left phenomena for their forces and laws; that is, for something immaterial and hyper-physical. Its search for the principles of matter finds them to be principles of mind; the farther it advances the more purely in-
tellectual becomes the matter of its quest, until it comes itself to the admission that "there is no sensuous objectivity of which intellectual elements do not constitute the essence." If then, as we believe, the ultimate reality is spirit, and science is the honest seeking for truth, what difference does it make that she begins with matter? The result must be the same, and perhaps the surer for being slowly reached.

We can see already how this advance of natural science brings the question of immortality face to face with large analogies. Our new learning teaches the indestructibility of matter and the persistence of force. No smallest atom perishes or is wholly lost. There is metamorphosis, there is no cessation. Decomposition is in order to recombination, and everywhere disappearance leaves behind it the promise to reappear. My body will perish in its existing form and turn to dust. But that dust itself is imperishable, immortal; it will take on new forms, and enter into new combinations to the end of time. And so force amid its infinite transmutations is self-existent and eternal. The ray of light that falls on the scattered seed, blooms in the wayside flower, and after ages of long burial, is dug up in the coal-bed, and on the hearthstone emits once more its latent, undying spark. Men have not failed to see how these analogies from the inorganic world point to the conservation and continuity of life, and there are many who exclaim to-day: We too believe in immortality—not indeed as you conceive it, a petty individualism, but the immortality of man, the perpetuation of the human race. Men die, but Man lives on—one great Being ever growing toward perfection through the service of all who have lived for its sake. In this lies our individual immortality; we contribute something to the stock of human thought or human effort, and we live for ever in the life of humanity, in our share in the progress of the race, in the memory and gratitude of men to come. Such a creed may sound cold and comfortless to the Christian, yet it is worth his consideration. To devote ourselves to the service of a generalization, and to look for after life only in our work interwoven with the progress of mankind, will scarcely satisfy the cravings and aspirations of the personal soul. Such impersonal immortality seems indeed but a fine name for annihilation. Yet the two main ideas of Positivism—that the race, as a whole, is advancing to perfection, and that the individual has higher duties to mankind than to himself—these must claim a Christian's sympathy. Consider this immortality of sacrifice, in which the social feeling is so victorious over self-love that one is content to merge his individuality in the unity of the common nature, and drop his separate being for the wider life of the undying race, and we must admit it to be a lofty and generous conception. Compare it with the narrow feeling too common among us, which makes men cling to immortality from desire of selfish happiness; which makes them dwell on their own future as their only interest; which shuts out social feeling and shuts them in to individualism; which narrows all their care to securing their own eternity, and makes them content to look on the life beyond as bringing to the few continuous union with good, and to the many continuous union with the evil, and we must admit that, some of us might well take a lesson from our enemies, if not as to the substance, yet as to the spirit of their faith.

We should learn then that we have not to argue with a crude and coarse materialism. The leaders of science have got past that, and will bring those among whom it lingers, up to their own level. They admit the persistence of life in general, but deny the permanence of any particular form it assumes. The whole question of immortality as between Christianity and Science centres to-day in a single point: the continuity of individual
consciousness—the permanence of the personal being which we are.

There are two general arguments to establish this point. One is the popular argument of appeal to the intuitions of consciousness. It is in common use with preachers and poets, for it is of a sort that comes home naturally to the minds of all men. We have an instinctive belief that we are made to live for ever. We have looked on death; we know its outward signs, but we cannot believe that the whole truth of the matter is told us by our senses. We feel within us,

Those obstinate questionings,
Of sense and outward things,
Which, be they what they may,
Are yet the fountain light of all our day.

They may be stilled for a season, but cannot be silenced for ever, and in their presence the idea of annihilation is as abhorrent to our natural reason, as to our natural feelings. Our feet are set within a world of finitude. A darkness that rises from the valley of shadow falls everywhere around us, and to our ears comes ever the sublime lament of things that die. And yet we walk this earth with the conscious bearing of a race of immortals. This short flutter of joys and pains, this brief glimmer of smiles and tears—this is not all our life. We feel,

That life shall live for evermore,
Else earth is darkness at the core,
And dust and ashes all that is.

If for a moment the thought crosses our brain that this human soul, "the roof and crown of things," could die and make no sign, the solid earth fails beneath our feet, and something seems to break within our heart. Now

Who forged this other influence,
This heat of inward evidence,
By which we doubt against the sense?

How shall we account for this voice within our soul, if it be not here to reveal a fact?

What shall we believe or trust if not these innate convictions of our common consciousness?

The second argument we speak of is the philosophic argument from the nature of the soul. It shows that spirit, self-conscious being, is substance, and is the only substance. By substance is meant that which is permanent, indestructible and immutable, because it is not subject to any limitation or conditioning from without, but has its whole being within itself. Here is the difference between personality and individuality. The being of every individual thing is dependent upon the totality of the conditions surrounding it. Change them and you destroy it. A piece of iron rusts or oxidizes until it is a piece of iron no longer. A stone may be pulverized, dissolved in water, chemically changed until its elements are united with those of other things, and its original identity is lost. But the being of a person is independent, it is self-existence. If the person alters, it must be through its own act. Alteration is Latin for "othering." In the case of the individual thing, alteration is effected by the influence of some other thing. Water alters in obedience to temperature; as water it ceases to be, becoming ice or vapour. But the person is self-determining; he is his own "other," his own limit, his own means and his own end. Thus personal being is beyond the reach of external event, is without the sphere of finitude. The existence of spirit is of necessity its existence for ever. The existence of self-conscious beings is of necessity the existence of immortal beings. When therefore the naturalist tells the philosopher: On the whole we have given up the theory of immortality, the latter can only answer with a compassionate smile. It strikes him as it would strike the naturalist to be told, "on the whole we have given up the theory of gravitation." Indeed the phrase "immortality of the soul" seems to
him an unintelligent expression; it is a pleonastic truism, and to argue it is as if one should argue the non-solidity of liquids, or the non-three-footedness of quadrupeds.

We have referred only briefly to these arguments, because, weighty as they are, they are not nowadays available. The argument from intuition is useless with those who are trained to distrust all intuitions and weigh everything by the critical understanding. The philosophic argument is equally useless with those who are ignorant of philosophy and prejudiced against its study. How then shall Christians to-day go about to establish their doctrine of personal immortality? There remains a method which may seem indirect and inconclusive, but which, it may be hoped, will be effective, for it puts the question on its true ground. And that is this: to rest the doctrine of immortality on the cardinal, elementary doctrines of Christianity—the nature of God, the nature of man and the relation between them; to cease to view it as an independent and isolated question, and to present it as an integral element of Christian truth; to cease to urge and argue it on its own merits as if it stood alone, and to hold and treat it as a corollary, a necessary consequence of Christian principles; so that we are released from any necessity to prove it, if those principles are proved or admitted. When we have convinced men of the truth of the Christian revelation as it relates to the essential facts of the human condition, we shall find that immortality, and prayer, and providence, and such questions will take care of themselves; we shall have no further need to argue them. We are too apt to waste our strength in a desultory warfare over regions remote from the main strategic points we hold; and then those distant regions, covered by our extended lines, are converted into keys of our position. It would be wiser policy to maintain our entrenched camp and offer battle only there, for there victory will be decisive and give us easy mastery of all outlying territory in dispute. This, however, will oblige us to see to it that our entrenchments are kept in good order, proof against the newest inventions in artillery, and up to the highest level of military art, lest we perish under the fall of antiquated and neglected defences. To drop the figure, if we rest the question of immortality on the cardinal truths of Christianity, we must take care fully to apprehend those truths and to present them justly, so that their breadth and depth and living power, their comprehensiveness and their simplicity may be made known to men. And here that we touch, as we conceive, the main root of the difficulty, we shall venture to speak with freedom.

There is reason to fear that it is the simplest and most fundamental of Christian truths that would sound newest in men's ears to-day. We preach too often in place of Christ's Gospel a human theology which is neither reasonable nor Christian. Some of it is the product of the monkish, scholastic mind of a world that has passed away; some of it was shaped amid the violent excitements and reactionary strifes of the Reformation. It has lost influence over the world's mind. More than that, it has provoked a reaction. It is not too much to say that the current theological teaching is as largely responsible for modern disbelief as is the materialism taught by Science. If men to-day doubt of God and their future life, it is because they can no longer believe many dogmas of an orthodox theology which is the only exponent of Christianity they know. Let us not be misunderstood. We do not write to attack theology or decry dogma; on the contrary we would defend them. But it is to be remembered that theology is not the faith. That faith indeed was once for all delivered; it is unchanging and unchangeable. Theology is the measure of man's apprehension...
of divine truth. Its systems register the conceptions of their time. They give us the best thought and clearest vision their makers could attain to; they can do no more. Hence theology must change, must move with the movement of the human mind, and its history from Clement and Origen to Bull and Butler is only the record of its growth. It is our part to carry on its progress, and for this we must recognize its deficiencies. No science is injured by correction; if we clear it of errors, we strengthen it and do it service. Now for many years our theology has been holding up to men ideas of God and of man wholly inadequate to their enlarged and refined conceptions, and they reject them to-day as ignoble and untrue. These ideas were adequate to the past, for they were the product of the past, but they have fallen below the intellectual and moral level of the present, and theology must rise to that level before God and immortality can be a universal faith again.

We shall be told perhaps that the doctrines of the received theology are the teaching of Scripture; that we cannot have the Christianity of the Bible without them. This is of course the very question we raise. Wherever we hold theology to be erroneous, there we hold it be unscriptural, and our point is that there are doctrines of this theology not taught by Scripture nor properly derived from it. At once we shall be met by an overwhelming array of proof-texts. But it needs no long study of the Bible to know that such a method can make it prove anything. The devil can cite Scripture for his purpose. These doctrines come from the misreading of Scripture. They spring from that blind literalism that kills, because it misses the spirit of truth; from that false and shallow theory of inspiration which has made an idol of the written word as before the Roman made an idol of the Church; which shelters itself behind men's misplaced reverence to numb and cramp the faith of Christendom. They are handed down from days when sound scholarship was unknown; when men's only aim was to find support for theories and their only study how to warp and bend the Bible language to make it fit with the hybrid philosophy of the Schools. They are not in Scripture; they contradict its spirit. They are "Aberglaube," the human overgrowth which has buried and choked the simple truths of the Gospel.

Let us turn to one or two of these theologic doctrines which bear on the question of immortality, and see if they are not as much at variance with the spirit of Christianity as with the dictates of an educated reason. There is a theological idea of God which cuts Him off from any close or constant relation to the universe or to mankind. According to this, six thousand years ago God made the heavens and the earth, and now He rests from all His work that He has done. The finished spheres rolled from His hands complete as the ship that glides from the dockyard when the builder launches it and leaves it. The universe is wound up like a clock to run by its natural laws, and there is no action left to the Creator but one of interference. When He appears in His own person, it can only be to interrupt the continuity of the natural order. There is a regular, settled course of things, but a special Providence occasionally interposes to make them go differently. And so the feeling grows up that somehow the material world is not God's own, and miracles are valued for proving the important truth that God can suspend the laws of nature at His will. It is no wonder that scientific men feel they can dispense with such a do-nothing God who sits apart from the world, a remote and misty phantom, supposed to possess a sort of disused veto-power. It is no wonder that in the necessity they find for some actual source of life and energy, they personify an abstraction and call it Nature.
This narrow and mechanical notion of the Creator is not Christian. He whom we know through Christ is about us and before us as well as behind us. God is in everything or He is in nothing. He is no "Supreme Being" of French Deism. He is to be conceived as in the universe, not as out of it. As we learn to know "Nature," we learn to know the methods of His working. Who is its indwelling life and ever-active power. St. Paul knows nothing of our distinction between natural and supernatural, as if both were not equally divine; although conservative theologians might well shrink from the seeming "Pantheism" of his language: "One God and Father of all, who is above all and through all and in you all." "Of Him and through Him and to Him are all things." Again, if the sole, all-working energy of the natural world is a personal will, there is nothing lawless in a miracle. It is only the immediate exertion of the same power that ordinarily works mediatly. Thus miracles are not evidence to God, but God is the evidence to miracles. We believe in the wondrous works of Christ because we believe in Christ. And this is the mental attitude he approved. That men should believe in Him because they saw signs and wonders He expressly discouraged. Of one village the evangelist tells that "He did there no mighty work, because of their unbelief."

Now this God of nature is revealed to us as the Father of mankind. In that single word what a world of meaning centres! It fills and satisfies the mind and the soul. But the false theology has severed this relation as it has the other. The God of such theology is in His own being self-sufficient. He creates the world for His own glory, and man to pay Him worship. He has no duties toward us. He has the rights of a feudal lord over his serfs. We have no business to judge of the right or wrong of His actions; the sovereign is above the law. And then man, having the misfortune to inherit a diseased moral nature, is strangely enough held accountable for that misfortune. He is by nature born in sin and a child of wrath. He is under a curse. With evil propensities and little strength to resist them, he is thrown into a world of temptation and left to take his very slight chance of escaping eternal damnation at the hands of a just God who hateth iniquity. It is no wonder that men of clear head revolt against such a caricature of Christ's Gospel, and prefer no religion to a bad one. Where in this is the great truth of the Divine fatherhood? Where God's patient, tender, self-forgetful love, so beautifully taught us in the parables of Christ? Where St. Paul's grand idea that He must always and through everything remain true to His own nature? "If we believe not, yet He abideth faithful; He cannot deny Himself." It seems that this theology has done for us what St. Paul believed impossible when he exclaimed: "I am persuaded that neither death, nor life, nor things present, nor things to come, nor height, nor depth, nor any other creature, shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is in Jesus Christ."

Nor is the matter greatly helped by the doctrine of the atonement, as commonly taught. The Gospel account, that God so loved the world that He sent His Son to save sinners—and to save them not only from punishment but from sin—this was soon overclouded and perverted by the bar-creation?" The candidate promptly responded, "The exhibition of the Divine glory," and was somewhat startled at the abrupt demand in a formidable voice, "How would you like that to be said of you?" "I don't understand, Sir," he faltered. "Why, suppose you had done some worthy or generous action, how would you like it to be said that you had only done it for the sake of showing yourself off!"
barism it sought to convert. It could not cope with the notions of wild justice it came in contact with. When the barbarian was wronged, his resentment demanded the suffering of the offender; and adequate suffering could expiate the injury. Such is the barbaric notion of justice; "an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth." But if suffering is what justice demands, and what satisfies it, it is but a step to hold that the suffering of one may be undergone by another,—that it makes no difference to justice whether the offender suffers or some one else in his place. The records of uncivilized people are full of examples of this vicarious punishment. For instance, the story of Zaleukos, who when his son was condemned to lose both his eyes, gave one of his own to reduce the penalty. Now the god of the barbarian was but himself "writ large." These savage notions soon began to work upon men's view of the Christian faith, and in course of time passed into the growing theology. God's justice, outraged by men's sins, demanded a satisfaction in the form of suffering, and His infinite majesty could be satisfied only by their eternal pains. But Christ had suffered on the cross in their place, and His few hours' agony, curiously multiplied by the dignity of His divinity, was accepted as equivalent to their endless tortments. These views were thrown into legal forms of expression under the influence of the Roman law upon some doctors of the Church, and hence they are still called the "forensic" view of the Atonement. As Llewelyn Davies has pointed out, no civilized court of law would admit for a moment the principles assumed. That the proper demand of justice is a fixed equivalent of suffering; that this should be proportioned to the dignity of the person injured—as when a serf was whipped for killing his fellow serf, but hung for striking a knight; that it is indifferent whether the offender suffer or some one else for him—these are assumptions which modern criminal law would simply find matter of amusement. Some who feel it difficult to defend theological tradition on this point resort to a desperate device. They tell us that divine justice is not the same as human, and that we cannot argue from one to the other. This is utterly to confuse the moral sense, and to undermine the foundations of ethical thought and practice. It is because our moral convictions—and among them our idea of justice—are absolute to our reason that they are authoritative with us. We must rather trust their voice as to their divine character than this unsupported assertion to the contrary. Besides, as the writer just referred to remarks, "it would be singular indeed that the justice of God should differ from that of civilized men only by resembling that of primitive barbarism." We cannot wonder then that men of to-day turn from the Gospel of reconciliation with contemptuous indifference when it is thus misrepresented. Another point of this theological teaching more than all the rest has shaken men's faith in their immortality, and that is the doctrine of the future life itself. Its retributive penalties and its recompensing joys have been so represented that men cannot bring themselves to believe in the one or to care for the other. The picture of unending bliss is weak and colourless to the point of the absurd. Our spiritual existence is described in earthly images of baldest materialism. There is a city of gorgeous splendour, with thrones of sapphire, walls of jasper, and gates of pearl. The action for the scene is as monotonous as human faculties are varied,—if action it can be called, for to stand for ever robed in shining white, chanting hymns of adoration, seems little else than idleness. If the heaven of the old theology ever did kindle the imagination, it does so now no longer. The docile believer contemplates this eternity of dulness with a secret sinking of the heart, and we cannot
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wonder if the less reverent turn from it with good-natured contempt. If the picture of heaven is weak, the picture of hell is horrible. The torments of the wicked have these singular characteristics: they are physical; they are penal, not reformatory; and they are uniform or undiscriminating. Can any healthy reason which has learned its Christianity from the four gospels bring itself to believe in a hell where the punishments of condemned spirits are purely corporeal, of a sort suited only to the body as it is laid down at death; where they are utterly aimless and retrospective, undesigned by the Judge who is also the Saviour of men to work the sinner’s purification; where they are indiscriminate upon all, visiting all alike with the same tortures, regardless of the infinite variations in degree of sin which earthly lives present; where above all they are eternal, not because the sins of time can merit the retribution of eternity, but on the feudal principle referred to that punishment should be proportioned not to the offender’s guilt, but to the dignity of the person offended,—and this although the doctrine carries with it the monstrous Manichean fancy of an eternity of evil in God’s world which He cannot or will not prevent? Shall we wonder that men reject this ghastly doctrine which makes their heavenly Father the arbitrary and relentless Moloch of the universe?

Here then, in view of these errors of the past, we learn our first duty as teachers of immortality. It is because the infidels identify this theological caricature with the religion of Christ that they reject the one with the other. If we disavow it, we disarm them. It is dangerous to cast pearls before swine, but it is also dangerous to give starving men stones for bread. Let us learn that such a false teaching is our worst hindrance to success. Let us free ourselves from the traditional errors and misconceptions that clog our speech and distort our message, and the Gospel of Christ, now as at the beginning, will conquer the world.

And with that Gospel is bound up the faith in immortality. For those who accept the Christian teachings as to God and man, and cherish them not merely as a doctrinal system for the head, but as a living reality for the heart and life—disbelief in immortality becomes impossible. Our surest way to teach that truth is to educate the religious spirit, and lead into the religious life. They who live in conscious communion with a heavenly Father know that if in this world only they have hope in Him, they are of all men most miserable; and in that consciousness they feel that when men talk of the annihilation of a human soul, they are talking nonsense. And this faith is founded on a fact. We are one with God in our essential nature, for spiritual being is one and homogeneous. We spirits are made in God’s image, and Jesus is made in ours. “He that sanctifieth and they who are sanctified are all of one.” “For as He is, so are we in this world.” And not only is there unity of nature, there is communion of life. “In Him we live and move and have our being.” Our being is contained in and sustained by His. We abide in Him and He in us, and He abides for ever. We share in His life, and as that life is everlasting, we know that we too are immortal. Thus His existence certifies our unending life, for “He is not a God of the dead, but of the living.” Death is therefore only an event in life; it is death of the body, but it is new birth of the spirit. That which our soul cries out for at sight of death is a reality; the bodily husk falls from us only to waken us to a fuller consciousness and a truer reality. It was the fancy of the ancients to speak of the “sleep of death,” but for the Christian, life is the sleep from which death wakens him.

Our birth is but a sleep and a forgetting.
In death the spirit opens its eyes, recalled from a troubled dream to the realities of its life, which have all the time surrounded it unseen, and to the Father who has been all the time “not far from every one of us.” In this faith our life is “builded far from accident.” We are persuaded that nothing can separate us from the living God; not life nor death, not things present nor things to come, nor angels nor principalities nor powers. The spirit which we are, is anchored safe in the Spirit whose we are, for He is all in all.

If now we look back from the plane of this reasonable faith to the view of the Positivist, in which we have admitted there is something to admire, we shall find that we have no need to borrow from it, if we but hold the truths of our religion in the grasp of an adequate conception. We can answer: Our religion also teaches the eternal progress of the race; we too believe in the conservation of all human effort to the general good, but we believe besides in the unending life of the individual workers and their unceasing work. You look to a sacrificial death for the undying race; we look to an endless life of loving service. You speak of an immortal humanity all whose past generations are dead—whose life is only in the future; we believe that all men who have been, are—a mighty host whom we on earth call dead because they are removed to a better world whither we too are going. You believe in the concentration of the whole race into an ideal Man whose continuous life preserves the memory of our thoughts and deeds; we too believe in that ideal Man, but not as an abstraction, powerless to hold any vital relation to our souls, not as a metaphysic shadow, but as a person, the God-Man, Christ in whom we are recreated, whose name is Eternal Love. Your conception has a kind of barren grandeur, but it does not rise to the magnificence of ours; it is a lower thought, and we will not change gold for lead.

Thus all of truth and nobleness there is in Positivism, and more than that, we have in Christianity, for it was the misconception of a dull and narrow-hearted past to view our future life as an inert repose of selfish bliss. The spiritual world is one of beauty and of rest, but not such beauty as speaks only to the outward eye, not such rest as the wearied body longs for, not such a world as it appeared to Oriental or to Mediaeval fancy. A peace that passeth understanding welcomes the weary and heavy-laden from their struggle with the cares of life, from their deeper struggle with the weakness of the flesh; but it is a peace of freer action, not of idleness. In the many mansions of our Father’s house shall be found full room for the development of all our nobler faculties—reason, imagination, the affections, the active energies. Feelings which have found no food here shall there be satisfied. Faint possibilities of our nature which here we see in glimpses shall there be grasped and made realities. New aspirations shall call to higher action. The outlines of life shall be filled up, and the rough sketch finished as we grow into a perfect man, the stature of the fulness of Christ. A world of boundless knowledge and unbounded capacities to learn, of glorious work to do and adequate faculties to do it—this shall be our home.

“For doubtless unto each is given
A life that bears immortal fruit;
In such great offices as suit
The full-grown energies of heaven.”

The scholar and the seeker will be there, and the check of earthly limitation shall be taken away and the secrets of all time and space given them to study. The prophets and reformers will be there, and shall be sent forth now on larger missions with ampler powers. The heroes of the right will
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be there, and shall be called now to conquests crowned with no blood-stained laurels. And the loving and the tender will be there—they who have made their lives a ministry to troubled souls and broken hearts, and that ministry shall be carried on in wider ways we know not of.

For it is a home of purified and permanent affections, where misconception melts into insight, divisions into sympathy, and hatred into love. A household and a family where the dearest dreams of home-life shall find their happy fulfilment; where all interchange of thought and feeling shall be freer, fuller, and more perfect; where those we have loved shall ever be around us, with others whom we shall know in person as we have known them by name—all the innumerable company of the great and good of every age and clime. And where the purified in heart shall see God; where we shall live in the light of our Father's countenance, and meet face to face our elder brother, Christ.

The Reciprocal Influence of Christianity and Liberty.


By Christianity we understand, no ecclesiastical hierarchy or organization; but the religion instituted by Christ, promulgated by his Apostles, set forth in the Holy Scriptures, propagated and preserved in the world by the preaching of the Gospel and the power of the Holy Ghost. By liberty we understand, neither lawlessness nor license in Church or State. While the end of civil government is to secure that order which is necessary to the largest attainable measure of free activity for all, the end of civil liberty is self-government; and it implies that the civil government should give to every man as full an opportunity for attaining and enjoying that end as the rights of others and the good of all will admit. Civil liberty may exist under any form of civil government, but it seems plain that it is best secured when a popular constitution can be permanently and quietly maintained. Religious liberty is neither Caesarism, nor secularism, nor individualism, no indifferentism. It does not abate one jot of the claims, the absolute claims, of God and His truth; but it leaves those claims to be addressed to the mind and heart and conscience of every man, not to his bodily sensibilities or to his temporal interests. It relies upon moral and spiritual influence, not upon physical force. It is consistent with the profession and maintenance of the most minute and prolix creed, but is most fully enjoyed where the symbols of communion, retaining all that is essential and fundamental to true religion, are the most comprehensive and simple.

Christ's religion was embodied in Himself, in His character and work and teaching. Who, then, was He, and what did He teach? The Son of God was born in a stable, and died on the cross. He was known by His neighbours as the carpenter and the carpenter's son. His daily life was among the poor and the lowly. He gathered a company of fishermen as His bosom friends in His earthly ministry, and took a penitent thief as His companion to Paradise. He taught that the poor shall possess the kingdom of Heaven, and the meek shall inherit the
earth; that God watches over the humblest of His children with more than paternal care, that the angels who always behold the face of the Father minister to them, and that woe is to him who despises them. "The princes of the Gentiles," said He, "exercise lordship over them, and their great ones exercise authority upon them; but so shall it not be among you; but whosoever will be great among you shall be your minister, and whosoever of you will be the chiefest shall be servant of all." So much for His followers among themselves. To them He directs all His precepts—not to kings, or rulers, or magistrates, or any in authority; and should His followers be called to discharge such functions, He has left the spirit of these same precepts, and these only, to guide them. Yet, He never utters a word to make the poor discontented or turbulent, to render them jealous or envious of the rich and great; or hostile to them, or ambitious to reach their places. He never says a syllable to stir up a spirit of sedition against the constituted government, even though it was their own despotism of Rome. His command is "Render to Caesar the things that are Caesar's," as well as "to God the things that are God's." But it must be remembered that Caesar and his deputies and officials, and all the machinery of the Roman government then lay, and were regarded as lying, beyond the bounds of His Kingdom—that kingdom of the truth for which He was giving laws. To His kingdom that government as a system was a foreign element.

The Apostles renew and re-echo the teachings of their master. They declare that God is no respecter of persons, but that whatsoever any man doeth the same shall he receive from the Lord, whether he be bond or free. They teach that all Christians are brethren, as children of a common Father and redeemed by a common Saviour, and that by love they should serve one another. It is the man, and not his accidents, that fills their view; the soul for which Christ died, and not its external circumstances of worldly dignity or of worldly insignificance, that measures their interest and regard. "Let the poor," says St. James, "rejoice in that he is exalted; but the rich in that he is made low;" and He emphatically condemns the contemptuous treatment of "the poor man in vile raiment." "Ye see your calling, brethren," says St. Paul, "how that not many wise men after the flesh, not many mighty, not many noble, are called;" "we are all one in Christ Jesus; where there is neither Greek nor Jew, Barbarian, Scythian, bond nor free, but Christ is all and in all." Yet the Apostles, after the example of their Master, taught distinctly that "every soul should be subject to the higher powers," to the lawful government; that Christians should submit to every ordinance of man for the Lord's sake; as free and not using their liberty for a cloak of maliciousness, but as the servants of God." They taught, too, that there should be order and government in the Church itself; that we are members in one body, and that all members have not the same office. But it is to be observed, that, though "God hath set in the Church first the Apostles," yet St. Paul says, for himself and his colleagues in that office, "We preach not ourselves, but Christ Jesus, the Lord, and ourselves your servants for Jesus' sake;" "not for that we have dominion over your faith, but are helpers of your joy." And St. Peter exhorts presbyters, as being himself their fellow-presbyter, to conduct themselves "not as lords over God's heritage, but as examples to the flock." Indeed, the ministers of God were approved as such by special toils and privations, abuse and contempt, "for, I think," says St. Paul, "that God hath set forth us, the Apostles, last, as it were appointed unto death; for we are made a spectacle to the world and to angels and to men; even unto the present
honour we both hunger and thirst, and are
naked and are buffeted, and have no certain
dwelling-place, and labour working with our
own hands; being reviled we bless, being
persecuted we suffer it; being defamed we
entreat; we are made as the filth of the
world and are the offscouring of all things
unto this day." Such was the highest dignity
to which men were called in the Apostolic
Church.

Such was the religion which Christ and
His Apostles established. So far as the in-
fluence and spirit of such a religion should
leaven human society, how is it possible that
it should fail to promote liberty, brotherhood
and equality among them; to develop man-
hood, to relieve the oppressed, to elevate the
degraded, to humble the proud, to restrain
the selfishness of ambition, to temper the
exercise of authority, to check the insolence
of power and the domineering of despotism;
and to make both the high and the low un-
speakably happier, according to the noble
sentiment of St. James, in their mutual
approximation! Christianity lays the only
secure foundation for permanent civil liberty.
It is utterly unlike any mere doctrine of the
rights of man. It inculcates duties rather
than rights. By its doctrine and spirit of
meek humility and brotherly love, it is quite
as inconsistent with the coarse and violent
and insolent demands of a reckless mob as
it is with the cool and cruel and cunning
policy of an aristocracy or the ruthless
despotism of an autocrat. Christianity alone
effectually represses that spirit of human
pride and selfishness which tends alike to
 crush and to undermine the rising fabric
of civil freedom. Christianity is popular
without being revolutionary; submissive to
wrong, but not conservative of evil. Doubt-
less, as there always have been, so there
always will be, in every community, men of
inferior mental capacity and moral character;
but while these may need to be, in various
degrees, guided and restrained, Christianity
forbids that they should ever be trampled
upon or used merely as means for the elevation
or aggrandizement of others. Christianity
teaches us to support the weak, and not to
make them support us; to love them as
brethren, to be pitiful, to be courteous,
honestly to desire that our inferiors should
become our equals, to respect their humanity,
and to seek by all possible means their
speediest elevation and improvement. Chris-
tianity is hopeful. She does not despair of
the elevation of the masses of mankind or
give them up to a hopeless and interminable
degradation. "But they are mere children,"
it is said. Be it so, and she would have us
treat them as children. But children are
guided and governed, not that the parents
may enjoy the honour and dignity of govern-
ing, not that their despotic spirit may be
justified, not that their wealth and con-
sideration may be increased, not that they
may live at their ease on the labours of
their children, not that their parental sway
may be perpetuated, but always with the
express hope and aim that those children
may soon learn to guide and govern them-
selves, and eventually to guide and govern
others in their turn. Such, Christianity
would teach, should be the treatment of all
inferior classes in society. The highest ideal
of the Christian state, is, "a government
of the people, by the people, for the people."

When we pass from theory to fact, and
inquire of history what has been the actual
influence of Christianity upon civil liberty
and civil life, it is necessary to remember
that this divine religion exerts its influence
through human agencies and organs, and
that its proper effects are liable to be modi-
fied or obstructed, and even perverted or
annulled by the imperfection or reaction of
the medium through which it is transmitted.
This religion is pure only at its source, and
it is only by constantly recurring to that
source that its lost purity is to be restored.
Let us be thankful that in the Holy Scrip-
tures we have the means of thus revisiting that source and making fresh draughts from the pure waters of life and truth. Indeed, it is one of the most striking proofs of the truth and divinity of the Christian religion, that, though, in the progress of enlightenment and knowledge we may reach higher and larger views of divine and spiritual things and of the economy of the Kingdom of God than those of Jerome or Origen, or Tertullian, of either of the Gregorys or Clements, or of Ireneüs or Ignatius, and may have a more thorough and critical knowledge of the meaning and the doctrine of the Scriptures than the most learned and excellent of the early Fathers possessed, yet we can never get above or beyond, nay, we can never attain to the full height and depth and length and breadth of the original doctrine of Christ and His Apostles. As our minds and knowledge, our science and culture expand, we only come to understand that doctrine better, and at the same time to apprehend more distinctly its unfathomable riches, its unapproachable, superhuman character. Assuredly Jesus Christ and His religion are not a product of the development of humanity, but come into that development from a higher source. It is true they did not come into the world by chance. No one who recognizes a universal plan of Divine government in the world, who discerns in history the unfolding scheme of a wise and holy Providence, can fail to see that a preparation was made for the coming of Christ, not only in the Jewish history and economy, but in the language and literature, the philosophy and polity, the civilization, culture and conquests of the Greeks and Romans. Christ came in the fulness of the times. In Him a Divine element was brought into immediate contact, into permanent and visible conjunction with human history. But this Divine element thus entering into the evolution of humanity, the historical results must be determined by the action and reaction of the divine and the human elements upon each other; and whatever may have been the Providential preparation for this influx of the Divine, there still remained on the human side manifold oppositions and obstructions to be overcome and surmounted.

Christianity had to cope with the narrow and grovelling prejudices of Judaism, with the desperate scepticism, the proud and perverse disputations of Greek philosophy, with the brutal violence and iron vigour of Roman despotism, and with the rank licentiousness and leprous vices of a corrupt and decaying society. Even before the decease of the Apostles the results of the reaction of these human elements, the leaven of human corruption began to show themselves, at Jerusalem, at Antioch, Corinth, Rome, among the Galatians, among those to whom St. Peter and St. Jude wrote their epistles, and in the seven churches of Asia. After the death of the Apostles there followed a rank luxuriance of strange doctrines, a very Babel of monstrous heresies, through which the truth of the gospel owed its preservation, humanly speaking, to two things, the pressure of persecution and the faithful care of the governors of the church. But the very prestige of the services of these latter, such is the weakness of human nature, led to their corruption and degeneracy, to a vast expansion of the pretensions and power of the hierarchy—an evil, in its consequences, almost as great as that which had just been escaped. And, again, when the persecution ceased, upon the conversion of Constantine, the corrupting worldly element only gained a firmer foothold in the Church. Hierarchy and people, clergy and laity alike fell under the control of the imperial power, no longer an external force assailing the Church from without, but wielding its domination within with an insidious and irresistible sway. The Bishops of the Church and the very doctrines of religion became the footballs of court
intrigue. Notwithstanding all this, no impartial student of history can fail to acknowledge that the spirit of Christianity wrought many social reforms and ameliorations; but it is not to be wondered at, that, under such circumstances, it could not produce all the beneficent effects of its proper character. With the decline and fall of the Roman Empire, Christianity, in the West, was driven to take up its home among the hordes of barbarian invaders. Such was the new stock on which it must be engrafted, such the mass of ignorance and violence it had to leaven, of such rough and uncouth materials it had to reconstruct the Christian Church. Of course the practical result was modified by the character of these materials. As the imperial power declined and was withdrawn, that of the hierarchy increased, until the Papal domination, with all its pestilent corruptions and its secularization of the Kingdom of God, was established throughout Europe. Coming off victorious from its struggle with the bastard empire of the West, allying itself with the spirit of the feudal system, it proudly trampled under foot the temporal sovereignty, and, with a blasphemous assumption of the attributes of Deity, it ruled over the kings of the earth. Truly, if there were not in our holy religion, an indestructible power and life, it would have been at length crushed out of existence, under such a load of corruptions and perversions, varied and multiplied and accumulated from age to age. But instead of that, the spirit of Christianity roused itself at last to throw off with one mighty effort the crushing incubus—and then came the glorious Reformation. Yet, even here, there appeared the perversion of an encroaching human element. The character of this heavenly religion was not manifested in its purity, for, as was natural, in resisting the corrupt domination of the Romish hierarchy, too close and too subservient an alliance was made with the civil power. This has been the great drawback upon the full working out of the proper influence of Christianity under the Protestant Reformation. Still, with this drawback here, and the vastly greater drawbacks elsewhere, the grand result as to the actual influence of Christianity upon civil liberty, is this; that under its influence, and under that alone, has civil liberty ever anywhere in the world been enjoyed by whole communities; nowhere else have purely popular governments been established with permanent success. The ancient republics were really oligarchies, the mass of their population being slaves, or, at least, destitute of the rights of citizenship; they were based upon force; they subsisted upon war, piracy and plunder; and the freest of them were always in an uncertain and fluctuating condition. Under the influence of their religion, all modern Christian governments, of whatever form, repose, in a greater or less degree, upon a free and enlightened public opinion as their basis, and make it avowedly their great object to promote the general good and advancement of the people by the arts of peace. Under the influence of Christianity alone have castes and classes disappeared, and the dignity, the moral claims and inherent rights of man as man, been acknowledged. Under her influence alone have slavery and serfdom been abolished. But, in the working out of this abolition, we have especially to note that it has been the latent spirit of our divine religion, and not the ecclesiastical hierarchy—the spirit of that religion, often, in spite of the hierarchy, which usually allies itself with the aristocratic tendencies—the spirit of that religion working up from the general Christian heart, that has accomplished the grand result. Christianity is manifestly not of the earth, not a mere natural result of human progress, but a factor and a force introduced from above. Men lived for ages in the same latitudes and longitudes which are now the
seat of Christendom, in the same climates, under the same general physical conditions; yet, without Christianity they never worked out these results. Men still live under similar favourable external conditions in Japan, for example, and yet they do not reach these results. To make Jesus Christ, as Mr. Buckle would do, a mere product of his times, and the Christian religion a mere result of the natural evolution of mankind under the given external circumstances; to deny to it the credit of having sensibly affected the production of the modern culture and freedom which distinguishes Christendom, or, indeed, the production of any good whatever; and yet to labour through whole volumes in a systematic effort to heap upon it the odium of having caused most of the evils and created most of the obstacles that modern civilization has had to encounter, is one of the most astonishing specimens of perversion of sentiment, distortion of facts, and sophistry of reasoning, to be found in the whole compass of modern literature.

As to the effect of Christianity upon religious liberty, it is manifest that the persecutions which disgraced its history during the middle ages, and for a long time after, among Protestants, even, as well as among Romanists, find not the slightest foundation or sanction in the character or teaching of Christ or His Apostles. Our Lord knew that His religion would be exposed to the malignant persecutions of Jews and Gentiles; He often foretold it, and warned His disciples to be prepared for it; but He never suggested a retort. The contrary was the precise characteristic of His whole spirit and doctrine. The Apostles met the persecutions which had been predicted, but they never had the most distant thought of retaliation. Of course, discipline was exercised within their own flocks, but it was spiritual discipline by spiritual methods, never with the use of physical force, which in those times they could not have used if they would, and would not if they could. Among St. Paul's many journeyings after his conversion we hear of none undertaken on any mission like that upon which he was stricken down on the way to Damascus. For the schismatic or the heretic, as well as for the evil liver, the highest punishment was the being cut off from the communion of the faithful. The right of expelling refractory members must be inherent in every society, and is perfectly consistent with the truest conception of religious liberty. The upbraidings of conscience and the fear of God's future judgments are perfectly consistent with religious liberty. The question of moral right and the reality of the Divine threatening is a question of truth or fact, and not a matter of religious liberty. But there is not in all the life and teaching of Christ or His Apostles the slightest hint of punishing misbelieving or misbehaving brethren with torture and imprisonment, the faggot and the stake, or the cool, diabolical farce of delivering them over to the secular arm for the execution of such inflictions. It is true the faithful are forbidden by the Apostle to keep company with an excommunicated person, even so much as to eat, and our Lord Himself had said, "Let him be unto thee as a heathen man and a publican." But it must be remembered that, when those rules were given, their application would not expose the party offending to any physical suffering or hardship, and certainly it was not intended that they should; it was not intended that a man should be forced to believe the truth in order to avoid being starved to death. And if, in subsequent times the application of these rules led or would lead to great physical privation, to cold and nakedness and famishing and death, then, their literal execution was as gross a perversion of Scripture as Satan himself could have suggested. The coarsest Infidelity has been guilty of no greater blasphemy. Let us be thankful that the spirit of Christianity has thrown off the
incrustations of ages of corruption, and brought a large part of Christendom to the distinct consciousness, to the full and hearty acceptance of religious liberty. It is true that intolerance and the duty of persecution are still preached in some quarters, and the infallible, unchangeable Church of the Middle Ages must perforce continue to preach it and practise it as far as her crafty estimate of expediency and present safety will permit. But for such assailants of religious liberty to attempt to brand the object of their attacks as heathenish indifferentism, is a proof either of great obtuseness of perception or of a conscious perversion of truth for the sake of a plausible argument.

Religious liberty does not hinder the church from effectually insisting upon the preservation of pure doctrine in her bosom. But her doctrine is addressed to the minds and consciences of men, under the motives presented by sound reason and Divine authority, and not those drawn from the Inquisition and the Auto-da-fé. Every man has a right to accept her doctrine or to reject it—not an absolute right, for no man has such a right to reject any truth or to maintain any falsehood—but a relative right, _i.e._, the Church has no right, and her Founder never intended that she should exercise or claim the right, forcibly to compel acquiescence. Christianity fully recognizes man’s mental and moral freedom, and his personal accountability to God for the exercise of that freedom. She may say with Christ, you must believe or be condemned; but she may not say with Charlemagne, you must be baptized or be drowned. God has revealed His mercy that we too might learn to be merciful; He has so revealed His vengeance that we might learn to refrain from its exercise. [Rom. xii. 19.]

In short, persecution originated in human corruption, not in Christian principle; in human passion and self-will, or at best in the mistaken judgment of human infirmity, not in the spirit or teaching of Jesus Christ. It was not introduced into the world by Christianity, but has been engrafted upon it by the spirit of the world in days of darkness and violence and hierarchical domination. It is manifestly inimical to the interests of true religion. It engenders and encourages hypocrisy, or stolid ignorance, or the abnegation of thought and reason and personal accountability; and thus tends to destroy proper, personal, rational faith, the faith of a reasonable man, the faith that leads to a reasonable service. True faith and true religion absolutely presuppose a free action of the mind and will of man. No other religion has so fully recognized this fact as Christianity; and a return to the principles of religious freedom is but a return to the first principles of Christ’s religion, the disentanglement, after ages of perversion and corruption, of its true spirit and proper influence.

Now it is but an identical proposition to say that wherever the tendencies of Christianity have the freest scope, and its proper results most thoroughly worked out, there Christianity will exist in its most complete and characteristic form. And every stage of progress towards such a consummation must be so much vantage ground for further advancement. If Christianity tends to promote civil liberty, or naturally to coalesce with it, then the existence of civil liberty must react advantageously upon Christianity. They must be mutual friends; and though each may have many other friends besides. There may be many other influences favourable to civil liberty besides Christianity—and among them may even be some of an utterly irreligious and anti-Christian character—as, on the other hand, there certainly are many influences favourable to Christianity besides civil liberty. The same is true of the relation of Christianity to general light and knowledge, to civilization and social culture. It is among
its divine credentials that it falls in and harmonizes with whatever tends to the elevation and happiness of man, or to the unfolding and enlargement of his powers, to the perfecting of humanity in any of its aspects or relations. Christianity has its proper spiritual purpose, which is no other than to lead man on to the attainment and accomplishment of the highest end of his being, in his relation to what is above and beyond this present world. But notwithstanding this, or, rather, precisely because of this, it is in conscious harmony with all that is true and beautiful and good, with all that is pure and honest and virtuous, with all that is lovely and noble and manly. The more perfectly man is developed as man, in all his normal faculties and relations, the better vehicle he becomes for the manifestation of the full power and glory of the Christian religion. Such a development, from whatever causes proceeding, is, humanly speaking, a preparation for Christianity; for if this religion comes to raise the fallen, to elevate the degraded, to guide the erring, to enlighten the dark, to ennoble the mean, to reform the vicious, she cannot but welcome whatever will help her in her benign mission. But light and liberty and love cannot but help her. Christ did, indeed, once say, "He that is not with Me is against Me;" but it was of Satan He then spoke. Again He said, "He that is not against us is on our part," and then it was of well-intentioned but partially enlightened men He spoke.

It is true, man's nature is radically perverted, and the best things may, by abuse, become the worst. Without the aid of Divine grace, without an influence from on high, without the leaven of Christ's religion, man can never reach his highest development in relation either to the future world or to this. Every right and good tendency in him, is, in its normal evolution, ready to welcome and embrace Christianity. Scientific superciliousness and philosophic pride and prejudice are no part of man's true development. But though the evil of man's nature crops out everywhere, yet, on the whole, intellectual light and culture are more favourable to Christianity than brutish darkness and ignorance. Ignorance may be the mother of superstitious devotion, but knowledge is the foster parent of true religion. Christianity does not fear knowledge or frown upon it; rather she both commends and commands it. "Be not children in understanding," is her injunction, "howbeit, in malice be ye children, but in understanding be men;" be men—men is what Christianity wants; not ignorant children, but intelligent men. Every soul may be, in the sight of God, equally precious, yet the conversion of one St. Paul was of more consequence to the advancement of the Christian religion—such are the law and movement of Divine Providence—than the gathering in of whole masses of ignorant heathen at Laodicea, at Sardis, or even at Rome. And, as civil liberty must naturally help to produce, in a given community, a greater number of men, of real, intelligent, manly men, it cannot fail to exert a favourable reflex influence upon the promotion both of the truth and of the power of Christianity. Moreover, civil liberty must give Christianity a freer scope for exerting and diffusing its own benign influence.

We have but to glance at the history and geography of Christendom to find this view abundantly confirmed by facts. We shall find that whenever and wherever civil liberty has become quietly and permanently established, then and there has Christianity had its purest and noblest realization, has exerted most widely its transforming spiritual influence; in Germany, in Holland, in Switzerland, in England and Scotland, in America, in France. The old French Revolution is often thrown back upon us as settling the whole question against us; but it is strangely or studiously forgotten that all the horrors
of that revolution and all its atheistic orgies resulted not from civil liberty, but were the natural and necessary fruit of the preceding ages of civil and religious despotism, of grinding and intolerable oppression. The Atheism and the spirit of license already existed; they caused the evils of the revolution, and were not its effects. Voltaire had already come upon the scene, and had completed his career. Meantime, so far as civil liberty has resulted from that revolution, even though Atheism may have had a hand in producing it—for God often brings good out of evil—it has been an inestimable blessing to France and to Europe. Our greatest temporal benefits commonly proceed from a variety of causes; and it is sometimes through the crisis of a violent and dangerous disease that the system is most thoroughly purified and invigorated. Had not men perversely insisted upon associating the idea of infidelity with the spirit of liberty, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, had not quite too much of the old religious and civil despotism been retained and restored in the conservative reaction, the blessing resulting from that revolution had been greater still. But, after all, at this present moment, is there not vastly more of intelligent practical Christianity in Hungary than in Austria, in France than in Spain or Italy or in any country of Europe where civil liberty has always, or until recently, been suppressed? Those professed friends of Christianity, who, in the fanatical zeal of blind conservatism, insist upon associating civil liberty with infidelity and Atheism, and Christianity with despotisms and oligarchies, inflict upon the cause of true religion a sorer wound than could ever have been inflicted by Infidelity and Atheism themselves. They furnish Infidelity and Atheism with their most effective weapons; they put the greatest stumbling-block in the way of religion; they make zealous Infidels and Atheists of thousands who would otherwise, by God's grace, be as zealous Christians. The lovers of freedom will be Infidels, because Christians will be lovers of absolutism, defenders of slavery, and advocates of caste.

That religious liberty reacts advantageously on Christianity needs no further argument but the simple appeal to history and facts. The religious despotism of Roman Catholic countries serves merely to keep out the light and truth which might lead to a reformation of old and festering corruptions; and to educate, or rather to leave uneducated, masses of men semi-atheistic, semi-heathen, superstitiously devout but morally and intellectually weak and childish. And in Protestant countries religious intolerance has uniformly resulted in dwarfing and paralyzing the religion it was designed to protect. This is abundantly illustrated in the religious history of England and of America. Intolerance has always been followed by religious declension and doctrinal superficiality. To pass at once to the present time, compare the energetic, intelligent, aggressive spirit of Protestantism in England, or Switzerland, or America, with the cold and lifeless state of the same religion in Denmark and Sweden. Error, corruption, conscious weakness may be intolerant; but truth needs no such protection; she rejoices in her own strength and in her perfect adaptation to man's nature and wants. She does not treat man as a maniac who must be laced in a strait jacket in order to be kept in the true religion.

Had Christianity needed the protection of an intolerant religious despotism, what would have become of her in the earliest and purest periods of her history, when all the powers of the world, both civil and religious, were arrayed in deadly hostility against her. And how can she now hope to subdue the world which still lies in wickedness, to prevail over the Brahminism, and Buddhism, and Con-
fucianism which hold possession of India and China and Japan, containing about half the population of the globe? When she asks of the Chinese and Japanese a free entrance among them, shall she plainly tell them that so soon as she gets the upperhand there she will strip of their goods and banish from their homes, or consign to prison, torture and death, all who refuse to receive her teaching and conform to her rites. Surely, if she prefers her petition with such an intention, she ought in honesty and fairness to announce it beforehand. In no such spirit did Jesus and His Apostles preach the Gospel of the Kingdom of God; in no such spirit did He open His great commission in the synagogue at Nazareth; and in no such spirit is the world to be subdued to His obedience. When James and John would have called down fire from Heaven to consume those who refused to receive Him, He meekly rebuked them, saying, "Ye know not what manner of spirit ye are of, for the Son of Man is not come to destroy men's lives, but to save them." Christianity is not to convert men as Charlemagne converted the Saxons and Philip II. the Moriscoes; her festivals are no longer to be St. Bartholomew's Eves* and Sicilian Vespers; her Easters are not to be made more joyous and solemn by holocausts of hundreds of human beings in Auto-da-fes; her heroes and champions are not to be exhibited in Albigensian and Waldensian crusades, in Dutch massacres, in Huguenot expatiations, in Inquisitorial tortures and

Smithfield fires. No; turning away from such scenes, let us listen to the words of Jesus: "Come unto Me all ye that labour, and are heavy laden, and I will give you rest; take My yoke upon you and learn of Me, for I am meek and lowly in heart; and ye shall find rest unto your souls." And hear the Apostle, saying, "By the gentleness and meekness of Christ, I beseech you." Such is the spirit in which Christianity is to go forth to her future and final victories. Such is the spirit in which she is to grapple with the free thought and the free and vigorous activities of the present and the coming age. The weapons of her warfare are not carnal, but mighty through God to the pulling down of strongholds. Civil and religious freedom are the conditions of her real and complete success. Yet how slow has she been to learn this lesson, a lesson lying among the first principles of the doctrine and spirit of her Divine Founder! or, rather, to unlearn that other lesson which the hierarchial perverters of that spirit and doctrine had been busy for ages in inculcating. The instances of persecution to which allusion has just been made, are all chargeable to Roman Catholics; but it is not intended to be denied or concealed that instances, many instances, of similar persecutions are not wanting on the Protestant side. The others alone have been signalized for two reasons: (1) The early Protestants in this respect did but inconsiderately and blindly copy the example of their Romish brethren and predecessors. The right and the duty of persecution had been preached and practised all along, as a thing of course—it was an inveterate prejudice—an heirloom received from the maternal home. To preach and practise it was felt to be necessary in order to substantiate a claim to earnest faith and piety. Later developments have shown the true spirit of the two systems. There may have been individual instances of toleration on the side of Romanists—not of Rome—just as there may have

* It is little to the purpose to apologize for the Pope—the Infallible Pope—who ordered a Te Deum to be sung upon hearing of this massacre, by saying that probably he had been misinformed in regard to the nature of the facts. Had his infallibility expressly made the apology for himself when he was better informed, the case might be otherwise. Did he ever make it? The apology from any other party is neither authoritative nor conclusive.
been individual instances of persecution on the side of Protestants. Lord Baltimore may have established universal toleration in his colony of Maryland,* while Calvin burnt Servetus, and the Puritans maltreated the Quakers. Far be it from us to think that there have been no good men in the Church of Rome. She has had in her bosom a Fenelon and a Xavier and some of the noblest saints that ever lived; but it is a striking and significant fact that many of those whom she has canonized after they were dead she persecuted and harassed unmercifully while they were living. They were saints in spite of her system and in spite of her ruling powers. On the other hand, there have undoubtedly been very bad men among Protestants, even among those of great pretensions to religion and piety. But they have been in such in spite of the system which should have made them better. In like manner, heathenism has had its Socrates, its Regulus, its Lucretia and its Caesar Marcus Antoninus; whilst Christianity has had her John XXIII., her Alexander VI., her Caesar Borgia, her other Lucretia, her Richard II., her Charles II., her Catharine II., her Benedict Arnold, and her George IV. But a system must be judged by its general results and revealed tendencies and not by sporadic and exceptional cases. (2) We have cited instances of Romish persecution exclusively, because those instances have been in degree and character incomparably more flagrant, cruel, horrible, systematic and persistent than those which can be alleged on the other side; and they have never been disowned or condemned by any Papal bull or syllabus or encyclical letter; but rather have been implicitly or expressly applauded and approved by the highest authorities of the Roman Church to the present day, and sanctioned in their principle by the express definitions of the present infallible Pope himself. But to the credit of Protestantism it may now be said, that, whatever may have been its incidental shortcomings in the past, it has generally learned at length, in a greater or less degree, the simple apostolic and Christian lesson of religious freedom.

By religious freedom we mean that there should be, under the law of the land, freedom of thought, of speech and of the press, for all kinds and modes of religion, including not only all denominations of Christians, but Judaism, Mahometanism, Paganism, Pantheism and Atheism. Of course the State may have its own religion, while it tolerates all others; and malicious blasphemy, or immoral practices, or foul and reckless assaults upon Christianity, however they may seek to clothe themselves in the guise of religion, may be restrained by law as being offensive to the moral sense and the well-being of the community. Precisely at this point nice questions may be raised; and here, as in all complex practical matters, it may be difficult so to frame the rule as definitely to provide for all real or supposable cases. But the principle should be, universal religious freedom. Some may think so broad a toleration inconsistent with earnest loyalty to Christian truth. But suppose Christ to have told the Scribes and Pharisees, and Herod and Pilate, that He proposed, as soon as He and His followers should be able to do, to put them all down by force and crush them with a strong hand! (But then what of the “more than twelve legions of angels?”) And suppose Peter to have told Simon Magus that, if the law allowed it, he would send him forthwith to torture and the flames; or Paul to have told the magistrates at Philippi that, if he had the power, he would scourge them, and, instead of thrusting their feet into the stocks, would bind them to the stake and burn them upon the spot; or to have announced to the Athenians on Mars’ hill, that, as soon as the Christians should grow strong enough, they would drive them out of their

* And yet it appears from a careful examination of the history of the time that this was done not from choice, but because it could not be helped.
temples, throw down their altars, and compel them to worship in Christian Churches, or strip them of their goods and banish or immolate them all!

No; Cortez and Pizarro are not the representatives of the Apostles, nor the models of Christian missionaries. Such was not the spirit in which the Gospel was preached at the first, and such ought not to be the spirit in which it is to be professed and propagated now. Surely, it has greater advantages for preserving itself and making progress now, than it had then. If it succeeded then without the protection and aid of intolerance, still more may it succeed without such aid and protection now; for it will hardly be suggested that the fires of intolerance are intended by Divine Providence as the appropriate modern substitute for the primitive miracles; or, that what the suffering of persecution did for the purity of the early Church the exercise of persecution is to accomplish for the later Church.

Christianity needs only a fair and open field; with really earnest and faithful adherents, who believe in their Lord with all their hearts, who love His blessed name as St. Paul loved it, and who love the souls of men even as He loved them who died for their redemption. Going forth in such a spirit, there is no danger of defeat, no doubt of success. Our help is in the name of the Lord; and a strong tower is our God. Our hope and confidence are in the truth, in the presence of Christ, and in the power of the Holy Ghost.

BIBLICAL NOTES:—THE LOGOS.

By N. M. Williams, D.D.

It is proposed to inquire into the origin and meaning of the term Logos, as used in the first fourteen verses of the Gospel according to John. Logos has for its English representative, Word: “In the beginning was the Word;” “The Word was made flesh.” The Greek language would have supplied another term—ρήμα; but it is clear that this was intentionally avoided. Luther, in his German Bible uses Wort; the Vulgate uses Verbum.

The question involved in the discussion is this: Does the term Logos imply personality? If it does not, the Introduction of John’s Gospel furnishes no proof that Christ was pre-existent, and therefore no proof that he was equal with God. It will be seen, therefore, that the question is one of inexpressible importance.

If exegesis, conducted partly in the light which the history of logos shall supply, and conducted, as it certainly ought to be, independently of theological creeds, shall lead us to the conclusion that Logos denotes not a person but a thing, not a revealer but a revelation, let us not hesitate to honour the Creator of the human mind by accepting it. The origin of the term is of less importance than the manner in which it was used by John. It is proposed, therefore, to examine first, some of the principal propositions contained in the Introduction. Internal evi-
BIBLICAL NOTES: THE LOGOS.

V. 1. ἐν ἀπόχρυσ (in the beginning). The Logos was ἐν ἀπόχρυσ. This by itself can scarcely be held as expressing eternity past. It conveys the idea of timelessness or pre-temporalness. As Dr. Schaff says, "Before creation there was no time, for time itself is part of the world, and was created with it. (Mundus factus est cum tempore, not in tempore)." If ἐν ἀπόχρυσ represent pre-temporalness, it represents a state which was anterior to creation. The Logos, then, was pre-temporal, and therefore was not created. But creator and creation are exhaustive terms. No other can be inserted between them. If, therefore, the Logos is not embraced in the term creation, it must be embraced in the term creator. Thus even from the first proposition of the Prologue it may be inferred [that the Logos is not a thing but a person, and a creative person.

Ἡν (was). John abstains from using that other Greek verb which would have implied beginning of existence. Εὐνενέρο (became) would have made impossible the idea of pre-temporalness in ἐν ἀπόχρυσ. Of things (vs. 3) John says: "All things were made, became, came into existence, by him." In vs. 6 we read: "There was a man sent from God;" there became, arose (not ὑν but Εὐνενέρο) a man sent from God. The coming of John the Baptist was a historical fact; the existence of the Logos was a fact anterior to history. In vs. 14, instead of ὑν, Εὐνενέρο is again used, and in a very instructive manner: "And the Word was made flesh"—the Word became flesh. But John does not say: In the beginning became the Word, as if there were a point before which the Logos had no existence, but it is: "In the beginning ὑν the Word." This precise use of two Greek verbs could not have been undesigned. The distinction is expressed in German by war (was) and ward (became). Students of Plato have been often struck with the distinction as made in some of his Dialogues. Referring to a passage in the Timaeus, Prof. Taylor Lewis says:

From this passage alone, had there been no other, we are justified in saying that τιοι, in its highest sense, expresses essential, eternal, necessary, self-existent, independent, uncaused being, or essence, having no dependence on time and space. The other, γενομαι, expresses phenomenal, temporal, contingent, dependent being, generated in time and space.

Such being the meaning, in John, of ἐν ἀπόχρυσ, and of ὑν, it follows that these, in connection, express the idea of eternity, and therefore it follows that Logos implies not a revealing thing, but a revealing person. Καὶ ὁ λόγος ὑν πρὸς τὸν θεόν (and the Word was with God). Πρὸς (with, toward). The entire force of the proposition is in the preposition. Πρὸς τὸν θεόν expresses not space or local contact, but continual direction toward God, as if separation, substantial and ethical, were for ever impossible. Had John intended to say that the Logos came forth from God, he would have used a preposition which expresses source.

Καὶ θεὸς ὑν ὁ λόγος (and God was the Word). Θεὸς is put first for emphasis (Meyer). It is not the subject but the predicate. The Word was God is more accordant with the genius of the English tongue, and the emphasis expressed in the Greek by location should be expressed in English by the voice, and not be wholly lost, as it is in nearly all audible reading, by being put upon was. Θεὸς has no article, and this saves the personality of the Logos from being merged in the personality of God. It is not The Logos was the God, but it is The Logos was God. The Logos and God are, therefore, not identical. There is a sense in which they are distinct beings. If the Logos was a thing, not a person, the terms of the proposition are remarkably wanting
in the precision which is characteristic of John's style; nay, they lead us to an absurdity.

Vs. 3. Πάντα δὲ αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο. (All things were made, became, by him.) The contrast between ἐν of vs. 1, and ἐγένετο of this verse, is very marked. The Logos was, but all things became. Things have an origin, a beginning; the Logos has not a beginning; therefore again the Logos is a person. δὲ αὐτοῦ (through him) the Genitive of instrumentality, as in Col. i. 17. Hebrews i. 2 is important, δὲ καὶ τοῖς αἰῶνας ἐποίησεν (by whom also he made the worlds). God made the worlds through the Son, says the writer, and as John says that all things were made by the Logos, it follows that Son and Logos refer to the same being; yet God did not create all things by the Logos as mere instrument, for Col. i. 16 says, that in him (ἐν αὐτῷ) all things were created.

Καὶ γεροῖς αὐτοῦ ἐγένετο οὐδὲ ἐν, δὲ γέγονεν (and without him was nothing made that has been made). Nothing; not even one thing, not even matter, not even spirits, were made without the Logos. Through the Logos God made literally everything. The Logos must have existed, therefore, before spirits and before matter. How, then, can Logos mean anything else than a person? Not one thing that has been made was made except through a thing, is a worse specimen of interpretation than that which attributes mere insanity to the man who dwelt among tombs, and then transfers it to three thousand swine.

Vs. 6. Ἐγένετο ἀνθρωπος ἀπεσταλμένος παρὰ θεοῖ (There became, arose, a man who was sent from God).

Vs. 8. Οὐκ ἐν ἐκεῖνος τῷ φῶς (he was not that light). How could John have found it necessary to guard his readers against the supposition that the Baptist, himself a person, was not that light, if the Logos were not a person?

Vs. 11. Ἐκ τὰ ἦδα ἔλθε (he came unto his own). τὰ ἦδα (his own things), the Jews, as his own possession or inheritance. Ἰδοι, the Jews as his own people. The possessor of the Jews was clearly a person, which person is denominated the Logos.

Vs. 14. Καὶ ὁ λόγος σάρξ ἐγένετο (and the Word became flesh). The Logos ἐν (was) from the beginning, before time, but the Logos ἐγένετο (became) flesh.

Μονογενὴς παρὰ πατρός (an only begotten of the Father). But only begotten implies personality, for it is a brief form of expression for only begotten Son. It is applied to Christ by none of the sacred writers except John. The full form, the only begotten Son, is found in i. 18; iii. 16—18; 1 John iv. 9. Meyer insists that μονογενὴς is spoken of Christ's divine nature, and answers to the apostle's peculiar conception of the divine Sonship of Christ. He holds that Christ is Son through a metaphysical relation to the nature of God. He did not become Son through incarnation, but he is the only begotten as the Logos before all time, and appears as such through the incarnation; παρὰ (from), not of, as in the authorized version. The Logos was begotten from the Father. He was the same as the Father in essence or substance.

The chief propositions of the Prologue, then, make it evident that in using the term Logos, John had the conception of a person; not that of an attribute of God, or of the divine reason, or of "divine communication."

We must now consider the historical side of the question. Did John go to the Alexandrian Philosophy for the term Logos? Was he indebted to that or any other human philosophy for the Logos idea as developed in the introductory verses of his Gospel? The term itself is not synonymous with ῥήμα, used for example in Heb. xi. 3: "Through faith we understand that the worlds were framed by the word of God" (ῥήματι θεοῖ). This is a general statement, while John's (i. 3) is a special one; ῥήμα is used to signify the mere word; logos, word,
as the expression of thought; ἰδιόμα is neuter; that logos is masculine ought not to be pressed. Luther’s Wort is neuter, and therefore he uses the neuter article das; yet even in the German Bible the context would show that a person must be meant; as Dr. Schaff has said, Ewald, breaking through all usage, retains the masculine article in his German translation—đer (instead of das) Wort. As, then, a word is the expression of thought, Logos is an appropriate term for expressing the relation which the Messiah, before incarnation, held to the Supreme Being. The Logos is one who expresses, who reveals, God.

So far as the present subject is concerned, the Alexandrian philosophy is represented in Philo. This singular man, a Jew, an admirer of the idealism of Plato, the great allegorizer of the first century, was born twenty years before Christ and died about A.D. 50. He flourished, therefore, before John wrote his Gospel. His works might have supplied John with the word Logos, and with some part of the Logos doctrine. But, in the first place, no evidence has appeared that John ever saw Philo’s works, or knew what they taught. Upon this, however, it is unnecessary to insist. It may be admitted, as not improbable, that writing his Gospel so many years after Philo, he knew, by report, what the Alexandrian had written, but he could not have been indebted to him for the mere word, for logos was in common use. To what extent John’s ideas of the Logos were formed by what he may have heard of Philo, is a more serious question. Had the Alexandrian philosophy entered Palestine? In treating of the historical aspect of the Logos in his Commentary on John, Tholuck takes the negative. He combats Gfrörer’s view that the Essenes were an offshoot of the Egyptian Therapeutes, and that this fact supplies a date at which the Alexandrian Gnosis was transplanted to Palestine. He cites Neander as also opposed to Gfrörer’s view. Neander (Vol. I., p. 61) has the following:

The features of the resemblance between these societies, as well in the form of their association as in the circumstance of their repudiating slavery, as a thing contrary to nature, are yet by no means such as to warrant the theory of an outward connection. Analogous tendencies of the Jewish mind in Palestine, and of the Jewish-Alexandrian mind in Egypt, might have easily produced two such mystic fraternities, independently of one another, with a form adapted to the different countries.

A quotation by Gfrörer from a Karaite author, is examined by Tholuck, and is alleged as supplying no proof that what was introduced into Palestine from Egypt by a Rabbi, who had been banished from Palestine, was the metaphysical speculations of Alexandrian Jews.

Again, Philo’s Logos and John’s are very unlike. Philo (Paris ed., 1640), “De Mundi Opificio,” p. 6, C, represents the Logos of God, “invisible and intelligible,” as εἰκόνα θεοῦ (image of God). In the “De Profugis,” p. 464, he calls the Logos σοφίας πνεύμα (fountain of wisdom). In the same treatise, p. 466, B., he calls him ἄρχωρεύς (high priest): “This is what we affirm, that by high priest is not meant man, but the divine Logos, who is without sin, both voluntary and involuntary.” In the same place he calls God the πάτερ (father) of the Logos. In the “Confusione Linguarum,” p. 329, C, Philo calls the Logos πρωτόστατον θιόν (eldest son), and πρωτόγονον (first begotten); p. 341, B, τὸν ἄγγελον πρωτόστατον (eldest angel); ἄγγελον πολυγόνον (arch-angel of many names); p. 341, C, άδιάδεικτον (eternal image). In the treatise “De Agricultura,” p. 195, B, the Logos is called μεγάλου βασιλέως ἀρχον (the under-commander, or viceroy of the great King.) In “De Cherubim,” p. 129, C, the Logos is the ὁργανός (instrument) by which the world was made. In an English translation of Fragments of Philo’s Writings found in Eusebius, the Logos is called “second God.” In the “De Somniis,”
p. 599, C, Philo represents the Logos as θεός (God), but insists that there is only one true God, the expression of which requires the Article, while as he also teaches, θεός, when applied to the Logos must be without the Article. In brief, Philo, as Meyer and others hold, makes the Logos not a person at all, but "the sum of the divine attributes." Philo’s Logos, more briefly, is "image of God," "fountain of wisdom," "high priest," "son," "eldest son," "first begotten," "eldest angel," "arch-angel of many names," "eternal image," "sub-commander," "organ" (i.e., instrument), "second God," "God," not "the God." Philo’s Logos never becomes flesh. "No one," says Mr. Wescott ("Int. to the Study of the Gospels," p. 267), "had dared to form such a sentence as that which, with almost awful simplicity, declares the central fact of redemption, in connection with time and eternity, with action and with being, 'The Word was made flesh and dwelt among us.'" It must be added that Philo is not consistent with himself. In the "Legis Allegoriarum," p. 52, B, allegorizing, according to his custom, he says: "That the river which flows out of Eden to water the paradise, is generic goodness; this flows out from the wisdom of God," and this wisdom of God he affirms to be the Logos of God. But in "De Profugis," p. 466, B, he makes σοφία (wisdom) the mother of the Logos. On one page wisdom and the Logos are identical, and on another the Logos is the daughter of wisdom. Philo’s view of the Logos is complex and confused; John’s is simple and clear. If Philo does not vacillate between personality and impersonality, he does vacillate between representations which are quite as inconsistent. John never contradicts himself. His view of the Logos is a marvel of unity and condensation. It is light from the beginning to the end. It is music caught up from eternity and poured grandly forth, as from a single instrument, upon the darkness of the world’s night, while Philo, living in the earlier half of the same age, makes discord with his many-voiced philosophy. John no more took the music of the Prologue from Philo than Luther took his majestic Old Hundred from the clangorous notes of the old German barbarians.

If John was not indebted to Philo for his doctrine of the Logos, was he indebted to the Targums? Here the writer is under the necessity of relying upon quotations made by others. Says Tholuck: "The Chaldean paraphrasts never speak of God as operating immediately, but constantly represent him as acting through the mediation of the WORD of God. In them we have (Gen. iii. 8; Deut. iv. 12), 'The voice of the word of God spake.' Gen. xlix. 18 the Jerusalem Targum translates: 'I wait not for liberation through Samson or Gideon, but for salvation through thy WORD.' The Memra is also employed in a sense parallel with 'the angel of the Lord.'" (Judges xi., seq.) Prof. Stuart (Bib. Sac., Jan. 1850) speaks as follows:

In Ex. xix. 17, the Hebrew runs thus: "And Moses brought forth the people out of the camp to meet with God;" in the Targum, "To meet with the word of the Lord." Ps. ii. 4 (Heb.): "The Lord shall have them in derision;" in the Targum, "The word of the Lord shall deride them." Gen. xxxix. 2 (Heb.): "The Lord was with Joseph;" Targum: "The word of the Lord was with Joseph."

That these and kindred forms of expression are proof that the Targumists believed in a personality distinct from that of the Supreme Jehovah, and mediating in the affairs of men, is extremely doubtful. Rhetorical personification may be all that was intended. Prof. D. S. Talcott, in an article on the Word, in the American edition of "Smith’s Dictionary of the Bible," says:

Most, if not all the passages in which the expressions above cited [Memrá da- Yəḏ (sometimes Dibbúr), "the word of Jehovah"] occur, may be expressed by a reference to the principle, namely, the repugnance of the writers to bring the Divine Being into too close contact, as it were, with men.
The Targumists, according to others, must have used Memra (Word of God) to denote a person, but it is admitted that they have nothing to say of an incarnated Memra. Of course it is possible that John knew something of the teachings of the Paraphrasts, but there is no evidence that he did; and in any case it is entirely unnecessary to suppose that he drew from them any part of his Logos doctrine.

In a discussion of this kind we ought to make careful examination of the apocryphal books, yet little else can now be done than to refer to the principal passages which bear upon the question before us: The Book of Wisdom vii. 22—30; ix. 1; xviii. 15, 16 (the last very striking); Baruch iii. 37, 38; Ecclesiasticus i. 1—10; xxiv. 5—47. With respect to these and many other similar passages in which is a description of wisdom (in one case, of the “almighty logos”) the question is whether the writers are indulging in mere rhetorical personification, or whether they intend to teach the existence of an actual person; if the latter, whether they mean the supreme Jehovah or a being distinct from him. Opinions are divided. Though the evidence is wanting that John had read the Apocrypha, yet there is nothing unreasonable in the supposition that writing his Gospel in Ephesus, between which and Alexandria there was considerable communication, he knew by report something of the beautiful descriptions of wisdom which they contained. Even if it be admitted that it was the intention to represent wisdom as a person, distinct from Jehovah, the doctrine of the Logos as taught by John is not to be found in any part of the Apocrypha.

Shall we find it then, it must be asked finally, in the Old Testament? This has never been pretended. In Proverbs, indeed, we also have beautiful descriptions of wisdom. See especially i. 20—33; viii. 1—9, 12. Chap. viii. 22—31 is as follows in the translation given by Prof. E. P. Barrows in the Bib. Sac., 1858, p. 364:

Jehovah possessed me (or, obtained me) as the beginning of his way, before his works, of old. From everlasting was I founded, from the beginning, before the earth was. When there were no deeps I was born; when there were no fountains laden with water. Before the mountains were settled, before the hills was I born; when he had not yet made the earth and the fields and the first of the clods of the world. When he prepared the heavens, there was I; when he set a circuit upon the face of the deep; when he established the clouds above; where the fountains of the deep were made strong; when he appointed to the sea its limit, that the waters should not pass its border (or, his command). And I was at his side as one brought up by him (or, as an artificer); and I was daily a delight [to him]; exulting before him all the time; exulting in the habitable abode of his earth; and my delight was with the sons of men.

As Prof. Barrows has said, the lowest view of this passage “is that which takes the term wisdom simply as a poetic personification of the lessons which are perpetually inculcated on man as well by the order of nature as by the course of divine providence, * * * and in sharp contrast with this view is the opposite extreme, which understands wisdom throughout these passages, directly and simply, of our Lord Jesus Christ in his personal presence and ministry.” This latter, we are reminded, is the opinion of Dr. Gill. “In finding Christ in these passages,” says Prof. Barrows, “Dr. Gill is right, but in finding in them only ‘the personal ministry of Christ in the days of his flesh,’ he is manifestly wrong.” The reviewer rejects the theory of poetic personification, and holds that wisdom in Proverbs “is the eternal Word himself, always present with his church, both before and since his incarnation, as the centre and source of her spiritual light and life.” That the writer of Proverbs intended merely to personify wisdom seems to be more probable, yet it may be admitted that this very personification, taken in connection with the numerous representations of the Old Testament generally (Gen. i. “God said;” Psalm
xxxiii. 6), that God accomplished his purposes in nature and among men by his word, prepared devout Jews for the sublime doctrine of John.

Our conclusion then, is this, that John was not indebted to Philo, or to the Targumists, or to the Apocrypha, or to Proverbs, or to any other part of the Old Testament for the Logos doctrine, for in not one of these quarters is the doctrine to be found; but that the term itself, which clearly was not coined by the evangelists, was already in existence, and therefore was not drawn directly and consciously from the Gnosticism of Alexandria. As logos had come to be well known, partly through the Septuagint and partly through Philo, John deemed it a suitable word for the expression of his views. But whence the doctrine? This we believe to have been suggested by the Old Testament, and to have been drawn directly in part from the teachings of Christ, and in part from what John saw of Christ himself. The illuminating influence of the Holy Spirit must, of course, be pre-supposed. That Jesus called himself the Logos is more than can be shown, but the Logos idea was clearly taught. The description found in the Prologue is to be found, also, in a scattered form in the body of the Gospel. In the Prologue John says: “In the beginning was the Word;” and Jesus himself had said, “Before Abraham became, I am.” John says, “And the Word was with God;” and Jesus himself had said, “With the glory which I had with thee before the world was.” John says: “And the Word was God;” and Jesus had said: “I and my Father are one.” John says: “All things were made by him;” and Jesus had said: “My Father worketh hitherto and I work.” John says: “In him was life;” and Jesus himself had said: “I am the bread of life.” John says: “And the life was the light of men;” and Jesus had already said: “I am the light of the world.” John, still speaking in the Prologue, says: “And the light shineth in darkness;” and Jesus had said, “He that followeth me shall not walk in darkness.” John says: “And the darkness comprehended it not;” and Jesus had said: “Men loved darkness rather than light.” Thus it appears that instead of weaving out of his own intellect that sublime description of the pre-existing Son of God which we find in his Prologue, John took the thoughts and almost the very words from the Saviour himself. He arranged the thoughts; he gave them a compacter form; he threw over the whole a rich, truthful colouring, drawn from what has been called his experience of the Logos doctrine, and so we have the most unique composition and the most profound thought to be found in human language.
REVIEW.

HISTORY AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE SACRED TABERNACLE OF THE HEBREWS.


The significance of the Jewish tabernacle must always be an interesting study with every intelligent Christian. It is to be regarded as a presentation, in a different language, of the same great truths as those which are brought out in the New Testament; and every one knows that much is gained by studying the same truths in different languages. Our conceptions become in this way much more vivid and distinct. In the tabernacle, the kingdom of God is exhibited to our mind in an earlier stage of its development. By contemplating it in the different aspect thus brought to view, we are helped to a better understanding of its nature. The reader of the New Testament, by the aid of a previous attention to the tabernacle, is able to comprehend more thoroughly the symbolism of the latter. For these reasons, if for no others, we regard Mr. Atwater's work as one of singular value.

The tabernacle is to be considered as the residence of the Divine King of the Israelites. The remembrance of this will aid one in understanding some parts of the Jewish ritual that might otherwise be comparatively unintelligible. This explains the great importance attached to personal cleanliness and freedom from corporeal blemishes on the part of all the attendants of the sanctuary. Some of the sacrifices—such, for instance, as burnt-offerings—were forms of consecration to the service of the sovereign—what in modern phraseology would be called homage. In short, the idea of the tabernacle as the palace of the monarch gives to many parts of the Mosaic ritual an interest and an importance of which they would otherwise be destitute.

Quite a large portion of the book is occupied with a discussion of the significance of the tabernacle. The position taken is, that it had throughout a symbolical character, "that the edifice itself, with its equipments, its attendants, and its various services, as they appeared to the senses, represented a system of truth in the higher sphere of the invisible and the eternal." Symbolic language was in very common use at the time of Moses; and, though it is admitted that the art of alphabetic writing was used to some extent at that period, it is equally certain that symbolic writing must have been the more common and the more effective medium of communication of moral and religious truth especially. This remark is emphatically just in relation to the Egyptians. Much use was made by them, not only of symbolic writing, but of what may properly be styled symbolic institutions. The construction of their temples, the rites performed in them, the garments worn by the priests, were all designed to represent in a visible form the doctrines of their religion. It is, therefore, an altogether natural supposition that a man like Moses, learned in all the wisdom of the Egyptians, and whose task it was to digest a religious system for a people who like the Israelites had lived for centuries in Egypt, would adopt spontaneously a form of language by which those whom he wished to instruct could be reached most readily and effectively. Nor is it at
all strange that he should not only use the same form of language in general, but should besides, when trying to express, as he must often have had occasion to do, the same ideas, have had recourse to the same symbols as were employed by the Egyptians. There is nothing, necessarily, any more objectionable in this than there is in printing the scriptures by the use of the same press and the same types as are employed in printing the vilest books.

The tabernacle was meant to be symbolic of Mosaism exclusively. That it was so relatively to every form of pagan worship, admits of no question. It was symbolic of Mosaism in distinction from Christianity; not as if there were any intrinsic contrariety between the ideas inculcated in the two systems, but merely in the fact that the stage of development at which the two set forth the divine plan of redemption was different. The conceptions of the truths of Christianity which existed in the minds of the ancients were less definite, less exact, than those which prevailed after the advent of Christ. The Mosaic symbols were intended to represent these less adequate conceptions, but not to represent different truths.

The views set forth in this book as to the symbolic character of the tabernacle are marked, in our view, by great sobriety. Extremes are carefully avoided. The author conceives that there is a middle path to be taken between the notion that everything belonging to the tabernacle was typical, and the notion that nothing was so, except what is particularly spoken of in the New Testament as having such a reference. The two systems of religion, Mosaism and Christianity, being essentially identical, it is to be presumed that what in the tabernacle was symbolic of Mosaism was typical of Christianity.

A good many interesting details are given in this book in regard to particular kinds of symbolism; as those of number, form, colour and the like; but in reference to these, the book itself should be consulted. The portion of the book which treats of this subject will well reward careful study.

We have been particularly pleased with the views expressed in this work in regard to the origin and meaning of sacrifices. The question whether or not they were expressly commanded by Jehovah is considered by Mr. Atwater as of no practical importance; because, even if not thus directly enjoined, they were prompted by man's religious instinct, and were approved by Jehovah. The heart of man, in a word, naturally expresses itself by means of sacrifice. It is maintained, besides, that all bloody sacrifices embodied in themselves the idea of expiation; though, very probably, in the patriarchal ages, expiatory sacrifices were not in use any farther than as the idea of expiation entered into the notion of all animal sacrifices. This idea of expiation existed in the mind of the patriarchs only in a vague and indefinite shape, as marking the earliest stage in the development of the plan of redemption. At this period, as well as at all subsequent periods, sacrifices had no intrinsic atoning power. They could atone for sin only as they were symbolic, anticipatory of the real atonement afterwards effected by Christ. The idea which lies at the basis of atonement is that of covering. The sin atoned for is regarded as if no longer in existence; and the transgressor is no more to be punished than he would be if he had not sinned.

The symbols incorporated into the tabernacle had in many cases a prophetic character. They were types. Emphatically was this the case with the priesthood. The priests were types of Christ in reference to the freedom of access to God which was allowed to them. They alone were permitted to enter the tabernacle; and only to the high-priest was it lawful to go into the holy of holies, just as Christ our Mediator enters
into the immediate presence of God. The whole body of the people were required to keep themselves ceremonially pure; but this purity was enjoined on the priests with special urgency, on the ground that Christ was literally without sin. In general, the priesthood typified Christ in its official position, in the object to which its functions were directed, and in the means by which that object was effected.

It is an inquiry of considerable importance how far the ancient Israelites comprehended the significance of the tabernacle. The general answer given to this question is, that they were as competent to understand its symbolical significance as men of the present day are to apprehend the meaning of the Bible. The extent to which they understood it depended on their mental character, on the degree of attention and study which they gave to the subject, and on the spirituality of mind which they possessed. On these same things depends the success of any one at present who would understand the Scriptures.

It will be apparent, we trust, that we attach great value to this work of Mr. Atwater. We earnestly hope it will be carefully read not by ministers and professedly biblical students only, but by all intelligent Christians. We wish to speak emphatically in praise of the style in which it is written, as contrasted with that of a good many works by English authors which we have lately had occasion to read. Its style is pure, free from all traces of affectation, from unusual and barbarous words, and elaborate attempts at originality in the diction—attempts such as are apt to be violent in proportion to the triteness of the thought. The author evidently does not labour under the delusion, which we think is becoming quite common, that water which is not transparent must necessarily be deep.—Bibliotheca Sacra.


In the judgment of thoughtful minds it will be conceded that the author of this work has made a valuable, and in some respects fresh, contribution to the already vast literature of Christology, although his ideas are not new in the history of Christianity, but are reflected in ancient opinions which at the time were pronounced heretical under the names of Apollinarian, Eutychian, Patr ipassian; they appear also in the transcendental deification of man by the German Mystics of the Middle Ages; in more modern times they are seen in the philosophical speculations of Schelling and Hegel regarding the metaphysical unity of the divine and the human; and they are enunciated in substance by that eminent theologian, Horace Bushnell, in his views upon the essential humanity of the divine nature as manifested in the Lord Jesus Christ. In fine, the idea of some kind of identity of the divine and the human as existing potentially in all men but only perfectly expressed in the one God-Man, Christ, has run through theology and philosophy. There has always been a contest about the person of Christ. The orthodox Church has, for the most part, been content to abide by the decision of the Council of Chalcedon, that in the one person of Christ were two distinctly separate natures; or, that the Divine Word, the second person of the Trinity, took to himself "a true body and a reasonable soul," so that not only a human body, but a human soul, was comprehended in the complex nature of Christ. In a word, it was assumed as a doctrine of revelation, very much as the Trinity itself was assumed, that there were two natures, the divine and the human, in Christ's one person, but how they exist, or how they came to exist, was not attempted to be explained, was deemed inexplicable. This perhaps showed the wisdom of the early
Church in not going beyond the record that “no man knoweth the Son but the Father.”

It has been felt, however, in many ways, that here was a theme, or department of theology, which was exceedingly obscure, even after the sharp contests of the fourth and fifth centuries A.D.; and that a question of the utmost depth and importance was still left open. The harmonious development of Christian truth, it may be, required this. Here is the central theme, the very root-principle of Christianity. Our author says in the opening sentence of his Preface: “If apology were necessary for the appearance of a new volume on so old a theme as the Person of Christ, it might be found in the fact that the old has become the new—and it will ever be the grand centre of regard and interest of all Christian minds. The thought of the Christian world is being turned, as never before, to this central Person of history, with the feeling that here, in this wonderful Life and Character, is contained the secret that will explain the riddle of the world, as well as the power that alone can cure its evils.” Theology is progressive chiefly on the inductive side, in the higher reason and consciousness of minds supernaturally guided and developed, and why has not the time now come for combining the rays of maturer Christian thought and experience upon the profoundest theme of theology—the Person of Christ? Is there a deeper subject? Is there one involving more vital issues? Does it not go to the root of Unitarianism and orthodoxy? Does it not involve the scientific questions of the day in regard to the origin and nature of man? Does it not comprehend the Christian life, the way of salvation, and the gospel itself? Has the Council of Chalcedon, or any other council, settled the question, or put a stop to men’s thinking upon it? Is not the truth of the Person of Christ, who is both source and sum of Christian doctrine, as fairly open to the researches of a reverent reason, as the subject of the Trinity, or of the Atonement? Dr. Dorner himself declares that the doctrine of the Trinity was evolved in its present dogmatic form from the early controversies upon the Person of Christ. We know of few persons better fitted than the author of this volume, by mental culture, by power of concentrated thinking upon high spiritual themes, and by simple love of truth and spirit devoid of ambition, to re-open this profound question of Christian thought.

The book is dedicated, with warmth of respectful expression, to Horace Bushnell. It would not perhaps be too much to say that it is the fruit of his powerful inspiring influence upon a rich and thoughtful mind. It is divided into two parts. The first part consists of seven elaborate discourses upon The Divine Humanity of Christ—The Son of Man—Christ the Root of Humanity—The Human Development of Jesus—The Image of God—The Human Trinity—Man’s Place in the Creation. The second part comprises a historical and critical Review of the doctrine of Christ’s Person.

The commonly received orthodox view of Christ’s nature presents, according to this author, an unscriptural and falsified image. It lacks the single and perfect view of the Biblical image of Christ. He is conceived of now as divine, and now as human, or as both together in a kind of unity called one person, but which is really and practically a duality; our author would bring by his theory these two aspects of Christ’s person into a real unity, or identity, so as to give a single, distinct, and adequate—and, so to speak, a stereoscopic—image of the God-Man, without blur or imperfection. Taking his stand on the sublime Old Testament truth that man was made “in the image of God,” he reasons that there is something essentially divine in humanity, and something essentially human in the divine—an eternal humanity. It was then no strange thing
review.

for the Divine Logos, nor was it any violation of his nature, to become flesh. The Logos did not "assume humanity," as is said in the language of the schools, but, as the Scripture says, "became flesh," not as a mere conjunction with it, not as an inhabitation of a bodily nature, not as a superaddition to a human spirit, but by such a self-emptying or "kenosis" of the divine, as made God a true man without taking to Himself a human soul. The human soul is eliminated from this view of Christ's person because not wanted, because the divine soul is itself already human. A real unity of the Person of Christ is thus secured—a perfect and single image is obtained. There is no confusion of wills, or composition of wills, as in the dual view of the Council of Chalcedon, of John of Damascus, of the Fathers, and of the orthodox Church to this day.

Mr. Goodwin has sought to find a ground for the Incarnation deeper and more permanent, and a conception of its reality less contradictory and confusing to reason, than has hitherto prevailed. The attempt to merge the two natures brought together from without, each retaining its own properties "without conversion, intermixture, or confusion"—to combine two heterogeneous natures in one person,—has been tried for nearly fifteen centuries, in every conceivable variety of form and combination; and the problem, he thinks, is not yet solved, and never can be on these premises, for it is an attempt to make the impossible possible.

"The view advocated in this volume," he says, "proceeds from a different idea or starting-point, viz., that the Incarnation is not a synthesis, or union of opposite natures, but a development, or the determination of the Divine in the form of the Human." The essential Humanity of Christ, aside from its unessential and fleshly robe, is traced to its true origin and eternal existence in God, and not derived from the race He created, and of which He is the original. It is thus a Divine Humanity, and identical with His Divinity. For as Dorner has truly said, "The Deity can be shown to be the principle of itself and of humanity, but the humanity can neither be the principle of itself nor of the Deity. Still less can our fallen humanity be the source of that sinless and ideal Humanity which we behold in Christ." The "Son of God," who is also the "Son of Man," is to be conceived of not as God and man united, but as a Person in whom these natures have their identity in one being, who is both divine and human in his attributes.

We have indicated, as far as we can do in a brief sketch, what is the general theory maintained in this book, for the fuller development of which we must refer our readers to the book itself. Written in a bold but reverent spirit, and in a clear style which has at times marked beauty and force, it will delight readers who love to dwell in these lofty places of spiritual thought. It will open more of the riches of the knowledge of Christ. It will relieve the difficulties of some minds in respect to the anomalous nature of Christ's person as presented in the creeds. It is not only a worthy contribution to theological science, which we hail in these days of superficial thinking, but it has many practical bearings of a noble and fructifying kind on life, character, and philosophy.

The Darwinian theory of development, as now carried to its extreme, beyond, we think, the more just ideas of its originator, presents the bestial view of man's origin. It is well to bring into clear light the divine element in man's nature, or we sink into the brute from which, it is claimed, we are descended. Nothing but a strong theory that lifts up the race to God can meet a strong theory that pulls it down to the level of the animal. The elevating force must be more powerful than the depressing.
Another advantage of this theory is its mediating quality in variant and opposing theological beliefs. It forms a *via media* between sincere though extreme views of the proper humanity and divinity of our Lord Jesus Christ. The honest Unitarian is right as far as he goes, but he stops immeasurably short of the truth. He believes—in his theosophic philosophy of nature—in the divinity of humanity, but he looks only at the humanity of Christ, not seeing in the Divine Logos the original divine man, the Ideal and Redeemer of fallen humanity, the root and ground of humanity itself because He is divine. He sees in Christ but an ordinary though lofty man. He does not see the true God in him. On the other hand, the orthodox believer looks chiefly at the divinity in Christ, and hardly discerns his glorious humanity, through which, or united to which, his own sinful humanity becomes redeemed and glorified, and made "a partaker of the divine nature."

In what has been said we have perhaps seemed to favour the theory of the book. It certainly has its charms. It profoundly stimulates thought. It opens new views of the nature and work of Christ. In it we somehow feel that a mighty truth, not for the first time presented in misty grandeur to the mind, has been laid hold upon, which the creeds have heretofore failed satisfactorily to explain, and which the author with all his power struggles in vain to represent because probably it is past the power of any man entirely to comprehend and clearly to set forth. It will lead, we hope, to a deeper study of the subject and of the Scriptures; and here, we would suggest, there seems to be some failure in the argument. The mystery of "God manifest in the flesh" rests upon the basis of Inspiration. Its primary proof and conditions are therefore found in the Word of God. There should have been, we venture to say, on so important a question, more of critical examination of texts—especially of that class of texts which set forth Christ's humanity. Here, to our mind, as yet, is the chief, we will not say insuperable, difficulty, with the theory. When our Lord said, "Father, if it be possible, let this cup pass from me; nevertheless, not as I will, but as Thou wilt;"—"my soul is exceeding sorrowful, even unto death;"—"Father, into thy hands I commit my spirit;"—"my meat is to do the will of Him that sent me;" and where it is written, "Jesus wept"—"who was tempted in all points like as we are"—in such passages, if a human soul is not meant—a soul comprising reason, sensibility, and will, that go to make up a human personality **distinct from** the divine—we hardly know how language could express this. Does the Divine Logos speak and do these things? We may come to believe in Patripassianism, or Theopassianism, but that those things written in the Scriptures of the life of Christ, where words, acts, feelings of the simplest and most natural kind, which belong distinctly to a human soul,—those things can be ascribed to God, or to an impersonal human nature which is but an organ of the divine nature, or to a form in which the divine nature manifests itself—this is hard to conceive. Harder still is it to conceive of the shrinkage of the divine into the human,—so that the divine shall form the soul of the human in its finite limitations. Mr. Goodwin attempts to meet this difficulty by the analogy of the human spirit in the human body; but the analogy is an imperfect one, since the human spirit, though made in the image of the divine, has a beginning, a birth, a growth, corresponding with the birth and development of the physical nature. They are fitted to each other, at least during their union and life together. But how can we believe the Eternal and Divine to begin, to be born, to be made? How can He increase in wisdom and knowledge? How can He be shut in to the ignorance of infancy, and grow to the omni-
science of God in the period of a human life?

There is the danger of mixing up the boundaries of the divine and the human, as well as the opposite danger of obscuring the divine parentage of man. In speaking of the unique being of Christ, we may indeed reverently, by way of speculation, conjecture that his incarnation is not so much a change of nature as of form and condition, and that his divinity may be brought over to the side of his humanity so that his is a divine humanity, not less but more human because it is divine, though this leads very close to the doctrine that the incarnation is a mere theophany in which our veritable human brother and Saviour vanishes away; but it seems to us that there is some tendency in Mr. Goodwin's book to lose sight of the distinction between man and the "Son of man," to regard man as Christ, to speak of man as divine, to clothe him with the incommutable nature of God. In the language of Eckhart, and Tauler, and the old German Mystics, there was much of this daring phraseology which is wonderfully fascinating; but should we not, since Luther's day at least, be very careful in the use of indefinite terms and forms of speech upon such themes.

We should like to dwell longer upon this volume because of the great importance of the subject, and because the book is a promise and fulfilment of better things in our theology. It gives signs of new life, progress, and power. It is written in a calm, truth-seeking, and believing spirit. It is in the genuine line of productive investigation, wherein the scholastic and analytic are subordinate to the rational and spiritual elements of thought. A loftier idea both of the nature of God and of man must be conceived, in which not the distinctions which separate the two but the vital relations which, above all, in Christ, harmonize the two, must be chiefly regarded, before we can arrive at the fundamental and divine truth of Christianity. This treatise aims at least in that direction. It opens an old and deep fountain of theological inquiry long sealed up by the rigid hand of tradition. It will be of great assistance to many minds labouring with the complex questions that theology and the creeds—not the Scriptures—have raised respecting the nature of our Lord Jesus Christ. If it does not satisfy all questions and clear away all difficulties from this profound and mysterious theme—if it does not even succeed in establishing its own position—it is still a work of an ennobling and elevating character, and it will, assuredly, in the author's own words, lead its readers "to think more divinely, and at the same time more humanly of Christ, and more reverently of themselves and humanity."—J. M. Hop- pin, Yale College.


The object of this work is to show that the presumed incompatibility of science and religion does not exist. For the sake of brevity and precision the authors have confined themselves to the single point, that immortality is strictly in accordance with the principle of Continuity, which is the guide of modern scientific advance. But their reasonings are equally applicable to other religious truths. The authors themselves in developing their argument, find occasion to apply them to the resurrection of Christ and the Christian miracles; and arrive at the conclusion that the Christian doctrine of the Trinity accords with and gives a basis for completing the most profound and far-reaching speculations of science respecting the visible universe.

The work evinces a thorough sympathy and extensive acquaintance with modern science, and is written in a spirit at once scientific and reverent. Some of the considerations urged are the following: In addi-
tion to gross matter, science now recognizes force (potential and kinetic), and a finer kind of matter, called ether, which is not perceptible by any sense. As the gross matter may have been developed from the ether by some condensation or modification, so the ether itself may have proceeded from something still more tenuous; and certain scientific observations are cited which have at least suggested the probability of this; also the accordant theory of Sir W. Thomson is cited, that the primordial atoms are vortex-rings generated out of a perfect (frictionless) fluid filling all space; thus dispensing altogether with the atoms of Lucretius, infrangible in "solid singleness." This line of thought leads to the conception of the visible universe as developed from the invisible, i.e., from a sphere of existence transcending the human senses; and necessarily implies that it had a beginning and in some sense a Creator. Again, the energy active in the seen universe is continually wasting, and must eventually issue in the cessation of all life and motion. But this energy which is constantly leaving the seen universe is not lost, but passes over into the unseen universe. Observations indicating the absorption of light by the ether are cited as illustrative if not corroborative. The unseen universe will eventually absorb the active energy of the seen universe and perpetuate it in continuous action. The authors add: "We may now perhaps imagine, at least as a possibility, that the separate existence of the visible universe will share the same fate, so that we shall have no huge, useless, inert mass existing in after ages to remind the passer-by of a form of energy and a species of matter that is long since out of date and functionally effete. Why should not the universe bury its dead out of its sight?"

In the foregoing paragraph we have not attempted to give an analysis of the course of thought, but only to exemplify the treatment of the subject. We believe that science and philosophy are destined to confirm man’s belief in the existence of the spiritual world, and greatly to enlarge and clarify our knowledge of its relations to the world of sense. Already the old view of the universe as merely inert gross matter, has been displaced by the recognition of the ether, and of the correlation and conservation of force, and new lines of thought from the material to the spiritual indicated. This justifies the anticipation that clearer light is to be thrown on the relations of the two. The bold speculations of this volume are necessarily crude and imperfect. But the authors have the merit of seeing that there is a way to truth in that direction and of resolutely endeavouring to find it. It may be read with profit both by theologians and scientists. It certainly demonstrates that the ocean of human knowledge is broader and deeper than the shallows which may be navigated by throwing the lead and observing the headlands on the shore.—New Englander.


It might have been thought that the Homilist was too well known to need recommendation, and yet we have often met with ministers who said they had never seen it. Our invariable advice to all such has been to procure it immediately, and many a time have we been warmly thanked afterwards for that advice. There really is no work for ministers equal to it, and, we might say, none to be compared with it. There are discourses in some of the earlier volumes that might be matched against the most splendid pulpit productions of ancient or modern times. To students preparing for the ministry it will be invaluable not only as supplying thought which may be used with good effect, but as affording an educa-
tional training in homiletics which will help to fashion their character, as preachers, for life. To hard-worked ministers it will prove a constant friend. We mean the class who are so often called on "to give out," and who have but little time or opportunity "to take in," for there is hardly a page that is not suggestive or fruitful of precious thought. Of the New Series we can speak in the highest terms. Mr. Urijah Thomas seems gifted with analytical power and spiritual insight, nearly equal to his father, while we think we can see marks even of wider reading and higher culture in his editorial management. Let those of our ministerial readers who have not seen the Homilist just ponder the "bill of fare" which this volume presents: Leading Homilies; The Preacher's Homiletical Commentary,—Homiletic Sketches on the Book of Psalms, on the Book of Job, and on the Gospel of St. John; Words of Angels to Men on Earth; The Preacher's Germs of Thought; Pith of Renowned Sermons; The Preacher's Finger-Post; Seeds of Sermons from the Minor Prophets, Micah; Biblical Criticism; Ancient Myths—their Moral Meanings; Scientific Facts as Illustrations of Eternal Truths; Biblical Anecdotes as Illustrations of Eternal Truths; Hebrew Ceremonies as Illustrations of Eternal Truths; Original Similitudes; Homiletical Breviaries; Literary Notices. There is something to tempt preachers who desire to be "thoroughly furnished." Laymen also who wish to know something of the grounds and reasons of faith should procure the Homilist. We have pleasure in adding that the theology of the work is thoroughly Biblical as opposed to scholastic or sect forms of faith, and its spirit wide enough to embrace all who call Jesus "Master and Lord."

We had not seen this work when we wrote our notice of Mr. Spurgeon's book, "Commenting and Commentaries," for our April number, or we should not have allowed his words to pass without challenge. Mr. Spurgeon says, "Dr. Whedon lacks common sense, and is no expositor." We strongly demur to both statements, and regret that Mr. Spurgeon should have used such language. Dr. Whedon is the editor of the Methodist Quarterly, the leading organ of the Methodist Episcopal Church of America, of which he is also a distinguished minister. This, and the fact that the preparation of this Commentary was undertaken by the direction of the General Conference of the Methodist Episcopal Church (the highest ecclesiastical legislature of the largest religious body in America), should have prevented Mr. Spurgeon from describing Dr. Whedon in such contemptuous terms. As to the Commentary itself it has been very favourably received by nearly all the Reviews and Magazines and other publications of the orthodox churches of America, and, so far as we know, Mr. Spurgeon's is the only voice that has been lifted against it since its appearance in this country. That it is as Mr. Spurgeon complains, "anti-Calvinistic," we must allow; but we cannot join with him in saying it is "furiously" so. Dr. Whedon believes, as many others do, that the theology prevalent in the primitive Church was not Augustinian or Calvinistic, and it is this (as he believes) more ancient and apostolic theology that he has endeavoured to reproduce in his Commentary. Surely good men may differ upon some of those points, of which St. Peter speaks as "hard to be understood," without depreciating each other, or seeking to write each other down by the application of offensive epithets. Our judgment is that Dr. Whedon's Commentary is a very creditable performance—keeping in mind that it was intended to be popular rather than critical, and that it represents
the theological standards of the Methodist Church, which are Evangelical Arminian, and also that it strongly upholds infant baptism, to all which we know Mr. Spurgeon is vehemently opposed. In addition to the comments, which are generally as sensible and as much to the point as they are brief, a very valuable essay is prefixed to each volume, and an introduction to each book—the results of much reading and patient thought; and maps, plans, and illustrations are given where necessary. The work is also beautifully printed, and is issued in a very handy form.


Biblical archaeology has suffered an irreparable loss in the death of Mr. George Smith, the celebrated explorer of the ruined cities of the East, and the equally celebrated interpreter of their long-buried monuments. It is a mysterious Providence which removes such a man in the prime of his life and the ardour of his work, and just at a time when still greater things might have been expected from his matured scholarship and well-trained experience. We are thankful, however, that there are others fully competent to carry on the work, as these volumes testify—a work the value of which cannot be estimated too highly by the Biblical student, or by any one who feels interested in the literature and history of those nations which played so important a part in the affairs of the ancient world. Vols. I., III. and V. are devoted to Assyrian texts—the translators being Sayce, Talbot, Rawlinson, Smith, Renouf, Rodwell, &c., with a Preface to each volume by Dr. Birch; and Vols. II., IV. and VI. are devoted to Egyptian texts—the translators being Birch, Maspero, Lushington, Cook, Pierret, Chabas, Goodwin, Horrack, &c., with Prefaces by Dr. Birch; a short explanatory introduction also is prefixed to each translation, Assyrian and Egyptian, either by the translator or by Dr. Birch. The Biblical student will find in these volumes many incidental confirmations of, and many aids to, a better understanding of Sacred History.


Both in matter and manner this volume is highly creditable to Mr. Lobb. It has been prepared with great care and good sense. The subjects are well chosen and well arranged; it is handsomely got up, and has one of the most complete Indexes we have ever seen, No point of interest is left untouched. The "Biography" and "Narrative of the Revival" are simply a condensation of the more important events in the life and labours of the two Evangelists. It is only right to give Mr. Sankey his place, for although he is no preacher, he very largely contributed to Mr. Moody's usefulness by his thrillingly beautiful service of song. To the tens of thousands who heard Mr. Moody, during his late visit to this country, this book will be an acceptable and welcome souvenir of a ministry for which many, we believe, will have reason to be thankful to all eternity. To those who have not heard him it will afford a fair opportunity of judging of his peculiar power as a preacher. It will be seen that it consists largely in the use of homely illustrations and positive and direct scripturalness of statement, charged with a spirit of tenderest pity and love. "You have no likes in your sermon," said Robert Hall to a brother-minister. "You tell us what things are, but never
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what they are like. Yet Christ taught, 'the kingdom of heaven is like,' &c. It is just in this point, so desiderated by the great preacher, that Mr. Moody excels. He goes out into common life and finds pictures and patterns of spiritual truth everywhere; and in plain strong language flashes them upon the conscience and heart of his hearers. It is in gathering up these illustrations and giving them in all their homely simplicity—serving them up, so to speak, with their "native flavour" on them—that Mr. Lobb has done so well. We thank him, and hope his book will obtain an extensive circulation, for it is eminently adapted to usefulness.


We are informed that the substance of these Papers has appeared in the Methodist Magazine, and that the writer, being requested to collect them into a volume, has taken the opportunity of expanding the original Essays and making them somewhat more complete as an analysis. We fully concur with the judgment of those who thought these Papers worthy of a separate publication and a permanent place in our religious literature. Although quiet and unpretending they contain the results of much sanctified study, and are marked by a rich and ripe spiritual culture not often met with in these days. Of course, as might be expected, the theology of the writer is Evangelical Arminian, and therefore anti-Calvinistic, but even Calvinists may read the volume with pleasure and profit—so much precious teaching will they find on those great doctrines which all hold, and on those principles and duties which animate and govern all true Christian life. The writer divides St. Paul's devotional writings into Salutations, Thanksgivings, and Prayers, and under these heads has embraced a considerable portion of New Testament revelation, for he carefully notes the relation of St. Paul's words to the words of the Lord Himself, as recorded in the Gospels, and to the words of the other apostolic writers as recorded in their Epistles. The work is far more comprehensive than might be supposed from its title, and will prove not only a valuable help to ministers, but will be appreciated by all who love clear, definite teaching in "the deep things of God." We would particularly call attention to the Introduction and Analysis as masterpieces of profound thinking and logical classification.

Dates and Data relating to Religious Anthropology and Biblical Archaeology.

London: Published for the Author by Trübner and Co., 57 and 59, Ludgate Hill.

The Preface informs us that the object of this work is to bring together, in consecutive order, under specific dates, some of the results of recent researches in Prehistoric and Biblical Archaeology, and Comparative Mythology, with the view of attempting to furnish trustworthy materials for the advancement of the study of Religious Anthropology. We are further told that the present volume, embracing the Primæval Period, forms a work complete in itself; and that the sequel will consist of three equally complete volumes, treating severally:—The Proto-historical Period; The Classical Period; The Post Classical Period. We give the author credit for great industry in collecting and arranging the mass of rare and curious matter which this volume furnishes; but we regret to observe that his object is to discredit the Sacred Writings wherever he thinks he can find an opportunity of doing so. An Anti-Biblical spirit pervades the book. In numerous places he deliberately
seeks to bring Scripture and science into conflict, either by avoiding all reference to those principles of reconciliation which eminent scientific men as well as theologians have cordially recognized, or by slurring them over in a way little short of wilful misrepresentation. So eager is he to prove the Bible wrong, or to leave the impression that it is so, that in several cases he accepts certain alleged "scientific" and "historical" conclusions which long ago have been shown either to have no basis in fact at all, or no sufficient evidence to support them. In short he is ready to accept any statement if it can only be used to destroy or weaken faith in the Bible. Honest minded readers will know how to receive opinions offered with such a bias, and the Bible will be none the worse for his attempts. Is it modesty or is it shame prevents the author giving his name? We sincerely hope it is the latter.


The title of this work explains its character, but nothing short of a careful examination of the contents could enable anyone to understand how full and valuable it is. It only wants one thing to make it perfect, viz.: A critical exegesis of the Hebrew text. Though wanting this, it is a complete repository of divinity ancient and modern, doctrinal, experimental, and practical. If Mr. Spurgeon had done nothing more in the world than produce "The Treasury of David," it is enough to immortalize him. Ministers and preachers particularly will find it immensely helpful for pulpit preparation; and so long as the Church of God loves the Psalms this is a work which will be valued and prized.