HUMAN DESTINY.

A CRITIQUE ON UNIVERSALISM.

BY C. F. HUDSON,
AUTHOR OF "DEBT AND GRACE, AS RELATED TO THE DOCTRINE OF A FUTURE LIFE."

"To those who by patient continuance in well-doing seek for glory and honor and immortality, Eternal Life."

BOSTON AND CAMBRIDGE:
JAMES MUNROE AND COMPANY.
1861.
PREFACE.

The "Affirmative Argument" here offered to the public, upon the question stated in page 21, first appeared in a discussion held with the Rev. Sylvanus Cobb, editor of the Christian Freeman, in the columns of that paper. The use of it as part of a volume was granted to Mr. C. at the outset, and the whole discussion was published by him in that form, in January last. Declining an offer made in the mean while for publishing, each party at the expense of his own matter, Mr. C. courteously grants the use of his plates for the present volume. This will account for its appearance as part of a work, though in itself complete.

The "Rejoinder" which was made occupies about twenty pages of the larger work, but is too closely connected with the "Negative Argument" to appear in place without it.

The writer intimated a wish to present, at some future time, a more full and thorough criticism of the Universalist faith. (P. 24.) This is still his desire, if he may ever think himself competent, and find leisure for the task. But he can not now flatter himself with that hope, and therefore the more readily offers the present essay. And, though no other person would execute precisely his design, yet he finds so many things uttered elsewhere, quite to his mind and far surpassing his ability, that he need little regret if his wish is finally disappointed.
PREFACE.

The turning-point of the whole controversy, he believes, will be found in the question of free-agency. In his work on "Debt and Grace" he has signified his approval of that view which regards sin as mystery (c. 2, §§ 2, 3); and he also finds something of man's dignity in his power to choose immortal life, and to make it in that special sense his own (c. 13, §§ 4, 5). And though his view of the end of evil is commonly deemed heterodox, it should do no harm if he commends, on the question of free-will, large portions of Dr. Bushnell's "Nature and the Supernatural," and of Dr. Squier's "Sin not of God," his "Reason and the Bible," c. 14, and his article on "The Power of Contrary Choice," published in the New Englander, May, 1860. It is also to be wished that some of the more abstruse discussions of this matter in Dr. Müller's "Christian Doctrine of Sin" could be popularized; but this, perhaps, can only be when the people at large shall be brought, by a fresh and practical interest in theology, into the same range of thought.

Meanwhile, the common consciousness of accountability, betrayed in the love of praise no less than in the sense of guilt, must ever suffice for the practical argument. Yet, as the dearth of virtue and the prevailing unfitness for an after-life may have caused a general despair of immortality just before Christ appeared, so mere argument for free-will can effect little except with the daily example of high moral sense. The upright life, abhoring the evil and cleaving to the good, can alone thoroughly persuade men that they may either lose or gain eternal life.

Cambridge, Mass., Nov., 1860

CONTENTS.

INTRODUCTION ........................................ 21

CHAPTER I.

WHAT ARE THE PROMINENT OCCASIONS OF THE UNIVERSALIST FAITH? ..................... 25
1. Reaction from the Doctrine of Eternal Misery ........ 25
2. Certain Views of Divine Sovereignty .......... 26
3. A certain View of the "Highest Good" ........ 28
4. Various Reforms ........ 29
5. Anti-slavery Effort ........ 30
6. Modern Spiritualism ........ 30
7. A light Estimate of the Import of Salvation ........ 30

CHAPTER II.

ARE THERE RADICALLY BAD MEN? ............... 34
1. The essential Freedom of the Human Will .... 36
2. The Nature of genuine Moral Virtue .... 40
3. Extensive Wickedness among Mankind .... 42
4. Various Examples ........ 45

CHAPTER III.

§ 1. Is the proper Immortality of Man assumed in the Bible? .... 53
CONTENTS.

§ 2. Is the immortality of the Soul implied in the Scriptures? 63
§ 3. The General Tenor of Scriptural Language .... 65
§ 4. The Exegetical or Analytic Argument. Gen. ii. 17; Ezek. xviii. 31, 32; Luke x. 25, 28; John xiv. 19; Rev. ii. 10, 11; Matt. x. 28; and 2 Pet. ii. 12, examined 72
§ 5. Do the Phrases ἡ ζωὴ αἰώνιος (rendered in our Version "eternal" or "everlasting life," by Universalists, "age-lasting" or "aeonian life"), and its equivalent ἡ ζωή εἰς τὸν αἰῶνα, imply Immortal Life? 85
§ 6. If "aeonian" life does not imply Immortal Life, then do any who fail of it finally attain Immortal Life? Luke xx. 34-38; 1 Cor. xv. 22; Rom. v. 18; Acts xxiv. 15; and 1 Tim. iv. 10, examined 89
§ 7. The Two Theodores. Change for Authorities 103

CHAPTER IV.

The Historical Argument 107
§ 1. There was deplorable need of Light on the Subject of Immortality when Christ came 107
§ 2. As the early Christians were not "Orthodox," so neither were they Universalists 111
§ 3. Where did Universalist Views take their Rise? 114

CHAPTER V.

Does the Doctrine of the Immortality of a Class accord with a Just Philosophy and with the Sentiments of Humanity? 125
§ 1. The Ontological Proof of a Future Life 125
§ 2. The Theology of Salvation 130
§ 3. The Nature and Design of Punishment 135
§ 4. Is the Immortality of a Class unkind to Man? 139
§ 5. Is the Selection of a Class to Immortality worthy of God 144
DISCUSSION OF HUMAN DESTINY.

QUESTION.
Do reason and the Scriptures teach the utter extinction of an unregenerate portion of human beings, instead of the final salvation of all?

AFFIRMATIVE ARGUMENT.
BY C. F. HUDSON

INTRODUCTION.

For several generations past the great controversy in the Christian Church has turned on the question of a supposed eternal misery of the wicked, and a supposed eternal evil in the universe of God. Two parties have been arrayed against each other, separated by a twice infinite difference of opinion, inasmuch as endless bliss and endless woe are each infinitely removed, and in opposite directions, from man's original nothingness. Each party has also maintained, consistently with its confidence in the safety of truth, or at least in the hurtfulness of error, that its opinion is most conducive to the present and future welfare of man. And when we look to the lives of those who have held the opposing opinions with any devoutness, it can not be denied that they have exhibited real, though sometimes different, graces and virtues.

Paradoxical though it may seem, their twice infinite difference has turned on one point of agreement. They have held alike and in common the actual immortality of all human souls. The paradox vanishes at a single thought, and appears as an
essential and explanatory fact. For only as immortal beings can sinful men be eternally blessed or endlessly wretched.

But this common opinion of a general immortality is lately, more than for several centuries past, challenged and denied. It is claimed, by respectable and growing numbers, that man’s immortality is not absolute, but dependent on personal goodness and virtue of character. The language of Paul, “to those who by patient continuance in well-doing seek for glory, honor, and immortality, eternal life,” is taken by these persons in a literal sense, which precludes the endless life of those who obey not the gospel of Christ. This third opinion, commonly known as that of the final annihilation of the wicked, is now giving a triangular character to the Eschatology of the day. In its recent history it is not old enough to have produced much character of any kind, and will be judged somewhat by the existing character of those who embrace it. I think it suffers no disparagement by their general morals. And two hundred years ago, when it had lived long enough to allow some estimate of its proper fruits, we are told it was “matter of public notoriety that in respect to morals no sect had approached more nearly to the simplicity and strictness of the early Christians” than those who held this view.

It has fallen to my lot to offer this view instead of that of eternal suffering in my book on “The Doctrine of a Future Life.” There has been a little criticism on the part of my orthodox friends, as if I had more ably combated their view than defended my own. And I have met a few who told me they would sooner accept the Universalist faith than mine. The former fact I think is due to the aggressive character of my book; the latter, to the modern novelty of my opinion. But in view of both facts I am happy in my present opportunity to treat the question anew; to show — if my pen and the truth will allow it — that the Universalist view is untenable, and to say some things that more directly concern the view I hold.

But before I proceed to the argument I should meet certain prejudices of various kinds that may beset me.

1. I shall not by the phrase “Universalist faith” imply the opinion that all men, without respect to present character, enter immediately after death into a state of unsullied happiness. This notion has been ably opposed by those called Restorationists, and it is fast declining. Yet I find the term Restorationist inconvenient, because it implies the opinion that there is a fall in the history of the human race from which man is restored; and this opinion is disowned by many who believe that condition is ever the inseparable consequence of acquired character, that salvation is never forfeited or lost, and that Restoration is strictly impossible. By the term Universalist, then, I mean simply one who holds that all men will be at last both holy and happy.

2. I shall disclaim all opinion of a special or violent interposition on the part of God, in the final perishing of the wicked. My view is that the unrepenting sinner destroys himself; and though this self-destruction may not be complete in the death of the body, but in a second instalment of death, I shall still regard it not as miracle, but the natural process of the life divorced from an unloved God, languishing back to naught.

This view also cuts off a frequent objection that final punishment is “vindicative,” and that God is wrathful in a bad sense of the word. It also allows the opinion that physical death is not a crisis in the history of one’s being, and that one who has not deliberately rejected God and virtue before the dying breath, may embrace God and virtue thereafter. Thus I hold, and have long held, the salvability of the heathen. The doctrine of an intermediate state without change, and of an appointed limit of probation on either side of the interval between death and resurrection, may still be true.

3. I speak of “persistently wicked” men. I do not assume that there are such, that being part of the argument. Nor do I design to limit the power of God in this regard, but only to show that the soul may be so contaminated with sin that reformation would involve reconstruction, at the hazard of personal identity; or, that after a great sin the power of faith in God’s forgiveness, or the possibility of happiness along with a faithful memory, may be gone.
Having premised these things, I am prepared to state my general argument, as follows:

I. What are the prominent occasions of the Universalist faith?

II. Are there radically bad men? Or, is there a "good in all," which may justly be called a redeeming virtue in the worst, and a nucleus of their reformation and salvation?

III. Do the Scriptures teach the immortality of man as a race, or of the good—or those who shall become good—as a class?

IV. Is the immortality of the good as a class supported by the history, especially of early Christian doctrine?

V. Does this doctrine accord with a just philosophy, and with the sentiments of humanity?

By way of apology I will offer but a single word. The compliments that have been bestowed upon my book may raise undue expectations of my present argument. Suffice it to say, the book was the fruit of long meditation, and of several years' study; my present effort must be begun and ended in not many days. And I am not as familiar with Universalist as with orthodox opinions and history. The main advantage, if any, which I shall have over the opponent of my opponent in their late discussion, will be that of my position. I have not to maintain any tenet of eternal woe. For this advantage partly do I write, and on it partly shall I rely. In one view it is a disadvantage. My change from the orthodox view was a great emancipation, and he who has changed once may change again. Who knows that one will abide in the half-way house, and will not some day rejoice in another great emancipation? We shall see. Meanwhile, I shall deem the present essay as an introduction to the great subject, on which I may possibly, years hence, gratify the wish of friends at both ends of the street by writing more fully.

CHAPTER I.

WHAT ARE THE PROMINENT OCCASIONS OF THE UNIVER-

SALIST FAITH?

Here is a delicate point of argument; for the causes of human opinion bear some analogy to the motives of human conduct, of which we ought not hastily to judge. I think, however, the argument is a legitimate one; for every cause enters into and qualifies its effect. Nothing is thoroughly known until it is traced to its source. Moreover, in every important and extensively prevalent opinion, however erroneous, there is some element of truth whence its power is derived. And we shall labor at great disadvantage if we do not thankfully recognize all that is good, even relatively, in whatever we oppose. I think the remark of Coleridge a just one, that "unless you understand a man's ignorance, you may be sure you are ignorant of his understanding." I shall waste my words if I do not know the paths by which my gentlemanly opponent and those on his side have come to their opinions. Only thus should any one pretend to offer himself as a guide into the right way.

1. One most obvious cause of Universalism is the reaction from the doctrine of eternal misery. It is easy to utter those two fearful words without thinking what they mean. It is almost as easy to forbear thinking upon them out of a suspicion that they mean more than can be true. But to ponder them, and then believe them, is hard indeed, and requires a high opinion or a deep sense of human guilt and ill desert. I have met with ministers who confessed they did not dare to think of the eternity of misery, for fear they should doubt the fact. And it has been said very plausibly, if not very truly in the choice between the two more prevalent beliefs: "We are all
Universalists when we lose our friends." And I can easily understand those who say they did not really believe in endless woe, even when they thought they did.

In this view I would say that the Universalist faith is relatively true. But it will be a part of my historical argument to show that this reaction did not begin—as there was no occasion for it—until the latter half of the second century, when Platonic views of the immortality of the soul had begun to be received into the faith of Christians.

2. Certain views of the sovereignty and supremacy of God have in various ways promoted the Universalist faith. Men would fain comprehend all things in the world, including those which seem evil and wrong, under one system and plan of God. This desire seeks to get rid of the perplexity and mystery of sin. It is of two kinds,—intellectual and moral; the first often attended with a deadness of the moral sense, and the second growing out of a tenderness and acuteness of the moral sense. A word respecting each of these.

(1.) I frequently meet persons who say there can be nothing in the universe opposed to the will of God, for the very idea of God makes Him the absolute sovereign, disposing and ordaining all events. In accordance with this view they excuse any apparent wrong in themselves as the necessary imperfection of finite and infant being. And as they grow consistently cold and philosophic, they extend the same charity to their neighbors. "Whatever is, is right," is their motto. And though earth is so full of apparently needless suffering, and of such exquisite counterfeits—if not realities—of guilt, these people persuade themselves that the Infinite Being can not have allowed any thing which He would disapprove or dislike, and that all men, with greater or less completeness of moral mechanism, are gliding on toward the same final happiness.

This philosophy is doubtless a reaction, in part, from the higher forms of Calvinism. When the scripture texts that asserted the unity and sovereignty of God against the Persian Dualism and the Greek and Roman Polytheism, were taken as charging God with all that men ever did, and when God was said to condemn some for the sake of glorifying others, so that he must appear to do evil that good might come, it is no wonder that all evil was denied, though at the hazard of denying with it all moral good, and of locking up the universe in necessity and fate.

This doctrine of necessity I name as a cause of Universalism, not because all Universalists hold it, but because I meet it more frequently now in their books and on their lips than elsewhere. I rarely meet one who makes a thorough and outspoken denial of man's free agency, who is not a Universalist. And I so often meet Universalists who scout the notion of free will and moral responsibility, that the two beliefs have become somewhat associated in my mind. Many of the persons I speak of are not members of Universalist churches; but some of them are such, and they find support in respectable books of Universalist literature.

(2.) But a sensitively acute moral sense, no less than a cold philosophy, may stagger at the mystery of sin and deny its existence. For sin, as I take it, when reduced to its proper elements, is no mere misfortune or indiscretion; but it is doing wrong in the face of conviction both of duty and of interest, and with the certain prospect of bitter regret, availing or unavailing. Thus sin, as sin, is purely monstrous,—excuseless and reasonless, a disjointing of the will from its just moral relations, threatening havoc around if not ruin within. But this anomaly is so horrible and horrifying that, like calamitous tidings, men dread to believe it true. They sometimes turn away from it, shocked and confounded, wishing not to look at it, or to think of it, again; but hoping that the apparent mystery of human guilt may be resolved into some better mystery of divine goodness and omnipotent love.

Whether the mystery can be thus solved is a question to be considered in the next chapter. I need only to remark here that Olshausen, alluding to the Universalist view, has well said: "Although this may often be owing to a sickly and torpid state of the moral feelings, yet it is without doubt deeply rooted in noble minds; it is the longing of the soul after complete har-
mony in the universe.”

But I think such a harmony does not preclude the notion of temporary and even self-ruinous perversion of finite free agency. God may still be divinely sovereign and good. “The highest power only becomes the more perfect, from the fact that instead of acting with all-subduing violence, it operates in a determinate mode, as a spirit of holiness and love. This higher power may safely leave man free, for the very reason that it is omnipotent; for it is the character of strength not to fear freedom; and it is precisely because Omnipotence governs the world, that no infringement of universal order is to be apprehended from the personal self-subsistence [or perverse action] of finite spirits.”†

3. I query whether Universalists do not usually hold an opinion of the “highest good” from which I should dissent, but which has contributed to their faith. The natural and just revulsion from the thought of eternal misery has given prominence to the question of happiness or misery; and it were no wonder if this question should displace that which is most important,—What is the highest kind of happiness or welfare? Is it not virtue? Is it not better to be worthy than to be fortunate? My noble opponent, and multitudes of Universalists with him, will at once say, “Yes, virtue by all means, and let the happiness take care of itself. First pure, then peaceable. Seek first the kingdom of God, and his righteousness.” And the moral philosophy prevalent among Universalists,—that blessing can not be sundered from goodness, that suffering is inseparable from guilt, and that the only forgiveness is the putting away of sin,—this philosophy has opposed the happiness-worship of which I speak. Still I doubt if many have not become Universalists out of a primary love of enjoyment—here or hereafter—to which moral worth is secondary. The same may be true of other religionists—this is religionism as distinct from genuine godliness, and it is an exceedingly subtle mischief in human nature. But is it not fostered more by the

hope of a final happiness, in spite of any guilty abatement or postponement of that happiness, than by the doctrine that makes godliness the condition of the gain or total loss of the happiness?

I have watched the progress of phrenology, and have read some phrenological books. I am sure that multitudes of them make virtue the means and happiness the end, as if virtue were not intrinsically good. Many of them manifestly use words of moral and religious import in a merely physical sense, as Epicurus doubtless did when he wrote a book about holiness. In fact, much of the phrenological philosophy is strictly Epicurean, making pleasure the highest good, and prudence the highest virtue. Of the phrenologists the great majority I think are Universalists;—many because they have found in their science special and striking proofs of the goodness of God in the economy of Pain,—of which hereafter. But many of them are Universalists on the happiness principle. These are no disparagement to those who are nobler minded; but the fact is proper to be named among the causes of the faith.

4. Important among these causes are various modern reforms, such as those of criminal codes, of prison discipline, and of the treatment of the insane, and efforts in behalf of the incontinent, of abandoned females, and of vagrant children. All these reforms have grown out of a kindlier feeling of humanity, and they have all encouraged a higher faith in the salvability of those who seemed beyond hope. Many who had been given up as lost have been recovered back to the paths of virtue. These reforms are an honor to our age, and no lover of his kind should discourage the last effort to save the fallen. They are our brothers and our sisters all. But the question still remains whether the cases of reformation form so large an induction as to warrant the inference of a general salvation in the holiness and blessedness of God’s kingdom. This question I reserve for the next chapter, where I shall examine the doctrine of the “good in all,” which is one form of the Universalist faith.

* Comm. on Matt. xii. 31, 32.
† Bockshammer, Freedom of the Will, p. 104. Kaufmann’s Trans.
5. Philanthropic effort in behalf of the slave is another occasion of this faith. "God hath made of one blood all nations of men." There is a human brotherhood, and a divine Fatherhood; and he is false to humanity and piety who does not recognize and live out this truth. But whether the fact warrants the faith in question is to be considered.

6. Modern Spiritualism has doubtless promoted the belief of the final salvation of all. I would not by any means confound the two doctrines; for the majority of Universalists may think no more of the supposed revelations of Spiritualism than I do. And I shall have no occasion to discuss their merits. I simply name the fact that nearly all Spiritualists are Universalists, and may refer to the opinions of some Spiritualists when I come to the scripture doctrine of immortality.

7. I think that Universalists have thought less than others of the infinitude of blessing implied in eternal life, and have thus been more ready to regard eternal life as the destiny of all. I think this is the fact because I have frequently heard Universalists speak of it as unjust if the sufferings of this life are not to be compensated with endless joy; or, as if the eternal life of some instead of all would be an unequal partiality in God. The reasons for the fact are various.

(1.) Universalists have not been compelled to ponder and weigh an infinite boon in order to justify a supposed exposure to an infinite woe. This is an orthodox habit of mind, which is exceedingly interesting, and which is one of the more common methods of vindicating the divine justice. God is so good as to offer immortal glory to man, once and again. If man declines — refuses — rejects — scorns the offer, does he not deserve the pains of hell? How shall we escape endless pangs, if we neglect so great salvation? Such is the argument; and it is so plausible that I have heard of one Universalist preacher who in a pardonable vexation with the people for not welcoming his faith said that if there was not a hell there ought to be one. The orthodox reasoning on this subject is indeed a monstrous perversion, which, pressed to its consequences, involves the notion that, from the beginning and for ever, infinite evil has as good a right of possession and may claim as fair a chance in the universe as infinite good.

But, notwithstanding this fearful corollary, the orthodox man, compelled to offset an infinite good against an infinite evil, has got some benefit of the process. With this doctrine of election, or selection, he has thought intensively, has intently considered the "powers of the world to come," has reckoned the "unsearchable riches" until he has felt that they were past computation, and has contemplated the "far more exceeding and eternal weight of glory" until not only the heaviest temporal calamities have seemed a "light affliction," but even the hazards of deathless pain, however imminent, have seemed of little account.

The method of the Universalist, on the other hand, has been the extensive. He has enlarged the range of the eternal life, making it comprehend the entire host of the human race, and the whole range of God's intelligent creatures. The orthodox estimates have been those of magnitude; the Universalist, those of multitude. And I believe that many Universalists have sought to enlarge the bounds of the eternal weal (they can not make them wider than I shall) because they have less fathomed its depths.

I think the early Christians had an advantage here. With no eternal evil to fear for any, but deeming themselves called by God's free gift, freely received, to be "heirs of glory," joint heirs with Christ of all that eternity can yield, they gained some sense of what is "Length, and Breadth, and Depth, and Height," in the computations of the celestial kingdom. Hence we cease to wonder that when fiery trials came, and not the strong men only, but delicate women and children of tender age were killed all day long, counted out like sheep for the butcher, — they thought they more than conquered, in the name of the Prince of Life who had loved them unto death. The early Christian martyrdoms served as a precedent for the courage of the later martyrs, burdened with the tenet of eternal woe. Let that burden be removed, and the "great salvation" be great not as from an infinite evil, but as for an
eternal and ever augmenting good,—and when poor, weak men, born of yesterday, shall begin to reckon the magnitude of the salvation, modesty may inspire some doubt whether all are thus saved. To be indeed “children of the Most High,” “sons of God,” “kings and priests” unto the Lord of all, may be so high an honor that an “election,” or selection, shall not be a very unworthy doctrine.

(2.) The slight estimate of which I speak is in part due to a reaction from a false heavenly mindedness. There are many professing Christians who seem to do christian duties because they lead on to eternal glory. This is what Coleridge has well styled “the-other-worldliness”—trying to be godly, not because it is right, but because it will pay well. This is a gross perversion, the over-working and abuse of considerations that should be properly used, for cherishing of gratitude and for comfort in tribulation. It is the counterfeit doing harm to the genuine. And this spurious piety is specially mischievous when it assumes that the degree of future glory is never affected by one's attainments in virtue, but that the best and the worst of the saved will be at once and equally blessed when they pass the pearly gates—a doctrine which the parable of the laborers in the vineyard was never designed to teach. This selfish and miraculous theory of future glory is justly repudiated by many Universalists, who find the law and the measure of happiness in virtue itself. Science and philosophy are discovering to men close and natural connections between well-doing and well-being. A very important gospel this—or, rather, a very important law of all gospel. But it may go too far with its doctrine of natural processes, sinking the supernatural in these, and losing itself in the finite, which is its proper sphere. And it will be well if in the rigor of moral law men do not forget the miracle of infinite love that has offered immortal life to those who had incurred some sort of death.

(3.) The light estimate of eternity is also due, in part, to the secular prosperity of this age, and to the unwonted preaching of the gospel in its secular bearings. The gospel easily catches
CHAPTER II.

ARE THERE RADICALLY BAD MEN?

By radically bad men I do not mean persons who are born of badness and unto badness, as if character were a thing of parentage or race. But, are there human beings in whom evil feelings, purposes, and habits so predominate that they mark and determine the character? And I use the popular phrase “bad men,” rather than the scriptural phrase “the wicked,” because I think the former best represents the latter in its original and proper sense. But scriptural expressions are apt to be used in a technical and conventional sense; “the righteous” and “the wicked” may come to signify men who are such according to an arbitrary and false standard. This is a great evil, and it needs to be corrected by substituting for the technical phrases such homely but hearty Saxon words as scarcely need defining.

And by the question, Are there radically bad men?—I do not mean to intimate that there are no traces of good nature even in the worst men. The real question will be, Is there “good in all,” upon which the Universalist so much relies, a genuine goodness, a real virtue, a moral principle? Is it an element so substantial, and a germ so vital, that it must, by a natural law of character, grow and develop into a prevailing goodness and a final salvation? If this question is answered in the negative, then the question remains, Will God, by methods higher than the native elements of character, secure in all men a final holiness and blessedness? This question will be considered in the closing chapter.

Here, at the outset, I should discard a host of rash and conventional judgments that are wont to be pronounced upon human character. Men are too often judged good or bad according to outward appearance. This is the way of men as compared with the judgment of Him who looketh upon the heart. Precisely this is meant by the “respect of persons” which the Scriptures so much rebuke. Human nature, fallen desperately in love with happiness, is apt to think that those who are “well off” must be good people, and that those who are badly off must be bad folks. This was the great mistake of Job’s friends, and it has been made thousands of times since his day. God is no such “respecter of persons,” or of outward advantages; but in every nation he that feareth God and worketh righteousness, in whatever condition, is accepted of him.

This principle cuts off all hasty condemnation of the heathen in the mass, as if they must inevitably perish. If they cherish true goodness and virtue, neither their ignorance nor their unscriptural methods of worship will exclude them from God’s kingdom. But as ignorance is a very great evil, and the gospel is worth preaching to everybody, the question remains, Whether a heathen, with his false views of God, may not lose confidence in the supremacy of goodness, take the side of an evil divinity because the evil divinity is supposed to be the more powerful, and thus debauch the conscience and allow vice to become a settled policy and ruling principle of the character? How else shall we understand Paul’s account, in which, after giving a long catalogue of heathen sins, he says: “Who knowing the judgment of God, that they which commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but have pleasure in them that do them?”

In judging of character I also throw out of account all considerations of natural temper or disposition, amiable or otherwise. The brutes, in their measure, may have these as well as men. We are responsible, not for the nature we are born with, but for the use we make of native temper and capacity, in repressing the evil and cherishing the good. I also throw out of the account the manifold differences of education and custom, whereby the same act which expresses ill-feeling and hate in one man may express goodness and love in another man. All this, I presume, is so well understood between him-
self and my opponent, that it needs only to be named, and not argued.

The whole subject of human character is a vast one, and it is all involved in the question if there be radically bad men. I can only pretend to make a few points of the general argument; suggestions only, where demonstration—in a matter so prejudiced by manifold dispute—would require a volume.

1. The first point to be insisted on is the essential and responsible freedom of the human will. I believe—it is almost a proverb—that the common consciousness of man asserts his freedom. Without this there could be no merit, either good or ill. Without this, whatever right or wrong there might be in the nature of things, neither could exist in actions or in men. There could be neither praise nor blame, there could be no character worthy of the name. Without freedom, the native dispositions and original feelings of men might be more complex than those of the brute, and more interesting for study; they might be more agreeable or disagreeable, more fortunate or unfortunate; still they would be the inevitable result of forces within the man and of circumstances without him, for which he would be as blameless and as thankless as the revolutions of the windmill.

But this practical consciousness of freedom—which excuses or condemns ourselves if it be real, and makes God an impostor if it be unreal—has been often denied for the sake of a theory. I believe it has often been denied by men troubled with a sense of guilt, of which they wished to be rid. Still more unfortunately it has been denied by divines, to save their views of a divine sovereignty and efficiency, or to save a false theory respecting God’s foreknowledge. Supposing that God could foreknow only as a natural philosopher does, or as an astronomer predicts an eclipse,—by calculations of cause and effect—they have ignored all actions that could not be determined by such calculation. The same class of divines have also been prejudiced by a false theory of freedom; one which divorced the will utterly from moral considerations, and reduced it to a sheer caprice. At an earlier date—in the Reformation—

the notion of free will was supposed to make man independent of the gratuitous help of God. This explains that remarkable book of Luther, On the Bondage of the Will (De Servo Arbitrio). The other causes culminated in the no less remarkable and more famous work of Edwards on the Freedom of the Will.

Those who have opposed the Calvinistic scheme have often said that Universalism is its legitimate fruit. I think, for the theoretic denial of free will I have just named, that this is true. The Calvinists, by a happy inconsistency, have maintained a deep sense of the evil and wickedness of sin. But when they had, by a method

"More honored in the breach than in th’ observance,"

made the Author of man’s nature and surroundings responsible for all men’s doings, it was natural that men should infer that God’s fairness required the salvation of one as well as another. The principle, or rather the lack of principle, by which God elected one man, appeared equally good for the election of all men. Hence we need not wonder that the Universalism of eighty years ago was offered as a “Calvinism Improved”—a title given by Dr. Joseph Huntington to his Universalist book. Here another cause of Universalism is worthy of note. The Old-School doctrine of the nature of the Atonement made it a legal satisfaction for the sins of the saved. The New-School doctrine of the extent of the Atonement makes it sufficient for all men. Combine the two, and all are saved at a stroke of logic. Some of the Universalists have employed this logic, and the result of their reasoning abides, though the old and false view of the Atonement is discarded. But the Calvinistic views of the human will, I think, prevail now more among Universalists than among the Orthodox. I may have misjudged the literature of Universalism on this point, and if so I shall thankfully stand corrected. But such is my strong impression.

Now I admit that the freedom of the human will, as uncon-
trolled by any necessitating power of motives, makes the actions of men no more traceable by any philosophy of cause and effect. We shall then have what Dr. Bushnell calls the "supernatural" in the will itself. And when the will does not follow the motives or reasons which it ought to follow, there is a wild lawlessness that perplexes us, and threatens disorder and ruin, limited only by the power of the perverse free agency. But this lawlessness is precisely what I understand to be the essence of sin. Sin is the transgression of law; and sin is guilty, and not unfortunate merely, just because it is not compelled by motive, or passion, or any cause out of the free will itself. And this, too, is the mystery of sin. It is that for which there is no valid reason; an act which the person knows to be equally wrong and imprudent, and so an act of un-reason; an act admitting no excuse save those worthless pleas by which the selfish or malicious guilt was first palliated or instigated. Such are the excuses which the stammering tongue fails to utter when one is confronted with the conscience, suppressed for a while, but again accusing. And by this final verdict of the conscience the guilty man is rendered—like him in the parable of the wedding garment—speechless.

This mystery of sin, which seems to be involved in the very idea of moral character, has been recognized by various eminent writers, even since the time of Plato. I will quote but one, and that one probably a Universalist. I mean Neander, whose labors in Church History have such signal merit because he was not a mere compiler of facts, but a philosopher, profoundly versed in the causes of human action. He says: "According to my conviction, the origin of evil can only be understood as a fact—a fact possible by virtue of the freedom belonging to a human being, but not to be otherwise deduced or explained. It lies in the idea of evil that it is an utterly inexplicable thing, and whoever would explain it nullifies the very idea of it. It is not the limits of our knowledge which make the origin of sin something inexplicable to us, but it follows from the essential nature of sin as an act of free will that it must remain to all eternity an inexplicable fact. It can only be understood empirically by means of the moral self-consciousness." (Planting and Training of the Church, book 6, chap. 1, note.)

I have thought it important thus to insist on the freedom of the will and the reasonless nature of guilt, as showing that man may be really guilty and bad. This alone, of course, does not prove any man radically bad, since one may, perhaps, repent of little sins, and reform himself into entire goodness. Yet the reasonless nature of guilt shows that it may not so be. He who acts foolishly, lawlessly, madly in a small matter, may do the same in things of weightier moment. He that is unjust in that which is least may also be unjust in much. Nay, as physical disorder tends to further and utter derangement, so the human will forsaking the law of reason may gain fresh impulse away from the true good, and end in final and utter abandonment, in the darkness of un-reason which it has freely entered.

I will here remark that while I am glad to hear my Universalist friends speak of charity and forgiveness, and doubt not they cherish a real feeling of good will toward all, yet a very common theory pressed to its consistent results would destroy the very idea of charity and forgiveness. If no man acts against known duty or interest, if all are doing precisely according to their best light and knowledge, then what place for charity or pardon? One who is conscious of having done the best he knew or could, does not ask forgiveness, nor thank one for the offer of it. And if it is further said that men do wrong only under the influence of passion or of strong temptation, the question recurs, Do they act with good conscience? and, Can they not resist and conquer their foes, the evil passions? If they can not, they need no pardon, for they are simply victims. If they can do better, their guilt remains; and while we should forgive until the seventy times seven, it should be with some fear that the actual and, in its measure, reasonless and excuseless guilt may continue and subvert the soul. But let us never speak of forgiveness under a theory that leaves nothing to be forgiven.
2. The nature of genuine moral virtue is such that we should not hastily conclude that all men possess it, even in slight measure. Virtue is something more than prudence, or a regard for one's interest. It is true that duty and interest ever coincide; neither can properly interfere with the other. Honesty is ever the best policy. Yet it has been well said that he who is honest from policy is not an honest man. To do a certain act because it is prudent and profitable, and to do the same act because it is right, generous and noble, are two very different things. Though all that is really virtuous is also really prudent, still here are two kinds of motive totally different. The two planes are indeed exactly parallel, and the figures are equal and similar; yet he who moves in one plane may have no sympathy whatever with him that moves in the other. The two persons are of different aims, and may therefore reach different moral results, and destinies.

The nature of virtue as something more than prudence may be observed in various relations, and illustrated in various ways. The man of prudent expediency is apt to be self-seeking and selfish. The man of principle regards what is right—for others no less than for himself. One makes self the centre about which his life revolves; and the other looks to what is just and good for all. One is devoted supremely to his own interests; the other is benevolent, devoted to the welfare of those around. One is seeking to gratify himself; the other is self-sacrificing, self-denying. The friendships of the one class are friendships of convenience,—they love those that love them, as publicans and sinners may do; the other class make all men their neighbors, and give not expecting to receive again. The former are almost sure to fall before temptation, because selfishness is ever short-sighted and blind and weak; the latter endure trial because they are settled in principles of duty, as upon a rock.

Here we may urge that the scripture doctrine of conversion contains an important principle, and that the change from selfishness to benevolence is most radical, and beyond the power of any prudential consideration. "He that saveth his life shall lose it." "If any man come to me, and hate not his father and mother and wife and children and brethren and sisters, yea, and his life also, he can not be my disciple." Self-denial, or the foregoing of pleasure and even of the favor of friends and kindred, out of regard for him who was "full of grace and truth," is made the condition of acceptance with God. Such is the high style of virtue which he requires. But self-denial is, in the very idea of it, beyond the power of self-love. No self-seeking can help in this matter of self-forgetting. If this is not the sole work of a higher power, lifting man up and out of his selfishness with his free consent, it is at least the work of a higher nature than any mere regard, however far-seeing, to one's own interest. And this seems to me to cut off one very common argument of the Universalist, i.e., that the vicious and abandoned will and must become virtuous when they find that this is for their interest. I answer, the habit of self-interestedness is just what makes the case of many so helpless and hopeless. They are slaves to self, "lovers of pleasures more than lovers of God." This is their bondage, and they can not be emancipated by any proclamation how they may serve themselves better. Prudential maxims may lengthen their chain, but they can not break it; a wiser policy may let out their tether, and give them a wider range of self-service, but it can not make them truly free. It can not make them unselfish, or give them a generous and hearty interest in the well-being of others, or a self-sacrificing joy in that which is noble and true. Such a freedom comes from the Deliverer, the Jesus who came to save his people from their sins.

But to break away from this self-love requires some struggle and effort, and it may be refused as an intolerable hardship. Here is a most alluring bondage from which we are not sure that all will escape. True it is that when one is devoted from self to the general good, he has an interest in that wherein he takes an interest, so that "all things are his," and he has gained the true riches, the unsearchable and inexhaustible wealth of God's domain. But no self-love can grasp that priceless pearl. And because the neglected duty of regard for others brings an
accusing conscience, the duty itself may be hated. I can not otherwise explain the dislike which Alcibiades had for Socrates, when he “wished that he were no longer to be seen among men,” apparently because, while Socrates was doubtless his true friend and well-wisher, he wished to dissuade him from a low but fond demagoguism, and make him a nobler and truer man. I can not otherwise explain the conduct of the man who ostracized the Athenian whom no man could accuse, because he could not bear to hear him perpetually called “Aristides the Just.” I can not otherwise explain the open scoffing at the idea of moral principle, of which we heard a little in political life a few years since, when many whose sincerity was not questioned were reproached as “conscience men.” I can not otherwise explain the feeling of the Scribes and Pharisees, of whom Christ said, “Ye have both seen and hated both me and my Father,” a signal instance of cherished malignity, which seems to preclude the notion that all sin grows out of ignorance or misconception, or that all will do better when they know better.

For some further suggestions under this and the following heads, I will refer to Dr. Bushnell’s argument on “The Fact of Sin,” in his work on “Nature and the Supernatural.” The most thorough discussion of the whole subject is found, I think, in Müller’s “Christian Doctrine of Sin.”

3. The extended history of wickedness among men, often in most flagrant form, gives some reason to fear that there may be radically bad individuals, finally unsaved. I wish here not to be misunderstood. I am not of the croaking school of philosophers, who say deliberately and habitually what David said in haste, that “all men are liars.” It is indeed a significant fact that multitudes have doubted whether there be any disinterested benevolence or virtue in the world. The famous maxims of Rochefoucault are based on this denial. And we know how many have re-asserted that of the British statesman: “Every man has his price.” Almost in the same tone has Jeremiah said, “The heart of man is deceitful above all things, and desperately weak” (Heb. enosh), i.e., our hopes of

human nature are often wofully disappointed. But, while I doubt the conversion of the world into a church, I am not given to jeremiads. I do not believe that the history of the world has been mainly a catalogue of hatreds, vices, and crimes. I doubt not the vast majority of all men’s outward acts have been good rather than bad. It must have been so. Society could not subsist for a single week if it were otherwise. Fallen as mankind are, they are not so lost to self-love that they should destroy themselves in a truce. And—better than this self-love or prudence—there are many natural sentiments of the human heart that produce much agreeable and amiable deportment and feeling. But it still remains true that man shows too bad a history for an unfallen race—a race of which every individual has retained the remnant of saving virtue, as a “good in all.” For argument’s sake we may regard as hyperbole the strong language in Genesis: “God saw that the wickedness of man was great in the earth, and that every imagination of his thoughts was only evil, continually.” And we may say the same of Paul’s account in the first chapter of Romans: “And even as they did not like to retain God in their knowledge, God gave them over to a reprobate mind, to do those things which are not convenient; being filled with all unrighteousness; full of envy, murder, debate, deceit, malignity; whisperers, backbiters, haters of God, despiteful, proud, boasters, inventors of evil things, disobedient to parents, without understanding, covenant-breakers, without natural affection, implacable, unmerciful; who knowing the judgment of God, that they who commit such things are worthy of death, not only do the same, but have pleasure in them that do them.” But if this be hyperbole, it is not confined to inspired men, writing in the interest of a humbling doctrine of man’s nature. A heathen writer of the first century says of Rome: “All is full of criminality and vice; indeed much more of these is committed than could be remedied by force. A monstrous contest of abandoned wickedness is carried on. The dust of sin increases daily, and shame is daily more and more extinguished. Discarding respect for all that is good and sacred,
lust rushes on wherever it will. Vice no longer hides itself. It stalks forth before all eyes. So public has abandoned wickedness become and so openly does it flame up in the minds of all, that innocence is not only a rare thing, but has wholly ceased to exist." * Add to this dark picture of an age of corruption and vice the wars of aggression in all ages, and of conquest without even the paltry pretence of "extending the area of freedom"—too often for a French or Napoleonic love of "glory;" add the intrigues, lusts, rapines, and murders of all times, including the finest portions and palmiest days of Christendom; the revival of the slave-trade in the noon of the nineteenth century, uncondemned by the courts of "the land of the free and the home of the brave," and with the augmented horrors of a "middle passage" under the vigilance of a frowning world; add the developments of border-ruffianism, in Congress and out of it, scorning reason and truth to carry a purpose of oppressive and lustful conquest; add the recklessness of a perverse nature that so often utters the maxims: "rule or ruin," and "after us the deluge;" and from such historic data what shall we infer? Shall we say that all this badness is only a lowering of the general tone of morals, which yet spares the inmost integrity of each individual of the race? Shall we say that the evil infests society, and pervades the mass, injuring fatally no single member? The wide differences of character that have been ever observed, oppose this view. The distinctions of good men and bad men have not been regarded as mere differences in degree, but distinctions radical; and though they may have been sometimes made by false tests and standards, yet wherever there has been enough of moral truth for a true and just standard, the same distinctions have been made none the less. Here is a very strong presumption that, as many seem far more bad than good, so as to be commonly reckoned on the whole bad, the badness which is so large in the aggregate may in some individuals be more concentrated, so as radically to affect and determine the character.

* Seneca, De Irâ, l. 2 c. 8. Compare Livy’s Preface.

4. Various examples, I think, confirm our fears that some men are hopelessly bad. And I shall not seek my examples among the lower classes of men, so often given over as past saving, or as not worth saving, by the élite of society. Here is one of the great corruptions that Christ came to rebuke,—the "respect of persons" or of outward appearances and advantages, which often make men really worse instead of better. Akin to this is the common condemnation of men because ignorant, sceptical, or unorthodox. So the Pharisees said: "This people that know not the law are accursed." And in modern times the term "miscreant" has grown out of the same feeling that no man could be worse than a misbeliever; for that is the meaning of the reproachful word. The mission of Christ, who made himself the "friend of publicans and sinners," was in part to condemn this false and pernicious method of judgment.

Here it may be urged that Christ extended his charity to all classes. "Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do," was his dying prayer. But it may be fairly questioned whether the prime instigators and contrivers of his death were included in this petition of mercy. The account occurs in Luke xxiii: 33, 34: "And when they were come to the place which is called Calvary, there they crucified him, and the malefactors; one on the right hand and the other on the left. Then said Jesus, Father forgive them, for they know not what they do." This condonation may apply only to the Romans, who were the instruments employed by those who plotted his death, and to others who might fairly plead some excuse of ignorance. Luke tells us in the next verse, with two intervening statements, that "the rulers derided him;" and though Christ felt no resentment or revenge, we can not, in a strict interpretation of the passage, make the act of pardon cover the argument of my opponent. Especially is this view discouraged by what Christ had before said to the class in question, "Ye have both seen and hated both me and my Father;" and on another occasion, "If ye were blind, ye should have no sin; but now ye say, We see; therefore your sin remaineth." With
which agrees that of John, “There is a sin unto death; I say not that ye shall pray for it.”

For examples of apparently bad men, then, I will name:—

(1.) Balaam. This man, who had very important gifts of prophecy, seems after all to have had none of that charity or holy love without which one is nothing. He is preeminently an instance—and as such Bishop Butler has wisely selected him—of the power of man to act wickedly, against the fullest conviction both of duty and of interest. He was well persuaded that Jehovah was the true God, and that one’s highest welfare, if not the only salvation, was in his favor. “Surely there is no enchantment against Jacob, neither is there any divination against Israel.” (Num. xxiii: 23.) “There shall come a Star out of Jacob, and a Sceptre shall rise out of Israel, and shall smite the corners of Moab, and destroy all the children of Sheth.” (xxiv: 17.) “Let me die the death of the righteous, and let my last end be like his.” (xxiii: 10.) Such were his utterances in the rapture of the prophetic spirit. Yet this same man, for filthy lucre’s sake, contrived a plan by which he should seduce the Israelites into idolatry with its usual vices, so he might feel warranted in pronouncing upon them the curse which Balak craved. If it be said that he did this in the confidence that nothing could harm the Israelites,—as some have excused the treason of Judas against Jesus,—then we must consider that after the seduction was accomplished and the curse pronounced, and twenty-four thousand of the Israelites had perished, he joined the army of Balak to meet their attack. If he expected Balak would conquer, he accepted the bribe and repeated the guilt which procured it. If he expected the Israelites to conquer, he gave up all hope of dying the death of righteous people, or of interest in their inheritance. In either case, we do not wonder that the Jews regarded him as a thoroughly bad man, and that the early Christians called the sin of simony after his odious name.

(2.) Nero. This emperor of Rome, in the earlier part of his government, was restrained by the counsels of Seneca, and seemed likely to disappoint the gloomy expectations of the people. But he soon entered upon a career of infamous lust and crime. His mother, wife, and many other relatives, were put to death by him. Seneca was sacrificed to his jealousy. Tacitus remarks that, after the murder of many illustrious personages, he manifested a desire of extirpating virtue itself. Suetonius asserts positively that the burning of Rome that occurred in his reign was by his command. Tacitus thinks it uncertain whether this was by his order, or by accident; he says, however, that all Nero’s efforts failed to quiet the general suspicion that he fired the city, and for this reason he charged the crime upon the Christians. There is no doubt that during the conflagration he sung the Fall of Troy to the music of the lyre, looking upon the scene from a tower.

Niebuhr regards this as simply showing that Nero was mad, though he says that after the murder of Agrippina he “abandoned himself more and more to bloodshed, and delighted in it.” Admitting that he was insane, the question still remains whether moral causes did not mainly produce his insanity; for all his derangement was apparently moral rather than mental. And if so, what proof have we that such a morbid condition, such disease of the soul, might not end in its proper death?

I have met another solution of the rational difficulties in the way of Nero’s salvation. A Universalist to whom I mentioned his playing while Rome was burning, thought that was rather a hopeful feature of the case. For Shakespeare has said:—

“The man that hath no music in himself,
Nor is not moved with concord of sweet sounds,
Is fit for treasons, stratagems, and spoils.”

But Nero was evidently no such man, for he could sing. "So much the worse," said I, "for the common opinion is that he played the lyre just because Rome was burning." My friend was not so sure of that, and thought that as we all need charity we should have a little for Nero. This seemed to me like stretching the veil of charity to meet a case and cover a theory—until it was rent. The question remains: Was Nero so unmoved by the calamities of half the people, that he could enjoy
the poetry of their blazing homes? If so, was he radically good or bad?

(3.) Caesar Borgia. Ranke says of this ambitious son of Pope Alexander VI., "He had caused his brother, who stood in his way, to be murdered and thrown into the Tiber. His brother was attacked and stabbed on the steps of the palace by his orders. The wounded man was nursed by his wife and sisters; the sister cooked his food, in order to secure him from poison, and the Pope set a guard before his house to protect his son-in-law from his son—precautions which Caesar derided. He said, 'What is not done by noon, may be done by evening.' When the prince was recovering from his wounds, Caesar burst into his chamber, drove out the wife and sister, called an executioner, and ordered the unfortunate prince to be strangled. . . . He killed Peroto, Alexander's favorite, while clinging to his patron and sheltered by the pontifical mantle. The Pope's face was sprinkled with blood. . . . Rome trembled at his name. Caesar wanted money and had enemies; every night murdered bodies were found in the streets. Men lived in seclusion and silence; there was none who did not fear that his turn would come. Those whom force could not reach were taken off by poison."

There were, if possible, "greater abominations than these." The record of them is cited by Gordon in his lives of the father and the son, in modest Latin which may satiate the curious.

(4.) Colonel Francis Chartres. "Of immense wealth and of aristocratic connection, every effort was turned to the gratification of animal passion. Even in his old age, his body burned to a cinder, the fire of passion continued unabated. Utterly impotent in body, he pursued the shadow of the same lusts with the same energy with which he had pursued their substance." He was executed in the year 1730, at the age of seventy, for an attempt at rape. The following epitaph was written by Dr. Arbuthnot:

"Here continueth to rot the body of Francis Chartres, who, with an inflexible constancy and inimitable uniformity of life, persisted, in spite of age and infirmities, in the practice of every human vice, excepting prodigality and hypocrisy. His insatiable avarice exempted him from the first, his matchless impudence from the second. . . . He was the only person of his time who could cheat without the mask of honesty, and retain his primeval meanness when possessed of ten thousand a year; and, having deserved the gibbet for what he did, was at last condemned to die for what he could not do."

Along with Chartres I may allude to Count Cenci, so abandoned to lust as to attempt the ravishment of his own daughter. The account of him may be found in a tale recently translated, "Beatrice Cenci." It is doubted by some whether so over true a story should be read.

(5.) Bertrant Barère. This man is known to many of your readers from the account of him by Macaulay. Those who have read that account, I think, will not say that the French Revolution, with its Reign of Terror, made him what he was; but that he more than any other man made them what they were. Let those who have read say whether Macaulay is rash in his opinion "that Barère approached nearer than any person mentioned in history or fiction, whether man or devil, to the idea of consummate and universal depravity. In him the qualities which are proper objects of hatred, and the qualities which are the proper objects of contempt, preserve an exquisite and absolute harmony. In almost every particular sort of wickedness he has had rivals. His sensuality was immoderate; but this was a failing common to him with many great and amiable men. There have been many men as cowardly as he, some as cruel, a few as mean, a few as impudent. There may also have been as great liars, though we never met with them or read of them. But when we put every thing together, sensuality, poltroonery, baseness, effrontery, mendacity, barbarity, the result is something which in a novel we should condemn as caricature, and to which, we venture to say, no parallel can be found in history."
(6.) The perpetrator of the “Three Memorable Murders,” of whom De Quincey says: —

“To an epicure in murder, such as Williams, it would be taking away the very sting of the enjoyment, if the poor child should be suffered to drink off the bitter cup of death without fully apprehending the misery of the situation. . . . The logic of the case, in short, all rested on the ultra fiendishness of Williams. . . . Our present murderer is fastidiously finical in his exactions — a sort of martinet in the scenical grouping and draping of the circumstances in his murders. . . . Let the reader who is disposed to regard as exaggerated or romantic the pure fiendishness imputed to Williams, recollect that except for the luxurious purpose of basking and reveling in the anguish of dying despair, he had no motive at all, small or great, for attempting the murder of the young girl. She had seen nothing, heard nothing — was fast asleep, and her door was closed; so that, as a witness against him, he knew that she was as useless as any of the three corpses. And yet he was making preparations for her murder, when the alarm in the street interrupted him.” (Note Book, pp. 53, 54.)

The “three corpses” do not mark the three murders, but the third murder.

The reader should also peruse De Quincey’s essay on “Murder as one of the Fine Arts,” in his volume of “Miscellaneous Essays.” I quote De Quincey the more willingly, because, taking the common view of man’s immortal nature, he seems to be a Restorationist.

I mention these examples, not because I would assume the divine prerogative of judgment upon the cases; I do no such thing. I do not assert that all or any of these apparently quite bad men are lost. I simply cite the facts of history respecting them, to show what may be true of their radical characters, and to show that in a human, and even a humane, judgment of character, we are not warranted in asserting their final regeneration and salvation as heirs of an “eternal weight of glory.”

I need not multiply examples, for the argument does not turn on numbers. If it did, I think almost any one might name instances of apparently utter abandonment, or of persons in whom the religious faculty, once excited, had afterwards apparently died out. I have known such persons; and in each case the apparent death of the spiritual capacity could be directly traced to a deliberate resolve to please one’s self out of the way of manifest duty, and that resolution was considered final, and was made in view of all supposable consequences, here or hereafter. Some points here raised will be considered more fully in my closing chapter; but this class of cases gives some support to a strict interpretation of the Parable of the Sower. Such are the seed falling on stony ground, or among thorns; it is as if the soul had but one germ of religious vitality; and when this is quickened and fails to take root, or to become a radical and ruling principle, the proper life of the soul is expired forever.

The Scriptures speak of a sin against the Holy Ghost. Whether that is strictly unpardonable will be considered in the next chapter. But I may here give my view of the nature of it, to meet an argument that will doubtless be offered by my opponent, from the many cases of conversion of very hardened and abandoned men. I think that in all such cases there had been no flagrant sin against conscientious conviction. Either the law or the love of God had never been fully understood. The sense of duty or of mercy in all such cases comes with an original and fresh power, upon a heart before blinded, or upon feelings blunted by bad or even vicious habit, reaching for the first time the inmost core and centre of the nature, and inspiring there a spiritual and immortal life. So it was with Paul — fierce persecutor as he was, he had never disowned the principle of duty, though sadly, and not without fault, mistaken in the details of it. So it was with John Newton — carrying on an active traffic in the persons of his fellow-men, “ignorantly, through unbelief.” My Universalist friends are very familiar with such cases, and I am glad of it. I wish my orthodox
friends knew them as well. They relieve our hopes of the degraded and the outcast, and rightly interpreted, they give fresh zeal to our efforts for fallen humanity. But ten thousand such cases do not relieve one instance of contempt of duty, and of mercy, and of man, and of God, deliberately cherished under the full blaze of the gospel’s blessed light; and I do believe there are such instances.

CHAPTER III.

DO THE SCRIPTURES TEACH THE IMMORTALITY OF MAN AS A RACE, OR OF THE GOOD—OR THOSE WHO SHALL BECOME GOOD—AS A CLASS?

§ 1. Is the proper immortality of man assumed in the Bible?

Here, at the outset, we meet the question whether man is naturally immortal. We may call this the question of the immortality of the soul; or, if that phrase seems too technical and metaphysical, it is the more general question whether all human beings are destined actually and absolutely to an immortal life, without forfeiture or failure.

The older Universalists, as Winchester and Huntington, holding the old opinion that sin against an infinite God deserves endless woe, regarded eternal life not as of man’s nature or desert, but as once forfeited, and now bestowed as an act of grace. They held that all had been liable to “eternal death.” And if we take this phrase in its literal sense, as signifying the loss of immortality, we should then have at once a doctrine of conditional immortality, and we should say nothing more about any absolute immortality of the soul or of man.

But modern Universalists, if I am not mistaken, do not allow any notion of forfeiture or of speculative contingency in respect to immortality. They say it would be either unjust to man, or unworthy of God, that He should allow such a being as man, by any possible means or supposition, to fail of the immortality for which he was created. And in this view the word death, as used in the Scriptures, can have no reference whatever to the being of the soul, or to the loss of immortality, but it can refer only to the dissolution of the body, or to such a low moral or spiritual state as is, for the time, no better than death itself.
Universalists at this day, I say, will hardly allow the idea of annihilation as a thought to be in anywise entertained. I may be mistaken; but I think the following criticism of my heterodox book, from my very good friend, the editor of the Christian Inquirer (Dec. 19, 1857), is only a strong statement of the real views of Universalists generally. The Inquirer says:—

"He admits the possibility of the annihilation of the soul of man, which argues a want of appreciation of its exceeding worth, its dignity, and divinity. We can not but feel that any man who esteems the image of God at so light a figure that it could by any possibility of its earthly action, choice, experience, or condition, come within the verge of the shadow of annihilation, is not fitted to write upon the immortality of man. He speaks of what he does not know, and testifies of what he has not seen. The creation points to man as the crown and completion of its long ages of change and refining development, the king and climax of its several departments of vegetable and animal growth. History and revelation confirm all that nature hints of the honor and greatness of the spiritual nature. To believe in the remotest contingency or possibility of the utter extinguishment of these souls, is to throw a disastrous eclipse over all those teachings and hopes they inspire, and destroy all moral perspective. If we admit that one soul will be annihilated, we admit that all souls may be; we lose the absolute certainty of immortality; we begin to sink ever so little in a fathomless gulf of soulless and atheistic nonentity."

Abating the strong statement of the case, the above, I think, expresses the common view and sentiment of your readers. But if so, it cuts off all proof of the natural immortality of man, from two of the passages most relied on by Universalists. I refer to Rom. v. 12–21, and 1 Cor. xv. 12–58. For it is manifest that if these passages teach the final salvation and actual immortality of all men, they equally teach that man has been subject to utter death, and liable to annihilation—the very thing which is held unjust to man or unworthy of God. Life and death are in these passages put in contrast. The death came by Adam; the life comes by Christ. If the life includes immortality, the death implies annihilation; and it follows that man is no more absolutely immortal, or by a strict nature, but by grace; by a regaining of what was lost; by a recovery of what was forfeit; by a redemption—a rescue from the jaws of the very monster which it is supposed has no place nor right in all the universe of God.

The only escape from this view that annihilation has been invited and confronted by man, is in supposing that Rom. v. 12–21, and 1 Cor. xv. 12–58, refer not to life and death of man’s being, but either, literally, of man’s body, or, metaphorically, of his moral nature. The immortality of the soul is then no longer expressed or directly taught in those passages, but assumed and implied. So much for the present; what the passages do refer to, we will inquire hereafter.

Another important passage relied on to prove the final salvation of all is that in Luke xx. 35–38. And this is also relied on by some as explicitly declaring the immortality of all. The phrase, “Neither can they die any more,” is applied to all mankind. But we need only remark that the expression, “they which shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world,” etc., is at least partitive in form; the whole passage taken alone would not suggest the immortality of all, but of a class only; the proof that it applies to all must be derived from other passages. Hence it is simply accurate to say that the immortality of all men is not here named, or explicitly taught.

Now orthodox writers, in saying that “the immortality of the soul is rather assumed, or taken for granted, than explicitly revealed in the Bible,” have been obviously consistent because they have not applied these three passages to all mankind. A single orthodox writer, maintaining the immortality of the lost, has endeavored to show that the last-named passage applies to all; but his attempt to relieve the silence of the Scriptures on the immortality in question only adds a manifest burden to the orthodox argument; for he would have those elsewhere called the “children of the wicked one” here called the “children of God.” (J. H. Hinton, Athanasia, pp. 423–443.) What the passage means is to be seen hereafter.
But it will be found as really consistent for the Universalist to say that the immortality of the soul is not explicitly taught, but silently assumed in the Bible. For if he claims that it is taught in Rom. v. 12–21, and 1 Cor. xv. 12–58, his argument, as we have seen, proves more than he admits; it proves too much. Hence I think the Universalist labors under the same general difficulty with the Orthodox, respecting the profound silence of the Scriptures on a very weighty matter,—their utter failure to name the immortality of the soul as such, or the immortality of man as man. And I may therefore here repeat, with some variations, the argument I have published on this subject.

To propose the argument more distinctly I should say that I reserve two or three passages supposed to imply the immortality in question, for separate consideration. The point now urged is that man’s immortality is nowhere either directly asserted or made the burden of a proposition, nor stated, mentioned, spoken of, or alluded to, in proper terms. As Olshausen says, "the doctrine of the immortality of the soul and the name are alike unknown to the entire Bible." Such expressions as to live or to exist for ever, to be immortal, the immortal soul, etc., never occur in the Scriptures with plain reference to the nature of man or the destiny of the human family. If such be the doctrine of Scripture, it is not told, but quietly taken for granted and assumed.

For argument’s sake I will admit this; and we will compare this supposed implicit doctrine of the Bible with another doctrine doubtless assumed in that volume, and with which the doctrine in question is often associated as one of the main pillars of all religious truth. I mean, of course, the doctrine of God’s existence; which I say is assumed or taken for granted because it is never made the burden of a proposition. The doctrine of one God is sometimes asserted against that of many gods. And in one instance (Heb. xi. 6), where the nature of faith is the point in question, the existence of God appears in a subordinate statement, by which the doctrine is explicitly assumed; but even this is a single case.

Now I assert that we might expect these two truths to receive similar treatment in the Bible. For the questions of God’s existence and of man’s immortality are of precisely the same importance to man himself. Not of the same absolute importance, to the universe at large; for in that relation the eternal duration of a billion human souls might be only as a drop in the ocean, to the existence of an infinite and eternal God. And therefore, if the universe had been divided into two halves, ruled by two Gods, and if the Bible were a volume of diplomatic documents and messages exchanged between the two deities, then we might suppose a bare allusion in it to the existence of the people of this earth, and nothing said whether they would at all live for ever. All nations are as the dust of the balance, compared with the Deity. "He sitteth upon the circle of the earth, and the inhabitants thereof are as grasshoppers before him." But the Bible is no such book of state papers, or of royal correspondence. It is not a majestic thundering, from deity to deity, uttered from Sinai to Olympus, or from nebula to nebula, in which the children of Adam might be overlooked and forgotten; but it is a special revelation from the Supreme God to the sons of Adam. And it is a revelation for their special instruction and benefit and behoof; and so exclusively for them is it designed, that all the rest of the universe is put by it in the background, and it seems to make the earth the centre of the world, insomuch that its apparent meaning once imprisoned the reformer in astronomy, Galileo; and the star gazers can now tell us more about the universe than the Bible itself does. And this confined and exclusive character of the revelation, with which geologists and astronomers have sometimes quarrelled, is just and proper because the dearest personal interests of man’s immortality are as important to him as all worlds beside, and as the being of God himself. Whether God exists at all and whether man lives for ever, are questions of equal moment to man. Hence I say that in the revelation of God’s character and of man’s destiny, these two doctrines, if equally true, should be treated alike; we should expect to find them on the same footing.
If, then, one of these cardinal truths is stated in the Bible explicitly and directly, we should expect the same of the other. If one is expressed not directly, but explicitly assumed, with frequent mention and allusion, we should expect the same of the other. If one is assumed implicitly and silently, — taken as a doctrine too clear for doubt and scarcely needing to be named, we should expect the same of the other.

But in fact these doctrines receive in the Bible the widest difference of treatment. That of the divine existence, as I have already remarked, is not directly asserted; but it is assumed as too clear for assertion. It is taken as a first truth of the religious consciousness, to prove which would be preposterous. The Bible never goes into debate with the atheist. If one says in his heart, “there is no God,” there is no help for him in logic. But while this truth is taken for granted in the Bible, so far from being tacitly assumed, it is named and alluded to in various forms of speech, continually. It stands out, in bold relief, on almost every page. In two short books only is it not named, — Esther and the Song of Solomon, — and their inspiration has been questioned on that ground. In every other book this doctrine is the apple of gold in the picture of silver. It is the central truth, that makes the Bible a Discourse of God — the Word of God. It is the Shekinah that renders it sacred and “holy.” And with manifold names, and expressions of the wisdom, power, and goodness of God, do the Scriptures invite men to the faith, love, and service of Him. If we strike out from the record those passages that tell of His being and His works, we reduce the dimensions of the volume almost by half, we make it a book without sense or meaning, we exchange its radiant light for midnight darkness.

But if we expunge from the same book all those passages in which man’s immortality is expressly mentioned or unquestionably assumed, we leave the volume unchanged. It might have been written precisely as it is, and the revelation would have been just as complete as it is, if the sacred writers had agreed to ignore that doctrine now so much on the lips of men, or at least, to speak about it so obscurely that their words should settle nothing in the case.

Whence this contrast in the scriptural treatment of these ideas? Will it be said that man’s immortality is sufficiently clear to man’s unaided reason? But that important truth ought to be exceedingly clear to human reason, which need not be named in a revelation. And if the more obvious truth is named less frequently because more obvious, then man’s immortality should be as much clearer than God’s existence as a thousand is greater than zero; for this is about the numerical ratio in which the truths are named.

No one will claim that the soul’s immortality is so clear past all shadow or dream of doubt. But if we suppose, for argument’s sake, that it is too clear to need explicit mention in the Bible, we only encounter a new difficulty. The revelation which God should make to man is of necessity given in man’s language; not only in a human dialect, but also in the current phrases of human speech, including many proverbial expressions. But if the immortality of men were so clear a doctrine of the human reason, it must be a most cherished sentiment, and must give rise to many familiar expressions — household words of natural theology. In fact, the doctrine has created various forms of expression that reveal the sentiment, wherever it has been believed. These now appear in the daily speech of Christendom, and we shall find them also in the old forms of gentile philosophy. Why, then, are such expressions wholly avoided and unknown in the Bible? Why should the spirit of prophecy, that catches so readily the language of men, have failed to conform to their style of thought in this most important item of their own immortal nature? If man is born an heir of the future eternity, why is he not invited and encouraged to its suitable virtues by some mention of the fact? The gift of immortality is surely preeminently worthy of God’s sacred mention to those who think and say so much of their supposed possession of the boon. Why has he not deigned to say a plain word about a nature in man which would be the chief element of the divine image in him?
Such are our difficulties, on the supposition that man's proper immortality is too clear to need mention in a revelation. Turning from the supposition to the facts, we only meet a new difficulty in the anxious doubts of long generations on this very question. Because man was made for immortality, we find in his fallen nature, through all history, some sentiment of the birthright he had lost. He finds himself subject to death; but he also finds, or thinks he finds, some remnant within him of that which is too good to die. Is death an eternal sleep? or, "If a man die, shall he live again?" This was the Question of Ages. But when it came to be answered, and "Life and Immortality were brought to light," there was not a word said respecting the immortal nature of which there had been so much talk. He who "had the words of eternal life" never said that all men were to live for ever. He never spoke of the life that he gave as an attribute or quality of some other essential life which men already possessed.

As I have remarked already, the Universalist will not probably claim that Christ gave immortality to all men; for this would imply that it had been lost. He will say rather that Christ revealed and gave assurance of what was already true. Thus a writer on 2 Tim. i. 10, in the Universalist Quarterly (vol. ii. p. 55), says: "Immortality of some beings was brought to light; but not surely the immortality of angels or of beings in another sphere of action. It was the immortality of mankind. But this could not have been disclosed, unless it had been possessed as an inherent attribute of the soul, prior to its disclosure—before the appearing of Christ." But Christ never said that men are immortal. His own words are never such as to describe such an existing fact. And the expression "brought to light" does not require such an interpretation. It may as naturally signify that he pointed out the way of life; or that he showed that there is immortality for man, and how it may be gained. And this accords perfectly with the general tenor of his language. "I am the way, and the truth, and the life." "He that eateth of this bread shall live for ever." "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him should not perish, but have everlasting life." "Because I live, ye shall live also." Whether these and similar expressions cover the doctrine of immortality, I shall examine hereafter. But if they do, we see at once that they confirm my interpretation of the phrase in question.

And equally significant, it seems to me, is the silence of Paul respecting the immortality of the soul. It may be said that the Jews were too little philosophic, or too full of national conceit and prejudice, to think of such an immortality, good for all nations and all men. But Paul surely suffered no such lack of culture, nor such narrowness. He was the apostle of the Gentiles; and he who could quote the gentile poets, and was even more a logician than a poet, could not have been so grossly ignorant of the Grecian philosophy as to know nothing of its doctrine of immortality. Why did he, then, never speak of the immortality of the soul? Or, if he thought that too abstract and metaphysical a form of thought, why did he not speak of an immortal nature in man? or of man as somehow immortal? Nay, if he thought the Greeks in the truth respecting a universal immortality, but in error respecting the nature or method of it, why did he not take special pains to recognize their half of the truth, and complete the doctrine by showing the connection between its two parts? When some mocked at the mention of the resurrection of the dead, why did he not show that immortality did not at all depend on the resurrection? And when, in that most ample discussion in the 15th chapter of 1st Corinthians, he made a supposition of no resurrection, why did he say, "Then they which are fallen asleep in Christ are perished"?

The sum is this: The Scriptures, given to reveal God's character and man's duty and destiny, speak of the divine existence many hundred times and in considerable variety of ways; but they speak of man's proper immortality, equally important to himself, never. And though the question had been long agitated among men, and the doctrine was incarnated in men's language, Christ, coming to illustrate the subject, said nothing of the doctrine. And Paul, whose education and mis-
sion pointed him out as the man to name and teach so great a truth, has failed to do it. The question arises whether the supposed taking for granted of man’s immortality is not an assumption out of the Bible, and foreign to it.*

I think that my argument from the silence of the Scriptures respecting man’s immortality receives additional force from some facts among the Spiritualists. They offer the spiritual manifestations as proving more than almost any thing else the immortality of the soul. Those Spiritualists who reject the Bible will naturally regard its teachings as defective on this subject. But how is it with those who accept the Bible? I can not speak from very general acquaintance or reading; but I have read enough to know that the following incident means something. The first lecturer on Spiritualism whom I have heard, informed us he had been a Methodist preacher. He found himself in trouble because he could not prove the immortality of the soul from the Bible. He told his perplexity to a friend, yet he found no relief, but aggravation of his difficulty, for his friend was in the same predicament. The friend, however, thought that what the Church had always held must be true, and he must preach it indulging no private speculations on the subject. Our lecturer replied that God gave him the faculty of reason, and he did not dare to forego the use of it; he must think for himself. And he thought he could now prove the desired immortality, thus: Matter is eternal. Whatever produces material effects is matter. The spirits do this;

* This argument from the persistent silence of the Scriptures respecting man’s immortality I regard as the main argument of my book; and it is so regarded by others. It is passed over in silence by three of my reviewers: D. N. Lord, Theological and Literary Journal, April, 1858; Dr. J. Strong, Methodist Quarterly Review, July, 1858; and Dr. A. Hovey, State of the Impenitent Dead. Another reviewer, Prof. E. P. Barrows, Bibliotheca Sacra, July, 1858, entirely misapprehends the argument; he proceeds as if I had in mind only the “immortality of the soul” in the technical or metaphysical sense, though I devote a paragraph (p. 162) to prevent such a misconception. I know the professor too well to suspect him of an intentional ignoratio elenchii; but the ignorantia elenchii is manifest.

hence they are material and eternal; and the Bible, recognizing their existence, teaches thus the immortality of the soul.

The argument of our lecturer plainly proved a great deal too much,—a past eternal existence, as well as a future immortality, and that of all species of life. It was pretty straight pantheism. Yet I doubt whether the lack of faith among orthodox Christians in a Providence that could give immortal life to the worthy alone, or their reliance on immortality from some “nature of things,” has not helped forward this modern style of pantheism.

§. 2. Is the immortality of the soul implied in the Scriptures?

A truth which does not lie on the surface of an expression, or in the form of its words, may yet be very clearly contained or implied in it. Is the immortality of man thus taught in the Bible? A very few passages only need here to be considered.

Gen. i. 26, 27: “And God said, Let us make man in our image, after our likeness. . . . So God created man in his own image, in the image of God created he him.”

I think this can prove no more than the creation of man for immortality, of which, nevertheless, he might fail. I think the expression in the Book of Wisdom, ii. 23, denotes just this: “God made man for immortality (ep’ aphtharsia), and to the image of his own nature made he him. But by the envy of the Devil death came into the world.” Some editions of the Apocrypha have the word eternity instead of nature; but this is a false reading of ađiotētōs instead of idiotētōs, which has been remarked by various scholars. And I think the context shows that the prospective immortality was, in the opinion of the Jews, cut off by the entrance of death. This appears more fully from the entire context, which I think signifies the immortality of the righteous alone:—“And they [the wicked] knew not the secrets of God, nor hoped for the reward of righteousness, nor esteemed the honor of holy souls. For God made man for incorruption, and to the image of his own nature made he him. But by the envy of the Devil death came into
THE SCRIPTURAL ARGUMENT.

64

AFFIRMATIVE ARGUMENT.

if it were not so often adduced by many orthodox people. I am happily ignorant of the Universalist treatment of it. Suf-

fice it to say, the previous verse,—“All go unto one place; all are of the dust, and all turn to dust again,”—and still more

the 19th verse, sustain the view which takes it as a challenge; q. d.: “Who knows whether the spirit of man goeth upward?”

etc. It is a piece of Solomon’s scepticism, which proves Epie-

necanism and French atheism if it proves anything. That it

should get into a “Scripture Manual” as a proof-text that man

will live as long as God does, shows either a sad state of tradi-

tional reasoning, or a great meagreness of orthodox argu-

ment.

Eccl. xii. 7: “Then shall the dust return to the earth as it was; and

the spirit shall return unto God who gave it.”

Here the Preacher speaks more as a moralist, and, as the

last two verses show, with some sentiment of piety. Yet

his whole book yields scarcely a glimpse of immortality. The

“judgment” named in verse 14, if after death, proves no etern-

al life. And the expression “shall return to God who gave it,” naturally denotes that the spirit reverts back to the disposal

of the power that created it; and it may intimate a return to

original nothingness. This view is strongly supported by an

expression of Justin Martyr, treating this very question of im-

mortality. He says: “As the personal man does not always exist, and body and soul are not ever conjoined; but, whenever

this harmony must be dissolved, the soul leaves the body, and

the man is no more; so likewise, whenever it is necessary that

the soul should no longer be, the vital spirit leaves it, and the

soul is no more, but itself returns again to neither whence it was

taken.” (Dial. c. Tryph. c. 6.)

§ 3. The General Tenor of Scriptural Language.

There are two methods of human thought and investigation:
synthesis and analysis; the compiling of facts, and the exam-

ination of them singly. Neither of these methods is safe or

complete without the other. When, therefore, I offer the
general tenor of scriptural language on this subject, I do not ask the reader to deem it worth a straw without some consideration of what the language means. For it is at least conceivable that after a hundred passages have been recited, sounding as if they supported one side of a question, they should be one by one transferred to the other side, or removed and thrown out as not referring to the subject,—belonging to neither side.

Before giving my list, therefore, or my enumeration, I remark that it includes most of the passages that seem to refer to the future if not the final destiny of man. It also does not include the greater number of passages in the Old Testament that probably denote temporal destructions or deliverances of the Jews. I think not more than a tithe of the number I give could be claimed as of special Jewish application; and I willingly pay such a tithe in account with the seed of Abraham, with the single remark that if such Old Testament passages signify nothing beyond the grave, then the Jews knew nothing beyond the grave. But then it becomes a fair question whether the passages do not contain a principle, and if the temporal deliverances and destructions were not types of similar results in man's relations to the immortal life. And if it is claimed that many of the passages I count refer to the life or death of the body but not of the soul, I reply that very few passages will be left to be referred to any immortal life. And the question whether they are to be taken literally or metaphorically, will be duly considered. Also the question whether those which speak of everlasting or eternal life, or life eis ton aionan, denote the life of the Christian dispensation, aionian life in some limited sense, or immortal life in the absolute sense.

A very few passages, obviously not referring to man's final destiny (e.g. Isa. xxxviii. 16), are thrown in as suggesting the literal sense of others which may thus refer. Also two or three asserting God's immortality, because they contain phrases apparently denoting the destiny of good men.

I must ask the indulgence of the reader, or rather his assistance, referring as I do to most passages without quoting them. My best apology is that such passages ought to prove nothing either way if they are not read; and when they are read in their places one has the benefit of the context.

TO LIVE; LIVING.

"This do, and thou shalt live" (Luke x. 28; compare Lev. xviii. 5; Neh. ix. 29; Prov. iv. 4; vii. 2; Rom. x. 5; Gal. iii. 12). "Man doth not live by bread alone, but by every word that proceedeth out of the mouth of the Lord doth man live" (Deut. viii. 3; comp. Matt. iv. 4). "Incline your ear and come unto me; hear, and your soul shall live" (Isa. iv. 3; comp. 1 Sam. i. 26; xvii. 55; xxv. 26; 2 Sam. xi. 11; Ps. lxix. 32; cxix. 175; Jer. xxxviii. 20).

"He is just; he shall surely live" (Ezek. xlviii. 9; comp. ch. iii. 21; xviii. 17, 19, 21, 22, 24, 32; xx. 11, 13, 21, 25; xxxii. 10, 11, 13, 15, 16, 19; xxxviii. 3–14). "The just shall live by faith" (Rom. i. 17; comp. Hab. ii. 4; Gal. iii. 11; Heb. x. 38). See also Ps. lxxxi. 15; cxviii. 17; cxiv. 144; Prov. ix. 6; xv. 27; Isa. xxxvi. 14, 19; xxxviii. 16; Luke, xx. 38; John v. 25; vi. 57 ("He that eateth me, even he shall live by me"); xi. 25; xiv. 19 ("Because I live, ye shall live also"); Rom. vi. 8; vi. 13; 2 Cor. xiii. 4; Gal. ii. 19, 20; 1 Thes. v. 10; 2 Tim. ii. 11; 1 John iv. 9.

"Shall be called holy, every one that is written among the living in Jerusalem" (Isa. iv. 3). See also Ps. xxvii. 13; iii. 5; lvi. 13; lxix. 28; cxvii. 9; cxlii. 5; Matt. xxii. 32; Mark xii. 27; Luke xx. 38.

TO LIVE FOR EVER, (Gk. eis ton aionan, Heb. lôlâm.)

"He that eateth of this bread shall live for ever" (John vi. 51, 58). See also Gen. iii. 22; Deut. xxxii. 40 ("I [Jehovah] lift up my hand to heaven, and say, I live for ever"); Ps. xxii. 26; xlix. 9.

LIFE.

"Tree of life" (Gen. ii. 9; iii. 22, 24; Prov. iii. 18; Rev. vii. 7; xxii. 14). "The soul of my lord shall be bound in the bundle of life with the Lord thy God" (1 Sam. xxv.
29). “Thou wilt show me the path of life” (Ps. xvi. 11; comp. Acts ii. 28). “I have set before you life and death, blessing and cursing; therefore choose life” (Deut. xxx. 19; comp. v. 15; Jer. xxi. 8). This and the following passages, I offer as typical, and as containing a principle: Deut. xxxii. 47; Ps. xxx. 5; xxxiv. 12; xxxvi. 9; xci. 16; Prov. iii. 22; iv. 22, 23; v. 6; vi. 23; viii. 35; x. 11, 16, 17; xi. 19, 30; xii. 28; xiii. 12, 14; xiv. 27 (“The fear of the Lord is a fountain of life”); xv. 4, 24 (“The way of life is above to the wise, that he may depart from Sheol beneath”); xix. 23; xxi. 21; Eccl. vii. 12). “Strait is the gate, and narrow is the way, that leadeth unto life; and few there be that find it” (Matt. vii. 14). “It is better for thee to enter into life,” etc. (Matt. xviii. 8, 9; comp. Mark ix. 43-45). “If thou wilt enter into life, keep the commandments” (Matt. xix. 17). “Shall not see life” (John iii. 36). “Resurrection of life” (John v. 29). “Ye will not come unto me, that ye might have life” (John v. 40; comp. x. 10; xx. 31). “I am the bread of life” (John vi. 35; comp. vs. 33, 48, 51, 53, 63; also ch. i. 4; viii. 12; xi. 25; xiv. 6; Acts iii. 15; Col. iii. 4; 1 John i. 1, 2).

“Book of life” (Phil. iv. 3; Rev. iii. 5; xiii. 8; xvii. 8; xx. 12, 15; xxi. 27; xxii. 19). “Water of life” (Rev. xxi. 6; xxi. 17; comp. ch. vii. 17; John iv. 10; vii. 38). “Crown of life” (Jas. i. 12; Rev. ii. 10).

See also Rom. v. 17, 18; vii. 10; viii. 6, 10; 2 Cor. ii. 16 (“Savor of death unto death, and of life unto life”); iii. 6; v. 4 (“Mortality swallowed up of life”); Gal. iii. 21; Eph. iv. 18; Phil. ii. 16; Col. iii. 3; 1 Tim. iv. 8 (“Godliness, having promise of the life that now is, and of that which is to come”); comp. 2 Pet. i. 3; 2 Tim. i. 10; Heb. vii. 16; 1 Pet. iii. 7, 10; 1 John v. 12, 16.

ETERNAL OR EVERLASTING LIFE (ζῶ ἀιῶνιος.)

The phrase is found once in the Old Testament (Dan. xii. 2), and forty-four times in the New Testament, the places easily found by the concordance. In most instances the expression is partitive, or designates a class of men. Whether the phrase implies immortal life will be considered hereafter.

OTHER EXPRESSIONS APPARENTLY DENOTING IMMORTAL LIFE.

“He asked of thee life, and thou gavest it him, even length of days for ever and ever” (Ps. xxi. 4). “Life for evermore” (Ps. xxxiii. 3). Immortality or incorruption;—Athenasia (1 Cor. xv. 53, 54; comp. 1 Tim. vi. 16). Aphtharsia, (Rom. ii. 7; 1 Cor. xv. 42, 50, 53, 54; 2 Tim. i. 10. The word also denotes incorruptness, as in Eph. vi. 24; Tit. ii. 7.* King James’ translation of the word is not bad.) Incorruptible (Rom. i. 23; 1 Cor. ix. 25; xv. 52; 1 Tim. i. 17; 1 Pet. i. 4, 23; iii. 4.)

TO DIE.

“Shalt surely die” (Gen. ii. 17; iii. 4; Ezek. iii. 18; xxxiii. 8, 14). “He that hateth reproach shall die” (Prov. xv. 10; comp. v. 23; x. 21; xix. 16). “The soul that sinneth, it shall die” (i.e. the very person that sins, Ezek. xviii. 4; comp. vs. 18-32). “That a man may eat thereof and not die” (John vi. 50; comp. xi. 26). See also Luke xx. 36; John vii. 21, 24; Rom. viii. 13.

DEATH.

“He that sinneth against me wrongeth his own soul; all they that hate me love death.” (Prov. viii. 36. This I offer as containing a principle respecting the future life. Comp. x. 2; xi. 19; xii. 28; xiii. 14; xiv. 12; xvi. 25; xviii. 21; Ezek. xviii. 32; xxxiii. 11.) “If a man keep my saying he shall never see death” (John viii. 51; comp. ver. 52). “The wages of sin is death; but the gift of God is eternal life, through Jesus Christ our Lord” (Rom. vi. 23; comp. vs. 16, 21; ch. v. 12, 14, 21; 1 Cor. xv. 21, 26, 54, 55, 56; also the

*I have since discovered error in this statement respecting aphtharsia. See it corrected in my Rejoinder, p. 494.
following passages, from which some may argue the metaphorical sense: vii. 5, 10, 13, 24; viii. 2, 6). See also 2 Cor. ii. 16 ("death unto death"); iii. 7; 2 Tim. i. 10 ("hath abolished death"); Heb. ii. 14, 15; Jas. i. 14; 1 John iii. 14; v. 16, 17; Rev. xxi. 4.

SECOND DEATH.

This phrase is put in contrast with "crown of life," "resurrection," "book of life," "water of life," Rev. ii. 11; xx. 6, 14; xxi. 8. It will be further examined.

TO PERISH; TO BE DESTROYED.

These expressions are the same in the original. I select mostly from the New Testament. "It is not the will of your Father which is in heaven that one of these little ones should perish" (Matt. xviii. 14; comp. John iii. 15; x. 28; 1 Cor. viii. 11). "A sweet savor . . . in them that perish . . . of death unto death" (2 Cor. ii. 15, 16; comp. 1 Cor. i. 18; 2 Thes. ii. 10). See also Luke xiii. 3; Acts viii. 20; xiii. 41; Rom. ii. 12; 1 Cor. xv. 18; 2 Pet. iii. 9. "Shall utterly perish in their own corruption" (2 Pet. ii. 12).

"Able to destroy both soul and body in hell" (Matt. x. 28; comp. Jas. iv. 12). "Will destroy those husbandmen," etc., (Matt. xxi. 41; Mark xii. 9; Luke xx. 16). See also Rom. xiv. 20; (2 Pet. ii. 12; 1 John iii. 8; Jude 5. "Every soul which will not hear that prophet shall be utterly destroyed (exolothrethesetai) from among the people" (Acts iii. 23; comp. Deut. iv. 26).

PERDITION; DESTRUCTION.

I discard the conventional sense of the word "perdition" which makes it the same with "damnation," remarking that it strictly means perishing or being destroyed. The question whether these words refer to the body alone, or to the being, is not here decided.

"To them an evidence of perdition, but to you of salvation, and that of God" (Phil. i. 28; comp. Heb. x. 39; 2 Pet. iii. 7). "Son of perdition" (John xvii. 12; 2 Thes. ii. 3). "Foolish and hurtful lusts which drown men in destruction and perdition" (1 Tim. vi. 9). "The beast . . . that goeth into perdition" (Rev. xvii. 8, 11).

"Broad is the way," etc., (Matt. vii. 13.) "Vessels of wrath, fitted to destruction" (Rom. ix. 22). "Whose end is destruction" (Phil. iii. 19; see context). See also 2 Cor. v. 5; x. 8; xiii. 10; 2 Pet. ii. 1; iii. 16. "Everlasting destruction," (2 Thes. i. 9; comp. 1 Thes. v. 3; Ps. lii. 5; xcii. 7; Isa. xxv. 25; xiii. 6. Whether this destruction admits a subsequent salvation is to be considered.)

As part of the general tenor of scriptural language I should name the class of

PASSAGES SUPPOSED TO IMPLY A GENERAL SALVATION.

Luke xx. 38; Rom. v. 12–21; and 1 Cor. xv. 12–58, are named above. The others most important are the promises that in Christ should all the nations of the earth be blessed" (Gen. xiii. 3; xxii. 18; xxvi. 4; Acts iii. 25; Gal. iii. 8; comp. Ps. lxvii. 2; lxxii. 11, 17; lxxxvi. 9; Isa. ii. 2; Mal. iii. 12; Rev. xv. 4). The mission of Christ to seek and save the lost (Matt. x. 6; xv. 24; xviii. 11; Luke xix. 10). The declaration, "And I, if I be lifted up, will draw all men unto me" (John xiii. 32). The designation of Christ as the "Lamb of God that taketh away the sin of the world" (John i. 29; comp. 1 John ii. 2); as the "bread of God that giveth life unto the world" (John vi. 33; comp. ver. 51); and as the "Savior of the world" (John iv. 42; 1 John iv. 14; comp. 1 Tim. iv. 10; ii. 4). See also Rom. xi. 14. The paternal relation and character of God (Isa. lxix. 16; lxix. 8; Mal. ii. 10; Matt. vi. 9; Luke xi. 2; Acts xvii. 26, 28; Heb. xii. 9; but see context, and comp. Ps. ciii. 13; Ezek. xviii. 4; Matt. v. 45; John viii. 41–44; Rom. viii. 15). The character of God as loving and merciful (in manifold passages). The restitution of all things (Acts iii. 21). The promises of Christ's universal dominion (Phil. ii. 9–11; Isa. xlv. 23; 1 Cor. xv.
24–28; Rev. v. 13). The destruction of death, Satan, and his works (1 Cor. xv. 26, 55; Gen. iii. 15; Heb. ii. 14; 1 John iii. 8; Rev. xx. 14; xxi. 4).

This list I do not offer as complete, so the reader will not be prejudiced by its brevity. Several passages concerning God's long-suffering with and repeated forgiveness of the Jews, in the Old Testament, might be added as containing a principle.

Yet if passages declaring the mercy of God are brought into the list, those touching the divine anger, whatever that means, might be added; and, as apparently asserting a limit to the divine forbearance, such a passage as Heb. iii. 7–iv. 11.

I have tried what I shall be proud if I have accomplished, to give this "general tenor" impartially. I here add that I do not assume that any of the passages apply to man's final destiny. I simply insist that in the absence of all statement of man's immortality this general tenor has great force; and the same silence respecting an immortal nature in man may admit the application of the common remark, that the literal or ordinary sense of words is prima facie the true sense, overruled only by special considerations. Whether the literal sense shall be applied to physical life and death, or to the question of immortality, is to be considered.

I am very far from asking or expecting that my opponent should examine all these four hundred passages, or even a small fraction of them. If he shows that those which I shall examine do not prove my proposition, I am answered, and that triumphantly, unless I happen to select the weakest passages for proof. For if my chosen texts do not contain my doctrine, there is left an à priori presumption against those I do not select. And if I have failed to present fairly the general tenor of the Scriptures, my opponent may do better.

§ 4. The Exegetical or Analytic Argument.

So much for the general tenor or tone of scriptural language respecting man's destiny. This is the synthetical argument, valuable in its place, but, as I said, indecisive without that other element of reasoning,—the inquiry what individual expressions mean.

I will now therefore examine a few of these passages more particularly; partly to meet certain arguments for their metaphorical sense, and partly to show more directly that they contain the literal sense, and apply to a final destiny.

Gen. ii. 17: "Of the tree of the knowledge of good and evil, thou shalt not eat of it; for in the day that thou eatest thereof, thou shalt surely die."

This is claimed, 1st, as applying to temporal or physical death only, not that of the soul; 2dly, as denoting moral or spiritual death only, and not that of the being.

To the first objection it is sufficient to reply for the present that no plain instruction appears to have been given our first parents of a distinction between body and soul as "body mortal" and "soul immortal." Hence, when they saw the brutes around them dying into nothingness, and heard the sentence, "Dust thou art, and unto dust thou shalt return" (Gen. iii. 19), it seems to me they must have had small hope of immortality left, unless by a rescue and redemption. And whether the promised deliverance would accrue to their benefit, or to that of their seed only, they were not told particularly, so far as we are aware. And the expression in Gen. iii. 22, "Lest he put forth his hand and take also of the tree of life, and eat, and live for ever," seems a little discouraging in the hour of expulsion from so sweet a paradise. I query whether a Universalist, commissioned to execute the business, using his own words, would have said just so much and then have dropped the subject, to finish his work by guarding the tree of life with forbidding security (ver. 24).

But it is urged, both by the Orthodox and by Universalists, that literal death could not have been intended in the sentence in Gen. ii. 17, because our first parents did not actually die on the day of their sin. It is inferred that the death intended was a moral or spiritual death, commonly called death "in trespasses and sins," and to support this view the expressions in Eph. ii. 1, 5; Col. ii. 13; Matt. viii. 22 ("Let the dead bury
for certain that thou shalt surely die.” Shimei did go, in pursuit of two fugitive servants, (under the law of Congress, we suppose, as Solomon had no statute so convenient, and thus by a long prolepsis of three thousand years anticipating the future as already present,) all the way from Jerusalem to Gath, and then from Gath to Achish—several days’ journey. Did that make the threatening word of Solomon out of date? His last words tell his evident meaning: “Thy blood shall be upon thine own head.”

I take the meaning of Gen. ii. 17, to be, then, that life was forfeit by transgression. And this might be the life of the soul no less than of the body; nay, it must appear so if there were no clear intimation that the soul was spared. And the earliest versions and paraphrases, besides able commentators, support the view I have given. The Greek translation of Symmachus (A.D. 200) renders the phrase: “Thou shalt be mortal.” The Syriac gives the same sense, which is accepted by Jerome, and by Grotius. The Arabic renders it: “Thou shalt deserve to die.” The Targum or paraphrase of Jonathan: “Thou shalt be subject to death,” or guilty of death (reus mortis); in like manner Isidore of Pelusium, and an eminent Rabbi, Nachmanides. Some of the Hebrews understood it to mean immediate death, averted by repentance. (See Fagius, in Poole’s Synopsis.) Other writers say: “The phrase, Thou shalt die, does not signify the fact of dying, but its necessity and desert.” (Cornelius a Lapide, et. al., in Poole’s Synopsis.) Vatablus interprets: “Thou shalt be subject to death, both of body and soul.” And Fagius adds that the Hebrews deny not this twofold death. Others: “Say rather that Adam then began to die; that is, by a lingering death of inward wasting and decay.” The above are all, save one, varieties of the same proleptic sense, and all are varieties of the literal sense. They differ in form only, while they agree in substance. The sense I have given is also approved by Anselm among the mediaeval Fathers, and by Dr. Knapp and Dr. J. Müller, among modern German divines.
metaphorical death that spares the immortal life of the soul. And hence the effort of a late writer against the view I hold to show that these passages do signify spiritual death.*

But I am willing, for argument's sake, to give up any support to my view that comes from my interpretation of all these passages. Allow, for a moment, that "death in trespasses and sins" denotes morally or spiritually dead. What is gained, either to the orthodox view or to the Universalist? If this death is like disease, it remains to be shown that it is not mortal—that sin is not to the soul what fatal disease is to the body. The metaphorical sense may thus *include* rather than *exclude*, the literal sense. So we say of the abandoned inebriate that he has "destroyed" himself. Instead of foolishly arguing that since he is not dead yet, but staggers boisterously about, he will live for ever, and never drop into a drunkard's grave, we say he will certainly die just because he has destroyed himself. So a moral and spiritual death may foreshadow and atmosphere a real and final death of the soul. We shall meet this question again. But here it may be remarked that the expression "death in trespasses and sins" supports the notion, if not of radical badness in human nature, at least of radical defect; and thus it supports some of the previous argument against the Universalist view. The word *dead* is a strong word even in a metaphor. The literal sense of Gen. ii. 17, is, I think, pretty fairly sustained. And though the view runs counter to the prevalent notions about the immortality of the soul, the passage applies to the soul as naturally as to the body. And this literal and extended application is proven, I

*Prof. Hovey (State of the Impenitent Dead, § 5) takes no notice of the authorities given in my book for the proleptic sense of Gen. ii. 17. His reader might think that I stand alone in my exegesis. He argues against it on the ground that such a lively figure of speech would not suit the formal announcement of a law and its penalty. It might be so in modern legislation, made into a special branch of government and a special business of a deliberative assembly. But God's personal and earnest words to Adam required no formality. This argument and the other reasons given by Prof. H. are freely submitted to those who read both sides.
think, by a few passages that speak of life as a thing to be chosen and gained, and of death as to be shunned. I will name two or three passages. One is in

Ezek. xviii. 31, 32: “Make you a new heart and a new spirit; for why will ye die, O house of Israel! For I have no pleasure in the death of him that dieth, saith the Lord God; wherefore turn yourselves, and live ye.”

I think the whole chapter and the class of sins which it mentions, do not favor the reference of this passage to the national life of the Jews as a people. It is remarkable as asserting and insisting on the personal accountability of each man for himself. “The soul that sinneth, it shall die,” and not one for another’s fault. Does the passage, then, refer to the prolonging of life in this world? It does, indeed, unless we suppose the Jews had such hopes of a future life in their own land, by a resurrection, that they might well understand these words as applying thus. I will not positively affirm that they looked so far into the future, in Ezekiel’s time; though they did afterwards. If they did then, the passage decidedly favors the future life of the righteous alone. If they understood it only of long life on earth, it has only a typical value in my argument, though that is something.

Luke x. 25, 28: “Master, what shall I do to inherit eternal life? . . . This do and thou shalt live.”

I do not now affirm that eternal or aionian life implies immortal life. But the phrase “thou shalt live” naturally suggests the literal sense. If the aionian life, or life of the gospel era, was implied, still Christ must mean more than simply that the lawyer would live on and into the gospel age, by keeping the commandments. If the aionian life was a spiritual and higher life, still Christ’s reply no less favors the idea that such would be the only continuing and immortal life.

John xiv. 19: “Because I live, ye shall live also.”

This expression cannot easily be referred to a moral or spiritual life, as distinct from life in the literal sense. All the circumstances, as they appear in the previous context, seem to refer the expression to the future destination of the disciples.

“I will not leave you comfortless; I will come to you. Yet a little while, and the world seeth me no more; but ye see me; because I live, ye shall live also.” The same literal interpretation is proven by the words of Christ in John vi. 39, 40, 49, 54: “And this is the Father’s will which hath sent me, that of all which he hath given me I should lose nothing, but should raise it up again at the last day. And this is the will of him that sent me, that every one which seeth the Son and believeth on him may have everlasting life; and I will raise him up at the last day . . . Your fathers did eat manna in the wilderness, and are dead . . . Whoso eateth my flesh, and drinketh my blood, hath eternal life; and I will raise him up at the last day.”

Rev. ii. 10, 11: “Be thou faithful unto death, and I will give thee a crown of life. He that hath an ear, let him hear what the spirit saith unto the churches. He that overcometh shall not be hurt of the second death.”

The phrase “second death,” which is here contrasted with “a crown of life,” occurs in three other places in this book, where it is put in contrast with “resurrection,” “book of life,” and “water of life.” It was also common among the Jews, and the following examples go to show that it meant extinction of being: “Every idolator, who says that there is another God besides me, I will slay with the second death, from which no man can come to life again.” (Pirke R. Elieser, c. 34.) “Let Reuben live, and not die the second death, by which the ungodly die in the world to come.” (Targum of Jerusalem, on Deut. xxxiii. 6.) “This hath been decreed by the Lord, that this sin shall not be forgiven them, until they die the second death.” (Targum on Isa. xxii. 14.) I take this to be a periphrastic way of saying that the sin should never be forgiven. So Matt. xii. 31: “It shall not be forgiven him, neither in this world, nor in the world to come.” David Kimchi, one of the ablest Jewish doctors, says the Targumist means, in the above expression, “the death of the soul in the world to come.” Again: “They shall die the second death, and shall not live in the world to come, saith the Lord.” (Targum on Jer. li. 39.) “They shall
die the second death, so as not to enter into the world to come."

(Ib. Jer. li. 57.)

On the phrase "the world to come," I shall speak again. I am aware that Dr. Hammond, who is quoted at length by Mr. Paige in his "Selections," makes some application of the passage in Rev. xx. 6, to the gospel dispensation. He speaks of "the second death, into which they are said to go, that are never to appear in the church again." But this indicates no immortality of the wicked. And the above citations, I think, fully warrant the words of Dr. H.: "Whatsoever be signified by the world to come (the age of the Messias, in whatsoever Jewish notion of it), it seems to denote such a death from which there is no release. And according to this notion of it, as it reflects filthy on the first death (which is a destruction, but such as is reparable by a rising or resurrection, but this past hopes, and exclusive of that), so will all the several places in which it is used be clearly interpreted. . . . And though, in these different matters, some difference there must needs be in the significations, yet in all of them the notion of utter destruction, final, irreparable excision, may very properly be retained and applied to each of them."

Matt. x. 28: "Fear not them which kill the body, but are not able to kill the soul; but rather fear him which is able to destroy both soul and body in hell." Compare Luke xii. 5.

I need not here debate the question whether the being here referred to as "able to destroy both soul and body" is God or Satan. It is supposed to be Satan by Maurice in his "Theological Essays," and also by Stier in his "Words of Jesus," in a happy statement of the argument. This view likewise accords with a remarkable passage of Arnobius, in his work "Against the Gentiles," (A.D. 303.) "This is the real death of man which leaves him nothing. What we see is but the separation of soul and body, not his utter destruction. This, I say, is the true death of man, when souls that know not God are consumed by long-continued torment, by a fierce fire into which certain cruel enemies shall cast them, who were unknown before Christ, and detected by himself alone." (l. 2. c. 14.) Arnobius evi-

dently refers to the evil angels, whom, in a collective sense, Dr. Bushnell calls Satan. What Arnobius says of "long-continued torment," or of infliction generally, belongs to his age. It concerns the form of thought only, not its substance.

That annihilation is the danger here described is conceded by Dr. Ballou, who says: "We see no allusion, here, to the idea of endless misery, but rather to that of annihilation. It was a killing of the soul as well as the body, a destroying of both soul and body; and the literal import at least of both expressions is, that it was a destruction of the one in the same sense as of the other." (Universalist Expositor, vol. iv. p. 168: See Paige, Selections, in loco.) And Mr. Balfour: "Men who are able to kill the body could not kill the whole man or person, for this would be to blot the man for ever out of existence. God only was able to do this." "If Gehenna refers to punishment in a future state, the passage in question rather teaches the doctrine of annihilation than endless misery." (First Inquiry, pp. 152, 156. See also Appendix, pp. 354, 355.) These writers think there could be no actual danger of annihilation,—or that, if God can thus destroy, it does not follow that he will,—because those whom Christ addressed were in the divine favor and under the divine protection. Very true; but that does not destroy all practical meaning of the passage. It may still describe a danger from which the disciples were delivered by their faithful allegiance, and would be finally saved by "continuing unto the end;" and a danger to which those are still exposed who do not trust in God because they do not love him.

Again, when one urges that the disciples were in no actual danger of annihilation, I reply, it is equally true that they were in no actual danger of any other calamity which gehenna may be supposed to mean. But Universalists now contend that "gehenna punishment," in some sense, is or has been actually suffered by ungodly men. And this is to admit that if destruction of "both soul and body" means annihilation, that is an actual danger, to be averted only by repentance. Christ never warns against an unreal danger.
Now that the destruction of the body here contemplated is literal, is admitted by all. It remains to be shown that the contemplated destruction of the soul is not also literal; or that the phrase "destroy both soul and body in gehenna" admits the idea that the soul is indestructible, or never will in fact be destroyed. But the literal sense seems so obvious and inevitable that some Universalists take the word "soul" (psyche), not in its modern sense, but in the sense of "life," comparing the passage with Isa. x. 18, and Mal. iv. 1. They take the phrase "soul and body" to be proverbial, and the whole phrase in hand to denote an utter destruction, temporally. But in a Bible that says nothing about an immortal soul, this interpretation is quite formidable. Admitting the phrase to be proverbial, it remains to be shown that the destruction named spares a principle of immortality, of which the Scriptures say nothing. But the passage in Matt. x. 28, is of still further importance, because it contains a much disputed word, gehenna (hell). Universalist writers have shown with great learning and ability that gehenna can not mean a place of eternal misery. It is taken from the valley of the son of Hinnom, or Tophet, and there was no eternal misery there. And because the punishment referred to in the twelve places in the New Testament where the word occurs, could not be executed in that valley, Universalists have also inferred that it might be something different from any punishment accomplished in that valley. Here two questions arise: What was the punishment of the literal Tophet? and, What corresponds to it, in the penalty of gehenna?

In Mark ix. 43-48, the word gehenna thrice occurs, and as often the phrase, "Where their worm dieth not, and the fire is not quenched." This brings us at once to Isa. xlvi. 24, the only other place where the phrase is found. "They shall go forth, and shall look upon the carcasses of the men that have transgressed against me; for their worm shall not die, neither shall their fire be quenched; and they shall be an abhorring unto all flesh." Here I do not see that it matters whether the place described is the valley before Jerusalem, or the scene of the ruin of Sennacherib's army, or of the destruction of Jerusalem. Allowing all this latitude, the words still denote a proper destruction, the fire devouring what the worm does not consume. The orthodox view of eternal non-destruction as much favors the immortality of "carcasses" as of the lost soul. The accompaniments of this scene of death are, the horror and infamy of dying unburied, the body being thrown into an accursed place once devoted to a hideous idol worship.

Death, then, with all its degradations and corruptions for "an abhorring unto all flesh," was the literal significance of Tophet. Such was the type — what was the antitype?

Universalists maintain that the special punishment of gehenna was accomplished in the destruction of Jerusalem, in fulfilment of the prophecies in Jer. vii. 31-34; xix. 6-13. (See Balfour, First Inquiry, pp. 123-128.) It seems to me difficult to refer to all the passages that contain the expression, particularly James iii. 6, to that particular event. Yet I am willing for argument's sake to suppose that they contain no allusion to a punishment after death. It will still remain for the Universalist to show that the Jews who suffered that punishment have any resurrection either to "everlasting life," or to immortality. This point will be examined soon.

But suppose we take Schleusner's statement, that among the Jews "any severe punishment, especially a shameful kind of death, was denominated gehenna." And also that the phrase "soul and body" was a proverbial expression, as above named. Setting out from this view, we naturally inquire how the Jews themselves came to use the term gehenna. Its general import is likely to appear in their traditions, though in these traditions may be many things foolish and puerile. In this view I quote a few passages from the Targums and the Talmud, premising that the doctrine of annihilation was adverse to the philosophic doctrine of the "immortal soul" which had begun to affect the Jewish mind. And again, I think I shall show that the early Christians, no less than the Targumists and Talmudists, held the annihilation of the incorrigibly wicked.

In the Jerusalem Targum on Gen. iii. 24, it is said: "He
made gehenna for the wicked, like a two-edged sword, cutting either way; and in the midst of it sparks and coals, burning up the wicked.” In the Targum on Ps. xxxviii. 20: “And they shall be consumed in the smoke of gehenna.” On Eccl. viii. 10: “They have gone to be consumed in gehenna.” And on Isa. xxxi. 9, gehenna is spoken of as “a fire which goes forth from the bodies of the wicked and sets them on fire; for it is said, “Ye shall conceive chaff, and bring forth stubble; your breath, as fire, shall devour you.” This may illustrate the phrase in James, iii. 6: “set on fire of hell.” The writer of the apocryphal book, Ecclesiasticus, evidently alluding to “ge-henna punishment,” says: “Humble thy spirit very much; for the vengeance on the flesh of the ungodly is fire and worms” (viii. 19). And again: “He that joineth himself to harlots will be reckless. Rottenness and worms shall inherit him; and he shall be lifted up for a greater example; and his soul shall be taken away out of the number.” (xix. 3.) The Jewish Talmud also says: “Those who sin and rebel greatly in Israel, as well as gentile sinners, shall descend into gehenna, and there be judged during twelve months; at the end of which the body is consumed, the soul is burned up, and the spirit is scattered beneath the feet of the just, as it is said in Mal. iv. 3.”

What, then, was “gehenna punishment,” even if we take the disputed word as an adjective, signifying simply the severest judgment, as Universalist writers explain the words in Matt. v. 22?

That “extermination is the greatest of all punishments” is a common remark of Maimonides, the “Eagle of the Jewish Doctors,” and of other Rabbies. One of these, speaking of the death of the soul, says this is “perfected punishment, and excision absolute, and perdition and corruption, which is never reversed, and is the greatest among all punishments.” And we dismiss the passage in hand with the words of Dr. Bentley, partly as confirming our interpretation, partly as showing that the punishment may not be severe beyond all reason or thought of man: “Oh, dismal reward of Infidelity! at which Nature does shrink and shiver with horror. What some of the learnedest doctors among the Jews have esteemed the most dreadful of all punishments, and have assigned for the portion of the blackest criminals of the damned,—so interpreting Tophet, Abaddon, the Valley of Slaughter, and the like, for final extinction and deprivation of being,—this atheism exhibits to us as an equivalent to heaven.” (Boyle Lecture, Sermon I.)

2 Pet. ii. 12: “But these, as natural brute beasts, made to be taken and destroyed, speak evil of the things that they understand not; and shall utterly perish in their own corruption.”

Granting, for argument’s sake, that this refers to a temporal destruction, it will remain for the Universalist to show that the phrase “shall utterly perish” allows a subsequent resurrection to immortality. It may also be compared with Acts iii. 23, where Peter quotes from Deut. xviii. 19, and says: “Every soul which will not hear that Prophet shall be utterly destroyed (exolothereutesetai) from among the people.” This was the punishment of extermination, and it is explained in the Mishna, the text or older tradition of the Talmud, as cutting off from the life of the olam habba,—a Hebrew phrase denoting the world or age which the Jews expected to inherit in the resurrection of the dead, and which they expected would continue for ever. What the phrase means we are to decide. I will only say for the present that it seems connected not only with the phrases, “world to come” (aion ho erchomenos, Mark x. 30; Luke xviii. 30, mellon aiôn, Heb. vi. 5), and “that world” (aion ekeinos, Luke xx. 35), but also with the zoe eis ton aiôna, and the zoe aiônios which are the subject of our next inquiry; and that it was a common expression in the Mishna that such an one is “worthy of the olam habba” (see Schoettgen, Hêrê Heb., in Luc. xx. 35).

§ 5. Do the phrases zoe aiônios, (rendered in our version “eternal” or “everlasting life,” by Universalists, “age-lasting” or “aiônian life,”) and its equivalent zoe eis ton aiôna, imply immortal life?

It it freely admitted that aiôn and aiônios are often used in
a limited sense. The former word does not necessarily mean 
eternity; nor the latter a duration strictly 
eternal. The same
is true of their English equivalents. The word 
ever is ap-
parently derived from the Latin 
venientum, which is the same as 
aióna. When one says, “I have 
ever loved flowers,” the phrase limits
the term to a very few years. Yet, when it is asked whether
the earth will endure 
ever, we understand an absolute etern-
ity. In the same way the phrase 
eis ton aióna, like its He-
brew equivalent, 
lóloám, may signify a duration without any
limit, assigned or conceived. And the word 
aiónios is doubt-
less thus used. (Rom. xvi. 26; 2 Cor. iv. 17, 18; v. 1;
1 Tim. vi. 16; 2 Tim. ii. 10; Heb. v. 9; ix. 14, 15; 1 Pet.
v. 10.)

As already remarked, the phrase 
zóé aiónios is used forty-
five times in the Bible, and in most instances partitively, or
with reference to a class. It is therefore important to the Uni-
iversalist argument to show, if possible, that the phrase does
not signify “eternal life,” in the strict sense of that expression.
Either the adjective 
aiónios does not refer to duration at all,
but signifies the nature or kind of life spoken of, or it refers
simply to the future age or dispensation, as distinct from the
expiring Jewish economy. The latter view, I think, is that
preferred by Universalists. The phrase 
eis ton aióna would,
of course, be taken in a similar sense.

To the first view,—that 
zóé aiónios denotes a gospel or
spiritual life, derived from Christ, as the Lord of the gospel
age, or (according to Maurice) a divine life, that relates us to
the Eternal One,—I simply reply: Granting this as the pri-
mary sense of the word, then is not the endless continuance
of the life implied as a secondary sense; and if so, do not the
“perishing,” “death,” and “not seeing life,” put in contrast
with it, denote a falling short of immortal life?

To the second view I find several objections:

1. The matters of contrast, and the connected and paralleled
expressions, do not favor a reference merely to the gospel dis-

censation. Contrasted are the expressions, to “perish” (John
i. 15, 16; x. 28); “persecutions in this time”

(Mark x. 30; Luke xviii. 30); “death” (John v. 24; Rom.
v. 21; vi. 23); “abiding in death” (1 John iii. 14, 15); “cor-
ruption” (Gal. vi. 8). The following expressions are con-
ected: “Ye judge yourselves unworthy of” (Acts xiii. 46);
“As many as were ordained to” (ver. 48); “To those who by
patient continuance in well-doing seek for glory, honor and
immortality” (Rom. ii. 7); “to lay hold on” (1 Tim. vi. 12,
19). The phrase “to live for ever” (eis ton aióna) occurs in
John vi. 51, 58, which should be compared with chajah 
( Gen. iii. 22; Deut. xxxii. 40; Ps. xxii. 26; xlix. 9). The
following expressions are also important: “They [Christ’s
flock] shall never perish” (shall not perish eis ton aióna,John
x. 28); “shall never die” (shall not die eis ton aióna,John
xi. 26); “shall never see death” or “taste of death” (eis ton
aióna, John viii. 51, 52); “shall never thirst” (eis ton aióna,
John iv. 14); “He that doeth the will of God abideth for ever”
eis ton aióna, 1 John ii. 17). I also venture to name as
parallel the phrase “neither can they die any more” (Luke
xx. 36), because it stands in connection with the phrase “to
obtain that world” (tou aiónos ékienon, ver. 35).

2. If the phrases in question are referred to the Christian
dispensation, many of the passages where they occur will be
hard to translate. The following are examples: “Shall not
thirst during the Christian dispensation.” “Shall not perish
during the Christian era.” “Shall not perish for the age to
come, neither shall any man pluck them out of my hand.”
“Shall live during (or into, eis) the future age.” “Abideth
during the Messianic kingdom.” “God so loved the world
that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth
on him might not perish, but have life for the age.” “Whoso-
ever liveth and believeth on me shall not die during the 
aión. Believest thou this?”

I do not wonder that in the argument which confines these
phrases to a dispensation, the terms “aonian life” and “aeonic
life” are found so convenient and occur so often. But this is
not to translate the words of life; and we should not be con-
tent with a mere transfer, when a translation involves or
betrays no difficulty.

3. It would follow that immortal life is one of the rarest
things named in the Bible. It follows that he who “brought
life and immortality to light,” and who “had the words of
eternal life,” spoke of immortal life in only a single recorded
instance. (Luke xx. 36.) In this view, about fifty passages are
given up at once as containing no assurance whatever against
the final annihilation of all mankind. And the whole doctrine
of immortality, either for all men or for any select class of
men, rests upon half a dozen passages or less. For not only the
fifty passages that speak of “aionian” life will fail in this great
argument, but all which speak merely of “life” or of “salva-
tion;” for life and salvation might be only for a temporary
existence. But if these words are supposed to imply immor-
tality, then those who have not life or salvation, may have no
immortality.

And here, before proceeding to the few passages on which
depends the last hope of immortality, I must repeat the cau-
tion against the assumption of man’s immortal nature. Mr.
Balfour, in his “First Inquiry,” has very properly remarked
on this subject: “Is not the doctrine of the soul’s immor-
tality revealed in the New Testament? No; for if it was taught
there, it would be no revelation from God to the world, for it
was a popular doctrine among the heathen nations many cen-
turies before the Christian era. With more propriety it might
be said that the heathen revealed this doctrine to God than
that God revealed it to them. Had the New Testament
writers believed the soul to be immortal, why did they never
speak of it as such?” (Pp. 332, 333.)

The sum is this. The Scriptures reveal no “immortality of
the soul.” And they announce the “aionian” life, not of all
mankind, but of those who through faith become righteous or
good. If, now, “aionian” life does imply immortal life, the
numerous passages in question teach most decidedly the immor-
tality of a class.

§ 6. If “aionian” life does not imply immortal life, then do
any who fail of it finally attain immortal life?

This question is important in the Universalist argument,
and complicated generally. Important, because some Univer-
salist writers admit that a sin has been committed of which it
is said there is never forgiveness, neither in this age (aiōn),
nor in the age (aiōn) to come. (Mark iii. 29.) Mr. Balfour,
treating on this passage, makes temporal death the irremissible
penalty in either age. He says: “It is generally admitted
that temporal death was the punishment of crimes under the
old dispensation; and that temporal death was inflicted for
crimes under the new, no one will dispute; for Ananias
and his wife, persons in the church at Corinth, are noted examples;
and John speaks of a sin unto death, for which even Christians
were not to pray, 1 John v. 16, 17.” (Second Inquiry, pp.
279, 280.) Thus Mr. Balfour. It remains to be shown that
Ananias and Sapphira, failing signally of “aionian” life, shall
yet attain pardon of soul, and immortal life. Is there a
third dispensation, of forgiveness for sins unpardonable in the
second? The language of the Epistle to the Hebrews I think
hardly allows that. “For it is impossible for those who were
once enlightened, and have tasted of the heavenly gift, and were
made partakers of the Holy Spirit, and have tasted the good
word of God, and the powers of the age (aiōn) to come, if
they shall fall away, to renew them again unto repentance;
seeing they crucify to themselves the Son of God afresh, and
put him to an open shame” (vi. 4–6). “For if we sin wil-
fully after that we have received the knowledge of the truth,
there remaineth no more sacrifice for sins; but a certain fear-
ful looking for of judgment, and of fiery indignation, which
shall devour the adversaries” (x. 26, 27). Granting this
“judgment and fiery indignation” to signify the destruction of
Jerusalem, where is the “sacrifice for sins” thereafter?

Mr. Paige endeavors to show that Mark iii. 29, does not
preclude final forgiveness, with a noticeable remark: “If, by
never forgiveness, it be denoted, strictly speaking, that the blas-
phemy against the Holy Spirit shall never be given, then there

8*
is a direct contradiction between this verse and verse 28; for there it is positively asserted, without any limitation or exception, that ‘all sins shall be forgiven unto the sons of men, and blasphemies wherewith soever they shall blaspheme.’” (Comm. in loc.) This would be called by Coleridge an asthmatic exegesis. Need any one be told that the 29th verse is the limitation and exception to the statement made in verse 28? This statement is in fact worse than nonsense without such a limitation. Aside from the qualifying exception, it is a proclamation of unbounded license to sin and blasphemy. If any one doubts this, let him read the 28th verse without the 29th. And then, as he shudders at the repeal of all moral law which stares him in the face, let him ask what the 29th verse does mean. I do not see how one can then avoid the notion of an unpardonable sin.

And if we take the whole expression as a strong, proverbial mode of speech,—as if it were said, “That is the blackest guilt of all; God will forgive any thing else but it,”—I do not see how we can escape the same conclusion, that there may be a sin unforgiven in the age to come, whether that age or aiōn be temporary or eternal.

And some of the expressions before cited show that the Jews regarded a certain guilt as finally unpardonable. “This hath been decreed by the Lord, that this sin shall not be forgiven them until they die the second death.” “They shall die the second death, and shall not live in the world to come, saith the Lord.”

But the question I have raised is also complicated. For it involves the whole doctrine of the Resurrection. Is this moral and spiritual, consisting in the conversion of the soul? or, is it physical, initiating the immortal life? Does it occur at the death of the body? or is it an event yet future to the human race? If future, is it simultaneous, and homogeneous for all? or, is there a twofold resurrection, one to immortality, and another abortive, ending in a sleep that knows no waking?

I shall have neither time nor occasion to resolve all these complications. All these shades of opinion are found in almost every denomination of Christians, and only one of them is peculiar and essential to the Universalist view. I need only show that there is not a final resurrection of all to immortal life. The supposed proof of this rests upon two or three passages, which must be the final resort of the Universalist faith. I have already alluded to them, and we will now examine them.

Luke xx. 34–38: “The children of this world (age, aiōnos) marry and are given in marriage. But they which shall be accounted worthy to obtain that world (age, aiōnos), and the resurrection from the dead, neither marry nor are given in marriage; neither can they die any more; for they are equal unto the angels; and are the children of God, being the children of the resurrection. Now that the dead are raised, even Moses showed, at the bush, when he calleth the Lord the God of Abraham, and the God of Isaac, and the God of Jacob. For he is not a God of the dead, but of the living; for all live unto him.”

Some have supposed that the expression, “a God of the living,” proves that the dead are now alive. But this would manifestly vacate the proof of a resurrection—the very thing that Christ was to show. What need of a resurrection for those who live? Thus Tyndale, answering the Platonic Thomas Moore, says: “Ye destroy the arguments wherewith Christ and Paul prove the resurrection. . . . If the souls be in heaven, tell me why they be not in as good case as the angels be? And then what cause is there of the resurrection?” The sense is this: God is the God of Abraham, Isaac, and Jacob, not because they were then alive, for the Jews never thought of them as such, but because they were to live, in the resurrection. Here is the figure of prolepsis, before noticed. God “ calleth the things that are not [yet], as if they [already] were.” The heirs of life belong to the living God; they “live unto him” because his eye is upon them, and no power can pluck them from his hands, but they shall be raised up at the last day. They have a life hid with Christ in God. But not so the children of death. This explains an expression already cited from the apocryphal Book of Wisdom, ii. 23: “By the envy of the devil death came into the world, and they follow him that are of his side.”
But it is said, "For all live unto him." This expression is important in the Universalist argument. But it proves nothing; for the context naturally refers the "all" to the subjects of discourse, either the patriarchs just mentioned, or those "accounted worthy to obtain that world," in ver. 35. Then it will be perfectly proper to read, "For they all live unto him." The Greek always allows this whenever the context can suggest it; for the pronoun is implied or rather contained in the verb, and is never separately expressed when the context does suggest it. And in the Syriac, as given us by Dr. Murdock, we actually have the translation I offer: "For they all live unto him."

The same phrase is used in Rom. vi. 10, 11, and Gal. ii. 19, apparently with reference to the future and immortal life. There is nothing in either context to suggest its application to the entire human race.

This phrase has also a historical interest. It occurs twenty-four times in the "Book of the Shepherd," written by Hermas, about A.D. 140. Clement of Alexandria cites a passage from it as "divinely expressed." Origen thought the book "divinely inspired." Chevalier Bunsen calls it "one of those books which, like the Divina Commedia and the Pilgrim's Progress, captivate the mind by the united power of thought and fiction, both drawn from the genuine depths of the human soul." All these admirers of the book rank as Universalists. It was read by the churches of Greece as late as the time of Jerome, and was the great exponent of the religious mind of the second century. But this favorite phrase, "shall live unto God," is in every instance referred to a class and never to all mankind. As used by Hermas it seems to refer to the future and immortal life.

But it is asked, Is not the resurrection here spoken of universal? This can not be inferred from the expression "the dead" (ver. 37); for the article does not, of course, make the expression universal, and in several of the like expressions in 1 Cor. xv. the article is omitted. Again, the expression in ver. 36 is peculiar. The "resurrection from (ek) the dead" is different from "the resurrection of the dead," and there are strong reasons for referring the phrase to the so-called "resurrection of the just," as if this were a resurrection from among the dead, either by priority in time, or by their prerogative as being worthy of life. In Luke xiv. 14, we read, "Thou shalt be recompensed at the resurrection of the just." In Acts iv. 2, we read of "the resurrection of Jesus from (ek) the dead." — the last phrase being the same with that under consideration. So likewise in Acts xxvi. 23, and Rom. i. 4. In Phil. iii. 10, 11, Paul says: "That I may know him [Christ], and the power of his resurrection, and the fellowship of his sufferings, being made conformable unto his death; if by any means I might attain unto the resurrection of the dead." In this remarkable passage the term rendered resurrection in ver. 2, is itself peculiar. It is not anastasis, but exanastasis,—an out-rising, or a rising up from among the dead. Universalists think Paul can not here refer to a literal resurrection, because he was sure of that, and because it would be absurd to say of it, "Not as though I had already attained, either were already perfect." (ver. 12). But there was reason why Paul should say this. There were those who said that the resurrection was past already, subverting the faith of some (1 Tim ii. 18). These were the spiritualists of that day, denying that Christ had come in the flesh, and affirming that the resurrection was rather an escape from the body or the "form," than a being clothed upon after the pattern of Christ's glorious body. Paul had, moreover, good examples to follow — some in that "great cloud of witnesses" — in striving after a resurrection. Women had received their dead raised to life again; and others accepted not deliverance from torture, "that they might obtain a better resurrection" (Heb. xi. 35). This could not have been conversion. Again, the phrase "were already perfect" evidently does not refer to moral perfection, or holiness, but recalls the expression in Heb. xii. 23: "the spirits of just men made perfect;" and this apparently signifies the being made complete, in the resurrection state. It is in almost so many words, "the resurrection of the just." Again, to say that Paul was sure of a resurrection is not to touch the point in question. To be
sure of an anastasis, was not to be sure of the exanastasis. In this might specially appear “the power of Christ’s resurrection,”—in a “resurrection of life,” clothing the heirs of life with spiritual bodies, of which his own risen form was the type and the assurance to all, that “live and believe” on him, or have living faith in him, that they may “never die.” Compare what is said in Rev. xx. 5, 6: “This is the first resurrection. Blessed and holy is he that hath part in the first resurrection; on such the second death hath no power.” This might be emphatically the resurrection, compared with which that of “the unjust” should be sometimes nameless or forgotten. Why, then, should Universalists dwell so much on “the resurrection of the dead, both of the just and the unjust” (Acts xxiv. 15) as literal, while they take as simply moral or spiritual the words in John v. 28, 29? “All that are in the graves shall hear his voice, and shall come forth; they that have done good, unto the resurrection of life; and they that have done evil unto the resurrection of condemnation.”*

And once more. We have already remarked that the expression “they which shall be accounted worthy,” is, in form, the description of a class of persons, and does not refer itself to all mankind. The equivalent expression in ver. 36, “the children of God,” also frequently occurs apparently denoting a class; e.g.: Matt. v. 9; John xi. 52; Rom. viii. 16, 21, ix. 8 (“They which are the children of the flesh, these are not the children of God”), 26; Gal. iii. 26; John iii. 10 (“In this the children of God are manifest, and the children of the devil”); v. 2. It is sometimes urged that the phrase “accounted worthy” does not denote moral fitness, but simply being thus “honored.” This I admit for argument’s sake.

Still we read of those who “judged themselves unworthy of eternal life” (Acts xiii. 46), and who were apparently taken at their word.

And this suggests my closing remark on this passage. What was this eternal or “aionian” life, which Luke records as having been rejected (Acts xiii. 46), if not the very life of which Christ is here speaking (Luke xx. 34-38)? The “that world” of which certain are “accounted worthy,” is the aiôn, precisely the age, dispensation, or whatever it be that is contained in the expressions “for ever” (eis ton aionan) and “world to come” (ho mellôn aiôn), and which gives us the adjective aiônios, so often rendered “eternal.” It is the word used in Mark iii. 29, where it is said that for a certain sin there is “never forgiveness.” But Universalists confess that in such an aiôn the sin is unforgiven. Now these were not two distinct aiôn. The phrase “world (or aiôn) to come,” often used in the New Testament, seems to have been also proverbial with the Jews, so Christ might speak of it as “that aiôn.” If, then, the phrase “hath never forgiveness” applied to this aiôn, admits an after forgiveness, why does not the phrase “neither can they die any more,” admit a subsequent dying? The adverbs (oudepot, Mark iii. 29, and ouk eti, Luke xx. 36) are equally strong. If the latter signifies immortal life for all, the former gives us contradiction. Who will tell us the way out of this dilemma? It may be said there must be some distinction between the two aiôn. But the utmost I can conceive is, a difference in form, leaving the aiôn single; the aiôn of the church militant, and the aiôn of the church triumphant; the kingdom on earth, and the kingdom in the heavens; but each including the same persons, and leaving to those who hear the gospel the duty to “lay hold on eternal life” as if no other life were immortal.

The next passage to be considered is,—

1 Cor. xv. 22: “For as in Adam all die, even so in Christ shall all be made alive.”

Two questions arise here. 1st, Does the term “all” in each member of the verse include the entire human race? 2d, If
so, does it preclude the distinction of a twofold resurrection, of the just and of the unjust, one class to life and the other to condemnation?

1. There would be no exegetical violence whatever in applying the word “all” in each member of the verse, to the subjects of discourse in the previous context. These were, those who had “fallen asleep in Christ.” It was doubt respecting their destiny, that troubled the Corinthian Christians. The expression, “if in this life only we have hope, we are of all men most miserable,” goes to make the case of believers, — who then found little good in life, and who were killed all the day long,— the burden of the argument. Again, where our translation speaks of “the dead,” the article is commonly omitted in the original. This is a matter of some account if the being “made alive” is taken as the “resurrection of life.” The article is found only in verses 29 (baptized for the dead), 35, 42, 52. Here the righteous dead, whether a part, or all mankind, are doubtless intended. But in every other instance (ver. 12 (twice), 13, 15, 20, 21, 32) the article is omitted. We may then translate, e.g. in ver. 16, “If dead persons rise not, then is Christ not raised.” We are not warranted in saying that in these verses “the dead” means of course all the dead. For all these reasons I find no difficulty whatever in rendering ver. 22 with reference to Christians, designated in ver. 18, 19, 20: “For as they all die in Adam, even so in Christ shall they all be made alive.” The Greek admits this no less than in Luke xx. 38, where, as we have seen, the Syriac requires it. The very common word “all,” very naturally used as I have taken it, does not require a sudden extension of the subject to embrace all mankind.

Yet granting that the word “all” in the first member of the verse applies to all the children of Adam, it may in the second member apply to all the “children of God” in Christ, and to none others. Such a comparison of two families and of their respective heads would not be unnatural. I choose, however, not to argue this point, partly because this would require some space, and partly because it is done by those in the orthodox view, and is less necessary for me.

2. But admitting that the word “all” applies in the second clause to the whole human race, we find in the next verse a distinction which may imply a resurrection of some “to condemnation.” “But every man in his own order; Christ the first fruits, afterwards they that are Christ’s, at his coming.” Here it seems to be implied that there are some who are not Christ’s. After Christ, the first instalment of the resurrection is of a special “order” or company; evidently the same with that spoken of in 1 Thes. iv. 14, 16, where Paul writes with much the same purpose (ver. 13): “For if we believe that Jesus died and rose again, even so them also which sleep in Jesus will God bring with him. . . The dead in Christ shall rise first.” And this reminds us of the “first resurrection,” on whose subjects “the second death hath no power” (Rev. xx. 5, 6). And as we read on in 1 Cor. xv. 24, 25, about “the end,” and the “putting down all rule and all authority and power,” and “putting all enemies under his feet,” we find no warrant in inferring the conversion of these adverse forces. The same event seems to be predicted in Ps. ii. 8: “Ask of me, and I shall give thee the heathen for thine inheritance, and the uttermost parts of the earth for thy possession.” But the next verse indicates a severer conquest than conversion: “Thou shalt break them with a rod of iron; thou shalt dash them in pieces like a potter’s vessel.” And ver. 12: “Kiss the Son, lest he be angry, and ye perish from the way.”

We have cited 1 Thes. iv. 14-16, which doubtless describes the same fact with 1 Cor. xv. 23. The passage in 2 Thes. i. 5-11, apparently refers to the same period. Here Christians are spoken of as “counted worthy of the kingdom of God” (ver. 5), and Paul prays that “God may count you worthy of this calling” (ver. 11), using the same word that occurs in Luke xx. 35. But here wicked men are explicitly said to suffer a very grievous destruction. They “shall be punished with everlasting destruction, from the presence of the Lord, and from the brightness of his power.” This everlasting or “aio- nian condemnation, is apparently in or from the same aion that is named in Luke xx. 35, and which is the period of Christ’s
kingdom. Grant, for argument’s sake, that this coming of Christ was at the destruction of Jerusalem. Still where is the proof that they who suffered the “destruction,” and who are so plainly excepted from the “order” or company named in 1 Cor. xv. 28, are yet the heirs of immortality?

Passing on to verse 26: “The last enemy, death, shall be destroyed,” this is good against the orthodox view of immortal death. But it proves nothing against the view I hold, either in reason or interpretation. There is no more death, when all who live are immortal. So it is said in Rev. xxi. 4: “And there shall be no more death.” But it had been previously said (xx. 13, 14): “Death and Hades delivered up the dead which were in them; and they were judged every man according to their works. And Death and Hades were cast into the lake of fire. This is the second death.” That this “second death” may have had power upon some, seems implied in ver. 6. The resurrection which precedes it may be an after instalment of another “order” or company of the dead, not particularly named in 1 Cor. xv. And that some may suffer the “second death” seems also implied in ch. ii. 11: “He that overcometh shall not be hurt of the second death.”

And the failure to name the secondary “order” of those raised up, agrees well with what I regard as the scope of the chapter. This was to comfort the doubts of the Corinthian Christians respecting their deceased brethren, and to meet certain difficulties respecting the possibility or the nature of a resurrection. In this view the closing argument of the chapter is plain enough, without supposing any allusion to the ungodly. As the immortal life was to be in a spiritual body, Paul might speak to those who professed to be spiritual, and with reference to such only. “He that soweth to the spirit shall of the spirit reap life everlasting.” “To be spiritually minded is life and peace.” But the early Christians seem to have regarded the ungodly as having a soul without the spiritual nature, a view which agrees with the proper sense of Jude ver. 19: “Soulual (or psychical, psuchiko), not having spirit.” And Paul draws his glorious argument to its close, not with any raptures in behalf of all mankind, but using such narrow pronouns as might make the glories of this resurrection the special privilege of those that “by patient continuance in well doing seek for glory and honor and immortality” (or incorruption, the aphtharsia, of vs. 42, 50, 53, 54). He says: “We shall not all sleep, but we shall all be changed” (ver. 51). “Thanks be to God which giveth us the victory through our Lord Jesus Christ. Therefore, my beloved brethren, be ye steadfast, unmovable, always abounding in the work of the Lord; forasmuch as ye know that your labor is not in vain in the Lord” (vs. 57, 58). And he next speaks about a “collection for the saints.” (xvi. 1.)*

Rom. v. 18: “Therefore, as by the offence of one judgment came upon all men to condemnation, even so by the righteousness of one the free gift came upon all men unto justification of life.”

It is in this one verse of the whole passage (vs. 12–21) that the word “all” is used in the second member of the comparison. And it is used with the word “men.” This apparently denotes all mankind, and their salvation. It seems to me the strongest passage that is or can be adduced in support of that view. And if this interpretation at all agreed with the general tone of scriptural language, if it were not an apparent exception from the usual style of the Bible, I should joyfully and without hesitation accept it as proving the final holiness and blessedness of all.

But the very frequent distinction made between the “saved” and the “lost” compels me to hesitate and examine the passage more narrowly. And I can not rest so fond a hope upon it for the following reasons:—

1. The passage is indisputably valid against all theories of a

* I should here say that while I regard the resurrection as yet future, I do not regard it as bringing back the identical dying body. “That which thou sowest, thou sowest not that body that shall be.” The immortal life is in a “spiritual body;” not pure spirit, but an embodiment suited to the higher nature of spirit (pneuma) as compared with soul (psuche). Of the interval between death and the resurrection the Scriptures say little. The early Christians spoke of it as a “detention.”
limited atonement. And even more; it seems to assert that in Christ's name the sentence of death for sin is annulled in behalf of all. "God was in Christ reconciling the world unto himself, not imputing their trespasses unto them" (2 Cor. v. 19). In this view the relation of persons unconverted to God is this: they have not to ask for the pardon of past sins, so much as to accept the pardon already made out. But this is all I can prove from the passage in hand. Comparing it with passages parallel, I at once find a plain distinction between pardon granted, and pardon accepted and received. In ch. i. 16, I read of the gospel as "the power of God unto salvation to every one that believeth," Jew or Greek. In ch. iii. 22, I read of God's righteousness, or plan of justification, which is "by faith of Jesus Christ, unto all, and upon all them that believe," Jew or Gentile. Here the distinction seems to be fairly made by two prepositions, "unto" (eis), and "upon" (epi). In the passage in hand the first of these only is used. The phrase might therefore be rendered, "by the righteousness of one the free gift came unto (eis) all men, unto justification of life." In this view all men are virtually justified or pardoned, though by unbelief they may not be actually saved.

But it will be said the same preposition is used in the first clause, "upon (or unto, eis) all men to condemnation;" and if all actually die, why are not all actually saved? I answer, the sentence of physical death, even, is only virtual, not actual against all. Enoch and Elijah did not die. And Paul believed and taught that a whole generation of Christians would never die, but be "changed," at Christ's coming. All these are born mortal as others; the sentence was "upon" or against (eis) them, but it fails to reach them. So there may be those within the range and reach of the great salvation, who yet fail of it.

2. In ver. 17, it is said, "they which receive abundance of grace, etc., shall reign in life." But the word rendered "receive" (lambanontes) is slightly ambiguous. It may also mean *accept* or *embrace*. It is often used in the active sense, as well as in the passive sense. Its original sense is *to take*, and it is used in the common phrase "respect of persons" or *acceptance* of persons. It is also the root of the word used 1 Tim. vi. 12, 10, "lay hold on (epilabou) eternal life."

3. In vs. 14, 15, 16, 19, the distinction is made, not between "all" as dead and alive again, but between "many" and "many." The main argument may then rest on the comparison of the children of Adam with the children of God in Christ, which agrees so well with the general tenor of Scripture, and with which the 18th verse, as above explained, does not at all conflict.

4. The whole passage shows that what is gained in Christ has once been lost. This is something more than bodily immortality. It is salvation, in the broadest sense of the word. And the "free gift" or gratuity is said to superabound, or to cover more space than the condemnation could, not because it gives more than was lost, but because one divine act of justification avails against "many offences." Thus salvation is exceedingly gratuitous.

But it inevitably follows that the salvation has been once forfeit. In other words, eternal death was not an unjust sentence to be pronounced upon sin; and Adam might have perished, and the whole race in and with him, without wrong to man. The passage confirms what I have before remarked,—that annihilation has been invited and confronted. That God interposes to save is doubtless in keeping with His nature as Love. We may even say that in saving man God is simply just to Himself. But to man he is more than just. It is strictly true: "By grace are ye saved, through faith; and that not of yourselves, it is the gr(11ity of of God." "The wages of sin is death; but the amnesty of God is eternal life, through Jesus Christ our Lord."

I dismiss this passage by remarking that Tholuck, a learned Restorationist, of whom hereafter, in his Commentary on the Epistle, finds no proof here of the final salvation of all.

There are several other passages on which Universalists more or less rely, all of which I have not time to examine. Of the whole class given at the close of my "general tenor of
Scriptural language,” I will say that while they show a final universality of holiness and blessedness, or an end of evil, and are thus valid against the orthodox view, very few can even be offered as applying to all individual beings now living. And one or two might be applied to all brute creatures, as well as to all human beings (Rev. v. 18). I may hereafter consider such as my affable opponent shall offer. But I will here say a word respecting two or three.

Acts xxiv. 15: “And have hope toward God, which they themselves also allow, that there shall be a resurrection of the dead, both of the just and unjust.”

The word “hope” here used is frequently insisted on as showing that the resurrection of “the unjust” is a blessing, a resurrection of salvation. But I think this does not follow for three reasons:

1. It was natural that Paul, quoting that Jewish faith which he accepted, should name the whole of it; and that he should name it as his hope, if it were on the whole desirable. Now Christ very strongly asserted some sort of twofold resurrection,—of well doers to life, and of evil doers to condemnation. Does the latter sound like a thing desirable? No more so than a thousand calamitous events that have actually occurred. I should never have hoped for the Lisbon earthquake. Yet it did happen, and the existence of all Portugal was desirable nevertheless. So the complex resurrection Christ named was desirable; and no less to be hoped for was that which Paul named, though it were the same; especially if it ends in an immortality of goodness, and a universality of righteousness.

2. The Scriptures elsewhere speak of things partly good and partly evil as matter of thanks. There is an apparent instance in Rom. vi. 17: “God be thanked, that ye were the servants of sin; but ye have obeyed from the heart that form of doctrine which was delivered you.” A plainer example occurs in the 136th Psalm: “Oh, give thanks...to him that smote Egypt in their first-born;...and slew famous kings; for his mercy endureth for ever.” Such thanksgiving seems at least as misanthropic as Paul’s “hope” in question. Yet the whole Psalm means doubtless well enough. But

3. The resurrection of the unjust, though it be unto condemnation, and to the “second death,” yet may not be for that purpose, as if God were vindictive, or as if the claim of his law for so much penal suffering were inexorable. The Orthodox, regarding annihilation as better than the lost deserve, sometimes represent it as a “coup de grâce” to end their woes. Not thus do I “hope” for it. But if their resurrection be itself the overflowing of the fountain of life, if they who “will not come to Christ that they may have life” do yet in spite of themselves get more than they wish, so that they die by instalments and even die hard, I can rejoice in all the preternatural life they have. In all God’s realm no vitality is wholly lost that is lived, though it come to an end. So I can very comfortably “hope” as I think Paul did.

1 Tim. iv. 10: “The living God, who is the Savior of all men, specially of those that believe.”

It is noticeable that the only instance in which God is said in so many words to be “the Savior of all” is with such an immediate qualification. I simply remark: 1. In the Universalist view, of the final faith and salvation of all, the more natural phraseology would have been, “especially when they believe.” 2. This is one of the few instances in which God is called a Savior, rather than Christ. The word (Sōtēr) has in the classic Greek the more general sense also of Preserver, which it may have here, in obvious harmony with the specification named. 3. Waiving this, the distinction between salvation in the reach of all, and salvation “laid hold on” by all, will allow the especial deliverance here indicated.

§ 7. The Two Theodores. Change for Authorities.

In the late discussion between my opponent and the Rev. Dr. Adams, the concession of the Rev. Theodore Parker that the Scriptures teach the doctrine of eternal punishment was adduced, against which was offset the Rev. Theodore Clapp’s recantation of that view after an independent examination. In a grave question of this kind no one should, or honestly can, rest his belief on any other man’s opinion. Neither Dr. A.
nor Rev. Mr. C. wished the names they respectively gave to turn the scales of judgment in any man's mind. That would not be a Protestant wish. Yet both those names were properly offered, because men must respect the honest opinions of learned and thinking men. They have their weight, their importance, and their office, to command attention, and invite people to ponder a subject for themselves.

Partly for this purpose I shall offer a few names from my corner of the triangle, in my next chapter. But I may here offer one or two names in the question between my respected friends, which may command the attention of them both. And it is especially proper for me thus to offer names to gentlemen both right and both wrong in my opinion.

The first name is that of Augustus Tholuck. A few of your readers may need to be informed that he is the man who has done more than any other in Germany to secure a hearty love of the Scriptures, opposing at once the rationalism and the dead orthodoxy which are their equal foes. He is master of more languages than almost any other living man, especially of those which contribute to a right understanding of the inspired Word. Nor is he a mere bookworm, with more of uncommon than of common sense. He spreads a large part of his time in walks and entertaining conversations with students in the University, and in visits and varied correspondence. He is one of the most eloquent pulpit orators of Germany. He is an admirable teacher and lecturer, fresh and suggestive, with none of the pedantry or false profundity of German scholarship.

He has written commentaries on the Gospel of John, the Epistles to the Romans and to the Hebrews, the Sermon on the Mount, and the Psalms. Most of these have been republished in English translations. Dr. Schaff tells us: "As a theological writer, Tholuck has devoted his best hours to biblical exegesis. Here he has achieved his most enduring merits."

Now Tholuck is both orthodox and Universalist. He was one of those who in the World's Evangelical Alliance opposed the article on future punishment. His attitude on this subject is indicated by the following conversation between him and Dr. Sears of this country, held in London some years since. I take the account from Prof. Crosby's "Appeal to the American Tract Society," pp. 49, 50.

"Tholuck. I suppose my American brethren would consider me orthodox in general, except in my Universalism.

"S. Where did you find this doctrine—in the Bible, or in your philosophy?

"T. In both.

"S. What are the passages of Scripture on which you principally rely?

"T. My main passage is 1 Cor. xv. 28. . . . Also Rom. xi. 36. . . . Another passage is Phil. ii. 10. [His argument may be considered in the sequel.]

"S. Do you find no passages of Scripture which positively assert the everlasting punishment of the wicked?

"T. Yes: Matt. xxv. 46, and others like it.

"S. Can those passages which you think favor Universalism be understood in any other sense without violating the fundamental laws of interpretation?

"T. Yes, they can, but the construction would not be so easy and natural.

"S. Can the other passages, which speak of endless punishment, possibly bear any other construction?

"T. I do not see how they can.

"S. Well, what are you going to do with them?

"T. That is my only difficulty." . . .

The remainder of the conversation I can not quote. But it sustains the following statement by Tholuck, made in 1837, of what he had said in 1834: "Dogmatically, i.e. as a theologian, I feel myself drawn toward this opinion [the Universalist]; but exegetically, i.e. as an interpreter, I do not know how to justify it." (Selections from German Literature, by Edwards and Park, p. 215.)

I will close with a passage from one of the best biblical scholars in this country, Dr. G. R. Noyes, Professor in Cambridge Divinity School. He is a Restorationist. In his review of Maurice's "Theological Essays," (Christian Examiner,
March, 1855, pp. 294, 295,) he says: "Even in the writings of Paul, who is very strong in denouncing punishment against the wicked, there are passages in which he speaks of the purposes of God, and of the riches of his grace, in such a manner as to make it difficult to believe that he contemplated the strictly eternal punishment of all who die in sin. We refer to the manner in which he speaks of the salvation of all Israel in Romans xi., and the putting down of all enemies to the kingdom of Christ in 1 Corinthians xv. 25-28. We can not, indeed, find an express declaration in the Scriptures of the final salvation of all men. Enemies may be put under one's feet by confinement in a place of punishment, as well as by being converted into friends. But the spirit of these passages, which makes so much to depend on the means which the wisdom and mercy of God have, as it were, in reserve, is not very favorable to the doctrine of the endless misery of all who are leaving the world with a sinful character, or who have left it since the creation of man. The thought of Paul logically carried out leads to a very different conclusion, and awakens the most cheering hopes." He adds in a note: "The impartial and sharp-sighted De Wette finds still more actually expressed in 1 Cor. xv. 28, than we can."

This passage is very good argument against the orthodox view. But the words I have italicized would reduce the Universalist view very nearly to an arcana. These words are the more noteworthy as the writer was in so close neighborhood to verse 22, which Universalists regard as so fully stating their view. But in the view that all who live for ever will be holy we find a restitution of all things, and a universal dominion of Christ; and "the thought of Paul logically carried out" may prove no more than this.

CHAPTER IV.

THE HISTORICAL ARGUMENT.

In the words and by the work of Christ "Life and Immortality were brought to light." But that light, either for its original obscurity, or by its passage through the clouds and shadows of eighteen centuries, has come to have three widely different interpretations, of which one only can be true. How shall we select this and correct the errors of the remaining two?

Besides the examination of the Scriptures themselves, another method is perfectly legitimate. We may also inquire, What light was needed when Christ came? What light seemed to be immediately contributed by his coming? or, How did the early Christians understand his words? And again: What effect had philosophy when afterwards added to the gospel? In reply to these questions I propose to show —

1. That Christ came at a time of general despondency and despair respecting all future life.

2. That the early Christians understood his words as assuring immortal life to be received by faith in him.

3. That the subsequently added doctrine of the soul's proper immortality was the common occasion, first of the orthodox and then of the restorationist view.

§ 1. There was deplorable need of light on the subject of immortality when Christ came.

Because man was made for immortality, there had ever been, both among Jews and Gentiles, many thoughts about it. There could have been no welcome of the coming light if there had been no thoughts — even anxious thoughts — on the subject. But notwithstanding the natural thinking respecting
a future life, and even the strong desire for it, the opinions of men just before Christ came indicate a growing, often an utter, despair. Among the Hebrews, it has been questioned whether the Scriptures taught, or were designed to teach, any thing clear on the subject. Certain it is, that the Sadducees, denying all resurrection and spiritual existence, formed a most respectable party among the Jews, being sometimes represented in the Sanhedrim and in the priesthood. They to whom were intrusted the oracles of God, in which some "thought they had eternal life" (John v. 29), were in need of light.

Much more the Gentiles. If among the Jews, by various culture and intercourse with other peoples and influence from their opinions, there had been progress in the doctrine of an after life, on the other hand there was among the Greeks and the Romans a great and manifest decline of faith. The immortality of the soul was as old as Homer. It was older. Herodotus said that the Egyptians were "the first of mankind who defended the immortality of the soul." But the Hindoos, probably, had it quite as old, and the Persians not much younger. Yet, in the very form in which it was held by the Hindoos, and afterwards by the Pythagoreans and the Platonists, we discover the need of a revelation, and some cause of the doubts that followed. The Bhagavad Gita, which contained the essence of the Brahminical philosophy, asserted that the soul is not only immortal, but eternal. This was the doctrine of Pherencydes, the Assyrian, the hearing of which converted Pythagoras from a wrestler into a philosopher.

I need not follow the Greek philosophy on this subject through its forms and changes. The decline of faith which I assert is apparent in Socrates' time. He calls the soul's immortality an "old doctrine, long ago shadowed forth by the founders of the mysteries," and appeals to antiquity in support of his own view of the spiritual, undying nature of the soul, against the scepticism of his age. "Can the soul," he asks, "which goes to the presence of a good and wise God (whither, if God will, my soul will shortly go)—can this soul of ours, when separated from the body, be immediately dispersed and destroyed, as most men assert?" Aristotle, it is now generally conceded, neither taught nor held an after life, but the opposite. The famous argument of Cicero, who so greatly admired Plato, does not even pretend to prove the doctrine in question, as its very name imports ("De Contemnenda Morte," on the Contempt of Death). He labors to show that death is not an evil, because, if it is an eternal sleep, we shall not suffer during its continuance. This explains the passage in which his pupil wishes that, if the birds of prey should come for his body, he might have a stick to drive them away. And all are familiar with the expression about the Phaedo of Plato: "I have read it, over and over again; but, I know not why it is, while I read I give my assurance; but when I have laid the book down and begin to think on the subject myself, all that persuasion glides away." And this is said by one who "would rather err with Plato than think the truth with those contemptible philosophers" who denied a future life. And the familiar letters of Cicero, in which he would most naturally express his real sentiments, show no hope beyond the grave. To one friend he says: "Even we who are happy should despise death, since we shall have no sense nor feeling beyond it." And Seneca, whose "Moraes" are thought by modern pantheists about as good as those of the Bible, writes to one bereaved: "Death is the release and end of all pain, beyond which our evils do not pass. It restores us to the same tranquillity in which we were before our birth." And in one of his poems he says:

"Chaos and hungry Time devour us all.
Inevitable Death the body kills,
Nor spares the soul."

* Mr. Landis (Immortality of the Soul, p. 98, note) claims Aristotle as holding immortality; taking no notice, however, of my quotation from Ritter and my citation of Pomponatus and Mosheim to the contrary. (Debt and Grace, p. 275, note.) Even Cudworth says: "It must needs be left doubtful whether he acknowledged any thing incorporeal and immortal at all in us." (Intell. System, I. 97, Harrison's ed.) See, also, Wm. Archer Butler, History of Ancient Philosophy, II. 426-429.
Epictetus is another moralist of that age for whom some would dispense with the gospel light. "Whither do you go?" he asks. "Nowhere to your hurt; you return from whence you came,—to a friendly consociation with your kindred elements. What there was of the nature of fire in your composition returns to the element of fire; what there was of earth, to earth; what of air, to air; and of water, to water." And the elder Pliny: "The vanity of man, and his insatiable longing after existence, have led him to dream of a life after death. A being full of contradictions, he is the most wretched of creatures, since the other creatures have no wants transcending the bounds of their nature. Man is full of desires and wants that reach to infinity, and can never be satisfied. His nature is a lie,—uniting the greatest poverty with the greatest pride. Among these so great evils, the best thing God has bestowed on man is the power of taking his own life."

Such were the doubts and despair of men, waiting in the gloom of the shadow of death for the true life and light. And when the Life-giver came, how natural, if all mankind were the appointed subjects of immortal life, that this should appear in the ordinary speech of him who "had the words of eternal life." How strange that he and the apostles who heralded all through the Roman Empire what they called a gospel, should only speak of a certain "aonian" life, and even of that ambiguous duration as if it were the prerogative of a special class, to be had by striving for it; leaving the great and long-debated question of immortality in such obscurity as it was before. Truly, if man is at all immortal, his immortality was not then at all brought to light. It was not revealed in that phrase, "the resurrection, both of the just and of the unjust;" for this was a tenet of the Pharisees, to which Paul made appeal on a certain occasion of self-defence. If this was the revelation, it came not so much from Christ as by those of whom he said, Beware! For the doubts which Christ found prevailing, there were, as I have intimated, various causes. The philosophers had tried to prove too much; not only that all souls are immortal, but that the soul is eternal. And the new revelations on the subject would have to encounter men's philosophy. How natural, if man has immortality in any form, that he who contributed the great light on the subject should have somehow recognized the essential fact; so that one thing at least should be settled.

Does the objector anticipate the varying opinions of the second century, and say that nothing was settled by Christ's revelation? I answer, one thing was settled, so as to be never since disputed as a Christian truth. And that is, Whoever shall have Life,—whatever the word means,—has it through Christ; and by Faith,—whatever that word means,—does he accept and receive the life.

If this is a Universalist formula, I yield the argument. Whether any thing else was settled on the side of universal immortality, we are next to examine.

§ 2. As the early Christians were not "orthodox," so they were not Universalists.

An orthodox writer, in a late work, says "it is to be lamented that they [the apostolical Fathers] either wrote very little, or else their writings have, for the most part, perished." (Hovey, State of the Impenitent Dead, p. 131). I think I have elsewhere shown that there is reason for such regret as respects the orthodox argument; or that the early Christian writings do not support that view, but rather the view I offer. I will now cite a few expressions to show that they were not Universalists.

The so-called apostolical Fathers were Barnabas, Clement of Rome, Ignatius, Polycarp, and Hermas. The epistle ascribed to Barnabas is probably not genuine, though of a very early date. The writings now extant under the other names are partly genuine and partly spurious. I will quote from the former, making allusion to the latter only as indicating the sentiment of the age in which they were written.

Bunsen assigns the so-called epistle of Barnabas to the reign of Domitian, in the first century. The phrase "eternal death," not occurring in the Scriptures, is here found, in the following
passage: “The way of darkness is crooked and full of cursing (or, wholly accursed). For it is the way of eternal death, with punishment; in which they that walk meet those things that destroy their own souls” (c. 20).

The whole expression, “eternal death, with punishment,” which some might take as supporting the orthodox view, seems to be otherwise explained by the following expressions in the Homilies ascribed to Clement: “They wholly perish after punishment” (Hom. iii. c. 59). “By the greatest punishment they shall be utterly extinguished,” (Hom. vii. c. 7. See also Hom. xvi. c. 10.)

In the same chapter of the epistle it is said: “He that chooses the other part shall be destroyed, together with his works. For this cause there shall be both a resurrection and a retribution.” Again: “They that put their trust in him shall live for ever” (eis ton aióna, c. 8). “Who is there that would live for ever? (eis ton aióna;) let him hear the voice of thy Son” (c. 9).

The phrase eis ton aióna is rendered in the Latin in aeternum and in perpetuum, by Cotelerius. It was undoubtedly used by the early Christians to denote an eternal duration, and we shall therefore accept the common rendering, “for ever.”

One epistle of Clement to the Corinthians was publicly used in many of the churches. Mosheim and Neander think it interpolated in some passages; yet Bunsen regards it as of great importance, “historically, constitutionally, and doctrinally.”

The author, speaking of the “condemnation to come,” asks, “What world shall receive any of those who run away from Him?” (c. 28.) Again: “Wherefore we being the portion of the Holy One, let us do all those things that pertain unto holiness” (c. 30). “How blessed and wonderful, beloved, are the gifts of God! life in immortality! brightness in righteousness! truth in full assurance! faith in confidence! temperance in holiness!” (c. 35.) “By him would God have us taste the knowledge of immortality” (c. 36).

Of the eight epistles ascribed to Ignatius, three are deemed genuine. The following expressions fairly indicate his views:

“Be vigilant, as God’s athlete. The need is incorruptibility, and life eternal” (Polycarp, c. 2). “Those that corrupt families by adultery shall not inherit the kingdom of God” (Ephesians, c. 16). “For this cause the Lord suffered the ointment to be poured upon his head, that he might breathe immortality into his church” (Ib. c. 17). “I seek the bread of God which is the body of Christ; and his blood, which is love incorruptible and perpetual life” (Romans c. 7).

The views of Polycarp appear in the following passages of his epistle to the Philippians: “To whom [Christ] all things are made subject, both that are in heaven, and that are in earth; whom every living creature shall worship; who shall come to be the judge of the quick and dead; whose blood God shall require of them that believe not in him. But he that raised up Christ from the dead, shall also raise us up in like manner, if we do his will and walk according to his commandments, and love those things which he loved” (c. 2). “Whom if we please in this present world (aión), we shall also be made partakers of that which is to come; according as he has promised us, that he will raise us from the dead; and that if we shall walk worthy of him, we shall also reign together with him, if we believe. . . . And neither fornicators, nor effeminate, nor abusers of themselves with mankind, shall inherit the kingdom of God; nor they who do such things as are unbecoming” (c. 5). The Lord “grant you a lot and portion among his saints; and us with you, and to all that are under the heavens who shall believe in our Lord Jesus Christ, and in his Father who raised him from the dead” (c. 12). This epistle was read in some of the churches as late as Jerome’s time.

The “Shepherd” of Hermas has already cited for the phrase “to live unto God.” I will here add the following expressions: “They who are of this kind shall prevail against all impiety, and continue unto life eternal. Happy are they that do righteousness; they shall not perish for ever” (Vision ii. 3). “Fear God and thou shalt live; and whosoever shall fear him, and keep his commands, their life is with the Lord; [they
shall live for ever. *Dressel;* but they who keep them not, there is no life in them,” (Command vii.) “They that are subject unto evil desires shall die for ever” (Command xii. 2). “The trees which are green and righteous shall possess the world to come. . . . The wicked, like the trees which thou sawest dry, shall as such be found dry and without fruit in that other world. And like dry wood they shall be burned.” (Similitude iv.) “They who have known the Lord, and have seen his wonderful works, if they shall live wickedly, shall be doubly punished, and shall die for ever” (Similitude ix. 18).

I might cite another document belonging to this age, a part of the so-called “Apostolical Constitutions,” which Bunsen calls the “Church and House Book,” as further showing that there were as yet no traces or indications of Universalist faith. But I do not know that I need have cited a single word. I do not know that any Universalist expressions or writers are claimed before Clement of Alexandria, about A.D. 200, with one exception to be noticed presently. I find some traces of such views also in Athenagoras, who preceded Clement by a few years, and will grant him to the Universalists, though they have not claimed him.

Here, then, we come to a very critical question:—

§ 3. Whence did Universalist views take their rise?

And I propose to show that not the Scriptures alone, but Platonic additions to scriptural doctrine, were the occasion, first of Orthodoxy, and then of Universalism.

The orthodox view requires three conditions: a doctrine of indefeasible immortality; a doctrine of salvation conditioned within certain limits of time; and such fiery heat as shall fuse these together into the faith of men. They can never be first combined in calm deliberation, however coldly they may be received as a tradition.

The conditions I have named were brought together in Rome, about the year 138. The bloody hand of the imperial power was invoked to revenge the lust of a heathen husband upon a Christian wife. Her teacher in the faith of Christ is accused, and martyred. Two other persons, remonstrating against such flagrant wrong, are devoted to death.

The fierce fire of such persecution offered to combine the requisite doctrinal elements, and the materials were not wanting. Justin, surnamed “the Philosopher” and afterwards “Martyr,” was a recent convert from Platonism to Christianity. Of a warm and generous nature, he was moved to address to the emperor his first “Apology” or defence of the proscribed faith. That Apology I believe to be the oldest “orthodox” book. Now Justin brought, along with the name of Philosopher, much Platonic faith. He claimed for many doctrines of Philosophy and Christianity a common origin in an original revelation. The philosophers, he thought, had borrowed some things from the Hebrew prophets. And though he does not speak in distinct terms of the soul as immortal, there is very little in this book to indicate any opinion that the soul can die, but much to suggest the contrary.

On the other side, there is nothing in his book or in our history thus far, to indicate any opinion among the Christians of the final salvation of all. He regarded man as on probation during life, awaiting a judgment after the resurrection. “Plato,” he says, “held that the wicked will stand before Minos and Rhadamanthus, to be punished by them. We hold the same event, but before Christ as judge; that they may be punished in their reecided souls, not a thousand years, as Plato said, but eternally. If any one thinks this incredible or impossible, the error is of little account so long as we are not convicted of any evil conduct” (c. 8).

This is very mildly said, and with a protest of the paramount importance of practice over belief. The severe faith, however, was a burden to Justin’s own mind. Yet the opinion being once expressed, in an hour of darkness and in a book of philosophy to make it respectable, was able to hold its way in the church.

Justin, I said, does not put the soul’s immortality into a formula. He uses one expression in this very book which
might indicate an acquaintance with another view. "We have learned," he says, "that they only are made immortal who live piously and virtuously before God." (c. 21). Other passages will hardly allow this to be strictly taken. But as I have shown this to be the prevailing faith until his time, I may here add a very important fact confirmatory of my history.

One of the earliest questions in Christian philosophy, was that respecting the nature of the soul. Is it naturally mortal, or immortal? All the gentle philosophers who had at all asserted a future life,—excepting a few of the Stoic school,—and all the native pride of man, had said, "immortal." But the Christians said otherwise. And their almost uniform view on this question of nature is the more remarkable, because it is given by those who differed most widely in the question of fact, whether the soul would die. The following quotations will show their opinion:

Tatian, a disciple of Justin Martyr, says: "The soul is not in its own nature immortal, O Greeks! but mortal. Yet it is able not to die. For it does die, and is dissolved with the body, if ignorant of the truth; but it rises again with the body at the end of the world, receiving death in immortality for its punishment.* Whereas the soul that receives the knowledge of God, though dissolved for a time, does not die." (Oratio ad Graecos, c. 13.)

Theophilus of Antioch, who also belonged to the school of Justin, says: "Some one will ask, Was Adam by nature mortal? By no means. Immortal? Not thus, either. What then—nothing at all? I answer, neither mortal nor immortal; for if the Creator had made him from the first immortal, he would have made him a god. If mortal, then God would appear as the author of death. He made him, then, capable

* Prof. Hovey (p. 140) speaks of Tatian as teaching "the final extinction of the wicked." That the above expression gives his real view—of temporary extinction followed by eternal suffering—is believed by Morell, Duceaus, Oporinus, Teller, Dodwell, Daniel, and Redepningen, cited by Otto in his edition. The notion of a temporary extinction was the heresy of the sect of Arabians.

of becoming either; so that by keeping the command of God he might attain immortality as his reward, and become a god. But if he should turn to mortal things, and disobey God, he would be himself the author of his own death. For God made man free and with power of self-control" (Ad Autolycum, l. 2, c. 37). He elsewhere calls man mesos, "intermediate." He seems to have held the orthodox view.

Lactantius, "the Christian Cicero," (about A.D. 300,) was doubtless orthodox. But he says: "There would be no difference between the just and the unjust, if every man that is born were made immortal. Immortality, therefore, is not a law of our own nature, but the wages and reward of virtue... For this reason God seeks to be worshipped by man as Father, that he may attain virtue and wisdom, which alone impart immortality." (Instl. Div. l. 7, c. 5.)

These expressions of three different writers, and the last remark cited from Justin, are obviously inconsistent with their doctrine of immortal misery. And I have sometimes queried whether this apparent inconsistency might not be due in part to corruptions of the text. Indeed, Cotelerius, the editor of the apostolic Fathers, including the Clementine Homilies, remarks on those passages that plainly teach the immortality of the righteous only, that they disagree with other passages asserting the eternal suffering of the wicked, so that "the Pseudo-Clement must have written inconsistently, or must have been here interpolated." I find but one passage in the Homilies plainly asserting immortal woe; hence I should suspect the interpolation to be not "here" but there. But waiving this question of genuineness to the profounder critics, I proceed with my citations.

Augustine, the great light of orthodoxy, applies the same view to man's bodily nature: "Before man's sin the body might be called mortal in one respect and immortal in another; that is, mortal because it was capable of dying; immortal because it was able not to die." (De Genesi ad literam, l. 6, c. 25.) His view of the soul's immortality is Platonie enough,
and his arguments for it are worthy of the Schoolmen and of Samuel Drew.

And Justin Martyr himself, in his later work, the Dialogue with the Jew Trypho, says: "I neither regard Plato nor Pythagoras, nor any of their way of thinking. . . . The soul either has life in itself, or it receives it from something else. . . . But the soul partakes of life, because God wills it to live; and just so too it will no longer partake of life, whenever He does not desire it to live. For it can not live of itself, as God does. But as the personal man does not always exist, and body and soul are not ever conjoined; but, whenever this harmony must be dissolved, the soul leaves the body and the man is no more; so likewise whenever it is necessary that the soul should no longer be, the vital spirit leaves it, and the soul is no more, but itself returns again thither whence it was taken." (c. 4.) He never spoke of the soul as absolutely immortal, and in one or two expressions of this dialogue, he distinctly withholds such an adjective. *

The settled opinion of Athanasius, the "Father of Orthodoxy," on the main question, I think can not be proven. On the question of man's nature, he says: "God desired man to continue in incorruption. But man, neglecting and departing from the knowledge of God, and devising and regarding that which was evil, incurred the threatened condemnation of death. . . . By transgression they reverted to their native condition; so that, as from non-existence they began to be, they must now in due time suffer the loss and destruction of their being. . . . For man is by nature mortal, seeing he was created from non-being. Yet, as made in the likeness of the true Being, to be preserved by the knowledge of him, he might have escaped the force of corruption and remained immortal." (De Incarnacione Verbi, c. 4.)

In the fifth century, Nemesis, a Neoplatonist, became a Christian and bishop of Emesa. He is a Restorationist. But he says: "Since the soul is not yet known in its essence, it is not suitable to determine respecting its energy. The Hebrews say that originally man was made evidently neither mortal nor immortal, but on the confines of either nature; so that, if he should yield to the bodily affections, he would share also the changes of the body; but if he should prefer the nobler affections of the soul, he should be deemed worthy of immortality." (De Naturâ Hominis, c. 1.)

I would call special attention to this passage, both as testimony of Hebrew doctrine needing special explanation in the New Testament if it was not to be strictly taken, and also as coming from a Restorationist.

Nicholas of Methone, of the twelfth century, is regarded by Neander as the most learned theologian of his age. He says: "It is not every soul that neither perishes nor dies, but only the rational, truly spiritual, and divine soul, which is made perfect through virtue by participating in the grace of God." (See Hagenbach, History of Doctrines, § 174.) I do not know his opinion on the main question.

Deferring the opinions of Irenaeus and of Arnobius for a moment, I come back to Athenagoras, the first of the post-apostolic Fathers who does not recognize the intermediate nature of man. We know little of his history, but we are told he was a catechist at Alexandria, before Clement. In the strength of his expressions, though not in their frequency, he

* Professor Hovey, in his "State of the Impotent Dead," quoting a passage from Justin's Exhortation to the Greeks, says: "Mr. Hudson refers to the above, in proof, it would seem, of the following statement: 'In the same treatise he names as truths held in common, by the philosophers and the Christians, the doctrines of the divine origin of the world and creation of man, of the soul's immortality, and of judgment after this life.'" (P. 137.) Again he remarks: "'In the system of Athenagoras,' says Mr. Hudson, 'the immortality of the soul is certainly of nature.'" (P. 139.)
makes very free of immortality, and he presses his argument for the resurrection as completing the being of man whose soul is immortal. The body, he says, was made originally immortal, yet continuing by the sole will of the Creator. But man has an unchangeable continuance with respect to the soul. (De Resur. Mort. c. 16.) I can not give all my reasons for calling him a Restorationist. Some of his expressions might be taken as orthodox. Professor Hovey claims him as such. But he cites no expression strong enough, I think, to overrule the general tenor of his doctrine of man, and especially his argument that as man is an end in and to himself, no reason can ever occur why he should cease to be. (c. 12.) No orthodox view of the economy of eternal woe is at all admissible by the side of this statement. It is all that any Universalist can ask, unqualified as it is left. Hence I conclude that if Athenagoras was not consciously a Restorationist, he at least laid broad the foundations for the restorationism of the Alexandrian School.

I have spoken of a claim made by Universalists that there was restorationism before the time of Clement. This is done by Dr. Ballou, in the Expositor, May, 1884, p. 189, where he cites a passage in the second book of the Sibylline Oracles, of which, however, he makes little account. Dr. B. relies upon the date which had been usually assigned to this work; namely, the middle of the second century. But the critical labors of Friedlieb, who has edited the work, give the following results: Of the twelve books of these Oracles, the oldest was written about the year 160 before Christ; the latest towards the year 300 of the Christian era. The second is assigned to the beginning of the third century. Alexandre, another editor, agrees with Friedlieb in the main. My information is derived from a very able article on the subject in the Methodist Quarterly, 1855, pp. 510, 512.

The restorationism of Clement is not very explicit, though indubitable. He does not call the soul immortal, perhaps because this was a Gnostic style of speech, of which the Christians were somewhat shy. In one instance he speaks of the soul as saved, by present grief, from "eternal death;" but he uses the word "eternal" much as Maurice takes it,—as referring, not to duration, but to kind; death in sin and ignorance. He held all punishment to be chastening and reformatory, and speaks of a certain "discreet fire," or ignis sapiens, in a style suggesting the notion of purgatory, which was now taking its rise.

I need not tell my Universalist friends that Origen, "the Adamantine," was one of themselves. And I freely concede he was as adamantine for his virtues as for the power of his learning. I only ask that some regard should be had to all his opinions bearing on the question in hand. Neander speaks of him as attaching great importance to the natural immortality of the soul, as related to God. He is well known also to have held its preëxistence. He made much of the doctrine of free will, supposing that not only the lost, including Satan, might be saved, but that the saved might be lost again; in other words, he made evil an eternal vicissitude. A passage cited by Tholuck on Rom. v. 18, confirms the common belief that he regarded the doctrine of universal salvation as an anacanum, not to be generally published. And a passage in what may be called his Confession of Faith is remarkable for two reasons: it is the first in which the nature and destiny of the soul are told in extra-scriptural language; and it is hypothetically orthodox. He says: "Now that the soul hath its own substance and life, it shall receive according to its merits when it departs from this world; to possess eternal life and blessedness, if its deeds have secured this inheritance, or to be given over to eternal fire and punishments, if the guilt of its sins shall bring it to this doom." (De Principiiis, Praef. apud Rufinum.)

Of his allegorical method of interpretation I shall say nothing. He thought and spoke very much as I might have done, holding in one hand the doctrine of an indefeasible immortality, and in the other a Bible very infallibly true, and as of very elastic interpretation.

Origen lived about A.D. 225. His Universalism, with all its modifications, was obviously a late and incomplete development of the doctrine if true. I think the history shows what I proposed,—that it was due more to Platonic philosophy than
to exegesis; or to the doctrine of the soul’s immortality superadded to the Scriptures.

I need not trace its history further. Some of my orthodox friends may need to know that more than half the Fathers of the Eastern Church were Restorationists; and Gieseler tells us that “the belief in the unalienable power of amendment in all intelligent beings, and in the limited duration of future punishment, was so general even in the West, and among the opponents of Origen, that it seemed entirely independent of his system, to which, doubtless, its origin must be traced.” I need only show, in conclusion, that besides the orthodox opposition, two strong protests were made from the position I hold; one during the process of the change, and the other at a later date.

Irenæus, bishop of Lyons, was a disciple of Polycarp, who had personally known the beloved disciple, John. He suffered martyrdom in A.D. 202. His principal work is a refutation of existing heresies, principally the Gnostic; and with Gnostic views the soul’s strict immortality is associated in his book. Of his general merits of character the Restorationist Eusebius shall be our witness. Irenæus says: The Scripture “saith of the salvation of man, ‘He asked of thee life, and thou gavest him length of days for ever and ever;’” the Father of all making a grant of continuance for ever and ever to those who are saved. For life is not of ourselves, nor of our own nature, but a gift of God’s favor. And therefore he who preserves the grant of life, and renders thanks to Him who bestows it, shall receive length of days for ever and ever. But he who rejects it, and proves unthankful to his Maker for creating him, and will not know Him who bestows it, deprives himself of the gift of duration to all eternity. And therefore the Lord speaks thus to such ungrateful persons: ‘If you have not been faithful in that which is least, who will commit much unto you?’—signifying that they who are unthankful to Him for this short temporal life, which is His gift, shall justly fail to receive from Him length of days for ever and ever. . . . Souls therefore receive their life and their perpetual duration as a donative from God, continuing in being from non-existence because God wills them to exist and to subsist. For the will of God should have rule and lordship in all things; all else should yield and be subservient thereto. And of the creation and duration of the soul let so much be said.” (Adv. Haér. I. 2, c. 34, §§ 3, 4.)

The second protestant was Arnobius, A.D. 303. He had been a rhetorician of Sicca, in Numidia, and so bitterly opposed to the Christian faith that the sincerity of his conversion was

* Prof. Hovey (p. 141) raises a doubt whether Irenæus really held the opinion for which this passage is offered, and cites two authorities. I have not in my book ignored this doubt. But I have found the same doubt respecting Arnobius by one of his editors, which is as plausible as if he had said that daylight is green. I have found one editor of Irenæus remarking that such a passage favors “the error of Arnobius.” Cote- rius also, encountering the same “error” in the Clementines, says it is best explained by the passages in Justin, Irenæus, and Arnobius. And I have met a very intelligent member of the Catholic clergy who remarked that Irenæus had been criticized for the view. I may at some time present more fully the expressions of Irenæus and the opinions of the critics. Of the two writers referred to by Prof. H., one takes no notice of § 3, above quoted; and the other — and he not alone — takes the significant expressions in the entire passage as meaning “eternal happiness,” but without argument.

Prof. H. closes his “survey” with the following italicized statement: “The records of the primitive church, prior to A.D. 200, afford no evidence that a belief in the endless existence of the soul was brought over from pagan philosophy into the creed of the church.” In his “survey” he ignores the entire history of opinion respecting man’s intermediate nature, which Athenagoras alone did not hold. He ignores the suspicions of Justin’s orthodoxy. He regards Tatian, whom nobody wants, as the first and only amnificationist; though I must think his orthodox expression even without note or comment stronger than that of Athenagoras, which he quotes. And he says nothing of the third century, in which was ripened the seed sown in the second.

Here I am tempted to add a word from Hagenbach, who, after stating the opinions of the soul’s intermediate nature in the second century, says: “On the contrary, Tertullian and Origen, whose views differed on other subjects, agreed in this one point, that they, in accordance with their peculiar notions concerning the nature of the soul, looked upon immortality as essential to it.” (Hist. of Doctrines, § 58.) Tertullian was the great defender of the orthodox view, as Origen was distinguished for the restorationist view.
at first doubted. He therefore prepared his book, which ended the doubt. Neander says: "His work does not show the novice, who was a catechumen, but a man already mature in his convictions, if he was not orthodox according to the views of the church." The same historian speaks of the "free, independent manner in which he seems to have come to Christianity, through the reading of the New Testament, especially the Gospels."

Arnobius argues very fully the intermediate nature of man. His rhetoric is strong, but he shows a warm heart. He says: "Souls were formed not far from the yawning jaws of death, yet such that they might become long-lived by the gift and beneficence of the Sovereign Ruler, if they but endeavor and strive to know Him. For the knowledge of Him is, as it were, the leaven of life, preservative against dissolution." (Adv. Gentes, l. 2, c. 32.) "Wherefore we should not be deceived or deluded with vain hopes, by that which a new class of men, elated with an extravagant opinion of themselves, tell us: that souls are immortal, next in rank of dignity to the Supreme God, derived from him as Creator and Father, divine, wise, inspired with knowledge, and free from stain of gross matter." (l. 2, cc. 14, 15.) "This we do hold and know; on this one clear and manifest truth do we take our stand, — that all the gifts of God are for the benefit and happiness of all; most full of delight, love, joy, and gladness; yielding pleasures incorruptible and ever-during; freely offered to the wishes and earnest efforts of all; and to be excluded from them is destruction and death." (l. 2, c. 55.)

CHAPTER V.

DOES THE DOCTRINE OF THE IMMORTALITY OF A CLASS ACCORD WITH A JUST PHILOSOPHY AND WITH THE SENTIMENTS OF HUMANITY?

The present and concluding chapter of my prolonged argument must be somewhat miscellaneous. I must touch briefly the supposed metaphysical proofs of man’s immortality; a theological argument, or the doctrine of salvation; the supposed reformatory design of all punishment; and the questions, What is benevolent to man? and, What is worthy of God?

§ 1. The Ontological Proof of a Future Life.

The metaphysical argument for the soul’s immortality is the lineal descendant of the Grecian philosophy, particularly the Platonic; though it is older than Grecian thought, as appears from Cicero’s statements and from some of the Hindoo books. It is found most at length and in the most scholastic form in the early Christian literature, in Augustine. In modern times it is considerably broken down under the subtleties which the schoolmen have heaped upon it, and generally abandoned as unsatisfactory. Yet there is a very frequent presumption that the Scriptures teach or imply it, and that, therefore, we do well to prop it up, for the benefit of sceptics, by the support of pure reason.

The commonest rational argument is based on the immaterial nature of the soul. It is un compounded — not made up of parts, and so can not fall in pieces. Or, it is a spiritual substance, suffering no change or decay from physical causes and agencies. And, in obscure agreement with the latter view, it is often remarked that moral causes can not change or affect the substance or being of the soul.
I grant the immaterial nature of the soul; for I do not make the mind out of the brain, however dependent it may be, in the present economy, on cerebral action; rather, I regard the brain and all organism as produced by vital forces. And all life, animal and vegetable, as well as spiritual, seems a higher sort of life than the mechanical or chemical properties of atoms, or even the so-called imponderable agents — heat, light, and the electric, magnetic, and galvanic currents. When we have passed these limits, we find ourselves in a world of myriad forms of life, some of which trench very close upon the human, so that the higher examples of brute life compete with the lower examples of human life, and even bear away the palm. For dignity of nature, perhaps Bucephalus was as worthy of a city for a monument, and as worthy of immortality, as a good many men have been. The rational distinction between the human soul and the brute soul is not very well settled yet; and the fact reflects no great credit on our sagacity, or boasted superiority. And in the question of moral capacity, some dogs seem to have as tender a conscience as some men ever had.

I say these things, not to jostle the human race into rank with the brutes, — for I am as proud as any one of my humanity, though sometimes very much ashamed of it, — but to raise the question whether differences of character may not be even more important than differences of race, in this question of the immortality of souls, whereof the Scriptures say naught. Many good men — Duns Scotus, Ramsay, Dean, Wesley, Clarke, Tennyson, Theodore Parker, Agassiz — have held or allowed the immortality of brutes; and Bishop Butler and Isaac Taylor have remarked that the metaphysical arguments for our immortality are about as good for the immortal life of our four-footed and our footless neighbors. There is something in them besides atomic pieces of matter. And that something else, it seems to me, may be vital, spiritual substance — a great deal more manifold in its kind than atoms are, of which we have found about seventy sorts — gold, silver, copper, nickel, and so on down. There is a common notion that all spiritual substance is homogeneous; whence it is inferred that God and we are made of the same stuff. So the Platonists believed, with inevitable consistency, that the soul is immortal because eternal and divine. I reject the conclusion, because I deny the premise; and I reject the premise, also, because I deny the conclusion. And if we once admit that spiritual substance is heterogeneous, we may, perhaps we must, allow that no kind of created spirit is absolutely imperishable; and the greater frailty of one kind may denote at least a measure of frailty in another kind. In God we live, and move, and have our being — not in ourselves. And whether we shall live in Him and with Him eternally, may depend on our observance of the precept, “Be strong; quit you like men.”

If I am asked how the soul, as a spiritual substance, can perish from being, I will reply by asking how it comes into being. Or, rather,—not to debate the question whether it is created or propagated,—does the soul grow? and if so, how? Is the substance of the infant soul as entire and complete as that of the matured and full-grown intellect, master of a hundred arts and sciences? Is the quantity of being the same in the one case as in the other? I do not ask if the one weighs as many ounces or measures as many inches; but is there, for substance and amount, as much soul in the one case as in the other? If so, then are all souls equal in quantity of being? and if thus equal, whence the manifest and striking differences in their original and native power and capacity? If the brain and the material organism make all these differences, then do disembodied souls retain any of these differences, or any differences of constitutional habit or quality, intellectual or moral? If two souls in very different bodies should make an exchange, would they at once exchange characters? and if not, why? Again, if there is acquired power or habit of the soul, is that a development of what was in the soul at the outset, or is it something superadded to its nature or being?

I ask these questions for information. I can not answer them myself. And until they are answered, I think we should not hold with any dogmatism, that idea of the soul which makes it a pure entelechy — a logical entity or substance, imperishable as
truth itself, and which must be precisely similar in all individuals. But if there are real differences in human souls, and real processes of growth, however unlike the growths of matter, then all argument for its proper immortality is at an end. Aside from revelation, we might suppose that the soul has a certain and fixed period of growth, maturity, and decay; a period much longer, possibly, than the three thousand years of the cedar, yet strictly a period beyond which it could not live. And with the revelation, I find nothing to oppose this view: viz., that even without a natural and necessary period of life, the soul may suffer in its very being by all that wars against its well-being. The disregarded laws of its life may become the laws of its death. If it may thrive, it may languish; if it may wax stronger, it may grow weaker; if it may become more, it may become less. If the true, the beautiful, and the good are for "the soul's health," the false, the gross, and the evil may give it ill health. If purity may adorn it, vice may contaminate it. If virtue and love may give it power, sin may give it disease. Sin is the transgression of law; and if the 'wages of sin is death,' that death may be something more than a metaphor, and the disease which causes it may be mortal disease—a sin unto death. I have already remarked that death "in trespasses and sins" probably signifies a sentence of death yet future. And I find nothing in the proper nature of the soul to rescue it from the analogies which make disease the symptom of decay and the pathway of death.

Here I meet the objection that moral causes do not directly produce physical effects. But I am not so sure of this. The indirect physical effects of moral causes are legion. The world is full of the produce of mind. We can not glance amiss to see what thought has done. But by what intermediate stages has all the work of the human race grown out of its mind? It has not been by magic, as if we had the lamp of Aladdin; nor has it been done by Leibnitz's rule of pre-established harmony, which grew out of the notion that spiritual forces could not be harnessed to work in matter. Pyramids, temples, cities, steamships, and railroads have not sprung into existence because men have dreamed or wished them, nor merely because men thought them out. They are the product of thought applied; and applied with many zealous passions of the human soul, and with much labor of brain and muscle, with sweat and toil. At every inch of surface the spiritual force has touched and shaped the material effect.

And has the spiritual force itself been unaffected, unchanged? Many a human body has been killed by a blow of joy or grief struck through the human soul. The pang was first felt within. The outward death came of the inward agony. There are, indeed, trials by which, "though the outward man perish, yet the inner man is renewed day by day." But this is because the soul is wrought into harmony with a higher nature, or is made more completely a "partaker of the divine nature;"—is regenerated of an "incorruptible seed, which liveth and abideth for ever." And by the same reason, if worse and baser passions sway the soul, they may bring it down toward a real death. The decay of the faculties by vicious habits of thoughts—the deterioration and mental and moral disease so often observed—who shall say, in the assumption of an unrevealed immortal nature, that these are not incipient stages of dissolution, in which, unarrested, the soul itself may become extinct?

The argument may be more plainly stated in its stronger form. The material produce of mind is the effect of an unlike cause. This is the marvel and the inscrutable mystery. But mind is like itself; and though the soul's substance is not itself thought, feeling, and purpose, yet it is far more like them than matter is. The soul's substance is the physical medium, as it were, by which thought, feeling, and purpose, have reached the outer world. The material produce is both unlike, and at second hand. So much the more may these spiritual agencies work changes in the being of spirit, as kindred substance, close at hand as substance to its attribute.

Another form of the metaphysical or psychological argument should be glanced at. I often hear persons say that they are conscious of immortality. Well, they have a higher power of consciousness than I have; yet I will confess no inferiority to
them. To be conscious of immortality is to be conscious of being alive to-morrow, and a billion years hence, and every moment between. My friends do not mean that. They simply mean that they are conscious of a longing and aspiration after immortality; and so am I. And this proves — indirectly, as we presume that God is too good to tantalize and trifle with us — that we were made for immortality. But then the argument comes to the same footing with other longings and aspirations, which are valid according as they are noble and good. It is strictly a moral argument; and its value is settled, I believe, by St. Paul, thus: "To those who by patient continuance in well-doing seek for glory and honor and immortality, eternal life."

§ 2. The Theology of Salvation.

In treating the question of universal salvation, we should inquire how the term salvation is used and applied in the Scriptures, and also what it implies. For it is an essential part of the doctrine of forgiveness, involving the question whether we are saved by justice or by grace.

The Greek word for salvation (σωτηρία, σωτήριον) and the corresponding verb (σωζω) are used in the New Testament, with apparent reference to a final destiny, one hundred times. I may overcount a little; but I may safely say that if the word does not refer to man's final destiny in most of these instances, it does in none of them, and it assures the eternal life of no man. It is also worthy of remark that in the Syriac version it is rendered life, and the giving of life.

And of the hundred instances all except twelve apply the salvation to a class of men. Some of them do so very strongly. Thus Luke xiii. 23, 24: "Are there few that be saved? . . . Strive to enter in at the straight gate; for many, I say unto you, will seek to enter in, and shall not be able." Phil. i. 28: "An evidence to them of perdition, but to you of salvation, and that of God." 2 Tim. ii. 10: "I endure all things for the elect's sakes, that they may also obtain the salvation which is in Christ Jesus with eternal glory."

Some of the instances not obviously partitive will be claimed by my opponent as implying a general salvation. Thus John iii. 17: "God sent not his Son into the world to condemn the world, but that the world through him might be saved." (Comp. ch. xiii. 47.) But here the previous verses make faith the condition of salvation, even while they commend the divine love: "God so loved the world, that whosoever believeth," etc. And "the world" may easily signify all nations as compared with the Jews, who were claiming a monopoly of salvation. Thus, in another of the passages my opponent may claim, Acts xiii. 46, 47: "Seeing ye . . . judge yourselves unworthy of everlasting life, lo, we turn to the Gentiles. For so hath the Lord commanded us, saying, I have set thee, to be a light of the Gentiles, that thou shouldest be for salvation to the ends of the earth." The passage in John iii. 17, seems to me no more to prove the salvation of every human individual than the expression in ver. 26, "all come to him," shows that every Jew was baptized of John. When the Pharisees said of Christ, "If we let him thus alone, all men will believe on him" (ch. xi. 48), and again, "Behold, the world is gone after him" (ch. xii. 19), we do not suppose they meant every individual human being; yet in the last expression they use the same word which Christ used (kosmos, the world). Christ's promise might be as large, even larger than the Pharisees' complaint, and yet there be many unbelieving, and unsaved.

And when Christ says "the Son of man is come to save that which was lost" (Matt. xvi. 11; Luke xix. 10), the context will show a comparison made between the self-righteous Jews and those whom they hated and despised as having no inheritance with Abraham. Christ came to call not the righteous, or self-righteous, but sinners, to repentance. The poor in spirit, and the meek and lowly, were the true Israel. The passage indicates the non-salvation of those who rested securely and proudly in carnal hopes, i.e., in their Jewish blood, as much as it indicates any thing.

So much for the extent of salvation as revealed in the Scriptures. And now for the nature of it. Universalists have well
and truly insisted that Christ came "to save his people from their sins;" that salvation from sinfulness is more important than salvation from punishment—for sin is worse than pain; and that the doctrine of salvation from punishment, aside from the other salvation, is very pernicious, though there is too much of it in the world.

Here I may suggest to my orthodox friends that the doctrine of endless and infinite pain as the result of sin naturally tends to the evil just named. The self-love of man is in advance of the moral sense. And when he is told that he is in danger of undying agony, we may say what we will about his deserving it, still he will care more for the danger than for the guilt. The "great salvation" he will think of as the deliverance from the infinite peril; the deliverance from sinful bondage will be comparatively a slight thing. And this will explain the crouching and cringing attitude of some professedly Christian minds before God, and the professed feeling of some—we trust unreal—that if annihilation were the end of sin, they would no longer fear God or serve him.

Here I also recognize the Universalist opinion of salvation from this and that sinful habit as a real doctrine of salvation, though not the whole doctrine nor the true doctrine. It seems to me a subordinate sense of the term; though I am very glad if any hate sin enough to prize such a salvation very highly, and I am sorry if any cannot get any sense or meaning from the idea.

Yet a great question remains respecting the doctrine of salvation. Are we saved by grace, or by justice? Is there strictly any remission of the penalty of sin, or is there none?

I know that the doctrine of remitted penalty is liable to abuse; that corrupt human nature is willing enough to sin and then try to get rid of punishment—and that does not speak well or honorably for human nature. And I thank Universalists and Unitarians for insisting, very correctly, that certain bad consequences of sin are always inevitable; that it brings a bad and unhealthy condition of the soul, which no forgiveness or act of pardon can remedy at once; that the laws of our moral constitution, like all the laws of nature, are so wisely appointed that even Sovereign grace still respects them; and so when we sin we must suffer.

But here we come at the gist of our question: If a bad condition of the soul, that is, sickness and disease, be the punishment of sin, how long must it last? what is its natural termination? and may recovery be retarded by unforgiveness, or hastened and even secured by a work of pardon?

And here I think I find the common objection to Universalism well founded; viz., that in respect to penalty it has no doctrine of salvation. One can not be saved from what he was never exposed to; nor can one be saved from what he actually suffers. The Universalist, denying both the orthodox and the destructionist view of penalty, finds no salvation in that direction. And the only penalty in which he does believe is always suffered in full tale. Thus, between what is unjust and what is inevitable, there is no salvation.

This result is expressly admitted by Dr. T. S. Smith, in his "Illustrations of the Divine Government." He says: "The advocates for the corrective nature of punishment do not believe that all men will be saved, but that, sinners having been reclaimed by the discipline through which they will be made to pass, all men will ultimately be rendered pure and happy." Again: "It is true, that all who suffer future punishment endure the penalty of the law, and therefore, in a popular sense, can not be said to be forgiven." (Part II. c. 3.)

The obvious conclusion is that we are saved not by grace, but by justice, if we are saved at all. Dr. S. endeavors to turn the edge of this objection by saying that penalty itself is merciful and gracious, of which hereafter. But regarding penalty in the light of justice, which Dr. S. himself must in some sense allow, I can offer no better comment than in the words of Dr. Bushnell:

"In the school of modern Unitarianism, it is held that God can not deliver us of the just penalty of our sins at all; that we must bear it in the full and exact measure of justice, and that our only hope is to wear a passage through and get our
That is, one is to be punished at a venture for sins that may never be committed! The only escape from this absurdity is in another; viz., that guilt is ill-deserving not intrinsically but only because penalty is annexed; or that the punishment constitutes the crime. This I have endeavored to deduce in treating the difficulties both of the orthodox and the Universalist views on this subject. (Debt and Grace, c. x. §§ 5, 6.)

We come round again to the question, Is the disease of sin in the soul healed by forgiveness? I think the affirmative answer avoids all the difficulties I have alluded to. But this supposes that the moral disease, unhealed, is mortal. For, if a personal immortality remains, that implies a continuance of all the faculties of personal and responsible being, including free agency, and involving the power of self-recovery; and then forgiveness is not needed. But if the disease is threatening, or if “the wages of sin is death,” then forgiveness as a healing grace and power is legitimate. There is then “remission of sins that are past,” for their penalty is revoked and their power is broken in the same work of the soul’s recovery. Justification—or pardon—and sanctification are not divorced, but become inseparable. Mercy and truth are met together. Grace—or gratuitous favor and amnesty—is no repeal of law, but its reënactment, in the returning strength and life of one who was sinking into the outlawry of death.

Here I may remark that all the scriptural language which represents sin as disease and our Savior as a Physician, is specially pertinent to this view. The governmental system of the Roman Empire has, I think, made our theology too forensic, and the Schoolmen have made it too dialectic. Has it not yet to become, as it were, more therapeutic? And when we make it such, shall we not “hold fast the form of sound words” and of “sound doctrine” (hēgiasones didaskalías, healthy instruction, 1 Tim. i. 10; vi. 3; 2 Tim. i. 13; iv. 3; Tit. i. 9, 13; ii. 1, 2)?

§ 3. The Nature and Design of Punishment.

A doctrine of punishment has extensively prevailed which is
much like this: that crime and sin are infringements of law, upon which the law, or the majesty of the law-power, requires penal retribution, for which the severe name is vengeance. The law, it is commonly said, has been violated, “broken.” And to “repair” this damage there is a demand for suffering, expiation, satisfaction.

The false element in this theory is indicated by the results to which it has been carried in views of the Atonement. The redemptive work of Christ has been regarded as a compensation, a payment of debt in the sinner’s behalf, valid upon the sinner’s acceptance of the substitute. That this idea does away with free grace on the part of God is confessed by one author who says: “Sure I am, that debt can never be forgiven which is paid.” The difficulties of the theory are also betrayed by the connected question respecting the extent of the Atonement.

The Universalist theory of punishment as solely corrective and reformatory seems to me an extreme reaction from the above view. It has been favored also by the modern reform in criminal codes and prison discipline, and by the discovery that a humane ministry of penalty may reform, where rigorous and unmixed punishment only hardens. This view, however, may easily be carried to an extreme and false result. The transgressor of law may be regarded as simply unfortunate, and not as guilty; that which he needs may exclude all notion of what he deserves; he may be treated not as deserving any penalty, but as having special claims and rights, and as deserving to be reformed.

We need some view of the subject which shall avoid each extreme. And such a view I think is suggested by the Economy of Pain. To what purpose are the pangs and sighs and woes of which the world is so full? Are they all purely vindictive? Or, are they all reformatory? Neither the one nor the other. But they grow out of a natural system of penalty, very wise and merciful, yet no less just, which is exemplified on a large scale in the nervous system. The design of the nerves of sensation, with their exquisite susceptibility of pain, is the protection of limb, life, and health. Take out the nerves from the body, and it might be maimed or destroyed without one’s knowing it. They are the eyes and ears of the system, protecting it by their constant watch and their thousand alarms. Frost and cold are so fearful because they hurt so little,—numbing and stealing away the senses, and taking the life unwarned. These troublesome nerves, with their magazine of pangs so like Pandora’s box of all human ills, are the outposts and sharp sentinels that warn us of danger. They are all designed for our good. I thank God, therefore, for all the ministries of Pain. We could not live without them; and many would live longer and better if they had more of them.

At the bottom of Pandora’s box, in the fable, was Hope. But do we find hope at the end of all human pains? I find this—that many men push against the terrible dangers of which their kind nerves admonish them, and make a complete sacrifice of health, or limb, or life. And this is done not by holy martyrs only, dying under some lower law, that they may live up to a Higher Law, but by men of the lowest aims, rushing upon ruin in defiance of all law. Men do this sometimes for lucre. They do it often for lust; gratifying their queasy or their vicious appetites, purposely “living fast” and slipping rapidly and painfully down into their graves. They do it to glut their revenge; pursuing a foe to the ends of the earth, willing enough to die when he is dead.

In all these cases the punishing nerves demand and receive their dues. But what is the result? They were all designed to reform and save. In the general economy, their pains were salutary and healing, but instead of that they have only killed. In short, they who disregard the lesson of penalty, perish under it, and with it. The pains are sharp and very torturing, because they were set to guard a precious treasure of life; and the beneficence which ordained their sharpness, holds out to the end, and lets them die out with the life. They are, like the gospel itself, a sweet savor—of life unto life, or of death unto death, according as they are used or disused. But the beneficence goes on no further than death. When the life is
thrown away, the slighted mercy is not bound to restore the rejected boon. Why should it?

An old writer has laid down the principle thus:—

“Omnès pœnas non exterminantes sunt reformantes.”

All punishments reform—when they do not exterminate. And our question now is,—Is this true of all kinds of penalty, or of the physical only?

I reply, the examples I have offered have all the force of the argument from analogy. And the argument is made very strong by the immense number of the instances, and by the fact that we observe no contrary instances. So far as I know, in every department of nature, persistent action against the laws of being tends to deteriorate the nature and destroy the being itself. Real law can never be “broken;” it vindicates itself as immutable and sovereign, by breaking and crushing all that will oppose it.

But strong as the argument from analogy is, and much as it seems like a reason and nature of things, I doubt whether we are left to it alone. There are some things in the action of Conscience that suggest the same law as applying to man’s moral nature. When its admonitions are disregarded, it becomes blunted. If one will do what he knows is wrong, his feelings of misgiving gradually die out; the twinges of conscience subside into a dull and dead pain; regret and remorse often give way to hard-hearted indifference; the distinctions of right and wrong are confused and obliterated. The talent disused wastes away. Capacity becomes incapacity. The whole doctrine of judicial blindness, which we discover in the Scriptures, may be a verification in the conscience of the rule: “He that hath, to him shall be given; and from him that hath not shall be taken that which he seemeth to have.”

* Dr. Bushnell gives, among his “Sermons for the New Life,” one on this passage which so far suggests the thought of annihilation that he considers the doctrine and gives his reasons for thinking that conclusion can not be reached. It should be compared with some expressions in his Discourse on “Endless Life.”

But the conscience is, as it were, the nervous system of the soul. If it is not its vital faculty,—the very life of the moral and spiritual being,—it is at least the regulative faculty. When it is dead, the feelings and will may get a little remaining control from obvious convenience, or from conventional usage, or from the force of old habit; but there is nothing else to save one from ruin and death. And these mechanical forces can not renew the spiritual life. That can come only from God; and by the supposition the holiness, the purity, the self-sacrificing love of God as exemplified in Christ, have been declined. The economy of grace and truth which gave man a conscience is not bound to reinstate and renew it when man has dethroned and stifled it. That may be a sin unto death. And the natural penalty of the soul’s death may be equally merciful and just.

Here, if I have named the true doctrine of natural punishment, I may suggest a view of artificial, or special and enacted penalty, for consideration. Is it not anticipative,—a hastening of painful results of transgression, to bring them into clearer view? a make-weight to get the warning of nature felt and heard? When the reformation of the individual is hopeless, the punishment is justified as protecting the society, and its measure to be determined by the wise discretion of the society. The natural law of punishment still remains, as a divine law; the final execution of which may be the “vengeance” ascribed to God (Rom. xii. 19).

§ 4. Is the Immortality of a Class unkind to Man?

Here I must meet a very common objection based on the parental feeling, and will close with one or two direct arguments:

1. It is not a hardship that one should fail to be a parent of immortality. Many persons, as deserving and as affectionate as the average, are never parents at all, and never will be unless there is marriage in the heavenly state. George Washington was the father of a country, but never of a child. It is not essential, then, to the blessedness of the saved, that they
should be able to claim certain ones as their offspring. You may say that childless saints will be strangers to certain feelings of celestial joy; perhaps they will; yet in the resources of the celestial kingdom they shall lack no supply for any noble and holy capacity of their being; the Lord is their Shepherd, they shall not want.

But to be childless, says one, is not so hard as bereavement, and loss of children. And here I encounter the whole force of the Universalist sentiment: A parent would not let a child suffer or die, if he could prevent it. If the heavenly Father, who loves us better than we love our children, allows suffering and death, it must be because he has something better in store to prove his love.

Such is the argument, offered to show that each human family must find all its members in the heavenly mansions. It seems to me inadequate, for the following reasons:—

1. Parental affection is commonly a modification of self-love. The child is a second self. That is why one cares more for his own child than for his neighbor’s. But one’s desire for a child’s immortality should be of as high a moral type as the desire for personal immortality. The promise is no less rigid to the child than to the parent; “To those who by patient continuance in well-doing seek for glory, honor, and immortality.” If then, the parental feeling, and I may add, the feelings that lead to parentage,—which, like other qualities, may be inherited,—if these are subordinate to the sentiment of piety, I do not know but one may have high hopes of reunion with the child. Something like this may be implied in 1 Cor. vii. 14. At least there is a “christian nurture” which may devote and train the child for the higher life from its earliest infancy.

But if the parental regard is worldly, and the child is from the first devoted to and trained for the world, one can not complain if it avails no further. And even if the parent shall rise to nobler aims, and shall deplore the fruits of past ungodliness, He who is “able of the stones to raise up children to Abraham” may grant other consolation than an unbroken family circle in the kingdom of eternal life. To be at all a parent of immortality is exalted honor. Is there unkindness if one is not more?

2. Although God is not bound, against the perversions of free will, to make each man’s existence on the whole a blessing, still as matter of fact those who finally perish may have much to be thankful for. Most human beings seem to enjoy more than they suffer. And this may be true even if existence is finally lost. It may be almost a law of life that the pains of its decay should not outweigh the joys it brings. It may still be true that the failure of immortal life shall make it morally better that one had never been born. And they who perish may feel this on the same principle that disappointed lovers so often think life a curse—only with a million-fold more reason.

I have used the phrase “parent of immortality,” but only for argument’s sake. The Scriptures, I think, teach a higher parentage than human, for the immortal life. They who have “power to become the sons of God,” are “born not of flesh, nor of blood, nor of the will of man, but of God.” God is the “Father of spirits,” and the distinction between soul and spirit may apply in this argument.

2. The power of evil habit and of memory may render immortality burdensome. The time has been when death was deemed an emancipation from all earthly habits and minor differences of character. The good, it was thought, would be perfectly blessed as soon as they were dead, and the bad perfectly wretched. And all the good and all the bad were respectively put on nearly the same level. In accordance with this philosophy, or lack of philosophy, some of the early Universalists regarded death as putting an end to all distinctions of character. Sin came of the body; and to be out of it was to be in holiness and in heaven.

Maturer thought has changed all that. The soul, we now think, has its own laws, as every other real thing must have; and all its changes and improvements must observe those laws. Death is no longer the panacea for all its ills. The other world may be very unlike the present; yet it may bear strong analo-
gies. Fatal as its atmosphere may be to those who have rejected its life, its gentle zephyrs may not at once heal all the soul's ills. Though God works miracles at sundry times in his teaching and training of the human race, we may doubt whether there are miracles in the general economy of man's destiny. The result is, we must have some apprehensions, lest the laws of our physical and moral being may, even beyond the tomb, make death better than life.

In bodily sickness death is often preferred to the pains and weariness of slow convalescence. Just so evil habits of thought, feeling, and action, may require so long and weary a purgation on the other side, and may put one so far behind his companions in the heavenly race, that he would prefer not to tax their kindness, or seek their company. One may be so imbittered by habits of unbelief that the capacity for faith in disinterested kindness shall be gone. Cunning philosophers have doubted every such thing here; — who shall say they may not doubt there? Unhappy personal relations may fatally threaten all future happiness. The seducer may prefer never to meet the victim, all whose hopes he has sacrificed for lust. The murderer may decline the courtesies of heaven with one for whom he could find no room on earth. And if, as some have thought, the memory retains all one's past history, how many may be, so burdened and stung with poignant recollections that even the freeness and largeness of divine mercy can not give them rest? I believe in God's infinite power. But infinite power can not work contradictions; and it will not disregard the laws of created being, or of man's moral nature. And if God should administer the cup of Lethe to any, and so destroy or change a part of their personal being, out of kindness, he may also, for aught we know, kindly let them die, and may fill his universal domain with those who have earlier and more fully consecrated themselves to goodness.

3. Many persons, not the worst of men, have no desire for immortality. This desire has been called natural and instinctive; and we hear of the inextinguishable love of being. But, granting that this is the rule, and that it proves the actual immortality of those who rightly cherish it, there are exceptions so marked as to claim attention, if not to limit the argument. And for examples I will not name those who have doubted immortality because they have never distinctly heard or thought of it, but those who have lived in the midst of the sentiment.

If I mistake not, Joseph Barker, well known as having renounced Christianity, eschews all faith in an after life, and, apparently, all desire therefor. I do not think him an immoral man, though he has shared as a "reprobate" in the honors of a book-dedication. I would not judge him, or say a word against him. I do not devote him to death. But I name him as one who has been an able preacher of the gospel; was specially likely to fall in love with immortality; and is too acute to be necessarily prejudiced against it by what others say or think about it. He now thinks this life and its comforts are as much as any of us ought to wish or care for. I am very sure if he should die out with the rest of us, he would be the last man to complain. And I verily believe if he should be called to die only with a few followers, he would not wish to be disappointed, but would bear his peculiar fate as proudly as a hero. I may be mistaken in my man; but are there not such?

A more noted example is David F. Strauss, the author of "The Life of Jesus," which has made such a stir with its mythical theory. His acquaintance with the doctrine of immortality is even larger than that of Barker; but he rejects it all. In his later work, entitled "Glaubenslehre," or the Doctrine of Faith, he concludes: "The idea of a future world is the last enemy which speculative criticism has to oppose, and, if possible, to overcome."

He, certainly, will not complain of death. I do not say how much such opinions may prove in the question of what will be; but in the present question we must consult the choice and preference of men as they are — especially if they be able men, who may speak for themselves. And upon their testimony I submit whether the doctrine I hold, which is infinitely better than their wishes, is at all unmerciful.
§ 5. Is the Selection of a Class to Immortality worthy of God?

I have freely admitted that God would not be just to himself if he were simply just to his creatures. True to his nature as love, he must bestow upon men more and better than they deserve. And because God is not only love, but infinite love, my opponent may think the conclusion direct and inevitable that God must bestow upon each moral creature the infinite boon of immortal life, for which his moral constitution adapts him.

From this conclusion I dissent, for several reasons.

1. All analogy favors the idea of a sitting of the human species, and a conservation of the best, of or of the individuals that mature. I have not time to array the facts in this analogy, but may refer to what I have said elsewhere on the subject, and quote as follows: "A true analogy would make the probation of mankind not an exception to the rule, but the highest example of it. The law of selection in the case of man is different; the end is the same. The vegetable lifeling is the sport of chance. The animal, with its spontaneity, can help and provide for itself—subject, however, to many dangers which it can not avert, and to man's dominion. Man, by his free will, is elevated to a higher rank—beyond the reach of fate, but not of hazard. Indeed, the nations of men that have not heard the Word of Life are scarcely beyond the reach of fate; though strictly, as moral beings, they are savable, and perish through unbelief in Him who is 'not far from every one of them.' Those who dwell in Christendom stand higher than they, and may fall further. Yet the design of the species is accomplished in those who are perfected, and who shall never perish, because moral perfectness is an end in itself, and when attained, may be ever maintained. Man, as a race, is still subject to the sitting analogies that underlie him. As free, he is called upon to choose for himself; to make his calling and election sure; to acquit himself as a man. Failing of this, he is rejected, or reprobate, as refuse and worthless. He is likened to tares; to the useless produce of the fisher's net; to the field of briers and stones, whose end is to be burned. Condemned as morally unworthy, his reprobation has a higher ethical significance, while its literal import remains." (Debt and Grace, pp. 239, 240.)

2. While God is bound, in justice or equity, not to make existence a curse, he is not bound to make it a blessing. That there is such an obligation is very strongly asserted by Mr. Ballou, in his "Divine Character Vindicated," where he thinks that "human existence, if enforced at all, should be, to each and every individual, when taken as a whole, a good, and not an evil—a blessing, and not a curse." (P. 122.)

This would be true if man had no moral freedom, and were not capable of deserving evil as well as good. But this fact seems to me entirely overlooked in Mr. B.'s statement. But if man may deserve evil at all, he may deserve evil on the whole; and though his continuance in a sinful and evil immortality would be past all reason, yet there may be the best reason for his failure of immortality. And one may so fail that his brief existence shall be a loss rather than a gain. We may well suppose that this was the case with Judas. "Woe unto him by whom the Son of man is betrayed. Better were it for that man if he had never been born."

But if the individual man may deserve a balance of finite evil, much more may he forfeit an infinite good. The infinite boon may be infinitely desirable; and because we would like to have it, we may persuade ourselves that we have some claim to it, or that it is not fairly withheld from us. But if bestowed, it is and ever will be an infinite gratuity.

3. In the economy of God's empire of holy blessedness, a comparative claim of one individual may be overruled by the higher claim of another. In point of right, I must yield to any one who can fill my place in the universe better than I can. Even in propriety and benevolence, I might wish to yield my place to such an one, for the general good. And if I have impaired my capacity of usefulness, it is not for me to say that infinite power, and wisdom, and goodness, too, can not replace me; especially if incapacity and deterioration have gone so far that the process of recovery may be slow and difficult.
4. Virtue is heroic. And it may be worthy of God to select, and to elect, those who are morally heroic, for the inheritance of immortality. The forms of heroism may be as various as the Christian virtues and graces; yet it may be one essential element of all Christian virtue. Self-sacrifice, self-denial, is essentially and peculiarly Christian. "If any man come to me, and hate not his father, and mother, and wife, and children, and brethren, and sisters,—yea, and his own life also, he can not be my disciple. And whosoever doth not bear his cross, and come after me, can not be my disciple." Though we may not take those words of Christ literally, they will contain the principle I have named. God has a right to be choice respecting the members of his family, and to require of those who aspire to that honor the most strenuous efforts to prove worthy of it. With all their differences, a close resemblance has been observed between the stoic and the Christian systems of morals. And the stoics held the immortality of a class. Christ, teaching a higher virtue, and offering a higher glory, may bestow such immortality by a higher right. The Christian race differs from the Grecian games, as it has more crowns than one; yet we must strive, if we would triumph. It is a true hymn that says:

"Awake my soul, stretch every nerve,
And press with vigor on;
A heavenly race demands thy zeal,
And an immortal crown.

"'Tis God's all-animating voice
That calls thee from on high;
'Tis his own hand presents the prize
To thine aspiring eye.

"A cloud of witnesses around
Hold thee in full survey;
Forget the steps already trod,
And onward urge thy way."

My argument has already been drawn out to greater length than was anticipated, either by my courteous opponent or my self. A few points that might be touched must be passed by. Certain elements of truth, on which my opponent may insist, I have not recognized as fully as I shall be happy to do, though I fail to carry them to his results. I do not offer my argument as perfect, or free from flaws. I never yet saw such an argument on a theme so extended and so complex. I shall be happy to see all my errors corrected, whether essential or trivial. Of their importance, the reader will judge. I have tried to make as few as possible; and if my humble effort shall help any one to think out for himself a solid, scriptural, and true opinion respecting our relations to the endless life, I shall not have written in vain. With sincere thanks to the editor and his readers for their liberal hearing of views from which they so much dissent, I bid you, for the present, farewell.
THE PARABLE OF THE RICH MAN AND LAZARUS.

DOES IT IMPLY ETERNAL FUTURE SUFFERING?

The well-known passage in Luke xvi: 19–31, has been recently cited to sustain the above named doctrine, in such a way as to justify some inquiry into its proper import. The reviewer of an argument on the final extinction of the wicked and the end of evil, granting that the passage is "a parable, and not real history," and that "the fire in which this rich man is tormented, with the other drapery of the parable, is symbolical," says; —

"It is conceded, once more, that this man is in Hades (νῦν Ὄξωμ), not in Gehenna (χώρα). The scene is laid before the final judgment, for his five brethren are yet living on earth. We are not certain, however, that our Lord meant to lay any stress on this distinction. It is very possible that he intended simply to represent the awful reverse in the condition of wicked men after death, taken as a whole. But if the distinction between Hades and Gehenna be insisted on, this only makes the representation tenfold more terrible. For the New Testament teaches, beyond the possibility of doubt, that the happiness of the righteous and the misery of the wicked are consummated, not in the intermediate state, but at the resurrection. It is when Christ comes to be glorified in his saints, that he also takes vengeance on them that know not God. If now this rich man, tormented in the flames of Hades, and asking in vain for a drop of water to cool his tongue, is yet waiting with horror for the day of Christ's vengeance, what must be that vengeance! Can it be the everlasting cessation of all suffering by annihilation? To believe such a contradiction is impossible.

"The reader is especially requested to notice the fact that in this para-
ble fire is employed, in entire accordance with Jewish usage, as the symbol of torment, not of destruction: 'I am tormented in this flame.' No intimation is given that in this torment there is any approach towards annihilation. On the contrary, his state of misery is regarded as fixed: 'Between us and you there is a great gulf fixed: so that they which would pass from hence to you, can not; neither can they pass to us, that would come from thence'—and there he is left. *

Most Christians in this country are so little acquainted with the distinction of Hades from Gehenna, that we are gratified with this clear statement of it by an eminent biblical scholar and teacher. It will be my aim to show that his concessions are warranted by the history of Christian doctrine, are important, and preclude the inference which he himself draws from the passage.

The argument will be, 1st, to show more at large that the passage in question is a parable; 2dly, to state some of the interpretations or applications of it; 3dly, to inquire what it implies respecting the present and future state of the dead.

I. That it was regarded as a parable by many of the Christian Fathers will be readily inferred from the applications which they made of it. And this opinion was so strong that in some manuscripts it came to be expressly called a parable. A manuscript of the seventh century prefaces it thus: "And he spake also another parable." Another of the tenth century reads: "The Lord spake this parable;" and with this agree some copies of the Gospels. The scholiast in a few later manuscripts says: "The scope of the passage respecting the rich man and Lazarus is a parable, and it was spoken parabolically, if indeed the evangelist did not prefix this title to the account." (See Tischendorf's N. T., 1859.)

Among modern writers we may cite as follows:—Lightfoot remarks: "Whoever believes this not to be a parable, but a true story, let him believe also those little friars, whose trade it is to show the monuments at Jerusalem to pilgrims, and point


exactly to the place where the house of the rich glutton stood. . . . That it was a parable, not only the consent of all expositors may assure us, but the thing itself speaks it" (Heb. and Talm. Exercit., in loco).

A similar account is found in the Talmud, which was a body of Jewish tradition. Lightfoot renders it as follows: "There was a good man and a wicked man that died. As for the good man he had no funeral rites solemnized; but the wicked man had. Afterward there was one saw in his dream, the good man walking in gardens, and led by pleasant springs; but the wicked man, with his tongue trickling, drop by drop, at the bank of a river, endeavoring to touch the water, but he could not." (Jerusalem Talmud, in Chagigah, fol. 77, col. 4.) With this compare the following, taken by Hammond from the Babylonian Talmud (ad cod. Berachoth): "A king made a great feast, and invited all the strangers; and there came one poor man, and stood at his gates, and said unto them, Give me one bit or portion; and they considered him not. And he said, My lord, the king, of all the great feast thou hast made, is it hard for thee to give me one bit or fragment, among them?" And the title of this passage there, is, "A parable of a king of flesh and blood." Whitby and others have referred to the last passage.

These extracts are important as showing that there were different versions of the account, and thus incidentally confirming its parabolic character. They also show that it did not originate with Christ,—the Nazarene whom the Jews devoted to the cross; for then they would never have received and incorporated it among their traditions. I infer that Christ found the parable already existing, and made his own use of it.

We conclude this point with the remark of Wakefield: "To them who regard the narration as a reality it must stand as an unanswerable argument for the purgatory of the Papists."

II. What is the interpretation or application of the parable? Whatever the passage may imply respecting the future destiny
of the individual soul, it can not be directly thus applied, for it would then cease to be a parable. As a parable it was designed to teach some other lesson; either of temporal judgment upon persons or nations, or — in a way not literally described — of reverse of earthly fortune after death.

Here I need not insist upon any of the various views that have been offered. In my own opinion there is a reference to the covetousness and pride rebuked in verses 14 and 15, and the parable is an admonition that the rich who now despise the poor will yet be glad of their pity. When this reverse of fortune will happen, — whether on this side of the grave or beyond it, — concerns the implications of the parable, of which hereafter.

But in its application no small range is allowed by the following rule of Moses Stuart: “Allegory differs from parable only in the style and mode of expression. Take an allegory and express it in the historic style, and you convert it into a parable. Hence the same rules of exegesis apply to both.” (Notes to Ernesti’s Principles of Interpretation, §160. Mr. S. refers to Beck, Keil, Seiler, Storr, and Lowth.)

Under this rule I may refer to other applications of the passage, if it were only to check the proneness of some minds to confine the parable to a general description of the future state.

Tertullian (A.D. 220) connects the passage with what is said of John the Baptist in verse 16, and of the nature of adultery in verse 18, and makes a special application of it to John and Herod Antipas (Matt. xiv. 1–10). The same view is taken by Schleiermacher. Tertullian, however, interprets the drapery of the parable quite literally, though he regards Abraham’s bosom and Hades not as final but as intermediate states. (Adv. Marcion. i. 4, c. 34.)

Another application of the parable is thus stated by Dr. Trench:

“It is worthy of notice that besides the literal and obvious, there has also ever been an allegorical interpretation of it, which, though at no time the dominant one in the Church, has frequently made itself heard, and which has been suggested by Augustine, by Gregory the Great, by Theophylact, and by more modern commentators than one. According to this the parable, like so many others exclusively given by St. Luke, sets forth the past and future relations of the Jew and Gentile. Dives is the Jew, or the Jewish nation, clothed in the purple of the king and the fine linen of the priest, the ‘kingdom of priests.’ He feasts sumptuously, — that is, the Jews are richly provided with all spiritual privileges, not hungering and thirsting after the righteousness of God, but full of their own righteousness; and who, instead of seeking to impart their own blessings to the Gentiles — to the miserable Lazarus that lay covered with sores at their gate — rather glorified themselves by comparison in their exclusive possession of the knowledge and favor of God. To them is announced — that is, to the Pharisees, who might be considered as the representatives of the nation, for in them all that was evil in the Jewish spirit was concentrated — that an end is approaching, nay, has come upon them already: Lazarus and Dives are both to die — the former state of things is to be utterly abolished. Lazarus is to be carried by angels into Abraham’s bosom — in other words, the believing Gentiles are to be brought by the messengers of the new covenant into the peace and consolations of the Gospel. But Dives is to be cast into hell, — the Jews are to forfeit all the privileges which they abused, and will find themselves in the most miserable condition, exiles from the presence of God, and with his wrath abiding upon them to the uttermost, so that they shall seek in vain for some, even the slightest, alleviation of their woful estate.” (Notes on the Parables, pp. 369, 370.)

Dr. T. thinks that “if the present had been expressly named a parable, it would tend to confirm this or some similar interpretation; for according to that commonly received it is certainly no parable.” This question he does not decide; but, after giving his exposition of the passage in its details, he concludes by repeating the allegorical interpretation more at large. (pp. 386–390.)

Without adopting or condemning any of the more specific applications, we repeat that it plainly teaches a divine providence and judgment. God may allow the bad to prosper, and the good to suffer, even until life is ended. But it shall not be so always. However unequal their lot may be in this life, we may still say of the righteous man, It shall be well with him,
and of the wicked, It shall be ill with him. Yet, in such an application of the parable, we need no more press the literal sense than we would assert the literal truth of the descriptions in Dante’s Divina Commedia, or in Milton’s Paradise Lost. For parables are poetic; and the truth of poetry consists in its accordance with just sentiment and principle, not in its detail of incidents.

We now pass from the practical to the doctrinal question.

III. What does the parable imply respecting the present and future state of the dead? That it implies something, is manifest; for such a parable could not have been made if there were no future state. If all men’s hopes and fears were buried in the grave, and if death were the end of all things, there would have been no material out of which to create such a description for any application whatever. We therefore freely say that the parable, whatever it may or may not teach, assumes and implies a judgment, or some kind of retribution, after death.

But what judgment? Here we meet the obvious and acknowledged fact that the rich man is said to be not in Gehenna, but in Hades. Hence the parable does not indicate the final condition of man, nor declare the final judgment. The statement that “a great gulf is fixed” fairly implies, indeed, that the case of the rich man is hopeless; but as it can not imply the perpetuity of Hades,—for that is elsewhere expressly said to be destroyed,—it can not teach the final condition, nor the immortality, of any occupant of Hades.

Unfortunately the distinction between Hades and Gehenna is not made in our English translation. But the words are very different in their origin and use. The latter is derived from the “valley of the son of Hinnom,” near Jerusalem; an execrated place, whither carcasses were carried, to be consumed by worms or by fires which were almost constantly fed. Hence the expression in Isa. lxvi. 24, respecting “the carcasses of the men that have transgressed” against the Lord;

“for their worm shall not die, neither shall their fire be quenched; and they shall be an abhorring unto all flesh.”

Here note that the same reasoning which deduces the immortality of the lost from Mark ix. 43-48, will also prove the immortality of “carcasses” from the passage in Isaiah. But the scriptural use of the term “unquenched” indicates a complete destruction of that upon which the fire is said to act. (See 2 Kings xxii. 17; Ps. cxviii. 12; Isa. i. 28, 31; Jer. iv. 4; xvii. 27; Ezek. xx. 47, 48; Amos v. 6; Matt. iii. 12; Luke iii. 17.)

The term Gehenna was used by the Jews, apparently to denote the final destiny of the lost. It occurs in Matt. v. 22, 29, 30; x. 28; xviii. 9; xxxiii. 15, 33; Mark ix. 43, 45, 47; Luke xii. 5; James iii. 6;—in books of the New Testament which would fall most directly into hands of Jewish readers. It is not used by Paul, Peter, or John. Two or three expressions seem to be equivalent, viz.: “furnace of fire,” (Matt. xiii. 42, 50); “lake of fire,” (Rev. xx. 10, 14, 15.) The connected expression in Matthew, “there shall be wailing and gnashing of teeth,” will hardly prove a continuous life in Gehenna; it may be explained by the passage in Ps. cxii. 10: “The wicked shall see, and shall be grieved; he shall gnash with his teeth, and melt away; the desire of the wicked shall perish.” The connected expression in Rev. xx. 10, “shall be tormented, day and night, for ever and ever,” should be compared with the previous verse; and it should be remembered that “the Beast and the False Prophet” are not persons but systems, and that the whole book is of a highly symbolical character. That the fire of Gehenna is a symbol not of mere torment, but of destruction, might be inferred from a manifold use of the term fire in the Scriptures, and from other Jewish writings. Thus the Targumist on Gen. iii. 24 speaks of Gehenna as “burning up the wicked,” and on Eccl. viii. 10: “They have gone to be consumed in Gehenna.” Hence it avails nothing for their immortality, if the “flame” of Hades
does not destroy them. He who is “a consuming fire” may frown more fiercely beyond the judgment—He who says of the contrite: “I will not contend for ever; neither will I be always wroth; for the spirit should fail before me, and the souls which I have made.” (Isa. lxxi. 16).

That Gehenna does not destroy is sometimes inferred from the different manner in which two evangelists report a question of the evil spirits: “Art thou come to destroy us?” (Mark i. 24 i) and, “Art thou come to torment us before the time?” (Matt. viii. 29.) But the argument proves nothing; for the first question may equally mean: “Art thou come to destroy us before the time?” Just as a prisoner awaiting execution may inquire of the officer: “Have you come to lead me to the gallows” i.e. before the time. (See also Eccl. vii. 16, 17.)

The other word, Hades, is used much more frequently, and in a more extended sense. It constantly occurs in the Septuagint as the Greek equivalent of the Hebrew Sheol. And Sheol appears as the common receptacle of the dead, without respect to character. The term is commonly rendered “hell,” but very improperly, as may appear by a few examples. Thus we read in Ps. xvi. 10, quoted in Acts ii. 27: “Thou wilt not leave my soul in hell” (Sheol). In Ps. xxxix. 8: “If I make my bed in hell (Sheol), thou art there.” In Amos ix. 2: “Though they dig into hell (Sheol), thence shall mine hand take them.” In Jonah ii. 2: “Out of the belly of hell (Sheol) cried I, and thou heardest my voice.” To avoid this incongruity our translators have sometimes employed another word; thus in Gen. xxxvii. 35: “I will go down to the grave (Sheol) unto my son mourning;” and ch. xlii. 38: “Then shall ye bring my gray hairs with sorrow to the grave” (Sheol). Compare 1 Sam. ii. 6; Job xiv. 13; xvii.13; Ps. vi. 5; xxx. 3; Eccl. ix. 10; Isa. xxxviii. 18; Hos. xiii. 14, cited in 1 Cor. xv. 55.

The general sense of Sheol is manifest from these passages. It means the state of death, or the abode of the dead. It is more than the grave, to which some would confine it; yet it is not the place of future punishment, though in a very few instances it is apparently synonymous with “death” as denoting punishment. Thus “the wicked shall be turned (back) into hell (Sheol), and all the nations that forget God” (Ps. ix. 17); “Let death seize upon them; and let them go down quick into hell” (Sheol, Ps. lv. 15).

The term Hades occurs in the N. T. in Matt. xi. 23; xvi. 18; Luke x. 15; xvi. 23; Acts ii. 17, 31; 1 Cor. xv. 55; Rev. i. 18; vi. 8; xx. 13, 14. In every instance except the passage in hand, the sense obviously agrees with that of Sheol in the O. T. It is equivalent to the term Death, that last enemy which is to be destroyed. The “gates of Hades” (Matt. xvi. 18) are the powers of Death; and they shall not prevail against the church of Christ. He has overcome and conquered, has taught the song of triumph over death (1 Cor. xv. 55), and the keys of Death and Hades are the symbol of his victory.

The distinction between Hades and Gehenna is observed in the early Syriac and Arabic versions, in most if not all the Latin translations, in the Geneva French, that of Diodati, the Spanish, and others. In the German of Luther the distinction is not observed. This reformer was led by doctrinal reasons to render Hades and Gehenna by the same word Helle, though this gives the Restorationist the advantage in 1 Cor. xv. 55: “O hell! where is thy victory?” Luther found the notion of Hades as an intermediate state perverted into the doctrine of Purgatory, and in opposing this he took away in his translation the material proof of the intermediate state itself, though he elsewhere confessed the doctrine. The effect is well stated by Stilling: “They [the reformers] extinguished the flames of Purgatory, and enlarged the bounds of Hell by adding Hades to it. No middle state or place was any longer believed in, but every departed soul entered immediately upon its place of destination, either heaven or hell. They carried this point too far. It was wrong to make a Purgatory of Hades; but it was also going
too far to do it away together with Purgatory.” (Pneumatology, pp. 10, 11.)

The distinction between Hades and Gehenna is ably shown by Dr. Campbell, in his Dissertations on the Gospels (Diss. vi., Part ii.). He would have the former term transferred to our Bible, and the latter translated as it now is. Besides many others, Dr. Trench has also stated the distinction, thus: “Abraham’s bosom is not heaven, though it will issue in heaven; so neither is Hades ‘hell,’ though to issue in it, when death and Hades shall be cast into the lake of fire, which is the proper hell (Rev. xx. 14).” (Notes on the Parables, p. 379.)

Passing from the verbal distinction to the doctrine of Hades, we remark that the present passage is the only one which seems to imply that it is a special place or state of punishment for the wicked. The rich man is there, and “in torments,” as if that were “his own place;” while Lazarus is carried to Abraham’s bosom as if that were his proper home. And this would be the just inference if the Scriptures told us nothing else of Hades. Even as it is, some have thought that the Gentile doctrine of Tartarus and Elysium, as different departments of Hades, had given a special coloring to this narrative; and this is probable. But to say more than this,—that Abraham’s bosom is heaven and that Hades is Gehenna,—would be wholly without warrant, opposed both to the current use of language, and to the opinions of Jews and early Christians. The Jews, regarding the resurrection as still future, did not conceive of the patriarchs as yet living. The God of the living was their God because they were to live, and thus Christ proved the expected resurrection. See Luke xx. 37, 38, and Acts ii. 29-34. “Thou shalt be rewarded at the resurrection of the just,” said Christ (Luke xiv. 14), in a passage not unlike our parable. The punishment of the wicked begins no sooner. And the early Christians very uniformly regarded Hades as a state of “detention” for all souls, excepting martyrs as perhaps worthy to enter heaven at once.

How, then, shall we explain the drapery which in Luke xvi.

is thrown around the intermediate state, making it so much like a world of retribution? I think there is an easy solution of this difficulty, without regard to the question of consciousness or unconsciousness in the disembodied soul. It is simply this: The final judgment is anticipated. This anticipation may be either actual, in the expectant thoughts and feelings of the rich man and Lazarus; or it may be dramatic, transferred to the dead from the thoughts of the living.

The former view is supported by Dr. Trench, who says: “To be in Abraham’s bosom was equivalent with them [the Jews] to being ‘in the garden of Eden,’ or ‘under the throne of glory,’ they being gathered into the general receptacle of happy but waiting souls. (See Wisdom iii. 1-3.) The expression already existing among them received here the sanction and seal of Christ, and has come thus to be accepted by the Church, which has understood by it in like manner the state of painless expectation, of blissful repose, which should intervene between the death of the faithful in Christ Jesus, and their perfect consummation and bliss at his coming in his glorious kingdom. It is the ‘Paradise’* of Luke xxiii. 43, the place of souls under the altar (Rev. vi. 9); it is, as some distinguish it, blessedness, but not glory.” (Pp. 376, 377.) He adds in a note: “Limbroch (Theol. Christ., l. 6, c. 10, § 8) has a striking passage, in which, starting from the Scriptural phrase of death as a sleep, he compares the intermediate state of the good to a sweet and joyful dream, while the wicked are as men afflicted with horrible and frightful dreams, each being to waken on the reality of the things of which he has been dreaming; in this agreeing with Tertullian, who calls that state a “prelibatio sententiae,” a foretaste of the judgment.

In support of the other view,—that the “torment” in Hades is a dramatic anticipation of the judgment, the thoughts of the living being transferred to the dead,—the passage above referred to might be cited, Wisdom iii. 1-4: “But the souls of

* This sense the term “Paradise” is very doubtful. See Chrysostom, “De Cruc. et Latoun;” In Genesis, 70; Sermon vii.; and H. L. Hastings, “For Ever with the Lord.”
plained dramatically, as the blood of Abel was said to cry from the ground for the vengeance of his murder. This view at least relieves the difficulty of supposing that the martyrs feel the impatience and unhappiness which might be indicated in verse 10.

But if Hades may be thus represented as a state of suffering, even for the heirs of life, how much more for the heirs of death! And this, either with or without reference to future actual suffering. Thus in Ezek. xxxii. 24, 25, 30, the enemies of Israel are spoken of as “enduring shame,” while they are described as “slain,” “fallen by the sword,” “gone down to Sheol,” or to “the pit,” and in their graves. And the word “shame” is rendered in the Septuagint by “torment.” And in Isa. xiv. 4–27, we have a picture of the occupants of Sheol as living and speaking, to welcome the fallen Babylon, along with various designations of Sheol as the home of the dead. “Sheol from beneath is moved for thee to meet thee at thy coming; it stirreth up the dead for thee, even all the chief ones of the earth; it hath raised up from their thrones all the kings of the nations. All they shall speak and say unto thee, Art thou also become weak as we? Art thou become like unto us? Thy pomp is brought down to the grave, and the noise of thy viols; the worm is spread under thee, and the worms cover thee.” “Thou shalt be brought down to Sheol, to the sides of the pit. They that see thee shall narrowly look upon thee, and consider thee, saying, Is this the man that made the earth to tremble, that did shake kingdoms?” “All the kings of the nations, even all of them, lie in glory, every one in his own house [or sepulchre, buried with honor]. But thou art cast out of thy grave like an abominable branch, and as the raiment of those that are slain, thrust through with a sword, that go down to the stones of the pit; as a carcass trodden under foot.”

Even in this picture there is no anticipation of future torment. There is no reference to a future and a divine judgment, but only a dramatic judgment of the dead, before a tribunal of
dead ones. And there would be no strain upon the language if we should interpret the parable of the rich man and Lazarus by the same dramatic method. The moral lesson which it was designed to convey, whether of personal warning or of a judgment upon the Jewish nation, would lose none of its force. In any case the picture of a final acceptance of the meek and lowly, and a final rejection of the luxurious, the selfish, and the proud, remains, and retains all its high and instructive colors.

But if any one thinks that the anticipation of judgment is more than dramatic, that here is an account of real thoughts and feelings, joy and anguish, before the resurrection, we are willing, for argument's sake, to admit this. Of the disembodied soul the Scriptures say very little. The chasm between death and the resurrection must indeed be bridged over by some principle of personal identity, so that in the future life we may still be our own selves, and not new beings. Yet the Scriptures reveal the chasm, and the brink beyond it, more than the connecting bridge. While I shall not affirm the absolute unconsciousness of the dead, I can not, on the other hand, discover any proof of high happiness, or of extreme suffering, enjoyed or endured for five or six thousand years before the judgment. This view is specially unwarrantable if we refer the account in Matt. xxv. to the final judgment; where those judged appear uncertain whether they shall be accepted or rejected.

Yet I will admit, for argument's sake, that there is active life in Hades. I thus admit it, because I would fain examine each link of the chain by which the doctrine of eternal woe is thought to be connected with the parable. If I have shown that the premise — the supposed activity of the intermediate state — is untenable, I wish also to show that the conclusion commonly derived would not follow from it.

For we have only to suppose that the rich man feels in Hades what the reprobate often feel in this life, — gnawing remorse, and "a fearful looking for of judgment and fiery indignation, which shall devour the adversaries" (Heb. x. 27), — and his terror and torment will be amply accounted for. To say that the distinction between Hades and Gehenna "only makes the representation ten-fold more terrible," and to infer that final annihilation brings an incredible contradiction, — seems to me inconsiderate. By such reasoning I could show that capital punishment is not fatal because its pain and agony and shame give disquieting and tormenting anticipations. But capital punishment is fearful even without respect to the divine judgment which lies beyond it. Many a convict has committed suicide in prison, to avoid the disgrace of judicial execution. Such an one might say, consistently with the argument we examine, that the pain of dying ends in painlessness, and he has nothing more to fear. Yet the horror of such a death frightens him into suicide, and hurries him with the guilt of a fresh crime before the final Judge.

But really the argument in hand overlooks the agony in which the being of the soul may expire. The writer thinks of annihilation as of falling into sleep; he ignores the woes which may culminate in the second death. For as physical death is complex, — dying and being dead, — so we may presume that annihilation is complex, — the process, and the eternal night, the "blackness of darkness for ever," in which the process ends. This result, even without the dire process, is so appalling that many say they would prefer eternal pain.

"For who would lose,
Though full of pain, this intellectual being."

And, — if we must account for the pangs of Hades, — aside from the anticipated woes of expiration, we might speak of the woes of retrospect; — the harvest past, the summer ended, the soul unsaved; one's good things all enjoyed, and a poor and despised fellow creature now comforted with immortal hopes. How suitable to such a case the reflection of the Psalmist: "He shall gnash with his teeth, and melt away; the desire of the wicked shall perish!"

One expression of the writer we have cited is specially
worthy of notice. He says the rich man’s “state of misery is represented as fixed: ‘Between us and you there is a great gulf fixed: so that they which would pass from hence to you, can not; neither can they pass to us, that would come from thence’—and there he is left.”

The writer here forgets, for the moment, his own distinction between Hades and Gehenna. “Death and Hades are cast into the lake of fire. This is the second death. And whosoever was not found written in the book of life was cast into the lake of fire.” When it is shown that the rich man survives the agonies of this second death, and long subsists in an element best adumbrated by a “lake of fire,” then the immortality of “them that perish” may be argued. But until then we must respect those early Jewish expressions of which here is an example: “They shall die the second death, and shall not live in the world to come, saith the Lord.”

But there is another argument for such immortality, based on the justice and revealed fact of degrees in future punishment. There are, it is said, inequalities of misery during the intermediate state, — those who died earliest suffering longest, — and there are no degrees in annihilation. Hence future misery cannot end in annihilation.

For argument’s sake we admit the alleged differences of suffering before the judgment. But the conclusion will not follow. For, as already remarked, annihilation is complex; and in the process of the second death that divine justice which awards “many stripes” and “few stripes” “according to the things done in the body,” and which will never inflict or allow an undeserved stroke of penalty, may find as many degrees of suffering as there are degrees of human guilt. By a law of nature the inebriate and the profligate often die hard, suffering special pangs for special contempt of the laws of life and health. By analogous retributions of remorse and shame the guiltier soul may die with heavier woes.

But if it is said, again, that six thousand years and a very few hours of misery in Hades are too unequal to be balanced by any natural law of death in Gehenna, the inference of eternal woe is not justified even then. We can not infer the infinite from the vast. Even if immense differences of punishment should accrue, that does not prove that there is no limit of just suffering, or that God can not easily observe such limit in the suffering that remains. Justice is equity, — exactness in moral relations; and the justice of the Infinite One is infinite equity and exactness. And He who counts the hairs of every head, and with whom a day and a thousand years are equally regarded, may note the expiring sentence of each culprit with scrupulous exactness, if need be, forgetting him into nothingness when a human judge would have forgotten him altogether. If degrees of suffering are at all worth looking after when the loss of an infinite boon has been incurred, we need not fear that the wisdom of the Eternal will be perplexed in such matters. And it is specially futile to suppose that inequalities of temporary suffering are to be corrected by differences of eternal anguish. It may seem convenient to leap from a supposed immensity, to infinity; but those who reason thus only rush from apparent finite difficulties — which can be no difficulties at all with God — into a confessedly appalling doctrine of endless and infinite guilt, suffering, and evil, as a dire necessity from which Omnipotence may not escape!

The reader will remember that we do not admit as fact several thousand years of suffering before the judgment, for the sins of life; — we simply wish to try the argument for eternal woe. But if any one shall still say, Six thousand years is so long! and if a single soul lives and suffers during that period, why not for ever? — we will ask the astronomer to enlarge our conceptions a little, and let any one say how much the argument is worth.

To find the distance of an object that can not be reached, we move a certain distance to the right or left, and observe the difference in the direction of the object. The desired distance is then found by a simple calculation. And the difference or change in the direction of the object is called a parallax.
Now most of the visible stars are so distant that when the earth has moved nearly 200,000,000 miles, they still appear in precisely the same direction. The nicest observations detect no change, or parallax. Yet all these stars are comparatively very near to us. If they were the smallest assignable fraction of an infinite distance away from us, they would be beyond the reach of vision, out of sight ten thousand times over. And if we supposed them then to remain visible, the base line of 200,000,000 miles, which now gives us no parallax, might be multiplied by all the numbers in the world, and we should be without parallax still.

Passing from the overwhelming computations of unfathomable space to the estimates of our future duration, we find offered to us, so to speak, a base line of 6000 years from which to gain a parallax of the lost soul's immortality; or rather, to show that there can be no parallax, no change, no shadow of wasting or decay, though the stranded soul is beaten by eternal waves of punishment, the famished soul fed only by the fires of hellish passion so much fiercer and hotter than those of Hades,—yet that there is no swooning or sinking into death so long as God's own Eternity holds out!

He would be a poor astronomer who should regard a thousand times six thousand miles as of any account in computing the stellar distances;—much more, if he should infer, because he then found no parallax, that the stars are at an infinite distance. And if modesty becomes us in the reckoning of dead and empty spaces, how much more does it become us in reasoning out living years and centuries and eternal ages of joy, or of supposed agony! We can commend the rare modesty of Watts, who was staggered at the thought even of a good man's immortality; and yet more, at the thought of a deathless guilt. He says: "Nor do I think we ought usually, when we speak concerning creatures, to affirm positively that their existence shall be equal to that of the blessed God—especially with regard to the duration of their punishment." (World to Come, Discourse xiii. § 2.)

THE RIGHTS OF WRONG;

OR,

IS EVIL ETERNAL?

In a recent conversation on the subject of future punishment, we heard something like the following dialogue:—

A. Can justice require the endless suffering of the lost?

B. But an end of their sufferings is just what the wicked would desire; and God is not bound to gratify them, as he would by annihilating them.

A. What would gratify them proves nothing either way. The question is, What do they deserve? They have at least one valid claim,—a claim to justice.

B. They have no rights whatever.

A. What! not even to strict justice?

B. They are wholly undeserving; they have forfeited all rights.

A. Then they have no right to strict justice!

We think the last inference was fair, at least as showing that B.'s particular theory of "infinite justice" was suicidal. He could no longer claim that the lost should exist forever in order that they may suffer for ever; for by his own showing they have no right to existence.

But we may not condemn the prevalent doctrine of eternal punishment for the weak arguments of B., or of any other man. We will therefore state the common view, and reason upon it independently.

The wicked are supposed to suffer for ever. That eternal woe is either something which they may claim in their own right, or, if they "have no rights," it is demanded by some dread nature
of things. Either God has no power to destroy the wicked; or his wisdom forbids it, lest worse evils should follow in the wake of their annihilation; or he has no right to let them perish.

I. His power to destroy them is sometimes denied, as in a late assertion that "annihilation is impossible;" though the expression was perhaps not designed to be strictly taken. It is also sometimes said that the soul is divine, and a part of God; but this statement will not be pressed, as it would evidently prove too much. The common argument from the soul's immaterial and uncompounded nature would also prove the immortality of the brutes, as seems to be admitted by Bishop Butler, and is remarked by considerable writers. Hence it is better to say with Jeremy Taylor: "Whatever had a beginning may also have an ending; and it shall die, unless it be daily watered from the streams flowing from the fountain of life, and refreshed with the dew of heaven, and the wells of God. . . . Immortality was not in Adam's nature, but in the hands and parts, in the favor and superadditions of God." At least we should not, as many do, infer the immortality of the lost from the words of Christ in Matt. x. 28.

II. If it would be unwise for God to destroy the wicked, it must be for some such reason as this,—that their eternal sufferings are needed, either as an example, to restrain other beings from sin and death; or as a means of impressing the glorified saints with the greatness of their salvation, and thus of increasing their blessedness; or as an instructive display of the holiness of God in his "infinite justice."

But the first of these suppositions implies that God could never, to all eternity, raise up and discipline in holiness the beings who should ever love and enjoy him, without a coeternal woe in myriads of the lost. The second implies great and eternal imperfection in those who are saved; viz., that they do not love God and goodness heartily enough for their own sakes or for their proper bliss; perhaps not enough to save them from plunging into annihilation if they might die. The third implies that God's "infinite justice" binds him to the eternal existence of those who rebel against him. And this is the third case first supposed.

III. If God has no right to destroy the wicked, then, whatever rights they may have or may not have, wickedness has claims obviously implied, and which we propose seriously to consider.

We shall not stop long to show that an eternal suffering of the lost would imply an eternity of wickedness and of evil. Even if the lost should not actually sin for ever,—adding ceaselessly to the number of their transgressions,—still they are supposed to remain for ever guilty and wicked. If they never change for the worse, neither do they change for the better. In their immortality wickedness appears as for ever actual. And if wickedness is an evil in itself, the eternal wickedness is an eternal evil.

Nor will it be any less really an evil because forever punished, or eternally overruled for good. The punishment would be—or would be thought—an expression of God's hatred of the evil; and the good supposed to accrue would be strictly by an overruling of the wickedness, and not its legitimate fruit. Like begets like, and evil naturally produces only evil.

Hence it appears to us that the immortal misery of the lost, making evil coeternal with God, implies very important rights and claims on the side of evil. If these rights do not inhere in the persons of the lost, they are the rights of wickedness itself. If the former have forfeited all claims whatsoever, the latter retains an inalienable right—if not to liberty and happiness, at least to life in bondage, and the pursuit of misery.

How such an eternal opposition to the justice and holiness of God should be consistent with his justice and even required by it, many theories have been advanced. We shall not examine those theories here. We only remark that the justice of God should never be called "infinite" with respect to any single or finite fact; for the very idea of justice implies a limit. Justice is exactness in moral relations. It regards that which is right and equal. If divine justice is "infinite," it is such simply for the infinite range and the endless round of its applications, and in no other way.

And to the common objection—the argumentum ad invidiam—that an end of suffering would please the lost (which proves
nothing either way), we may further reply that an end of wickedness and woe is just the thing which would not please Satan. Nothing could be more to his wish than that sin which God abhors, and pain which he pities, should run parallel with the eternity in which he dwells. And though Satan should suffer with the lost, he would be no less pleased with the company of their misery. *Is God bound to gratify him?* And this question is equally pertinent whether we regard Satan as a single person, or as the “aggregate of evil spirits,” or as a personification only of the power of evil. The rights of wickedness would be the same in either case.

Now we assert, against all theories of immortal woe, that WICKEDNESS HAS NO RIGHTS. It has none because it is essentially and eternally wrong. It is just the thing in all the universe which ought not to be. It has, therefore, at the outset, no right to exist. And of course, where it starts into existence, it has no shadow of right but to come to an end; if not by reformation, then by execution and extirpation. It can come into being only by fraudulent or violent intrusion. It is an outlaw that knows no rule, and has no proper place in all the world. It has no right of possession anywhere. Its only possible pretence of right is at best a “squatter’s claim.” It can assert no such right by any title that is known or customary in the world. It has never created, nor inherited, nor received by grant or purchase, nor obtained by first discovery, nor gained by occupance undisturbed, nor has it earned by honest labor, nor won in manly trial of strength or skill, a single cubic inch of space for a home in all the universe of God. Nor is there any supreme Law of Nations that should give it a right of conquest in any realm of the King of kings. It begins only as rebellion, and has only a rebel’s right either of citizenship or of residence. It lives only as revolt from God; and “what world shall receive any of those who run away from him?” *

Nor is its right of sufferance any better than its right of possession. Because it is only evil and wrong, it has no “city of refuge” anywhere. There is no sacred altar to which it can cling, no inviolate temple to which it may flee for safety. It has no right of sanctuary or asylum or retreat, to save its life, in all the dominions of God. Neither in heaven, nor on earth, nor under the earth, can it find just or permitted hospitality or protection. Though it gain admittance in the thoughts and hearts of men,—nay, a second and a seven-fold admittance in a house empty, swept, and garnished,—it has gained no right even there. And if it would seek a resting-place in the supposed “world of woe,” even at the gates of Pandemonium it must become a suppliant to the divine mercy for admission. It does not change its hateful nature by crossing the threshold of the “abodes of eternal despair;” for grim despair must drive it even thence. Because its nature is wickedness, He who forbids and abhors it wholly, abhors and forbids it there.

Nor has it the right of a fugitive and vagabond life, to roam homeless for ever, seeking rest and finding none; that would be a right of existence which it has not. Its only right is “beyond the bounds of time and space” in the strict sense of the phrase; a doom which in fact is commonly assigned to it by the theology of men’s hearts and sentiments, more true than that of the schools and systems. For when divines are asked where is the eternal abode of Satan and the lost, they commonly do not know where, which is practically not far from nowhere.

And here again is the theology of men’s feelings truer than their reasonings. The thought of eternal evil is as painful to good men as the fact must be hateful to God. Hence good men think little about it; it enters little or not at all into their schemes of future blessedness. They give it no place in their expected hallelujah. It is out of their thoughts, and thus practically out of the world — the same as if it were not. They simply regard the wicked as finally lost and gone, as we think the Scriptures also regard them.

Such was the true scope and import of the anathema that lies on the pages of the Bible. It was a devoutement to death. Of the Hebrew chereth or excision there were various degrees, of which the last and uttermost could only be fatal to the being

---

* Clement of Rome, Epistle to the Corinthians, c. 23.
of him that suffered it. Such an one was "an abomination, to be detested and removed from the sight of God and men." From the sight of men, for evil is painful to the moral sense; all good angels and all good men and other creatures in all the realms of God, do join with one harmonious voice in that prayer of David: "Oh, let the wickedness of the wicked come to an end!" And it can vanish from the sight of God only by dying out from the fair universe of which he is the Creator and Sovereign Lord.

But here it is objected that sin and wickedness — hateful and abominable though they be — do actually exist; and hence our argument proves too much; for, if valid, it would as much prove that evil can not exist at all, as that it will not be eternal; for evil is intrinsically as wrong and detestable for a moment as it would be existing for ever. And so the argument proves nothing.*

The objection seems to us only plausible. We think the common sense and instinct of mankind finds a real difference between evil temporary, and evil eternal; between evil doomed, and evil spared; between evil under sentence of death, and evil in immortal life; between evil transient, and evil abiding for ever; between evil unsettled, fugitive, fleeting, and evil fixed, enduring, permanent; between evil frail and vanishing, and evil indestructible, irreducible; between evil casual — incidental to the trial of new-created beings, and evil constant — ever inseparable from a perfected and matured system. To deny the difference between these seems to us like arguing that the unsightly poles and scaffolding used in erecting a building may never be removed, because if they are endurable a week they are endurable forever; or that they who languish with disease should remain immortally sick if they do not get well. And all the differing features of temporary and eternal evil betoken to us a difference not in their amount only, but in their relations, and power, and kind.

But if common sense should not at once discover this difference, crying out that nuisances must be seasonably abated, and restrained wrath yet cease from all God's fair domain, some things further may be said. An ancient wit tells us of a scholastic, who, having a house he wished to sell, carried about a brick as a sample and advertisement of it. Now he doubtless selected such a brick as would speak well for the house, — one that would appear and endure well. But our divines seem not so wise as that. If the scheme of God's eternity is to be represented by some specimen Moment of duration, the fairest one of all would fain be chosen. Instead of that we are offered the first that comes, — the nearest at hand, — the poor and transient Now. The model Instant is taken out from the history of a fallen, rebel world, with rebellious angels for wicked and wretched company. The world of men quite young, and that of the fallen spirits not very old. And there is something too, in the history, about a song of the morning stars, and sons of God shouting for joy, and all things being made very good, — as if there might have been no evil once. Yet from the present evil age the minute is selected to mirror forth the eternal future; here, and in this part of the universe, the brick is chosen that shall represent the plan of the eternal realm. A very poor brick; taken from the feet of a certain image, — iron mixed with potter's clay; — misshapen, bearing the footprints of a wild beast that has slunk in to mar and destroy; such a brick as common builders will not use, nor have, but throw away. Such are the pattern moments shown us in this world half recovered from a sad ruin; and we are told that the Great Architect may have such, and use them, and show them, in his grand and glorious Cosmos, for ever!

But this is not all. The objection that our argument against the eternity of evil proves too much may be retorted. If the argument from a specimen Moment avails to show that evil for ever may exist, it equally proves sin may for ever have existed. For, a moment in the past eternity is intrinsically no different from a moment in the future eternity; and if the moment Now is

---

*Dr. T. M. Page, New Englander, Feb., 1856, p. 148; — Dr. J. Strong, Methodist Quarterly, July, 1858, p. 417; — Prof. E. P. Barrows, Bibliotheca Sacra, July, 1858, p. 252; — Prof. A. Hovey, The Imminent Dead, pp. 145, 146. Dr. Whately states the same difficulty in his "Scripture Revelations of a Future State," c. 8. But here, as throughout the book, — which is a series of checks to dogmatism, — the design of his argument is negative and not positive. It is commonly inferred from the whole chapter that he holds immortality of the god alone.
a sample of all the other moments in the world, it follows that evil has existed eternally. The instant in which it did not exist can not be claimed by our divines. Their logic can not save from its contamination a fleeting second of the unbeginning past. It not only will live as long as God does, but it is already as old as he is. Hence it never began to exist, but is self-existent, un-created, unoriginated, divine. Here we have a plain doctrine of two coeternal principles, and may as well at once confess ourselves Manicheans in full bloom,—if this method of gauging Eternity by its bits and fragments is sound reasoning.

But if we grant that what has begun to be may cease from being, then, ere we stamp aught with the signet of eternity, we must look beyond the bare fact of its existence to the nature and reasons of it; we must discover in it the qualities that fit it for endless duration. We do not know that sin or evil has one such quality. Nay, it is a very common saying among philosophers, ancient and modern, that evil is privation and negation, akin to nothingness, and the like. Thus the Father of Orthodoxy: "Evil things are not entities; but good things are entities, since they are of God who truly is." If, then, God chooses that evil should exist for ever, or if he lacks the power or the right to bring it to an end, or to let it die, the proof of its sad eternity must be a plain declaration from God himself that such is his free choice or his dire necessity. The doctrine finds the slenderest support in human reason. Let us see if the Revelation unveils and declares it.

We can not in this brief tract give even an outline of the scriptural proof that wicked beings are not immortal. But a few striking features of the argument may suffice to call attention to the subject.

The most obvious fact, in a cursory reading of the Scriptures, is the entire absence of all mention of the immortality of the soul as such, of mankind as a race, or of the wicked as a class. "The doctrine of 'the immortality of the soul' and the name are alike unknown to the entire Bible." (Olshausen, Comm. on 1 Cor. xv. 19, 20.) And because the doctrine is not mentioned or spoken of, those who hold the prevalent view must suppose one of three things: either that the immortality in question is assumed or taken for granted as too clear to need express mention, or that it is implied and easily made out from the revealed rewards and punishments, or that the eternal existence of the lost is unworthy of the name of immortality.

I. Is the immortality in question assumed? In support of this view it is often urged as a parallel case that the divine existence is assumed without being expressly asserted. Very true; but there is this difference in the cases: the existence of God, while assumed as too clear for doubt, is named, spoken of, alluded to, and otherwise explicitly assumed, in many hundreds of scriptural expressions. But the immortality in question, if assumed, is never at all alluded to, but is treated with utter and profound silence. This difference can not be explained by supposing the immortality of man so much clearer than the divine existence; for the former has been far more doubted by mankind than the latter. Nor is the difference due to the higher importance of the doctrine of God's existence; for though the being of a God is of more account to the universe than the immortality of man, yet to man himself it is not more important. And the Bible is given not to the universe at large, but as a special revelation to mankind, to instruct them in their duties and their destinies;—given to bring life and immortality to light.

II. The immortality of the lost is not implied in the Scriptures. The Hebrew phrase, "living soul" (Gen. ii. 7), is applied also to the brutes (Gen. i. 30). The creation in the divine image may include the notion of man as designed for immortality, but then the immortality is lost with the divine likeness, and regained only with it (Eph. iv. 24; Col. iii. 10). And the Scriptures in their general tenor expressly promise to the righteous "life," "eternal" or "everlasting life," "life for evermore," "length of days for ever and ever," "immortality," "in-corruption," and that they shall "live," "live for ever," and be "incorruptible." On the other hand the destiny of the lost is called "death," "second death," "destruction," "everlasting de-
struction,” “perdition,” “corruption;” and they are said to “die,” “surely die,” to be “destroyed,” “destroyed for ever,” to “perish,” “utterly perish,” to be “consumed,” “burned, “devoured,” “cut off,” to be “as nothing,” and “put away as dross.” These expressions are employed in about five hundred and fifty instances in the Bible, with apparent reference to the final destinies of men as good or bad. Some of the examples in the Old Testament may indeed be claimed as referring to temporal deliverances and destructions; but even these may be fairly taken as containing a principle, or as stating in a general way the proper retribution of the classes named. To the Hebrews such a general application of them would be most natural. And in this way almost every doubtful passage has been taken as a text for a discourse on the final judgment of mankind.

Now it is a rule admitted by all interpreters that, primâ facie, the true sense of an expression is the literal sense; i.e., the common, ordinary, usual, obvious sense, which first strikes the mind of the reader. This sense may of course be overruled; for the whole meaning of the Bible does not lie on its surface; the book contains more than meets the eye in a casual reading. Still the rule holds good, that the common sense of words is overruled only by special considerations, which appear in the context or in the general structure of the book.

But the doctrine of the immortality of the lost gives to all these five hundred expressions a metaphorical sense. The ordinary and indigenous sense is thrust out, to make room for an extraordinary and exotic sense; and “life” and “death,” and all their kindred words, are taken to mean, not conscious existence and its opposite, but happiness and misery. And our Christian literature and modes of thought are so accustomed to this metaphor, that we are sometimes told it is of course the true interpretation, and can hardly admit of an opposing argument.

But this “of course” flies in the face of the universal rule giving the literal sense a first choice. And what reason is offered for the metaphorical sense, in so many hundred phrases, comprising the general tenor of the Revelation itself, and involving the question of immortal woe and eternal evil? What reason for an “of course” so infinitely dreadful? If in one single instance the soul or mankind or the lost were called immortal, then so much of logical and fair reason for the procedure would be apparent. But no such reason is given. By a single writer, who betrays the force of the difficulty, a solitary passage is offered as asserting of all mankind that they “can not die any more” (Luke xx. 36); but his interpretation finds few if any supporters.

Yet other reasons are more commonly offered. There are about twenty passages in which the punishment of the lost, under various names, is called eternal. But here the slightest attention will discover a remarkable fact: that, with a single apparent exception, the punishment of the lost is never called eternal misery. When it is called suffering, it is not said to be eternal; and when it is called eternal, it is not said to be suffering. These two fearful words, which have had continual wedlock in our modern religious dialect,—as if such rights of wrong had been established from of old,—are carefully and sedulously divorced in the language of the Scriptures. The apparent exception is a single instance, and this claims brief attention.

The passage is found in Rev. xx. 10: “The devil that deceived them was cast into the lake of fire and brimstone, where the beast and false prophet are; and they shall be tormented day and night for ever and ever.” This is the first passage appealed to by a late writer, beginning his direct Scriptural argument for the common view.* Other passages are often adduced to show that the death threatened to Adam was not literal; but this is the first and only one that can be even offered as portraying immortal woe.

Here several facts are obvious to remark:—

1. The picture is placed at the end of the revelation of the just judgment of God, whereas, if it be a ruling text, it would seem most in place at the beginning of the sacred volume. This supposed unveiling of undying woe is found not in the first year of man’s history, but in the Year of the World 4068; about 140

* Dr. A. Hovey, “The Impenitent Dead.” § IV, p. 78.
generations after the first man was put on trial for immortality, with the express condition that if he ate of a certain forbidden fruit he should surely die. If then, when, in the childhood of the race, the plainest instruction was needed, "line upon line and precept upon precept," — if then it had been said, "If thou eatest thou shalt surely not die — thou shalt be tormented day and night for ever and ever," from such anadamantine bolt, driven with a divine and omnipotent emphasis, the received chain of argument might be safely suspended. The reverberating thunders of such a sentence might have secured an "orthodox" interpretation of every subsequent allusion to man's destiny. We might then have been sure, when we read of "death" and of "destruction," and of "perishing," and so on, that these expressions were not to be taken in their common sense, but as intimating "torment day and night for ever and ever." But such plain warning of a twice infinite danger — deathless pain added to the loss of endless joy — was deferred for more than four millenniums, and given at length, not in the hearing of all human ears, but to one in visions on the isle of Patmos.

The highest crime which history records against Caligula is that he pretended to publish his laws by posting them on pillars so high that none could read them, and then punished his subjects for not obeying them. No man believes that the faithful and just God has done any such thing; but, as we would shun the very appearance of evil, we should have some care lest our interpretations of his word suggest a procedure which would be infinitely worse.

2. The only plain and unequivocal announcement of endless woe should be found in a book of unquestionably canonical character. The adamantine bolt should be planted in a rock that can be riven or shaken by no honest criticism. But the Apocalypse is the very book whose place in the canon has been most disputed, and that by orthodox divines. It was not read in the early Syrian Churches. Its canonicity was denied by Dionysius of Alexandria, Cyril of Jerusalem, and other Fathers, and was generally doubted in the Greek Church. It was decidedly questioned by Erasmus, Luther, Carlstadt, and Zwingli, and, lately, by Bleek, Lücke, De Wette, Neander, and others. These opposing suffrages do not and can not destroy the book — as it can not be either destroyed or established by mere authority. We find the proofs of its inspiration in its marked contrast with other Apocalyptic books of the time; in the chastened glory of its imagery, and in the comfort and support to faith it has yielded in times of persecution and fiery trial. Yet the interpretation of it requires caution and modesty, lest the remark of Calvin, who professed not to understand it, should get some shadow of truth: "It either finds a man mad, or it makes him such." Such a censure of these who overworked the book in one direction may check the confidence of these who press it with rigor in another direction; who find in its "second death," its blotting from the "book of life," and its barring from the "tree of life," no bar against immortal woe; who, having abandoned the literal and prima facie true sense in more than five hundred instances, at one late passage insist that such a sense is to be taken without question lest we be found tampering with God's word.

But if the literal sense is to be overruled in any case, there is, à priori, as good reason for doing this once, and against the claims of eternal evil, as for doing it five hundred times, in favor of those claims. We think it is not rationalistic, but rational, to say as much as this. And in this view the words of Paul in Rom. ix. 20, sometimes cited in this argument, might be retorted, with an emphasis. Our hermeneutics should not readily decide the claims of a final and universal holiness and blessedness — "against God."

3. On the meaning of the passage in question we should add that the same strictness which would prove the endless misery of "Satan, the Beast, and the False Prophet," would prove from the context the literal destruction of another host. "Fire came down from God out of heaven and devoured them." But the highly dramatic character of the book forbids exegetical rigor. In a dramatic view there is some reason — supported by other passages of Scripture — for supposing that the "torment" is not literal but figurative, describing the utter and total extinction of the powers named. Aside from this, the "lake of fire and brimstone," is by some taken as a symbol of earthly calamities, to
which these powers shall be subject "day and night for ever and ever." Better than this would be the view that takes the last phrase — "for ever and ever" — in the sense of "during the existence of the thing," — the Latin perpetuo; — a sense in which it doubtless occurs in the Scriptures.

We have spoken of other arguments to show that the terms "life" and "death" are used in a metaphorical sense in the Scriptures. The passages most frequently adduced are Matt. viii. 22; Eph. ii. 1, 5, and Col. ii. 13 ("Dead in trespasses and sins"); 1 Tim. v. 6. To these may be added Rom. vi. 11; viii. 10; Heb. vi. 1; ix. 14; James ii. 17, 20, 26; Rev. iii. 1. If a moral or spiritual death is intended in these passages, then, it is claimed, the sentence in Gen. ii. 17, may not imply the death of the soul. The argument is of course negative. It can not directly or positively show the immortality of the lost; for it would be absurd to deduce immortal life out from the dregs of spiritual death; though we find one instance in which this is done, by Augustine (In Joh. Evangel. Tract., c. xlvii. § 8).

To this negative argument there are three replies: 1. We are inclined to deny that "spiritual death" is the proper or primary import of these passages. There is another interpretation; viz., that "dead in trespasses and sins" signifies, subject to death by reason of trespasses and sins. The reference is to a future death, incurred by sin; and this may be death of body, or soul, or both. The figure is that of prolepsis, or the anticipation of the future as already present. This figure is undoubtedly of frequent occurrence in the Scriptures, and we have found it applied in various early versions and by various commentators, to the sentence in Gen. ii. 17. And the same exegesis is given by many others, in the most important of the other passages.*

* In Gen. ii. 17, the proleptic sense is given by the Targum of Jonathan, the Greek of Symmachus, the Syriac and the Arabic; by Jerome, Isidore of Pelusium, Nachmanides, Vataihus ("subject to death, both of soul and body"); and Flavius. The Heb. words mean "not this twofold death"); Grotesus, Knapp, J. Mueller, and others. The same sense is given in one or more of the other passages by Augustine, Theodoret, Eusebius, Calvin, Beza, Turrettin, Gomar, Grotesus, Vitringa, Bengel, Breydenacker, Wahl, Ruedeckert, Fritzsche, Kauffner, Tholuck, Hammond, Whitby, Macknight, Clarke, and others. In a few instances (Heb. vi. 1; ix. 14; James ii. 17, 20, 26) this sense is precluded because things are spoken of and not persons.

2. Granting the sense of "spiritual death" in the other passages, it would still remain to be shown that the term death always has that sense; or that it has that sense in all the passages relating to man's final destiny; or that it never indicates or implies a literal death of the soul.

3. Granting the metaphorical sense, we may yet claim that instead of being sundered from the literal sense, it still hovers round it as being derived from it. We have an illustration familiar to all. It is often said of the drunkard that he has "destroyed" himself. Do we infer that because he can not be more than destroyed, and is not dead yet, therefore he will live for ever and never sink to a drunkard's grave? Just the opposite. And the reason is that the term "destroy", though used in a slightly metaphorical or proleptic sense, still anchors in the original and literal sense. The drunkard will die because he has destroyed himself. So "spiritual death" may very aptly — as the penumbra of a total eclipse — foreshadow and atmosphere an eternal death that leaves no trace of life nor gleam of hope.

The other phrases supposed to imply the immortality of the lost, such as "their worm dieth not," etc., "unquenchable fire," "everlasting punishment," can not here be considered. We need only remark that the latter phrase is put in contrast with "life eternal," and for that reason the implication of immortal life is unnatural. And orthodox writers concede that extinction would be eternal punishment. The common argument from the other phrases would prove far too much, as the immortality of carcases (Isa. lxvi. 24), of tares, chaff, and fell trees, and even the eternal woe of Christian martyrs, who, as Eusebius says, were burned at the stake in "an unquenchable fire."

The parable of the Rich Man and Lazarus, if taken literally, describes only the intermediate state, and proves nothing beyond the judgment. "Abraham's bosom" is not heaven, though it will issue in heaven; so neither 'Hades' is hell, though it will issue in it, when death and Hades shall be cast into the lake of fire, which is the proper hell" [and the second death. Rev. xx. 14; cf. Matt. x. 28]. (Trench, On the Parables.)
III. We named one other argument of those who hold the common view; viz., that the eternal existence of the lost is unworthy of the name of immortality, and therefore they are not called immortal. Very true; but this reasoning may go further than it was intended. The Bible is peculiarly apt to call things by their right names. Now "eternal conscious existence" is the right name for eternal conscious existence. But the Scriptures never assert even that of the wicked; and those who use the phrase, as some carefully do, are inconsistent by their own showing; they travel out of the record, and are "wise above that which is written." If these good people — and Christians generally — would adhere more closely to the words which are "profitable for correction," this sad controversy about immortal woe and eternal evil would soon come to an end.

It hardly needs to be said that, while we deny the eternity of evil, we affirm its actual temporary existence, and its guilt on the part of man. We are not deists or pantheists, that we should exculpate man by calling his sin only relative and apparent. We affirm also that there is a true and valid doctrine of the "wrath of God;" — a displeasure against every evil work, which will destroy along with sin all those who love and cherish it. And over against this only right of guilt we find a proper Gospel of grace: "God so loved the world that he gave his only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on him might not perish, but have everlasting life."

We may suggest, in conclusion, that the doctrine of undying evil has a practical bearing. If God, the Lord of the Universe, can not avoid an eternal continuance of evil, then poor, weak man, in his petty relations to the world, may think it no sin to allow some things not the best. "Necessity knows no law;" and the higher necessity may lend its sanction to the lower. Individuals and communities may tolerate peccadiloes and social mischiefs because worse things shall ever be; which would be thrust away by a prevalent feeling that evil has no rights, and will in due time be swept away from the whole realm of God.

POSTSCRIPT.

The following passage in Dr. Mansel's "Limits of Religious Thought" has been largely republished by the religious press, and seems to require some notice:

"It is urged that sin can not for ever be triumphant against God. As if the whole mystery of iniquity were contained in the words for ever! The real riddle of existence—the problem which confounds all philosophy, aye, and all religion, too, so far as religion is a thing of man's reason—is the fact that evil exists at all; not that it exists for a longer or a shorter duration. Is not God infinitely wise and holy and powerful now? and does not sin exist along with that infinite holiness and wisdom and power? Is God to become more holy, more wise, more powerful hereafter; and must evil be annihilated to make room for His perfections to expand? Does the infinity of His eternal nature ebb and flow with every increase or diminution in the sum of human guilt and misery? Against this immovable barrier of the existence of evil, the waves of philosophy have dashed themselves unceasingly since the birthday of human thought, and have retired broken and powerless, without displacing the minutest fragment of the stubborn rock, without softening one feature of its dark and rugged surface."

It is worthy of remark that Dr. M. had just spoken of "arbitrary and summary decisions of human reason on the most mysterious as well as the most awful of God's revealed judgments against sin,—the sentence of Eternal Punishment." He also says it is "assumed" by objectors, that God's punishment of sin in the world to come "will take place as a special infliction, not as a natural consequence;" and that it "will be inflicted solely with reference to the sins committed during the earthly life; — that the guilt will continue finite, while the misery is prolonged to infinity."

These preliminary statements seemed to us, in several points, inaccurate. Many defenders of the doctrine have regarded eternal suffering as a divine infliction, and some still so regard it. Again, the eternal suffering has been regarded, until recently, as deserved by an "infinite guilt" contracted in this life; and the objection has been, that infinite guilt within this life is impossible. Again, when orthodox writers have attempted to justify eternal pain on the supposition of eternal sinning, the objector has urged that there can be, in all reason, no eternal sinning. Moreover, that theory of unceasing misery hardly escapes the objection raised against inflicted punishment. For, since no cre-
ated being is self-existent, it must still be supposed that God for ever holds the sinner in being, and thus conserves him ever, as it were, on the rack. If God does not scourge the recreant with his right hand, he still appears as grasping him by the left hand, while the process of anguish goes on unceasingly. It can not be maintained that God merely allows the sinner to reap the fruit of his own doings, leaving him for ever alone. For, when the Creator shall let any creature utterly and finally alone, the anathema is fatal. None can live without God.

It may be suggested, then, that “the arbitrary and summary decisions of human reason” are possibly on the side of the “most mysterious and awful judgment;” the more properly, since the author “assumes” to speak of an “immortal soul” which the revelation never calls immortal. The revealed word also calls the final punishment an “everlasting destruction,” and speaks of the judgment as manifestly just, never as mysterious.

Our author appears inaccurate, also, in the larger extract we have cited for examination. Who says that “the whole mystery of iniquity is contained in the words for ever”! Deists and rationalists, for whose benefit he speaks, do indeed most earnestly protest against that doctrine which he calls “most mysterious.” But very many of these persons regard moral evil as a stage of natural development, and thus deny that sin “exists at all.” On the other hand, orthodox divines usually aver that sin is an unnatural and perverse action of free will, and that all sin, however temporary, is a proper mystery. Hence the argument of Dr. M. seems to us both inadequate and irrelevant: he has admitted the notion of eternal woe to be “most mysterious” and “awful,” and thus apparently not on the same footing with temporary evil; and his principal objectors deny the chief element in the mystery to which he makes his appeal.

This inadverrence is explained by that which is the main argument of Dr. M.’s book,—his large use of the mysteries in nature and revelation, reducing the exercise of reason, he thinks, within certain rigid limits. Every new or grand mystery he can show, adds to the force of this main argument. Thus it is for his interest to add the dire tinct of immortal woe to the cloud of his witnesses. He brings this doctrine upon the stand, not simply because he regards it as true, but that its overwhelming mystery may check the rash presumption of man’s knowingness, which he would fain rebuke. Therefore does he tell us that, if we admit the existence of temporary evil, we can not disprove its eternal continuance.

The interested nature of his argument makes his inadvertent concession the more important. And the authority of his name and great ability is, in this matter, more than balanced by that of several writers who have held the eternity of future suffering, but have expressly admitted that it is the special difficulty of the received theology. Thus a learned reviewer of the controversy between Peter Bayle, who offered the Manichean hypothesis, and his opponents, said: “No one can deny that the very great difficulties which press the doctrine of the origin of evil and its reconciliation with the justice and goodness of God, could be more easily overcome if an end of hell-punishments is supposed, and not their eternity.” (Buddus, Inst. Theol. Dogm., l. 2, c. 3, § 17.) And Dr. Müller closes his elaborate work on “The Christian Doctrine of Sin” by saying: “A purely theoretic solution of the problem of the world would be possible if the evil were not;—the evil which does not resolve itself as a passing moment in the process of the development of the world, but is capable of being maintained, by the will of the creature persistently hardening itself, through endless ages.” (The reader will observe that the burdensome doctrine is here stated in the precise form in which Dr. Mansel thinks it most mild and rational.) And to the question, “Shall Eternity be begloomed with sin for ever unconquered, unconquerable?” Dr. Young replies: “The thought is unutterably affecting. Far, far without—not beyond the range of celestial vision, but not obtruding upon it—there may be a dim and dark and mysterious phantasm; the only speck in a universe of light, and too remote withal to cast upon it even the faintest shadow.” (The Mystery, p. 335.) Thus would an orthodox writer put the supposed infinite evil so far out of the way, and so nearly out of the world, that it should be reduced to a finite thing, even a “speck.” (Shall Heaven be poorer if the mote disappears?)

For its inaccuracies, and by these and other authorities, the plea of Dr. M. might be ruled out of court. But we have not yet done with this attempt at reasoning from the finite to the infinite.* We think it ought to hold as well in respect to physical evil and mystery as to moral. Let us see what it might prove.

A gentleman once attempted to analyze the venom of the rattlesnake, but without success. His most powerful reagents produced no effect upon it, and its nature remained to him a profound secret.

* The authority of Dr. Whately, who employs a similar argument, may here be alleged. But Dr. W. avoids the inaccuracies we have pointed out, and shows in the same treatise that he does not hold the eternity of future suffering. We have examined the point he makes in “Debt and Grace,” pp. 147-152.
THE RIGHTS OF WRONG;

Let us suppose that this were a chemical mystery, never to be solved by the reason or advancing knowledge of man. Poison, then, is a mystery—perhaps in more senses than one. Most of the reasons against the eternity of poison might be urged to show that it should not and does not exist at all. For, its nature is a mystery, without respect to its quantity. It is such examined by the grain—a ton of it is no more so. Insoluble when diffused through the space of a cubic inch, it is no more so if spread over a continent. Insoluble in the days or years of time, it is no more so in the cycles of eternity. Hence, if there is to be an eternal world of moral evil, not infringing upon God’s sovereignty nor encroaching upon his holy kingdom, there may be a corresponding thesaurus of venom, for ever undissolved, stored in long rows of colossal demijohns, tier upon tier; vessels of adamant that shall ever restrain the virus from breaking forth in mischief, yet all eternally conserved—for a display of the terrible import of that dark mystery, Poison, or for whatever other reason may be supposed.

Why not?—since venom is confessedly a gentler form of evil than sin. Nay, even if the poison were allowed to course through the veins of living creatures, causing deathless yet guiltless pangs, that were better than eternal hate and rebellion against the All Good.

Rather, who does not say that the more crying evil of sin is the very reason why it of all things should not be eternal? Precisely because it is a very special mystery, and perchance the only absolute mystery, it should come to an end. God knows the frame and constitution of all created things; but sin, perhaps, even he does not understand, and therefore he can not speak for the sinner when he shall stand speechless. Sin is pure monstrosity, rising out of lawlessness, and therefore knowing no principle of action or of continuance, but speedily dashing and destroying its subject against the laws of being which are eternal. When a frail creature, born of yesterday, chooses to act madly and wildly, that is no reason why he should have power to do so for ever, but just the contrary. But the usual mode of arguing from “the evil of sin” seems to make its enormity a reason for its perpetuity;—as if it were too evil to come to an end.

The remaining argument of Dr. M. would prove, we think, a great deal too much. “Is God,” he asks, “to become more holy, more wise, more powerful hereafter; and must evil be annihilated to make room for His perfections to expand?” By such reasoning we might show that God needs never to have done any thing, but might be as Brahma—eternally quiescent. Was He not all holy, and wise, and mighty, from the beginning? Why, then, should Chaos and old Night give way to light and order? Must God find room for His perfections to expand? Why should He visit the earth with a deluge, and purge it of abounding wickedness? Was the remaining Universe not wide enough for display of His glory? Why should He hear the cry of the children of Israel, and “triumph gloriously” over their oppressors? Must the Eternal Sovereign achieve a victory? Why appoint a day of final judgment, and a “restoration of all things”? Why not stereotype the Universe at any instant of its progress, and tell His creatures that His divine perfections require no advance of the world,—in whatever condition they are, they must adore Him and be content?

But the Father “worketh hitherto,” and resteth never until he can pronounce all things very good. Nay, just because his are active perfections, progress is the law of all his intelligent creation. Hence it is simply consistent in theologians to say that hell itself comes to no stand-still, but its guilt and woe are ever augmenting. But the eternal progress of woe which God pities, and of guilt which he abhors, would be an advancing triumph over him. In order to this, some sphere of his realm must be, in the received theology, consigned away from him, and devoted to the Adversary whose work he sent his Son to destroy. Has the Universal Ruler endorsed the consignment?

At this point we may quote the words of a reviewer of Dr. M.’s book: “Much is made of the familiar commonplace, about creation involving a change to the Creator, either from worse to better, or from better to worse, from a lower to a higher, or from a higher to a lower mode of being; or from one state to another, the change being purely indifferent. On all which, for my part, I do not feel called upon to say one word—inasmuch as the same things advanced by infidels of different schools have been met, so far as they can be met, many times over. This newer scepticism—for such essentially I hold it to be, of course without the remotest suspicion of the lecturer’s personal faith—contains only the old poison not even changed in form.” (J. Young, ‘The Province of Reason,’ p. 89.)

Mr. Maurice, reviewing Dr. Mansel in his work entitled, “What is Revelation?” makes the same point which we noted on p. 16. He says:

“What I was, in my haste, about to condemn in Mr. Mansel, is in you and me. We have been tolerating evil; we have been believing that because it exists, it may just as well be immortal. This is the unbelief which has paralyzed all our arms and all our hearts. This it is which makes us patient of baseness and cowardice in ourselves,
which makes us indifferent how much of moral corruption there is in the world. We have said to ourselves, What is there in that little word ‘for ever’? Is not God good now? Yet He suffers evil. We who are pledged by the vows of our Ordination, as well as by the vows of our Baptism, to resist evil to the death,—we have been actually propagating this accursed denial, we have been investing it with sacred names, we have been making it a part of our orthodoxy. Do you think that this can go on? Is not this habit of mind destroying the vitals of the Nation, the vitals of the Church?"—Pp. 436, 437.

Citing Dr. Mansel’s allusion to "the great and terrible mystery of Divine Judgment," Mr. Maurice speaks of all things in earth and heaven being made subject to Christ, and says:

"Such a Judgment,—that which is called, in the New Testament, the unveiling of the Son of Man, the discovery of the real Head and Source of all Life, Order, and Peace, in God’s universe, the overthrow and destruction of all Death, Disorder, War,—the Judgment which has cheered the heart of the sufferer on sick-beds, the lonely prisoner, the martyr at the stake, not because he expects some reward for himself, but because he shall see Righteousness and Truth triumphant; because he hopes to hear his prayers answered, that God’s Will may be done at last throughout His Creation; such a Judgment we must banish from our thoughts. By proclaiming that all the Divine Government and Education of mankind have not been necessarily tending to this issue, that the contradictions which every true man feels to be agonizing may be immortal, the idea of Judgment is destroyed."

Supposing that evil were to be eternal, he says: "We shall not be able to stop at Mr. Mansel’s point; we shall be certain that Evil must reign fo. ever and ever, must drive out all that is opposed to it." Is there not indeed an "irrepressible conflict," which must issue in a Universe either all good, or all evil? We rejoice, with Mr. Maurice, in the conflict of opinions on this subject,—and conclude in his words:

"If private Christians may discover that the notions they have cherished on the subject of the future world, its joys and its torments, have darkened the Universe, as well as the Gospel of God’s Kingdom to them,—surely, the preachers of that Gospel have more need still to be inquiring whether they have not entertained theories which go near to make their preaching utterly vain, a tissue of empty truisms, or flagrant contradictions. Mr. Mansel’s words may be most effectual for bringing this question to a trial."—P. 440.

Dr. Richard Rothe is well known, where he is known at all, as perhaps the foremost theologian of Germany. Dr. Schaf says of him:

"He enjoys the respect and esteem of all who know him personally, as a most excellent man and humble Christian." "We must assign to Rothe the very first place among the speculative divines of the present day. He surpasses even Nitzsch, Muller, Dorner, Martensen, and Baur in vigorous grasp and independence of thought, and is hardly inferior in this respect to Schleiermacher." A late writer in the Bibliotheca Sacra (April, 1860) speaks also in the highest terms of him, and of his chief work, the "Theological Ethics." From this we offer the following extracts:

"Evil can therefore be for God only an object of absolute negation, and his agency in respect to it only an absolute reaction against it for its complete removal; which, as divine and absolute, must be absolutely efficient. This absolutely efficient, unconditioned, negative reaction of God against sin, is his punitive agency. Thus, in general, the conception of punishment as divine is, that it is the absolute and purely efficient reaction of God, on the side of his omnipotence, against sin, whereby he removes it absolutely."

He then shows how the divine abhorrence of evil co-operates with a regard for the sinner, and modifies punishment,—God seeking first to destroy sin by separating the sinner from it, directing the painful consequences of sin against the transgressor in the form of chastisement and correction,—and thus concludes:

"But penal retribution can not enforce the attainment of its primary object with reference to the sinner; viz., his separation from sin, or his amendment. By means of his power of self-determination the sinner is able to harden himself against it. Yet he can not thus annul or frustrate the divine punishment, but by so doing he gives it a changed direction. Divine penalty is essentially divine negation of sin, divine reaction against it; and, as divine, simply absolute. It can not relax until it has actually removed the sin. If the sinner does not separate himself from the sin, if he identifies himself with it finally, then the punishment is directed against himself, and fulfills the divine judgment upon sin in himself, by the abolishing of his own being. For, evil must be done away absolutely, as certainly as it is opposed to God, at whatever cost. If the sinner will not cease from it, then must he share its doom; successfully mock God in his defiance, he can not. Thus divine retribution results at last in the annihilation of the sinner; even by means of the evil impending over him as consequence of his sin, through and in it the divine punishment culminates. This annihilation of the sinner,—this death in the New Testament sense—is accordingly the final aim of the divine punishment; and the necessary final result, lying in its very idea, of sin consistently and completely fulfilling itself." . . . "If punishment is executed completely, then its consequence is over the annihilation of the sinner himself. As punishment, that is, when it remains punishment and is not removed by forgiveness, it ever ends with the death of the sinner in this sense."

(Theologische Ethik, § 499; Vol. ii, pp. 195-197.)
And when we follow Dr. Mansel's appeal to "God's revealed judgments against sin," we find every reason to hope that evil will come to a full end. The first great act in the drama of divine judgment was the Deluge; a cleansing of the earth from the violence with which it was filled. In the full account of this, and in all the scriptural allusions to it, not a word is said of any transfer of the sin and woe, to subsist for ever in another sphere. Then came the oft-named "overthrow" of the cities of the plain; the "eternal fire" of their visible and exemplary doom denoting, even with orthodox writers, an utter and irreparable destruction. And this "example," we believe, shows the true import of the great judgment named in Matt. xxv. 41, 46, which is described as an "everlasting destruction" in 2 Thess. i. 9. Then there are psalms of imprecation, which ask nothing worse than death. Is not the key to the difficulties they have made to be found in that prayer of all the righteous, "Oh, let the wickedness of the wicked come to an end"?

In the New Testament, the parables of the Wheat and the Tares, the Net and the Fishes, the Vine and the Branches, show that evil will have no eternity. And what can be a stronger intimation of this than the words in Heb. vi. 27, "A fearful looking for of judgment and fiery indignation, which shall devour the adversaries"? The doom of the mystical Babylon, of the Beast and the False Prophet, and of Death and Hades, indicates no perpetuity of evil. Christ shall also "destroy him that hath the power of death;" and he shall "destroy the works of the Devil;" which could hardly be true if any doing of Satan should be eternized. And those sublime expressions of God's sovereignty,—"Of Him, and through Him, and unto Him, are all things;" and, "That God may be all in all;"—must be sadly qualified if we allow a sphere of eternal rebellion, either as counterpart, or as part, of the divine realm. The passage in Phil. ii. 10, may denote an unwilling subjection. But the parallel passage in Rev. v. 13 employs the same phrases by which the ancients described the universe; and we there read: "Every creature which is in heaven, and on the earth, and under the earth, and such as are in the sea, even all that are in them, heard I saying, Blessing, and honor, and glory, and power, be unto Him that sitteth upon the throne, and unto the Lamb, for ever and ever." Could this be true, if evil is to be eternal?

REVIEWERS REVIEWED.

It is now three years since the work entitled, "Debt and Grace, as related to the Doctrine of a Future Life," was given to the public. The notices of the press, even where the author's solution of theological difficulties was strongly objected to, have been more favorable than he had reason to hope. With no advantage of position, known only as discarded for a supposed error, cut off from all appeal except to the calm reason of his readers, his very weakness was, perhaps, the secret of any success his book has met.

One writer has remarked that "for a rarity, he does not complain of his reviewers." Through the public religious press he could rarely reply to them if he would; yet he tenders thanks for some courtesies in that way. And he does not now write to complain. He would fain correct some errors and misapprehensions into which he thinks his reviewers have fallen; reply to some arguments they have advanced; offer some views which they have suggested; and, in general, indicate the state of the controversy, if such it may be called. He accordingly notices some writers who can not be considered his reviewers.

Believing that a growing acquaintance with the doctrine of an End of Evil, by Immortality through Christ alone, gains for it tolerance and frequent hearty acceptance, he would fain leave the discussion with the more eloquent friends of the view, and, in due time, to the lecture room and the religious press.

November 1, 1860.
THE THEOLOGICAL AND LITERARY JOURNAL. No. XL. April, 1858. Pp. 592-624.

This reviewer endeavors at the outset to show that "the Bible is not the real ground of our faith," though perhaps unconsciously to us, because we treat so fully the speculative argument in the case. To this we have replied in the preface of "Christ our Life." We may certainly follow the reasonings of orthodox divines, and show, if we can, that their efforts to relieve the difficulties of their tenet are vain, and their only refuge is in mystery.

The reviewer's first attempt at criticism is remarkable. Citing a part of what we say of "The Dignity of Wickedness" if there be an irreducible power of rebellion (pp. 16, 17, 115), but overlooking what we quote from Milton and Æschylus, and our remark that "this sentiment of the dignity of eternal rebellion of course belongs properly to the old gentle conception of a divine nature without a divine goodness," he exclama: "We have never met a more audacious, though solecistical and self-confuting denial of the fundamental truths of religion and morals than this." We need only reply, it is no wonder that he proceeds to deduce all manner of horrible things; that he says we "represent that sin" may "become intrinsically good," and that we "imply that the persistent rebellion of fallen creatures, and a continual advance in malignity, is not only justifiable, but a duty," and that we "deny the right of God to the homage of his creatures." Really, the reviewer seems to be taking windmills for giants, and to justify a remark we have heard on his mode of attack, that "he cuts right and left with his eyes shut." How else could he say that we "ascribe utter heartlessness to God in regard to his own rights, the extent to which his creatures carry their rebellion," etc., directly after quoting our words: "Yet, because he hates them not, their sin is a grief which his love both creates and freely endures?" (P. 600.)

How else, after quoting a passage in which we speak of evil "appearing thus even for ever as a vagabond without a home in the universe," and, regardless of "an infinitely infinite," a "compound infinity of good," an "infinity of the second order," which we offset against the supposed lingering and dying evil,—how else could he deduce the conclusion that "holiness and happiness are to have no place in the universe, except in the few human individuals in whom they are reproduced through the work of Christ."? How else could he venture to say, "Such is the horrible picture which Mr. H. draws of the divine administration and empire!"—and again, "If the whole circuit of worlds, if the whole aggregation of moral beings revolts, and —with the exception of a few"— "are at length dashed in wrath down the bottomless precipice of annihilation, Mr. H.'s beauteous ideal of God and the universe is verified!"? (Pp. 602, 605, 606.)

That one who calls this "the work of Mr. Hudson's rationalism, or speculation, independently and in contravention of revelation" (p. 606), and who says of our book that "its whole aim is to determine the question on the ground of rationalism, against the doctrine of the Bible" (p. 623), should quite ignore our chapter of "Scriptural Argument," was, perhaps, to be expected.


This reviewer also begins with a sweeping charge of rationalistic modes of thought against those who deny eternal future suffering. Of this he thinks our book is a "striking illustration," remarking that "only 67 pages are devoted to the 'scriptural argument,'" that eleven of these are concerned with the opinions of the Jews in the time of Christ, and that this argument is preceded by 169 pages—his printer should have said 159—of criticism upon the philosophical grounds alleged in support of the doctrine we deny. To this we have replied above, and here say again that a scriptural argument in the case may well be brief if the Bible gives any plain verdict on the great question.

The reviewer's reply to our rational argument requires some remark.

On page 626 he quotes a passage in which we suppose an extremely harsh government, and a very mild government of rewards without inflictions, and ask which is the stronger. (Pp. 84,
85.) Overlooking the point of comparison, he says we “assume that, in a moral government rightly constructed and administered, ‘the mere loss of place or favor,’ without any positive infliction of penal evil, should be a sufficient protection against sin and its consequences.” The reader will say if we assume any such thing. We might also ask where God’s actual government is the strongest? Is it in heaven, or in a supposed world of sin and woe?

On the same page the reviewer quotes our statement that “if man is created absolutely immortal, subject to the alternative of eternal happiness or eternal misery,” he should now be exposed to no dangerous temptations, should be furnished with every motive to virtue and find no motive to sin. (P. 240.) Overlooking our grave supposition, he says we “assume” again, that a moral government administered by law over free beings may be so constructed as to exclude all dangerous temptations.” In reply, we simply repeat, that if the incurring of infinite woe were abstractly possible, infinite love would, in all reason, sedulously guard every creature against the awful danger. We also believe that the danger of infinite misery is avoidable, in a divine, universal, and eternal government. Hence our argument that the supposed necessity of eternal evil is a limitation of God’s sovereignty, and is dualistic.

To this the reviewer replies by alleging the moral necessities that pertain to the divine perfections: “It is impossible for God to lie” (p. 628). As if the necessity of God’s doing right could at all illustrate a necessity of eternal sin and wrong in his universe! But, it is added, “It is impossible that he should not love and reward holiness. It is equally impossible that he should not hate and punish sin—and, for any thing that our finite reason can determine, punish it eternally.” To which we reply that by the concession of various orthodox writers, annihilation is eternal loss and punishment. But that is an infinitely different thing from an endless perpetuity of the sinfulness which it is impossible that God should not abhor.

On page 639 we read: “A fallacy which runs through the present treatise is the substitution of the quantitative argument, where sound logic absolutely demanded the qualitative.” Yet on the next page the writer quotes us saying: “The distinction of evil as much or little, lasting or fleeting, will be almost worthless if it can be denied from no principle.” (P. 148.) Thus we plainly recognize the true mode of reasoning which we are charged with wholly ignoring. Whether we have with any fidelity observed the rule we so plainly laid down, the reader must judge.

On page 631, the reviewer quotes our conclusion that “we may then say of it [sin] that it inheres in no principle, and finds no sanction. It is neither God’s choice nor his necessity. It is only an incident of his majestic forbearance. It lingers between life and death, being and not being. It is transient because transitional, and pertaining to no system. It is not of the Creator, but of the creature; not of the Infinite, but of the finite; not of the Eternal,—how then can it attain to eternity?” (P. 152.) Upon this he remarks that by our own showing certain “elements of sin”—man’s freedom and God’s suffering—pertain to the actual system. Now these very good things which are thus called “elements of sin” are certainly not designed to effect sin as an end. They are not even proper occasions of sin. They simply allow a possibility of sin. They are more properly elements of holiness,—even God’s long-suffering specially granting a space for repentance, which is the only reason why sin subsists even for a moment. And when the reviewer comes to “ask in turn: if sin is not of the eternal?”—we must inquire what he means.

Of the twenty-two “theodicies,” or theories of the justice of endless suffering, which we criticize, the reviewer notices only one. This is, “The Imperative Nature of Duty.” He thinks our statement of it is “very well said,” and wishes, since it was once our own, that we “might return to it.” To our critique he replies that though “penalty does not satisfy the requirement, of the divine law, which is obedience,” still it “does and must satisfy divine justice.” (P. 633.) But how can divine justice be better satisfied than when all things contrary to justice are done away?—which we think is the import of the scriptural
“athanema.” The excellent remarks of Dr. Rothe on the import of the divine wrath are also here pertinent. (See “The Rights of Wrong,” p. 23.) Our reviewer thinks our distinction between the infinite and the absolute is the same with that which he makes between the “absolutely infinite” and the “relatively infinite.” But we doubt this; and, if it were so, he must grant that annihilation, or the loss of an infinite boon, is a relatively infinite punishment.

We are surprised that our reviewer should say that we discuss the question of man’s “natural immortality” under the head of the scriptural argument (p. 634), when in fact, after that argument, we devote an entire chapter to the “rational argument,” and another whole section to history of the early christian doctrine; which was, that the soul is absolutely neither mortal nor immortal, but capable of becoming either. We think our reviewer need not have been “surprised,” and would not have raised a false issue, if he had noted our effort “to divest the argument of its appendages,” on page 162. Why, we asked again and again, if any sort of general immortality is assumed in the Scriptures,—the very thing alleged by various opponents,—why is the Bible so profoundly silent respecting so all-important a fact? This silence respecting man’s immortality, contrasted with the constant mention of a truth that is assumed, is regarded by good judges as the main scriptural argument of our book. To say that a knowledge of the nature of the soul is not essential to religion, or important in a revelation, is to say what is very true; but it is no reply to our argument.

On the term gehenna, and the passage in Isa. lxvi. 24, the reviewer gives some history of Jewish opinions, differing not materially from that which we presented. To his remark that we “have been able to allege nothing valid against” the authority of Josephus (p. 638), we have replied by adding two witnesses to the eight whom we adduced to impeach that testimony. (Christ our Life, p. 154.) And the half-score are supported by Usher and a dozen others, cited by Fabricius (Bibliotheca Graeca, l. 4, c. 8). To the remark that “for the very reason that the fire and the worm are symbolic, not literal, both can exist together; and, for the same reason, both can prey upon their victims without end” (p. 637), we reply that such an abstract possibility makes nothing whatever against the natural import of the symbol; and, in the type, there was nothing else than loathsome yet complete destruction.

To all that is said respecting spiritual life and death (pp. 641–646), we need not reply particularly. We do not see that our argument for a proleptic sense of the terms in question, supported by early versions and numerous authorities to which we have since added others, is at all impaired. And, if it were impaired, the notion of immortal spiritual death would not follow.

In a single passage, Col. iii. 1, the reviewer has pointed out an apparent error in our exegesis (p. 176), which we have corrected in subsequent editions. We would here also acknowledge a correction made by the Congregationalist (Nov. 5, 1858), of a statement which we found to be too general, respecting the sense of versó (p. 177), which is amended.

Freely assenting to the four rules of interpretation laid down by the reviewer (pp. 646–7), we come to his argument on the passage respecting the Rich Man and Lazarus. To this we have replied in a separate tract. See also Olshausen, as cited in “Christ our Life,” p. 132. We have met one intelligent Congregational minister who seemed surprised that the passage should be adduced to show eternal future suffering. We may also reply further that the argument for this, from the horror with which the rich man awaits its consignment to gehenna, seems to assume that gehenna can not be exceedingly fearful unless its tenants are immortal. So readily do men confound the vast with the infinitive.

The remark that, “in this parable fire is employed, in entire accordance with Jewish usage, as the symbol of torment, not of destruction,” has been quoted by a subsequent writer (Dr. Thompson, “Love and Penalty,” p. 323), and requires some notice. By the reviewer’s own showing the entire “Jewish usage” would not forbid our view; for he quotes the famous twelve months’ torment in fire that then and thus destroys
(p. 639). But we submit that the general usage of the term fire in the Scriptures shows that its proper office is to consume. Even Matt. xiii. 42 will best agree with this view, when compared with the rest of the chapter and with Ps. cxii. 10.

The reviewer thinks our exegesis of the phrase “everlasting fire,” as denoting the eternity of effect, is unnatural. (Pp. 651, 652.) But he does not notice the half-dozen orthodox authorities, and parallel examples, by which it is supported. We have since added others, including the following passage from the Clementines: “Punished with eternal fire, they shall after a time be extinguished. For they can not now exist for ever, who have ever and only dishonored God.” (Hom. iii. c. 6. See “Christ our Life,” pp. 156, 109-115.) And we find that Otto understands the phrase in the Epistle to Diognetus, c. 10:—“Eternal fire, which will punish unto the end (μέχρι τῆς ἐνδοχος) those whom it receiveth,”—in the same sense with ourself. (De Justini M. Scriptis et Doctrinâ, p. 191, note.) We remarked, “This can not denote the common view of punishment without end; it may mean: ‘will exterminate.’” (P. 299, note.)

Passing over several pages which may be left with the reader of both sides, we notice the statement that “we can as well conceive of a man as punished a thousand years before he begins to be, as a thousand years after he has ceased to be” (p. 653). Of this hereafter. The writer admits that “eternal death, as the penalty of sin, in the sense of annihilation, is an intelligible idea.” Would he speak of a person as “dead” a thousand years before he is born?

The argument from the “destiny of Satan” (pp. 688, 689) is examined more at large in “Christ our Life,” pp. 71, 136-148.

In a review article we can not ask a thorough examination of our argument. Yet we think that in the passages examined there might have been more frequent allusion to our modes of interpretation, and further recognition of our authorities. We would instance Gen. ii. 17; Mark ix. 43-48; Matt. iii. 12; xxv. 41, 46; John iii. 36; 2 Thess. i. 9; and the phrases “gehenna,” and “second death.” By his inaccurate citation of John iii. 36,—“Abiding under God’s wrath” (p. 658),—our author not only ignores the view of it which we support from Calvin, but he apparently glosses the words of Scripture with a sense which they may not bear. See Isa. lvi. 16.

The reviewer endeavors to support the eternity of future suffering from “the stupendous miracle of the resurrection” of the unjust. (P. 660.) This reasoning seems to us not “qualitative” but “quantitative.” It means this: only infinite guilt can require a stupendous miracle in the path of punishment. But if the pain deserved by unrepented sin is in its nature irremissible, it is so in any measure, great or small. A slight claim of justice would be as inexorable as a large demand, and would justify an adequate miracle for its execution, however stupendous. The quality of justice does not depend on the quantity of guilt. The argument here offered gives indirect confirmation of our reasoning in the book reviewed, pp. 396-400.

Are the wicked raised up with spiritual bodies; or do they put on incorruption, or immortality?

We can hardly claim that the article entitled “Objections from Reason against the Endless Punishment of the Wicked,” by Dr. Long, Bibliotheca Sacra, Jan., 1860, pp. 111-154, is a review of our book. Yet we have found occasion to notice one or two points of the writer, in “Christ our Life;” pp. 73, note, 149, 150. We here add that we were not prepared to assent to his statement that “there is in truth a greater mystery in the permission of sin in the present world, than in its continuance in a world of retribution” (p. 128), until we found him describing punishment as a “blotting out” of sin. He says: “The sin which was not prevented must be blotted out.” By an adequate penalty God “maintains his character as a righteous Sovereign, preserves among his subjects a state of moral order, and makes perfect satisfaction for sin.” “He blots out the sin he permits.” (P. 133.) Can this writer affirm any eternity of sin? Can it be cancelled and yet perpetuated? In his view eternally punished sin appears not to be an evil. But he must differ from the common view, of sin as eternally persistent and defiant, ever subsisting under punishment and in spite of it. Would he ac-
cept the orthodox descriptions of "constant and everlasting warfare," cited in "Debt and Grace," pp. 49, 50, 118, 122? We may also inquire if final punishment brings about "a state of moral order" among all the proper subjects of divine government; or if, in the common view, it does not divide that government by setting apart a world of disorder and anarchy?

Art. V. Hudson on a Future Life. By James Strong, S.T.D. 
PP. 404-418.

This writer gives a very good account of our opening argument, and names most of the "theodicies" which we examine. He rejects those which infer infinite guilt from the infinite attributes of God, and accepts the theory of eternal sinfulness. He supports it by the current arguments, but without following our critique upon it. We need then only reply with the remark of a paper of his own denomination, in a notice of this article,—that three-score years and ten are a very short base-line from which to get a parallax of eternity.

He occupies two pages (408-410) with objection on the score of differences in guilt, and the difficulty of supposing degrees even in lingering annihilation. As if these could be more troublesome to God than eternal guilt, or the precise measure of its punishment!

Of our scriptural argument he notices only our examination of Matt. xxv. 46 (pp. 411-413), tells us in strong language that this passage is decisive against us, but does not follow our inquiry into the Septuagint use of σωτήρ. He thinks that by our view the whole passage is "at last reduced to this frigid meaning: These shall for ever be blotted out of being, but the righteous shall possess immortal blessedness." As if it were a small matter to be utterly consumed.

To his argument from Rom. ii. 5-10, and Luke xvi. 19-31 (pp. 413, 414), which he seems to think "quite conclusive," we have replied in "Christ our Life," pp. 135, 136, and in the tract above referred to.

He alludes to our argument from the history of christian doc-

trine with the remark that "almost every form of false doctrine in vogue in the Church" has been supported in the same way. (P. 416.) If this needs any reply, we will simply say that if our historical argument has any force, it is not that of a mere precedent for our view; but it consists in showing that the modern doctrine is an innovation, clearly traceable to a given period, to assignable causes, and in characteristic effects.

The other matters are left with the reader. With the exception of one or two expressions we acknowledge the tone of the review as hardly prospective, and, in various matters, appreciative.

A notice of "Christ our Life" in the Methodist Quarterly for July, 1860, pp. 510, 511, here requires some attention. After saying some good things for the book, the writer criticises as follows: "1. Mr. Hudson's theory is constructed by effecting a systematic change in the definition of a number of words in Scripture and established theology." This he regards as a departure from the sentiment of the Church through ages; and he thinks that by the same method Pantheism or Atheism might be substituted for the Theism of the Bible.

Now we think that if the writer had told his readers that we take the terms "life," "death," to "live for ever," to "perish," etc. when applied to man's final destiny, in their literal sense, they would have understood more than they now do, and some of their fears might have been spared. Says a reviewer of our doctrine: "Here lies the great error of the system: interpreting the Scriptures literally, when they should be understood figuratively." * Curiously enough, the last tract we have seen pub-

* J. G. Stearns, "Immortality of the Soul," p. 59. The Essay was procured and is recommended by the Ontario Baptist Association, in 1852. We observe that it repeats the common allegation that the Bible "takes for granted" the immortality of the soul. (P. 28.) Expressions in pp. 38, 39, 51, are worthy of note as a virtual concession that annihilation is an infinite punishment. Even a temporary sleep of the soul would be "innumerable loss." Paul would infinitely rather live on here in the flesh, and suffer what he did, than that soul and body should fall asleep in death." See also Bibliotheca Sacra, Oct., 1860, p. 802.
lished against our view makes an effort to show that the so-called figurative sense of the terms “life” and “death” is the literal sense!*

The reviewer says further: “2. Adopting in the terms significant of duration the Universalist modes of argument, Mr. H. incurs, we think, the ultimate consequence of abolishing absolute eternity from the Bible. Not for penalty alone can ἁλώς and ἄνεμος, and their equivalent phrases, be made to designate the temporary.” Etc.

But in the very preface and “contents” of the book reviewed we plainly show our opinion that “eternal death is eternal punishment.” On page 4 we say: “We regard the loss of immortality not only as penal, but as an eternal punishment.” Coming to the locus classicus in this controversy (Matt. xxv. 46), we repeat that “we shall not at all insist on the acknowledged fact that the word ‘eternal’ (ἁλώς) is often used in a limited sense.” (P. 122; comp. pp. 127, 128.) And the “Scriptural Argument” in our larger work opens as follows: “It is hardly necessary to remind the reader that the question we raise is not respecting the duration of future punishment, but respecting its nature. We are to show that exclusion from all life is a punishment, and that it is the revealed punishment of the lost. If it be so, then we may at once admit the words ‘eternal,’ ‘everlasting,’ and similar phrases, used to indicate duration of the final doom, as denoting an absolute eternity; we shall waste no efforts to reduce their significance in the least.” (P. 160; comp. pp. 187, 418, 420.) We confess that our reviewer’s entire failure to recognize these professions — even if he thought us unfaithful to them, which he does not say — is somewhat trying to the “general good temper” which he accords to us.

His manifest inaccuracy casts suspicion on his third count, which he concludes as follows: “The diminished sinfulness of sin can dispense with an atonement, quite discards a Divine Mediator, and finds the Trinity decidedly useless. Mr. Hudson himself finds and exemplifies these consequences. His own the-


ogy is disorganized. His theory is a stupendous step in the direction of no religion at all.”

This charge, supported by no specification, is too sweeping to allow or to require particular notice. We may cite, in reply, from our larger work: “We prefer to derive the divine nature of the Redeemer, not from the greatness of the evil He has removed, but of the good He has achieved; not from that which He has undone, but from the nature and vastness of that which He has done.” (P. 404.) And, in pp. 393, 394, we endeavor to show that the rationalist doctrine of self-salvation is fairly deduced from the notion of an unimpaired immortality. Religion is a cherished sense of our dependence on Him in whom we live and move and are; which feeling, we humbly believe, is best promoted by the view we hold.

If we mistake not, the above examples are not the only inaccuracies of the reviewer, in treating the question of future punishment. In the “Notes on the Gospels” by Dr. Whedon, the comment on Mark ix. 43–48 insists on the word “never,” used by our translators in vv. 43, 45; and also on the threefold repetition, in vv. 44, 46, 48. These common errors are very excusable in one who is not versed in Greek or in the criticism of the text; but we think they ought not to be made by a scholar. (See our remarks upon them in “Christ Our Life,” pp. 96, 97.)


The writer of a notice, whom we happen to know as a Doctor of Divinity, here repeats some of the objections already noted, and says that our view “neither solves nor cuts the difficulty, because the loss of existence is an evil of more terrible magnitude than even that of perpetual punishment.” This severe judgment is a very helpful offset against the opposite criticism, and may save one the trouble of changing the name of the next reviewer into a note of exclamation.


Here the Rev. N. Rounds, D.D., while charging us with “sophistry,” repeats, we think, the hackneyed fallacy that it is nothing to be reduced to nothingness. He in fact tells us that
when one is deprived of being, the privation ceases with the existence, for nobody is then deprived. He thinks that if such absurd and contradictory privation is called punishment, all created beings were suffering a punishment, eternal a parte ante, until their creation. Which demonstrates, he thinks, that annihilation is no everlasting punishment at all. “And it is just at this point of confluent absurdities that the theory of Prof. Hudson explodes.” (!)

If this argument needs any reply we will simply remark, that the nature of things corresponds with the possibility of things. The deprivation of a possible being or endowment is loss. But a mathematical line, whose richest being is pure length, is no loser because it has not also breadth. To talk of the loss of an impossible existence is as absurd as are the tears of a child imploring of its nurse the sun reflected from the surface of a stream. If our eternal past existence had been possible, and we had missed it by any wickedness, then would the loss be real and penal. If we might have been gods,—dii immortales et sempiterni,—deep were the guilt that should degrade us to the rank of creatures. If we could have been created for both eternities, the future and the past, the stream of Time bearing our bark both ways, then the purpose to live and know the future alone would be a guilty forfeiture of the eternal past. And death would then bring a double eternity of penal privation. Would that be nothing to speak of?

And in a very important sense man is made for both eternities. To know the past is to live it. As the memory of bygone days recalls them into the present, so to be master of the world’s history is to live anew the world’s life. Geology carries back this life into the untold ages. Man is not only a microcosm, to mirror the universe, but his dial is shadowed from eternity. Can the eternal future ignore the eternal past? Will not the heirs of Immortality roam, in thought and ever growing knowledge, as far in the ages gone by as they shall live in the ages to come? For that inner experience which is so much better than the outward, is there any limit to our best being, either way? And while they who never can exist can never lose existence,

will not those children of Adam who care not to be sons of God, suffer penal loss, in a real sense, of God’s own Eternity?


We have elsewhere pointed out what we regard as serious historical errors in this book. (Human Destiny, pp. 116, 118, 123, 423.) Since Dr. Brown, in the tract above referred to (p. 27), renews to us the grant of Tatian, much against our will, we will here add other words of that hard-thought Father. He says: “As we who can now die easily shall hereafter receive either immortality with pleasure or pain with immortality; so likewise the demons, abusing their present life by sin, perpetually dying while they live, shall afterward receive the same immortality.” (Ad Graecos, c. 14.)

We commend Dr. H.’s “remark, that neither science nor revelation assures us that Adam had observed the phenomena of death in the brute creation before the fall” (p. 95), to the attention of scholars. And if our first parents knew nothing about literal death, why should other evils incurred by sin be threatened under the name of death? Did the metaphorical sense of this word come first, and the literal or radical sense afterwards? And, is the figurative sense any more suitable in declaring a law, than the proleptic sense to which he objects, while he recognizes none of the many authorities, even of early versions, by which we support it?

When this writer “rejoices to find that Dobney . . . hesitates to deny the eternal misery of Satan” (p. 83), we think his eagerness betrays him. Mr. D. simply chooses not to “inquire into the fate of fallen angels” in his present argument, but to show that no eternal misery of men can be inferred from Rev. xx. 10. (Pp. 229, sq.) The reader will say if the reviewer meets that argument. And we think it is with an ill grace that one who takes hundreds of important passages in a figurative sense, insists on a passage in the most figurative of all the scriptural books, warning us that “to attempt any modification of its primâ facie import” seems “a perilous tampering with the word
philosophy as it is in theology.” (Christianity and Mankind, IV. 336.)

To the author’s citation of that unknown book, the Targum of Daniel, we will add another instance of his facility in valuable authorities. In a note on p. 313 he quotes as “a work of the second century, which, though strictly speaking anonymous, has ever been of high authority,” the “Quæst. et Resp. ad Orthodoxos,” printed with the works of Justin. “Anonymous” is a gentle name for what the critics usually call “spurious,” or “adulterinum,” as Otto styles this treatise, citing authority for a “cloud of witnesses.” He and a dozen other critics assign it to various periods, from the end of the fourth to the beginning of the sixth century. Bellarmine alone, so far as we find, assigns it to the second century; and he sometimes takes it for Justin’s own, though the writer contradicts Justin, and gives, says Otto, “not even a syllable (ne quidem) of Justin’s opinions.” The internal proofs of its later date—in that it mentions Irenæus, Origen, the Manichees, and the monks—plainly warrant Maran in thinking it “strange” (mirandum) that any one should call it Justin’s.

In a note on page 371, Mr. L. attempts to convict Albert Barnes of what “deserves to be reprehended severely.” Let us see how he succeeds. Mr. Barnes (Defense, p. 233) alleges that Grotius, in his “De Jure,” uses the terms guilt and punishment in their proper sense; but, “when he had a controversy with Socinus, and a theory to defend,” he takes them as sometimes used without reference to personal ill desert. To this statement Mr. L. objects that Grotius did not write his “De Satisfactions” until 1616 (we find the date 1617), whereas Socinus died in 1604; that he then had no peculiar theory to defend; but that he had a specific theory when he wrote his “De Jure.”

We hardly need reply that authors have two lives, and may be “controverted” after they are dead. Moreover, the very title of the “De Satisfactions” puts it “adversus Faustum Socinum,” whose name appears in almost every page. And in chs. iv., vi., Grotius says that Christ was “justly punished” for...
that Locke "believed in their perpetuity." The language quoted does not prove this; and the passages referred to (Essay, b. 2, c. 28, §§ 8, 12) assert only what all admit respecting the power of God. Setting out from this point he elsewhere says: God "can not be supposed to make any thing so idly as that it should be purposely destined to be put in a worse state than destruction (misery being as much worse a state than annihilation," etc.) (Journal, Aug. 7, 1681.) And the whole passage, coupled with the language we quote from his "Reasonableness of Christianity," makes the opinion attributed to him, we think, more than doubtful. We do not here charge Mr. L. with flagrant error, but he overlooks that which required his attention, and proves his own points too easily.

For Locke’s opinions on the “immortality of the soul” we may also refer to his Journal, April 20, 1682.

A few words more respecting the “false representations” alleged against our book. The accuracy of the accuser appears on page 308, where he says that we “quote with approbation” a passage which we distinctly cite as one of “the severest reproaches and calumnies.” (P. 259.) Mr. L. had just given several pages to convict us of “egregious and criminal misrepresentation,” such as implies “the grossest incompetency,” or else renders the supposition of our moral honesty “utterly inconceivable.” (Pp. 304, 306.) This invective is certainly eloquent. And how convincing, too, side by side with gentle instruction of “our German cousins,” who “seem unable to comprehend these plain distinctions” which Mr. L. lays down, and thereby have "made the confusion worse confounded." (Pp. 294, 295.)

What have we done? Mr. L. alleges that in the Pagan philosophy the term 

- 

that Locke “believed in their perpetuity.” The language quoted does not prove this; and the passages referred to (Essay, b. 2, c. 28, §§ 8, 12) assert only what all admit respecting the power of God. Setting out from this point he elsewhere says: God “can not be supposed to make any thing so idly as that it should be purposely destined to be put in a worse state than destruction (misery being as much worse a state than annihilation,” etc.) (Journal, Aug. 7, 1681.) And the whole passage, coupled with the language we quote from his “Reasonableness of Christianity,” makes the opinion attributed to him, we think, more than doubtful. We do not here charge Mr. L. with flagrant error, but he overlooks that which required his attention, and proves his own points too easily.

For Locke’s opinions on the “immortality of the soul” we may also refer to his Journal, April 20, 1682.

A few words more respecting the “false representations” alleged against our book. The accuracy of the accuser appears on page 308, where he says that we “quote with approbation” a passage which we distinctly cite as one of “the severest reproaches and calumnies.” (P. 259.) Mr. L. had just given several pages to convict us of “egregious and criminal misrepresentation,” such as implies “the grossest incompetency,” or else renders the supposition of our moral honesty “utterly inconceivable.” (Pp. 304, 306.) This invective is certainly eloquent. And how convincing, too, side by side with gentle instruction of “our German cousins,” who “seem unable to comprehend these plain distinctions” which Mr. L. lays down, and thereby have “made the confusion worse confounded.” (Pp. 294, 295.)
Now, while we do not think ἀθανάτος was ever a strict synonym of sempiternus, our readers are amply informed that the philosophers held the soul to be immortal because eternal. (Pp. 269-274, 298-301, 316.) And we afterwards (p. 322) call the phrase “immortal soul” a Gnostic style of expression, in which Christians did not yet freely indulge;” though they had begun to regard all souls as exempt from death. Again, while we quote several Fathers saying the soul is not immortal, in no a single instance do we thence infer that the writer held the actual extinction of the wicked. For other reasons we claim two, and only two, of the post-apostolical Fathers as holding our view. One of these, Arnobius, is conceded by Mr. L. The other, Irenæus, is claimed against us by Prof. Hovey, to whom we here further reply that our claim is supported by Huét and some others. Since Mr. L. does not notice the passages we cite in proof, nor the grounds of our approval of Gieseler, who says of Justin that he “appears to regard it as possible that the souls of the ungodly will be at some time wholly annihilated,” he is welcome to sneer at the “literary pretensions” of those who find traces of this doctrine in Irenæus and Justin. (P. 295.) And when he thinks it “hard, very hard” to believe we “could purposely and designedly turn pervert facts” (p. 307), the reader may also think this is hardly credible, and repose his confidence where he sees fit.

We might forbear further criticism. But our historian must needs be an interpreter and theologian likewise, and we will add a word. He who tells us that “βαίνει alone means simply to ascend” (p. 210), can easily find that we “pass from death unto life” in conversion (pp. 167, 329), and yet apply the same passage (John vi. 24), and Rom. vii. 24, to the event of physical death (p. 330). Let him also refer Ps. vi. 5; Isa. xxxviii. 18, 19; Job xxviii. 22; Ps. xxx. 9; lxviii. 10-12; cxv. 17; cxviii. 17-19; 1 Sam. ii. 9, to spiritual death (p. 322), and then set about correcting the “wretched shallow theologizing” that has been done upon Gen. ii. 17, apparently by Augustine, Calvin, and Turretin; informing us that neither soil, nor remorse of conscience, nor corporeal dissolution, nor eternal misery is the penalty there threatened, but these things are only consequences. (Pp. 322-326.) And since he tells us that “Christ has satisfied the law, and endured its full penalty for his people” (p. 129), we are sure that it is not spiritual death. Was it death in the abstract? Our author seems to think that “separation from God” is the true sense, and that this clears the divine justice. (P. 320.) One who justifies an eternity of woe so easily, may elsewhere tell us, respecting “the infinite evil of sin,” that the expression “was originally derived from the Bible — Job xxii. 5” (p. 398), ignoring the common consent of commentators that the phrase there used bears no such sense.

Mr. L. hesitates to apply his doctrine to the case of the heathen. “What propriety is there,” he asks, “in endeavoring to drag into the issue the question” respecting them? (P. 403.) If his pen had not on the same page grown petulant, and if he had not afterwards charged with “open and iniquitous trifling” (p. 500) those who, in seeking to justify the ways of God to man, offer a view of future punishment which admits an end of evil,—one might hope something from his anxiety on this grave question. May not the apparent doubt even in his mind make some others less dogmatic?

A passage in his title-page is very suggestive. We translate it thus: “All souls are immortal, even those of the ungodly; for which it were better not to be imperishable. For, punished in unquenchable fire with limitless punishment, and dying not, they can find no end to their misery.”

We have looked for this morsel, paraded thus without a name, but do not find it. It may have been written in the darkening ages; we are confident it is not from the earlier Fathers. So apt a motto, supported by a great and good name, would weigh something. And if, of its four unequivocal expressions of the immortality or of the eternal misery of the wicked, a single one had been found in the Scriptures, there might be an end of controversy. But though our author speaks of “a few of the texts” “in which the soul is declared to be immortal” (p. 179), he offers no similar expression from the blessed volume. Yet a clear revelation of the received doctrine required expressions no less
explicit, which are found in most other pretended revelations, and which so abound in modern theology. Their entire absence from the Scriptures has a significance which is beginning to be felt.


To what we have already remarked upon some of the statements and reasonings of this writer ("Christ our Life," p. 150, note), we add a few words here for reasons which will appear.

When we saw the tract announced we thought of the probable embarrassment of a genuine disciple of Sadoc, if he were asked, "Do you believe in the final annihilation of the wicked?" "What do you mean," he would inquire, "by speaking of the wicked? I regard death as a law of nature, and an eternal sleep for all, however bad or good."

But the effort of this writer to make his epithets carry so persistent that he does not hesitate to describe the doctrine he "refutes," thus: "All men, the righteous and the wicked, alike suffer the full penalty of the law; they cease to exist. There is no remission of the penalty, no forgiveness, no salvation." "Let them sin however much, they can incur nothing more. The worst that can happen will happen, at all events." (Pp. 63, 64.)

The essay is plainly, then, something more than a criticism upon erroneous arguments of some annihilationists. Deriving the doctrine from speculations in Egypt, Babylonia, and Greece, through the Epicureans and the Sadducees, and telling us that "a large portion of the modern Universalists hold it, with some modification, at the present time," (!) sedulously ignoring both the Christian tenets of those whose philosophy he censures, and the fact that many among us do not reason the matter thus, he presumes to say: "Such are the principal arguments relied on by its advocates in support of the doctrine of annihilation," and that all their other reasons "are of secondary importance" (P. 34.)

We say that he "sedulously ignores." He does more. Quot-
parent at a glance." Now, without pretending to exegetical skill, we may remark that most commentators have "glanced" at this passage with other eyes. Only Wetstein, so far as we now know, saw it in the same light with Mosheim. The work of Dr. Trench on the Parables is considered pretty good authority; and he dissenting decidedly from Mosheim, with counter-arguments which Mr. W. will do well to answer. Even more, Dr. T. thinks the parable was directed against the very Pharisees whose doctrine of the soul our author so warmly espouses. He says: "However loosely strung together, at first sight, verses 15–18 may appear, there is a thread of connection running through them all, and afterwards joining them with the parable, — there is one leading thought throughout, namely, that in all is contained repute and threatening for the Pharisees." (P. 366.) He speaks of it as " being evidently addressed to the Pharisees" (p. 367); and as "announced " to the Pharisees, who might be considered the representatives of the nation, for in them all that was evil in the Jewish spirit was concentrated." (P. 369.)

And with this application of the passage many, if not most, commentators agree. We may name Grotius, Bengel, De Wette, Olshausen, Ripley, and Barnes.

Another instance of our author's facility of proof, by authorities which he extols, is worthy of notice. Though the opinion is with some a rank heresy, it will serve his purpose if he can show that some kind of resurrection occurs at death, or that the term anastasis signifies the future state. Dr. Dwight offers to his hand, and is with him "the best authority." (P. 53.) Mr. W. quotes his exposition of the passage in Luke xx. 27–38, and says: "Of his competence to understand it and speak of the meaning of the original word, we surely shall not doubt. Nothing can be more directly to the point before us — nothing more conclusive."

Perhaps so. Yet many good Christians think otherwise, and we find not a few good writers who support another interpretation. Allford speaks of the "striking remarks" of an able writer, "showing that the phrase 'children of God' is used by Matthew and Luke only of the state after the Lord's coming."

(Christ our Life, pp. 53, 54.) And a recent writer, who is very orthodox, speaks of those who "quote the loose and rickety statements of Dr. Dwight in full, on the meaning of ἀνάστασις, and then blink the whole question of the usus loquendi of the language itself." (E. Russell, D.D., Bibliotheca Sacra, Oct., 1860, p. 775.)

One example of strong language is worthy of note. "It is scarcely possible," says Mr. W., "to put into words a more glaring tissue of absurdities and profanations of truth than attend the doctrine of a resurrection, if man has no immortal soul." (P. 44.) But some of the writers we have just referred to take pains to say that "the immortality of the soul" does not explain the passage in Luke xx. 36. And Olshausen, commenting on that noble argument in which Paul refutes genuine Saducees so much more gently than our author assails those who daily speak of Jesus and the Resurrection, says: "The doctrine of the immortality of the soul and the name are alike unknown to the entire Bible."

We scarcely need to say that we regard this shaft, pointed with a false epithet, as deriving its force from the long bow that carries it. To the Boston American Tract Society we owe no ill-will. We bore a humble share in the early discussions on that silent policy which made another Society a refuge of oppression, and shall ever rejoice in the work for human freedom that grows from the recent separation. That the officers of this Society should be good, orthodox gentlemen, lies in the natural course of things. And we are willing that they should maintain their own views, though they duly criticise and "refute" those we hold. But we are sure that five years hence they will have treated us more justly than now. And we thus write because we think the wise friends of the Society will not ask so long a delay.


Our opponent in this discussion is clearly one of our "reviewers," and, as his "say" was somewhat the longer, he will
allow us a few words here; the more readily, as we shall leave
the main argument to speak for itself, and touch only trifles.

On page 469, Mr. C. thinks we make too strong a statement,
in saying that *aphtharsia* “never means moral incorruptness, ac-
cording to Passow, Schlesner, Bretschneider, Wahl, and Rob-
inson.” And he proceeds to *infer* that they regard it as having
this sense, though they do not name it. As if a lexicograpger
might fail to mention a sense which he supposed a word to bear!
Mr. C. appeals to Parkhurst and Robinson who *do* name such a
sense, and the appeal is fatal to his previous argument.

He then attempts another inference. “Schrevelius defines
thus: ‘Aphtharsia, — immortalitas, incorruptibilitas.’” Here
the two Latin words are evidently taken in the same sense of
inmortality. But our friend thinks he finds that “incorrupti-
bilitas” bears also the sense he wishes to make out, and, trans-
lating a noun by an adjective, jumps to his conclusion.

We have sought for the list of adjectives he cites under the
noun above named, and find them in Ainsworth. Of course not
under that word, but under *incorruptus*; and, what is more, the
rare word *incorruptibilitas* is not given by Ainsworth at all.

To render a noun by an adjective is an error not only in form
but in fact; for every scholar knows that a noun may not have
the same range of significations with the derived adjective.
This is specially true in the present instance. All the lexicograp-
ghers — at least the half-dozen we have examined — give a
secondary and “figurative” sense of *incorruptus*. But to neither
of the noun forms, *incorruptibilitas, incorrupto*, and *incorrup-
tela*, does either of them assign a metaphorical sense. Some of them
cite the Vulgate in Rom. ii. 7; Eph. vi. 24, and elsewhere, but
they all give the sense of the noun, in whatever form, as uni-
formly literal.

In our Affirmative Argument, page 69, we gave *aphtharsia* as
occurring in Tit. ii. 7, in the sense of “incorruptness.” This
error is corrected on page 434, and we remark: “My friend, also;
must mend his Greek.” Hence comes an odd tissue of errors.
Mr. C. is sure that he need not mend his Greek, though he fails
to understand my correction. He appeals to Griesbach:—

“Griesbach has *adiaphtharia*, as Mr. H. informs us. We will
not differ from Griesbach.” But the very thing we said was
that the received text has *adiaphthoria*, and also *aphtharsia*, the
word in question, which the critical editors omit, leaving only
*adiaphthoria*, which is the proper term for “incorruptness.”
So our friend does differ from Griesbach, in supposing that he
gives one of the above words instead of the other. He speaks
of “the choice of MS. for the reading of this word.” But the
choice is between one word and two words.

The next paragraph we are not sure that we understand; but
if we do, it “discovers” that we had made the very error which
we were trying to correct for our mutual benefit. We can only
decide one point wherein our friend is “not certain.” “Gries-
bach’s version,” surely, does not “mend our Greek.” And we
know no “Greek version” of the Greek.

The Presbyterian Quarterly Review. Vol. VIII. April,

This article is prefaced with the titles of several works, among
which the writer speaks courteously of our own. But the care-
lessness by which our name is twice mistaken will be found to
extend, we think, to more serious matters.

The obnoxious doctrine is traced at the outset, by a plain *ar-
gumentum ad invidiam*, to the excitement a few years since
respecting the end of the world. The so-called “Millerites,”
“partly to cover their retreat,” “revived the old dogma.” By
similar reasonings the Romanist ascribes the Reformation to va-
rious frailties of human nature.

And when, some pages after, the writer speaks of various feel-
ings which make men wish that suffering and sin might end, and
yet says: “Eternal suffering — it is an awful idea! We stand
aghast before the terrible mystery” (p. 621), he betrays the
“self-suspicion” which we have assigned as a perpetuating cause
of the distressing doctrine. We wish his jealousy had made
him more scrupulous in other matters.

For, on page 602, he sets down Mr. Dobney as a materialist
for the following words: “The death threatened to Adam was
the death of the entire man,” “the extinction of being.” Has he fairly read Mr. D.’s book?

Dwelling at large on the materialist view,—which he may refute a thousand times without proving either the immortality of all spirits or the eternal corruption of evil souls,—he at length says that our view “can not fail to rob” not only “hell of its terrors,” but “heaven of its glory.” (P. 612.) How is this? Why — “Hell is simple death; and of course, heaven is simple existence”!

To such wonderful facility of adverse argument we can only reply by referring to extended statements of our view that the literal sense of the phrases, “everlasting life,” and, “to live for ever,” is primary, and the sense of blessedness, accessory. See “Christ our Life,” pp. 45, 75-77, 127. To the words of Fritzche there quoted, we here add the statement of Bretschneider, who closes a lengthy argument thus: “As one reviews this whole series of representations and expressions, one sees how far from correct they are who either take death for a miserable life, or render it by ‘unhappiness,’ and ‘life’ or ‘eternal life’ by ‘happiness.’ Rather, ‘death’ never means unhappiness, nor ‘life’ happiness; but the former is always death, and the latter is always life; and the implied conception (Nebenbegriff) of wretchedness and happiness is purely accessory, and can never constitute the fundamental signification (Grundbedeutung).” (Evang. Pietismus, § 22, p. 264.)

Does our author mean that the literal sense of immortality cuts off the hope of eternal blessedness? He almost says as much, when he attempts to criticise our view of the atonement as follows: “Mr. Hudson says, ‘eternal existence,’ not eternal blessedness, through holiness in Christ, ‘eternal existence is of grace.’” (P. 623.)

But if “life is more than meat,” the gratuity of immortal life may extend to its blessings.

Omitting all recognition of the sense in which we take Eph. ii. 1, as well as of our authorities, the writer comes to Mark ix. 43-48, repeats the argument from the threefold repetition which we have before remarked, and concludes: “All going back to Isaiah livi. 24, to break the force of these words; to Ecclesiasticus and the ‘Targum of Jonathan;’ all the explanations about

’Tophet’ or the ‘Valley of Hinnom,’ which the Annihilationists borrow from the Universalists, make but a puerile and miserable piece of pettifogging.” To this protest against the comparing of a passage with its only parallel in Scripture, we must reply by saying what this critic may need to know,—that good orthodox commentators do freely refer to these same sources of illustration; and if he will show that they support any other doctrine than our own, he shall be our faithful instructor.


In a course of lectures addressed to a mixed congregation we can not expect a full account of the arguments offered for views that are combated. And when our author exclaims, “Away, then, with the gloomy retreat of the annihilationist” (p. 263), and adduces Gen. ii. 17; Isa. xxxiii. 14; Matt. viii. 12; xxv. 41; Mark ix. 43-48; Luke xvi. 19-31; John iii. 36; Eph. ii. 1; 2 Thess. i. 9; Rev. xiv. 10, 11; xx. 10, in support of an infinitely gloomier doctrine, we need not be surprised if he fails to recognize our exegesis of these passages, supported by various orthodox writers. Nor will he be surprised if he fails to convince us of our “error,” or—if we may quote a pleasantry of his—to “annihilate” us. Arguments are often advanced, not to change the opinions of men, but to prevent their being changed.

And yet desirable changes may grow out of such efforts.

Thus, when we are told that the Old Testament “assumes” the immortality of the soul, and “illustrates it as a truth too deeply imbedded in the soul to call for argument” (p. 254); and that Christ “assumed it as a familiar truth” (p. 258); and yet no proper expression of the idea is cited from the Scriptures, in a book full of varied expressions of it;—some will ask, Why do the inspired writers never name that which it is so hard for uninspired writers not to name?

Again, our author illustrates the primary importance, and we

think also the weakness, of Matt. xxv. 46, in the orthodox argument. “These shall go away into everlasting punishment; but the righteous into life eternal.” Without reciting our half-dozen reasons why immortal life should not here be inferred from that which is put in contrast with eternal life, we may notice two or three things in the extended argument here offered (pp. 303–319) to show that the term in question, κόλασις (kolasis), excludes the idea of annihilation.

It is urged, negatively,—and the statement is six times repeated, finally in small capitals,—that this word does not mean annihilation. Who says that it does? There are those who hold that it may mean “cutting off,” or “abscission.” Thus Sir James Stephen, and even Mr. Landis. And such a sense would “cut off” all proof of deathless suffering from the passage. But neither of the three writers named by our author in connection with our view (p. 203) take the term in that sense. Neither the sense of abscission, nor of annihilation, is at all essential to our argument. And we think our author’s repeated negative is apt to produce a false impression, and to mislead some readers. Others will perceive that all this negative argument is quite irrelevant.

But while we have no occasion to say that kolasis means annihilation, and regret this occasion even for explanation, the converse statement, that annihilation is punishment, has been so often made by good orthodox writers that we scarcely need repeat it. Thus the younger Edwards, in the very essay from which our author quotes what he calls “an argument of irresistible force,” says: “Endless annihilation is an endless or infinite punishment.” (Works, I. 80.) And when this concession is made by various great and good men, shall we suppose that mankind must still find eternal evil revealed, and most explicitly, in this single passage?*

*Besides the general difficulty of proving a momentous doctrine from any single word in either of the four Gospels, written in another language than that which Christ spoke, it is an open question whether Matthew wrote in Greek, or we have only a translation from a Hebrew original. The force of these facts is very well stated by Sir James Stephen, in the “Epilogue” from which we have published some extracts.

But our author does not endorse the concession, and therefore gives a more direct and positive argument, to show—what? That kolasis means torment, or suffering, or pain, uniformly? Nothing of the kind, though this is essential to his conclusion. He endeavors to show that it sometimes has the sense of torment, which we need not deny. Yet this sense is found among the lexicographers with difficulty. We discover it only in Sturz’s Lexicon of Xenophon, and in Sophocles’ “Glossary of Later and Byzantine Greek,” to which our author appeals. That the final kolasis should be supposed to mean torment, after the soul began to be called immortal, was a matter of course. But the very name of the Glossary shows that its testimony does not reach the case. And the other witness, Sturz, who gives “torment” as a fifth sense, citing a single passage of Xenophon (Cyrop. 3, 1, 13), and 1 John iv. 18,—offers another sense as allowable instead.

And on 1 John iv. 18, to which our author also appeals, we find that Pickering defines thus: “A hindrance, an obstacle; ‘fear hath an impediment,’ i.e., by apprehension of punishment.” He cites another instance where the word means “obstacle,” remarks that the proposed substitution of another term (κολόνα) is unauthorized, and that the same reading by Grotius in 1 John iv. 18 is incorrect.

Thus the authority for the sense of “torment,” even in very rare cases, is either too late, or too doubtful, for the great argument. And in the two places where the verb (κόλασις) occurs in the New Testament, Acts iv. 21, and 2 Pet. ii. 9, no one claims that it should be rendered “tormented.”

The sense of κόλασις varied with time, and we think with dialect. In the record we have of Christ’s teachings it is a γλύφων, (γλύφων), or it occurs but once. If the somewhat uncertain note of such a rare word is the most distinct assurance of a penalty of deathless woe—elsewhere called death—to millions, we may well ask, What is Revelation?

The precise phrase in question, κόλασις αἰώνιος, occurs in Philo, where it can not possibly denote “eternal punishment.” (See Debt and Grace, p. 118; Christ our Life, p. 123.) Though orthodox writers certainly will not fear to notice, and thus publish, this fact, yet such publication will, we think, mark a new stage of the discussion.
Nor is this alleged as the proper sense of the word in any of the twenty-eight examples of its occurrence in the Septuagint Greek. So far from this, our author, arguing against the favorite Universalist sense, of corrective chastisement, adduces two or three instances of punishment by death. And these are some of the instances we have offered against the current argument on Matt. xxv. 46. In a death-penalty, kolasis loses not only its character of chastening and discipline, but also the sense of infliction that ends in pain. We may speak of a person as “tormented to death;” but kolasis hardly means torment. We may speak of a person as “punished to death;” but this is not the form of speech in the cases in hand. It is punishment by death. Death is the punishment; not the pain of dying, but the loss of life and all its joys. Thus kolasis acquires a more general sense than the original one of “trimming” and chastisement, and applies to any thing that may be considered as penalty. Hence the phrase we adduced from 1 Esdras viii. 24: “They shall be punished (κολασθήσονται*), whether it be by death, or banishment, or confiscation of goods, or imprisonment.”

Though the term kolasis, then, does not mean death, yet death is kolasis. And if the soul can die, or be by any divine judgment condemned to perish, that death will also be kolasis. And if annihilation is eternal death, it is also eternal kolasis — everlasting punishment; and no argument for the “immortality of the soul” can be made from that final and decisive judgment.

We remarked that our author adduces two or three instances from the Septuagint of kolasis by death. But death is the actual punishment in most of the twenty-eight passages where the word occurs. And there is one example which Dr. T. fails to notice, but which shows that there might be kolasis without the possibility of pain. A lifeless block of wood might be the subject of it. The author of the Book of Wisdom says of an idol image: “That which was made, together with him who made

“Love and Penalty.” To reconcile these is the problem that presses every sufferer, and every one who pities others’ woes. The view we offer is supported, we think, by all analogy, since every serious and irreparable injury shortens life or precipitates death. And our view is finely stated in the words of an old writer: “Omnes peææ non exterminantes sunt medicinae.”

But when we suppose a final and extreme penalty—a last resort—which neither heals nor kills, the problem presents frightful if not insuperable difficulties. Given Infinite Love, to reconcile therewith—nay, to deduce therefrom—the ceaseless woe of millions of creatures of that Love. For, however rebellious any may become,—however they may seem to be verily children of the Wicked one,—yet we are all an offspring from God, and we can exist only by his suffrancé and upholding power. That eternal evil—rebellion for ever—accords with no rational view of God’s universal sovereignty, we have endeavored to show. And—to say nothing of the love of Him whose tender mercies are over all His works—we think no human reason can harmonize deathless pain with divine justice. Our author gives, in various pages, snatches of five or six of the theodicies we have examined. He advances nothing new, that we discover. But we may close with a few words upon his leading argument, which is in the general strain of Dr. Taylor’s Lectures on the Divine Moral Government.

“The demerit of sin,” we are told, “must be determined from the nature and value of the law which it violates.” And again: “The violation of this law is a deadly blow aimed at the happiness of the moral universe.” (Pp. 140, 143.) The italics are ours. It seems to us that centuries of very weak human government have vitiated our views of the government that is divine. The last enactment of that government invites us to love. And it gives commandment to love, not for the safety of the government, but from pure love to the governed, and with oft-repeated promise of “eternal life” to those who obey. Instead of this “new commandment,” another Decalogue, it seems to us, would better suit the received doctrine of penalty. Start-

ling as the sound may appear, would not the sense of the law which our author supposes run nearly thus?

Thou shalt not dethrone God. Nor create an Evil God beside him. Nor calumniate and ruin His good name for ever. Thou shalt remember and regard His eternal blessedness, not changing it to infinite wretchedness. Thou shalt honor the laws which He has made, and not repeal or annul them. Thou shalt not destroy and annihilate the universe. Nor confound and reduce all things back to chaos. Nor steal away the world of matter from that of mind. Nor defame the angelic host, and mar the peace that reigns in heaven. And thou shalt not covet the power to commit these sins, or to strike a fatal blow at the welfare of all being.*

With some fear that our first reviewer will again misunderstand us, we humbly submit that the transgression of such a law would confer scarcely less “dignity of wickedness” than the common theory implies. And the cry of astonishment,—Is thy servant a God, that he should do this infinite thing!—seems to us as proper in the common view as it would be in the supposed case. If our author means to say that infinite guilt can attach to any rash act, or any wild, wicked dream of a puny creature, then let the infinitude be plainly stated, and the rational argument for deathless penalty stand or fall with it. If he does not intend thus, then why shall we not apply to the proper being of the incorrigibly wicked, and in their strict sense, those emphatic words with which his argument began: THE WAGES OF SIN IS DEATH?

We are indeed finite creatures, born of yesterday. But death is penalty—not inexorable fate. Sinful are we, but there is love for us, and life. And though we are frail, eternity is not denied to us. “God so loved the world that He gave His only begotten Son, that whosoever believeth on Him might not perish, but have everlasting life.”

* The last clause suggests one of the more common theodicies, which we have examined under the title, “In suo infinito.” (Debt and Grace, pp. 89, 90.)
WORKS ON FUTURE LIFE.
BY C. F. HUDSON.


OPINIONS OF THE PRESS.—MOSTLY FROM OPPONENTS.

"Those who wish to understand the doctrine of annihilation as presented by a sincere, able, and scholarly expounder, should read the works of Prof. Hudson."—The Independent.

"We have here a work surpassing in elaborateness and completeness the most of modern theological productions. . . . The author is mild and candid in the statement of his views, correct in his representations of others, and exceedingly full and impartial in his exhibition of the various phases of belief and conjecture that have prevailed, both among philosophers and Christian writers, from the Fathers down to the present time."—Zion's Herald.

"We have read it with deep interest, and not without profit."—Congregationalist

"His work shows very careful and extensive research, and on many collateral points his suggestions will be found instructive and important. . . . The aim of the book is, by showing the limitation of evil, to vindicate the goodness of God. There is scarcely one of the numerous positions of the writer for which he does not find collateral support in passages from the writings of distinguished Christian authors of past centuries."—New York Evangelist.

"As a history of religious opinions, their relations and influence, it is a thesaurus. It has more real argument in it than almost any other 12mo volume of less than 500 pages we have ever seen. . . . It is impossible not to respect his candor and acknowledge his ability. He is not to be answered by a paragraph, nor disposed of by a sneer."—Free Will Baptist Quarterly.

"Moving straight in among some of the most perplexed, solemn, and profound questions of theological concern in our day,—especially those of Retribution, Human Nature, Divine Justice, and Love,—with a bold heart, a firm step, and a learned head, the author will not fail to get a hearing. He has suffered cheerfully, both for his orthodoxy and his liberality. Whatever sectarians and elders may do, thinkers and scholars will attend to him with respect."—Huntington's Monthly Religious Magazine.

"The following is from one of the best informed theologians of America:—

'It is a work with which no one who feels an interest in the subject can afford to dispense, whatever may be his views. The matter of fact and argument condensed in it would be expanded by many writers into half a dozen volumes. . . . I am persuaded that there is no single work which gives so good an historical view of the various forms of opinion in relation to the matters discussed . . . It is not merely a work of learning; it is full of thought."—Christian Register.

A "most extraordinary book,—on the score of argumentative ability, among the greatest contributions that have been made to theological literature in America for many years."—Universalist Quarterly.

"His argument—founded on Scripture and the creed of the early Christian Church—is profound and powerful."—N. Y. Morning Express.

"Unquestionably the most candid and the most able work yet produced in our theological literature against the doctrine of eternal suffering . . . The book cannot fail to make a stir among theologians."—Christian Advocate and Journal.

"The most learned, acute, and able treatise called out by the controversy. A work pervaded by an admirable spirit."—Alger's "History of the Doctrine of a Future Life."
From Rev. Convers Francis, D. D., Professor in Cambridge Divinity School.

"The most complimentary notices have certainly done it no more than justice—hardly that. The more I have read it, the more I have admired the very thorough and painstaking research, the profound scholarship, and the able, fair reasoning, which pervade the whole work. I really think it is a book of higher theological character than we have had among us for a long time. The ability, the sound learning, and the extent of research, by which it is characterized, will entitle it to rank among the works of permanent and settled value in theology."

From the Author of "Life in Christ," a Congregational Minister, London, Eng. [The gentleman to whom John Foster addressed his noted Restoration Letter.]

"Thanks for the noble gift. ... I think you have treated the subject in a manner which must command the attention of scholars on both shores of the Atlantic. I truly congratulate you on having enabled to render this signal service to the cause of that which seems to be important truth."

"The author is a fine scholar, and writes with ability."—Central Chr. Herald.

"A learned and able work."—Methodist Quarterly Review.

"On every page it affords proof that it is the work of a scholar, who is well furnished by wide reading and patient investigation, and who has the modest and reverent spirit of an earnest seeker of truth."—Unitarian Quar. Journal.


"The candor of his statements and reasoning is admirable. ... It is the most able and complete exhibition of a view which is far more likely to make converts in the future than Universalism. ... The entire subject of future punishment needs a new discussion, by men of eminent scholarship, vigorous thought, and genuine piety."—Congregational Herald.

"Whatever support can be contributed to this doctrine by affluent learning, scholarly culture, brilliancy and force of style, and dialectic astuteness, is subsidized for the purpose in this massive and compact volume. The number of editions it has reached, notwithstanding the immense burden of quotations from ancient and modern sources, which the author's exhaustive reading has enabled him to pack into it, evinces its power. ... Of course, we have no room here to undertake a refutation of this subtle and dangerous book, which is likely to promote what we believe to be one of the most threatening and pestilential heresies just now crowding upon us."—Princeton Review.

"The appearance of the fourth edition of this book is evidence of its popularity and its mischief. It is spiritedly written, and with considerable show of learning and of philosophical method. A sort of halo is thrown round the subject by a style which, though not always transparent, is yet singularly elastic, copious, and vigorous."—Christian Review.

"Mr. H. has carefully studied the literature of the controversy. The arguments are quiet, clear, and, in general, candid. ... It is, by far, the ablest book we have ever read on the subject. ... Of course, it does not convince us that the orthodox view is erroneous, but we cannot believe that truth will suffer by fair and candid discussion. ... The book is worthy of a careful study and of a candid answer."—Presbyterian Quarterly.

"We have here the whole literature of the question. And the reader will be well repaid by a masterly accumulation of testimony, as to the meaning and usage of terms and the faith of eminent Christians, through the whole history of the church. Also, by many worthy and truthful reflections."—W. M. Ferrell; God in His Providence, p. 287.

Able, searching, and exhaustive. The author sustains the position he has taken with ability and success.—Boston Atlas

It exhibits the same constructive skill, sharp dialectics, copious learning, keen criticism, and general good temper as his former work.—Methodist Quarterly.

A pious and learned work.—Boston Traveller

The conclusion legitimate, and to many minds will be conclusive. The book is adapted to do good.—Christian Era.

Very closely and compactly written. . . . The thoroughness, spirit of candor and courtesy, etc.—Advent Herald.

Whoever wishes to see whatever may be fairly and candidly urged against natural immortality on scriptural grounds, will find this brief work better adapted to his purpose than any thing beside which has come under our notice.—F. W. B. Quarterly.

Every sincere disciple will find great help from his books; in common with the writings of Olehhausen, Tholuck, Maurice, Kingsley; they make it very plain that the popular doctrine of Retribution must be reconsidered and resisted.—Monthly Religious Magazine.

Mr. H. is now the most prominent, as well as incomparably the ablest champion of the "annihilation" theory of future punishment. . . . His argument, though not convincing to our minds, is learned, ingenious, plausible, and, in many respects, instructive.—Congregational Herald.


It is a real mitigation of our regret [to see him in the position of an opponent], that we find in him still the gentleman, scholar, and Christian. . . . Further, it is a positive satisfaction to read an argument against Universalism that has something of freshness and power.—Universalist Quarterly.

His style is lucid, compact, precise, and vigorous. Pre-eminently he is a man of soft words and hard arguments.—F. W. B. Quarterly.

An extended discussion upon the points of difference between them; conducted in a kind tone, and with considerable fairness and thoroughness.—Congregationalist.

One of marked ability on both sides.—Boston Atlas.

There is no lack of ability on either side, though Mr. Hudson exhibits the more learning, acuteness, etc.—Congregational Herald.


THE RICH MAN AND LAZARUS. 24 pp. 5 cts.

THE RIGHTS OF WRONG; or, Is Evil Eternal. With a Reply to Dr. Mansel. Fifth Thousand. 24 pp. 5 cts.

REVIEWERS REVIEWED. Brief Replies to various Criticisms and other Arguments. 36 pp. 10 cts.


JAMES MUNROE & CO., Publishers,
134 Washington Street, Boston.