THE

THEOLOGICAL WORKS

OF

HERBERT THORNDIKE.
THE

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of

HERBERT THORNDIKE,

SOMETIME PREBENDARY OF THE COLLEGIATE CHURCH OF ST. PETER,
WESTMINSTER.

VOL. III.—PART II.

OXFORD:
JOHN HENRY PARKER.
M DCCC LI.
TITLE OF THE WORK, THE SECOND BOOK OF WHICH IS CONTAINED IN THIS VOLUME.

An Epilogue to the Tragedy of the Church of England, being a necessary Consideration and brief Resolution of the chief Controversies in Religion that divide the Western Church: occasioned by the present calamity of the Church of England; in three books: viz. of

I. THE PRINCIPLES OF CHRISTIAN TRUTH;
II. THE COVENANT OF GRACE;
III. THE LAWS OF THE CHURCH:

BY HERBERT THORNDIKE.

London; Printed by J. M. and T. R. for J. Martin, J. Allestry, and T. Dicas, and are to be sold at the sign of the Bell, in St. Paul's Churchyard. 1669.
OF THE

COVENANT OF GRACE.
THE

CONTENTS OF THE SECOND BOOK.

OF THE COVENANT OF GRACE.

CHAPTER I.

Two parts of that which remains. How the dispute concerning the Holy Trinity with Socinus belongs to the first. The question of justification by faith alone. The opinion of Socinus concerning the whole covenant of grace. The opinion of those who make justifying faith the knowledge of a man's predestination, opposite to it in the other extreme. The difference between it and that of the Antinomians. That there are mean opinions.

Page 1

CHAPTER II.

Evidence what is the condition of the covenant of grace. The contract of baptism. The promise of the Holy Ghost annexed to Christ's, not to John's, baptism. Those are made Christ's disciples as Christians, that take up His cross in baptism. The effects of baptism according to the apostles.

Page 15

CHAPTER III.

The exhortations of the apostles, that are drawn from the patterns of the Old Testament, suppose the same. How the sacraments of the Old and New Testament are the same, how not the same. How the New Testament and the New Covenant are both one. The free-will of man acteth the same part in dealing about the New Covenant, as about the Old. The Gospel a law.

Page 29
CONTENTS.

CHAPTER IV.

The consent of the whole Church evidenced by the custom of catechizing. By the opinion thereof concerning the salvation of those that delayed their baptism. By the rites and ceremonies of baptism. Why no penance for sins before, but after, baptism. The doctrine of the Church of England evident in this case. 40

CHAPTER V.

The preaching of our Lord and His apostles evidenceth, that some act of man's free choice is the condition which it requireth. The correspondence between the Old and New Testament inferreth the same. So do the errors of Socinians and Antinomians concerning the necessity of baptism. Objections deferred. 55

CHAPTER VI.

Justifying faith sometimes consists in believing the truth; sometimes, in trust in God grounded upon the truth; sometimes, in Christianity, that is, in embracing and professing it. And that in the Fathers as well as in the Scriptures. Of the Informed and Formed Faith of the Schools. 68

CHAPTER VII.

The last signification of faith is properly justifying faith: the first, by a metonymy of the cause; the second, of the effect. Those that are not justified, do truly believe. The trust of a Christian presupposeth him to be justified. All the promises of the Gospel become due at once by the covenant of grace. That to believe that we are elect or justified, is not justifying faith. 85

CHAPTER VIII.

The objection from St. Paul:—We are not justified by the Law nor by works, but by grace and by faith. Not meant of the Gospel, and the works that suppose it. The question that St. Paul speaks to, is of the law of Moses and the works of it. He sets those works in the same rank with the works of the Gentiles by the light of nature. The civil and outward works of the Law may be done by Gentiles. How the Law is a pedagogue to Christ. 99
CONTENTS

CHAPTER IX.

Of the faith and justification of Abraham and the Patriarchs, according to the apostles. Of the prophets and righteous men under the Law. Abraham and Rahab the harlot justified by works, if justified by faith. The promises of the Gospel depend upon works which the Gospel enjoineth. The tradition of the Church. .......................... 118

CHAPTER X.

What Pelagius questioneth concerning the grace of Christ. What Socinus further of the state of Christ before His birth. The opposition between the first and second Adam in St. Paul, evidenceth original sin. Concupiscence in the unregenerate, and the inability of the Law to subdue it, evict the same. The second birth by the Holy Ghost evidenceth that the first birth propagateth sin. ............................................. 148

CHAPTER XI.

The Old Testament chargeth all men as well as the wicked to be sinful from the womb. David complaineth of himself as born in sin, no less than the Wise Man of the children of the Gentiles. How Levitical laws argue the same. And temporal death under the Old Testament. The Book of Wisdom. And the Greek Bible. ............................................. 173

CHAPTER XII.

The heresy of Simon Magnus the beginning of the Gnostics. That they were in being during the apostles' time. Where and when the heresy of Cerinthus prevailed, and that they were Gnostics. The beginning of the Encratites under the apostles. It is evident, that One God in Trinity was then glorified among the Christians, by the "Fulness of the Godhead" which they introduced instead of It. .................................................. 182

CHAPTER XIII.

The Word was at the beginning of all things. The apparitions of the Old Testament prefaces to the incarnation of Christ. Ambassadors are not honoured with the honour due to their masters. The Word of God that was afterwards incarnate, was in those angels that spoke in God's Name. No angel honoured as God under the New Testament. The Word was with God at the beginning of all things as after His return. 206
CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XIV.

The Name of God not ascribed to Christ for the like reason as to creatures. The reasons why the Socinians worship Christ as God, do confute their limitations. Christ not God by virtue of His rising again. He is "the Great God," with St. Paul; "the true God," with St. John; "the only Lord," with St. Jude. Other Scriptures. Of the "form of God," and "of a servant," in St. Paul. . . . . . . . 219

CHAPTER XV.

Not only the Church but the world was made by Christ. The Word was made flesh, in opposition to the spirit. How the prophets, how Christians, by receiving the Word of God, are possessed by His Spirit. How the title of Son of God importeth the Godhead. How Christ is the Brightness and Image of God. . . . . . . . 234

CHAPTER XVI.

The testimonies of Christ's Godhead in the Old Testament are first understood of the figures of Christ. Of the Wisdom of God in Solomon and elsewhere. Of the writings of the Jews as well before as after Christ. 263

CHAPTER XVII.

Answer to those texts of Scripture that seem to abate the true Godhead in Christ. Of that "creature" whereof Christ is "the first-born," and that which the Wisdom of God "made." That this belief is the original tradition of the Church. What means this dispute furnisheth us with against the Arians. That it is reason to submit to revelation concerning the nature of God. The use of reason is no way renounced by holding this faith. . . . . . . . . . . . . . 273

CHAPTER XVIII.

The necessity of the grace of Christ is the evidence of original sin. How the exaltation of our Lord depends upon His humiliation, and the grace of Christ upon that. All the work of Christianity is ascribed to the grace of Christ. God's predestination manifesteth the same. . . . . . 316
CONTENTS

CHAPTER XIX.
Evidences of the same in the Old Testament. Of God's help in getting the land of promise; and renewing the covenant: and that for Christ's sake. That Christianity cannot stand without acknowledging the grace of Christ. The tradition of the Church: in the baptism of infants; in the prayers of the Church; in the decrees against Pelagius, and other records of the Church.  

CHAPTER XX.
Wherein original sin consisteth. What opinions are on foot. That it is not Adam's sin imputed to his posterity. Whether man were at the first created to a supernatural end, or not. An estate of mere nature, but innocent, possible. Original sin is concupiscence. How baptism voids it. Concerning the late novelty in the Church of England about original sin.  

CHAPTER XXI.
The opinion that makes the predetermination of man's will by God the source of his freedom; and wherein Jansenius differs from it. Of necessity upon supposition and absolute. The necessity of the will following the last dictate of the understanding is only upon supposition; as also that which God's foresight creates. The difference between indifferent and undetermined.  

CHAPTER XXII.
The Gospel findeth man free from necessity, though not from bondage. Of the antecedent and consequent will of God. Predetermination not the root, but the rooting up, of freedom and of Christianity. Against the opinion of Jansenius.  

CHAPTER XXIII.
A man is able to do things truly honest under original sin. But not to make God the end of all his doings. How all the actions of the Gentiles are sins. They are accountable only for the law of nature. How all men have or have not grace sufficient to save.
CHAPTER XXIV.

Though God determineth not the will immediately; yet He determineth the
effect thereof by the means of His providence, presenting the object so
as He foresees it will choose. The cases of Pharaoh, of Solomon, of
Ahab, and of the Jews that crucified Christ. Of God's foreknowledge
of future conditionals that come not to pass. The ground of fore-
knowledge of future contingencies. Difficult objections answered. . . 447

CHAPTER XXV.

The grounds of the difference between sufficient and effectual. How natural
occasions conduce to supernatural actions. The insufficiency of Jansenius his doctrine. Of sufficient grace under the law of Moses and
nature. . . . . . . . . . . . 475

CHAPTER XXVI.

Predestination to grace absolute, to glory respective. Purpose of denying
effectual grace absolute, of punishing respective. The end to which
God predestinates, is not the end for which He predestinates. Grace
the reward of the right use of grace. How much of the question the
Gospel determines not. That our endeavours are engaged no less than
if predestination were not, it determineth. Of the tradition of the
Church: and of Semi-Pelagians, Predestinatians, and Arminians. . . . 496

CHAPTER XXVII.

The question concerning the satisfaction of Christ, with Socinus. The reason
why sacrifices are figures of Christ, common to all sacrifices. Why,
and what sacrifices the Fathers had; what the Law added. Of our
ransom by the price of Christ's propitiatory sacrifice. . . . . . . . . 536

CHAPTER XXVIII.

Christ took away our sin by bearing the punishment of it. The prophecy
of Esay liii. We are reconciled to God by the Gospel in considera-
tion of Christ's obedience. The reconcilement of Jews and Gentiles,
men and angels, consequent to the same. Of purging and expiating
sin by Christ, and making propitiation for it. Of Christ's dying
for us. . . . . . . . . . . . 547
CONTENTS.

CHAPTER XXIX.

The grant of grace in consideration of Christ supposes satisfaction made by Him for sin. Neither our sins imputable to Christ, nor His sufferings to us, formally and personally; but as the meritorious causes which satisfaction answereth. The effect of it, the covenant of grace: as well as help to perform it. The Fathers saved by the faith of Christ to come. The Gospel a new law. The property of satisfaction and punishment in Christ's sufferings. Of the sense of the Catholic Church. 565

CHAPTER XXX.

God might have reconciled man to Himself without the coming of Christ. The promises of the Gospel depend as well upon His active as passive obedience. Christ need not suffer hell-pains that we might not. The opinion that maketh justifying faith to be trust in God, not true; yet not prejudicial to the faith. The decree of the Council of Trent, and the doctrine of the School; how it is not prejudicial to the faith. As also that of Socinus. 585

CHAPTER XXXI.

The state of the question concerning the perseverance of those that are once justified. Of three senses, one true, one inconsistent with the faith, the third neither true nor yet destructive to the faith. Evidence from the writings of the apostles. From the Old Testament. The grace of prophecy—when it presupposeth sanctifying grace. Answer to some texts: and of St. Paul's meaning in the seventh of the Romans. Of the polygamy of the Fathers. What assurance of grace Christians may have. The tradition of the Church. 615

CHAPTER XXXII.

How the fulfilling of God's law is possible, how impossible, for a Christian. Of the difference between mortal and venial sin. What love of God and of our neighbour was necessary under the Old Testament. Whether the Sermon on the Mount correct the false interpretation of the Jews, or enhance the obligation of the Law. Of the difference between matter of precept and matter of counsel; and the perfection of Christians. 659

CHAPTER XXXIII.

Whether any works of Christians be satisfactory for sin, and meritorious of heaven; or not. The recovery of God's grace for a Christian fallen from it, a work of labour and time. The necessity and efficacy of penance to that purpose, according to the Scriptures, and the practice of the Church. Merit by virtue of God's promise necessary. The Catholic Church agrees in it. The present Church of Rome allows merit of justice. 695
CHAPTER XXI.


These things thus premised, as concerning that estate, where- in the Gospel overtaketh the will of man, to whom Christ is tendered, being under original sin; I say, that it finds him not void of that freedom of choice in doing or not doing this or that, which stands in opposition to necessity, but that which stands in opposition to the bondage and servitude of sin. This position is intended to contradict an opinion, which seemeth to be very ordinary among divines, as well of the Reformation as the Church of Rome, though more ingenuously professed and maintained by these; who, pretending to derive the efficacy of God's predestination, and the grace which it provideth, from that decree of His will whereby He determineth the will of His creature to do or not to do whatsoever is indeed done or not done, in order of nature before it determine itself, do consequently profess, that, notwithstanding this predetermination of the will is no less effectual than God's omnipotence (whereof it is the immediate and indefeasible consequence and effect), yet there is no freedom in the creature, no contingence in the effects of it, but that which followeth upon this will of God, determining understanding creatures to do that which they do freely, as it determines natural things to do that which they do necessarily*.

* This account, so far as it relates to the doctrine of the Thomists, is taken from Jansenius, Augustinus, tom. iii. De Gratia Christi Salvatoris, lib. viii. c. 1. p. 348. a. ed. Paris, 1641. "Doctores hujus temporis qui de gratia efficaci magno conatu disputant, in duas capitales opiniones distinct sunt. Alii," (scil. sectores S. Thomae) "naturam ejus in quadam Dei motione aut impulsu collocant, quæ ex se voluntatem efficaciter determinet ad consensum, ita scilicet et ut, ea posita et passive recepta in voluntatem, statim consensus ejus præstæ sit, simulque stare non possit ut dissensat. Hanc ut aliquis habeat dieunt non esse in hominis potestate, quia datur ex Divino beneplacito; sive qua tamen fieri non possit, ut quicquam aut boni

THORNDIKE.

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§ 2. This position, though I intend not to admit, yet I count it a point of ingenuity in them, who think they free themselves of great difficulties by supposing it, expressly to maintain the truth of that supposition, whereof they make so much advantage. For they, who, not daring to encounter the difficulties wherewith it is chargeable, do claim the consequences of it without premising the express supposition of it, do as good as say nothing; where they advise not the reader of those difficulties, which the prime principle that they proceed upon is burthened with. But he, that sees how particular instances depend upon general principles, shall not stick to judge of their positions by the dependance they have upon this supposition, so soon as they are informed of the credit which it deserves. Now this predetermination being the immediate effect of God’s omnipotency, as for the cause of it, [so⁴] for the nature of it, troubles very much those that maintain it to say wherein it consists; as indeed it may very well trouble any man to say of what colour a chimara is, being in rerum natura just nothing. For if they say it is a principle infused by the immediate work of grace into the will, it is straightforward evident, that the having of it is not to make the will able, which all habitual endowments tend to, but to make it actually to work. It must therefore consist in a certain motion or impulse, immediately wrought by God in the will, which though it is not in the will to have, depending merely upon the will of God, yet that neither good nor ill can be done without it: being necessary (as they think⁵) to the effectual determining of the will upon two accounts; first, as the will is a secondary cause, that cannot work unless moved by the first cause; secondly, as the will, not being determined of itself, cannot be determined to any act but by the same first cause. But these two accounts seem to me both one. For nothing can determine the will to act, speak-
OF THE COVENANT OF GRACE.

ing of that which determines it formally, or in the nature of a formal cause, but the act of it. For, supposing the will to act, and excluding whatsoever else might be considered, the will remains determined: not supposing that, it may further be questioned, what determines it. The question then being only, what it is that determines the will in the nature of the effective cause, the difficulty that causeth the question is but one; because it is presumed, that the second cause cannot act, if not acted, that is, determined to act, by the first. The nature then of this motion, received and lodged in the will, is imagined nevertheless to be successive; such as is the being of colours in the air, when they go to the eye, or that impulse which a handicraft-man moves his tool with. And the necessity of it standeth upon a general account, not of original sin, but of God's creature (such as in all estates is requisite to the acts of the will); because nothing can be done by the creature but that which God shall determine it to do.

§ 3. But there is of late another opinion started in the Church of Rome by Janseniwis, in his Augustinus; which maintains, that the will, in all actions that are good according to Christianity, is determined by grace, effectually inclining the will by the love of true good, preventing (not expecting) the motion thereof, and producing that influence of the will whereby formally it acteth. The nature of it, then,

4 "Juxta sententiam istorum recentiorum" (viz. the Thomiste), "prae determinatio physica est motio nescio quae virtuosa, qua habeat esse quoddam incomplenum, et sit in voluntate per modum quo colores sunt in aere, et impetus in re quae impellitur." Cornel. Jansen., ibid. c. 2. p. 349. a.

* So corrected in MS. "as the will in," in orig. text.

1 "Quamvis... tanta inter physicam prae determinationem, prout a Scholasticis defendi solet, et medicinalis Christi adiutorium discentiania sit, in hoc tamen... cum ea convenit, quod officium physice prae determinandi voluntatem ei vere competat, eoque vocabulo non abstrahat sed concreto et unico meritum appellari possit. Nam hoc ipso quo... secundum principia sancti Augustini, gratia vera Christi est... adiutorium quo... fit velle atque perficere, prout ab... adiutorio sine quo non distinguatur... itemque adiutorium non... potentiare... quod velle et agere possimus, si volumus, sed... voluntatis et actionis... quo Deus facit ut reipien velimus et agamus... prout ea... suas... locas... demonstrata... sunt... perspicue patet, istud adiutorium esse tale, ut voluntatem cum quocumque alia gratia in potentia constitutam ad actum protrahat, non si voluerit (quemadmodum gratia Adami et Angelorum... &c.),... sed ei efficacissime praebendo ut velit. Non enim expectat ut voluntas secum influat... sed fact sim... secundum voluntatem, applicans eam ad volendum agendumque, quicquid per eam Deus volendum agendumque constituerit. Cum enim per terrenas cupiditates voluntas ad non volendum, imo ad repugnandum, determinata sit; tollit istam depressionem atque determinationem in contrarium, et reflectit eam..."
consists in that very act of life, whereby the reasonable creature exerciseth its choice, no ways requisite to the actions of nature, which man is able to do under original sin; but merely upon that account, as the cure of it, restoring the due command over that concupiscence wherein original sin consisteth, and not extending to the state of innocence.

§ 4. Which notwithstanding, the will is no less naturally determined by it, than by that principle which the other opinion advanceth. For they say both, that the will is not determined by the object, howsoever proposed, but morally; as he that outwardly adviseth or persuadeth, determineth him that resolves, upon that consideration which he advanceth, to that which he proposeth. And therefore this determination, both agree, satisfies not that efficacy of grace, which the scriptures proposed in the premises require. Therefore, as the former opinion determineth the will naturally, by a principle really lodged in the nature of the will; so this, by the very vital act of willing, really subsisting in the nature of the will, though produced by God, a cause above nature; which, when the delight in good which it importeth is so great as to swallow up all contradiction, it determineth to the same, preventing the determination of itself; when otherwise, acknowledging, that, though of the same nature with that which overcometh, it is nevertheless defeasible.

§ 5. From this ground there flows another difference between these two opinions; [as h] we go further from the fountain head, still more visible. For the former, admitting free-will to

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*See the passages cited in note f.*

*Added from MS.*
be a faculty, able to act or not to act (supposing all that is requisite to enable it, in particular the helps of God’s grace), assails all difficulties, by distinguishing the compound sense of those sayings, which express contradiction between pre-determination and freedom, from the divided sense of the same. For example, if it be said, that to which the will is predetermined must needs come to pass, therefore the will cannot be free to choose whether it shall be done or not; the answer is, that the will is able to do otherwise “in sensu diviso non in sensu composito,” dividing it from the determination of it, that is, not being determined, but not putting it and the determination of it together, that is, being determined. So the will hath, as they say, “simultatem potentiae,” not “potentiam simulatit;” that is, in their barbarous Latin, a power of doing this as well as that at one and the same time, not a power of choosing or acting both this and that at one and the same time. For the ability of doing may well stand with the actual choice of not doing; but actually at the same time to choose to do and not to do, are terms inconsistent: as it may be truly said, that a white wall may be black, though not, supposing it continue white! This dis-

14 Eire quidquid ab adversariis subjici potest, unica illa distinctione sensus compositi in diviso, in quo sumi praedeterminationis physicae defensores adhibent, solvi ac dissipari potest. Non enim necesse est, siunt ut cum omnibus illis ad agendum requisiti, inter que etiam caelestis delectatio est, et simul ut non agat voluntas; sed solum ut possit non agere. In libero enim arbitrio quantumcumque ad agendum preparato, ino determinatio et actu operante, repertur (ut ipsi docent) simultas potentiae ad operandum et non operandum; non potentia simulatit, ut videlicet simul agat et non agat. Hoc est, ut clarius dicatur, in libero arbitrio est potestas ad opposita, non tamen potestas ad opposita simul in se habenda. Hoc enim nemo nisi fatus dixerit. Hoc ergo sensu inter intelligendum esse docent id quod adversarii ad libertatem postulat, ut videlicet posita omnibus ad agendum requisitis, etiam caelestis quamcumque delectatione et praeordinatione, et simul ut possit non velle, non autem ut simul non velit. Potentia enim non volendi non repugnat omnibus illis ad volendum requisitis, sed

solum, quod actualiter non velit. Itaque, in sensu diviso, potest voluntas non facere id quod Deus per gratiam efficacem in ea operatur; in ipsius voluntatis composito, nequaquam. 

Eodem modo locus Concilii Tridentini, quo dicit, quod ‘liberum arbitrium a Deo motum et excitatum possit dissentiere si velit;’ itemque quod ‘inspirationem recipiens, illum et abjiciere potest: ‘non difficuler ab eis et a nobis solvi potest. Concilium enim in sensu diviso, inquirent, loquitur; quo significatur, uta hominem recipere Dei inspirationem, et motionem, et excitationem istius delectationis aut praeordinationis (addo, si liber, etiam actuali ipsius voluntatis consensione ac motum), ut nihil aferat ejus voluntatis potestatem dissentienti, si velit, quamvis actualis dissensus cum illis presuppositis componi nequeat. Potestas enim dissentienti non repugnat isti excitationi, aut delectationi, aut praeordinationi, aut ipsi etiam consensui actuali voluntatis, sed tantum dissensus actualis: quamadmodum, cum paries albus vere dicitur esse posse niger, non hoc significatur, quod albedine permanente simul in eo
BOOK II.

...tinction I cannot see how Jansenius can employ, though he think he may, whether it serve the purpose or not. For that indifference wherein the first opinion maintaineth the very nature of free-will to consist, at least in words (whether they signify any thing or not), the second maintaineth to be so far from the nature of it, that the freedom of the will is not to be had and obtained without either abating or extinguishing all indifference in it: the will being free from sin and slave to righteousness (which is an addition making the slavery of the will no slavery, but the freedom thereof perfect freedom), or else free from righteousness and slave to sin (which slavery is perfect slavery, but imaginary freedom), according as it grows, of indifferent, determined to righteousness or to sin; which he pretendeth to be the only freedom whereby it is capable. And how then should Jansenius employ the distinction premised, to salve that indifference of the will which he disavoweth? And therefore, in consequence hereunto, they can neither admit that any help of grace is sufficient that is not effectual (and so, that he who keeps not the covenant of grace was ever able to keep it), nor that our Lord Christ shed His blood for any but them who are and shall be actually saved by it.

§ 6. As for those of the Reformation (amongst whom it is manifest, that this great question of the agreement between grace and free-will is as hotly disputed as in the Church of Rome),

[And those of the Reformation.]

nigredo reperi possit, sed quod simul cum albedine sit in eo potentia ut fiat niger. Haec et similia respondent ii qui physicam tuentur prae determinationem, ut per eam non destrui libertatem patefaciant. Quae sane omnia ad istam veram Augustini gratiam ab adversariis argumentis eripiendam, tuendamque illam arbitrii libertatem quam putant esse necessarium, mutatis tantum vocabulis, huc transfert possent."

See the end of the passage quoted in the last note.

1 So corrected both in errata and in MS. But the MS. also reads, "serve the other opinion to any purpose or not?" which seems to be nearer Thornike's meaning.

Liquet, quod illa major quod latitudo libertatis respectu tam boni quam mali, que in illo primo hominem et angelorum statu apparuit, non ex natura, multo minus ex perfectione liberis voluntatis fluxerit, sed potius ex ejus naturali et concreta imperfectione. Quae ex perfectione vera libertatis sua voluntate excidere potest nai Deus impeditat; unde fieri non potest ut ista latitudine actuam liberam voluntatem sit natura vel perfectio libertatis; sic ut fieri non potest, ut potestas claudicandi sit natura vel perfectio potestatis progressiva, vel potestas errandi intelligitiae, vel mortalitatis hominis, vel aequivocabilitas carnis... Non enim ideis liberum arbitrium non habent, quia pecuta eos delectare non possunt, "Magis quippe esse liberum, a delectatione pecandi usque ad delectationem non pecandi indeclinabilem liberatum."

OF THE COVENANT OF GRACE.

CHAP. XXI.

upon the whether of these opinions they ground themselves who reject Arminius and the Lutherans, it is not so easy to say; as it may clearly be said, that they must choose the one or the other, if they will speak things consequent to their own principles. It is manifest, that Doctor Twisse hath embraced the former: which he that should say that any of the rest have forborne to employ, either because they could not make it popular to the capacity of vulgar understandings, or because they found not themselves able to manage it, perhaps should not conjecture much amiss. But we have of late a work of one Doctor Strang, late of Glasgow, *De Voluntate et Actionibus Dei circa peccatum*; wherein he maintains at large, against Doctor Twisse in particular, that it makes God the author of all sin, and by consequence plucks up all Christianity by the roots. For the rest, professing to embrace the opinion of Jansenius, as confining the predetermination of man’s will to all works of supernatural grace, though not undertaking to maintain it, he hath added unto it that wherein it is certainly defective; to wit, an account how evil can be fore-known by God, not determining the will of the creature to act it. For, this being done, the same account will serve to reconcile the free-will of the creature, both to the activity of providence in general, and to the efficacy of predestination in matters concerning the world to come. Which how securely soever Jansenius pass by, he may think that he hath secured the point of faith con-

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[Note: The text is not fully transcribed due to visibility issues. The full text is not provided.]
BOOK II.

Concerning the grace of Christ, but he cannot think that he hath satisfied any divine, that the rest of the question can be resolved according to his opinion, as the reason of Christianity requireth. I am much in fear, that our puritan preachers, when they swagger over the Arminians in their pulpits, do neither inform them, how great a part of the reformation, as all the Lutherans make, is on their side (neither the Church of England nor that of Rome having given sentence in the whole question); nor what difficulties their own opinion is liable to, which it would make their hearts ache to overcome. For my part, finding the determination of the Synod of Dort against Arminius not to reach the whole question (concerning the reconciling of man's freedom, as well to God's foreknowledge and providence, as to His predestination and grace), I have thought best to propose the opinion of predetermination (which pretends to do it, but does it not, as I suppose), together with that wherein Jansenius varies from it, to make such a resolution as I am able to propose in so difficult a business, the better to be understood.

§ 7. Now for that which I propose, that the will of man, though under original sin, is free from necessity, though not free from bondage (which is to say, that neither as a second cause, nor upon the account of Adam's fall, it is determined to do or not to do that which indeed it doth); I must distinguish, that necessity upon supposition is not that necessity which the will of man is free from, and which the contingency of the effects thereof is opposite to. For if any thing be said to be necessary upon supposition, not of the cause which necessarily produceth it, but of itself which is supposed to be, well may it be said necessarily to be, because it is upon the like necessity, as every thing that is must needs be, because that you suppose that it is. In like manner, if you suppose any thing which implieth the being of another thing (as if a man see London-stone), because no man sees that which is not, this supposition infers not that necessity which destroys freedom; because it imports the being of that which you suppose.

1 "Τὸ μὲν ἔνεστι τὸ ἐν ἐστὶν ἐκ τὸῦ ἀνάγκης ὡς ἐστι, καὶ τὸ ἀνάγκης ἐκ τοῦ ἐστιν ἐκ τοῦ ἀνάγκης." —Aristot., De Interpre., c. ix. § 11.
OF THE COVENANT OF GRACE.

CHAP. XXI.

That necessity that destroyeth freedom and contingency, is antecedent to the being of contingencies, in the nature of an effective cause, though not always absolute. For he which will speak properly and safely, must not call any thing absolutely necessary but God alone, and His perfections; from Whose free-will all the necessity that is found in His creatures proceedeth. But, in regard that we see the sun rise and set always in one constant order, the fire always burn, and the earth always keep the place, truly we distinguish these things as necessary, from those that come to pass either so or otherwise; as having a presumption, from so much experience of the will of God, which all things must obey, already past upon the course of their nature, by the causes, which, being thereby produced, cannot but by the same will be defeated. But of this, I do not see what question can remain.

§ 8. One kind of determination I shall grant upon the premises, that the will of man is liable [to; that is, that]

The necessity which it inferreth, not prejudicing the freedom of it. I grant, that the will necessarily followeth the last and ultimate dictate of the practic understanding: setting this grant aside, as impertinent to the question in dispute; for the last dictate of the understanding, that advises about doing or not doing this or that, imports more than a judgment that it is best to do or not to do this or that, or that it ought to be done or not done by him that will do as he ought. For it is manifest, that a man many times does not do that which he is resolved that he ought to do. And so it may fall out, that such a dictate or sentence shall not be the last or ultimate dictate of the understanding; because, falling to advise anew after that sentence, it may find some new consideration, whereupon it may resolve to proceed otherwise than afore. Therefore, the last or ultimate dictate of the understanding cannot be understood to be any other than that which is effectual; that is to say, when it is supposed,
that the effects follow upon it. And upon these terms I
grant, that the will is necessarily determined by the last
dictate of the understanding; inasmuch as it is supposed
to be necessary, that the will be determined by some judg-
ment of the understanding, either expressly pronouncing, or
implicitly resolving, that this or that is for the best to be
done or not done. So that he that says, that the will is
necessarily determined by the last judgment of the under-
standing, says no more but this, that the will is necessarily
determined by that judgment which determines it. For,
supposing it is the last, you suppose that the will proceeds to
action upon it. So that the necessity which all this infers
is no prejudice to freedom or contingency, being only the
necessity of that, which must needs be because you suppose
that it is1.

§ 9. The like is to be said of the foreknowledge or foresight,
which God hath, of whatsoever shall at any time come to pass,
and the necessity which, though it causeth not, yet it in-
ferreth". For no man can know that which is not true, nor
see that which is not in being; neither can that be foreseen,
which is not to have being at that time when it is foreseen
to come to pass: and therefore all foresight necessarily im-
plies a supposition of the future being of that which is fore-
seen. A thing necessarily true, howsoever we suppose the
will to be determined to do whatsoever it doth; that is to
say, whatsoever we suppose to be the ground of God’s fore-
sight. For, supposing that God from everlasting foresaw
that St. Paul should be converted at such a moment of time,
because He had a purpose from everlasting to determine his
will freely to embrace Christ at that moment of time; yet
was not St. Paul converted because God foresaw that he
should be converted; but, because he was to be converted,
therefore God foresaw that he should be converted.

§ 10. Indeed we are to distinguish three instances in the
knowledge of God concerning future contingencies. In the
first, He sees what may come to pass; in the second, what
shall come to pass; in the third, what is come to pass. The
first, by the perfection of His nature: the second, by the

* See Bramhall as above quoted, pp. 43, 44: and num. xi. pp. 61, 62; and xxiv. pp. 158, sq.
num. xxii. pp. 147, 148.
decree of His will, giving steady order to things of themselves moveable, as Boethius says (that is, to contingencies; for we suppose contingency to stand with providence, and we enquire how that consistence may appear): the third, by the act of freedom, seen from everlasting, before the will that doth it have being, in those very decrees, in the execution whereof providence consists. There is in an architect, or surveyor of buildings, a certain knowledge of that which he designeth, before he go to work; consisting in a certain idea or form, which his business is to copy out of his mind into the materials. But when his work is done, he sees that in being before his eyes, which he saw in his own design afore. The wisdom of God is that sovereign art, which directed Him in making heaven and earth, and ordaining whatsoever comes to pass in both. The decree of His will (whether immediate or mediate) distinguishes between that which may be, and that which is at the present; and therefore, in the same sort, between that which may be and that which shall be for the future. But though His knowledge increase not, when He sees that in being which formerly He saw was to be, because He goes not beyond Himself for the knowledge of it: yet, to see that it is, supposeth the act of the freedom which doth it, past; to see that it shall be, to come. In like manner, therefore, whilst the act of the creature appeareth to God as to come, He seeth what shall be. But if all future contingencies be present to God from everlasting, then, consequently, He sees also from everlasting the act of that freedom which produceth them, as done in the due time of it: and in this sight consisteth the effect of the same presence of future contingencies in and to God's eternity from everlasting. There is therefore in God a certain kind of knowledge of that which is to come, which divines call "scientiam visionis;" whereby God sees from everlasting the greatest contingencies to come to pass at that moment of time when we see them come to pass: which, whatsoever is the ground


"To see it supposeth," MS.

"Concerning the foreknowledge of God, he (Hobbes) confounds that speculative knowledge, which is called the 'knowledge of vision,' which doth not produce the intellective objects (no more than the sensitive vision doth produce the sensible objects), with that
of it, whether it be possible for us to say how it is possible or not, yet this we must say of it, that it presupposeth the future being of that which it foreseeth, and therefore is no way the cause of it; though the future being thereof presupposeth also that knowledge in God, which directeth that freedom which bringeth it to pass. So that the fathers of the Church had cause to insist (against those heretics, that derived the source and original of sin in the world from some other cause than the free-will of the creature and the abuse of it), that future contingencies come not to pass because God foretells that they will come to pass; but that God foretells that they will come to pass, because they are future contingencies, that is, things which (though contingent) yet shall come to pass; and, therefore, that God's foresight infers no necessity in those things which He foresees shall come to pass by the free choice of the creature.

§ 11. For though there remaineth yet a further question concerning the ground of this foresight, how that can be other than necessary which is certain, because the knowledge of God that foretells it cannot be uncertain: yet would it be no less evident, that the foresight of God, which presupposeth the future being of that which it evidenceth, causeth no necessity in that which it presupposeth; though I could give no account, how the future being of that which is contingent can be certain. And as it is not requisite to the maintenance of Christianity to be able to answer all questions that the enemies of it may make; so were it very impertinent, not to allege that which is evident in behalf thereof, because there hangs another question at the end of it which I cannot so evidently resolve.

§ 12. And upon these terms I set aside that necessity, which God's foresight of future contingencies infers, as impertinent to the question in hand: being merely the necess-

E.g.—"Non enim ex eo quod Deus scit futurum aliquid, idecirca futurum est; sed quia futurum est, Deus novit." S. Hieron., Comment. ad Hierem, c. xxi; Op., tom. iv. p. 653.—"Hoc enim necessario futurum est quod Ille vult, et ea vere futura sunt quae Ille praecivit." S. Aug., De Gen. ad Lit., lib. vi. c. 17; Op., tom. iii. p. 207. D.
sity of that which must needs be, because you suppose that it is; all foresight necessarily supposing the future being of that which is foreseen, as all sight supposeth the present being of that which is seen.

§ 13. Further, when I say, that the freedom, which the covenant of grace supposeth in man to whom it is tendered, requireth, that his will be not determined by God before it determine itself, to wit, in order of nature; I do not therefore require, that it be always indifferent, that is, no more inclined to do than not to do this or that. I have learned out of Aristotle's Morals, that a drunkard may choose whether he will be drunk or not; though it is not possible, 168 that he should in an instant change that inclination to which he is habituated*: and that, as the world is, it cannot in discretion seem possible to come to pass, that some opportunity of bringing that inclination to effect shall not come to pass, before the inclination of his habit be changed into the contrary by frequency of practice. But this I say: that, in this latitude and variety of man's inclinations, he is not determined by any of them presently to satisfy and execute it, having so many to please besides; and that God, without determining immediately, by His omnipotence, the will which remains not determined by its own inclination, is able to bring to pass whatsoever His providence shall order, by wills of men left at large to their own choice, though not in a state of actual indifference (without bias inclining them to do, rather than not to do, this rather than that), yet in a capacity of becoming actually indifferent by change of judgment (and, by consequence, of inclinations), which frequent acting according to another judgment shall produce; in the mean time not determined by God, otherwise than as they determine themselves. It is not therefore my meaning to say, that the will proceeds immediately from a state of indifference to determine itself, by choosing that whereon the man's happiness depends. For it is manifest, that all choice is determined by the appearance of good in the object, to reason that sees it, nor can proceed without it. It is mani-

fest, that all virtues and vices are mere determinations of indifference in the will, to some thing chosen for a chief good. It is manifest by experience, that the proposing of an object determines many times the will to choose it. It is received in philosophy, that from that which is indifferent, as indifferent, no action can proceed; that the same remaining the same can never do but the same; that nothing can come to be anew of itself, without some cause. And how shall the will, from mere indifference, proceed immediately to do this rather than that? How shall indifference prefer doing this, before doing that, or not doing this? My meaning is this: that, without appearance of reason sufficient to convict the mind what is good to be done, there is no freedom in the will that can determine to choose it; that, when there is no appearance of reason to the contrary (as in the general nature of good), there is no freedom to refuse; that all habit of virtue or vice tends to determine indifference to the object and act of it, and effecteth so much in this life, that morally, and speaking of that which experience and discretion will allow, it is as impossible, that some man should do any thing that is good, as some other revolt from all goodness. And therefore [1] do allow a kind of freedom in the blessed, as well as in the damned, who are arrived at the full determination of the will for the better or for the worse, and are past deliberating any more to which side they shall adhere for everlasting. But their estate I account impertinent to the question in hand, concerning that freedom in this life, the use whereof is every man's title to the world to come and his own share in it. As also the estate of the blessed angels, and devils: whom all allow to be as effectually determined to evil or to good, upon their fall or settlement, as men are upon the performing their race here. But as I have granted, that no man can desire that in which he sees no reason why it is good for him; so, seeing sufficient reason, he is not thereby immediately determined to act, but only enabled to act, according to it. The coherence of true good with the utmost happiness of mankind is so dark, the coherence of counterfeit good with his utmost misery so remote; that, as the appearance of counterfeit good may interpose to defeat the prose-

* Corrected from MS. "with," in orig. text.
ution of that which sufficient reason convinceth to be true, so may the appearance of true good interpose to defeat the prosecution of that which is counterfeit. So that the race of this life is a continual deliberation about the necessity of the means, even in them that have made choice of their end. It may be disputed indeed, that, when after resolution and choice we have experience of great debate within us what to do, it is not the will, the subject of freedom, that is the seat of this debate, but it is the sensual appetite, that makes opposition to the resolution of reason; and that this opposition is mere violence to the natural exercise of freedom, not pretending to introduce a contrary resolution, standing the first, but hindering execution, by degrees upon contrary information to reverse the sentence. But the determination which we suppose sufficient reason had produced, remains always inefficacious: and therefore the question must needs have recourse, what determines the will; till answer be made, that it proceeds effectually, inwardly to choose and outwardly to act, by that choice determining all capacity of indifference in itself, which, redounding to every man's account at the general judgment, must needs be the act of the will, that is, of the person that doth it.

§ 14. By that which hath been said, I conceive I give account, why, having hitherto established the necessity of grace upon the account of original sin, I now advance a proposition tending to reconcile, as well the activity of God's providence generally in all things, as the efficacy of His predestination and grace in supernatural actions, leading to the happiness of the world to come, with our common freedom. For it is manifest, that this opinion of predetermination proceeds not upon any supposition of original sin, but merely of the nature and state of a creature: and intends to affirm, that, whether Adam had sinned or not, the will of man must have been determined by God to do whatsoever it should do, as unable to determine itself; otherwise than as every creature moves, when God moves it. And therefore I am here to acknowledge, the answer is larger than the question, at least than the occasion of it, and the resolution than the ground of the doubt: the necessity of the grace of Christ being grounded only upon the fall of Adam,
and that bringing on the dispute, what free-will hath to do
where the free grace of God cannot be spared, and therefore
what free-will it is, that remains to be freed from the bondage
of sin by grace. But, as the general comprises necessarily
all particulars, it is no less destructive to the covenant of
grace, that the freedom of the will should be denied upon the
account of the constitution of nature, than of depravation by
sin. And therefore I find myself bound to answer, in what
estate the covenant of grace overtakes man born in original
sin; whether upon the account of original sin, or merely of
God's creature.

§ 15. But I do purposely observe this to all them of the
Reformation, that I believe their own consciences will tell
them all, if passion or faction give leave, that all the contro-
versy advanced against the Church of Rome, about free-will
in the works of salvation, was grounded upon the supposition
of the necessity of grace occasioned by original sin, from
which so much is derogated as is arrogated to free-will
without it; and therefore the controversy never needed
about all kind of works, but those only that tend to salva-
tion, the means whereof became necessary upon the account
of original sin. Which if it be true, then cannot the interest
of the Reformation consist in any opinion concerning all
manner of human actions without difference, whether in the
state of uprightness or sin; nor can any thing but the spirit
of slander impute the maintaining of God's grace without
or against such opinions, to any inclination towards the
abuses of the Church of Rome, but to the conscience of
God's truth, without respect of persons. For further evi-
dence whereof, I shall make good use of the evil of faction,
if not of division, now on foot upon occasion of this dispute,
as well among those of the Reformation as in the Church of
Rome. For seeing that both parties are divided about it,
though in the Reformation only the matter hath proceeded
to a breach, first, between Lutherans and Calvinists in the
dominion of the empire, then in Holland between these and Arminians; he
that goes about to cast the aspersion of popery upon that
opinion which the papacy enjoineth not, though it alloweth,
must first answer, whether the popery of the Dominicans
and the rest of them that hold predetermination, whether
the popery of Jansenius and his followers, be popery or not. With all, I shall think the way made towards the proof of my position, by observing, that the ground upon which I shall proceed to make evidence of freedom from necessity under original sin, will necessarily take place against the predetermination of the will by God, whether under original sin, or in the state of uprightness. And, upon that ground, I shall freely affirm, that this position is not only intended to contradict, but also effectually contradicteth, the opinion of the predetermination of the will by the immediate operation of God.

CHAPTER XXII.

THE GOSPEL FINDETH MAN FREE FROM NECESSITY, THOUGH NOT FROM BONDAGE. OF THE ANTECEDENT AND CONSEQUENT WILL OF GOD. PREDETERMINATION NOT THE ROOT, BUT THE ROOTING UP, OF FREEDOM AND OF CHRISTIANITY. AGAINST THE OPINION OF JANSENIIUS.

The ground which I speak of may be branched out into particulars, as large as you please. But it shall be enough for me to say: that whatsoever is read from one end of the Bible to the other, concerning a treaty tendered by God to man, concerning an alliance or covenant contracted upon it, concerning an inheritance or assurance of an inheritance upon that alliance, concerning exhortations, reproofs, promises, threats, inducing to observe that contract and not to transgress it; all this, and whatsoever else may be reduced to this nature, evidenceth, that neither freedom from necessity is lost by original sin, nor the will of man determined by the immediate operation of God to do or not to do this or that.

§ 2. I must further mention here that difference between the antecedent and the consequent, the conditional and the absolute, will of God; the first, suspended upon some act of man’s free will, the second, resolute, as supposing the same past, or not requiring it: not because the divines, as well of Thordike.
the Eastern as of the Western Church, have embraced it; but because they all found, that they could not discharge their account of the Scriptures without it.

§ 3. But I must not forget to mention withal the rewards and punishments, expressed in the Scriptures to be brought upon the compliance with, or resistance of, those helps, which the antecedent and conditional will of God requireth, whether he choose it or not.

§ 4. In the Old Testament, you have the contestations of Moses in Deuteronomy; often warning God's people, that He had set before them the good and the bad for them to make choice. You have the prophet Esay, v. 3—6; contesting with God's vineyard, that He had done what He could do for it, and that, having borne wild grapes instead of good fruit, it was therefore just with Him to destroy it. You have the Psalmist; protesting the cause, why He gave over His people to their enemies and to famine, to be their disobedience: Psalm lxxxi. 9—17. You have the prophet Ezekiel, xviii. 30—32, thus reclaiming them: "Return and repent of your transgressions, and wickedness shall not be to you a stumbling block; cast from you all your transgressions which you have transgressed with, and make you a new heart, and a new spirit; for why should ye die, ye house of Israel? for I delight not in the death of him that dieth, saith the Lord God; but repent ye and live." For is not this to say, of Myself I desire not your death, but because of your obstinacy in rejecting My prophets? By whom He so often protesteth, that He had risen betimes to send them from age to age, if by any means He might reclaim them to His law, and so preserve them in the inheritance of the land of promise.

§ 5. In like manner our Lord in the Gospels: Matt. xxiii. 37, 38; Luke xiii. 34, 35: "Jerusalem, Jerusalem, that killest the prophets, and stonest them that are sent thee, how often would I have gathered thy children, as a hen gathers her chickens under her wings, and ye would not! behold, your house is left unto you desolate." And St. Stephen, Acts vii. 51: "Ye stiffnecked and uncircumcised in hearts and ears, you do always cross the Holy Ghost, as did your fathers." And the Scribes and Pharisees, in the

[2 Chron. xxxvi. 15; Jerem. vii. 13; xi. 7; xxv. 3, 4; xxvi. 5; xxix. 19; xxxii. 33; xxxv. 14, 15; xlii. 4.]

[In the New Testament.]
OF THE COVENANT OF GRACE.

Gospel, "made void the counsel and purpose of God towards them;" Luke vii. 30. But, above all, you have the purpose of God manifested by the Gospel, of sending our Lord Christ for the salvation of the world: as John the Baptist says, John i. 29, "Behold the Lamb of God, that taketh away the sin of the world:" and our Lord to Nicodemus, John iii. 16, 17; "God so loved the world, that He gave His only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him may not perish but have life everlasting; for God sent not His Son into the world to condemn the world, but that the world by Him might be saved." And St. Paul commandeth Timothy, that prayers be made by the Church for all men, even for the powers of the world, then their enemies, as a thing pleasing to God: "Who," saith he, "would have all men to be saved and come to the knowledge of the truth; for there is one God, and one Mediator between God and man, the Man Christ Jesus, Who gave Himself an expiation for all, to be witnessed in His own time:" 1 Tim. ii. 4—6. And if there be any other passages of the New Testament, as others there are, to witness that Christ is given by God for the reconciliation and salvation of all mankind.

§ 6. One I will not omit, because the mistake which is alleged to divert the sense of it is remarkable. 2 Pet. iii. 9: "God slacketh not His promise, as some men count slackness, but is slow to wrath in our regard, not willing that any should perish, but all come to repentance." Which they will have to signify, that He would have none of "us," that is, of the elect, to perish; because it is said, "μακροθυμεῖ εἰς ἡμᾶς" "He is patient towards us," the elect. They might have seen, that this is not the meaning of the words, by Luke

BOOK xviii. 7[18]: “Shall not God avenge His elect, that cry to Him
day and night, though slow to wrath in regard of them?
["kal"]
I tell you He shall avenge them speedily.” “Καὶ τετρα
µακροθυµῶν ἐπ’ αὐτοῖς”—“though slow to take vengeance
in regard of them,” upon their oppressors, is here, “Μα-
κροθυµῶν εἰς ἡµᾶς”—“slow to take vengeance” upon our
oppressors “for us,” which He hath promised to take.
[In Syriac, ἐµακροθύµησεν in the Greek of the New
Testament, signifying the delaying of vengeance (due
to them that oppress Christians, as you see by St. Luke),
the Apostle attributes to the desire of saving those whom He
spares.

§ 7. Nor will I stop here to shew you the insufficiency of
these expositions, which, in despite of the words, are fastened
upon these texts, to avoid the difficulties which they create
to prejudice opinions. For it is manifest, that the conse-
quence of them is no more, but the very same that arises
from any Scripture, that testifies the means which God uses
for the good of any man to become frustrate through his
fault: in consideration whereof, that God shall call them to
account at the last day, who, either being convict of the
truth of His Gospel, or having means offered to be informed
of the same, embrace it not; or, having embraced it, notwith-
standing persevere not in it by living as Christ requireth;
or, on the contrary, that He shall reward them who embrace
it, and persevere in it. Which being so many, that they are
not to be avoided without setting a great part of the Scripture
upon the rack; I count it not worth the while to insist here,
that St. Paul's meaning is not, that God would have some of
all estates to be saved, or that he would have many to be
saved, or those that are saved to be saved, or upon any other
of those lame expedients, which have been applied to plaster
the wound which these plain texts do make: but I insist upon
this, that the meaning of them cannot be, that God would have those only to be saved that shall be saved; having such a swarm of Scriptures to evidence, how many things there are which God would have done and are not done; having all the importunities and complaints which God useth by His prophets, to assure us, that He would have found that obedience at the hands of His ancient people which He found not; all the preaching of His Gospel, all the motives of believing, all the exhortations to accept and perform the covenant of grace in the New Testament, ready to witness, what men are to give account for at the day of judgment. All which must be satisfied, before there can be cause to balk the plain meaning of St. Paul's words: which cannot seem inconvenient in any other regard, but because they make God to will that which comes not to pass; all the Scripture witnessing, that all that shall be condemned, shall be condemned for not doing that which God would have them do. For, wheresoever God's justice punishes, there is it of necessity, that man had sufficient means to do otherwise: where it rewards, there was possibility of transgressing, there was a capacity of indifference, and a will actually undetermined to do or not to do this or that, notwithstanding original sin.

§ 8. But, first, to declare what I understand this antecedent will of God to be, I must distinguish, with some divines, that God must not be said to will this because of that, or for that, but may be said to will that this be because of that, or for that. "Deus non vult hoc propter hoc, sed vult hoc esse propter hoc." When I say, 'because of that,' or 'for that,'


"Vult ergo (Deus) hoc esse propter hoc, sed non propter hoc vult hoc." S. Thom. Aquin., Summ., P. I. Qu. xix. art. 5. Respond.
I extend the observation to two kinds of causes: to the final cause, for which a thing is said to be done; and to the motive or impulsive cause, because of which a thing is said to be done; when we speak of the doings of understanding and free causes. For, these having something in consideration to move them to do what they do, this motive which they consider, holds on the side of the effective cause, inasmuch as there had been no proceeding without the consideration of it. Though it is also true, that the motion which consideration produces (being so called but out of that resemblance, which it holdeth with the motions which natural things are visibly transported with), importeth no more, than the appetite of some good thing, the want whereof they apprehend; which is nothing else but the effect of the final cause. So that the motive cause is no other than the final cause, in respect of that effect, which it hath indeed moved the effective cause to produce. So then, when I say, that "God willeth not this for that," or "because of that," I say, that God can have no ends upon His creatures, being from everlasting possessed of all that He can desire, and therefore not to be moved with the desire of any thing which He hath not, to procure it. But when I say, God "will have this to be for that," I say, that God hath appointed not only His creatures, but whatsoever He bestows upon His creatures, for that, as for their end; which therefore if it fail, it is not God that fails of His end, but the creature that fails of the end that God appoints it. And indeed the doubt is vain, though to many it seems difficult that God should fail of His end, if we should say, that He would have any thing come to pass which indeed comes not to pass. For if God would have it come to pass immediately by His own operation, and absolutely, it were indeed a failure of His omnipotence, if it should not come to pass; but that He would have it to come to pass by the operation of His creature, and reserving a condition—if it do as it should do, supposeth His omnipotence in making the creature able to do or not to do this or that, but destroys it not by the failure of that which it is not employed about. So also, when I say, God does this because of that, to wit, in the nature of a motive or impulsive cause, I say no more but this, that God from everlasting deter-
OP OF THE COVENANT OF GRACE.

mined that it should come to pass, in consideration of that because of which it is truly said to come to pass. Which no way signifies any motion of desire impressed in His own excellence, but that He orders the reason of all things that come to pass. The antecedent then or conditional will of God, consists in appointing all that He bestows upon His creature, or acts towards it, for several and proper ends; but supposes a possibility in those ends to be brought to pass, grounded upon an ability in the creature to bring them to pass: insomuch as God, otherwise, cannot be said to treat with men as men, nor they ground a conscience of duty from themselves to God, but supposing Him to mean that which His words signify from them by whom they come; and that whose grants, promises, commands, threatens any thing, upon an impossible condition, neither grants, threatens, promises, or commands it, but says right nothing. I will give you my daughter in marriage, if you touch the stars with your little finger; that is, saith the civilian in the Roman law⁶, I will not give you my daughter in marriage. I say not so much; but that God, under an impossible condition, signifies no part of His own intentions.

§ 9. This antecedent will of God, they that understand not in St. Paul’s words, when he says, “Christ gave Himself a ransom for all,” do think it enough to distinguish between sufficient and effectual; and that, granting the blood of Christ to be a sufficient ransom for mankind, it will be true that He “gave” it “for all,” though in no way intending it for any but those who are saved¹: which is far otherwise. For that

⁶ “Si impossibilitas conditionis obligatio-
nibus adjectur, nihil valet stipulatio.
Impossibilitas autem conditio habetur,
cui natura impedimento est, quominus existat: veluti si quis ita dixerit, Si digito calum attigero, dare spondes?”
Instit., lib. iii. tit. xx. § 11.

¹ “Responsio igitur, quando Chris-
tus ab Apostolo dicitur ‘redemptionem Semet Ipsum dedisse pro omnibus,’ in cruce videlicet pro omnibus moriendo, ab aliquibus intelligi, quod se dederit redemptionem seu remedium, id est, pretium, pro omnibus omnino sufficientem, quia sufficientia pretium obtulit; non tamen pro omnibus omnino sufficientem, quia non omnibus applicatur ista redemptio: idque iuxta regulam a sanc-
to Prospero traditam,” &c. . . . “Sed 
... genuinus veriusque respondens 
Christum dici ‘Se dedisse redemp-
nem pro omnibus,’ hoc est, pro univer-
sa Sua ecclesia tota orbe dispersa, et 
consequenter pro omnibus hominum 
generibus, regibus,” &c., “itemque pro 
omnibus, hoc est, pro hominibus om-
tom. iii. lib. iii. c. 21, pp. 162, b. A, E, 163. a. A.—“Multa melius magisque 
Catholicæ questionem ita dissolvit B. 
Prosper; . . . Quod ad magnitudinem, 
inquit, et potentiam pretii, et quod ad 
umam pertinet causam generis humani, 
sanguis Christi ademptionis totius 
mundi; sed qui hoc sæculum sine fide 
Christi et sine regenerationis sacramen-
which is not true without an addition abating the proper significa-
tion of the words, is absolutely untrue; unless the addition, not being expressed, may by due construction of reason be found to be implied. Now to say, that Christ's blood is only sufficient to redeem all but intended to redeem only some, is to say, that it was not given for all, as St. Paul affirmeth, though being a price sufficient to redeem all, it might have been given for all; which is not enough to make good, that He "gave" it "for all," as St. Paul affirmeth. And that it might have been given for all, being sufficient to redeem all, is no sufficient reason to infer St. Paul's injunction of praying for all men, even for princes, and the powers under them: then no friends to Christianity; so that, whether for them or not, was more questionable than whether for others or not. For it followeth not, because Christ's blood is sufficient to ransom all mankind, therefore we are to pray for the salvation of all mankind, not supposing it given for their ransom. Therefore this addition of abatement can by no construction of reason be found to be implied in the words: but we must have recourse to that antecedent will of God, by which Christ intended to pay that which was sufficient for all mankind; though not intending to oblige God to do the utmost of that which His justice will allow, to bring all to salvation in consideration of it; but only what His own wisdom should think fit to be done, in that consideration, for that purpose. Which alloweth, not only a possibility of salvation, but also a sufficiency of means to bring all mankind to it, provided by God, as purchased by Christ; whatsoever may interpose to defeat the effect thereof, which God, not being obliged to hinder, thinks fit in His secret wisdom to permit. Neither can this secret will of God be any way reconciled to His declared will (that is, neither can this declared will of God, which comes not to effect, be ever maintained to be the will of God as the Word of God calleth it, or to be truly declared) upon those terms; but only to be a declaration or sign, that God would have that come to pass, which indeed He would not have come to pass, as not coming to

to pertransseunt, redemptionis alieni aut. . . . Hae ills; prorsus consensus 
tanee cum eo quod Scholastici dicunt, Christum sufficenter non efficienter
omnes redemisse." Estius ad II. Tim. 1. 4.
pass, because He would not have it come to pass. But if God have put no bar to the salvation of any man, antecedent to the death of Christ, but hath, by Christ's death, provided all means sufficient to save all, then it is truly said (John iii. 16), "So God loved the world, that He gave His only-begotten Son, that whosoever believeth in Him should not perish, but have life everlasting;" though God doeth not what He might do, but what He thinks fit to do, to make the ransom which Christ gave for all, effectual to the salvation of all. Nor is this infringed by saying, that the conditional will of God is not absolutely the will of God, but with a term of abatement, His will upon condition; which, without that addition, abating the proper sense of God's will, it were not. A thing which I have professed already, by premising, that God wills not any of those things which come not to pass, as His own end, but as the end of those means which He provides to bring them to pass. For the question is not about the act, but the object, of God's will (which the Apostle also means when he saith, "This is the will of God, even your holiness," 1 Thess. iv. 3): when it is disputed, whether "all" signify "some," and "the world," "the elect;" when the Scripture saith, that "Christ gave Himself for all," and "for the world," and therefore that "God would have all to be saved," and none to "perish." The act of God's antecedent will is as properly expressed by that which God "would have" done, as of His consequent will, by that which God "will" do. Nor is there any figure in saying, that God would have that done, which He will not do; because He knows sufficient reason to the contrary, whether He declare it or not, but, setting that reason aside, would have done: or that He would have that done, which He provideth sufficient means to bring to pass. But that "all" should signify "some," and "the world," "the elect," because God will not do all He can to save those whom He would have to be saved, is a figure in rhetoric called mendacium, when a man denies the Scripture to be true.

§ 10. The same is the difficulty, when our Lord Christ [And how He prayed for them I ask not for the world, but for them whom Thou hast given Me, for they are Thine,) prays upon the cross,
"Father, forgive them, for they know not what they do."

For though He ask not that for the world which He asks for His disciples, yet He would not have prayed for that, which He knew that God would not have done; His prayer being the reason, moving God to grant means effectual to bring to pass that which it desireth. But had there been in God a purpose to exclude the Jews from the benefit of Christ's death, considering them as not having yet refused the grace which Christ prayed for, it could not have been said, that He would have our Lord Christ die, or pray for them, and therefore that He would have them to be saved.

§ 11. This is then my argument, that the will of man is neither by the original constitution of God determinable by His immediate operation, nor by man's original sin subject to a necessity of doing or not doing this or that; because God treats with the posterity of Adam concerning the covenant of the Law, first, and since concerning the covenant of grace, no otherwise than originally He treated with Adam about not eating the forbidden fruit. For, in conscience, were it for the credit of Christianity, that infidels, whom we would persuade to be Christians, should say: True, if you could shew me, that God by His immediate act determines me to do as you require me, without which, you tell me, I cannot do it, and with which I cannot but do it; or that, by the sin of Adam, I am not become subject to the necessity of doing or not doing this or that: but supposing either of these, if you move me to do what you profess I cannot do, you are either a mad-man yourself, or take me for one. Do they take their hearers for men and Christians, or for beasts, who, having first taught, that man can do nothing but what God determines him to do, infer thereupon, that they must endeavour themselves to do what God commands, and what their Christianity requires? Or that they are obliged by their Christianity to do that, which their corruption from Adam necessitates them not to do? Is it for the honour of God's justice, that it should be said, that He intends to damn the most part of men for that, which by their original corruption they were utterly unable to do, without giving them sufficient help to do it; no help

* Corrected from MS. "He knew not that God would have done," in orig. text.
being sufficient, which the determination of the will by the immediate operation of God makes not effectual, as they think? Do they not make the Gospel of Christ a mockery, that make it to require a condition, impossible to be performed by any whom God determines not to perform it, having resolved not to determine the greatest part of them that know it, to perform it? Certainly this is not to make the secret will of God contradict the declared will of God, but to make the declared will of God a mere falsehood; unless the declaring will make contradictions true. For to will, that this be done for an end, which God that willeth will not have come to pass, makes contradictions the object of that will; and that, for the same consideration, and at the same time, God from everlasting determining, merely in consideration of His own will, that the condition of that, which He would have to come to pass conditionally, shall not come to pass. What is it then to declare all this to the posterity of Adam, already lapsed, without tendering help sufficient to enable them to embrace what He tendereth? For it is manifest, that Adam had sufficient grace to do what God commanded; and it is as manifest, that God tenders both the Law to the Israelite, and the Gospel to the world, in the same form as He tendered Adam the prohibition of eating the forbidden fruit. Nor can it be denied, that this prohibition contained, in the force of it, all the persuasions, all the exhortations, all the promises, all the threatenings, which either the Law or the Gospel to their respective ends and purposes can be enforced with. It must therefore be concluded, not that they suppose in Adam's posterity an ability to do what they require, as did the original prohibition of eating the forbidden fruit, but that they bring with them sufficient help to perform it, not supposing any thing that may bar the efficacy thereof, till the will of him to whom it is tendered makes it void.

§ 12. And truly, speaking of that which the natural endowment of freedom necessarily imports in the reasonable creature, it is utterly impossible, that any thing should determine the will of man to do or not to do this or that, but his own action formally, or in the nature of a formal cause; which therefore, in the will, cannot be the action of God,
BOOK II.

nor be attributed, imputed, or ascribed to Him, to Whom it were blasphemy to impute that, which His creature is honoured with. That God should immediately act upon the soul of man, or his will, is no inconvenience; because that act must end in the will or soul, and not attain that effect which the imperfection of the creature bringeth to pass. Ending therefore in the creature, and not in that which the action of the creature produceth, it leaveth the same, of necessity, in the state wherein God first made it. And I may well suppose here, and will suppose, that God's act of creation continues the same for all the time that He maintains the creature in that perfection of being (that is to say, in that ability of acting), which from the beginning He gave it.

§ 13. This discourse, I confess, extendeth to the voiding of the immediate concurrence of God to the actions of His creature; which my purpose necessarily requires me not to maintain. For 'concurrence' supposeth the creature to act without help of God That concurrreth, and therefore cannot be requisite on behalf of the cause, being supposed to act of itself, but on behalf of the effect wherein it endeth; which, having a being, is supposed necessarily to require immediate dependance upon the First Being, Which is God. A strange subtlety: acknowledging the creature able to act, and supposing it to act of itself, to imagine, that this act can end in nothing, as that which it effecteth, without God's concurrence: which, immediately attaining the effect, in which the action of the creature endeth, will enforce, that God is as properly said to give light as the sun, to burn as the fire, to do that act which is essentially sin, as the man that sins; and therefore, at once, not to sin, because we suppose His concourse tied by the original law of creation to the determination of His creature, and to sin, as producing immediately whatsoever is in that action which is essentially sin. For unless the species or nature of the act, importing generally no sin, were a thing subsisting by itself, as by the understanding it is considered, setting aside the sin which the particular that is acted implieth (as Plato is supposed to

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* See e.g. Strangius, De Volunt. et Action. Dei circa Pécatum, as above quoted, lib. i. c. 10. pp. 52 sq. ; and Bellarm., De Grat. et Lib. Arbit., lib. iv. c. 15; Controver., tom. iv. pp. 742, C, sq.
OF THE COVENANT OF GRACE.

have maintained his ideas), it is impossible, that he who doth the act which is essentially sin should be said truly not to sin; the law of concurring to the doing of sin, and producing the act which essentially importeth it, necessarily drawing the imputation thereof upon him, that freely tied himself by settling it. Let it once be said therefore, that God made the fire able to burn, the sun able to shine, the will of man able to make a free choice, as he is a reasonable creature; and it will be very impertinent to require any action but that of the fire to the consuming of wood, but that of the sun to the dispelling of darkness: supposing God to maintain, or rather to issue every moment, the ability of burning or shining once given His creature, from His own spring-head of being, so long as His creature endureth. And therefore, if ever God made the will able to choose the doing or not doing of this before that, upon the direction (not of right reason which directeth not to sin, but always) of reason (for all choice supposes reason to direct it), it is impertinent to suppose any thing requisite to the exercise of this freedom of choice, but the maintenance of reason, issuing from the fountain of God's wisdom, so long as the man continues a reasonable creature.

§ 14. If the immediate concurrence of God to the action of His creature make the actions wherein the perfection of His creature consisteth (much more the imperfections and failures of it) a stain to His excellence; much more shall the act of determining the choice of His creature (free before it be determined) impute to God whatsoever it importeth for the worse, the imputation whereof for the better is a stain to His excellency. And is it possible, that God, by making the creature capable of such imputations, should depose Himself from the throne of His Godhead, and set up His creature in His stead, in making it able to act that, either naturally without His immediate concurrence, or morally also, by determining that freedom (by the use of his own reason and choice), which He in no instance afore determineth? Certainly they consider not what they grant themselves, when they suppose, that God made it able so to do; when they make the abilities which He giveth unable to do their work, till He determine them so to do, so that, being so determined before they determine themselves, they cannot do otherwise.
§ 15. And suppose it a contradiction, that the will should choose that, which no reason why it should choose appeareth; certainly, when reason pronounceth the motive that appeareth to be sufficient, the action that ensueth cannot be said to proceed from a cause indifferent to act or not, though the determination thereof be not peremptory till the act follow. Now is there any necessity, why God should interpose to determine the indifference of the cause, otherwise than as enabling it to determine its own indifference? Suppose then a sentence passed in the court of reason, importing not only, this is to be done, but this shall be done; do we not see every moment protestations made by the sensual appetite, and acts entered of them by the judge? Indeed, if the matter of them do not bear a plea, the sentence remains; but is it therefore necessary, that execution follow? Witness those that act against conscience. Witness Aristotle's dispute of incontinence, placing the nature of it in doing the contrary of that, which the judgment is resolved ought to be done; as if the one could be absolutely the best, the other the best at this time. Witness Medea in Ovid, when she says, "Vide meliorea, proboque, deteriora sequor"—"I see the better, but I do the worse." For the mouth of conscience is to be stopped with a pretence of repentance to come, and so present satisfaction is clear gain by the bargain. If at length it come to execution of the sentence, I demand what it is, that makes the resolution from thenceforth peremptory, but the same reason, that determined the choice afore; unless we suppose new matter advanced in plea first, and afterwards voided. If that which was sufficient afore prove not effectual till now, it is not because any thing was wanting, without which the will was not able to proceed, but because reason to the contrary appeared considerable before.

§ 16. I grant there be those, that have so far determined the indifference of their own inclinations, that no reason to the contrary appears considerable, to delay execution of the sentence passed long since. But this appears by experience to take place, as well in those who have degenerated to devils incarnate, as those who have improved to saints upon earth:

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and therefore cannot be attributed to the force of true good, acting beyond the appearance which it createth in the mind, because God’s immediate act directs it; but partly to the habitual grace of the Holy Ghost, with the resolution of Christianity, presenting true good as lovely and beautiful as indeed it is; partly to the custom of doing even those acts, which without the assistance of God’s Spirit our nature cannot do; upon which, as the habitual endowment of the Holy Ghost follows by God’s gracious promise, so there follows naturally a facility of doing even supernatural actions which men habituate themselves to, by the mere force of custom, excluding the consideration of all that reason to the contrary, that hath proved abortive and addle long since. Which notwithstanding, the choice remains free; by virtue of that original freedom, which determined the indifference of every man to those actions, the frequenting whereof hath created an habit.

§ 17. And this is the ground of that account which we owe; that, God shewing sufficient reason why we ought to be Christians, and the world to the contrary, our choice hath followed for the better, or for the worse. For the efficacy of the said reasons on either side implies, beside the sufficiency of them, only a supposition of that which comes to pass; which the same reasons determine a man to do, that remain uneffectual till the execution of sentence. But if the will of God interpose to determine the will before it determines, there can be no more ground for any account, why it acteth or acteth not, than the earth is to give why it standeth still, or the heavens why they move. For it is not the nature of heaven and earth, that makes them stand still or move, but the will of God, that made it their nature, and creates all the necessity that follows upon it; as I said afore. If therefore a man can do nothing till God determines him to do it, and cannot but do that which He determines him to do, then is there the same necessity for that which he doth, as for the heavens moving or the earth standing still.

§ 18. Here a difficulty is made in regard of the merits of Jesus Christ: “Who for the joy set before Him underwent the cross, despising the shame, and sat down at the right hand of God” (Heb. xii. 2); and, “Humbled Himself, be-
BOOK II.

coming obedient to death, even the death of the cross, wherefore God also hath over-exalted Him" (Phil. ii. 8, 9). As if, because the merits of Christ are the acts of a will, by the hypostatical union utterly determined to the will of God, it were not requisite, that the promises of the Gospel should be obtained by performing the covenant of grace, when a man might not have performed it. The answer is not to be cleared more than the mystery of the Holy Trinity is to be comprehended. For, of a truth, how should it be understood, how the will of God the Father freely tendered, how the same in the Son undertook to assume our nature, and to perform the work of our redemption in it? But upon this freedom depends the consideration, which makes the grace of Christ due by God's promise. For though the will of man in Christ were utterly determined to that which the will of God should choose; yet, because it became so determined by the Divine will in Christ, freely assuming our nature, the influence of that freedom into all that He freely did, in virtue of that choice, makes the acts thereof meritorious of the rewards of His cross.

§ 19. Nor is there any use to be made of the distinction between the compound and divided sense of any propositions, but those that speak of that necessity which follows upon a supposition of the being of those things, which are said to be necessary. That necessity, and only that, it reconcileth with contingency. Necesse est prædestinatum salvari—Non necesse est prædestinatum salvari: in English (for we must suppose the property of each language), It must needs be, or it is necessary, that he who is predestinate should be saved—It is not necessary, not of necessity, it must not needs be, that he who is predestinate should be saved. Compounding or twisting in your mind the quality of predestinate with salvation, that is, supposing a man to be predestinate, the affirmative is true, necessity is attributed to the salvation of a man so qualified; dividing them, that is, not supposing the man to be predestinate, the negative: because Christianity supposeth predestination to preserve freedom and contingency. But if you say in Latin, Prædestinatus necessario salvatur; in English, He that is predesti-

[Note: Sensus Compositus Divinis, how far applicable.]

*a* See Jansen., August., tom. iii. lib. vi. c. 9. p. 275. a, b.
nate is saved necessarily, or by necessity; it must be utterly denied for the same cause. The same distinction may be used, when the necessity is not upon supposition of the being of that which is said to be necessary, but to no purpose. For it is necessary, that the fire burn, or the sun shew us light; if wood be put to it, if it be above our hemisphere: it is not necessary, if otherwise. But this makes not that which is necessary upon such a supposition ever a whit the more contingent; nay, it were ridiculous to express it, because a limitation so unnecessary may be understood. No less necessary will that act of the will be, to which God determines; though, otherwise, the being of it were not only not necessary, but impossible. Nor will it be true to say, that he who doth what God determines him immediately to do, hath power to do the contrary, at the same time, though not to do it at the same time; "simultatem potentiae ad oppositum," not "potentiam simulatis." For if the will cannot act till so determined, it were a contradiction to say, that it hath power to do that which you say it cannot do.

§ 20. Wherefore, if God from the beginning ever gave the reasonable creature a will actually not determined to do or not to do this or that, the same will by which God does this

continuing for all that time that He maintains it, there is no more room left for a will of determining the same in God, until by virtue of His first will it determine itself; than there is room in God, not to will that which actually and presently He willeth. It is therefore too late to say, that God, determining as well the manner by which all things come to pass, as what shall come to pass, can as well determine the acts of His reasonable creatures to be done freely, as the acts of natural things to be done necessarily; having supposed afore, that He determines these acts by determining immediately the will to do them. For though I count it necessary to grant, that God by His providence determines all future contingences, for the reason to be shewed in due time; yet,

1 "Si enim cum dicis, Prædestinatus non potest damnari, intelligas its, id est, non potest esse ut prædestinatus sit et damnetur, verum dicis; quia conjunctive intelligas: falsum autem si disjunctive; ut si intelligas istum non posse damnari quem dico prædestinatum; potuit enim non esse prædestinatus, et ita damnaretur." P. Lomb., Sent. lib. i. dist. xl. B.

= See above, c. xxii. § 5. note i.

= Corrected from MS. "still," in orig. text.

* Below, c. xxiv. § 17.
should He determine the will to do them without supposing it to determine itself, there could remain neither contingence in the effect, nor freedom in the cause. And therefore I say, that God determines those things, that come to pass freely and contingently, so to come to pass; but He cannot determine this by destroying freedom and contingency; therefore, not by determining immediately the will of man to do or not to do this or that. For this determination produceth not that necessity which stands upon supposition of an act freely done (and therefore contingent, as that which need not have been done), or of the foresight of it, or of effectual means to bring it to pass (which cannot be defeated because they are supposed to take effect); but that which stands only upon supposition of the cause, which being the determination of God, and therefore indefeasible, the necessity which it produceth, whatsoever it be for the kind, will be stronger than any necessity, that is antecedent to the being of any thing in the creature. And though I said before, absolutely, that the action of the creature cannot be imputed to God⁸; yet, upon an impossible supposition as this, I can and must infer, that nothing can be imputed to the creature as good or evil, to reward or punishment, but all to God: which is a consequence that Christian ears must not endure.

§ 21. For I suppose no Christian ears can endure to hear, that God should infuse any inclination to malice into the heart of His creature: because, when it comes to effect, the effect will be imputable to God; and because, before it comes to effect, the work of God must be called evil, as inclined to evil. How then shall we endure to hear it said, that God, by His indefeasible omnipotency, determines the creature to do all the evil that it does, and that without this determination no evil can be done, with it no evil can but be done? For alas! the covering will be too short, to say, that God produceth only the positive action of sin, the malice incident to it (consisting in the mere want of conformity to the rule which it ought to follow) proceeding from the imperfection of the creature. For the difference between the action of sin, and the sin which it acteth, consisteth merely in the conceit of man's understanding, not apprehending at once

⁸ § 11, sq.
all the particulars, wherein the action consisteth: no action possibly being so bad, that in some general considerations, common to those which are good, it may not be counted good. But those general considerations express not the particular act, which is supposed to be sin. So soon as the nature thereof is sufficiently expressed, so soon it will appear to be essentially sin. Therefore, if God determine the creature to the act of sin, He determines it to sin. And though, upon these terms, there can neither be sin nor virtue, good nor evil, Law nor Gospel, providence nor judgment to come; yet, upon these terms, the actions of the creature will be imputable to God alone, though not as good or bad, or as the actions of God, yet as the actions of Him that is supposed to be God in words, but denied to be God in effect.

§ 22. As for that which was said, as if otherwise the efficacy of God's predestination, and that grace, which by it He appointeth for those that shall be saved, could not subsist; or as if otherwise God could not be maintained to be the first cause; I will say no more now, than what I said of the ground for God's foreknowledge of future contingencies: that, when I come to say how God determines future contingences, I will do the best I can, to render such a reason, as may maintain Him to be the first cause, and so to foresee all future contingences, by the same means, by which He determines that they shall come to pass; without giving just ground to infer, that there is neither contingency in the effect nor freedom in the cause, no providence, no judgment, no Christianity, appointed by God. But if I fail of giving such a reason, I disclaim it here before I give it: and will rather allege that I have none to give, and yet believe both God's effectual providence, and the freedom and contingency of men's actions; than believe the determination of man's will by the immediate operation of God's providence to be the source of freedom and contingency, which I have shewed leaves no room for contingency or providence.

§ 23. And now I may freely grant, that Jansenius hath avoided the charge of telling what it is, that comes between the last instance of deliberation and the first of resolution; by the immediate act of God, to enable a man to do that,
which he that is able to deliberate and act both, is not able to bring to pass. Which is the same chimæra with the imagination of infallibility in every sentence of the present Church, when it comes to pronounce, though the premises upon which it proceedeth do not appear, even to them that pronounce, infallible. Nor will I envy him the advantage that he may make, of the distinction between the sense of that which is said to be necessary including this predetermination, and not necessary setting it aside. For having shewed, that it is to no effect, but to destroy contingency, that is, Christianity, and to multiply contradiction to that common sense which all own, I may well bid much good do it. But I am not therefore bound to believe, that it will serve his turn (proceeding upon the account of indifference in the creature, and the necessary effect of a secondary cause); who standeth upon that necessity of grace which original sin introduceth. For how shall he say, that (setting aside God's predetermination) the will may have grace sufficient to do the work of grace, (including the same) it cannot but do it; who makes the will utterly unable to do it, till it be determined to do it; and therefore takes away all difference between effectual and sufficient grace, all intent of Christ's dying for them that shall not be saved? Indeed, if he extend his opinion to the reconciling of man's free-will with God's providence in matters not concerning the work of saving grace, he may make use of predetermination in giving account how sin is foreknown, and the rest which hitherto he resolveth not. But, grounding himself upon the exigence of original sin, it were not wisdom for him to scandalize his own opinion by making sin as necessary by God's act, as he makes the work of grace.

§ 24. There is extant a brief resolution of the whole question by that learned gentleman Thomas White; where he concludes (paragraph 10*) that God determineth every man
so to determine himself in whatsoever he does (by the love of good infused, and the causes which His providence useth to represent it desirable), that he cannot do otherwise. How he would answer concerning evil, is not so plain by his words. He says, indeed, it is not the same thing to determine and cause to determine; as for the Ammonites, and David, to kill Urias. But if the murder be duly imputed to David for procuring means towards it that might have failed, would he have God procure means that cannot fail? It cannot be allowed, but thus; that though of themselves they might fail, yet, supposing the foreknowledge of God that employeth them, that is, supposing them to take effect (which supposition, all the experience in the world concludeth, cannot be cleared till the effect follow), they cannot fail. And the nature of

habituelles, ut ex eis sequatur hominem sese determinare ad aliquem actum particularem; clarum rursus est neque providentiam Divinam neque has causas aliquo modo impedire libertatem, sed eam adjuvare et perferre. Cum enim non obstantibus his, immo his adjuvantibus, homo determinet semetipsum ad talem actionem ex eo quod predictae impressiones sunt quasi partes et facultates et instrumenta per quae sese dirigit in consultatione et resolutione, clarum est quod substantia libertatis integra et illibata est, immo fortior et vegetor, per has impressiones; et ipsarum impressiones sint quæ faciant ipsum recte vel faciliter sese determinare, et arbitrium suum exercere. Unde si ex hoc quod Deus in Sese prædefinit habeat effectum futurum, vel quod agat per media in quorum integra collectione praesentiatur volitio futura, dicatur Deus hominem ad eam prædeterminare; clarum est hujusmodi prædeterminationem naturam et exercitium liberi arbitrii nullo modo tollere, sed magis perferre, et esse necessario prærequisitum; nisi in adeo fuse pessundatum errorem aborokürkovus voluntatis reliabi malimus . . . . Haec dicta sunt de prædeterminatione in via explicata, quam putem esse D. Thomæ et graviorum ipsius sectatorum. Alii enim, quæ vel est aliquidum ipsius sectatorum vel ipsa imponitur, ut asserant libertatem consistere in potestate arbitrii et non in duas contradic- tionis partes suptoe marte versandi; sed quia ex indifferenti nihil procedit, properea a Deo Ipso immediate infundi


$t"$ Objecere conetur aliquis, Saltem praefinito et causa mediae ab ipso ordinate efficiente ut homo non possit non se determinare ad hane individuum actionem; determinans itaque hominem. Permissio antecedente, respon- detur manifestum esse nequitiam consequentium. Nunquid enim idem est facere aliud facere aliquid, et ipsummet illud facere. Num enim idem est me persuadere aliqui fornicacionem et me fornicari? . . . Et si aliquando eadem voce utrumque significaret, num in eadem etiam significacione vocem usurpari credendum est? Si dicitur ignis urere lignum, et homo admoto igne tabulam urere, etine eadem vocis acceptatio? Si ulli Ammon et David peremerunt Uriam, nunquid in eadem usurpatione vocis 'interficere?" $Id.,$ ibid., p. 273.
freedom, the ground of the account to come, consisteth in this; that, determining a man to act, he might not have acted, till the act was done. For certainly it were a contradiction to say, that which determines the will to act (speaking, not of the thing without, but of the consideration thereof in the mind), may not be extant when a man determines himself in virtue of it. Nay, were this consideration, whereby God determineth, indefeasible of its own nature (for as employed by God's providence, that is, supposing the effect to follow, it is), it were that very predetermination which I have infringed by the premised discourse; coming from God, in order of reason, first, and in the very next instant producing that choice, wherein the determination of the will formally consisteth.

§ 25. I will therefore conclude, that wheresoever through the whole Bible God calls any man, or His ancient people, or by the Gospel all people, to yield Him that inward obedience and worship in spirit and truth which Christianity requireth (all this proceeding supposing the corruption of man's nature by the fall of Adam), there He will take account of His disbursements by that which the creature shall have done, not finally determined to do it by anything preceding the choice. Putting you in mind to add to the evidence for this, all that I said in the beginning of this Book, to shew, that the condition of the covenant of grace implieth a resolution generally to obey all that Christianity enjoineth. For whatsoever delight in the true good God may prevent and determine the will with (as prevent it He may and doth, so as to take most certain effect), it must have in it the force of choice upon deliberation, that makes God, instead of the world, the utmost end of all a man's actions. And in virtue of this choice, whatsoever is done in prosecution of it, consisteth in the like freedom of preferring it before the difficulties that impeach it; which therefore he that will, may follow, and fail of his purpose. "He that might have transgressed and did not, his goods shall be firm," saith Ecclesiasticus; xxxi. 10, 11. Christianity then supposeth free choice, as well to do rather than not to do, as to do this rather than that. But Christianity cannot suppose this freedom, till it can sup-

v c. ii. § 1, &c.
pose the reason, why every thing is to be done, to appear. For that is it, which must determine the indifference of man's will to proceed. And therefore, if there be any thing, which without Christianity a man under original sin stands not convinced that it is to be done; though, supposing Christianity, his freedom may extend to it, yet, not supposing the same, it doth not. This is that which I come to in the next place.

CHAPTER XXIII.

A man is able to do things truly honest under original sin. But not to make God the end of all his doings. How all the actions of the Gentiles are sins. They are accountable only for the law of nature. How all men have or have not grace sufficient to save.

Now to the second part of my position I say, that, though (notwithstanding the inclination of original concupiscence) a man is able to do any kind of act, towards himself, towards all other men, or towards God, yet is he not able to do any for that reason for which it is indeed to be done; and, therefore, that he is by his birth slave to sin, and without the grace of Christ cannot become free of that bondage.

§ 2. The first part of this position stands upon the words of St. Paul, Rom. ii. 14, 15: "For when the Gentiles, that have not the Law, do by nature the things of the Law, these, not having the Law, are a law to themselves; who shew the work of the Law written in their hearts, their consciences bearing witness with them, and their thoughts afterwards interchangeably accusing or excusing." I know St. Augustin, Prosper, and Fulgentius, will have this to be said of the Gentiles, that had been converted to Christianity. But having shewed, that the interpretation of the Scripture is not subject to the authority or judgment of particular doctors; and knowing, that the tradition of the Church neither

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* Lib. cont. Cassian. Collatorem, c. x. § 2; Op., tom. i. p. 181. a. Bassan. 1782: adding however (§ 3. ibid.), "Sin autem (quod magis vult hic dis-
putator intelligi) de illis ista dicuntur, qui alieni a gratia Christiana," &c.
* De Gratia Christi, c. xxv.; ap. Bibl. PP., tom. vi. P. I. p. 90. F.
* Bk. I. Of the Pr. of Chr. Tr., c. xxi. § 7, &c.
BOOK went before them nor hath followed after them, to make the position upon which their interpretation proceeds a point of faith; I follow peremptory reason from the process of St. Paul's discourse: who, having concluded the Gentiles to be liable to God's judgment in case they embrace not Christianity, and coming to do the like for the Jews, upon a supposition, which he takes to be evident upon experience (as appealing to their own consciences in it), that they kept not God's law, by which they hoped to be saved, proceeds to compare with them the Gentiles whom he had convicted afore, that he may prove the Jews to have as much need of the Gospel, as he had proved the Gentiles to have. He saith then, that the Gentiles have also a law of God; which is the sense of God's will which nature works in their hearts: and that, as the Jews did many things according to God's written law, so did the Gentiles according to the law of nature: but if they could say, that the Gentiles kept not the law of nature, as hitherto he had proved; no less might the Gentiles say, that they kept not the Law, by which they pretended to be righteous before God. This you shall easily perceive to be St. Paul's business, if you compare that which he writes Rom. ii. 12, 13, 17—24. concerning the Jews, with that which went afore from Rom. i. 18. concerning the Gentiles. Indeed, when the Apostle afterwards compares the circumcision of the heart, which makes a spiritual Jew, with the Gentile, who in his uncircumcision doth the same righteous things of the Law, which the said spiritual Jew doth (Rom. ii. 25—29); as I acknowledge, that there is no spiritual Jew by the letter of the Law, but by the grace of the Gospel (which, though covertly, had course and took effect, though in a less measure, under the Law), so I must acknowledge, that none but the Gentile converted to Christianity can be compared to him. But it is no prejudice to the Apostle's argument to say, that the Gentile is capable of that by the Gospel, which the Jew could not boast of by the Law, but by the grace of the Gospel under the Law. Whereas, if the Apostle do not convict the Jew to have need of the Gospel by shewing the Gentile to bear the same fruits by the law of nature which the Jew brought forth by the law of Moses, he leaves him utterly unconvicted of the necessity God had to bring in the Gospel, for
OF THE COVENANT OF GRACE.

433

the salvation of the Jew, as well as of the Gentile. And therefore, when St. Paul names "the things of the Law," he compriseth as well those duties that concern God, as those which concern ourselves and our neighbours. Agreeing herein with the experience of all ages and nations; which allows religion towards God to be a law of all nations, as well as the difference between right and wrong in civil contracts, between honest and shameful in men's private actions, to be impressed by God upon their hearts, and from thence expressed in their laws and customs.

§ 3. And truly it can by no means be denied, that the difference of three sorts of good things, honesta, utilia, et jucunda, things honest, useful, and pleasurable, is both understood and admitted amongst heathen nations; that is to say, that heathen nations do acknowledge, that there are some things, which, of themselves agreeing with the dignity of man's nature, are more worthy to be embraced, than those which present us either with profit or pleasure without consideration of what seems us otherwise. To which, assuming this, as evident by experience of the world, that the reason of that which is honest or honourable, as suitable with the dignity and worth of man's excellency, is not always contradicted in occasions of action, either by profit or pleasure; there will be no possible reason for any man to deny, that (notwithstanding original concupiscence) a man may be led by reason of honesty to do that which it requireth. Whereof we have invincible evidence, not only in the philosophy of the Greeks, and the civility of the Romans, but in the works of mercy and virtue, which every Christian may receive at the hands of the Jews and Mahometans, so often as they are not overswayed by their passion or interest.

§ 4. But now, for the reason which their actions do or ought to follow, whereas it is certain, that the reason of all men's actions is derived from the end which they propose themselves, and that the end which they ought to propose themselves is the service of God; it is as certain, on the other side, that through the original corruption of nature a

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man is not able to resolve to make God the utmost end of
his actions, and that, not resolving this, he cannot become
free of the bondage of sin. This remains already proved by
the necessity of the grace of Christ demonstrated afore, and
stands perfectly verified by the experience of all ages and
nations alleged even now. For though there is in all men
conscience, to prefer that which is honest and more honour¬
able before either profit or pleasure: notwithstanding, ex¬
perience shews, that the world is never without occasions,
wherein it cannot be obtained together with profit or plea¬
sure; and the same experience will shew, that the motives of
profit and pleasure (which Christians therefore call tempta¬
tions, because they know from whence they proceed) easily
prevail over the conscience of that, which were, according to
the due worth of our manhood, more honourable for us.
This, if we take every man by himself, considering him as
not engaged in society and communion with others: but if
we suppose him prevented with such relations, it is admira¬
ble to consider, but evident to be observed, that men are
more wolves to men than wolves are to wolves; and that by
those oppressions and cruelties, whereof there is no example
in the wildest of beasts, men make themselves way to the
greatest glory that the world can raise. This is that which
Macchiavel observes: that the world esteems great things,
whether they be good or not; and, magnifying those that
follow them, shews, that it is not for want of will, but for
want of means and opportunities, that the most do not do
the like. Nay, they that have the best resolutions when
they are alone, when they engage themselves but in company,
do proceed as if they thought it civility to offend God, for
love of them whom they converse with. These are the tem¬
inations of the flesh and the world, that hold men obnoxious
to the bondage of sin, notwithstanding that conscience, which
prefers honesty before profit or pleasure. And in regard of
this bondage our Lord said in the Gospel (John viii. 31—36),
"If ye abide in My words, ye are truly My disciples, and
shall know the truth, and the truth shall set you free." And
when they answer, that, being Abraham's sons, they were never
slaves: "Every one that committeth sin, is a slave of sin; now
the slave abideth not always in the house, but the son

b See II Principe, c. xv.
183 abide always; if therefore the Son set you free, then shall you be free indeed.” And St. Paul hereupon, Rom. vi. 17, 18: "Thanks be to God, that, being slaves to sin, ye obeyed from the heart that form of doctrine that was delivered you; and being freed from sin ye became slaves to righteousness." For out of the sense of this bondage he cries out again, Rom. vii. 24; "Wretched man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?" Which, if it be said of the unregenerate man, expresseth the estate of all such; if of St. Paul, conclueth the unregenerate to be in that estate much more.

§ 5. And indeed, original concupiscence having brought into the world the ignorance of that truth, which the fathers had received from God concerning God, as I said afore; it cannot be imagined, that men should be induced by that slender light which remains, of one God and His providence, and that suspicion which was left, that He will one day take account of man’s actions, to baulk the temptations of profit and pleasure, out of a resolution to do all things which the light of nature might convince them to be according to God’s will, for no other reason but to obey Him and to do Him service; though otherwise convict, that all is due to Him, whatsoever they are able to do for His service. Hence came the worship of idols; even among them, whom St. Paul affirms to have known the majesty of one true God, Rom. i. 20. And hence came those sins, which he hath shewed us, in that first chapter of his Epistle to the Romans, to have been the native consequences of the worship of idols. Hence came all counterfeit religion into the world; inasmuch as they, that know themselves to be liable to some religion, are nevertheless unwilling to embrace that which obliges them to resign themselves to the service of God, so long as any [reason] can be shewed them, which may tender them plausible persuasions of peace with God, reserving their own passions and interests. And that very religion, which God had tied His own people to (for a means to bring them to understand the difference between the civil obedience and the outward service, to which He had promised the happiness of the land of promise, and that spiritual service of God, to which He intimated the

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\(^{c}\) Above, c. xx. § 31. \(^{d}\) Added from MS.
promise of the world to come), became so darkened by the
same common corruption of nature; that in a manner the
whole body of that people, when they had retired themselves
from the worship of idols to the observation of the Law, was
carried away with an opinion of righteousness before God,
in consideration of the outward observation thereof, consist-
ing in those works, which by the force of common nature
(I have shewed) they were able to do; without troubling
themselves with the true reason from which they are to be
derived, and the right intention to which they are to be
levelled, which here I shew, that only the grace of Christ
enables us to set before us.

§ 6. By that which hath been said, a difficult objection
may be answered, which ariseth from the consideration of
those philosophers and heretics, who have not been, nor are,
afraid to lay down their lives for the maintenance of their
sect or religion by testifying the truth of it; as we read in
St. Chrysostom*, that many of the Marcionists would do.
For if they can endure this (which is the utmost that they
can endure) without the help of God, Who requires it not at
their hands, what should hinder other men to lay down their
lives for God, and by consequence to overcome less difficulties,
which hinder them to follow the true goodness which God
requireth? This is answered by the terms of my position:
that there is no kind of act which a man of himself cannot
do, but the reason of God's will, and the intent of God's ser-
vice, of himself he cannot do it for; though he may think,
that he doth it for nothing else. For evidence whereof, I
must have recourse to that which I said afore†, in resolving,
whether there is any such faith to be found as is not the
virtue of a Christian. For accordingly I will distinguish,
that faith is either the belief of the Gospel and Christianity,
or the profession of it, whether sincere or counterfeit. I say
then, that the sincere resolution of professing of Christianity

* Eusebius (H. E., lib. iv. c. 15; lib. v. c. 16; lib. vii. c. 12: pp. 135, 182, 262. ed. Valer.) and S. Clement of
Alexandria (Strom., lib. iv. c. 4; Op., tom. i. p. 571), speak of mar-
yrs so called among the Marcionites. Thornrike perhaps may have confused
these passages with St. Chrysostom's

† Above, c. vi. § 7.
OF THE COVENANT OF GRACE.

(being the condition, to which all the promises of the Gospel are due, as I have shewed\(^5\)) is the work of that grace, which the obedience of Christ hath purchased for us. In order 184 whereunto, though the preaching of the Gospel containeth sufficient motives to convince the world of the truth of it; yet, seeing the publishing of those motives by the Apostles of Christ, is the purchase of His blood, and seeing those motives, being (though sufficient, yet) not demonstrative, are resisted by the greater part, it is the work of God's grace, wheresoever they become effectual, to move any man to believe that Christianity is true, in order to the resolution of embracing it: Notwithstanding, inasmuch as the profession of Christianity, when it is protected by the powers of this world, is no disadvantage, but a privilege (especially where there is difference about Christianity, and a man professes what the secular power professes), it is easy to see, that there is reason enough in this world to move a man to profess Christianity for his own sake, and not for God's. Much more to believe the truth of it, for which he hath sufficient reason besides. But, this faith not being that which is called faith absolutely, but with an addition of abatement, we are absolutely to conclude, with the council of Orange\(^6\), that to "believe as a man ought," is not the work of free-will, but of God's grace; the limitation of, "as a man ought," serving to exclude such counterfeit faith as I have described. Now, though this reason of professing Christianity for advantage of this world, be the most ordinary and visible, when Christianity is protected by the laws and powers of the world; yet may it as well come to pass and effect otherwise, or at least, that which countervails it. For Aristotle observes unto us in his Morals, that all men are not carried away, either with the profit of this world or the pleasures or honours; there are those that prefer virtue, whether speculative, or active: though this active virtue, he describes to consist in that mean, which the discretion of the world determines\(^1\). For he often repeats

\(^5\) Above, c. ii. &c.


\(^1\) "τιμεῖς εἷς καθοῦς ὑπάρχει οἱ μὲν φύσεως ἡλιός οὐκ ἔργον τῆς φύσεως ὡς ἐν τῇ ἡμᾶς ὡς ἐν ἑαυτῷ ἐκείνῃ ἀλλὰ δίδασκε θέλεις αὐτάς τοίς ὡς
this for his principle, that in that work, that the difference of good
and bad must be taken for granted, from that which the civili-
ty of the world acknowledges. But how easy is it for them,
who have addicted themselves to the profession of that civili-
ty, or that knowledge, which the world pretends not to, to
embrace and profess opinions which the world allows not,
and, having made it their business in the world, rather part
with their lives, than be constrained, either to believe, or not
believing to profess, otherwise? How much more, in the
knowledge of God, and the hope of happiness (which we
suppose Christianity truly to promise), may a man, that pur-
sues not the truth of it with that humility which it requires,
by the judgment of God fastening upon false principles, by
virtue of them be induced to embrace those conclusions,
which he shall rather part with his life than refuse, and yet
for his own sake, not for God's, Who teaches them not?

§ 7. And upon these premises we may determine, whether
all the actions of the Gentiles, and unregenerate, are sins or
not; at least, so far as it is requisite to determine any thing
in it. For, on the one side, it is evident, that (seeing it is
impossible, that they should by nature attain to a resolution
of doing all that they do in obedience to the will of God
and with an intent of His service), it is not possible, that
their actions should have that utmost end which they ought to
have. On the other side, seeing it appeareth, that nothing
hinders them to do things for the mere regard of honesty,
or of doing good to others, without making themselves
positively and expressly the end of what they do; it is mani-
fest, that the next end which they intend by them may be
good, and that the things which they do are such as of their
own nature may be ordered and directed to the service of
God, though by them not so intended. And therefore, when
it is said, that unregenerate men do all for themselves as their
utmost end, we must distinguish in themselves the seeds of

ἀλλὰ μὴν καὶ ἑγαθάλλῃ γε καὶ καλὰς, καὶ μᾶλλον τούτων ἐκαστον, ἐγερ κα-
lὰς κρίνεις περὶ αὐτῶν ὁ σπουδαῖος κρίνει

δὲ ὁ ἐπανικάτω." Ιδ., ibid., I. vi. 16.

§ 13.—"Ο σπουδαῖος γὰρ ἐκαστὰ κρίνει ὁρθῶς, καὶ ἐν ἑκάστοις τάλαθοις αὐτῷ φανερεῖ... καὶ διάφερει πλείστον ὅσων ὁ σπουδαῖος τὰ τάλαθος ἐν ἑκάστοις ὄραι, δοκεῖν κα-

καὶ μέτρον αὐτῶν ὄραι." Ιδ., ibid., III.

iv. 4. 5.—And elsewhere repeatedly.

k Corrected in the errata into, "with
the seeds," which is unintelligible.
OF THE COVENANT OF GRACE.

virtue, which the common notions of difference between good and bad contain, from the corruption of original concupiscence. 

For well may we say, when they are moved with regard of honesty to do any thing, that they do it for themselves; because it is the native worth of their manhood which moves them to do it. But when it is said, that, addicting themselves to the riches or honours or pleasures of this world, which they addict themselves to for love of themselves, they make themselves their utmost end; this must be understood, as in 185 moral matters, for the main part of their doings; the love of riches, honour, or pleasure, much less of civil virtue, not disabling them, or so swallowing up all consideration of that, which of itself suits with the worth of man's nature, but that, without any other regard, they may many times choose to do it. And therefore, having made good the grounds aforesaid, I shall leave it to the reader's own judgment; whether he will hold all their actions to be sins, because they are not positively directed to the utmost end of God's honour and service, or those which are done for honesty's sake to be virtues, because they are positively directed to that next end that is according to God's will, and might have been directed to His service: assuring myself, that no interest of Christianity obliges either me or him to determine this or that.

§ 8. And now, before I leave this point, I infer again here, from the reasons which I have used to prove the capacity of indifference in the will of man, excluding the actual determination of it, before he determine himself; that all this is not to say, that indifference is requisite to all freedom, but to the freedom of man alone, in this state of travail and proficiency. For my ground is God's tender of a treaty and conditions of peace and reconciliation, together with those precepts and prohibitions, those promises and threats, those exhortations and dehortations, which it is enforced with. So that it is utterly impertinent to allege here the freedom of God and angels, the freedom of the saints in the world to come, the freedom of our Lord Christ's human soul1; to prove, that this indifference is not requisite to the freedom of man, because it is not found in that freedom which they are arrived to: to whom no covenant is tendered, no precept requisite,

1 See Jansen., August., tom. iii. lib. vi. cc. 7, 8, 9; pp. 270. b. B, sq.
no exhortation useful, as being either the cause of all rule of
goodness, or so united to it that they cannot fail of it. And
though the perfection of their estate admiitteth no possibility
of failing, yet it is no ways prejudicial to the honour of God,
to provide men here of such an estate, as is necessarily capa-
bile of failing; his perfection being such, as is necessarily
capable of improvement. And, therefore, it is no disparage-
ment to God, that He should create a possibility of sinning
in that creature, in which, if there were not now a possibility
of sinning, there could not be a possibility of attaining hap-
piness by not sinning.

§ 9. These things thus settled, it remains that we enquire,
whether that sufficient grace, which the difference between
the antecedent and consequent will of God settles, be granted
indifferently to all mankind or not. And my answer is
briefly this: that God hath provided for all mankind that
grace, which, at a distance, is sufficient to save all mankind;
but that grace which is immediately sufficient to save, He
hath not immediately provided for all mankind, but hath
trusted His Churc[h to provide it for the rest of mankind,
having left them means sufficient to do it.

§ 10. My reason is this, because, where God sendeth
immediately means sufficient to save by converting to Chris-
tianity, there He will demand an account of the neglect
of that means which He tendereth. For I suppose from
that which I said in the first Book against the Leviathan*,
that as many as come to the knowledge of Christianity
are obliged to receive it. Certainly, he that believes the
Christian faith, must needs believe, that God hath done
enough to oblige all, that come to know the truth of it, to
submit themselves to it; otherwise to remain liable, not only
to those sins which they are under when they come to know
it, but to the guilt of neglecting so great salvation, provided
and tendered by God. Now that those, who never heard of
the Gospel of Christ and remain destitute of all means to be
informed of the truth of Christianity, shall not be judged,
either for neglecting or transgressing that will of God which
it publisheth, will appear by manifest consequence from the
express words of St. Paul concerning the judgment, which the

* Bk. I. Of the Pr. of Chr. Tr., c. ii. § 9, c. iii. § 33, sq.
Jews and Gentiles before the Gospel remain subject to; Rom. ii. 12−16. "For as many as have sinned without the Law, shall perish without the Law, and as many as have sinned under the Law, shall be punished by the Law; for the hearers of the Law are not just before God, but the doers of the Law shall be justified; for when the Gentiles, not having the Law, do by nature the things of the Law, these, not having the Law, are a law to themselves, who shew the works of the Law written in their hearts, their conscience also witnessing with them, and their thoughts interchangeably accusing or excusing, in the day that God shall judge the secrets of man according to my gospel." Some construe these words thus; "As many as have sinned without the Law shall perish without the Law, in the day that God shall judge the secrets of men according to my gospel." If those that sin without the Law shall perish without the Law, it is manifest, that they shall not be condemned for transgressing the Law, which they never knew: and if the ground why they perish be the law that is written in their hearts, to which their conscience bears witness, when their thoughts accuse or excuse them; whether this be at the day of judgment or not; it is plain, the conscience can never accuse a man (nor, by consequence, God condemn him) for transgressing the will of God which he never knew. And if God proceed not with the Gentiles upon the Law, which the Israelites only knew, but upon the light and law of nature, by which, not knowing the Law, they found themselves obliged to do that which it commanded; then shall He not proceed upon the Gospel with them, who never had means to know it, but upon the light of nature, and the conscience of what they have done or not done, according to it or against it.

§ 11. And indeed the words of our Lord are plain enough (John iii. 17−21): "God sent not His Son into the world to condemn the world, but that the world through Him might be saved: he that believeth on Him shall not be condemned, but he that believeth not on Him is condemned already, because he believed not in the name of the only-begotten Son of God: and

Epist. ad Rom. ii. 16. Others have connected the words with ἀπείκονιστα, or with κατηγοροῦντα, &c., in v. 15. See Poli Synops. ad loc.
the condemnation is this, that light is come into the world, and men love darkness better than light, because their works are evil; for every one that doth evil, hateth the light, and cometh not to the light, that his works be not reproved; but he that doth the truth, cometh to the light, that his works may be manifest, that they are done in God." For he that is condemned for not believing, because he hates the light, must first see the light, before he hate it; and so, positively refuse to believe, because his works will not endure the light. And no man could do the truth, and that in God, but he that was under the law of God; who, if he did not the truth which the Law requireth, would consequently hate the truth which the Gospel preacheth. So, he that is condemned for not believing, is he that heareth the Gospel and receiveth it not. And to this reason we must refer the words of St. Paul, Acts xiv. 16; "Who, in by-past ages, suffered all nations to walk in their own ways:" and again, Acts xvii. 30; "God therefore, Who did oversee the times of ignorance, now enjoineth all men every where to repent:" and Rom. iii. 25, 26; "Whom God hath proposed for a propitiatory through faith in His blood, to declare His righteousness, because of the passing by of sins that went afore; to declare, I say, His righteousness at this present time." For we cannot imagine, that He will not demand account of the sins that have been done from the beginning of the world; of Whom "Enoch the seventh from Adam prophesied, saying, Behold the Lord is come with the ten thousands of His holy" angels, "to do judgment upon all, and to rebuke all the ungodly of them of all the ungodliness which they have committed, and of all the bad words they have spoken against Him, wicked sinners:" Jude 14, 15. And it is not for nothing, that God, when He let the Gentiles alone to walk in their own ways, notwithstanding "left not Himself without witness, doing good, giving us rain from heaven, and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness;" as St. Paul proceeds, Acts xiv. 17: nor that "He made of one blood all nations of men to dwell upon the face of the whole earth, determining times appointed before [and'] the bounds of their dwelling; that they might seek the Lord, if by any means they might

* Misprinted, "to," in orig. text.
find Him by groping, though not far distant from each one of us; for in Him we live and move and have our being; as some also of your poets have said, 'for we are His offspring;'' as the same St. Paul had premised, Acts xvii. 26—28. For to what serves his witness, but to inform the process of his judgment? But God is said to have let them alone, passing by their sins, because, by tendering them His Gospel, He did not aggravate their judgment in case they should refuse it, nor require of them that obedience which it inferreth: whereas, by the Gospel, "the wrath of God is revealed from heaven upon all ungodliness and unrighteousness of men, that hold the truth in unrighteousness;" as St. Paul saith, Rom. i. 18, 19: "because," saith he, "that which may be known of God is manifest in them; for God hath manifested it to them" by His works; as it follows there. So that the Gospel, as it declares the judgment of God upon those sins that are done under the light of nature, so it declares so much heavier vengeance against those, which are done under and against the light which it sheweth. Which is the reason, why, so many times in the Psalms, the bringing in of the Gospel is prophesied under the figure of God's coming to judgment; Psalm 1, xcvi., xcvi., xcviii. § 12. And indeed there is necessary reason for this, if we believe that God will judge every man according to his works at the last day: which, as I shewed you in the dispute concerning justifying faith, that it is a principle of our common Christianity, an article of our belief, which no man can be saved that holds not; so I may thereupon further say, that all men that are under the Gospel shall be judged according to that obedience which the Gospel and Christianity requireth. For if St. Paul had only said (Rom. ii. 12, 16), "As many as have sinned without the Law shall perish without the Law, and as many as have sinned under the Law shall be condemned by the Law, in the day when God shall judge the secrets of men according to my gospel by Jesus Christ;" as the construction which I spoke of even now requires; he had only said, that the Gospel declareth that God shall judge the secrets of men by Christ: which is that which the Apostles witnessed, as from our Lord Christ, to move men to

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See above, c. vii. § 5.
embrace it. But having said also, that the "Law is not given to the righteous, but to the lawless and disobedient, to the ungodly and sinful, to," &c., "and if there be any thing opposite to the sound doctrine," which is "according to the glorious Gospel of the Blessed God, which I am trusted with" (1 Tim. i. 9—11); he sheweth us also, that those who have been under the preaching of the Gospel shall be judged according to that obedience which the Gospel requireth; to wit, according as they have either performed or neglected it. The reason; because I have shewed the Gospel not to contain a mere promise on God's part, but a covenant with man; by which he must stand or fall, as he hath performed the terms of it or not. But to neglect the Gospel, or to transgress it, cannot have been any part of their works that never heard of it: and, therefore, they cannot be judged by it, but by the work of God's law which is written in their hearts, by virtue whereof, their conscience bearing witness of the works that they have done or not done, the thoughts thereof shall accuse or excuse them before God; as St. Paul saith of the Gentiles during the Law. But had they been tendered that grace which is sufficient to save, without doubt they must have given account to God of it, the account being grounded upon that which a man receives, as our Saviour shews by the parable of the talents. "And that servant which knows his master's will, and prepares not and does according to his will, shall be beaten with many stripes; but he that knows not, and doth things that deserve stripes, shall be beaten with a few:" saith our Lord, Luke xii. 47, 48. Not as if any servant knew nothing of his master's will, as I have shewed, by the light of nature; for how should he then do that which deserves stripes? but because many know not that which will which our Saviour preacheth, and, not knowing it, are not under account for it.

§ 18. Indeed, God, for His part, hath provided that grace, which is sufficient for the salvation of all mankind, by providing our Lord Christ; Whose obedience and sufferings have purchased the coming of the Holy Ghost upon His disciples, and enabled them, both by the works which He had given them to do, and by the interpretation of the Old Testament concerning our Lord Christ, to tender the world sufficient
conviction of His rising again, and of the faith of those promises, which He hath made to all them that take up His cross, to become conformable to His sufferings. But these promises are so great, that whosoever stands convict that they are true, must needs stand convict, that he is in reason bound to embrace the condition upon which they are tendered; unless he can make a question, whether the world to come is to be preferred before this or not. And this I affirm to be sufficient grace, contained in the preaching of the Gospel, which tendereth this conviction to all mankind; supposing, that no immediate act of God is requisite to determine him that standeth so convict, to embrace it, but that it must be the act of his own free choice, that must resolve him to it. And all this of the mere free grace of God; inasmuch as nothing but His own free grace could have moved Him to provide this means, which only the coming of our Lord Christ could furnish. And though, for the glory of His goodness, this means is common to all mankind, inasmuch as the motives of faith, wherein it consisteth, are of the same force and virtue towards all; yet it is no less the grace of Christ, being the purchase of His obedience and sufferings. For if it be said, that the work of embracing the Christian faith is supernatural, inasmuch as it tendeth to supernatural happiness: it is to be answered, that all the means that God uses to induce us to embrace the same, are also supernatural; being provided by God’s immediate act, beyond all the force of nature, and therefore proportionable to the work which they require. And if it be said, that the difficulty thereof (in regard of original concupiscence) is such as no reason can overcome; it is answered, that, as these motives are the productions and instruments of God’s Spirit, accompanying His word, whereby it knocks at the hearts of them to whom this conviction is tendered, so they carry with them a promise of the habitual assistance of God’s Spirit, to move them that yield themselves to it, to perform that which they undertake, notwithstanding original concupiscence.

§ 14. In the mean time, these being the grounds of this sufficiency, it is manifest, that as many as are utterly destitute of these means, and that by no fault of their own in-
neglecting opportunities of being informed, cannot be said to have had that grace, which is immediately sufficient to save them. For if Christ immediately preached is only grace immediately sufficient, then have not they, to whom Christ is not immediately preached, that grace which only is immediately sufficient. So that, the motives of Christianity (the last whereof is the fulfilling of all prophecies concerning the calling of the Gentiles) being absolutely provided, that grace is provided for all, which is sufficient to save all at a distance. But the preaching of Christ to all not being immediately provided by God, but recommended to His Church, under that obligation which He hath laid upon it to that purpose; that grace, which is immediately sufficient to save all, is not immediately given all: being given by that will of God, the effect whereof He hath trusted to the ministry of His Church, and by consequence left the guilt of making void His counsel in it, not upon those that never heard of any such counsel of His, but upon the causers of intestine divisions in the Church, of corruption in the faith, and in the manners of the Church. For it is utterly impossible, that without unity in the faith, without living conformably to that which we profess, that faith, which is destroyed by them that profess it, should prevail over the enemies of it.

§ 15. In particular, let no man think, that I allow that preaching of the Gospel, which I maintain to be sufficient grace, to consist in never so many declamations, or rather exclamations, out of the pulpits, to return to the ways of Christianity: cautioning in the mean time, that all the promises of the Gospel are due by the immediate and personal imputation of the obedience of Christ unto the elect alone; God, in His time, immediately determining their will to embrace Christ, as the wills of the reprobate to cast Him away. For if the true motives of Christianity, represented by the Church as they are delivered by the Scriptures, be sufficient grace to save all men; then is it a peremptory bar to the sufficiency thereof, to make those motives inconsistent with the common sense of all men, in the conviction whereof this sufficiency consisteth. And they who preach so, how much soever they call themselves 'ministers of the Gospel,' are not the ministers of God's word but their own.
CHAPTER XXIV.

THOUGH GOD DETERMINETH NOT THE WILL IMMEDIATELY, YET HE DETERMINETH THE EFFECT THEREOF BY THE MEANS OF HIS PROVIDENCE, PRESENTING THE OBJECT SO AS HE FORESEES IT WILL CHOOSE. THE CASES OF PHARAOH, OF SOLOMON, OF AHAB, AND OF THE JEWS THAT CRUCIFIED CHRIST. OF GOD'S FOREKNOWLEDGE OF FUTURE CONDITIONALS THAT COME NOT TO PASS. THE GROUND OF FOREKNOWLEDGE OF FUTURE CONTINGENCIES. DIFFICULT OBJECTIONS ANSWERED.

Now that I may resolve you⁴, what it is that makes this sufficient grace become effectual, I say, that, though God determine not by His immediate act the free-will of man to do or not to do this or that, yet He hath determined from everlasting the events of all future contingencies, by determining the objects, whether inward or outward, which all men, in all occasions that shall come to pass, shall meet with; knowing, that the consideration of them will move them effectually to resolve upon doing or not doing that which they shall do or not do. Outward objects I call the things themselves, that present themselves to man's senses: inward, the representations of them laid up in the storehouse of man's mind (whether for the fancy or understanding), the consideration whereof may tender him that which comes under deliberation, under the appearance of good, whether true or counterfeit. And my meaning is, that the providence of God, in determining the objects which every man shall meet with to move him to resolve this or that, proceeds either upon the original right of God toward His creature, in presenting it with that, whereupon He knows a man will resolve to do either good or bad; or upon the reason of reward or punishment, which the foregoing actions of every man, and the impressions and inclinations to good or evil which they have left in him, shall descrve: saving what His own

⁴ See Preface to the Epilogue. § 17 sq.
free grace shall disburse of mere bounty, over and above that, which His merciful justice (that is to say, those promises, which of His free goodness He hath made to man) doth any way require at His hands. For as it is God's free grace to enter into covenant with man, so it is a part of justice in Him, according to the Scriptures, to make good His promises; even unto them, who by the terms of the covenant, which they so often transgress, can challenge nothing at His hands. My position is averred by all those Scriptures, which declare, how God brings to pass His counsels declared afore. In rendering the sense whereof, I shall not need to suppose that, which, having proved already, I may of right suppose; that God, by His immediate act, determines not the will of man to do this or that, or not to do: because, by the true course, which the Scriptures express God to hold in bringing His purposes to effect, that course will appear to be false; over and above what hath been said.

§ 2. I begin with Pharaoh. When God intends to deliver the Israelites out of his hands, when God suffered the magicians to do the three first plagues, was it because He, that suffered not Balaam to curse Israel, when he sacrificed thrice to his devils to put a curse against Israel in his mouth (Num. xxiii. 2, 17, 30), could not have hindered their acts to take effect? Or because he had deserved, by oppressing Israel, to be given up to their temptations; which because God knew they would prevail over him, it is truly said, both that "God hardened Pharaoh's heart," and that "Pharaoh hardened his heart," or that "his heart was hard:" Exod. vii. 3, 13; viii. 10, 15, 28; ix. 7, 12, 34; x. 11, 20.

§ 3. There is another passage of the story very much to be observed, because the sense of it lies in the right translation of the original words, which, how unusual soever it seem, is very manifest by the consequence of the text, Exod. 190 ix. 14—16. "For at this time I send all My plagues upon thine heart, and thy servants, and thy people, that thou mayest know, that there is none like Me in all the earth: for already had I sent My plague, and struck thee and thy people with the pestilence" (which had destroyed the cattle afore, Exod. ix. 6), "and thou hadst been destroyed from the earth; only for this have I preserved thee, to shew thee My
power, that My name might be spoken of all over the earth. It is manifest, that God means to say, that He had destroyed Pharaoh afore, had it not been to shew a greater work. And he that considers, that the Hebrew hath nothing but the indicative to signify all moods and tenses, will make no question of it. The Greek plainly expresseth it: "ἐνεκὼ μὲν τούτου διεστράθης;" And the Chaldee of Onkelus, "توقيث הוא ידך כי רבי כ選 מים."—"Nunc enim aderat Mihi ut mitterem"—"For it was now near Me to stretch forth My hand" (that is, I was near doing it), perhaps signifies neither more nor less. And if St. Paul translates part of it word for word, "ἐνεκὸς τούτου ἐξηγειράς σε, ὅπως ἐνείλθωμεν ἐν σοι τὸν δύναμιν Μου"—"For this cause have I raised thee up, that I might shew My power upon thee;" yet is that nothing to the sense of that which went afore: nor to argue any intent in St. Paul, to give occasion for those horrible imaginations, that have been framed upon these words; as if God made Pharaoh, and all in his case, on purpose to shew His power and get glory by damning them to everlasting torments. For it follows a little after in St. Paul: "What if God, willing to shew His wrath, and make known His power, have borne with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fit for destruction; and that to make known the riches of His glory upon vessels of mercy, which He had prepared for glory." In which words it is manifest, that God spared the life of Pharaoh in the plague of pestilence, though then fit for destruction (for by this discourse it appears, "κατηργησιμένος" here signifies "fit" of themselves, not fitted by God"), out of His long-suffering, though "willing" (that is, determining) to make

\[\text{Rom. ix. 17, 22, 23.}\]
BOOK II. His power known by destroying him, proving utterly obdurately. But this out of an intent, by the consideration of what they had seen come upon him, to win His own people from the idolatry of Egypt to submit to His law: as, when St. Paul writ, by the judgments of God upon the Jews for rejecting Christianity, He called the Gentiles to it. For this is the inference that St. Paul makes in the next words; "Which are even we whom He hath called, not only of the Jews but of the Gentiles:" introducing in the same words that comparison between the Jews, whom He then called to the Law, and the Gentiles, whom He was now calling to Christianity, which the correspondence between the Old and New Testament importeth. And so the sense of St. Paul is the same with that, which St. Peter said in the words quoted afore\(^x\); that God delays His wrath in taking vengeance upon the oppressors of His people, because He would have none of them perish, but all come to repentance. The sense which I deliver, you have in Grotius his Annotations\(^7\); and before the publishing of them, in a book of Miletarius\(^8\) concerning this subject; since, in the late Annotations\(^9\); and before any of them came forth many years, I had declared it for my sense of these words\(^b\). By which you may see, that Pharaoh, seeing himself and his people not cut off, when their cattle were destroyed by the pestilence, did not believe that it came from God: and also, when God had declared His purpose in preserving him alive to terrify him the more, and when He had caused the plague of hail to cease, which then He moveth him with, is (by the love of rule over those, whom by right he had nothing to do with)

\(^x\) c. xxii. § 6.
\(^7\) "Ori eis aut\(\delta\) tou\(\tau\)o \(\alpha\)\(\varepsilon\)\(\theta\)\(\gamma\)\(\iota\)\(\iota\)\(\mu\)\(\iota\)\(\upsilon\)\(\sigma\)\(\omicron\)
\(^8\) e\(\nu\)\(e\)\(ka\) tou\(\tau\)ou d\(\iota\)\(e\)\(\iota\)\(\nu\)\(\rho\)\(\iota\)\(\theta\)\(\iota\)\(\nu\)\(\sigma\)\(\iota\)\(\nu\)
\(^9\) l\(\iota\)\(x\)\(\iota\)\(\omicron\)\(\nu\)\(\iota\)\(\sigma\)\(\tau\)\(\iota\)\(\nu\)\(\rho\)\(\iota\)\(\theta\)\(\iota\)\(\nu\)\(\epsilon\)\(\nu\)\(\iota\)\(\tau\)\(\omicron\)\(\omicron\)\(\nu\)\(\iota\)\(\omicron\)\(\tau\)\(\omicron\)
\(^b\) Seil. the Critici Sacri sive Doctiss. VIRORUM in SS. Bibl. Annotationes, &c., Lond. 1660. Thorndike's Epitome came out in 1659: so that he must have seen the Annotations before they were published.

* Possibly in the Moyen de la Paix Christienne, &c.: of which the fourth Part (which the present editor has not met with) contains "l' esclaircissement sur la doctrine de la Predestination et de l'efficace de la grace de Dieu:" by "Theophile Brachet Sieur de la Milleterie." The first part was published at Paris in 1637.

* This apparently refers to sermons or something of the kind. Thorndike's first printed book came out in 1641.
persuaded to break his promise of letting them go, when it should cease, Moses having told him that he would break it: Exod. ix. 27—35. And because God knew, that these temptations would prevail over Pharaoh, therefore He had foretold the plagues, and the deliverance of His people upon them; Exod. iii. 19; vi. 2: and therefore it is truly said, both that "God hardened Pharaoh's heart" (to wit, by causing him to meet with these considerations, which made him neglect the plague; for that which elsewhere is called "hardening of his heart," is called "not setting his heart upon the plague," Exod. vii. 23): and that "Pharaoh hardened his heart," or "that his heart was hard:" Exod. vii. 3, 13; viii. 10, 15; ix. 7, 12, 34; x. 1, 20.

§ 4. Lastly, observe, that, when Pharaoh had let the people go, God led them not by the way of the land of the Philistines, which was the nearest, "because God said, lest the people repent them when they see war, and return into Egypt;" but made them go about by the way of the wilderness of the Red Sea: Exod. xiii. 17, 18. And again, Exod. xiv. 1—5: "God spake to Moses, saying, Speak to the children of Israel, and let them return and encamp against Pihahiroth, between Migdol and the sea, before Baalzephon, even against it shall they encamp, beside the sea; and Pharaoh will say of the children of Israel, they are entangled in the land, the wilderness hath inclosed them; and I will harden Pharaoh's heart, and he shall pursue them, and I will get glory upon Pharaoh and all his host, and the Egyptians shall know, that I am the Lord: and they did so: and it was told the king of Egypt, that the people fled." For it is to be observed, that God had not yet required of Pharaoh, that he should let them free for ever, though He had made him let them go without any promise of return. When therefore he sees, on the one side, that the meaning of God was not that they should return any more (which made him so unwilling to let them go, as always supposing it); and, on the other side, that by their undiscreeet march, as he thought (which God had provided for another cause), there was hope to bring them back: his old thoughts revived, that all these plagues come not from God but otherwise, [and] that he might yet bring them under his rule. Whereby it is most evident:
first, that the destruction of Pharaoh was designed by God, through these means, in consideration, first, of oppressing His people, then, [of] his impenitence upon these extraordinary trials; then, that it appeared to Him that they would take effect, when He saith, "Pharaoh will say they are entangled in the land;" and that this is the hardening of Pharaoh's heart by God. And hereupon dependeth that which is said of the Egyptians, Wisdom xix. 1, 2: "But wrath without mercy pursueth the wicked unto the end, because He also had foreseen what they should do in time to come; to wit, that, repenting themselves, they would straightway pursue those whom they should have let go, diligently entreating them to depart." Seeing the impenitence and unbelief of their obdurate hearts to have been such, that thereby it appeared to God, how, upon the first overture, they would return to their first hope of reducing the Israelites to their bondage.

§ 5. See the like in the enemies that God raised Solomon to punish his idolatries: 1 Kings xi. 14—23—26. Hadad the Edomite having escaped into Egypt, every man knows, that jealousies between neighbouring princes makes them ready to entertain their neighbours' enemies, though under colour of relieving of the oppressed, even when the cause is not clear. And though Hadad were never so welcome in Egypt, yet every man knows, what difference there is between ruling at home, and courting Pharaoh in Egypt. And can there remain any question, how God "raised Hadad for an enemy to Solomon?" How, but by providing that state of things, which He knew would be effectual to persuade a man, in the case which He knew to be his? By the like means, God, foreseeing the rebellion of Rezon against his master Hadarezer, king of Zobah, and the success thereof in setting up a kingdom at Damascus out of a conspiracy of banditti, might foresee, that he must needs inherit his master's hostility with the Israelites. As for Jeroboam, God, having appointed Ahiah the Shilonite to prophesy to him the apostacy of ten tribes to his government, knew, that he might needs inherit his master's hostility with the Israelites. As for Jeroboam, God, having appointed Ahiah the Shilonite to prophesy to him the apostacy of ten tribes to his government, knew, that he might needs inherit his master's hostility with the Israelites. As for Jeroboam, God, having appointed Ahiah the Shilonite to prophesy to him the apostacy of ten tribes to his government, knew, that he might needs inherit his master's hostility with the Israelites. As for Jeroboam, God, having appointed Ahiah the Shilonite to prophesy to him the apostacy of ten tribes to his government, knew, that he might needs inherit his master's hostility with the Israelites.
prophesied. And was it not possible for God, that knew Jeroboam's heart, to know what he would do, when the Israelites had privately persuaded him to return from banishment, upon Rehoboam's answer to the petition, which it seems he had procured? Certainly, he that believes the Scriptures, can no more doubt, that God designed the punishment of Solomon's idolatries by these means, than that He designed the event itself of it, though by the malice of the parties.

§ 6. Consider now the vision of the prophet Micaiah concerning the enterprize of Ahab upon Ramoth Gilead (1 Kings xxii. 23—26): "I saw the Lord sitting on His throne, and all the host of heaven standing aside Him, on His right hand, and on His left: and God said, Who shall seduce Ahab to go up and fall at Ramoth Gilead? and one said this, and another said that: and a spirit came forth and stood before the Lord, and said, I will seduce him; and the Lord said, Wherewith? and he said, I will go forth, and be a lying spirit in the mouths of all his prophets: and He said, Thou shalt seduce him, and also prevail; go and do so." God, Who shewed His counsel to His prophet in this manner, knew well enough, what prophets Ahab delighted in, and what they were that sought favour at his hands. Shall we imagine, that, when He lets the evil spirit loose (whom He knew to be of himself officious enough to the ruin of God's people), and says, "go and prevail," that He considers not their inclination to take fire at his temptation, for obtaining favour at Ahab's hands; or Ahab, to make use of their credit, to win the good king Jehosaphat to his pretences? If these things were in consideration, as the means to bring about God's design upon Ahab—(here you must pardon me, if, speaking as a man to men, I can express the matters of God no otherwise than the Scripture doth, in the likeness of an infinite wise prince, though assured, that one act of God's wisdom, which is God, attains and contains all this),—which the text plainly expresseth; did God go by guess, or doth the Scripture, condescending to our infirmity, speak of Him in "the style of the sons of men," as the Jews say, and represent to us the order which He designs in those things which He brings to pass, in the fashion of a prince, taking counsel with his servants and vassals what course to take?
§ 7. But let us not forget the greatest work of God's providence that ever the sun saw, in procuring the redemption of mankind by the malice of Satan and the Jews in putting our Lord Christ to death. The words of St. Peter are very express (Acts ii. 23): "Him, being delivered by the determinate counsel and foreknowledge of God, ye have taken, and through wicked hands crucified and killed." And again (Acts iii. 17, 18): "And now, brethren, I know that you did this ignorantly; as also did your rulers; but God hath thus fulfilled those things, which He had foretold by the mouth of His holy prophets, that Christ should suffer." What was the ignorance of the rulers, we learn by the vote of Caiaphas, that swayed the council (John xi. 49, 50): "Ye know nothing, nor argue, that it is expedient for us, that one man die for the people, rather than that the whole nation perish:" ratifying the reason propounded afore; "If we let Him alone thus, all will believe on Him, and the Romans will come, and take us and this place and the nation away." What was the ignorance of the people, we learn by St. Paul, Rom. x. 3: "Not knowing the righteousness of God, and willing to establish their own righteousness, they were not subject to the righteousness of God." And again, 1 Thess. ii. 15, 16, he thus qualifieth the Jews: "Who both killed the Lord Jesus, and their own prophets, and please not God, and oppose all men; forbidding us to speak to the Gentiles that they may be saved: to the fulfilling of their sins always; for wrath is come upon them to the end." The Scribes and the Pharisees had got possession of the people's hearts, by persuading them, that God accepted them as righteous for the outward observation of the carnal law of Moses, given for the condition, by which they held the land of promise. They then persuaded them to demand our Lord to death, for the same reason for which their predecessors had put their prophets to death, because they preached to them that inward spiritual righteousness, which our Lord demandeth as the condition of obtaining the world to come. And for the same reason their successors persecuted the Apostles; because, not entailing His righteousness upon them, as the sons of Abraham, they shewed the Gentiles how to become as righteous as they thought themselves. The priests and rulers and elders, who, by the means
of the Scribes and Pharisees, carried the people, and were not
willing to part with their power by receiving law from our
Lord Christ (as not believing, that He preached His Gospel with
an intent to establish them in their power but to take it out of
their hands, as belonging to the Messias), made it their
business to persuade the people, that it would be the ruin of
the nation to acknowledge Him for the Messias. If God hath
assured us, that these were the inclinations, that brought to
pass this godly murder of our Lord, shall we believe, that He
Himself had them not in consideration, when He designed
the redemption of mankind by the means of it? Or that,
having them in consideration, He foresaw not what effect they
would have in the Jews, being abandoned to the malice of
Satan that procured it? If we will learn "the determinate
counsel and foreknowledge of God" from the Scriptures, we
must have recourse to those means, by which the Scriptures
teach us that it came to pass. For, truly, it was never designed,
nor did God foresee, that it would come to pass by other
means, or otherwise, than indeed it came to pass. It is a
conceit, that deserves reverence for Ignatius his sake, a dis-
ciple of St. John; who in one of his Epistles informs us,
that the birth of our Lord, and the manifestation of His
Godhead in the flesh, was so husbanded, that the devils
themselves (though, when they were constrained to obey Him,
they cried Him up "the Son of God"), yet should not loose
the hope of destroying Him. Can we think, that God im-
mediately designed such a stratagem upon Satan, and had not
regard to the inclinations of his ministers, or knew not what
effect those considerations would have, which should arise in
them upon those objects, which His providence presented
them with?

§ 8. By this we may see, why our Lord upbraids the cities
in which He did His greatest miracles: Matt. xi. 21, 22.
"Woe to thee, Chorazin, woe to thee, Bethsaida; for had the

4 "Καὶ ἔλαβεν τὸν ἐρχόμενον τοῦ αἰῶ-
nος τούτου ἡ παρθενία Μαρίας, καὶ ὅποιο-
τός αὐτῆς, λυλαῖο καὶ δ σάντος τοῦ Κυρίου τρια μοντρὰ κραυγῆς, ἰστιν ἐν ἑαυτῇ Ἡ-
του τεράστην." S. Ignat., Ad Ephes.,
Jacobson.—"Cifantur verba Ignatii ab
Origene, Homil. vi. in Lucam, a Basil-
lio, Homil. xxv. De Sancta Christi
Nativitate, Hieronymo, ad Matthaei
cap. i., Joio Monacho in Oxoniensi
Præsbyteria, lib. i., cap. 31. ap. Pho-
tium Bibliothecæ Codice 222." Cote-
ler., ad loc.
mighty works that have been done in thee, been done in Tyre and Sidon, they had long since repented in sackcloth and ashes: and thou, Capernaum, that art exalted to heaven, shalt be cast down to hell; for had the mighty works that have been done in thee, been done in Sodom and Gomorrah, they had stood till this day." I do so respect the learning and judgment of Grotius and Jansenius, that I will not take upon me to censure them, when they make these words signify no more, than that, in probability, Sodom and Gomorrah had repented at the sight of such miracles. But I find no good reason to infer, as our Lord doth, that, positively, Chorazin, Bethsaida, and Capernaum, shall be tormented more than Tyre and Sidon, than Sodom and Gomorrah, because, probably, Sodom and Gomorrah would have repented at the sight of such miracles. The same I say to others, who would have our Lord say only this; that, had those miracles been done in Tyre and Sidon, they would have repented, but not from the heart; because miracles are not able to convert any man to God from the heart. For, in conscience, is there reason, that Chorazin and Bethsaida should fare worse than Sodom and Gomorrah, because Tyre and Sidon would have repented as hypocrites, continuing no less sinners than they that repented not? But to say,
as others do, that, had God ordained those miracles to be done at Tyre and Sidon, at Sodom and Gomorrah, He would have determined their wills by His immediate act to be converted; is to say, that our Lord by a mental reservation says that, whereof He expresseth not the reason, and so cozens them, that satisfy themselves with the reason which He expresseth. I know these answers are brought to avoid the heresy of Pelagius; that outward calling, without inward grace, is enough to convert a man. But there is no necessity to grant the consequence. The miracles of Christ, supposing His doctrine, import the inward grace of the Spirit to make it prevail. Why else are they, who said they were done by Beelzebub, guilty of the sin against the Holy Ghost? And this means, being sufficient to convert them, had been effectual, had they found men better disposed. What was the difference? They had found men not zealous of their own righteousness by the Law; who, therefore, had not resisted the righteousness of God, which Christ teacheth with miracles sufficient to convict them that He was a true prophet. Upon these grounds, God, Who knew all their hearts, might comprehend the event.

§ 9. The case of David at Keilah is so near this, that I must not mention it any where else; 1 Sam. xxiii. 10—12. "And David said, O Lord God of Israel, Thy servant heareth for certain, that Saul is coming to Keilah, to destroy the city for my sake: will the men of Keilah shut me in his hand? will Saul come down, as Thy servant heareth? O Lord God of Israel, shew Thy servant. And the Lord said, He will come down. And David said, Will the masters of Keilah shut me and my men into Saul's hands? And the Lord said, They will." What escape is there here, when God, out of His knowledge of the secrets of their hearts, foretells what they would do, if Saul should come against the city?

§ 10. Nor will I forget that of the wise Hebrew; for he drew at the fountain-head of the prophets, though he spake not by their spirit. It is thought to be said of Enoch, according to that which we read of him, Gen. v. 24, Heb. xi. 5; but the argument is the same, whether so or not. Wisdom iv. 10, 11, 14: “He pleased [God] and was beloved of Him, so that, whereas he lived among sinners, He translated him; he was taken away [speedily], lest wickedness should alter his understanding, or deceit beguile his mind;... for his soul pleased God, therefore hasted He to take him away from wickedness.” For if God knew such occurrences as would deceive Enoch, or one in his state, then by those occurrences He foresees the decree. If He knew none, unless Himself determine his will to be deceived, then can it not be said, that God “translated” him “lest wickedness should deceive him,” but lest God should appoint him to be deceived by wickedness. The same author thus commendeth the mercy of God in destroying the Canaanites by little and little (Wisdom xii. 10): “But, chastising them by little and little, Thou gavest them room of repentance; though knowing their perverse disposition to be such,... that they could not repent.” That is, knowing that this gentle dealing of God would not be effectual, notwithstanding all that He had done to assure His people of the land of promise, to move them to embrace the true God: upon which condition they might have been suffered to live as slaves to the Israelites, if not as strangers among them; as Rahab the harlot was suffered to do among her kindred, because she alone embraced those terms. So that the precept of the Law, that commands the seven nations utterly to be destroyed, stands upon supposition of this impenitence thus foreseen.

§ 11. To the same purpose speak those texts of Scripture, in which it is said, that, if such or such a thing be not done, such or such a thing will come to pass. As Gen. xi. 6: “Behold, the people is one, and their language the same; and having begun this, they will not give over whatsoever they have thought to do.” Acts xxvii. 31: “Unless these remain in the ship, ye cannot be saved.” Essay i. 9; Rom. ix. 29: “If the Lord of hosts had not left us a seed, we had been as

* Corrected from MS. “commandeth,” in orig. text.
Sodom, we had been like Gomorrah.” Matt. xxiv. 22: “Had not those days been shortened, all flesh would perish; but, for the elect’s sake, those days shall be shortened.” For there is no necessity to say, that God could not have prevented these effects by any other means (the building of the tower of Babel, for the purpose, by any other means but by dividing their language; the saving of the elect at the destruction of Jerusalem, but by shortening their time; the saving of St. Paul’s fellow-travellers, but by the mariners abiding on shipboard): but that God knew, that they would go to build the tower of Babel; that, the time not being shortened, even the elect would perish; that, if the mariners left the ship, the rest would be cast away; should not God otherwise interpose. As the Prophet Esay, shewing how great a mercy of God it was, that any of the Israelites should escape that vengeance which he foretelleth, and alleged by St. Paul to shew, how great a mercy of God it was, that any of them should be saved by the Gospel from the vengeance to come; declare, that God foresaw this ruin would come to pass if He did not interpose. But to say, that God foresaw this, because He foresaw that Himself had resolved by His immediate act to determine the wills of those men, by which they were to come to pass, to bring them to pass, is to say, that all those means, by which it is signified that He saw they would come to pass, are alleged by the Scripture impertinently and to no purpose. It followeth therefore, of necessity, that God foresaw that those things should come to pass, by the cases which He saw stated, and the wills of those men whom He saw concerned in stating the same. And, by the same reason, that holdeth, which is said, Exod. iii. 19: “I know, that the king of Egypt will not give you leave to depart, but by a mighty arm.” Upon which the saying of the wise man alleged afore is verified; that God knew, that the [Wisd. xix. 1, 2] Egyptians would repent themselves, and attempt to bring them back into bondage, whom they had just afore entreated to be gone.

§ 12. In fine, all the scriptures which say, this or that was done that such things as had been foretold might be fulfilled, prove the same without answer.

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§ 13. John xix. 24, 36: “They said then to one another, Let us not rend it, but cast lots for it whose it shall be; that the scripture might be fulfilled which saith, They shared My garments among them, and for My coat they cast lots.” And again; “These things came to pass, that the scriptures might be fulfilled, A bone shall not be broken of it.” Did God provide, that Christ’s coat should be seamless; that, there being loss in sharing it, the reason of casting lots for it might be unanswerable: did He provide, that our Lord should have visibly breathed out His last; that there might be no reason to break His legs, as the legs of the rest: that, having provided all this, He might at length determine them to do what they did? Which had He intended to do, it was impertinent whether He provided all this or not.

§ 14. Matt. ii. 17, 18: “Then was fulfilled that which was said by Jeremy the prophet, saying, A cry was heard in Ramah, lamentation and weeping and great mourning, Rachel weeping for her children, and would not be comforted, because they were not.” Herod was become jealous of the King of the Jews That was born, and would have taken Him away alone; but when he could not hear of Him by the wise men, resolved to take away all under two years old, that He might not escape. Did God know, that his bloody humour would resolve this wickedness upon these occurrences? Or did He first provide the occasion, and then determine him to do that, which, without providing the occasion, being so determined, he would have done nevertheless?

§ 15. All the scriptures in which this is said argue as much. I must not omit that which is said of Abiathar, 1 Kings ii. 27: “And Solomon drove Abiathar from being high-priest to the Lord; to fulfil the word of the Lord which He had spoken against the house of Eli in Shiloh.” Had God provided all that had befallen Abiathar, and in the end, according to His unquestionable justice, the occurrences that resolved him to be of the conspiracy of Adonijah; that the prophecies against Eli and his house (1 Sam. ii. 30—36; iii. 11—14) might come to effect, which no reason could be given, why so rather than otherwise: if, after all this, He
must interpose His immediate act to determine Solomon to
fulfil it, by setting Abiathar aside?

§ 16. If God thus, by His justice and His mercy, in con-
sideration of man's by-past actions, ordain the occurrences,
whereof He knoweth what the issue will be; shall it seem
strange, that out of His original right in His creature, hav-
ing set Adam in Paradise with those abilities, that all agree
he might have stood if he would, He checked not the malice
of the rebel angels, nor taught him that cunning, which his
simplicity had not needed, had he loved to continue (as was
elegantly said) "simplicior quam ut decipi posset"—"simpler,
or "more an innocent, than to be cozened?" Or can we say,
that he might have stood had he would: who by God's
immediate act, as we see, was not determined to stand; who
could not have stood, had he not been determined by God to
stand; and, had he been determined, could not but stand?
None of which follows, if we say, that God, seeing the state
in which He had placed him a sufficient bait to resolve the
apostate angels to tempt, seeing the temptation so strong
that Adam would not resist it, for the reasons, which He in
His secret counsel saw best, resolved to maintain both in
acting their own inclinations, and Himself to make the best
of that which should be done.

§ 17. And, this precedent being resolved, can it seem
strange, that He should order all men to come to the years
of discretion, when first they begin to act to their own ac-
count, with those impressions received from their education,
which He sees how they will incline them to the better or to
the worse;—seeing also, that they do not resolve them either
for the better or for the worse, but by the means of their
own free choice;—can it seem strange, I say, that He should
order them to meet with those occurrences, which, suit-
ning with the merit of their by-past actions, He sees will deter-
mine their choice for the better or for the worse, in those
things, which He sees that it was in them, though perhaps
with much more difficulty, and so for more advantage, to
have determined otherwise?

§ 18. But to leave the rest of this discourse till I can go
through with it: for the present, the reason of this position

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1 [The editor cannot trace this quotation.]  
2 Below, c. xxvi.  
3 The ground off. reknow-
ledge of fu-
ture contin-
gencies.
seems to me demonstrative (if any thing in this subject can be demonstrative); supposing that which hath been proved, that God by His own immediate act doth not determine the will of man to do this or that. For, seeing that Christian faith presupposeth, that God knoweth from everlasting whatsoever future contingencies shall come to pass during every moment of time whilst the world shall endure; and that it is evident, that whatsoever is known, must be knowable before it is known (and, therefore, certain or determined, not by being known, but by being capable of being known); what ground can we imagine in contingencies, to make them capable of being known? For, of their own nature, we transgress the very notion of contingencies which we suppose, and evidently contradict ourselves, if we say there is any thing in them, of themselves, to determine this to come to pass rather than that; supposing the cause to be no more determined to do this than that, which the supposition of free-will necessarily requires. Certainly Aristotle's resolution,—that they are sure in the alternative but that neither part of it can be certain¹ (that is to say, that Peter being tempted shall either deny his Master or not, but that, being contingent, it can neither be certain that he shall nor that he shall not),—is utterly inconsistent with that particular providence of God over all things, which Christianity presupposeth; and renders that great master (as a man too cunning not to see the consequence of his own position) very suspicious in a point so nearly concerning the belief of God's providence. Now future contingencies, in the notion of contingencies that are not yet come to pass, being in themselves nothing (that is to say, being only understood to be possible), cannot reduce themselves to the nature and state of future contingencies, in the notion of contingencies that shall come to pass; such as we believe all contingencies, that have or shall come to pass to the world's end, were to God from everlasting. It is therefore a mere contradiction to imagine, that contingencies, either by the possibility of their nature,
or by the capacity of the cause (that is of itself utterly undetermined to do rather than not to do, to do this rather than that), can be an object capable of being known by that knowledge, upon which they may be said to be certain and future, as things "that shall be," not as things "that may be," not as μέλλοντα but as γενομένα, to distinguish with Aristotle\(^m\). There are indeed those \(^n\), who undertake, that when it is said, Peter shall deny his Lord, Peter shall not deny his Lord (the one of which sayings must needs come to pass), seeing this necessity must needs be in the object before it be in the saying (because the saying is true or false by reason that the matter of it is so or otherwise before), therefore that part which appears true in time was true from everlasting: but that, they suppose, cannot be by virtue of any or all causes, lest the effects should no more be contingencies; therefore, by virtue of the things themselves, because, of a contradiction, the one part must needs be true, the other false. And this being of future contingencies they imagine it is, which the knowledge of God attaining, is therefore called 'sight,' because it reacheth that which is in being, and therefore present to it. But this imagination is a mere contradiction to common reason: which is able to tell any man, that possibilities differ only in this from nothing, that there are such things as can bring them to pass; and therefore have no being at all, but in the ability of their causes. Whereas, suppose them in being before their causes bring them to pass, what remains for their causes to do? which would have nothing to do, if that which they bring to pass were in being before they bring it so to pass. And what contingency could then remain? seeing whatsoever is, must needs be while it is. For this position prevents

\(^m\) "Ολος γάρ οὐ πάν γίνεται τὸ μελλόντα, οὐδὲ ταῦτα τὸ εσομένον καὶ τὸ μέλλον." Aristot., De Divin. per Somnum, ii. 4.

\(^n\) "Futura contingentia, quae absolu t. futura sunt, ab aeterno habent determinatam veritatem, secundum quam cognoscibilis sunt et in Deo praecipitur. Probatur l. ex dicitis, quia certum est Deum predicere futura contingentia; vel ergo vere vel falsa predict; non falsa, quia Deus non errat; ergo vere; at non potest vere predicere nisi vere futura sint; ergo in se determinate vera sunt. 2. Quia haec propositio est vera et necessaria, "Petrus peccabit vel non peccabit eras;" sed Petrus non potest utrumque facere; ergo aliter tantum facturus est: ergo, si nunc affirmem, illud ipsum futurum esse, quod ipse facturus est, vera est affirmatio," &c. Beccanu, Summ. Theol. Scholast., tom. i. tract. i. c. 10. qu. 6. p. 89. a. Mogunt. 1612; and see the whole chapter. So also Vasquez, In I. Part. D. Thomas, tom. i. Diss. lxvii. c. 3. pp. 403, 404. Ingolst. 1609.
any supposition, that may be made concerning the being of that, which is said to be, before you can suppose or understand it to be. And where is the difference between the being of God, and that of future contingencies, both being of themselves? Surely, supposing the necessity of this their being because God could not see them otherwise, they would be not only objects, denominating that knowledge of God to be 'sight,' which reacheth the present being of them, but causes, on which the sight of God must depend, as our sight depends on the object that causeth it. The future being, therefore, of contingencies, necessarily supposeth the determination of their causes; the contingency of them, that this determination is from their causes themselves, freely determining themselves; the certainty of them, from the infinite reach of God's understanding, comprehending the resolution of the creature by the present inclination thereof meeting the considerations which it is presented with. Wherefore, as it is impossible that the will should act unless the understanding go before, and the resolution of the will to do, or not to do, this or that, necessarily depends upon some act of the understanding, shewing by sufficient reason an end sufficient to move the will to proceed and resolve; so doth not the will effectually proceed, until the understanding shews that reason which effectually moves it to proceed. Now these reasons proceeding from those appearances, which the objects that every man meets with cause in his mind, either at the present, or by comparing that which outwardly appears at the present, with that which is laid up in the storehouse of the mind; and God having provided what objects every man in every moment shall meet with, to resolve him what to do, in every case that may come in debate: it cannot be imagined, that He provideth this, and knoweth not, by the means which He provideth, what will be the issue; supposing that He knoweth it not by His own resolution, to determine a man by His own immediate act to do whatsoever he does. And indeed, God comprehending what considerations a man every moment is moved with, and what be his own inclinations that is moved with the same, it cannot seem strange, that by this means (seeing it appears impossible that by any other means) He should
comprehend what will so come to pass; though knowing, CHAP that he that acteth, had, or might have had, sufficient rea-
sons to have done otherwise. Wherefore, if any man ask me, whether God know what will come to pass, if any case should be put which He knoweth shall never be put; which is now called in the schools God’s “middle knowledge,” because it hath, on the one side, that knowledge whereby He comprehendeth the natures of all things and the possi-
bilities of all events, on the other side, the view which He hath from everlasting of all things that have been, are, or shall be, for that tract of time which they endure (because I seem to say, that this is it which directs God’s providence

\[\text{O “Inter ea quae sunt in scholis ex-
cogitata ad conciliandam libertatem humanam cum certitudine et immu-
tabilitate decretorum Divinorum circa
actus humanos, increbuit in primitivis sci-
entia illa conditionata, ex qua ratio-
nem istius conciliationis petendar esse
censurunt Lud. Molina et Fonseca
Jesuítæ primi, et post eós plurimi, tum
in schola Romana, tum inter ipsos Pro-
testantes. . . Igitur maxima pars doc-
 torum scholæ Romæ in ea est sen-
tentia, Deum non solum praescrire ea,
qui libere et contingenter quidem sed
tamen simpliciter et absolute futura
sunt; verum etiam illa quae, licet nun-
quam futura sunt, libere tamen even-
tura essent, postea hac aut illa condi-
tione. Exempli causa, Deum non tan-
tum cognoscere quid singuli facturi
sumus ad finem usque vitae in variis
illis statibus, in quibus ex certa Dei
providentia sumus collocandi; sed pra-
terea quid factori essumus, si plane di-
versus esset futurus rerum status, et
alio atque alio agendi occasione sese
nobis offerent. . . Porro hanc scientiam
vocant scientiam medium, quoniam jux-
ta ipsos medium tenet inter scientiam quæ
dicitur in scholis scientia visionis, et il-
lam quæ dicitur simplicis intelligente.
Per scientiam autem visionis intelligunt
notitiam illam qua Deus novit ea quæ
extra Isum existunt in aliqua tempo-
ris differentia, nempe quæ sunt præte-
rita, presentia, vel futura. Quæ om-
nia Deus ab erno tum clare, certò, et
distincte cognoscit, ac si actu Ipsi pra-
sentia essent, non secus ac illa quæ co-
ram intuemur. Unde est quod dicunt
scientia visionis. . . Atque hæc scientia
dicitur quæ scientia libera, quia se-
quitur liberum decretum Divinæ vo-
lutatis de rebus creando atque conser-
vandis; sine quo, ut nihil existere pot-
test, ita quoque nihil potest videri praes-
sens vel provideri futurum. . . Per scien-
tiam vero simplicis intelligentiæ signi-
ficat eam quæ Deus novit et intelligit
omnia possibilia rerumque essentias et
connexiones omnes, seu necessarias, sive
quomodocumque possibiles. At-
quæ hæc scientia dicitur naturalis, non
libera: quia præcedit, juxta nostrum
concipienda modum, omne Dei decre-
tum de rebus faciendis; neque potuit
in Deo non esse, quanquam nihil ex-
tra Se crearet voluisset. Scientia autem
quam Deo tribuunt contingenter futu-
rorum sub aliqua conditione, media ab
illis vocatur, quoniam nec omnino con-
venit cum scientia visionis nec etiam cum
scientia simplicis intelligentiæ, sed de
utraque aliquid participat. Nec enim est
de rebus mere possibilitibus et abstracta
ab omni consideratione existentie; qua-
lis est scientia simplicis intelligentiæ: ne-
quæ etiam est de rebus absolute futuris
in aliqua temporis differentia ex decreto
Dei; quis est scientia visionis. Sed
partim refert scientiam liberam, quia
est de rebus libere futuris, si modo
conditio poneretur; et in libertate Dei
situm est ut conditio illa ponatur: par-
tim scientiam naturalam, quia præcedit
omne decreatum Dei, et Deus ea carere
non potuit, etiamsi non decrevisset
mundum aut aliquid creare.”

Le Blanc, Thes. Theol., Thes. de Con-
cord. Lib. Hum. cum Decret. Divinas,
P. I. § i. ii. viii.—x.; pp. 451—453.
—See Fonsæca, In Aristot. Metaph.,
lib. vi. c. ii. Qu. 4. sect. 8; tom. iii.
pp. 119. a. sq. (Colon. 1604); and Molina,
Lib. Arbit. cum Gratiae Donis, Divina
Præscientia, &c., Concordia, ad Qu.
1595).
in resolving what course to hold, by which resolution it appears to Him what shall come to pass: I shall not answer nevertheless without distinguishing; that God comprehends not the issues of those future possibilities, which men can imagine to themselves; and yet comprehends the issues of those future possibilities, whereof we suppose Him to determine all the circumstances. For let a man infinitely endeavour to limit, by his understanding, all that he can consider in the case of any man left to his freedom, he shall never be able to express that consideration, which shall be effectual certainly to determine him that is presented with it; because it is manifest, that infinite considerations more may present themselves, to move him to do nothing, or otherwise. But when the word of God speaks of those means, which, being provided by God, determine effectually the resolution of him that is moved by them, to wit, by the means of his own choice: though it is impossible, that, speaking to men, it should express all that God considereth to ground His fore-knowledge; yet, by that which it expresseth, it obligeth us to understand all that appeareth either to man to determine his choice, or to God to ground His fore-knowledge: which, though proceeding from His effectual providence, yet, supposing man's freedom, cannot be understood any way to impeach it. And upon these terms it may be understood, how future conditionals may be subject to the infinite capacity of God's understanding: inasmuch as, knowing what a man with these inclinations, being moved with these considerations, will do, He must needs know, what he would have done, had either his inclinations or the consideration presented been other than they are; God comprehending those which might have been, no less than those which are. And thus propositions concerning future possibilities may be said to be known to God, whether true or false, supposing the terms of them to intimate whatsoever may appear to God in the cases whereof they speak; which no terms that man can use can express.

§ 19. And, therefore, the like cannot be said of possibilities proposed to depend upon impertinent conditions: as who should say, If the Turk take Candy, the Pope will condemn

[Of possibilities proposed to depend upon impertinent conditions.]
Jansenius. For what possibility can depend upon a condition, that is supposed not to come into the consideration of him that must effect it? It is alleged, indeed, that Elias saith to Elizeus, 2 Kings ii. 10, "If thou seest me when I am taken from thee, it shall so come to pass to thee; if not, it shall not." But it is no marvel, that Elias, knowing that both his scholar's desire, and his seeing of him as he was going up into heaven, should come to pass, should seem to suspend the one upon the other; not because God had appointed any such dependence, but to signify, that he must be content to expect for the present, and that, when he saw him part, he might rest assured of it. But it is alleged also, that Elizeus said to King Joash, 2 Kings xiii. 19, "Thou shouldst have struck the earth with thine arrow five or six times, then shouldst thou have smitten Aram till they had been destroyed." To which I answer, that it is a prophecy: and that God had revealed to His prophet, that the Israelites should overcome the Syrians as many times as the king should strike the earth; not meaning that, if more or less than three, the number of the victories might be other than three; but knowing that he would strike thrice, and having intended them so many victories. Therefore the prophet is angry at the king for striking but thrice, because he might have expected (knowing no more than I have said), that the Israelites should have utterly destroyed the Syrians, knowing that they should overcome them as oft as he should strike. And this sense agreeeth well enough with the Hebrew (where the indicative serves for all the moods); translating it, "Then mightest thou have smitten Aram till he had been destroyed:" because the revelation which he had

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v e.g. "Similis est necessitas connexionis in illa conditionali enunciatione: quae eventu comprobata est, 2 Reg. ii. 20" (sic). "Cum Elias dixit Elizeo, 'Si videris me quando tollar a te, erit tibi quod petisti:' nempe duplex spiritus magistri. Ubi sola veritas infallibilis promissionis verbo Dei revelata objecta illa dispersata conjunctis." Strang, De Volunt. et Act. Dei circa Pecatum, lib. iii. c. 18. p. 746. 20 is misprinted for 10 in the original text of Thordike also.

r "Quartum testimonium ex 2 Reg. xiii.; ubi propheta Elizeus dixit ad Joaschum regem Israelae, 'Si percussisses quinties aut sexies, tunc percussisses usque ad consumpitionem.' Respondeo, in hac etiam propositione cernitur necessaria connexion, non quidem ex parte rei; dispersa enim sunt quae connectuntur: sed supposito instituto aut voluntate Dei, quam propheta revelavit." Id., ibid.; and see also lib. iii. c. 10. p. 648.

* "אַ֖זֶּה֙ הַמִּצְרָיִ֣ם גֵּרֵ֔י" 2 Kings xiii. 19.
would have borne it, not because God had suspended the event upon a condition so impertinent. For, in conditionals, neither the truth of the condition, nor of that which is inferred, is requisite to make them true; but only the truth of the inference, consequence, or dependence. If the sun rise not at such an hour, we shall not have day. It is a certain truth: not because the sun will not rise at his hour, nor that, rising, we shall not have day; but because the consequence is necessarily true. And therefore he, who by pronouncing a conditional affirmeth a dependence between the parts of it, whenas indeed there is none, speaks not only an impertinence but an untruth. If there be a dependence between them, though God only knew it, he saith true; if none, false.

§ 20. If it be requisite, that divines may understand one another the better, to call this God’s “middle knowledge;” be it so called, if you please. Upon terms I contend not. In the meantime let me say, that God not only seeth from everlasting those contingencies, which shall come to pass, every one in their several times; but also foreseeth, that they shall come to pass: which, though all a thing, yet are grounded upon several reasons. For all sight implying the being of that, whereof it expresseth the presence to that which sees; the view which God hath of future contingencies, implieth, that: they are present to Him in His indivisible eternity, in that difference of time, the whole succession whereof the instant of God’s eternity without succession answers. But when God, by resolving to produce that state of things which He chooseth, comprehends what will follow, this knowledge, being the ground upon which He sees what will come to pass, cannot be that knowledge, which, representing it to Him as present, must needs presuppose, and not produce, the being of it. And upon these premises I know what to say to the opinion of some of the school:\footnote{Thomistae recentiores certitudini isti, qua Deus ab eterno futura qualisbet contingentia praevidit, duos fundamenta prestruunt. Unum est, res omnes futuras in eternitate Deo presentes esse, non tantum in esse objectivo sive in esse cognito sed etiam in esse reali et secundum proprias suas existentias.}

\footnote{Nam, inquit, ita Se habet Deus in ordine ad futura contingentia, sicut existens in alia specula, ex qua intuetur totam viam in ordine ad transuentes per illam; licet enim unus perget post alium, et posterior non videat priorrem, ille tamen qui est in specula, omnes simul intuetur, et habet prae-
that the ground of God's foreknowledge of future contingencies stands in their being present to His eternity from everlasting, though in that difference of time, which they hold in the succession which the world is to endure; which whole succession the one indivisible moment of God's eternity answereth. For though it is not to be denied, that God sees all future contingencies, as thus present to Him, from everlasting; yet is it still to be demanded, what is the ground of this their presence, and how they come to be present to God: seeing they neither could be present to Him, not first supposing them to have being; nor could have being of themselves, as capable of not-being as well as of being: for this is the nature of future contingencies. Seeing then, that the presence of future contingencies to God in His eternity being supposed, we are notwithstanding forced to enquire how it comes to pass; and whatsoever proves the true reason of that, will prove the true ground upon which they may be foreseen: it follows necessarily, that the determination of contingencies, which qualifieth them future (in the notion of that which 'shall be,' not of that which 'may be'), is all the ground, why they are present to the view of God; which presence inferreth, that it is foreknown to God, that they 'shall be' at that time in regard whereof they are called future.

§ 21. But this opinion, I confess, is liable to divers great difficulties. Here, in the first place, it may be objected: that, by this means, we make God pick up that knowledge, that goes before His providence to direct it, from His creatures; collecting by the inclination which He sees to be in them, what they will do when they come to be in such or such an estate, and accordingly resolving to bring them or not to bring them to it. To which I answer, that this...
imagination is no less abusive, than that upon which Epicurus denied providence; for fear God should be troubled with that infinite care which it would require, as men are with a little part of it. But if all the sight which God hath of the creature, proceed from the knowledge of Himself, whereby, seeing what He may make, He resolves what He will make; though, I say, the sight of His creature at present depends upon the decree of producing it in His own time, yet, seeing I make this decree to depend only upon the infinite wisdom and goodness of God which moves Him to choose what He thought best to do, I make Him to depend upon Himself alone, not upon His creature. In like manner, though I make the decree of God’s providence to proceed upon consideration of the free inclination of His creature, moved by the consideration of such objects as He sees are presented to it; and His foresight of future contingencies proceeding from the free will thereof, to stand upon the said decrees: yet, since I derive the free will of the creature from the knowledge and will of God, and the state of it from the course of providence, which His own knowledge directs, I cannot be thought to disparage God with the imperfections of His creatures. I do indeed understand, that simple Christians take it with a grain of jealousy upon a man’s Christianity, when a man of understanding shews them the order of secondary causes in effecting the works of God’s providence; as if therefore he did not believe, that all comes from God, because he will not have Him, at every turn, to transgress the ordinary course of those causes which His providence hath once set on work: because they understand it not. But though the most understanding know very little of it, yet thus much they know; that it is more for the honour of God, that it should be thought, that God from the beginning hath elected repeatedly in the Augustinus itself); and it is the common objection of those who lean to Predestinarian opinions. See also Le Blanc’s statement of the argument of the Supralapsarians (Thea. Theol., Thes. de Conc. Hum. &c. P. i. § xiii. p. 468):—“Præcipuum fundamentum quo nuntiatur Tuisseus, Retorfortis, Voetius, Amesiæus, et alii, dum negant in Deo dni cognitionem contingenter futurorum sub aliqua conditio, ante liberum Ipius decretum, illud est, quod, ex corum mente, nihil futurum est præsum quam decreverit Deus illud esse futurum,” &c.: concluding, that “ista futuritio, quæ est ab æterno, causam habeat aliquem ætèrunum, quæ alia esse non potest quam liberum Dei decre tum: ut millies repetit Tuisseus in sua dissertatione de Scientia Medica.”

* Lucret., ii. 1089, sq. &c.
a certain order agreeable to His own infinite wisdom, justice,
goodness, sovereignty, but yet of His own free choice, by
which all things come to pass, His creatures serving the turn
of His purpose; than that He should at all turns, by moving
His creatures to that which they are not inclined to by their
first nature, but by His present will immediately, attain His
designs. For that He should transgress His own order for
the introducing of those effects which are above nature, the
whole book of God requires us to believe. And if the glory
of God consists in causing natural things, working their own
inclinations, to serve to do what He designeth; much more
it is for His glory, that, maintaining man in the exercise of
his freedom, He makes him nevertheless, whether by good
or by bad inclinations, an instrument to bring to pass those
events which He in His wisdom determineth.

§ 22. In the second place it may be objected: that, sup-
posing all that can be supposed in the nature of future con-
tingencies, they must appear possible on both sides, they
may appear infinitely more and more probable on the one
side; but so long as they appear not certain, they cannot be
the object of certain knowledge, as God's is; and certain they
cannot appear, so long as we suppose them to remain con-
tingencies*. To which I answer: acknowledging, that I, who
draw my knowledge from that which I see, cannot, by
limiting the probabilities of future contingencies, attain to
more than probability; but that it would be against all the
reason in the world, thereby to take measure what God can
attain to, comprehending, not only the inclinations of His
creatures, and the considerations which they meet with, but
also that they shall meet with no other but what He compre-
hendeth; and to undertake, that He, by what He sees, can-
cannot discern that to be certain, which I, by that which I see,
cannot discern to be more than probable. I know it may be
said, on the other side, that it is only the weakness of our
understanding, that hinders us to discern the consistence of

* See Preface to the Epilogue, § 18. Ac proinde conditionata scientia ut sit
certa et infallibilis, oportet ut objectum ejus sit conditionata propositio neces-
saria, nulla autem conditionalis pro-
positio est necessaria, in qua illatio
non est necessaria.” Strang., De Vo-
lunt. Dei &c., lib. iii. c. 11. p. 651.
our freedom with the immediate determination thereof by
the act of God to that which it chooseth. And it is usually
argued, that the work of saving grace, and the difference
which it maketh between those that are saved and those that
are not, would not remain such a mystery, as the differences
on foot about it in the Christian world demonstrate, if the
reason of it be resolved into the congruity of that motion,
which sufficient reason tenders to a reasonable creature. To
which I answer, in the first place: that if it were not a
secret, according to that opinion which I advance, this objec-
tion, wherein all the difficulty is couched, would not lie
against it; and that, supposing all the difficulty thereof
voided, it would remain no less a secret, why God should
move some, providing that congruity, others, waiving it, than
why He should by His own immediate act determine some
to be Christians, whilst it remains possible, that those who
are not so determined should be the like. To the other
I say: that it is one thing not to know, nor to be able
to demonstrate, how God can have certain knowledge of
things that whilst they are known remain contingencies;
another thing to know, that by the knowledge which He
hath, they remain not contingencies; Christianity supposing
them to remain contingencies. For it is no shame for a
Christian, or for a divine, to profess ignorance; when the
question is, how it may be evident, that matters of faith are
true: as in the matter of the Holy Trinity I have said.a. But
that, in a matter so subject to common understanding as the
determination of the will by its own choice (reason and ex-
perience justifying that which faith maketh the ground of
Christianity), because I cannot answer an objection, I shall
make the whole tenor of the Bible, the tender of Chris-
tianity, the whole treaty of God with man concerning his
happiness, delusory and abusive, as conditioning for that
which no man can stir head or foot toward, till, being de-
termined, he cannot do otherwise; [that] I should deny
that which appears, because I cannot evidence that which
appears not: seems to me very unreasonable. Especially,
having so many intimations in the Scripture, to signify,
that God hath in consideration the circumstance of each

a Above, c. xvii. § 32, sq.
man's case for the ground of His foresight in each man's proceedings. For let God's foreknowledge never so much require, that the truth of those things which He foreseeth, be determined and certain; it will be no abatement to this certainty, that I believe it is not grounded upon His immediate determining of man's will to do it, but upon His determining of the means, in consideration whereof He seeth that man will certainly proceed to determine his own choice.

§ 23. Lastly, it will be said, that by this means all things shall come to pass necessarily, being determined by God to come to pass. For unless we suppose, that the purpose of God can be defeated, that which He purposeth to bring to pass, must necessarily come to pass. I answer, that I have distinguished b between that sense, in which it may be said that a thing 'comes to pass necessarily,' and that sense, in which it may be said, that it 'must necessarily come to pass.' For I suppose, that the property of our English will help me here to distinguish these two senses, to all that consider their mother tongue, and may discern a several meaning, when a man says, The fire burns necessarily, and, Peter must necessarily deny our Lord (supposing that our Lord had foretold it). For when the necessity is understood, to be in the cause, which the nature thereof (though by God's will) determines; it is proper to say, that it comes to pass necessarily. But when the necessity is understood to stand upon a supposition of the effect, either being or known to be (which knowledge presupposeth it to be, being supposed to be true), or the like: it is proper to say, This must needs come to pass, or, It must of necessity come to pass; but not, that it comes to pass necessarily; because then the necessity must not fall upon the coming of it to pass, but upon the manner by which it comes to pass. I say then, if any can infer upon my saying, that the necessity which it infers is antecedent to the being of it, I grant I am fallen into the inconvenience which I would avoid, and will disclaim the position upon which it follows; but if it be only consequent upon supposition, either that it is, or that it is taken to be, it is no more than that necessity, which is found in all contingencies, according to all opinions, that must allow all things necessarily to be.

b Above, c. xxii. § 19.
BOOK II

(though not to be necessarily), supposing that they are. Now when I say, that God determines the events of future contingencies, I say not, that He doth it by determining their causes to do them, speaking of free causes (for the contingencies which come to pass by the concurrence of natural causes I grant to be mere necessities, in regard it is necessary, that when every cause acts to the utmost of his strength, that must not only needs come to pass, but come to pass necessarily, which the concurrence of several forces produceth, and must needs appear in the causes, to any that comprehends the force of them all): but that this act of His ends in determining the motives, which present themselves to such causes; which act is consistent with another act, whereby He maintains the cause in an ability of doing or not doing that which it is moved to do: but that, comprehending the inclinations thereof, and the force of the motives which it is presented with, He comprehends thereby, that it will proceed to act, though comprehending, that it might do otherwise, should it regard those appearances, which either habitually it hath or actually it ought to have. Now I confess again, it is hard for me to shew, how it ought actually to have those appearances which habitually it hath; but, seeing that (supposing this) I shew evidently, how the providence of God is undefeasible, the will remaining free and the effects thereof contingent, I will rather confess, that I cannot shew, where their freedom might or ought to move when it does not, than destroy the ground of all Christianity. Thus much is evident, supposing my saying; that the certainty of the event includes the supposition of the will acting freely, and therefore infers no necessity antecedent to it, the knowledge upon which providence decrees, foreseeing that it will freely proceed being so moved.
CHAPTER XXV.

THE GROUNDS OF THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN SUFFICIENT AND EFFECTUAL.
HOW NATURAL OCCASIONS CONDUCE TO SUPERNATURAL ACTIONS. THE
INSUFFICIENCY OF JANSENUS' DOCTRINE. OF SUFFICIENT GRACE UNDER
THE LAW OF MOSES AND NATURE.

And now I shall not use many words, to declare what it is, that makes those helps of grace, which of themselves are sufficient, effectual. For if all particulars are contained in their generals, that which is said of all the works of providence, must hold in those helps of supernatural grace, whereby it conducteth to the happiness of the world to come. And, therefore, the efficacy of God's grace (taking efficacy to imply the effect) consists in the order which providence useth, that the motives of Christianity (whether to embrace or perform the profession of it) be presented in such circumstances, as may render them accepted of the will, to whose judgment for the present they so appear. So that the same for nature and kind prove effectual to one, which to another prove void and frustrate. For it is manifest, that those helps are the grace of Christ, even as they are sufficient, and supposing them not to take effect. And it ought to be manifest, that the circumstances, in which they are present to every particular person, are brought to pass by the conduct of God's Spirit, Which filleth the world, and attaineth from the beginning to the end of all things which come to pass. And this Spirit, and the coming thereof, being purchased by our Lord Christ, and granted in consideration of His obedience, it is easy to be seen, how it is the grace of Christ, not only as sufficient, but also as effectual.

§ 2. This resolution then presupposeth two things as proved, chap. xviii. : the first, that the preaching of the Gospel is the grace of Christ; that is to say, a grace granted by God in consideration of Christ's merits and sufferings; the second, that the grace of Christ attaineth and reacheth the very effect of conversion and new obedience, and resteth

\[c. \text{xviii.} \; \text{§ 1, sq.}
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not in having enabled man to do it of himself without the influence of it\textsuperscript{d}.

§ 3. To make this part of faith better to be understood among believers, better to be maintained against unbelievers: that which this resolution advanceth, is this; that the grace of the Holy Ghost, purchased by the humiliation of Christ, and by His exaltation obtained, as it is the means which God hath provided for the publishing of His Gospel, to the conviction of all who understand it, that they ought to submit to the faith and live according to it; so it is the means to make it effectual to the conversion of the nations to Christianity, and that conversion effectual in their lives and conversations, by presenting the reasons and grounds thereof (being of themselves sufficient for the work) to every man's consideration, in those circumstances, procured by the providence of God which it executeth, in which His wisdom foresaw that they would take effect and become to the purpose. And truly, when our Lord saith (John xvi. 8—10); "And when He cometh, He will convict the world of sin, of righteousness, and of judgment; of sin, because they believe not in Me; of judgment, because the prince of this world is condemned:" we must understand, that the Holy Ghost "convinced the world of sin," because those miracles which the Apostles did by the Holy Ghost, convincing the world that they spoke the word of God, shewed the world, that they were under sin, and liable to God's wrath, if they became not Christians; and that He "convinced the world of judgment, because the prince of this world is condemned," by the conversion of those who forsook him to become Christians. Therefore St. Stephen upbraided the Jews, saying, "Ye stiffnecked and uncircumcised in hearts and ears, ye do always resist the Holy Ghost, even you also, as did your fathers" (Acts vii. 51); because, being convicted by the Holy Ghost Which spoke in him, that he spoke from God, nevertheless they submit not to his message. Therefore our Lord, Mark iii. 28—30: "All sins shall be forgiven the sons of men, and blasphemies which they shall blaspheme; but whoso shall blaspheme against the Holy Ghost, hath no remission for ever, but is liable to everlasting damnation; be-

\textsuperscript{d} Ibid., § 6, sq.
cause they said, He hath an unclean spirit" (which you have again, Matt. xii. 31, 32, Luke xii. 10); because, being convicted that our Lord spoke and did His miracles by the Holy Ghost, they blasphemed, saying, that He spoke and did them by an unclean spirit. For these words and these works are the means, by which our Lord accomplished His promise (John xiv. 23); "If any man love Me, he will keep My word, and My Father will love him, and We will come to him, and abide with him." For before the condition—"If any man love Me"—be fulfilled, the case is that which our Lord expresseth, Apoc. iii. 20: "Behold, I stand at the door and knock; and if any man hear My voice and open the door, I will come in to him and sup with him, and he with Me." But, being fulfilled, the words of our Lord take place, John xvi. 15—17: "If ye love Me, ye will keep My commandments; and I will ask the Father, and He will give you another Advocate, to abide with you for ever, even the Spirit of truth; Which the world cannot receive, because they see It not, nor know It, but you know It, because It abideth with you, and is in you." For seeing it is manifest by the premises, that the undertaking of Christianity is the condition upon which the Holy Ghost is granted as a gift to abide with Christians; the preaching of Christianity, that is, the proposing of those reasons which God by His word hath shewed us why we should be Christians, is the knocking of our Lord Christ by the Spirit at the door of the heart, that He may enter and dwell in us by the same Spirit: according to the words of St. Paul, 2 Cor. ii. 16; "For ye are the temple of the living God, as God hath said; to wit, I will dwell and converse among them, and will be their God, and they shall be My people." That which some philosophers
say of the natural generation of man,—that the soul frames its own dwelling,—being fulfilled in the work of regeneration by grace, when the Holy Ghost, by His actual assistance, frameth the man to be fit for the habitual gift of the Holy Ghost, by becoming a true Christian. If then we believe, that the Holy Ghost was given by God, and obtained by Christ, as well to make the Gospel effectual, as to move the Apostles to preach it; there can no doubt remain, that the preaching of the Gospel, that is to say, the means which the Holy Ghost provideth to make it either sufficient or effectual to convince the world of it, is the instrument, whereby He frameth Himself that invisible house of true believers in which He dwelleth. And, therefore, the means whereby God's grace becomes effectual to those who embrace it, is the same that renders it sufficient for those who refuse it; the difference lying as well in the disposition which it meets with (for which the man is accountable), as in the Spirit of God That presenteth it; Which renders God the praise when it takes effect, and leaves manf accountable when it does not. If this reason had been in consideration with Socinusg (and perhaps with Pelagiush), he would have found it necessary, acknowledging (as all that read the Scriptures must needs acknowledge that, which they find so frequent and so clear in the Scriptures), that the habitual gift of the Holy Ghost is granted to enable those who undertake Christianity to perform it, to acknowledge also, that the actual help of it is necessary, to make the motives of Christianity effectual to subdue men to it: and, by consequence, that the coming of the second Adam was necessary, to restore the breach which the first hath made, seeing it was not to be repaired without the same.

How natural occasions conduce to supernatural actions.

§ 4. Nor is it to be marvelled at, that natural means, conducted by the grace of Christ, should produce supernatural effects, such as I have shewed the obedience of Christianity to be: which, supposing the covenant of grace and freedom of man's will, cannot be otherwise; the reasons which appear to the understanding, and move the will, to act contrary to the inclination of original concupiscence, in 204

f Corrected from MS. "men," in original text.

See above, c. x. § 2, 3.

b See above, c. x. § 3.
professing Christianity and living according to the same, being sufficient to convict it to give sentence, that so the man ought to do; and the circumstances, in which the Spirit of Christ conducteth these motives to the heart, which It knocketh at by their means, being able to represent them valuable, to take effect with him, who is moved to the contrary by his original concupiscence. And though means natural; because they move a man to proceed according to right reason, which nature requires him to do: yet, as they are brought to pass and conducted by a supernatural cause, nothing hinders the effect to be supernatural, in such a nature as is by them made capable of acting above nature.

§ 5. I do much approve the discourse of some, that have endeavoured to shew how this comes to pass, thus; supposing the covenant of the Law to be the renewing of that which was made with Adam in Paradise, for the maintaining of him in the happiness of his natural life: which we may suppose, though we suppose not, that God covenanted not with him at all for the life to come. For the dispensation of those blessings of this life, which the covenant of nature, limited by Moses’ law to the happiness of the land of promise, tendereth, may well be the advantage which God taketh, to make the covenant of grace acceptable; especially to those, who, by God’s blessing, failing of the blessings of the first covenant, and by that means becoming out of love with this present world, meet with the covenant of grace, in such a disposition as may render it acceptable. For so long as things go well with men in this world, it seems harsh to require them to take up the cross of Christ, that they may

1 Volkel. (De Vera Religione, lib. iii. c. 11. pp. 56, sq.), arguing that neither the Law nor the covenant made with Adam offered any promise of eternal life, proceeds thus (p. 66).—“Existit autem non alia hoc loco quastio, quid causa fuerit, cur Deus tanti boni promissione in hanc muni se nectat distulerit. Intelligendum igitur est, duas potissimum rei istius causas reddi posse. Primo enim Deus pro summâ Sua sapientia hominem caput sé accommodare voluit. Deinde idem Divinae sapientiae/contentaneum erat, omnibus modis providere, ne homines sese in hereditatis caelestis nasci et immortalitatem fanquam rem debitam sibi tribui existimarent; ideoque non tantum facerent quanti summum istud bonum atque inexplicabilis Dei beneficentia, quae in eo tribuendo cernitur, estimari debet. Eam ob rem Deus per multas seculorum ætates homines tanti boni promissio destitutos esse voluit; ut et miseram for-tunarum suam agnoscerent, et meliorem statum sitienter appeterent, et tandem eum assecuti, Divinae gratiae magnitudinem sui momentis ponderarent, haecque ultima temporalis longi illius vetustatis feliciora esse intelligerent.”
obtain the world to come; but when the comforts of this world fail, it is no marvel, if any condition that tenders hope in the world to come be welcome. If it be said, that this renders the grace of Christ effectual only to the poor and men of mean condition in the world, who have cause to be weary of their estate in it; it is answered, that it is no marvel, if the means that makes the grace of Christ effectual, address itself especially to that estate of men, in which our Lord Christ (to Whom they so become conformable) appeared in the world. And for that very reason—to figure that estate of mind which the Gospel requires—the people of Israel were, by God's law, left unfurnished of many helps of policy and force, by which other nations maintain themselves free from servitude; that they might remain obliged to depend upon God's immediate assistance and providence. But it is to be said further; that, the greatest estates of the world being subject to the greatest crosses, through want of success, and those great changes to which they are liable, this way of preparation to the kingdom of heaven can no way seem wanting to any estate, when a beggar is seen no less to dote upon this world, than an unclean person is seen to dote upon that whore by whom he is abused. It is moreover to be said, that the remembrance of death, which must, and the inconstancy of this world, which may, deprive us of all the benefits thereof, being by God's judgment the punishment of sin, sours all the content of them that drench themselves deepest in the pleasures of this life, and gives them just cause to forsake them all, in case they stand not with the hope of the world to come: and the very enjoying of them (being enjoyed with that conscience, which all Christians have, of God's providence, and the sense of His hand from whence they come), is reasonably an advantage to those, who enjoy the best success that can be expressed in the course of this world, both to become thankful to God for it, and also to prefer eternity before it. Whereby it may appear, that the course of this world, disposed by God upon the terms of the covenant of nature, contains in it those opportunities and advantages, which the act of God's providence, by the grace of Christ, knows easily how to make effectual to the supernatural purposes of it.
§ 6. This is the place for the rest of that which I am to say of the opinion of Jansenius, settling the efficacy of saving grace upon other grounds than those which I use. The ground of it seems to stand upon the observation of St. Augustin, De Corrept. et Gratia, cap. xi., xii.\footnote{Itaque ipsum adiutorium distinguenda sunt. Aliud est adiutorium sine quo aliquid non fit, et aliud est adiutorium quo aliquid fit. Nam sine alimen- tis non possimus vivere, nec tamen cum aduerint alimenta, eis fit ut vivat qui mori voluerit. Ergo adiutorium alimentorum est, sine quo non fit, non quo fit, ut vivamus. At vero beatitudo quam non habet homo, cum data fuerit, continuus fit beatus. Adiutorium est enim, non solum sine quo non fit, verum etiam quo fit, propter quod datur. Quapropter hoc adiutorium et quo fit est et sine quo non fit.} distinguishing between the help of grace, without which the work of grace is not done, and that by which it is done,—"auxilium sine quo non," and "auxilium quo,"—and comparing the grace of Christ, which cometh to effect notwithstanding original concupiscence, with the grace given Adam, which might have come to effect, had he pleased, but came not, notwithstanding his innocence; as more powerful in our weakness, than that in his strength. For, hereupon, he will have the grace of Christ to be only that which takes effect; confining that help, without which the work of grace cannot be done, to the state of innocence, as out of date now under original sin. So that the freedom of the will is so far from being requisite to the effects thereof, that it hath no being but by the means of it, consisting in that free love of that which God commandeth, because He commandeth it, which it inspireth. As, on the other side, the counterfeit of it, in them that sin without reluctation because free from righteousness, is nothing but the free love of sin for the satisfaction of concupiscence. It is, therefore, in his opinion, impertinent, how necessarily the grace of Christ determineth the will to embrace the true good; seeing it is the love of it, and the delight in it, which grace worketh in the will, that determines it willingly and freely to embrace it.\footnote{Id., ibid., c. xi. § 34; Op., tom. x. p. 769, A. B.—Istam gratiam non habuit homo primus qua
nunquam vellet esse malus: sed sane habuit, in qua si permanero vellet, nunquam malus esset, et sine qua eam cum libero arbitrio bonus esse non possit, sed eam tamen per liberum arbitrium deserere possit. . . . Hae praeterea est gratia qua data est primo Adam: sed hae potentior est in secundo Adam. Prima est enim qua fit ut habeat homo justitiam et velit: secunda ergo plus potest, qua etiam fit ut velit, et tantum velit, tantoque arduore diligit, ut carnis voluntatem contraria concupiscit, et voluit, et voluit spiritus vincat.}
§ 7. To take the more distinct view of this plea, let us put the case in him, who, running full speed in a course of sin, is called by the preaching of the Gospel to become a Christian: or, to the same purpose, in him, who, being a Christian and running the same race, is summoned by his profession, and the grounds thereof, to return to it. In this case, can any man imagine, that the reasons which move us all to be Christians should raise no love of true good, no dislike to sin, no fear of vengeance, no desire of everlasting happiness, in him that considers them as they deserve? Especially being managed by the Spirit of God, Which knocketh at the door of the heart by that means. Or can any man question, that, as it is the fear of vengeance that beginneth, so it is the love of good for God's sake that consummateth, the resolution of becoming a true Christian? But, the question being put about changing the chief end of a man's whole life and doings, can it be supposed, that any man is prevented with such a delight in true goodness, as instantly to abandon the lust, which his business hath been hitherto to satisfy, without demur or regret?

§ 8. I doubt not, that God can immediately create in any man that appearance of true good, that shall without debate or looking back transport him to the prosecution of it: that, notwithstanding the covenant of grace, He may do it; which, though a rule to His ordinary proceeding, is no law to His sovereign prerogative. But him that is thus saved, though saved by grace, yet we cannot count to be saved by the covenant of grace; which proposeth a reward to them, who are led by [the] motives thereof, notwithstanding the difficulties to the contrary: though implying the work of grace in him that overcometh. And this no man more clearly acknowledged than Jansenius, De Gratia Christi [lib.] VIII. [c.] 2a:

per gratiam Dei prædestinatis non tale adjutorium perseverantiae datur, sed tale ut eis perseverantia ipsa donetur, non solum ut sine isto dono perseverantes esse non possint, verum etiam ut per hoc donum non nisi perseverantes sint. . . Illi ergo (id est, Adamo) "sine peccato ullo data est, cum qua conditus est, voluntas libera, et eam fecit servire peccato: horum vero cum fuisset voluntas serva peccati, liberata est per Illum Qui dixit," "Si vos Filii liberaverit, tunc vere liberati eritis." Et accipiant tantam per istam gratiam libertatem, ut quamvis, quamdiu hic vivunt, pugnent contra concupiscientias peccatorum, eisque nonnulla subreptam, . . . non tamen ultra serviant peccato quod est ad mortem, de quo dicit Johannes apostolus, "Est peccatum ad mortem, non pro illo dico ut roget."" Id., ibid., c. xii. § 34, 35; ibid., pp. 769. B, C, G, 770. A, B.

= "Tertio, prædeterminatio physica
where he confesseth, that the predetermination of the will by the grace of Christ is not indefeasible, but only when it overcomes; as God's predetermination, according to the Dominicans, is. For by this difference (which, in stating of this opinion, I have not neglected afore) the efficacy thereof cannot be attributed to the nature of that help which overcometh, as of another kind than that which proveth frustrate. And therefore, notwithstanding that large and elaborate work of his, he hath left us to enquire further, whence the efficacy of it proceedeth: as having, in effect, only resolved us, wherein the efficacy of grace consisteth, in the nature of the formal cause; not from whence it proceedeth, in the nature of the effective cause, which the question indeed demandeth.

§ 9. And, truly, the very consideration premised—that, as freedom from sin consists in the determination of the will to righteousness, which the grace of Christ effecteth, so freedom from righteousness, in the determination of it to sin, which it acteth,—enforceth another kind of freedom, common to both states, not importing praise or dispraise, but a capacity of either, by doing that which no necessity determineth a man to do: and, therefore, that, though the grace of Christ's cross be the medicine, yet, till it be freely taken, it worketh not the cure. This is that freedom from necessity by the present condition of our nature, the use whereof produceth the other freedom from bondage, either to sin or righteousness. Not that this state of proficience requires actual indifference, which supposeth so great an inclination and bias as that of inbred concupiscence; not determining the will to any action or object, but the acts thereof to those taints, which the want of a due end and right reason (and therefore of just measure) in a man's desire necessarily inferreth: but because, in passing from the bondage of sin to the love of righteousness, it is necessary, that a man go

BOOK II.

Of sufficient grace under the law of nature.

through an instance of indifference, wherein his resolution shall balance between the love of true good and that which is counterfeit.

§ 10. It is therefore to be acknowledged, that, in the state of innocence, there had needed no other help than the knowledge of God's will, to enable men to perform whatsoever He should require: [which knowledge had been of the sphere of nature, if we suppose that Adam was made and called only to the righteousness and happiness of this life; but supernatural, supposing him made and called to the world to come.]* For where no immoderate inclination of the sensual appetite created any difficulty, what should hinder the prosecution of a reason so unquestionable as the will of God is? But is not therefore the knowledge of God's will revealed by the Gospel, under reasons convincing man of his obligation to do it, upon the account of his utter misery or perfect happiness, the grace of Christ? Knowing, by the scriptures alleged before, that the means of it are purchased by His cross; and that, where the reason is so convinced, there cannot want motives sufficient to incline the will to make choice. Not that I think those reasons, not being necessary but only sufficient, would take place, were they not managed by God's Spirit; whether for the difficulty of supernatural actions, or for the contrary bias of inbred conecupiscence: but because, in the nature of a sufficient help, they do actually enable a man to make choice; though, in regard of the difficulties which contrary inclinations create, it is most certain they would prove addle and void of effect, were they not conducted by the grace of God, which is called effectual for the event of it. Not that the nature of those helps which prevail is any other than the nature of those which overcome not (which I may well affirm, if Jansenius, though to the prejudice of his opinion, cannot deny it); but because they are, by the work of providence, presented in several circumstances to several dispositions and inclinations, whether of God's mere will and pleasure, as He is Lord of all things, or upon reason of reward or punishment, in matters wherein He

* The passage in brackets is from MS. The orig. text runs thus:—"(of the sphere of nature, supposing Adam instituted and called only to the up-rightness and happiness of this life; or supernatural, supposing him instituted and called to the world to come.)" * See above in § 8. note m.
hath declared Himself by the covenant of grace. So that, the same reasons and motives, which in some prove void and frustrate, coming to effect, and reaching and attaining to the very doing of the work which they enable a man to do, it cannot be said, according to this position of mine, that God, by the grace of Christ, only enableth to do what He requireth (the will of man making the difference between him that doth it, and him that doth it not): but the very act, as well as the ability of doing, is duly ascribed to the work of God's grace, according to the articles agreed by the Church against Pelagius.

§ 11. And this not only under the Gospel, but even under the Law. For though I shewed you in the first Book, that the Law expressly tenders only the promise of temporal happiness in holding the land of Canaan, for the reward of the outward and carnal observation thereof; yet I shewed you also, that, in the meantime, there was another traffic in driving under hand between God and His people, for the happiness of the world to come, upon their obedience to His law, for such reasons, and to such an end, and with such measures, as He requireth. Therefore, "The Law is spiritual," according to St. Paul, Rom. vii. 14: and "a grace," according to St. John, i. 16, 17; when he saith, "Of His fulness we have all received, and grace for grace; for the Law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ:" the grace of the Gospel, instead of the grace of the Law. And St. Paul again speaketh of the things which are granted us by the Gospel, "not in words taught by man's wisdom, but by the Holy Ghost, comparing spiritual things with spiritual things;" 1 Cor. ii. 13: signifying, that he taught the Gospel out of the Law, comparing the spiritual things of the Gospel, as signified by the Law, to the same spiritual things as revealed by Christ. And again, when he saith, Rom. i. 17, "The righteousness of God is revealed" in the Gospel "from faith to faith;" his meaning is, proceeding to the faith of Christ from that which was under the Law. True it is indeed, and

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p "Septimo, ut fateatur grafiarm Dei et adjutorium etiam ad singulos actus dari quamque non dari secundum merita nostra," &c. From the Catholic confession of faith which Pelagius was compelled to make at the Council of Diospolis in Palestine, A.D. 416; ap. Labb., Concil., tom. ii. p. 1530. C.

q Bk. I. Of the Pr. of Chr. Tr., cc. xii., xiii.
BOOK II.

I acknowledge, that this spiritual sense of the Law was not to be discovered in the Law, nor was discovered under it, without the revelation of God's Spirit (That placed it there), to His friends the prophets, and by them to their disciples and followers. But the office of those prophets being to call the people to the spiritual service of God and obedience to His Law out of love (which was the intent for which His Spirit strove with them; as with those before the flood, Gen. vi. 2, whereupon Noe is called "the preacher of righteousness," 2 Peter ii. 5); it follows of necessity, that there was means for them to learn and to practise true righteousness, seeing they are charged for "resisting the Spirit of God" calling them to it. St. Stephen, in the seventh of the Acts, insisteth not in convincing the Jews of the truth of Christianity (supposing it done by that which had passed), but infers by all that long speech, clearly this,—that, as the Israelite refused Moses for a judge between him and the Israelite whom he wronged, as the people were rebellious to him in the wilderness, and turned back in their hearts to Egypt, so were they to the Prophet Whom Moses had foretold;—concluding therefore; "Ye stiffnecked and uncircumcised in hearts and ears, ye do always resist the Holy Ghost; as your fathers, so you also; which of the prophets did not your fathers persecute? killing those that foretold of the coming of that righteous One, of Whom you are now become the traitors and murderers." And our Lord, when He telleth them, that by honouring the memories of the prophets, and persecuting the prophets and wise and scribes and apostles, whom He was sending them, they owned themselves heirs of them that killed the prophets (Matt. xxiii. 29—37), sheweth, that the case was the same with the prophets of old, as with Himself and His Apostles. And whatsoever we read in the Old Testament of the grace of God to that people, in granting them His Spirit, or of their ungraciousness in resisting the same, serves to prove the same purpose.

§ 12. It is truly said indeed*, in rendering the reason why our Lord Christ came not till towards the latter end of the world, that God meant first to shew the world, that all other means which He thought fit to use to reclaim man by

* See above, § 5. note i.
the fathers, and by and under the Law, were not to purpose; that the necessity of His coming might appear: but that this is not to be understood, as if God meant to render them inexcusable by using insufficient means, that could not take effect; but that, dispensing to those times such means of grace as He found the reasons upon which His secret counsels proceed to require, proportionable to the obedience and service which He required then at their hands, He reserves the full measure of them to the coming of His Son, proportionable to the difficulty of bearing His cross, which He purposed for the condition of those promises which He brought.

§ 13. And the same is to be said of the fathers under the law of nature: which if we understand it to be so called, as if the light of nature then taught and enabled them to please God, we contradict, not only the faith hitherto maintained against Pelagius, but also the appearances in Scripture, of those revelations, of that commerce and intercourse with God, whereby they advanced to the state of his friends; the book of Job (to the time whereof we see this state lasted) presenting most evident instances both of God's correspondence with the godly of the Gentiles, and of Christian piety in their conversations.

§ 14. Now, to that state of innocence wherein Adam was created, it must needs be a grace of God to make known His will; because it cannot be supposed, that God should employ His creature in His service and not reward him for doing it with advantage: but not as if such knowledge could give him ability, but only determine the matter of his obedience, who had nothing to hinder the doing of that, which, commanded by God, must needs be for his advantage to do. Since the fall, if reasons provided by God, to convince the understanding, to incline the will, to that which He purposeth for our happiness, may and would prove ineffectual, were they not acted and managed by the Holy Ghost; let us not therefore so far misken the counsel of God in providing them, as to imagine the work is not done by them, because it is His special grace that makes them effectual to purpose. The endowments of Adam, how great soever they were, the event sheweth, that they might fail; and, had they not failed, it
must have been ascribed to God for a greater grace than those endowments; inasmuch as those made him accountable to God, that would have entitled him to a reward. So that by this account it will be no marvel, that the grace of Christ, which saveth us in and through this weakness of inbred concupiscence, should be counted greater than that which Adam had in his innocence.

§ 15. And the same is to be said of the angels that fell, and those that stood. How great soever their endowments were, had not the motive (whatsoever it was), that prevailed with the one part to depart from God, been prevented of taking effect with the rest, it might have come to pass as well in all as in some. That it did not, what can it be ascribed to (all being furnished with abilities fully correspondent to that which God required at their hands), but some dispensation of God's secret counsel, being by no reason of His declared justice obliged otherwise? Not that the will of Adam or of angels was not able to do what God required, and had done it, of itself, without any help added by God: but because so great is the influence of the Maker's providence, that the events thereof, how justly soever imputable to the choice of the creature, must of necessity have their springs in and from the secret dispensation thereof, not concerning His justice.

§ 16. Seeing then, that (as I said before*) the opinion of Jansenius, though it gives account wherein the grace of Christ formally consisteth, yet gives no account from whence effectively it proceedeth, but the immediate will of God, the question demanding, upon what ground it redounds to man's account; let them either look about them for a better reason, or accept of this, not as destroying that which it saith, but to the introducing of that which it sayeth not. For it is agreed upon both ways, that it is delight in true goodness for the love of God, that makes the grace of Christ's Gospel effectual in men's lives and conversations: how by the act of that will, which in others rejects it, I endeavour to say what the Scriptures and faith of the Church will allow; but Jansenius his opinion goes no further than that so it is; to wit, because love is free, therefore man is freely saved, how-

* Above, § 8: and see c. xxi. § 3—5.
soever love be brought to pass. But the necessity of those actions to which grace determineth, which is antecedent in Jansenius his opinion (the cause, which is God’s will, being indefeasible), is in mine only consequent; upon supposition of efficacy, which implies the being of that which comes to effect, grounded upon the foreknowledge of God, which supposes the free motion of the reasonable creature. If the advantage be such in reconciling the efficacy of grace with the free will of the creature, in reconciling the same with God’s foreknowledge and effectual providence, extending to all, good and bad, it will appear much more. For had Jansenius done his business in the matter of supernatural grace, he had not obliged us much; unless his resolution were an overture to abate the general difficulty that remains. But if he sends us for that to the predetermination of God, which is said to be requisite upon the general account of the creature and the indifference of man’s will; he leaves us to seek for a reason, how God is not the author of that sin which He determineth the will to do before it determine itself. If we avoid that, as Doctor Strang, whom I spoke of before⁴, hath done, by maintaining (against Doctor Twisse), that the will is not determined by God to the actions of sin: besides that he is to give account, why the same providence of God, which is general to all things, should be thought to reach this sort and not that (all actions, as appendances of God’s creatures, having the same dependence upon God which the prerogative of the first cause requireth); we are left to seek, how that foreknowledge of God, which directeth His providence, comes informed of the truth of future contingencies⁵. For if we maintain, that the wisdom of God, comprehending the inclinations of His creatures, and all those considerations which outward occurrences or inward appearances shall present or not present them with, to determine their choice, cannot thereby certainly discern what will come to pass (as Doctor Strang maintains⁶), that so there cannot be in God any certain

¹ Above, c. xxi. § 6.
* See the Pref. to the Epilogue, § 28.
*⁴ "Affirmativam partem tuentur plurimi Jesuistae, quorum haec est sententia. Etsi Deus considerando voluntatem creatam, quatenus est libera, indifferens, et indeterminata, non possit scire quid sit eventurum, tamen ex hypothesi, si haec aut illæ agendi aut non agendi occasiones sive angelis sive hominibus offertur, aut si voluntas eorum in tali vel tali ordine aut talibus circumstantiis constitueretur, aut tali excitatione moveretur, Deum ante omne decretum Suum certo cognoscere potuisse et ab æterno cognovisse, pro Sua Infinita sapientia, K K

THORNDIKE.
knowledge of future conditionals; I leave to them that shall peruse this writing, what satisfaction it is possible for them to give in the possibility of foreknowing future contingencies. For to say, that they may be foreseen in the decree of permitting them, is to say, that that, which may be otherwise, may be certainly foreseen by certainly knowing that there is nothing to hinder it.

§ 17. It remains, that I say, what is to be thought of that proposition which some of the school-doctors hold forth; that "to such, as do what is in them to do by their natural abilities, God gives grace"—"facientibus quod in se est ex viribus nature, Deus largitur gratiam?"—because it seems to follow upon supposition of that which I have maintained; that the unregenerate are, notwithstanding original concupiscence, able to do things that are good for a right end, though not out of a resolution to do all for the right end of all, which is God and His service. For hence it seemeth to be inferred, that those who live in civil righteousness for honesty’s sake (and not for their particular advantage, inconsistent with the general good of mankind), deserve, that God should send them those helps of grace, which are immediately sufficient to save them by the covenant of grace. But it is manifest, that the proposition may be understood in two senses: one in point of fact, the other of right; the one making the proposition universal, the other particular; the one importing that God may, the other that God must, give those helps of grace, that are immediately sufficient, to them that live well according to the light of nature: there being a vast difference between God’s giving the helps of grace that are immediately sufficient, to them whom He considers to have done such things as the light of nature justifies; and His giving them because of the same, as obliged so to reward

in quam partem voluntas eorum inclinatura esset; et quid esset actura aut omissura; cum tamen ipsa posset si velit agere aut non agere aut oppositum ageret. Hujusmodi scientiam conditionatam appellant mediam inter scientiam naturalem et liberam aut mistam ex utraque," &c. "Nos autem nullo tantum dari scientiam et doctrinam istam tum inutilium tum noxiam esse breviter ostendemus.” Straungh, De Vol. et Act. Dei circa Pecch., lib. iii. c. 11. pp. 650, 651. And see the whole chapter.

them. For the one leaves those sufficient helps gifts of God's grace by Christ: the other renders them rewards of men's works, not subject to God's bounty, being prevented with the obligation of justice; and therefore establishes that opinion of "meritum de congruo," which had much vogue in the schools, and supposeth not, but inferreth, the covenant of grace, and therefore destroys it, as resolving the effects thereof into those works of man, that oblige God to grant those helps, which the Gospel (pretending to be set on foot by God's free grace in Christ) tendereth. Certainly, admitting that which hath been proved, that the preaching of the Gospel is granted in consideration of the merits and sufferings of Christ, it cannot by any means be maintained, that any works of mere nature can oblige God to send the means of knowing the Gospel, and conviction of the truth of it, without granting by consequence, that the very coming of Christ, whereof these means are the consequence, must be imputed to the works of those, who, in the state of corrupt nature, have obliged God to send them the knowledge of Christ: which they could not have had, had not the coming of Christ been first provided: which, by this reason, must have been in consideration of the original merit of their works. I say, the original merit of their works: because in this case there could be no consideration of God's promise made out of free grace, as the ground of those blessings, which God thereby ties Himself to bestow, upon condition of doing that which His covenant requires; though otherwise infinitely exceeding the value of the condition which He requireth. For here it is evident, that the free grace of God, which tenders the promise upon the condition, is the original ground of all the claim, that any that is qualified can make to the promise. But supposing the works of corrupt nature to oblige God to give His Gospel, it is no more His free grace, but the original merit of those works, to which all the grace of it must be imputed. Which, as it directly falls into

* "Dicitur autem aliquis mereri ex condigno, quando inventitur aequalitas inter premium et meriti, secundum rectam estimationem. Ex congruo autem tantum, quando talis aequalitas non inventitur, sed solum secundum liberabilitatem dantis munus tribuitur quod dantem decet." S. Thom. Aquin., In Sent. lib. ii. Dist. xxvii. qu. 1. art. 3. Respond.—See Abp. Lawrence's Bampton Lectures, Serm. iv.  
* Corrected from errata. The MS. reads also, "resembling:" the orig. text, "verifying."  
* Above, c. x. § 1, sq.; c. xviii. § 6.
the prime article of Pelagius his heresy, that "grace is given according to merit," and that "it is not given to every act," being prevented by those acts in consideration whereof this opinion suppose it to be granted; so, by consequence, it makes the publication of the Gospel to be no grace of Christ, but the reward of man's merit: which is the true consequence of Pelagius his position. For though, being pressed with those scriptures, in which the grace of Christ is so clearly preached that nothing but impudence could deny it, he granted, that the preaching of the Gospel is as much of God's free grace as the light of nature by which these works are done; yet in very deed he overthrew his own saying (that is, gave the Church an indefeasible advantage against himself) by granting it: his heresy being no ways tenable, without maintaining the very preaching of the Gospel to be the purchase of man's merit, and Christ Himself, the subject of the Gospel, by consequence. And thus the heresy of Pelagius becomes that very opinion which St. Paul writes against; as often as he disputes, that a man is justified by grace and not by works: only with this difference, that when he writes against the Jews, arguing that a man is not justified by the works of the Law but by faith, his meaning is, that the righteousness of the Jews turned Christians is not to be ascribed to the outward observation of Moses' law, but to the covenant of grace; but when he writes to the Gentiles, that they attained not the promises of the Gospel by the works which they had done before they heard of it, but by the mere grace of God that sent our Lord Christ to bring it. But if any man insist, that nothing hinders him to suppose the Gospel already set on foot, and thereupon to say and hold, that by the use of corrupt nature God may be obliged to send the knowledge of it; the insufficiency of the plea will be evident enough. For, those works of moral honesty which

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d See above, c. x. § 2—6.

* See the passages from Socinus and Volckel., above, c. x. § 3. notes c, j; and from Arminius in note f below.
OF THE COVENANT OF GRACE. 493

corrupt nature is able to do, not serving to discharge the obligation thereof to God in those particular occasions upon which they become due, because they are void of any (whether habitual or actual) intent of that end, which they ought to aim at; it were ridiculous to tie God to grant the effects of His free grace, in sending our Lord Christ, to those that are less sinners than others. And, considering that which is visible in point of fact, it will be impossible to reduce those things, which appear in the propagating and maintaining of Christianity through the world, to any difference of works done before the knowledge thereof, as the reason of God’s dispensing of it.

§ 18. Which may also be said of another opinion⁴, that may be (and perhaps is) held upon terms not prejudicial to the faith, as this seems to be; to wit, that God, by declaring the covenant of grace, and His inclination to save all the world by it, hath tied Himself to grant such motions and inspirations of true good to all men, that, if they neglect them not, but do what corrupt nature so prevented is able to do, He shall stand obliged to second the same with means sufficient to bring them to everlasting happiness. For, the beginning of the work being acknowledged to require God’s preventing grace, it cannot be said, that those who are supposed to be thus saved are saved by works and not by grace; or that, in their regard, Christ is dead in vain, the said helps being granted in consideration of Christ’s death. But though it may without prejudice to Christianity be said, that God may dispense the helps of that grace, which Christ’s death hath purchased, besides and without the preaching of the Gospel; yet can it not be said, during the Gospel, that any man attaineth the kingdom of heaven, which Christianity promiseth, but by it. Now to be saved by the Gospel, requires the profession of the faith; and that, the sacrament of baptism, at least in resolution and purpose. So that whether, among those nations where the Gospel is not preached, any man be saved by this way, is a thing visible,

BOOK II.

and to be tried by examining who in this case hath been known to have become a Christian. Of which, I assure myself, there will be found so few instances of historical truth, that a discreet man will have no pleasure to introduce a position, so nearly concerning the intent of Christ's coming, whereof there can so little effect appear.

§ 19. For, supposing instances might be alleged to make the matter questionable, how far would they be from rendering a reason of that vast difference, that is visible, between the proceeding of God towards the salvation of those that are born within the pale of the Church, and those that live and die without hearing of Christianity? The one being so prevented with the knowledge of what they are to do to be saved, that they shall have much ado so to neglect it, as to flatter their own concupiscence with any colour of an excuse: whereas the other, whatsoever conviction we may imagine them to have of one true God, of an account to be made for all that we do, of the guilt of sin which they are under without the Gospel, it will be impossible to reduce the reason of the difficulties they are under, more than the former, to an equal desire in God of saving all, together with the difference of men's compliance with the helps of grace which it produceth. And therefore, considering the antecedent will of God is not absolutely God's will, but with a term of abatement, reserving the condition upon which it proceedeth, I conceive it requisite (as I have done) to limit the signification thereof to those effects, which we see God bring to pass by virtue of it. The utmost whereof being the providing of means for the preaching of the Gospel, it is nevertheless no prejudice to it, that the Apostles are forbidden by the Spirit to preach in Bithynia or Asia (Acts xvi. 6, 7); not because God would not have them to be saved, or because the Macedonians by their works had obliged Him to set them aside for their sakes, Who could have provided for both; but for reasons known to Himself alone, and not reducible to any thing that appears to us. Especially considering the case of infants dying before baptism, in whose works it is manifest there can be no ground of difference. For to say, that by

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# See below, § 20.

# Above, § 3.


the universality of that grace, which God declareth by Christ, we are to believe that they are all saved, as many as live not to transgress the covenant of grace; would be a novelty never heard of in the Catholic Church of Christ: tending to undermine the foundation of our common salvation laid by our Lord to Nicodemus; "Unless ye be born again of water and of the Holy Ghost, ye cannot enter into the kingdom of God." For how should the general tender of the Gospel entitle infants to the benefit thereof, because they never transgressed that in which they were never estated?

§ 20. It were in vain, then, to look about the Scripture for examples to justify any part of this position. The widow of Sarepta to whom Elias was sent, Naaman the Syrian who was sent to Eliseus, Cyrus, whom many suppose to have worshipped the only God (because, in the end of the Chronicles and beginning of Esdras, he saith, "the God of heaven hath given me all the kingdoms of the earth;" and because the prophet Esay makes him a figure of the Messias, as the kings of God's people were, for the freedom which they attained by his government), the centurion Cornelius to whom St. Peter was sent with the Gospel, are all of one case: which is the case of those strangers, who, living in the commonwealth of Israel, though not circumcised, yet worshipped the only true God, under those laws which (the Jews tell us) were delivered by God to Noe, and by him to all his posterity; and so were capable of that salvation, which the Israelites had the means of under the Law, though themselves not under it. But neither have we evidence, that their works under the light of nature obliged God to call them to the privilege of strangers in the house of Israel; nor can the works of Cornelius be taken for the works of corrupt nature, being in the state of God's grace which was manifested under the Law, and therefore prevented with those means of salvation, which become necessary under the Gospel to the salvation which it tendereth. So far are we from finding in them any argument of a law, obliging God to grant

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1 Selden, De Jure Nat. et Gent. juxta Discip. Ebraeor., lib. i. c. 10; Works, vol. i. pp. 158, sq.
them those helps in consideration of their works done in the state of corrupt nature. And, therefore, whatsoever examples we may find of this nature under Christianity, they are to be referred to the free grace of God: which, as sometimes it may come to those of best conversation according to nature (to whom the words of our Lord, "To him that hath shall be given," may be applied without prejudice to Christianity, Matt. xxv. 19, Luke xix. 26), so also it fails not to call those, who for their present state are most strangers to Christianity; that it may appear, that no rule ties God, but that free grace, which His own secret wisdom dispenseth. And, truly, those good works which corrupt nature produceth, necessarily depend upon those circumstances, in which God’s providence placeth one man and not another, though both in the state of mere nature; so that the one shall not be able to do that which is reasonable, without overcoming those difficulties, to which the other is not liable. In which regard it hath been said, that the heroic acts of the heathen may be attributed to the Spirit of God moving them; though not as granted in consideration of Christ, but as conducting the whole work of providence. So little cause there is to imagine, that the consideration of them should oblige God to grant those helps of grace, the ground whereof is the obedience of Christ, and the end, the happiness of the world to come.

CHAPTER XXVI.

PREDESTINATION TO GRACE ABSOLUTE, TO GLORY RESPECTIVE. PURPOSE OF DENYING EFFECTUAL GRACE ABSOLUTE, OF PUNISHING RESPECTIVE. THE END TO WHICH GOD PREDESTINATES, IS NOT THE END FOR WHICH HE PREDESTINATES. GRACE THE REWARD OF THE RIGHT USE OF GRACE. HOW MUCH OF THE QUESTION THE GOSPEL DETERMINES NOT. THAT OUR ENDEAVOURS ARE ENGAGED NO LESS THAN IF PREDESTINATION WERE NOT, IT DETERMINETH. OF THE TRADITION OF THE CHURCH: AND OF SEMIPELAGIANS, PREDESTINATIONS, AND ARMINIANS.

I AM now come to the upshot of the controversy concerning the covenant of grace, and free will in embracing and performing of the covenant of grace; which is the dispute about God’s predestination, whether it proceeds upon the

absolute will of God, or in consideration of man’s being qualified as the Gospel requires: which, though of itself never so intricate, the premises being supposed, must of necessity be thus resolved,—that, predestination being the appointment of grace and glory, as reprobation on the other side the decree of not giving effectual grace, and of condemning to pain, the appointment of glory and misery cannot be absolute, but the appointment to actual grace and perseverance or not, necessarily is. The reason, supposing the premises, is not liable to be contradicted in either part of it. For it cannot stand with the wisdom and truth of God, to execute His counsels upon other reasons, and in other considerations, than from everlasting He purposed to do. Therefore, for what reason, and in what consideration, God shall in due time give life and death to them whom He shall give it to, for the same reason He did resolve to give it from everlasting. But nothing is more evident in Christianity than this; that God, at the last day, shall give sentence of life and death, according as men shall be found to have behaved themselves as Christians or not. And all that I have premised to manifest the condition of the covenant of grace, makes good the same. For the state of life or death cannot become any man’s own upon other terms, than the right and title to it becomes his. Therefore God from everlasting determined to give life or death to every man, in consideration of his being found qualified for this or for that, according to those terms which the covenant of grace proposeth. On the other side, it being resolved, that man, as he is born into the world, is not able to do any thing that can oblige God to grant him those helps of grace, which only will be effectual to enable him to embrace and go through with that condition which the Gospel tendereth; it is manifest, that the reason, why He provides effectually sufficient helps for some, which others have not; why He tenders them to some in those circumstances in which He knows they will be effectual, to others not; must take rise and begin at His own free choice, in granting matters of free grace to whom He pleaseth, and not to others: though of each man’s proceeding or not proceeding in the way of Christianity a

*a See the Preface to the Epilogue, § 26.*
reason is to be given, from the good or bad use of those sufficient helps which he had been prevented with. For seeing it was in the mere appointment of God, to have caused any man to be born, or after to live, where he should have met with sufficient helps to convict him of the truth of Christianity, and those so presented to him as He best knew they would not be refused; there is nothing more manifest, than that it was only in the mere will of God, that it was appointed so as it is and not otherwise. But this is no hindrance, why the sufficient helps of God’s grace should not proceed from the will of man’s happiness in God, though they take no further effect through man’s fault; and the having or not having of further helps, which God either doth or might have seconded them with, be imputed to the good or bad use of those which went afore: because it hath been made manifest by the premises, that the end of God’s gifts is the happiness of His creature, though it come not to pass. But the reason of the particulars, which He actually bestows or refuses, is to be resolved into the quality of the persons that receive them or not; but so, that, the order of all depending upon the first helps of free grace which every man is prevented with, there is no reason to be given for the whole in the nature of a meritorious cause.

§ 2. Against the two parts of this resolution there are two objections, one against each; which so far as we shall be able to resolve, so far shall we be able to leave the business clear. For seeing that the end is first desired, and then the means (the reason why the means are desired being derived from the desire of the end, and referred to it); and that the end of all grace is glory, the end of all the means of salvation, the salvation intended by it; it seems, that God’s predestination must of force appoint salvation to them that are to be saved in the first place, from thence proceeding to design the way and order, by which the person designed to it may be induced of his own free choice to accept the means of it. This slight mistake seems to

* “Hic vero singularis est Gul. Twissi sententia” (s.c. de decretorum Divinorum ordine circa electos et reprobos). “Nam circa electos et reprobos non vult concipi debere nisi duo decreta, que subordinata sunt et quo-rum unum sit altero prius. Unum est de fine, alterum est de medias. Decretum de fine est illud, quo statuit Deus gloriam Suam illustrare in exercendae erga certos quosdam homines misericordia, erga alios justitia vindicante.
have been the occasion of many horrible imaginations, which even Christian divines have had; of God’s design from everlasting to create the most part of men on purpose to glorify Himself by condemning them to everlasting torments, though in consideration of the sins which they shall have done: that which had been granted in God’s predestination to life, upon this mistake, seeming necessarily to extend itself to His reprobation, signifying the decree of condemning to everlasting torments. But the mistake is, that the end of the creature by God’s appointment, is taken for God’s end; which, though it be His end because He appointeth it for His creature, yet it is not any end that He seeks for Himself. The reason is so punctually laid down in the premises, that it can be but repeated here: that God, being of Himself sufficient for Himself, can have no end upon His creature; because nothing accrues to Him, nothing goes from Him, whatsoever accrues to His creature or goes from it. And though, God having now resolved to make the world for Himself, that is, for His own glory, it is necessary we suppose Him to design the government of it, so as it may be a fit means to obtain that end; yet is it to be much considered, that, God having once given a law to His understanding creatures, tendering happiness as the reward of abiding by His law, it can no longer stand with that tender, that it should be a fit means of God’s glory to give happiness to His creature, not considered as qualified by His law, and therefore not to resolve

Decretum de mediis est, quo Deus decrevit in hunc finem homines creare, ut laborantur permittere, quibusdam Redemptorem et Servatorem præparare, illosque fide in Illum donare, justificare, et glorificare: alios vero in peccato reliquere, indurare, excelseare, atque tandem dammare. Quod decretum de mediis posteriis est decreto de fine et illi subordinatum,” &c. “Ut videre in Defensione ejus Perkisiana, Digressione de objecto praedestinationis; et alibi sape... Sed quamvis singuli propemodum theologii, dum decreta Dei ordinant, in apicibus quibusdam a se invicem discrepant, omnes tamen illi doctores, qui... objectum electionis et reprobationis consituent hominem ut nondum lapsum et conditum in pravissione Divina” (i.e. all Superlapisarians—see below, § 8. note r), “et inter effecta electioni et reprobationi communia numerant hominum creationem et lapsus permissionem, illi, inquam, omnes in eo conveniunt, primum decretum quod conciipiendum est in Deo circa homines illud esse quo Deus constituit in certis quibusdam hominibus gloriam misericordiam, in aliis vero gloriam justitiae Sue... ostendere: cui decreto subjiciunt et subordinant tamquam eo posteriore decreta de homine creando, et de lapsu ejus permittendo, ac de Christo Mediatore et Redemptore electa donando, ceteris vero in lapsu et perdizione relinquendia. Quae decreta rursus... varie nec omnes eodem modo dividunt et ordinant.” Le Blanc, Thes. Theol., Thes. de Decret. Divin. Ordine circa Electos et Reprobos, § xxxii., xxxiii., xxxv.; p. 156.
BOOK II. to give it. Whether we consider the interest of God's justice in requiring that law, it cannot be imagined that the love of any creature can move Him to waive it; or whether we consider His truth in making it good, being once declared, it is manifest, that the thing promised by it cannot be appointed by God as the means to His glory, not supposing the condition which it requireth. For whatsoever may be said of the consideration of our Lord Christ; as it can have no place, till we suppose His obedience to be in consideration, when any man's reward is appointed by virtue of that covenant which He came to treat; so can it not be in consideration, till we suppose him, to whom the benefit of it is appointed, to be qualified as it requires. And this might have been seen by the opposite decree of reprobation; in which everlasting death, appointed as the term of it, not being capable of bearing the notion of that which God aims at of itself, cannot be considered as the end. Which might have been argument enough; that, as the death of the reprobate is not, nor can be, the means of God's glory, but as it is intended to punish men's forfeits, so neither can the life of the elect be the means of God's glory, but as it is intended to reward their performance.

§ 3. It is therefore answered: that the reward of the elect, and punishment of the reprobate, becomes the means of God's glory, not absolutely, but in regard that God, having proposed a law, by the obeying whereof they might attain happiness, though requiring supernatural obedience, the one have observed it, the others not; and, God having proposed a law which the light of nature enableth all to observe, none have observed it: but otherwise, that it could no more be the means of God's glory to appoint life for the elect, than it could be the means for the same to appoint death for the reprobate; and, therefore, that it is necessary to the glory of God, that the good gifts, which He bestoweth upon His creatures, should all be taken for means of their everlasting happiness by His appointment.

[Scripture proof.]

§ 4. To which purpose we have not a few passages of holy Scripture that are very express. St. Paul tells the Athenians, Acts xvii. 26 [27]: that "God made all mankind of one blood, to dwell on the whole face of the earth, determining appointed
seasons, and the bounds of their dwellings, that they might seek the Lord, if by any means they might find Him groping, though not far off from every one of us." And so those of Lystra, Acts xiv. 16 [,17]: that "in the by-past ages He suffered all nations to walk their own ways, though He left not Himself without witness, doing good, giving rain from heaven and fruitful seasons, filling our hearts with food and gladness." For what can this "witness" mean, if it intend to destroy His own resolution of damning them? And therefore, speaking to them that condemn the sins of others and do the like, "Dost thou condemn the riches of His patience and long-suffering," saith he, "not knowing, that the goodness of God leadeth to repentance; but, according to thy hardness and impenitent heart, heapest up wrath to thyself, against the day of wrath and revelation of the just judgment of God?" Rom. ii. 3, 4. Which are the same terms, that St. Peter useth of the impenitent within the knowledge of Christianity; when he saith (2 Peter iii. 9), "The Lord is not slack of His promise as some men count slackness, but is long-suffering towards us, not willing that any should perish, but come to the knowledge of His truth:" which is, in that place, the effectual acknowledgment of it. As likewise saith the prophet to them that cast off the thoughts of repentance, as despairing of forgiveness; Ezek. [x]xxiii. 11—16. As he had done before, Ezek. xviii. 22. These exhortations signify nothing, unless we suppose, that it turns to every man's account to neglect the means upon which they proceed: which is this; that God on His part hath done what His goodness and justice requires (though not immediately bringing to pass that which was immediately sufficient to the capacity of salvation), and therefore requires this at their hands, intending to judge them in case they fail on their part. For there is none of those gifts, but enables a man immediately to do that which God immediately requires; and therefore condemns him, that neglects to do that, which he is immediately enabled to do. And though God cannot become obliged, upon man's compliance with the light of nature, immediately to give sufficient helps of grace to bring every man to His kingdom (because of the certain failure of man's compliance with them, through the servitude of sin,
from which we cannot come free by nature); yet is the sin, for which he is condemned, justly imputed to his not doing that, which by the light of nature he might have done. How much more is the refusal of sufficient helps to them, who have neglected the improvement of those helps, which they had, or might have had, to be imputed to them, who have made themselves to be refused them.

§ 5. From hence it necessarily follows, that those helps, which God follows His own preventing grace with, are granted in consideration of the good use of His preventing graces: notwithstanding that nothing hinders the goodness of God, both to oversee those failures, for which He might justly have given over those which He had prevented by His grace, and not brought them finally to persevere; or to re-double upon them those helps, which the use that they formerly had made of His former graces, might justly have moved Him to refuse. So, though all God’s gifts to man are granted out of God’s desire of man’s happiness (to wit, as the man’s end and not as God’s), so the gifts, by which it is purchased, are granted in consideration of the right use of His former gifts; that, in the nature of the final, this, of the meritorious cause: though no way obliging God, but by virtue of His own will to be obliged. And herewith agrees that of Solomon, Prov. xvi. 4: “The Lord hath made all for Himself, and also the wicked for the day of wrath.” For whether we translate it, with Grotius, “for itself;” or, as it useth to be translated, “Himself;” the consequence of it will be, that, as the world is, and as things pass in it, all that comes to pass is by God’s appointment, or for His glory; which is all one: leaving the account, by which it may appear so, to be given from the rest of the Scripture. But if we join both clauses together, by repeating “for Himself” in the second (as to say, that “God for Himself hath appointed

\( \text{P "Sensus non est malus, si 'prop-

\( \text{ter semetipsum' intelligas, non quod

\( \text{opus quoquam Deus habeat, sed ut

\( \text{proprietates suas notas faciat, et im-

\( \text{pium non fieri talem a Deo (absit hoc)

\( \text{sed fieri sive poni ad mala. Verum

\( \text{meiour erit huc interpretatio: 'Singula

\( \text{Deus facit' (id est, ordinat) 'ad id quod

\( \text{singulis convenit. Eiam impos ad

\( \text{diem calamitosum' (supple, ordinatus

\( \text{a Deo). Nam μη δυνατα, ut et vox

\( \text{respondendi' Latina, significat το

\( \text{σωτηρικα' ('eadem serie locare'). Sic

\( \text{Eccles. x. 19, της est 'compensat.'

\( \text{Neque sane alter sumser e hunc locum

\( \text{LXX. 'Panta τα έργα του Κυριου

\( \text{μετά δικαιωματω' φυλάσσονται δε δ ά-

\( \text{σεβθη εις ημερας καιρων.'" Grot., ad

\( \text{Prov. xvi. 4.} \)
the wicked for the day of His wrath"), then is the reason given, how the being of evil is for God's glory; to wit, by punishing them that do it. Herewith also agrees that of St. Paul, far better than it is imagined to do, Rom. viii. 28—30: "Now we know, that all things work together for good to them that love God, which are called according to purpose: for whom He foreknew, those He also predestinated to become conformable to the image of His Son, that He may be the first-born among many brethren; but whom He predestinated, those He also called; and whom He called, those He also justified; and whom He justified, those He also glorified." The "purpose," according to which he describes them to be called, to whose good all things conduce, is either the purpose of God or their own. As Barnabas "exhorteth" them, that were converted, "to cleave to God with purpose of heart;" Acts xi. 23. For "those that are called," are often taken by St. Paul, metonymically, for those that have obeyed their calling by God: as Rom. i. 6, 7; 1 Cor. i. 2, 24; Jude 1; Apoc. xvii. 14; and so κλησις, Eph. iv. 1. And so all things conduce to good for those, that not only are professed Christians, but are so from a steady purpose of heart. But though we grant, that they are described by two qualifications, one, that they "love God," the other, that they are "predestinated to life" (that is, called, out of a purpose in God to save them); yet they are not predestinated by God to become conformable to the pattern of Christ (which consists in bearing His cross), but as Christians. And this it is, which here St. Paul says they are predestinated to; not to life. The predestination, which he speaks of here, is not of men to be saved, but of Christians to bear the cross of Christ: whereof he had said a little afore, for the occasion of this discourse (Rom. viii. 17, 18); "If we be sons, then also heirs; heirs of God, but joint heirs with Christ; that, if we suffer with Him, we may also be glorified with Him: for I reckon, that the sufferings of this time are not valuable with the glory that is to be revealed upon us." And when he calleth them "saints," and "those that love God," and "those He foreknew," it is manifest, that the foreknowledge which he meaneth is that whereby God knew them true Christians from the heart, whom He intends to prove; and
therefore appoints them to bear Christ's cross, that, being justified, that is, approved in so doing, they may be glorified in God's purpose, and the right and title of their own estate. All this being manifest by the proposition of the chapter;—

"There is now, therefore, no more condemnation for them that are in Christ Jesus; that live not after the flesh, but after the Spirit:"—which words, plainly describing those that are Christians from a grounded purpose of the heart, of whom the sequel of the discourse must proceed, manifestly demonstrate, that St. Paul speaks not of God's predestinating any man to be saved, but of predestinating those, whom He knows to be good Christians, to bear Christ's cross, and so to obtain God's promises: as the same St. Paul saith, that it was granted of grace to the Philippians, "not only to believe in Christ, but to suffer for Christ;" Phil. i. 29. And hereby it is manifest, that succeeding graces are bestowed in consideration of the right use of those that went afore. For here you see, that those, who being moved by the helps of God's preventing grace have submitted themselves to the profession of Christianity from the heart, are in consideration thereof designed by God to the happy accomplishment of their course. And this is invincibly evidenced by the promise of the Holy Ghost, tendered by the Gospel to those that obey God's calling, by undertaking to be Christians, for the enabling of them to persevere in that which they undertake. The same is expressed in the words of the Apostle; when, having menaced the Hebrew Christians with the expectation of vengeance upon their apostasy, he thus restores them again, Heb. vi. 9, 10: "But we are persuaded better things, and that belong to salvation, of you, beloved, though we thus speak; for God is not unjust, to forget your work and labour of love, which ye shewed to His name, ministering to the saints, as still ye do." For it is manifest, that the Apostle expects here the supply of grace, enabling to persevere, from the justice of God, in consideration of that which they had done in performance of their Christian profession before.

§ 6. On the other side it may be objected, that, if the whole work of grace in the life of each Christian be resolved into the free appointment of God (in regard that those helps,
which each man is first prevented with, cannot be granted in consideration of any work of our nature, the rest depending on those first helps), it is to no purpose to dispute, how the freedom of the will takes place in every particular act, each man’s final estate being no less determined than if there were no place for it. Neither availeth it any man, that God appointeth him not to death, or gives him sufficient helps to bring him to life; seeing that, the efficacy of them depending upon His mere will, the sufficiency of them serves but to aggravate His sentence.

§ 7. To this my answer is, that I conceive I am not to answer further than St. Paul hath done: who, having objected to himself, in the person of the Jews, thinking much they should not be saved by the Law, “Why doth God then find fault? for who hath resisted His will” (Rom. ix. 19), returns an answer, that denies not that God might convert the Jews to Christianity, did He think it fitting; but thus:—

“Nay rather, who art thou, O man, that disputest with God? [Rom. ix. 20—24.] shall the earthen pot say to the potter, Why hast thou made me thus? hath not the potter power over the clay, to make one vessel to an honourable use, another to a dishonourable, of the same compost? what if God, willing to shew wrath, and make known His power, hath borne with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath fit to be destroyed? that He might also make known the riches of His glory upon vessels of mercy, us whom He hath called, not only of the Jews, but also of the Gentiles, whom He hath prepared for glory:”—where, since God forbears the vessels of His wrath with that long-suffering, which St. Peter says leads to repentance (designing to shew His wrath the heavier upon them for neglecting it), it is manifest, that they are not said to be “κατηρυσμένα εἰς ἀπώλειαν,” as if God had fitted them for it, as designed and made to that dishonourable use (which is the reason why I translated it not as a participle, but as a noun, not “fitted for destruction,” as by God, but “fit for destruction,” as of themselves9); and, therefore, that one and the same mass of compost, out of which the potter makes vessels to contrary uses, is to be compared with mankind in that estate in which the Gospel finds it; the question being made

9 See above, c. xxiv. § 3. note u.

THORNDIKE.
why some obey it and not others, why the Gentiles rather than the Jews; and the argument made, that, if God’s grace be the cause, then are not they to be blamed that neglect it; and the Apostle having premised for his ground, that all mankind, being overtaken by the Gospel destitute of righteousness, are to become Christians that they may obtain it. This being the case, it is plain, that the objection is the same against St. Paul, as against the resolution proposed. For as this answer supposes the reason, why the Gentiles were converted to be Christians, and the Jews not, to be resolved into the will of God; so the resolution here proposed resolves the reason of the true Christianity, and final perseverance in it, of those that shall be saved, into that disposition of motives, resolving free will, which God’s free grace only appointeth. And the question is evidently the same, if, as one ingredient into the disposition of each man’s salvation or damnation, it be demanded, why God suffered man to fall from the state of innocence, but procureth that the preaching of the Gospel arrive at the knowledge of some people, and not of others. For if, supposing sufficient helps of grace, the reason whereby they become effectual is nevertheless resolved into the immediate disposition of God; then, though we consider man as not fallen from the state of innocence, and resolve the reason, why God should bring him into that estate in which He foresaw that he would fall (intending to propagate his kind under the condition of this lapsed estate), we have recourse to no other reason than that which St. Paul employed before us.

§ 8. Where we may see the fault, which hath been committed by them’, who, to attain the end of His glory by the
absolute salvation of some and damnation of others, no other-ways qualified than as such persons, have made the object of God’s predestination to be mankind, not made but to be made; the purpose of making mankind being the next means subordinate to the attaining of that end, which the first decree proposed to God. For besides that this engages God to procure the fall of man, and the sins in which the reprobate finally persevere, no otherwise than the grace in which the elect depart; it makes God to predestinate only a number, and to reprobate the same: there being no other consideration possible to be had upon those, that are supposed not to be as yet, but only that they may be so many as God shall appoint of either kind. So that the glory of God, according to this monstrous imagination, shall consist only in saving such a number, and in damning such an other, rather than one or less one of either sort.

§ 9. Neither is this inconvenience cured by the position of those that have been called Sublapsarians”, by as monstrous
BOOK 11.

A name as the other of Supralapsarians: that God, seeing mankind lapsed from the state of innocence, resolving to save so many of them, and to damn so many, provided to send our Lord Christ with effectual means to save these, leaving those (unprovided of sufficient means) to find their own ruin. For so long as those, that are appointed to be saved and to be damned, are qualified no otherwise than as men found in the common case of man's fall, the glory of God is made to consist in damning so many of them and saving so many, rather than one more or one less. For the original corruption in which we are born, though it renders the first Adam unrecoverable without the Second, yet it leaves every man, in every instance, undetermined to evil, till by his own choice of evil before good, and the habit which accrues by custom, his natural inclination to it become so determined, that his choice determines without deliberating any more. But suppose so many absolutely appointed to life, and so many to death, in this estate; you suppose them respectively determined (though not, in particular, what good or what evil they shall do, yet in general) to sin and to die in sin, or, on the other side, to attain the state of grace and to die in it: unless we think, that, God being God, the absolute appointment of His providence can be defeated. Whereas, in making God determine to save and to damn those, who are qualified for each according to the Gospel, but to give effectual means of being so qualified to the one, which out of His freedom He refuses the others, granting them what He deems to be sufficient; we make the glory of God visible here in the one point, not disparaging it, if, in the other, it be for the present acknowledged (with St. Paul) to be invisible.

§ 10. For if there were any other religion in the world, which could pretend, maintaining the differences between good and bad, the providence of God in all things, and the reward of good and bad in another world, to give further reason of the coming in and continuance of evil in the world; there might be some pretence of prejudice to the privilege which Christianity claimeth in maintaining those principles, from the inability of declaring the reasons, by which God

dispenseth the means of His effectual grace. But there never was any other religion in the world, that could pretend any such thing.

§ 11. The Greekish philosophers (who were the divines of
the Gentiles), some of them openly professed necessity and fate, as the Stoic; thereby destroying freedom and conti-
gence, by the consequence religion, and all difference between good and bad; much more the truth of Christianity, con-
sisting in a treaty for embracing good and rejecting bad.
Others, supposing this, either renounced providence (and by consequence the being of God), as Epicurus and his pre-
decessors and followers; or at least doubted of it, in which mire it is more than probable that our master Aristotle sticks.
If, with Plato and Pythagoras, we suppose them clearly to acknowledge all this; yet is there a way left (either by making the material cause co-existent with God from ever-
lasting, with Plato, or by presupposing those contrarieties of good and evil, which Pythagoras, imagining to have been from everlasting, made by consequence the principles of all that comes to pass in the world) to advance some other cause of good and evil in this world than man’s will under God’s providence.

§ 12. And it is very remarkable, that Epiphanius observes,
all the sects of the Gnostics (whereof he, of all others, hath given us the most particulars) proceeded upon a pretence of giving a reason for the coming in of evil into the world: to wit, by setting up two principles or gods, one the fountain of evil, the other, of good. Which, together with the express testimonies of divers others of the fathers, witnessing that they had their principles from the Greekish philosophers, seems to argue, that they took their rise from

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2 Lucret., ii. 1089, sq.—Cic., De Nat. Deor., i. 2.—&c.
5 Corrected in MS. into, "imagined to have been from everlasting, and by consequence."
7 See the authorities on different sides of this question cited in Burton’s Bampton Lectures, note 7. pp. 263—268.
a pretence of rendering an account of the beginning of evil as well as of good; intimating thereby, that Christianity did not sufficiently perform it, as not pretending all to be declared till the general judgment. And this is the case of Marcionists and Manichees.

§ 13. For as for Jews and Mahometans, I suppose there is no man so little read in the difference between them and Christians, as to conceive, that they can give account of God's providence in the evil which He maintaineth to be in the world (together with the means, by which some come to life, others to death), if Christians by their profession cannot do it. Nor is it to be doubted, that the dispute about free will and providence (and consequently predestination, so far as the world to come is acknowledged) hath been and in part remains alive, as well among Gentiles, Jews, and Mahometans, as we see it is among Christians.

§ 14. So that we may justly infer, that—seeing no other religion, either antecedent to Christianity, or that hath come after it, can pretend that satisfaction to this dispute, which Christianity giveth by the coming in of sin upon the fall of Adam,—that it is no disparagement to it, not to be able to declare the reason of God's proceeding with particular persons in dispensing to them the means of effectual grace; when it remains manifest, both that Christianity goes further in declaring the same than any other religion can do, and, that there may be justly those reasons reserved to God, which He (notwithstanding the grace which He publishes by Christ) findeth no cause to declare.

§ 15. The answer, then, to the objection, consists in this; that, as it is not necessary for the maintenance of Christianity to give account why God disposeth of His effectual grace as He doth, so is there no opinion able to reconcile it to the freedom of man's will, within the bounds of Christianity, but that which maketh predestination to glory conditional, to grace, absolute. It may be the reader's lot, as it hath been mine, to hear an objection cast forth; that, if God's predestination be unmoveable, it is vain for Christians

That our endeavours are engaged no less than if predestination were not, [the Gospel] determineth.

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* Id., ibid., lib. ii. tom. ii. Hær. 66. Hær. 42. § 3; Op., tom. i. pp. 303. D,  
* § 14; ibid., p. 630. A.  
* 304. A.
to endeavour to live as Christians: and the answer so insufficient, as to leave more offence in his mind, than before it was made: according to that which is sometimes said, that unskilful conjurors sometimes raise a devil, whom they cannot lay again. For, certainly, it serves not the turn to say, that God, as He hath appointed the end, so hath appointed the means. For it is the secret will of God, which is always effectual, that appoints the end. But His revealed will, that appoints the means by commanding, comes not always to effect. And therefore, if God have absolutely appointed the end, he that knows not whether He hath appointed it or not, can have no reason to go about the means, till he know it as absolutely appointed as the end is. Nor serves it the turn to add, and to say further; that God, as He appointeth the end, so He appointeth also the means, to be freely employed by man for the attaining it: which the opinion of predetermination may say. For all the encouragement this can give a man to employ his freedom to any purpose, is; that, if God determine him, he shall freely employ it, if not, he shall freely not employ it, to that purpose: which is to say, in English, that his freedom (being called freedom, but is not) cannot be employed by him, that is encouraged to employ it. And therefore it is reasonable for him to say, I shall freely do so if God hath appointed it, and freely not do so if He have not appointed it. If it be said further, and that according to my opinion, that no event is determined by God, but supposing man's free will, and foreseeing what choice it will make upon the considerations which a man is outwardly or inwardly moved with; neither will this be enough to move a reasonable man's endeavours, supposing himself absolutely predestinated to life or to death before. For that life and death, being absolutely appointed, becomes God's end (though subordinate to a further end of His glory), and not only the end of the means which He provideth for it; a thing no less destructive to the supreme majesty of God than to that which I said afore. For that which God absolutely desireth, that He engageth His supreme majesty to execute and bring to effect; unless it can be thought, that a sovereign can be sovereign, and not stand obliged, and make it his interest, that no design of his be defeated. Which if
God do, what availeth it the creature, that the will thereof is free, and the effects of that will are not determined but by the free choice thereof; whenas, being the will of a creature, and necessarily proceeding upon consideration of those objects which providence inwardly or outwardly presenteth it with, it is, by a former act of that providence, determined to that, which may and must be the means of producing that end, which God had designed afore. And, upon these terms, providence will stand engaged (not to permit but) to procure the sins, upon which the sentence of eternal death, as the good works, upon which the sentence of eternal life, proceedeth. And he who knows, that whatsoever he doth, though never so freely, shall certainly bring him at length to that estate, which God had appointed for him before He considered what he would or would not do; what reason can he have to employ the endeavours of his will to do what God commandeth, for the obtaining or avoiding of that, which He hath appointed before any consideration of his endeavours? But absolute predestination to the first helps, that effectually bring a man to the state of grace, produceth not the like consequence. For as, supposing good and bad in the world, and that the Gospel is refused by some and embraced by others, it is merely the work of providence, that a man is born under the obligation of it or not, and cannot be imputed to any act of his own; so, he that supposeth, that God hath not appointed him to life or to death but in consideration of his own doings, shall no less stand obliged to follow those sufficient reasons of well doing, which God's Spirit by the preaching of the Gospel meets him with, than if it did not lie in the work of providence to make them effectual or not.

§ 16. As for all the rest of every man's life, that falls between the time that he is sufficiently convinced that he ought to live and die a good Christian, and that state of grace or of sin in which he deceaseth; it is evident, that the helps of grace are dispensed all along upon that reason of reward or punishment, which the covenant of grace establisheth. For, seeing the Holy Ghost is promised, to assist all Christians in the performing of that which they undertake by their baptism, it cannot be imagined, that God should destitute any Christian of helps requisite to the fulfilling of his Christianity,
whose profession was not counterfeit from the beginning (that is, not so real as it should have been), until he fail of complying with the motions of it.

§ 17. There is indeed some difference of opinion, according to which a difference will arise in the terms, by which we express ourselves in this business. There be those in the Church of Rome, who hold, that a Christian, once settled in the state of grace, may by God's ordinary grace here live without even venial sin till death. Supposing this done, the helps of grace, which God assisteth such a man with, are the effects of His justice, which consisteth in keeping promise; though originally the effects of mere grace, because it was mere grace that moved Him to make that promise. Those that hold absolute predestination to life or to death, and justifying faith to be nothing but the revelation of a man's predestination to life, can no more allow, that such a one may fall from the state of grace, than that God's promise can fail, or Christ's death be to no purpose: so that not only the sins which they do are to them occasion of good (as St. Paul saith, that "all things co-operate for good to them that love God," Rom. viii. 28), but the permission (which in that opinion is the procuring) of them is an effect of their predestination to life. According to this opinion, also, the helps of grace are the effects of that justice which consisteth in keeping, as well as of that grace which was seen in making, God's promise: though the condition of that promise be cleared, in this opinion, at the first instant that a man believeth; in the other, not till the last instant that he liveth.

§ 18. Though I have already laid aside both the suppositions upon which this opinion standeth, yet I suppose it not refuted as yet; because there must be a time on purpose to consider the arguments, which it pretendeth. But

* See below, in c. xxxii. § 9, the quotation from Andreas Vega. Bellarmine however holds, that "Nullus nisi per gratiam renovetur, peccata omnia mortalia vitae potest; venialia vero ne renovati quidem possunt, nisi privilegio singulari" (Bellarm., De Amiss. Grat. et Statu Peccati, lib. vi. c. 10; Contr., tom. iii. p. 491. A); and, "Non dicit Gregorius, omnia bona opera nostra esse impura, sed non omnia posse esse pura, quia fieri non potest ut non aliquando suprrepst aliquid quo bona aliqua opera vitietur" (Id., De Justificat., lib. iv. c. 21; ibid., p. 1240. D).


† Above, § 1; and c. vii. § 7.

‡ Below, c. xxxi. § 1, sq.
because one of the contradictions which it involveth, is this, that, making justification to consist in remission of sins, it alloweth the regenerate to become guilty of sin, and yet maintaineth him justified at the same time; another contradiction that it involveth, must needs be this, that the helps of grace requisite to the saving of him that is justified (which, as I said afore, according to this opinion, are due to the elect by the justice of God’s promise), are granted of mere grace, to the justifying of him, who, being justified, is notwithstanding acknowledged to need remission of sin. For to tie God by promise to help any man out of sin, as often as he shall please to fall back into sin (who, of grace, may always freely do it), is to make the Gospel a passport for sin. And therefore, notwithstanding this opinion, I shall not let to presume here (before I have spoken to it), that the helps of grace requisite to the recovering of him that is fallen from the state of grace, come not by the virtue of the promise, wherein the covenant of grace consisteth (the right whereof is forfeited in that case), but by virtue of that mere grace which first moved God to tender it, though in consideration of the merits and suffering of our Lord Christ which purchased it. Whereupon, the truth is, that the helps of grace that are requisite to maintain them in the state of grace, which have attained it, are due by that justice of God, which consisteth in keeping promise. And though God’s clear dealing with man requires, that from the first hearing of the covenant of grace (that is, from the first preaching of the Gospel, or from the first calling of him that is fallen from the state of grace) a man be enabled to embrace that which is tendered; yet, that he shall effectually embrace it, will always remain the effect of mere grace.

§ 19. So, the gifts of nature, and the death of Christ for mankind, are provided by God for the salvation of all, not as God’s end but as the end of the said means which He provideth. But that, by providing the death of Christ for the salvation of mankind, He obligeth Himself to grant them, who never heard of Christ, inspirations and revelations, convicting them that they are to be Christians, as He obligeth the Church to cause them to hear of Christ, I grant not (though I find it not to be prejudicial to the faith): because
then must all men be judged by the Gospel of Christ, reason being shewed, that they, to whom it is not preached, shall be judged by the law of nature. And upon these terms St. Paul may [allow\(^a\)] the demand, why God should complain, seeing no man can resist His will, but He may make whomsoever He shall please a good Christian [; and that his Gospel hath no answer for it\(^i\)]. But God to have absolutely appointed all men to life or to death, and so to be engaged by the interest of His sovereign majesty, not to see His design defeated, but to provide the means by which He designeth to bring His appointment to pass; [St. Paul's Gospel will not allow,\(^k\)] and his Gospel to have no answer for it. And therefore the comparison of the potter, that follows, though it hold thus far, that God indeed makes the vessels, that come to honour and shame in the world to come by the government of Him that made them, yet it holdeth not in this, that God's glory is interested to procure them to be saved that shall be saved, and them damned that shall be damned; as it concerneth the potter's trade to be furnished, as well with vessels for dishonourable, as for honourable uses. Nor will the instance of Pharaoh bear it, according to St. Paul's words. For had God spared Pharaoh's life out of a design to bring him to those torments, which his obstinacy in refusing the plagues that succeeded should deserve; He could not be said to "bear with much long-suffering the vessels of wrath that are fit to be destroyed," though intending at length to "shew wrath, and make His power known." The decree, then, of predestination, proceeding partly upon the terms of the Gospel, but in those things to which the Gospel extendeth not, and in those men that shall be judged by the law of nature, upon the sovereignty of God (the reasons whereof either we cannot understand, or God will not declare), containeth all the decrees, that order the motives, upon which God foresees a man will embrace and persevere in his Christianity to the end; or not persevere to the end, whether he embrace it or not; or, finally, not so much as hearing of it, will resolve for the better or for the worse from the beginning of his life to

\(^a\) Corrected from MS. "reject," in orig. text.

\(^k\) Corrected from MS. "St. Paul might allow the demand," in orig. text.

\(^i\) Added from MS.
the end of it; which our understanding necessarily distinguisheth by the objects which they bring to pass. The order of them is the same with the reasons, which the Scripture enableth us to give, for the effects which they produce, either in the nature of the final or meritorious cause: speaking only of that which comes from God's declared will, not from His secret pleasure; which, as it always verifieth His declared will, so extends to that which the other compriseth not. And it is as easy to comprise in the same decree (which is the pure Essence of God, willing to glorify Itself by doing that, which It might have glorified Itself by doing otherwise) the order of the reasons, upon which all mankind comes to that estate in which they shall continue everlastingly in the world to come. Seeing, then, all the effects of it fall not under God's revealed will, there can be no reason given for the whole decree, whether respective to any man, or to mankind. Seeing there is a reason to be given for all that fall under the same, in the nature of the final or the meritorious cause; God stands as much glorified, man as much obliged to work out his salvation with fear and trembling, as if he knew the bottom of God's secret counsel. And thus the objection is void.

§ 20. It remaineth, that we consider the tradition of the Church, and what it declareth concerning the truth of that which I have resolved, or towards it. Where we must take notice of the monks of Adrymetus under Valentine\(^1\): who received St. Augustin's doctrine of God's effectual grace, and predestination to it from everlasting, in such a sense, that they inferred from it all endeavours of men, all exhortations, reproofs, instructions, and prayers, to be utterly fruitless and vain; as tending to that which dependeth upon the mere appointment of God, which cannot be defeated, and without

\(^{1}\) "Propter eos, qui cum defenditur Dei gratia, putantes negari liberum arbitrium, sic ipsi defendunt liberum arbitrium ut negent Dei gratiam, asservantes eam propter merita nostra dari, scripsi librum, cujus titulus est, De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio. Ad eos autem scripsi monachos Adrumetinos in quorum monasterio de haec re ceperat esse contentio, ita ut me consulere aliqui eorum cogerentur." S. Aug., Retract., lib. ii. c. 66; Op., tom. i. p. 64. A.—"Rursus ad eodem scripsi alterum librum, quem De Correptione et Gratia praeotavi, cum mihi nunciatum esset, dixisse ibi quendam, ne minem corripiendum, at Dei præcepta non facit, sed pro illo ut faciat, tantummodo orandum." Id., ibid., c. 67; ibid. B.
which nothing can serve. To rectify this mistake, St. Augustin lived to write them his book yet extant De Correctione et Gratia; wherein he declareth all that he had said, of the grace of God, and the efficacy thereof, to proceed upon supposition of free will in man, though enslaved to sin by the fall of Adam, from the bondage whereof the grace of Christ, voluntarily though effectually, redeemeth those that are freed by it\textsuperscript{m}. Whereby (as by the rest of his writings concerning the grace of Christ against Pelagius) he establisheth two points, belonging to the foundation of the Christian faith: the first, of the freedom of man’s will, though not from sin, since the fall of Adam, yet from necessity determining the resolution of it, when by the treaty, which the Gospel advanceth, it is invited to embrace Christianity and to live according to it; which were all a mere nullity, were not any man free to resolve himself upon it; the second, of the grace of God by Christ, which if it may be purchased by the endeavour of man’s free will, then was it not necessary to send our Lord Christ, as the second Adam, to repair the breach which the first Adam had made: this being the sum of the Catholic faith in this matter, and the rest, which is advanced to shew how those two points both stand true together, belonging to the skill of a divine, not to the faith of a Christian, so far as, by maintaining them, men destroy the foundation of Christianity on neither side.

§ 21. Which, it is no marvel, that some things which St. of Semi-Pelagians. Augustin had said in giving a reason hereof, seemed to some to do; seeing those, that accepted of his doctrine in Afric, drew from it a consequence utterly destructive to Christianity. I speak of those in the parts of France about Provence and Marseilles; who, inferring from St. Augustin’s saying, that in his opinion God makes the far greater part of men on purpose to condemn them to death, seemed to maintain the beginning of salvation to come from those endeavours of

\textsuperscript{m} “Libeum itaque arbitrium et ad malum et ad bonum faciendum contestandum est nos habere; sed in malo faciendo liber est quisque justitiae servusque peccati; in bono autem liber esse nullus potest, nisi fuerit liberatus ab Eo Qui dixit, ‘Si vos Filium liberaverit, tunc vere liberi eritis.’ Nec ita ut, cum quisque fuerit a peccati dominatione liberatus, jam non indignet sui Liberatoris auxilio; sed ita potius, ut ab Ilio audientes, ‘Sine Me nihil potestis facere,’ dicat Ei et ipse, ‘Adjutor meus esto, ne derelinquas me.’” Id., De Coerpect. et Gratia, c. i. § 2; Op., tom. x. p. 751. B, C. And see the tract at length.
BOOK II.

man's will, born as he is under original sin, which God faileth not to second with those helps of grace which the matter requireth. There is great appearance of that which Jansenius disputeth so eagerly, De Hæresi Pelag. [lib.] vii. [c.] 5. et sq.⁰; that the main ground of their opposition was the decree of predestination, which St. Augustin would have to be absolute: as being persuaded, that thereby the effects of free will become fatal, in which that reason of reward and punishment, which the covenant of grace establisheth, requires contingency.

[Faustus.]

§ 22. And herewith the occasion, which Faustus pretendeth for the writing of his book De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio, agreeth: to wit, that a certain priest called Luci-

⁰ See above, c. xix. § 22. notes o to s.

"Tota causa erroris Semi-Pelagiani fuit illud propositum Divinae vocationis et praedestinationis, quo salvum a perituris discernuntur secundum Augustinum." Jansen., August., tom. i. De Hær. Pelag., lib. vii. tit. of c. 5. p. 173. b.—"Ut error Massilien- sium radicatus intelligatur, opera pretium est indagare, quid illud tam insolens fuerit in doctrina Divi Augustini, ut, illius declining studio, Catholici et t egregii in omni virtutum studio viri, per novi erroris commentum tantas tragedias excitaverint. . . Utigit breviter id quod res est dicam, nihil aliud eos in scriptis Augustini offendit, quam illud propositum voluntatis Dei, quo certus numeros salvandorum, reliquis perentibus, a perditionis massa discernitur. Ex quo proinde juxta doctrinam ejus fit, ut quotquot ita Divinae gratiae largitatis discretionem et secundum propositum illud vocati sunt, infallibilis gubernationis lege procuretur eis suadium Evangeli et cum suaudint credant," &c.; "quotquot non ita discreti atque vocati sunt, certissime pereant: tota denique salvandorum a perituris differentia, quam vel in hoc vel in futuro saeculo cernimus vel non cernimus, in constitutionem Dei prævenientem voluntates hominum, hoc est, in unicum Divinæ voluntatis cardinem refundatur." Id., ibid. c. 5. pp. 173. b, 174. a.—The same proposition is maintained from the letter of Hilary, in c. 6; and from the writings of Faustus, in c. 7: ibid. pp. 174. b.—176. b.

p "Domino beatissimo ac reveren-

dus is required by him, in the name of a synod held at Arles under Leontius, bishop, to recant certain positions tending to maintain the necessity of being damned for original sin, by the foreknowledge of God, in them for whom Christ died not, dying only for [some]; and this, by a letter subscribed by some of the bishops. This recantation being made, Faustus pretendeth to write, at the entreaty of the synod, to lay forth their sense and reasons; but to have added something upon the decree of another synod, held afterwards at Lyons. True it is indeed, which Vossius observeth (Hist. Pelag. [lib.] vi. Thesi. 14†); that, whereas some of them insisted on nothing else, others proceeded to deny the necessity of preventing grace. For whatsoever we say of Cassian, who hath writ to several purposes in several places; Faustus manifestly affirmeth, that, by the act of free will in beginning to believe, a Christian obtains the grace of God, which his own choice preventeth. Which, if we understand the faith which he speaketh of to signify Christianity, and the act of believing to consist in becoming a Christian, is nothing else but the fundamental faith of Christianity; that the habitual gift of the Holy Ghost is granted in consideration of a man's turning Christian. But, who believes, that the actual grace of the Holy Ghost, whereby the world is converted to be (as well as convicted that it ought to be) Christian, is obtained by the exaltation, as purchased by the humiliation, of Christ (which Faustus, supposing the preaching of the Gospel, being the means which it useth, no way denieth), acknowledgeth by consequence that act of faith, which preventeth the habitual gift of the Holy Ghost, to be prevented by the actual helps of grace, which the preaching of the Gospel importeth. And Jansenius (De Heres. Pelag. [lib.] viii. [cc.] 1—9") acknowledgeth, that they had no

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9 Corrected from MS. "sin," in orig. text.  
† Subjicit nunc (Prosper), quodam eorum prope adeo ad Pelagium accedere, ut ad Dei cognitionem et sanationis desiderium non alta nos gratia a Deo dicate, quam naturam nostram insita, per cujus usum rectum nos regenerationis gratiam censeant promoveri. Ubi cum quodam ita sensisse ait, non obscura significat suisse item alias, qui licet praefinitionis dogma respuerent, non tamen praevenientem gratiam negarent. Imo cum quodam dicit, hoc amplerius colligere licet, si non multis parsibus plures, salem et numero suisse pauciores, qui gratiam praevenientem agnoscentes solum absolu te praedestinationis dogma impugnarent. Voss., Hist. Pelag., lib. vi. thes. 14; Op., tom. vi. p. 758. a.  
* See above, c. xix. § 23. notes z, a.  
† See above, ibid., notes b—e.  
"Ex his que hactenus disserui—
design to destroy the grace of God through Christ, as Pelagius had; and therefore did acknowledge, not only the outward preaching of the Gospel, but inward inspiration to make it effectual: only that, making the effect of that grace which God appointeth, to depend on free will, they fell into the heresy of Pelagius, which they desired to avoid.

§ 23. Now Pelagius, indeed, acknowledged that grace, which the preaching of the Gospel signified, according to his own opinion, which was false. For, not believing that our will is any thing the worse for Adam’s fall, he could not allow, that Christ hath purchased any help to repair the breach, and to cure the disease which he had made. But as he could not deny it to be an act of bounty in God, to propose the reward of everlasting life, which is supernatural; so he must affirm, that it is purchased by the mere natural act of free will, without any help of grace, granted of God’s mercy in Christ, in consideration of His obedience. And by this means he brought the death of Christ to no effect; seeing God might have assured the tender of His Gospel to come indeed from Him, without it. And so the merit of grace (that is, the reason that obliges God to give it) is originally ascribed to the works of free will, according to Pelagius: but according to those, who, acknowledging original sin, acknowledge the cure of it by the help of grace purchased

mus, facile intelligere quilibet potest, longe aliue fuisset Massiliensis quem Pelagio... intentionem. Siquidem nihil aliud ex professo Pelagiani studio erunt, quam, sublata funditus Christi Salvatoris.figure, puram putamque philosophiam in Ecclesiam cum gentibus introducere, ut cum philosophis hujus mundi natura hominis illa putaretur, 'beatamque vitam virtute propria voluntatis officere.' Massilienses contra, tamquam Catholicae fidei sectatores, Christum nuture perditur Salvatorem omnibus modis sibi retinendum esse duzerunt, tuendumque gratiam Ejus. . . Sed cum istud prædestinationis et electionis propitium quo quidam pro solo Dei beneplacito, nulla pro sus habita consideratione voluntatis, a præditionis massa quam peccatum fecerat, allis in eadem causa prætermissionis, discerni debere dicebantur, et consequenter omnes voluntatis actus, quibus ex illa massa præditionis cripi-


† See Voss., ibid., Thes. xi., xii.; ibid., pp. 669, sq.
by Christ, which the preaching of the Gospel bringeth; not to the intrinsical value of the works, which free will alone doth, but to the promise annexed by God to the works, which free will by the help of grace purchased by Christ produceth. It was no marvel indeed, that they, who had overseen the actual helps of grace, should ascribe the merit of habitual grace (so the language of that time spoke) to the act of free will in beginning to believe (that is, to be a Christian); as not depending upon that operation of grace, which themselves supposed, though they oversaw it. But it were ridiculous to think, that he, who by the preaching of the Gospel, and the reasons which it seteth forth why men are to be Christians, is effectually moved to become a Christian, is not to impute his being so to that grace, which preventeth him with those reasons. How much more, when those reasons are acknowledged to be the instrument, whereby the Holy Ghost worketh a man's conversion at the first, or his perseverance at the last, is it necessary to impute it to the grace of Christ; that is, to those helps, which God in regard to Christ's death preventeth us with? Surely, should grace immediately determine the will to it, the effects that should be imputable to grace would be the same, neither the covenant of grace nor the experience of common sense remaining the same; which will not allow such a change in a man's life, as becoming a good Christian of an enemy to Christ's cross, to succeed, without an express change in the will, upon reasons convincing the judgment, that this world is to be set behind the world to come.

§ 24. It is now to be acknowledged, that St. Augustin, [St. Augustin, Cestinian, the second Council of Orange.]

writing against these men's positions, as they were related to him by the letters of Prosper and Hilary, his books (now extant) De Praedestinatione Sanctorum et De Dono Perseverantiae², hath determined the reason, why one man is con-

² See the Epistles to S. Augustin, of Prosper ("de reliquis Pelagianae heresibus in Gallia sobolescentibus, deque hujusmodi hominum querelis adversus Praedestinationis et Gratiae doctrinam superioribus ipsius Augustinii opusculis, presertim libro de Correptione et Gratia, explicantam"), and of Hilary (on the same subject), prefixed to S. Aug., De Praedestinatione Sancto-

rum and De Dono Perseverantiae; Op., tom. x. pp. 779—758.—"Ex duobus itaque parvulis originali pecato pariter obstrictis, cur iste assumatur, ille relinquatur; et ex duobus etate jam grandibus impius, cur iste ita vocetur, ut vocantem sequatur, ille autem aut non vocetur, aut non ita vocetur; inscrutabilia sunt judicia Dei. Ex duobus autem piis, cur huic donetur persever-

THORDIKE.
BOOK II.

Nothing, that can resolve into any act of man's will, but ends in God's free appointment: that Pope Celestius, writing to the Bishops of Gaul, upon the solicitation of the same Prosper and Hilary, in recommendation of St. Augustin's doctrine, then so much questioned in those parts, determines not only the sufficiency, but the efficacy, of the means of grace to come from God's grace: that the second council of Orange, determining the same in divers particulars, concerning the conversion of man to become a true Christian, concerning his perseverance to the end in that estate, hath only determined, that by the help and assistance of Christ, and the grace received in baptism, a Christian may, if he will faithfully labour, fulfill whatsoever his salvation requireth. Is there any thing in all this to signify, that a man's will, before he determines, is determined by God to embrace Christianity, and persevere in it to the end, or not? that every man is determined to everlasting glory or pain without consideration of those deeds of his, for which at the last he shall be sentenced to it, and either suffer or enjoy it? Here I must have recourse again to Vossius his collections, finding them sufficient, and my model not allowing me to say more. Whether no help of grace but that which takes effect, be sufficient; that is, whether men refuse Christianity or fail of performing it, because they could not embrace and persevere in it, or because they would not when they might: let him, that shall have perused what he hath collected in

rantia usque in finem, illi non donetur; inscrutabiliora sunt judicia Dei. Illud tamen fidélibus debet esse certissimum, hunc esse ex prædestinatis, illum non esse.” S. Aug., De Dono Persever., c. ix. § 21; Op., tom. x. p. 831. B, C.

And see both tracts at length.

a From certain canons appended to the letter of Celestius to the Bishops of Gaul, and entitled, “Præteritorum Sedis Apostolicae Episcoporum Auctoritates de Gratia Dei et Libero Arbitrio,” § 2—5: ap. Labb., Concil., tom. ii. p. 1615. A—D. They are decided to be not the work of Celestius, by Labbé, and Sirmond; and Binius attributes them to Prosper (ibid., p. 1613. D, E). The letter itself was written at the request of Prosper and Hilary (ibid., p. 1611. E).

b “Si quis alios misericordia, alios vero per librum arbitrium, quod in omnibus, qui de prevaricatione primum hominum nati sunt, constat esse vitium, ad gratiam baptismi posse venire contendit, a recta fide probatur alienus.” Conc. Arausc. II. (A.D. 529), art. 8: ap. Labb., Concil., tom. iv. p. 1668. D, E.—“Adjutorium Dei etiam renatis ac sanctis semper est impertandum, ut ad finem bonum pervenire vel in bono possint opere perdurare.” Eus. Concil. art. 10; ibid., p. 1699. B.—See also art. 4—7; ibid., pp. 1697. D—1668. D.

the second part of his seventh book, say, as to the persuasion of the whole Church. Whether God would have all men to be saved, and hath appointed the death of our Lord Christ to that intent; let him, that shall have perused the first part of the same, thesi ii. and iii., give sentence, what the Church hath always believed. No less manifest is it, by that which he saith there, parte ii. thesi ii., parte iii. thes. i. and ii., that there is no reason to be given, why any man sinneth or is damned, because God would have it so. On the contrary, that the reason why a man is not saved, to whom the Gospel is tendered, is, because he refuseth it; which God, for His part, tendereth to all mankind. In fine, that the Catholic Church, from the beginning believed no more, than that those, who should believe and persevere to the end, good Christians, were appointed by God to be saved; understanding this to be done by virtue of God's grace, for which no reason can be rendered from anything that a man can do, as preventing all his endeavours: I acknowledge to appear by that which he hath said, lib. vi. thes. viii. When therefore St. Augustin maintaineth (as I have acknowledged that he doth maintain), that the reason why one man is converted and perseveres unto death, another not, resolves into

d "Veteris hae Ecclesiae sententia fuit, velle Deum conversionem ac salutem omnium:" &c. Id., ibid., lib. vii. P. i. tit. of thes. 2. p. 779. b.—"Veteris Ecclesiae judicium fuit, Christum pro culpa universalis hominibus providisse a remedio universalis, solvendo Αἴρεσιν infiniti pretii, ne ejus defectu periret quisquam:" &c. Id., ibid., tit. of thes. 3. p. 780. a.

e "Deus non prædestinat ad pecandum, sed praecit libere peccatum: nec quia praecit Deus, peccabit homo; sed quia homo peccabit, Deus praecit." Id., ibid., P. ii. tit. of thes. 2. p. 804. a.—"Sensit Ecclesia vetus, eo reprobos detruiri in gehinnam atque ibi luere pomas aeternas: non quia vitia obedire Deo non potuerunt, sed quia noluerunt. Itaque et anathema illis dixit, qui existimarent hominem prædestinari ad malum, hoc est, qui prædestinatione Dei putarent hominibus imponi pecandis et perundis necessitatem." Id., ibid., P. iii. tit. of thes. 1. p. 806. a.—"De quesione alters, Patrum, tam Latinorum quam Graecorum, hoc judicum fuit, in homine caussam esse, quod non regeneretur, vel non perseveret. Quippe qui vocatus, venire cum posit, venire neglegat; donaque Dei prior repobet, et irrita reddat, quam a Deo repobetur; prior deserat Deum, quam a Deo deseratur." Id., ibid., tit. of thes. 2. p. 807. a.


Above, note e.
God's mere appointment; I will not dispute, whether this be more than the whole Church delivereth for that which it is necessary to salvation to believe. It is enough for me to maintain, that it seemeth to follow, by good consequence of the best reasons that I can see, from that sense of our Lord and His Apostles' doctrine, which the Church hath always taught. Which will allow me to maintain, as well the predetermination of the will, as absolute predestination to glory and pain, to be inconsistent, as with the covenant of grace, so with the tradition of the Church.

§ 25. I find, that Gennadius, being manifestly one of those in Gaul that contradicted something of St. Augustin's doctrine (by his commending of Faustus and Cassian, and censuring, not only Prosper, who confuted Cassianus, but even St. Augustin, in his book of ecclesiastical writersb), in a certain addition to that list of heresies which St. Jerom hath made, reckoneth them in the list of the heretics condemned by the Church, who teach absolute predestination, under the name of Predestinatians1. After him, not only Hincmarus


1 "In libello quodam de haeresibus, qui sancto Hieronymo attribuitur, cum catalogus hereticorum ad Photonum et Eunomiam usque perductus esset, qui circa eadem sancti Hieronymi vixerunt, sic de Gennadio subjungitur: 'Huc usque sanctus Hieronymus: hæc vero quæ sequuntur, a sancto Gennadio Massiliensi presbytero sunt positæ.' Prima vero haeresis quam Gennadius ibi ponit, est 'Predestinatiorum.'" Jansen., August., tom. i. De Hær. Pelag., lib. viii. c. 23. p. 428. b.—The tract thus attributed to S. Jerome is not in the editions of his works, but was published separately by Menardus, with the appendix of Gennadius added to it. That appendix as there published treats of four heresies. Three of these (the Predestinatians being omitted) are to be found in the editions of S. Augustin, added to his tract De Haeresibus (Op., tom. vii. p. 28). See Jansen., as above quoted: and, on the other side, Sirmond., Hist. Prædest., c. vi.; ap. Galland., Bibl. Vett. PP., tom. x. pp. 407, 408; and Cave, Hist. Litt., sub art. Hieron. Stridon., and Gennad. Massil.
of Rheims, condemning Gotescalcus, a monk of his province, for maintaining it (being transmitted to him by Rabanus of Mentz, who in a synod there had condemned him for the same), hath supposed it condemned for a heresy by the ancient Church; but also, before Hincmarus, Arnobius, that hath expounded the Psalms (called Arnobius the younger by some), and a certain continuation of St. Hierom's Chronicle, under the name of Tiro Prosper, the one contradicteth them, the latter mentions that they had their beginning from St. Augustin's writings. Sirmondus also, the learned Jesuit, hath published a piece so ancient, that, pretending to make a list of heresies, it goeth no further than Nestorius; reckoning next after him the Predestinarians, as those who derived themselves from St. Augustin's doctrine. To which it is well enough known what opposition is now made by them, who believe not that there ever was any such heresy, but that the adversaries of St. Augustin in Gaul do pretend, that such a sect did indeed rise upon misunderstanding his doctrine. And, certainly, there are properly no heretics, as to the Church, but those whom the Church condemns, for some position, which they had rather part with the Church than renounce. Neither can it be said, that ever there was any sect expelled the Church upon


2) "Dilexit maliedictionem Adæ... noluit benedictionem quæ per Christum affertur... Nota ex arbitrio evenisse ut nollet, propter hæresim, quæ dicit Deum alios prædestinationes ad benedictionem, alios ad maliedictionem." Arnob. Junior, Comment. in Ps. cviii.; ap. Magn. Bibl. PP., tom. v. P. iii. p. 291. D. E.


such cause. That there was a council held at Arles, and after
that another at Lyons, that decreed something about abso-
lute predestination, is as certain; as it is certain, that
Faustus writ his book De Gratia et Libero Arbitrio by com-
mission from them: for both are affirmed by the preface", which is of the same credit as the book. But what was
determined, we cannot measure by the letter of Faustus to
Lucidus; which goes along with it". Lucidus was a priest,
whom Faustus moves to recant his opinion, that God makes
the greatest part of men on purpose to damn them. This
he does by a letter, which he returns to Faustus, renouncing
several articles to that purpose; but which he might have
framed out of Faustus his book, always disowned. For why
might not Faustus be intrusted to write against the opinion,
and exceed his commission so far, as to deny preventing
grace? And though Faustus his letter is subscribed by
divers bishops, yet are they not the council, nor do the sub-
scriptions appear in all copies". As for the return, neither
doth it appear by the date, nor by any other mark, that it
was approved or enacted by the council".

§ 26. But, granting it had, the letter of Pope Celestine* in
favour of St. Augustin's doctrine must needs have given a
check to the execution of it; which, having decreed divers
articles concerning the necessity of preventing grace, in the
end, condemns the determining of difficult questions, that
[occur"] upon the necessary dispute of preventing grace.
And the second council of Orange, in the end, is content to
add only, that if any man say, that any man is predestinate

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* See above, § 22. note b.
‡ "Though we find at the end of this letter (of Faustus) the subscrip-
tions of several bishops: it is never-
thless true (as Sirmundus thinks), that it
belonged to none but Faustus; and
that it is he only, that wrote it in his
own name. And in Hincmar's time
it was believed to be subscribed by him
alone, as it still is in the best M.S.,
and particularly in that which Canisius
used." Dupin., Eccl. Hist., Fifth
See Sirmund., Hist. Prædest., cc. vii.,
x. pp. 408—410; Canisius, Thes. Mon.

Eccl., tom. i. pp. 344, sq. with Bas-
nage's notes, ed. Bannage Antv. 1725:
and Ussher, Antiq. Brit. Eccl., c. xiii.;
Works, vol. iii. pp. 486, sq. ed. El-
rington.

‡ The letter of Lucidus is addressed
to Leontius and 29 other bishops (in-
cluding Faustus himself). It refers
to the Council thus—"Proinde juxta
prædictandi recentia statuta concilii
damno vobiscum sensum illum, qui
dicit humanae obedientiae laborem Di-
vinæ gratis non esse jungendum,"
1044. D.)

§ See above, § 24. note a.

† Misprinted "incur," in orig. text.
to evil (whether of sin or punishment), the synod declares him anathema. Whereby, as whatsoever Faustus or Cassian might have said to the prejudice of preventing grace, is condemned by the synod, so that, which the former synod had said of predestination, seems to be superseded, and void, by a greater authority, of the see of Rome concurring with the council of Orange. Which may be the reason, why there is no further mention in antiquity of the decrees of those councils: which had they not decreed, as some suppose, Faustus would have heard of it by Maxentius; who is so angry with the see of Rome, that they made not the adversaries of St. Augustin heretics.

§ 27. I grant, therefore, that there was never any sect of Prædestinans. But I do not therefore grant, that ever there was any sect of Semipelagians. Faustus or Cassian might, in opposition to absolute predestination, mistake themselves so far as to deny preventing grace. Some on the other side (as he that writ the treatise which Sirmondus his Prædestinatus confutes, though some take it for his own that confutes it) might deserve the censure of those councils; as the positions that prejudice preventing grace are condemned by that of Orange, and the writings of Cassian and Faustus censured afterwards, their persons remaining untouched, upon conformity to the decree. As for Gotescalcus, whom Hincmarus condemned by virtue of the councils of Arles and Lyons, which I think void: I see there is opposition in point of right, what ought to be held between Hincmarus and his party on the one side, and Remigius of Lyons with his; whatever Gotescalcus his opinion truly was in point of fact.

"Aliquos vero ad malum Divina potestate prædestinatos esse non solum non credimus; sed etiam si sunt qui tantum malum credere velint, cum omni detestatione illis anathema dicimus." Concil. Arausio. II., in fin. canonum; ap. Labb., Concil., tom. iv. p. 1672. A. B.


* The second Book of the Prædestinatus is entitled "Liber sub nomine Augustini conflictus, nonagesimam hæresim continentis, quæ adserit Dei prædestinatione peccata comititi." The third Book contains "refutationem libri superioris sub S. Augustini nomine conflicti."

* See Mosheim, Eccles. Hist., Bk.
And therefore, the authority of the Church not being engaged on either side, I am at freedom to refuse absolute predestination to glory (much more predetermination, which is but one way to execute it), admitting absolute predestination to grace.

§ 28. And truly, though I impute it for a charge to those, that maintain the determination of man’s will by the immediate act of God before it determine itself, that they destroy free will by pretending to maintain it (because the determining of it, which they make the ground of freedom, is indeed the ground of necessity, which stands not with freedom), which is no small fault in divines; yet, as Christians, I count them so much the less enemies to the faith. For, inasmuch as they do this under the pretence of establishing freedom, it is manifest, that they ground their salvation upon the covenant of grace which supposeth it; and, therefore, think themselves notwithstanding obliged to apply their utmost endeavours to the fulfilling of it: though the difficulty of the question entangling, and as it were maleficiating their understanding, makes them imagine, that it is maintained by that which indeed destroys it.

§ 29. And, therefore, I cannot in the like manner excuse them, who, besides the predetermination of the will by God, do hold that faith, which only justifieth, to consist in believing that God predestinates to life in consideration of the obedience of Christ, provided for the elect of God alone: because, not requiring that voluntary conversion of the will to God for the condition of the covenant of grace (the revelation of the will of God aforesaid not implying any thing, but the evidence of God’s word manifested by His Spirit to that effect), they disoblige themselves of employing that freedom of the will which Christianity supposeth, to perform that condition which Christianity requireth; as if the loss of freedom from sin did infer the loss of freedom from necessity, by virtue of original concupiscence, extending nevertheless to the state of innocency. In fine, the free grace of God and the free will of man belonging both to the foundation of Christianity, there are two extremities to be [avoided\(^a\)] in

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OF THE COVENANT OF GRACE.

CHAP.
XXVI.

this question, consisting in destroying the one, out of a desire to preserve both; which he that hath not, in plain terms, destroys Christianity. And therefore I blame not the determinations of the council of Orange, that have secured us, on the one hand, against the merit of grace by works of nature; but I find reason, that we should be secured, on the other hand, against the determination of the will, that introduces necessity, to the overthrow of Christianity. For it is possible for the understanding of him, that desires to maintain both grace and free will, to be so intricated with the difficulty of reconciling them both, as to make the freedom of man's will to depend upon the immediate act of God's will, determining it freely to act when it acteth, out of pretence of maintaining the efficacy of God's free grace; whereas it is, indeed, no help of grace, that enables not freely to do what the covenant of grace requireth. I do not therefore pardon our Presbyterians, when they bring into their confession of faith (which we must all be obliged to forsooth) the determining of man's will by God, having no ways secured us from the position of justifying faith, to consist in believing that we are predestinate to life. But I forewarn their misled hearers, that, though they think themselves bound to pay them well for their pains, to make them partizans in questions which they understand not, and give them the confidence to censure for Arminians, those that resolve them in such terms as they comprehend not; nevertheless, at the last judgment of

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"Si quis sicut augmentum, ita etiam initium fidei, ipsumque credulitatis affectum, quo in Eum credimus. Qui justificat impium, et ad generationem sacri baptismatis pervenimus, non per gratiam donum, id est, per inspirationem Spiritus Sancti corrigendum voluntatem nostram ab infidelitate ad fidem, ab impietate ad pietatem, sed naturaliter nobis inesse dicit, apostolica licentia matutin est adversarius approbatur." &c. Concil. Araus. II. (A.D. 529), art. 5; ap. Labbe, Concil., tom. iv. pp. 1667. E, 1668. A. And see above, § 24. note b.

"All those whom God hath predestinated unto life, and those only, He is pleased, in His appointed and accepted time, effectually to call, by His word and Spirit, out of that state of sin and death in which they are by nature, to grace and salvation by Jesus Christ; enlightening their minds spiritually and savingly to understand the things of God; taking away their heart of stone, and giving unto them a heart of flesh; renewing their wills, and by His almighty power determining them to that which is good; and effectually drawing them to Jesus Christ; yet so as they come most freely, being made willing by His grace." Westminster Confession, chap. x. On Effectual Calling, § 1.—"The Confession of Faith of the Assembly of Divines agreed unto by the House" (of Commons), "except the 30 and 31 chapters, which are touching Church censures and synods, March 1659." Whitelock's Memorials, p. 699.
God, they may have cause to complain of them, if not for teaching them to tie knots which they cannot teach them to loose, yet for inducing them to break the peace of the Church, to obtain freedom of professing, or imposing upon others, the belief of things thus prejudicial to Christianity.

§ 30. In the mean time, it shall be enough for me, by this short resolution, to have drawn a line, which they that will tread the labyrinth of this dispute may be guided by, the best that I can shew, from falling headlong on either side. Not doubting, that the skill of those, who, being more traded in it, resolve to avoid both extremities, may produce that information, which may oblige me for further intelligence, as well as the rest of the Church: but having confidence, that the denying of God’s predetermination, is not the denying of God’s effectual grace; which I have shewed, that it doth stand with free will, according to the supposition that I advance; though I undertake not to shew, how reason reconciles the parts of it.

§ 31. And truly I am confident, that, when St. Augustin, in his book De Correptione et Gratia, distinguishes between that help of grace without which we cannot obey the Gospel of Christ, and that help by which we do it, “auxilium quo, et auxilium sine quo non”; and whencesoever else he makes the efficacy of grace to attain the doing of that which it effecteth, not only the enabling of man to do it; he never intended to determine the manner how it is effected. For though St. Augustin himself hath balked the ground which himself had laid, for the distinction between the antecedent and consequent will of God, in his book De Spiritu et Littera cap. xxxiii.⁵, by bringing in other expositions⁶ of St. Paul’s words,

[1 Tim. ii. 4.]

—“God would have all men to be saved, and to come to the knowledge of the truth,”—that are inconsistent with it; though I have not found him distinguish between necessity

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⁴ See above, c. xxv. § 6. note k.
⁵ “Vult autem Deus omnes homines salvos fieri et in aigionem verisiis venire; non sic tamen, ut eis adimat liberum arbitrium, quo vel bene vel male utentes justissime judicentur. Quod cum sit, infideles quidem contra voluntatem Dei faciunt, cum Ejus evangelio non credunt; nec ideo tamen eam vincunt, verum seipsos fraudant magno et summo bono, malisque pune- libus implicant....Ita voluntas Dei semper invicta est: vinceretur autem, si non inveniret quid de contemptoribus faceret, autullo modo possent evadere quod de talibus Ille constituit.” S. Aug., De Spiritu et Littera, c. xxxiii. § 55; Op., tom. x. p. 118. E, F: and see the whole chapter.
⁶ See above, c. xxii. § 7. note e.
upon supposition and antecedent, as Anselm in pursuance of his doctrine hath done: yet he, that shall read what he hath said of the redemption of all mankind upon Psalm xcvi., besides abundance of other passages, whereby he concurreth to witness that sense of the redemption of all mankind, of God's will that all be saved, of sufficient grace that is not effectual, which the Church generally declareth, as I shewed you before; I say, he that considereth them, will find it more reasonable to reconcile him to his own doctrine, than to pretend a change in his judgment, where he acknowledges none; as in the matter of preventing grace he doth not acknowledge. Certainly, seeing that Prosper, in defending him, frequently and clearly acknowledges Christ to have died for all mankind, out of God's will that all might be saved; but the author of the book De Vocatione Gentium (never yet suspected for a partizan of the Semipelagians) hath so plentifully maintained it, during the time that the parties in Gaul charged one another for Semipelagians and Prædestinationists (for during that time it was writ, without peradventure); they will never deserve well of St. Augustin, that defend him otherwise.


c "Nam 'judicabit orbem terrarum in sequitur; non partem, quia non partem eruit. Totum judicare habet, quia pro toto pretium dedit. Audisti Evangelium, quia cum venerit, inquit, congregabib electos Suos a quatuor ventis. Congregat electos omen a quatuor ventis: ergo de toto orbis terrarum." S. Aug., Enarr. in Ps. xxvii. § 15; Op., tom. iv. p. 1089. E.


k Above, § 24. notes c—f.


m See e. g. his Responsorium ad Capitula Gallorum (written in defence of S. Augustin); especially cc. viii., ix., where the objections to S. Augustin's doctrine to which Prosper replies, are respectively, "Quod non omnes homines velit Deus salvos fieri sed cer-

n E. g. the subject of lib. ii. c. xvi. of the De Vocatione Gentium is, "Quod Christus pro omnibus impius mortuos sit" (in fin. Op. Prosper., ap. Magn. Bibl. PP., tom. v. P. iii. p. 179. C—F). The book has been attributed to S. Ambrose, to Prosper (of Aquitaine or Regiensi), to S. Hilary of Arles, to S. Leo; and Voss. (Hist. Pelag., lib. i. c. 20. Op., tom. vi. pp. 575. b, 576. a) sums up the question thus:—"Sane ut non esse Regiensi Prosperi pro certo habemus, ipsa quia vel Arelatensis Hil-
arii vel Prosperi Aureliensis sit, vix dubitantum putamus." See also Cave, Hist. Litt., art. Prosper Aquitan.; who asssents to Voss's conclusion: and the Vita S. Prosperi, art. xi. pp. xxxv., xxxvi. prefixed to his works, 4to. Bas-
sani 1782.
BOOK II.

§ 32. So far are we from being obliged by his doctrine to acknowledge grace to come to effect by God’s predetermining the will of man to all that comes to pass: when I have shewed a supposition, according to which it may be done without prejudice to Christianity; though beyond my understanding to shew how. For supposing the common faith to be this, that God appointeth them to life or to death, whom He foreseeeth to embrace or not embrace Christianity, and to persevere or not persevere in the practice of it till death; can it not be true also, that He hath appointed some and not others the means, whereby He foresees that they will persevere? Nay, if some only persevere in the state of grace, when all might, as the council of Orange hath decreed, what is there but God’s will to create the difference? Much more, between them that never hear of the Gospel, and those that refuse it. And what hath Christianity here-upon to answer, but Porphyry’s question; why Christ came not afore? that is, why God suffered man to fall, and sin to come into the world? why He maketh not all men true Christians when He might? For one answer would serve all these questions. Which if it be a scandal to Christianity that it is not answered, it remains, that Christians be Porphyry’s disciples. In the mean time, absolute predestination to grace infers not absolute predestination to glory: nor obliges God to procure sin, as the means to His end; or as the means to that means, to predetermine man’s will to do it. But did St. Augustin’s doctrine, in my opinion, contain any thing contrary to the doctrine of the rest of the Church, concerning the antecedent and consequent will of God—the coming of evil into the world—and that the foreknowledge of God does not effect but suppose it—the freedom of the will from necessity, while slave to sin; I would think myself obliged to renounce him, that I might adhere to the rest of


† “Si Christus Se, inquinunt” (after Porphyry), “salutis viam dicit, gratiam et veritatem, in Seque solo ponit animis Sibi creditibus reditum; quid egerrunt tot seculorum homines ante Christum f...Quare Salvator Qui dictus est, Sese tot seculis subduxit?” S. Aug., Lib. ad Deogratias, seu Epist. cit., Quest. 2. § 8; Op., tom. ii. p. 276. A—C.
the Church: counting it a thing ridiculous, and contrary to
the principles of Christian truth, acknowledging the tradition
of faith to come from the whole Church; to advance the doc-
trine of a member thereof, though so eminent as St. Augus-
tin, against that which the rest of the Church is acknow-
ledged to have taught.

§ 33. If it be said, that the supposition of God's foreseeing
the event of men's resolutions by the objects and considera-
tions which He appoints them to be moved with, is an inven-
tion of the Jesuits, or at least hath been much maintained by
them; I demand, what advantage they have, that espouse
the supposition of the Dominicans (the first inquisitors, that
is, ministers of persecution for religion, by the interest of the
Church of Rome with secular powers)? especially, adding
unto it the position of justifying faith by believing that we
are predestinate, so destructive to the covenant of grace.
Yet I give the reader, that is willing to take the pains of
being informed, notice, that the supposition which I advance,
is rather in the form that is to be collected out of Durandus,3
than in that which the Jesuits 4 since have given it. In fine,
let Maldonate 5 and [the] Jesuits think it their honour to
profess, that they like not such and such expositions of Scrip-
ture because they come from the "heretics" (by which name
we know whom they mean): let Puritan preachers coif their
simple hearers with a prejudice against all that they like
not, as drawn from Arminians or Jesuits (whose positions
they understood not, and when they are understood, are
nearer the truth than their own). I shall find myself never-
theless obliged to follow that truth, for Christ's sake, which
I conceive maintains the interest of Christianity best; though

3 "Durandus, censuit et docuit, Deum cum causis secundis concurren-
re motae et mediate solum; nempe quia
rebus omnibus propria naturam et
essentiam dedit, et facultatem agendi
contulit, ac utramque virtutem sua con-
triculo conservavit: ea lege, ut creature
singularis, virtute semel a Deo indita
et perpetuo conservata, propios motus
decinspe obeant: absque eo quod Deus
eorum actus et effectus immediate et
per Se attingat: unde sequitur Deum
actum creature causam tamen remo-
tam esse, solam vero creaturam
causam proximam et immediatam."

4 Le Blanc, Thes. Theol., Thes. de Con-
ciliat. Arbit. Hum. cum Div. Concursu
et Cooperat. § 435; and see Du-
randus de S. Pordano, In 2 Sent. Dist.
37. qu. 1, &c.

5 See above, c. xxiv. § 18. note p.

6 "Hæretici—Hæreticorum magis-
ter—Hæreticus interpret"—&c. &c.
are phrases of common occurrence in
Maldonatus' Commentary on the Gos-
pells: Calvin and Beza being the two,
to whom such phrases are most com-
monly applied by him.

7 pp. 228—231 (both inclusive) are
omitted in the paging of the fol. edit.
OF THE COVENANT OF GRACE.

BOOK II. —

a Jew or a Pagan, much more a Jesuit or an Arminian, had said it.

§ 34. As for the opinion of Arminius, and the decree of the synod at Dort, having already said why I have enlarged my considerations beyond the compass of those terms upon which they disputed, it shall suffice me to say; that his opinion concerning election and reprobation is that, which I have shewed that all the Church hath always held for matter of faith: to wit, that God appoints them to be saved, and to be damned, who receive Christianity and persevere in the profession of it till death, or not:—that, in mine opinion, they might have admitted something more; to wit, that God is not obliged by any works of free will, preventing the help of His grace through Christ, but by His own free pleasure, to grant those helps of grace, which He knows will be effectual to final perseverance in Christianity, to some, which He refuseth to others:—and that the decree of granting them is God’s absolute predestination to grace. For I am confident, that Arminius doth acknowledge the calling of God’s grace to become effectual, by means of the congruity of those helps which God provideth, with that disposition which God foreseeth, in him whom He appointeth to be moved by the same. Whether or no the decree of the synod require further, that they should acknowledge predestination to glory to be absolute, I hold not myself anyways obliged to dispute. For I find, that those persons, that were employed to the synod from England, have professed, as well in the synod, as otherwise, that they came not by any commission or instruction from the Church of England; but only as trusted by King James of excellent memory, to assist his good neighbours, the States of the United Provinces, in composing the differences in religion raised among their divines and people. And,

* Above, c. xxi. § 6.


x "Sed et Rex nostrer, serenissimus rex Jacobus . . . nobis in man-
therefore, I cannot be concerned in the decree, to which the Church of England never concurred. Yet I say further, that the persons that concurred to it, whose opinions as divines I cannot esteem at an easy rate, by waiving the opinion of predestination, by acknowledging the death of Christ for all, and the operation of grace not irresistible, but such as stands not with actual resistance, do seem not to insist upon absolute predestination to glory; and that, if the decree do necessarily import it, I do not know how to reconcile it with their own opinions. Which whether it be also to be said of them of the Reformed Churches in France, who, holding the decree, do now acknowledge the death of Christ for all mankind, let them read their writings judge.

CHAP. XXVI.


* Deputies were sent to the Synod of Dort by the Reformed Churches of France, but were prohibited from going by Louis XIV.: see the Acts of the Synod of Alez in 1620, c. vii. § 16. (ap. Quicke, Synod. in Gallia Reform., tom. ii. p. 14). The First Synod of Charenton, in 1623 (c. xxvi.; ap. Quicke, ibid., pp. 126, sq.), adopted canons and decrees similar to those of the Synod of Dort on the subjects of Predestination, Universal Redemption,
CHAPTER XXVII.

THE QUESTION CONCERNING THE SATISFACTION OF CHRIST, WITH SOCINUS.
THE REASON WHY SACRIFICES ARE FIGURES OF CHRIST, COMMON TO ALL
SACRIFICES. WHY, AND WHAT SACRIFICES THE FATHERS HAD, WHAT THE
LAW ADDED. OF OUR RANSOM BY THE PRICE OF CHRIST'S PROPITIATORY
SACRIFICE.

HAVING thus shewed, how the Gospel tenders a covenant
of grace, though requiring the condition of Christianity, in
regard of those helps which the grace of God through Christ
provided for the performance of it: I am now to shew the
same, in regard of that right to which God accepteth that
performance. For if it appear, that God, out of His grace in
Christ, and not for the worth of that which we do, accepteth
it for a title duly qualifying us for remission of sin and life
everlasting; then is it a covenant of grace which the Gospel
tenders, though it require the profession and practice of
Christianity on our part.

§ 2. And here I have to do with the Socinians on the one
extremity, in the first place: who will not allow the Gospel
to continue the covenant of grace, if it be said, that it ten-
dereth remission of sins and life everlasting to those that are
qualified as it requireth, in consideration of the obedience
and sufferings of Christ, as the ransom and price of our sins;
acknowledging always, that Christ died to settle and establish
the new covenant, but not to oblige God by His death either
to declare and become engaged to it, or to make it good
having declared it, but to assure mankind, that God (Who
of His own free grace was ready to pardon and accept of
those, that should accept of the terms of reconcilement which
His Gospel tendereth) will not fail to make good that, which,
by delivering His well-beloved Son to death, He hath signed
for His promise to us*. Indeed, they go about to strengthen
this opinion, by adding another reason and end of Christ's

&c.: but at the Third Synod of Cha-
renton, in 1645 (c. ix.; ibid., p. 449),
a Form was adopted for baptizing
(among others) Mahometans, wherein
question 4 runs thus,——“Do you not
believe, that His” (Christ’s) “death is
the propitiation for our sins, yea, and
for the sins of the whole world?”
Question 4, in the Form for Jews
(ibid., p. 446; is to the same effect.
* See above, c. i. § 5, note m: and
Socinus, De Jesu Christo Servatore,
passim.
OF THE COVENANT OF GRACE.

CHAP. XXVII.

death; to wit, the attaining of that Godhead, wherewith God, they say, hath rewarded His obedience in doing the message which He trusted Him with, that thereby He might be able, of Himself, to make good that which God by Him had promised, confounding all that may oppose the salvation of them that embrace the covenant of grace. But that it should be said, that God declareth, or giveth, remission of sins and everlasting life to them that embrace the same in consideration of the obedience and sufferings of Christ, as satisfied thereby for that punishment which our sin deserved of His justice; this is that, which they deny, and the Church teacheth.

§ 3. And therefore this it is, which we must shew how it is delivered by the Scriptures. Which every man may observe to stand chiefly in those texts of Scripture, which say, that "Christ died for us," that He "redeemed" us, and "reconciled us to God by His death and bloodshed" (which, being the utmost of His obedience, comes most into account at all occasions of mentioning this subject). In fine, it is easy to be observed, that the expressions of this point in Holy Scripture have relation to the sacrifices of the Old Testament, as figuring the death of Christ; whereby both agree we are delivered from sin, the question remaining, whether ransomed or not.

§ 4. And therefore I shall first consider, how, and to what effect, the sacrifices of Moses’ law are figures of the sacrifice of our Lord upon the cross. Where I must, in the first place, infer from the principle premised of the twofold sense of the Old Testament, that all the sacrifices thereof were figures of the death of Christ, and our reconciliation with God by the same. So far I am from yielding them that unreasonable demand, that only expiatory sacrifices, and especially that of the solemn day of atonement, are properly so.

b See above, c. i. § 9. note y; c. x. § 5. note m; c. xiv. § 5. note q.

See above, c. i. § 5. note m.

d Above, c. iii. § 4; c. viii. § 16; c. xvi. § 2; and Bk. I. Of the Pr. of Chr. Tr., c. xiii. §§ 26—47.

e "Non omnia (sacrificia Legis) Christi mortem figurabant. Sed figura mortis Christi erat tantummodo sacrificia illa, quae publice, hoc est, pro universo populo, ipso etiam aliquando summum sacerdotem non excusae, et statis quibusdam temporibus fiant, praeertim vero illud, quod semel in anno summus sacerdos in sancta sanctorum ingrediens peragat; ut ex epistola ad Hebræos culcunque non ascendant eam legenti constare poterit." Socin., De Jesu Christi Servatore, P. ii. c. 9; Op., tom. ii. p. 156. a.
§ 5. Only I must declare my meaning to be this: that, whereas the sacrifices of the fathers were so, as they were pledges of God’s favour generally; the sacrifices of the Law (being the condition, upon which that people in general, and every person thereof in particular, held their interest in the land of promise) express more correspondence with that interest in the world to come, which Christians hold by Christ’s death on the cross. For, the land of Canaan being promised them upon condition of keeping the Law, and every man’s interest in the goods of it depending upon the same, it is manifest, that, whether the sacrifices which the congregation was bound to offer of course upon ordinary or solemn days, or those which purged legal impurities, inferring only incapacities of conversing with God’s people, or those which were offered for sins properly so called, or for acknowledgment of blessings received, or whatsoever they were, all were made and offered upon the general claim to the land of promise, and every man’s share in it. Neither is there any greater argument hereof than this; that there is no sacrifice appointed by the Law for capital offences, Num. xv. 22—29: as those which the Law deprived of all interest in the land of promise, all right to converse among God’s people. Which what it signified to Christians, you may see by the Apostle, Hebr. ii. 1—[4], x. 28, [29]; to wit, that they, who stick not to the terms of their Christianity, must expect so much the heavier vengeance at God’s hands. And therefore, when the Apostle argues (Hebr. x. 4), “It is impossible that the blood of bulls and goats should take away sin;” the answer is given by the same Apostle (Hebr. ix. 13),—“If the blood of bulls and of goats, and the ashes of an heifer, sprinkling the defiled, sanctifieth to the purity of the flesh;”—that it takes not away the guilt of sin from the conscience, which shuts Heaven upon us, but it takes away the incapacity of coming into the tabernacle, or conversing among God’s people, or other forfeitures of legal promises. And therefore I may conclude, that the sacrifices which the Law was established with (Exod. xx[iv]. 4—[8]), though not expiatory, gave the people right to the land of promise; to wit, as done to so-

* Corrected from MS.; misprinted “which,” in orig. text.
lemnize their resolution of submitting to the Law. For, the people having been idolaters in Egypt, as we understand by the prophet (Ezek. xx. 6, 7), and now submitting to a covenant with God for the land of promise, by obeying His law, are they not thereby accepted by God for heirs of it?

§ 6. This seems, indeed, not to stand well with the opinion of the fathers; St. Chrysostom, Theodoret, and divers others, the best expositors of the Scriptures that the ancient Church hath: that the sacrifices of the Law were appointed by God, not of His own original intent, but upon occasion of their proneness to worship idols, as the heathen did; granting them those rites, which they had known them serve their idols with, so as they might be performed after that particular manner which He should enjoin, as done to Him alone. And this they make the meaning of the prophet; when he saith, that God "commanded their fathers nothing concerning sacrifices at their coming out of Egypt" (Jer. vii. 22): because, we see, that in their first coming out of Egypt He treats with them about keeping His laws but not about sacrifices (Exod. xv. 25, 26). But nothing hinders those sacrifices, which were brought in occasionally, to have been intended to figure the sacrifice of Christ. As nothing hinders those sacrifices, which from the beginning had been delivered...
BOOK II

the fathers as pledges of God's love to them through Christ, to be, by the malice of the devil, diverted and employed to the service of idols. Certainly, the fathers before the flood sacrificed nothing but whole burnt offerings; because, at that time, they were not to eat of their sacrifices, feeding only on things that grew out of the earth (Gen. i. 29). For afterwards, when He gave the sons of Noe license to eat flesh, "Noe offered peace offerings;" whereof, part being burnt upon the altar, the rest went to the use of those that had sacrificed, to feast upon (Gen. viii. 19, 20; ix. [3.], 4). And those which Moses solemnized the covenant of the Law with, were "holocausts and peace offerings" (Exod. xxiv. 5): those which the Law makes properly expiatory, being afterwards introduced by the Law.

§ 7. Now, that all sacrifices are figures of Christ, we have not only the general reason premised, but particular instances in the New Testament. The paschal lamb; 1 Cor. v. 7. The holocausts and peace offerings which the Law was enacted with; Exod. xxiv. 5, Hebr. ix. 18—22: together with those, the blood whereof purgeth by the Law. The daily burnt offerings of the congregation; Heb. x. 11. (for Socinus is ridiculously wilful, to understand "καθ' ἡμέραν" there once a year¹, as if the speech were only of the sacrifice for the day of atonement): and, by consequence, all anniversarie oblations. And whereas Socinus observes, that no lamb is appointed by the Law for a propitiatory sacrifice: I suppose, when the Baptist saith (John i. [29.], 36), "Behold the Lamb of God, That takes away the sins of the world;" when St. John saith (Apoc. i. 5), "To Him that loved us, and hath washed us from our sins in His blood;" when the martyrs

¹ Misprinted 179 in fol. edit.

"In quibus verbis" (Heb. x. 11) "notandum est, adverbium Quotidie, non singulis diebus, sed sæpè, vel certo quodam tempore perpetuo, significare. Nec enim agitur hic de alio sacrificio, quam de illo anniversario pro omnibus peccatis: quod (ut saepius dictum est) vera oblationis Christi umbra fuit: et de quo hucusque institutus fuerat sermo. Id quod probe animadvertisse videtur Theodorus Beza," &c. Socin., De Jes. Chr. Servat., P. ii. c. 16; Op., tom. ii. p. 166. a: and so also in his Prefect. Theol., c. xxv.; ibid., tom. i. p. 590. b. Beza merely translates the verse thus—"Omnis igitur sacerdos ad stat quotidie, operatur," &c.

"Sequitur alius errorem tum in supra scriptis verbis; multos sic licet agnos pro peccatis immolatos fuisset: cum in nullo sacrificio, quod pro peccato fieret, agnos immolare tur; sed tantummodo aegna, sive capella, pro peccato privati. Quod etiam per se levare errorem est, quia tamen postmodum addid hic respetisse Baptismat, cum dicit, 'Ecce Agnus Dei, Qui tolit peccata mundi,' gravius fieri constat." Socin., ibid. c. 9; ibid. p. 166. a.
say (Apoc. v. 9), "Thou wast killed, and hast bought us to God out of every kindred and tribe and language and nation;" when the Apostle (Apoc. xiii. 8) mentions those, "whose names are not written in the book of life of the Lamb slain from the foundation of the world;" these, I suppose, knew well enough what creatures were sacrificed, and yet declare, that Christ was figured by lambs: to what purpose, let their words argue.

§ 8. It is manifest indeed, that the Epistle to the Hebrews argues most upon the anniversary sacrifice of the day of atonement: whereof one thing I must observe to him concerning the accomplishment of that which it figureth; that, as he maketh it (together with all other sacrifices, the blood whereof is sprinkled upon the ark) to signify Christ crucified without the walls of Jerusalem, so he maketh the sacrifice of Christ crucified, signified thereby, a peace offering for the Church to feed upon (as we do in the sacrament of the Eucharist); though by the Jews not to be touched, because they killed it without the city as abominable: Hebr. xiii. 8—16. But Socinus will not have this sacrifice made (at least not perfected), nor Christ a high-priest, till He entered into the heavens to present it to God, as the high-priest into the Holy of Holies to sprinkle the blood. How then is He figured by those sacrifices, the blood whereof is not carried within the veil? I grant, the sacrifice of Christ is not done till Christ come to judgment; as that was not done, till the high-priest came out of the Holy of Holies, declaring the accepting of it (Levit. xvi. 18—20). But, as he must be a high-priest that sacrificed what God accepted, so must Christ be high-priest before He was killed; and therefore a sacrifice as the Apostle expressly saith (Hebr. ix. 26—28),—that, "having abolished sin by the sacrifice of Himself, He shall

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n Misprinted "brought," in folio edit.

e "Animadvertendum præterea in hac collations" (Christi cum legali pontifice) "ominino videtur, quod, quemadmodum legalis sacerdos in sacrificio illo anniversario, quamvis non prius in sancta sanctorum ingredi posset, quam hostias pro peccato extra macassac, sanguinem tamen ipsarum hostiarum in sacrarium inferre debeat, et ibi coram Deo expiationem, quæ eo san-
guine fiebat, peragere; sic Christus, quamvis Seipsum hostiam pro peccatia nostris tradere debuerit, ante quam in caelum ingredieretur, Se tamen, per Quem expiationem perfectionis erat, coram Deo in ipso coelo deinde pro nobis sistere, et ibi nostrorum peccatorum ex-
piationem peragere debuit." Socin., ibid. c. 21; ibid. p. 174. a. And see also c. 15, ibid. p. 165. a: and elsewhere repeatedly.
appear again to the salvation of them that expect Him;” as the high-priest out of the Holy of Holies. The same is many ways evident by Hebr. ix. 14—20. For where Socinus will have Christ to “offer Himself unsotted to God by the eternal Spirit,” by presenting Himself in heaven immortal upon His resurrection, free from the punishments of sin which He had upon Him here on earth; you have seen, that the everlasting Spirit is the Godhead of Christ. And, had the Apostle meant the presentation, which is now in doing, he would [not] have spoken in the time past—“προστήνυμεν.” And he that considers, that all sacrifices were visited before they were killed whether lawful or blemished (which is called in one word, “μυμοσκοτειν’”), must believe, that He is called here “ἀμαμος,” as “found spotless;” and so, fit to be slain. And does he not make the death of Christ the sacrifice, when he makes the new covenant, in correspondence to the old, to be enacted by it? It is true, the same Apostle (Hebr. ix. 2—6), shewing the highest heavens to be the Holy of Holies where the priesthood of Christ is exercised, adds, that “if He were upon earth, He should not be a priest, there being other priests to offer gifts according to the Law;” but this is only to say, that His priesthood is not earthly, Who hath carried His own blood into the heavenly tabernacle, not meddling with the sons of Levi, or their office. For, “ἐν τη γη” is (according to the Hebrew, which for want of composition expresses adjectives by prepositions) for “ἐνθεομε.” “If He were upon earth,” signifies, If He were an earthly priest; as those of the Levitical priesthood. It is true, He was to “learn compassion for us by His sufferings here” (Hebr. ii. 17, 18; v. 1, [2.] 7, 8); but might He 236
OF THE COVENANT OF GRACE.

not, as well as other high-priests, learn that compassion by sacrificing Himself for us here, which He hath for us to the end of all things?

§ 9. In fine, every sacrifice is a sacrifice from the time that it is consecrated to God, as the paschal lamb from "the tenth day of the month" (Exod. xii. 3): thence it is "בֵּית—[an "offering"] due", and "δῶρον"—a "gift." Or let any Jew say, if it might not many ways become "πρόκειται—"prostitute," before it came into the Holy of Holies, because a sacrifice or [an "] offering before. And was not Christ consecrated when He was "the Lamb of God?" Of Himself He says (John [John i. 29, xvii. 19), "For their sakes do I sanctify Myself," to wit, to be a spotless sacrifice.

§ 10. This is therefore no exception to the general argumen- [Conclusion] the force whereof consisteth in this:—that, seeing it cannot be denied, that the inheritance of the land of promise, and each man's share in the goods and rights of it, is assigned the Jews in consideration of their sacrifices, to wit, as the condition of that covenant by which they were prescribed; it must not be doubted, that the inheritance of the kingdom of heaven is assigned to Christians by the covenant of grace, in consideration of the obedience and sufferings of Christ, which they figure.

§ 11. But this is still more evident by the terms of "ransom,"" and "price," and "buying," attributed to the sacrifice of Christ. The heathen had sacrifices that they called Lustralia: and "lustrare" signifies to "expiate" among the Romans; to wit, by paying a price. For Ennius, translating into Latin a Greek tragedy called "Εὐτροπός Λύτρα (out of Homer, where he speaks of Priamus ransoming Hector's corpse from Achilles), entitled it Hectoris Lustra. There-

Of our ransom by the price of Christ's propitiatory sacrifice.

"בֵּית—Sacrificium quod offeritur vel offerri debet." Buxtorf, Lex. Chald. sub voce.

"Λύτρον; Matt. xx. 28, Mark x. 45; Ἀντιλύτρον, 1 Tim. ii. 6; Λυτρουμα; 1 Pet. i. 18: &c. See Socin., De Jesu Christo Servatu, P. ii. c. 3; Op., tom. ii pp. 146. b—148. b.

Τυμή: 1 Cor. vi. 20, vii. 23. See Socinus, ibid.

"Αγορατισμόν: 1 Cor. vi. 20, vii. 23; 2 Pet. ii. 1; Rev. xiv. 4; and see Acts xx. 28, 1 Pet. ii. 9, Rev. v. 9. See Socinus, ibid.

fore it is the Latin of λυτρον. And ἀπολυτρώσει signifies "deliverance by paying a ransom." In the words of the prophet (Daniel iii. 57, iv. 24),—" Redeem thy sins by repentance, and thy misdeeds by having mercy on the afflicted,"—many blame the Vulgar Latin, and would translate פсан, "break off?" but the words of Solomon (Prov. xvi. 6),—" By mercy and truth iniquity is redeemed,"—show, that it is truly translated. And having shewed afore, that such considerations do qualify us for remission of sins, I may well argue from hence, that the term of "ransom" imports the consideration for which it is bestowed. Wherefore, let the "sweet-smelling sacrifice" of Christ (Ephes. v. 2) be understood in the same notion, as the good works of Christians are called "a sweet savour" (Phil. iv. 18, Hebr. xiii. 16); seeing Socinus will have it so: provided that it be understood, that the sacrifice of Christ is accepted to purchase mankind the right of coming out of sin into everlasting life; the sacrifices of Christians, to the qualifying of their persons for the benefit of the same. To the same sense, Prov. xiii. 8; "The ransom of a man's life is his wealth." For, literally, a man's wealth is the saving of his life with the world, that spares a man's life in consideration of his wealth (or sets not upon him in regard of it): which, the Psalmist saith, God does not (Psalm xliii. 6—8). Mystically, it is the same that Solomon

b This is c. iv. verse 24, in the Hebrew and Vulgate and LXX: c. iv. verse 27, in the Eng. Version. It is the 57th verse from the beginning of c. iii., omitting the Song of the Three Children.

c "Ubi" (scil. in Dan. iv. 24) "nihil aliud intelligi debet, quam justitiae operibus sive eleemosynis et misericordiis paupерum liberari hominem a peccatis et ab iniquitatis suis; vel quia in actu ab iniquitate et peccato recedit, et ita ab eis liberatur sive eripitur (ut verbum Chaldaicum, quod redimendī verbo versus fuit, vere significavit); vel quia . . . ex ratione per benignitatem Dei ponam suis peccatis debitam effugere ei datur." Socin., De Jesu Chr. Serv., P. ii. c. 8; Op., tom. ii. p. 148 b.—" Verbum פסח hic (Dan. iv. 27) vertunt Redimere. Significat autem sape vel abrupgere vel separare vel conterere: ideo commodo hoc loco verti posset, separa, vel abrupunte, peccata tua misericordia et humanitate: quasi diceret, sic facias peccandi finem, ut ingredieris novum cursum." Calvin, in loc.; Op., tom. v. p. 60.—And see, for others who follow the same interpretation, Poli Synops. ad locum.

d Above, c. xv. § 14.

e "Ut Ephesii ad singulare hoc Christi facinus imitandum magis accendantur, per appositionem subjungitur, hoc Ipsius Christi eximiam charitatem, hoc Ipsius egregium opus, suisse Deo obligationem et hostiam gratissimam. Itaque non de Eius corporis obligatione, sed de obligatione præstantismi facti agitur. Nam ipsum factum hostiam appellanti posse, patet ex eo, quod scriptum est Hebr. xiii. 16 . . . Quin similis prorsus loquenti modum, cum eadem appositionis usitatissima figura, habes ad finem Epist. ad Philipp. ; ubi scriptum est," &c. Socin., De Jesu Christo Serv., P. ii. c. 16; Op., tom. ii. p. 166 a.
said in the place afore quoted. But when Solomon saith
(Prov. xxi. 18), "The wicked is a ransom for the upright,
and the sinner comes instead of the righteous;" and the pro-
phet (Esai. xliii. 3), "I have given Egypt for thy ransom, Cush
and Seba instead of thee:" God signifieth by a parable, that,
having employed Sennacherib to execute His judgments
upon those nations, He had given him the Egyptians and
Ethiopians that He might spare the Israelites. So He pays
him his hire, which discharges His own people of that which
they had suffered otherwise. So, in the words of Otho (Tacit. Hist. ii.),—"Hunc animum, hanc virtutem vestram, ultra peri-
culitis objicere, nimis grande vite meæ pretium duco"—"I hold ["puto."
" it too great a price for my life, to cast this courage and valour
of yours any more upon dangers,"—it is manifest, that a "ran-
som" or "price" imports the consideration of that for which
it is laid out; the blood of his soldiers, for their general's
life. And shall it be otherwise, when the Apostle saith, that
Christ's death intercedes "for the redemption of those trans-
gressions, that remained under the Old Testament" (Hebr.
ix. 15)? when St. Paul saith, that "the Man Christ Jesus
gave Himself a ransom for all, to be witnessed in due time"
237 (1 Tim. ii. 5, 6)? when our Lord saith the same (Matt. xx.
28, [Mark] x. 45)? and St. Paul again (1 Cor. vi. 20): "Ye
are bought with a price; glorify therefore God with your
body and with your spirit, which are God's?" and again
(1 Cor. vii. 23): "Ye are bought with a price; be not serv-
ants of men?" and of Christ (Titus ii. 14): "Who gave
Himself for us, that He might redeem us from all iniquity,
and purify to Himself a peculiar people, zealous of good
works?" The same, Apoc. v. 9, Rom. iii. 24, Gal. iii. 13,
Ephes. i. 7, Acts xx. 28: where I must needs call it mere
impudence in Socinus*, to say, that God redeemed His
Church "by His own blood," because Christ's blood, which
it was redeemed with, was, as Christ'[s], God's own.

" Tacit., Hist., lib. ii. c. 47.
* " Ratio porro, saque potissima, cur
ita frequenter... Christi mortis mentio
fist, hanc est: ut seil, ad Dei, Cujus jus-
su Is animam Suam... pro nobis posuit,
... Christique Ipsiis charitatem nobis
commendandam, jugiter ante oculos ea
nobis obversetur... Quandquidem

Deus Ipse fuit, Qui vitam Filii Sui, ut
nos ab iniquitatibus nostris redimeret,
et Sibi assureret et vindicaret, pro nobis
impendit. Hinc Paulus, ab Ephesiis dis-
cessurus, inquit senioribus Ecclesiam,
Socin., De Jesu Christo Serv., P. ii. c.
3; Op., tom. ii. p. 147. a.
§ 12. It is not here to be denied, that these terms may, by figure of speech, signify mere deliverance: and that so they do signify in the figures of Christ in the Old Testament; when the judges and kings of Israel, when God above them, are said to redeem Israel, that is, to deliver him, without paying ransom for him: nor that the New Testament speaks likewise, when the effect only is considered. See Exod. xv. 13; Deut. vii. 8, ix. 26, xiii. 5, xxi. 8; 2 Sam. vii. 23; Nehem. i. 10; Psalm lxxxvii. 16 [Hebr.], xxxi. 6 [Hebr.], cxi. 9; Esai. xxxix. 22; Luke ii. 38, xxi. 28, xxiv. 21; Acts vii. 35; Rom. viii. 23; Ephes. [iv]. 30. As also for the terms of "buying" and "selling:" Rom. vii. 14; Esai. l. 1; Deut. xxxii. 30; Jud. iii. 8; iv. [2], 14; Ephes. v. 16; Col. iv. 5. And, therefore, it is not to be marvelled at, that the Jews, denying Christ, should deny His ransom; as not expecting to be delivered by paying ransom. But the figures of the Old Testament being performed in the New: where the sacrifice of Christ determines the ransom of Israelites (by their kings, priests, and prophets, as well as their sacrifices) to the ransom of the world by His blood; where the words of the Apostle and of our Lord express the guilt and punishment of sin, from which it redeemeth; next to the obstinacy of the Jews in not believing, it will be, to acknowledge freedom given, with the Jews, without acknowledging the consideration of a ransom, with Christians. Let us hear the Apostle ([1] Pet. i. 18—20): "Knowing, that you were not redeemed from your vain conversation delivered from your fathers with corruptible things, gold or silver, but [with] the precious blood of Christ, as of a Lamb without spot or blemish; foreknown indeed from the foundation of the world, ["for you."] but manifested in these last times for us." For though the end of this ransom be expressed, because it is not immediately

b "Quis est inehebes, quis in sacris Literis vel in alitis bonorum actorum scriptis iis parum verum, quis denique ista communis loquenti usus ignarus, qui nesciat redimendi verbum, non dicam aliquando, non etiam sepe, sed plerumque, et fere semper, potissimum vero apud sacros scriptores, metaphoricam prorurus significacionem obtinere, adeo ut nihil alium sit redderere, quam liberare, aut sibi esserere, quamvis veri pretii vera solutio aliqua non interveniat... Lege igitur primum Exod. xv. 13... Idem legitur Deut. vii. 8... &c. Socin., ibid., c. 1; ibid., p. 142 a. The passages of Scripture cited above are all quoted, and in the above order, by Socinus, ibid., pp. 142 a—143 a.

1 For the term of "redeeming."

2 Corrected from MS. "which," in orig. text.
attained by the paying of it, but by our will concurring with God's;—"Glorify God, because ye are bought with a price—
Be not slaves to men, because ransomed by Christ—By the blood of Christ ye are redeemed from your vain conversation received from your fathers;"—yet, if the meaning were only to assure them that their deliverance will not fail them, there could no cause be given them, why the purchase of it by way of ransom should be expressed: which every man that goes to market, must needs understand to import the consideration, in which we have it. There must be indeed freedom and deliverance, where a ransom is paid; as there is in our case, if the service of God be freedom. But where the guilt of sin goes before, a clear score follows, and the death of Christ comes between them; must not the consideration, which compares them together, make even the reckoning?

CHAPTER XXVIII.

CHRIST TOOK AWAY OUR SIN BY BEARING THE PUNISHMENT OF IT. THE PROPHECY OF ISAIAH LII. WE ARE RECONCILED TO GOD BY THE GOSPEL IN CONSIDERATION OF CHRIST'S OBEDIENCE. THE RECONCILEMENT OF JEWS AND GENTILES, MEN AND ANGELS, CONSEQUENT TO THE SAME. OF PURGING AND EXPIATING SIN BY CHRIST, AND MAKING PROFITITION FOR IT. OF CHRIST'S DYING FOR US.

There is further, in sacrifices, a consideration of bearing the punishment due to the sins that are expiated by them, and so taking them away: wherein the Scriptures declare the sacrifices of the Law to figure the sacrifice of Christ. So St. Paul (Gal. iii. 10, 13): "Christ hath redeemed us from the curse of the Law" (where it saith, Deut. xxvii. 26, "Cursed is every one that abideth not in all things written in the book of the Law to do them," "becoming a curse for us; as it is written, 'Cursed is every one that hangeth on a tree.'"

§ 2. The exception of Socinus k,—that this belongs only to Socinus' objection

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k "Execratio Legis, de qua in eo loco ad Galatas, non justitiam Dei in Lege expressam, cui satisfaciendum esset, sed exsecutionis ponzam a Lege pertinent nor true."
Jews, as a discharge of that curse which the breaking of Moses his positive law inferreth,—is neither pertinent nor true. For where the letter of the Law takes place to civil effects, there the spiritual sense thereof takes place to spiritual effects; by that which hath been said. Therefore, if the law of Moses bind the posterity of Abraham over to a curse, because they keep it not; which St. Paul supposeth; then the law written in the hearts of mankind (which the law of Moses, as it is spiritual, both containeth, and improveth), binds over mankind to that curse, which the transgression thereof inferreth. And there is no appearance, that those, whom the Apostle writes to, were Jews; but such as, out of error, thought themselves bound to be Jews (whether in part or in whole), as they were Christians. We are, then, ransomed from the curse by the curse which Christ endured for us. When St. Paul says (2 Cor. v. 21), "Him that knew no sin He made sin for us, that we might become the righteousness of God in Him;" Socinus saith, that Christ was "made sin," and "a curse," because the Jews used Him as if He had been 'sinful' and 'accursed' by the Law. But if God gave Him up to them so to be used, then was He used as sinful and accursed by the will of God, not only by the sentence of Pilate. And if we become righteousness to God, then He became not sin to man alone. Therefore, being so used, not because He, but because mankind, was sinful and accursed, the effect must be to the account of mankind, where the reason is grounded upon the consideration of it.

§ 8. But why do the Israelites lay hands on the Levites, the Levites and sacrificers both on the sacrifice, but to signify the discharging of themselves, and charging their guilt upon the priests and sacrifices respectively (Levit. i. 4, Num. viii. 10—14): which their constitutions enjoin to be done "with all their might," and "with confession of sins" (Maimoni, Of...
Offering Sacrifices, iii. 6, 8, 9\textsuperscript{a}). For this reason the sin offerings are given to the priests, "for bearing the iniquity of the congregation, and making propitiation for them before the Lord;" Levit. x. 17. The Greek indeed translates it, "\textit{'I\v{a} \v{a}\f\phi\ell\i\tau\i\tau e\'\tau h\i\nu\mu\a\r\i\tau\i\tau a\'\nu \tau\i\nu\v{a}w\v{a}g\v{e}h\v{s}, kai \v{e}\x\i\l\a\s\tau\i\o\s\te\p\e\r\i\a\i\a\i\tau\i\o\u\v{o\v\n\a\v{e}\tau\i\tau K\i\r\i\o\u\v{o\u\v{s}.}"}" But the meaning is, "That ye may take iniquity away from the synagogue" (to wit, by taking it on themselves), "and make propitiation for them before the Lord." For, in consideration of their taking the sin upon them, they are properly rewarded with the sacrifice. So Aaron "bears the iniquity of their consecrated things;" Exod. xxviii. 38. And the Levites "make propitiation, lest [Numb. viii. 19.] the people be slain for coming near." This is the reason of that, which the Apostle observeth, Hebr. xiii. 11; that "those sacrifices for sin, the blood whereof is carried within the veil, are burnt without the camp;" because, being charged with the sin which they expiate, they are to carry it away from among them, whom they clear of it. Wherefore, going on to apply this to Christ's suffering without Jerusalem, he sheweth the figure to be accomplished in His taking away our sins, but because they were laid on Him first. And, truly, the customs and opinions\textsuperscript{b} of the heathen, in purging their sins by laying them upon their sacrifices, are so plain to this purpose; that to deny this to be the intent of that pattern, which the devil thereby corrupted, is to offer violence to common sense.

§ 4. Here I come to the prophecy of Esay liii.: wherein, being obliged, literally, to expound it with Grotius\textsuperscript{c} of the prophet Jeremy, I shall be thought by some to make it the more difficult to prove this to be the mystical sense of it.


\textsuperscript{b} "Levit. x. 17. LXX. The Vulgate renders, "Ut portetis iniquitatem multitudinis et rogetis pro ea in conspectu Domini."

\textsuperscript{c} Corrected from MS. "opinion," in orig. text.

\textsuperscript{d} "Hae notae in Jeremiam quidem congruunt prius, sed potius sublimi- usque, sepe et magis k\v{a}rd \a\'\gamma\v{e}v (sec- cundum verba), in Christum." Grot., ad Isai. liii. 1: proceeding to expound the whole chapter in detail of Jerem- iah, as literally and in the first in- stance intended by it.
BOOK II. But having given myself a rule, to maintain the difference between these two senses in the prophecies of the Old Testament; I shall forbid Socinus any advantage against the Church by it. Thus then saith the prophet (Esai. liii. 4—[12]). "But He took our sicknesses, and bore our griefs. And we thought Him plagued, smitten of God, and afflicted. But He was wounded for our transgressions, and beaten for our iniquities; the chastisement of our peace was upon Him, and by His marks we are healed. We all had gone astray like sheep, every one was turned his own way; and God made all our iniquities to meet Him. He was oppressed and afflicted, yet opened He not His mouth; He was led as a sheep to the slaughter; and as a sheep is dumb before him that shears her, so opened He not His mouth. He was taken from restraint and judgment; and His generation, who shall declare? For He was cut off from the land of the living, He was smitten for the transgression of My people. And He made His grave with the wicked, and with the rich at His death; for no wickedness that He did, nor deceit in His mouth; yet the Lord was pleased to afflict Him with sorrows. If thou make His soul an offering for guilt, He shall see a seed; He shall prolong His days; and the good pleasure of God shall come to pass by His means. For the labour of His soul shall He see, and be satisfied. By His knowledge shall My righteous Servant justify many, and He shall bear their iniquities. Therefore will I give Him a share with the great ones, and with the mighty shall He divide the spoil; because He poured out His soul to death, and was counted among transgressors, and bore the sins of many, and interceded for transgressors."

§ 5. That the prophet Jeremy should be a figure of our Lord Christ in his doings and sufferings, is no more, than I have shewed that all the prophets were. That the prophet Esay should foretell the same for a figure of Christ, is no more, than that he should prophesy of our Lord Christ under the figure of himself; which he doth many times. The reason, why the prophet Jeremy is a figure of our Lord, imports no more than this: that, being sent by God to reduce

* Bk. I. Of the Pr. of Chr. Tr., c. 
* Misprinted "any" in orig. text.
OF THE COVENANT OF GRACE.

His people to His law, that they might continue enjoying the land of promise, he was by them taken for an enemy of his country, and used accordingly, because he foretold their ruin in case they obeyed not; and so God brought on him the merit of their sins, which he laboured to cure; but so, that, his doctrine and the event of his prophecies having reduced them to God and His law, their restitution from captivity, which he had foretold, came to pass by his means. Upon this account the prophet Jeremy is a sacrifice for his people: though no otherwise than as St. Paul exhorts the Romans, to “present their bodies [a] living sacrifice, holy, and acceptable to God” (Rom. xii. 1); or as he saith to the Philippians, “If I be poured forth” (as a drink-offering) [“σφυγμω- μας” — “upon the service and ministry of your faith” (Phil. ii. 17); or as to the Colossians (i. 24) he “supplies the remains of Eng. vers.] the afflictions of Christ in” his “flesh, for His body, which is the Church.” For the proportion will be just, between that reconciliation, which the prophet procures between God and His people by his intercession and doctrine as to their temporal estate, as a minister of God, and a figure of Christ; and that, which our Lord Christ procures between God and His Church as to the everlasting estate of it. Seeing then that Socinus acknowledges all this to be meant of the redemption of the world by the sufferings of Christ, what advantageth it him, that it is understood literally of the prophet Jeremy? For the importance of the prophet’s words in Him will take place according to the pretence of His coming, not according to the nature of the prophet Jeremy’s office.

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[a] “Isti Esaie loco” (c. liii.) “jam satis responsum est, cum de hircio emissario, de quo Levit. xvi. agitur, locuti sumus. Nam, quademmodum dicitur ibi Aharonem penere omnis populi errata super hircum, non quia ipse hircus imputarentur aut quia hircus ille popnas erratis populi debitas penderet, sed quoniam ea secum asportare censebatur, non secus ac si super illum universa posita fuissent; sic Deum in Christo inquitatem omnium nostrum sive popnam iniquitabus nostris debitis posuisse scriptum est, non quia illi errata nostra imputata fuerint vel eorum popnas Ipse vice omnium nostrum subierit, sed quoniam non aliter atque si super Se omnes iniquitates nostras et supplicia illis Divina lege debita habuisset, quam longissime a nobis ea asportavit atque project.” Socin., De Jesu Christo Serv., P. ii. c. 5; Op., tom. ii. p. 150. b; proceeding to explain away similarly other portions of the same chapter, but throughout applying it to Christ.—Volkel, also (De Vera Relig., lib. v. c. 28. p. 592) expressly expounds Isaiah c. liii. of our Lord; saying, that “adeo perspicue atque evident in Jesum Nazarenum convenit, ut præter Hunc nemini accommodari posse videatur.”—And Socinus himself uses equally strong expressions in his Explic. Lecor. S. Script., in Isa. liii.; Op., tom. i. p. 143. b.
§ 6. And, therefore, what if the Evangelist say—"He took away our infirmities, and carried away our diseases"—were fulfilled, when our Lord cured the blind and the lame; Matt. viii. 17. "Ελαβέ" and "ἐβαστάσατε" in the Evangelist, ἀπὸ and ἐπὶ, I confess, signify "taking away," as well as "bearing."” And, therefore, that which the Baptist saith (Mark i. 7), "Οὗτος εἰμὶ Ἰησοῦς Κυρίου τὸν Ματθαίου τῶν ὑποδημάτων Αὐτοῦ"— "Whose shoe-latchet I am not worthy to stoop and untie," is, in St. Matth. iii. 11, "Τὰ ὑποδήματα βαστάσαι,"—not to "carry," but to "take away His shoes;" which he that looses, intends to take away. Therefore Tertullian (Ad Marc. iv.): "Ipse igitur est Christus remedium valetudinum; Hic, inquit, imbecillitates nostras ausert et languores portat"— "Therefore Christ Himself is He that cures sicknesses; he saith, He takes away all infirmities, and bears our diseases;"— "Portare autem Graeci pro eo solent ponere, quod est tollere"— "Now the Greek is wont to put bearing," βαστάσαι, "for taking away." And, indeed, the cure of bodily infirmities...
by Christ could not be foretold by the prophet to come 'to pass by taking them upon Himself, but by taking them away from the people. But if we say, that He was to cure our spiritual infirmities no otherwise, neither will the figure of Jeremy, nor the words of Esay, hold so properly; which, as I said afore, are fulfilled more properly in the mystery, than in the history. For it is manifest, that bearing our sins serves to amplify the sufferings, whether of Jeremy, or of our Lord; which taking them away does not: and yet it is as well understood, that they are taken from them, by consequence; to wit, because laid on Him. For Jeremy bare the sins of the people first, as our Lord on the cross; but the cure came afterwards. Besides, when the prophet says, "If thou shalt make His soul a sacrifice for guilt;" it is manifest, that God lays the guilt on Him, which He takes from us. Thirdly, when the prophet says, "יהוה המיס יְבַטֵּח יִטְו לֵלֶכְתָּנוֹי" (where one case of the person, another of the thing, follows); and Socinus translates it, "God by Him met with all our iniquities:" I say confidently, he makes it no Hebrew. Had the prophet said יְבַטֵּח יִטְו לֵלֶכְתָּנוֹי, it might have passed for Hebrew, to signify that which he says; but as it lies, at no rate. Fourthly, no man shall expound the prophet but the Apostle (1 Pet. ii. 24, 25): "Who Himself took up our sins upon His body to the cross, that being dead to sins we may live to righteousness; by Whose blue marks we are healed; for ye were as sheep going astray, but are now returned to the Pastor and Bishop of our souls." First, when St. Peter repeats the very words of Esay; to question, whether he allege this passage or not, I suppose is ridiculous. Neither will it be of consequence, though we take ἐν τῷ ἔν τῷ ἔν. For whether Christ "took our sins

The two concluding words of this verse in the original are הֵרָדָא רָדָא, i.e. "the iniquity of all." Thornike has substituted equivalent words, apparently by an oversight.

* "Necesse, ut arbitror, omnino est, verba ita interpretari, 'Et Jehovah occurrir per Eum,' sive potius, 'cum Ec, iniquitati omnium nostrum,' aut, 'Et Jehovah occurrere fecit quod iniquitatem omnium nostrum.'" Socin., De Jesu Christi Serv., P. ii. c. 6; Op., tom. ii. p. 150. b.

* Crellius, Resp. ad Grot. de Satisf. Christi, c. i. (p. 21. b. Lond. 1656); seems to doubt it:—"Ex quo consequitur ne verisimile quidem esse aliter Petrum habere usum, si modo status debeli, quod velut Grotius, Apostolum ad ista Prophetae verba respectable." Socinus and Volckelius admit it expressly (Socin., De Jesu Christo Serv., P. ii. c. 6; Op., tom. ii. p. 161. a; Volkel., De Vera Relig., lib. iii. c. 18. p. 99).
up to the cross,” or “bare them upon the cross,” still they remain charged on Christ, fastened to the cross. As for the Apostle, Hebr. ix. 24—28:—where (having said, that Christ went “into heaven to appear before the face of God,” without any intent to suffer Himself any more, “as the high-priest entered once a year into the Holy of Holies, with the blood” of a sacrifice; “for then must He have suffered many times since the foundation of the world;” but “was once manifested at the end of the world, to abolish sin by the sacrifice of Himself”) he concludes, that, “being once offered εἰς τὸ πολλὰν ἀνενεγκεῖν ἁμαρτίας”—“to take away the sins of many, He shall appear the second time without sin to the salvation of those that expect Him;”—it is here evident, that Christ was manifested at the end of the world to such in the world as knew Him not; not to God in heaven, That did. And therefore sin is abolished by the sacrifice of the cross, if by His intercession in heaven, in consideration of it. And His second appearance is “without sin,” because He shall have taken sin away; but He shall have taken it away, by being offered. Therefore, if he will needs translate “εἰς τὸ πολλὰν ἀνενεγκεῖν ἁμαρτίας,” to “take away the sins of many,” yet can he not deny, that they are taken away by being borne upon the cross. For must we not have account from the text, in what consideration He takes them away? And is the assuring of us, that God will make good His promise, or is the moving of God to make it good, the pertinent reason why He is said to “take away our sins by a sacrifice?” There is no doubt, that St. Peter expresses the end of Christ’s sufferings in that which follows; “Ye were as sheep going


astray," &c.: but is not therefore the consideration to be expressed, upon which that end is attained?

§ 7. As for that little objection of Socinus', that, when the prophet says, "For the labour of His soul He shall see and be satisfied; by His knowledge shall My righteous Servant justify many, and He shall bear their iniquities;"—that it must mean, "He shall take away their iniquities," because justifying went afore:—neither uses the language of the Scripture always, according to order of nature and reason, to put that first which gives the reason of that which follows; so that "bearing their iniquities" (not "taking them away") may well follow, as the reason why He justifies: and if instead of "and" we translate "for" (which is usual in the Scriptures), we silence the objection, and make the reason why He justifies, to follow in due place; to wit, "because He bears their iniquities."

§ 8. Lastly, that the prophets and righteouss in general, and the Messias in particular, were to bear the sins of the world, and expiate the wrath of God for them; you may see by Grotius upon Matt. xx. 289, that the Jews have under-

\[\text{Chap. XXVIII.}\]


stood out of this place of the prophet Esay. Which is pre-
judice enough: if they, who understand not the reason why
and how we say our Lord expiates sin by bearing it, and
whose interest it concerns not to understand it by the native
sense of the prophet’s words, find that, which Christians deny,
and by denying prejudice the common cause. Which to
acknowledge, prejudices not Christianity; understanding as
much difference between that expiation which they make,
and that which Christ makes, as Christianity puts between
Christ and Christians.

§ 9. Let us now consider that “reconciliation,” which,
St. Paul saith many times, is wrought for us by Christ’s
death. 2 Cor. v. 18—[21]: “All things are of God, That
hath reconciled us to Himself by Jesus Christ, and given us
the ministry of reconcilement; as that God was reconcili-
ng the world to Himself by Christ, not imputing to them their
transgressions, and putting the word of reconciliation upon
us: we are therefore ambassadors in Christ’s stead, as if
God did exhort you by us; we beseech you in Christ’s stead,
Be reconciled to God: for Him, That knew no sin, He made
sin for us, that we might become the righteousness of God in
Him.” Socinus marvels, how any man can imagine, that
Christ can proffer us reconciliation, and not be reconciled to
us when He proffers it\(^b\). An imagination as ridiculous as
his, that fancied he should meet his fellow, before his fellow
met him. For if reconcilement be between two, though one
may provide the means (as in our case God), though out of
love, yet, seeing as yet He only offers friendship, that is to
say, seeing as yet we are not made friends, it is manifest,
that both are reconciled at once. And doth not experience
of the world shew, that, when princes and states are at war,
the one out of a desire of peace seeks means of reconcilement,
but is not reconciled before the other agree. So, God engages
to be reconciled, by publishing the Gospel, while He gives

\(^{b}\) “Ex his verbis” (2 Cor. v. 17—21)
“liqueat primum, Ipsum Deum fuisset
Qui nos per Christum Sibi reconcili-
avit; et idicric reconciliatorem per
Christum factam non Dei erga nos pla-
cationem sed nostri erga Illum conver-
sionem, unde stabilitis cum Eo amicitia
consecuta fuerit, significare; et tantum
abesse ut in reconciliatione hac pera-
genda Christus nobis Deum placaverit,
ut potius Eum jam placatum ostende-
rit, et ab Eo jam placato ad nos, qui
adhuc Illius inimici eramus, Sibi re-
conciliandos missus fuerit.” Socin.,
De Jesu Christo Serv., P. i. c. 8; Op.,
man leave to deliberate; but is not reconciled, till man undertake Christianity by being baptized. So, when God seeks to be reconciled to men, it is true, as St. Paul says, He "imputes not their transgressions to them:" for if He should prosecute their sins by imputing them, He should not seek reconcilement. But when He is reconciled, it is a contradiction, that He should impute them. Now, though the Apostles are messengers of reconcilement "in Christ's stead," yet with this difference, that He also furnished the means, they only brought the message. St. Paul therefore, having signified this means afore (when he says, that, "not imputing to the world their transgressions," He sought to be reconciled with them by Christ), and inferring, "Him That knew no sin He made sin for us, that we might become the righteousness of God in Him;" either he makes no difference between our Lord and the Apostles, or it is expressed by these words in reference to that which went afore; to wit, that God was willing to be reconciled with the world, because He had provided Christ, and Christ had undertook the sins of it.

§ 10. So again, Rom. v. 10, 11: "For if, being enemies, we were reconciled to God by the death of His Son, much more, being reconciled, shall we be saved by His life: nor only so; but we glory in God, through our Lord Jesus Christ, by Whom we have received reconcilement." From what shall we be saved by being reconciled? "From wrath," saith the Apostle, in the words next afore. Therefore, before reconcilement we were under wrath. And surely there is a difference between the right and title that we have to be reconciled with God (though upon condition of our conversion to Christianity), and between the state of reconcilement, which is our right to life: but so, that, if the state be from Christ (as St. Paul saith, "we have received reconcilement by Christ"), then is the right to it in consideration of Christ; when he saith, that, "being enemies, we were reconciled to God by His death."

§ 11. St. Paul again, arguing, how God hath "abolished" the difference between Jew and Gentile by the Law, pursues it thus, Eph. ii. 15, 16: "That He might make up both into one new man, through Himself making peace; and reconcile both in one body to God, by the cross, slaying the enmity.
BOOK II. by it." Here Soccius will have us to construe "τῷ Θεῷ," not with "ἀποκαταλλάξει," but absolutely, "to the behoof and glory of God." Which had a schoolboy done, he should have been whipt; for seeking something out of the text to govern that case, which he hath a verb in the text to govern. Therefore the Gentiles are indeed reconciled to the Jews, according to St. Paul. But why? Because "both to God."

§ 12. And therefore the reason is the same in the reconcilement of "men and angels," Col. i. 19—22: "For in Him He pleased that all fulness should dwell; and by Him to reconcile all to Himself, pacifying through Him by the blood of His cross, whether the things that are on earth, or that are in heaven: and you, being once estranged, and enemies in your mind through evil works, now hath He reconciled by the body of His flesh through death." Especially comparing this with the purpose of God, which he declareth, Ephes. i. 10: "For the ordering of the fulness of time, to recollect all in Christ, whether things in heaven, or on earth." For that which here he terms "ἀνακεφαλαίωσασθαι εἰς Χριστὸν"—"to recollect unto Christ" (that is, by Christ to reduce to the original state of dependence upon God), is in part the same with "ἀποκαταλλάξας εἰς Εαυτὸν"—"to reconcile to Himself," afore; but wholly agrees not; inasmuch as this particularly concerns the case of mankind, whose sin required reconcilement, that they might be reduced to God in one body with the holy angels, that had no sin. All this the Apostle meant to express at once, and yet imply what was particular to man, besides that which belonged to the angels. And we must either admit reconcilement between men and angels, because both reduced to God ("ἀποκαταλλάξας εἰς Αὐτὸν" signifying "ἀποκαταλλάξαι Αὐτῷ,"—that is, "Εαυτῷ," because of Christ mention had been made afore, Col. i. 20;—as "τετηρημένη εἰς ἡμᾶς," 1 Pet. i. 4, is "τετηρημένη ἡμῖν;" and 1 Pet. i. 25, "τὸ εὐαγγελισθὲν εἰς ἡμᾶς" is "ἡμῖν;" and "νικεῖσι εἰς Αὐτὸν," Ephes. i. 5, is "νίκεῖσι τῇ Εαυτῷ;" and "ἡμεῖς εἰς Αὐτὸν," 1 Cor. viii. 6, Αὐτῷ:) or shew, how the

1 "Its interpreter ego illa verba, 'Ut reconciliaret ambos in uno corpore Deo; ut scilicet significant, non quidem reconciliatos Deo ipsos' (Judæos et Gentiles) "fuisset, sed inter se: Deo tamen, id est, ad servium Deo, Eique sese toto dedicandum." Socin., ibid., P. i. c. 8; ibid., p. 138, a, b.
angels are reduced to God by the death and blood-shed of Christ His cross.

§ 13. It remains, that I say something of the effect of all this in "cleansing" and "purging of sin," and in "making propitiation and atonement for it." Of which you have the words of the Apostle, 1 John i. 7: "If we walk in the light, as He is in the light, we have fellowship with one another, and the blood of Jesus Christ cleanseth us from all sin." Where, cleansing of sin by Christ's blood supposing the condition of Christianity, it is manifest, that the effect of Christ's blood in cleansing of sin, is not to bring us to Christianity. Again, 1 John ii. 1, 2: "If any man sin, we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous; and He is the propitiation for our sins; and not for ours only, but for the sins of the whole world." Saith Socinus, "Jesus Christ the righteous," that is, "Jesus Christ the faithful:"—(1 John i. 9; "If we confess our sins, He is faithful and just to forgive our sins, and cleanse us from all unrighteousness:")—that so He may be thought to expiate our sins by testifying the covenant which engages God's faith. So far he goes for an interpretation, that destroys the virtue of Christ's intercession, founded upon His innocence: 1 Peter i. 19; Isaiah liii. 243 7—9. For if Christ be an effectual advocate because He suffered innocently for God's will, then, not only, because He hath obliged God by dealing in His name to make good what He hath promised us. Whereas, if His blood be a propitiation for the sins of Christians, that are not any more to be moved to receive the faith, as well as for the sins of the rest of the world, that are; it must be the same consideration of Christ's obedience, that moves the goodness of God to send the Gospel to the world, and to make it good to Christians. And what ἱλασμὸς, ἱάσκω, or ἱάος means, is seen by the Latin hilaris, according to Hesychius: "ἳαος," saith he, is "ἱάρος;" and "ἱάρος, περιχαρὴς τῇ ὅψει."—"cheerful in countenance;" and "ἱλαρῶς, εὐθύμως, φαιδρῶς"—"cheerfully,
BOOK merrily." So, the condition of Christianity being supposed in these words also, the consideration of Christ’s blood makes the face of God cheerful to a Christian, that sinneth. Here they allege "ἐξιλασκέοον τὰς ἀμαρτίας," Hebr. ii. 17, to signify "expiating sins," and that must presently be by bringing men to be Christians. But there is in diverse speeches of this subject that figure, which Servius so often observes in Virgil, calling it Hypallage. As "καθαρισμὸν ποισάμενος τῶν ἀμαρτίων," Hebr. i. 3: it is not the sin, that is cleansed; but man from sin. And yet the Apostle says of Christ, "Who having made purgation of sins." So, neither are sins ransomed, but men from sin. And yet he saith again, Hebr. ix. 15, "Εἰς ἀπολύτρωσιν τῶν ἐπὶ τῇ πρώτῃ διαθήκῃ ἀμαρτίων"—"For the ransoming of the sins that were under the former covenant." And this is the true sense of Dan.iv.24:; "Ἀπολύτρωσον τῶς ἀμαρτίας σου"—"Redeem thy sins." For though a man ransoms not his sins, yet he ransoms himself from his sins, by repentance; as I said afore. So, seeing propitiation tends to make God propitious, of angry; it is manifest, that "ἐξιλασκέοοε τὰς ἀμαρτίας," for variety, or brevity, or elegance of language, stands for "ἐξιλασκέοοε Θεὸν περὶ τῶν ἀμαρτίων." As for the Hebrew verb, ἤστη, whereof ἤσσασκέοοε is alleged to be the Greek, in the signification of "expiating a man of sin," which the sacrifice of Christ does, say they, by persuading him to be a perennis sit; sed quis perpetuo, in cœlis ad Dei dexteram collocatus, Divinæ liberalitatis nos admonet et ad eam amplementam jugiter movet, et summa auctoritate qua apud Deum pollet, . . . nos et servat et servaturus est." Id., ibid., p. 174. a, b. a E.g. in Virg. Ecl. iii. 43: ""Necdum illius labra adhiri; Hypallage est; pocula enim labris adhibebatur." And so in more than thirty other places; for which see the Index to Servius. * See above, c. ix. § 14. note m: and c. xxvii. § 11. note b. * Above, c. xxvii. § 11. * See above, note m: and Socin., De Jesu Christo Serv., P. ii. c. 11; Op., tom. ii. p. 158. b. 159. a: and Voelkel., De Vera Relig., lib. iii. c. 38. pp. 150, 161.
Christian: sometimes it is said of the priest making propitiation for the sanctuary or the altar, with the particle ημι; or for the people, with the particle βυ, as Levit. xvi. 33. And then, out of that which hath been said, it may appear, how the sacrifice is the consideration whereupon it is made. But if it be said of God, as Jer. xviii. 23, Ps. lxxix. 9, with the particle βυ, it seems to express God propitious to sin (when it is said, “Be propitious to our sins, Be not propitious to their sins”), without signifying how, or upon what consideration, He becomes propitious.

§ 14. The Apostle says again, Hebr. ix. 12; that “Christ entered into the Holy of Holies, not with the blood of goats and bullocks, but with His own blood, having found,” that is, obtained, “ everlasting ransom:” to wit, by the sacrifice of the cross. They say the indefinite tense signifies not always the time past. And I grant, it is enough, that the time which it signifies be past to him that speaks; as “ἀποκριθείς εἰπεν,” which you have so often in the Gospels, “He answered and said,” arguing no priority between answering and speaking: but necessarily, that our Saviour “answered and said” before the Evangelist related it; for sometimes it concerns not which is first, as whether our Lord first answered or first said. So, Hebr. ii. 10. When therefore the Apostle says, [“ἀγαγώντας τα,” of time present. Heb. ii. 10.] [“λήτρας-συμ.”] that “Christ entered into the Holy of Holies, ἀπολύτρωσιν αἰώνιαν εἰράμενος,” he saith not “εὐφήσιμον” (which he might as easily have said); nor meant, that He should or would find ransom by delivering His brethren from sin: but that He “had found ransom” by paying the price of their sin. For deliverance from sin is future in respect of the Apostle, and the time when he writ; which εἰράμενος cannot signify. Besides, if there be question, what but the nature of the thing signified can determine the order that is between them? Now, in our case, ransom is ascribed always to the sacrifice (as I have shewed), never to the sprinkling of the

“Deinde, quod attinet ad locum” (Epist. ad Heb.) “cap. ix. v. 12, animadverte poterat Grotius, soriores illos participiorum, quales est εἰράμενος seu εἰράμενος, verbis quae antea tempus significat, adjunctos, non semper requirere, ut actio illis expressa praecesserit eam, quam designatur verbis quibus junguntur, sed interdum vim habere participiorum temporis praesentis aut imperfecti, quando verbis praeteriti temporis (quo soriores etiam completae) adjunguntur.” Croll, Resp. ad Grat. de Satisf. Christi, c. x.; p. 225. a.
blood before the propitiatory. So, Hebr. i. 3; when it is said, "Christ, having made purgation of sins, sat down at the right hand of God." For if it be said, that He "made purgation of sin" by that assurance of pardon, which the appearance of His blood before God gives Christians; manifest it is, that what is attributed to the sprinkling of the blood before the propitiatory, must be understood to be effected by virtue of the blood shed at the altar. The case is plain; (Hebr. xii. [22], 24.) "You are come . . . to the blood of sprinkling, that speaks better things than that of Abel." Abel's blood shed called for vengeance; therefore Christ's blood shed for remission of sins.

§ 15. Herewith agreeeth St. Paul, Rom. iii. 25; "Whom God hath proposed a propitiatory through faith in His blood." Late writers so translate ἵλασθήριον, in the notion of a place; as δεσμωτήριον, κοιμητήριον, ἀκρωστήριον, of the same form. For my part, I rather follow Hesychius, or rather those that he followed: who most certainly had regard to this text, when they expound "ἵλασθήριον," "καθάρσιον θυσιαστήριον"—"a purging sacrifice," or an "altar," as the means to make God propitious; which is clear for our purpose. But whether the place or the means, why did God appear propitious upon the ark, but because made propitious by that which it signified, Christ incarnate, and by the blood of the sacrifice signifying the blood of His cross? Therefore they prayed towards the ark under the Law, as under the Gospel towards the east; and found God propitious, because of the consideration in which they directed their prayers; directed by our Lord, John xvi. 23—26. To which purpose we may observe the purging of the altar, tabernacle, and all within the veil, by the blood of the sacrifices: Levit. xvi. 16, 20, 33; Ezek. xliii. 20, 22, 26; xliv. 20. For what purging needed they, but as they became polluted by the sins of the people? As the land, which was holy, "being polluted by blood-shed, must be cleansed by the blood of him that shed it?" Num. xxxv. 33. Therefore the congregation became

guilty, when he that did a murder was not taken, because the land was promised to the congregation; and therefore an expiation is appointed, Deut. xxi. 1—9. In correspondence whereunto it must be granted, that the world and the heavens, being polluted with man’s sin (which is that “bondage of vanity and corruption, under which,” St. Paul saith, that “the whole creature groaneth, desiring to be delivered into that freedom” which the resurrection shall restore; Rom. viii. 19—22), were to be expiated by the sacrifice of Christ’s body brought in, and His blood sprinkled there (Hebr. ix. 23); that in consideration of His obedience and sufferings God might be found propitious there.

§ 16. So the everlasting intercession of Christ is grounded upon the everlasting ransom. Hebr. vii. 24 [, 25]: this “Priest, remaining for ever, hath an everlasting priesthood; wherefore He is able perfectly to save those, that come to God by Him, always living to intercede for them.” to wit, by pleading His own blood, the ransom of all sin. This is the ground of all our prayers, and the confidence which we may make them with; in particular, for the cleansing of sin, after reconciliation. Of which St. Paul, Rom. viii. 34: “Christ it is That died, or rather That is risen again; Who also is at the right hand of God, making intercession for us.” And this is the necessity of Christ’s sufferings, which the Apostle pleads Hebr. ii. 14—18: that He might be sensible of ours. For if the guilt be taken away by His intercession succeeding His sufferings, then did He suffer that it might succeed. And thus are our sins forgiven “for His name,” [*“... or “by His name;” [1] John ii. 12. Which Socinus will have to be God’s name; as in the Old Testament, Esai. xliii. 25, Psalm xxv. 11, lxix. 9, cxi. 8, cxiii. 11. But if the name of God be in Christ under the New Testament, as in the

* * * Primum id, quod illi assurunt de significacione pronominis Ἅρμα apud Johannem, non recte dictum est. Non enim Christum eo pronomine magis, quam Deum, designare solet. ... De Deoigitur, non minus quam de Christo, ea verba ‘propter nomen Ejus’ dicta fuisset, ex Johannis loquendi consuetudine merito suspicari possimus; praesertim cum aliis in locis apud Divinos scriptores legatur, Deum remittere et delere peccata propter Se seu propter nomen Suum; ut Esai. xlii. 25, et Psalm. xxv. 11, et lxix. 9: propter nomen Suum servare ac vivificare, ut Psalm. civ. 8, et cxiii. 11: et alia ejusmodi plurima. Quod autem propter Christum sive propter nomen Christi nobis peccata remittantur, nusquam alibi (ni fallor) diserte scriptum extat.” Socin., De Jesu Christo Serv., P. ii. c. 25; Op., tom. ii. p. 182. a, b.
angel that represented God in the Old (as I have shewed*); then, when we pray in Christ's name, we pray in God's name, though in consideration of Christ's merits.

§ 17. Upon the premises depends the true meaning of all those Scriptures, where Christ is said to have "died for us," and "for our righteousness." Not as if the preposition "for" could determine, whether we are to understand the final cause in respect of man, to move him to accept of Christ, or the impulsive cause in respect of God, moving Him to grant the Gospel. For when St. John says, that "we ought to lay down our lives for the brethren," as "Christ for us" ([1] John iii. 16); it is manifest, that our life is no ransom for the brethren, as Christ's for us. And when St. Peter saith, he "will lay down" his "life" for Christ (John xiii. 37, 38); he means not, to move God thereby to spare his Master's life. And yet notwithstanding, when Esau sold his birth-right "for a mess of potage" (Hebr. xii. 16); he gave away his birth-right in consideration of it. And should God have taken St. Paul's life upon condition of saving the Jews, they must have been saved in consideration of his becoming "anathema for" them; Rom. ix. 3. And Caiaphas thought, that Christ must be destroyed, lest the Romans should think that they would rebel under Him as their true prince; and so it was necessary, that "Christ should die for the people:" John xi. 50—52. But in what sense do Christians find it true? Surely, no man, that ever prayed to God in Christ's name, need to be told it.

§ 18. It is requisite, therefore, that we have recourse to the consideration of those things, which the Scripture uses to join with the mention of Christ's "dying for us;" if we will rightly determine the meaning of it. And so, having premised the consideration of a sacrifice upon which our sins were charged, of our ransom by the price of it, of reconcilia-

* Above, c. xiii. § 6.
CHAPTER XXIX.

THE GRANT OF GRACE IN CONSIDERATION OF CHRIST SUPPOSES SATISFACTION MADE BY HIM FOR SIN. NEITHER OUR SINS IMPUTABLE TO CHRIST, NOR HIS SUFFERINGS TO US, FORMALLY AND PERSONALLY; BUT AS THE MERITIOUS CAUSES WHICH SATISFACTION ANSWERETH. THE EFFECT OF IT, THE COVENANT OF GRACE: AS WELL AS HELP TO PERFORM IT. THE FATHERS SAVED BY THE FAITH OF CHRIST TO COME. THE GOSPEL A NEW LAW. THE PROPERTY OF SATISFACTION AND PUNISHMENT IN CHRIST'S SUFFERINGS. OF THE SENSE OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH.

There remains one argument from the premises, where I concluded, that effectual grace is appointed from everlasting, and therefore granted in time, in consideration of Christ and His merits; according to St. Paul, Ephes. i. 3—6. For if this grace be granted in consideration of Christ, and life everlasting appointed from everlasting, and granted in time, in consideration of that quality which this grace effecteth; it cannot in reason be avoided, that remission of sin and life everlasting is granted here in right and title, and in effect in the world to come, in consideration of that quality, which the effectual helps of grace of their own nature tend to produce, which they are appointed by God to produce, and which really and in effect [by them?] are produced, being granted by God in consideration of Christ's obedience.

§ 2. But why should I be so solicitous to restore all those Scriptures to their true meaning, which they have set upon the rack to make them speak a false; having such evidence of reason, that by this position they make the death of Christ void and needless, even in their own judgment? For though if they should say, that Christ came only to shew those works that might be sufficient to make His Gospel credible and give us good example, I could not say, that the death of Christ were to no end; yet would they say, that it were to no competent end, complaining (as they do) how much they are wronged, when they are understood to acknowledge no

[The death of Christ rendered void and needless by the position of Socinus.]

 corrected from MS. "thus," in orig. text.
further end of His coming. But when they say, that He
died to induce men to be Christians by enacting the covenant
of grace (that is, assuring them, that God will stand to it on
His part, and that, according to the example of Christ, bear-
ing His cross, they shall attain His glory); I demand, how
all this can be more assurance than every man hath, that is
peremptorily assured otherwise (as no man doubts, but com-
petently it may be assured otherwise), that the Gospel of Christ is God's message. For when sufficient evidence is
once made, and a man is convinced to believe, that God pro-
mises remission of sins and everlasting life to them that
embrace it; can he, that believes God to be God, remain any
more doubtful of the truth of His promise? To Pharaoh and
to his people, it was necessary, that the wonders of God
should be repeated; till they stood convic, that there was
no God else, which they believed not afore: but to them,
that admit the God of Israel to be the only true God, being
convict that the Gospel is His promise, is any further assur-
ance requisite, that He will stand to it; Who were not God,
if He should not stand to it? When they say, that Christ
died to the end, that being advanced to be God He might be
able to bring His promises to effect; I refer myself to the

* "Satisfactionem Christi non agnosce dicimus: nos vero agnosceimus
Deo dignam et Sacris Litteris consentaneam; Deo indignam, et a Scripturœ
sententia vehementer abhorrentem morito repudiamus." Crell., Præf. ad Re-

a "Ego censeo et orthodoxam sententiam esse arbitrur, Jesum Christum
ideo servatorem nostrum esse, quia salutis æternæ viam nobis annunciat
confirmaverit, et in sua Ipsius persona, cum vitae exemplo, tum ex mortuis
resurgendo, manifeste ostenderit, vitamque æternam nobis Ei fidem haben-
tibus Ipsæ daturus sit. Divinae aeternœ
justitiae, per quam peccatores damnari menorumur, pro peccatis nostris neque
illum satisfaciscœ, neque ut satisficeret opus fuisse, affirmò." Socin., De Jesu
Christo Serv., P. i. c. 1; Op. tom. ii. p. 121 a. And see ibid. oc. B—viii.;
 sq.—"Ex dictis intelligi potest duplex
potissimun ratio, qua mors Christi re-
misionem peccatorum ac salutem no-

b bis peperit: altera est, quod Deus
morte Christi, veluti pignore dato, ad
illam nobis dandum Sese obligaret;
altera vero, quod hoc via Christus po-
testatem amplissimo hoc beneficio nos
afficiendi fuerit consequaturus... Verum
hie alia praeterea Christi mortis subest
utilitas. Consentaneum enim immensum
Dei bonitati erat, Eum fidélibus
constituisse salutis principem. Qui non
solum viam ea qua diximus ratione ad
illam muniret, sed etiam omnibus istis
malis praegustatis misericors pontifex
feret, in tantoque propter istam obedi-
entiam dignitatis ac potestis gradu
collocatus non modo posset sed et vel-
let nobis perlicitantis subvenire." Volkel,
De Vera Relig., lib. iii. c. 18.
pp. 96, 101. And see also lib. v. c. 31.
p. 623.—"Postquam jam Christum
pro nobis seu via nostra legem minime
prestitisse... ostendimus, consequens
est, ut nec illum cruenta morte Suae
justitiae Dei pro nobis satisfacisse...
demonstramus." Id., ibid., lib. v. c. 22.
p. 570.

b See above, § 2. note b; and c. x.
§ 5.
sense of any man, that is able to think of God with due reverence, whether it be possible to imagine, that a mere man, having made promises to mankind in God's name, can live with God to see God's promises frustrate: and, by consequence, whether it can appear necessary, that our Lord Christ should be advanced to be God, that He might be able, in His own person, to fulfil the promises which He had made us in His Father's name. I refer myself to that which I have said, to shew the Word of God, Which took the flesh of man from the Virgin, to be God from everlasting, as the Son of God, and His everlasting Wisdom and Image: and, therefore, not advanced to be God in consideration of His obedience; but that, having condescended to that state, which His obedience in doing His Father's message and testifying the truth thereof required, the Son of God incarnate was advanced in our flesh by the appointment of God, in reward of His obedience, to the privilege of sending the Holy Ghost, to make His Gospel effectual to convert the nations to Christianity, that by them He might be acknowledged and glorified for that which He was from everlasting. So that, the end of His coming being to obtain that grace, by which the world might be converted to Christianity, and, being converted, obtain remission of sins and life everlasting for it; and neither of these purposes admitted by Socinus: we may well say to him, as St. Paul says to the Jews, Gal. ii. 21; "If righteousness be by the Law, then is Christ dead in vain." So, if righteousness came as Socinus would have it, then is Christ dead to no purpose; because all that he requires might have been as well effectad without it: whereas a due valuable consideration, in regard whereof the converting grace of the Holy Ghost, and remission of sins and life everlasting in consideration of the effect thereof, should be granted, could not have been had without it.

§ 3. It is strange to be observed, how little Socinus hath to produce out of the Scriptures, to prove a position of such consequence as this; all his business (in a manner) being to draw those texts, which hitherto have been understood in the sense of the Church, to his intent. I can, for the present,

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* Above, cc. xiii.—xvi.; and especially c. xiv. § 5, c. xv. § 15.
* This is almost exclusively the purpose of Parts ii. and iv. of Socinus De
BOOK II.

Recal no more, than those frequent passages of the Apostles (especially St. Paul), whereby they affirm the righteousness and salvation of Christians to come by the mere grace of God and our Lord Christ. Which I need not here repeat; no ways apprehending the inference, that it cannot be said to come from the mere grace of God, if I suppose the consideration of Christ’s obedience and sufferings as the purchase of it. It is true*, in the words of the prophet, Jeremy xxxi. 31—34. (alleged by the Apostle, Hebr. viii. 8—12, to be meant of the Gospel), we find a promise of God to pardon the sins of His people, without expressing any consideration in regard whereof He would do it. And likewise our Lord, in the parable of the master that forgave his servant “ten thousand talents” (Matt. xviii. 23—[34]), seems to express God’s pardon, which His Gospel publisheth, to be free from any consideration in which it is either proclaimed or granted. But as I said† to our Antinomians (who will needs believe, upon the warrant of the prophet’s words, that their sins are pardoned, merely in consideration of Christ, without regard to any disposition requisite to qualify them for it by the Gospel§), that it was neither requisite nor fit, that the terms, 247 upon which the blessings promised by the Gospel are granted, should be expressed by the prophecy, that only foretelleth the coming of it (being to be gathered from that proportion, which the Law, in regard of the land of promise, holds to the Gospel, in regard of the world to come); so say I to the Socinians (who will needs have the same words to signify, that, supposing the disposition that qualifies for the promises of the Gospel, they suppose no consideration of the obedience of Christ‖), that (though the terms of the Gospel are not ex-

* “Quæ” (ponitentia et resipiscenia) “modo adsit, Deum pro ingenti bonitate Sua, nulla vera satisfactione accepta, nobis peccata remittere voluisse in Novo Fodere, quod nobiscum per Christum percutere dignatus est, constanter affirmo, et nunc potissimum contendo. Id quod verissimum esse, vel ex illis Divini illius oraculi verbis” (Jerem. xxxi. 34.) “constare potest: ‘Quia propitius ero iniquitati eorum, et peccati eorum non recordabo amplius.’” Socin., ibid., P. iii. c. 2; Op., tom. ii. p. 191. a.—“Primum igitur considerandum est, in hac para-bola nullam mentionem fieri satisfactionis, quam rex ille a quoquam pro servo, cui debuit remiserat, aut acceperit aut requisisset. Quod satis de-monstrare videretur, Deum similiter pro nobis, quibus peccata remittit, nullam satisfactionem a quoquam vel acceptisse vel requisivisse.” Id., ibid., p. 193. a.
† Above, c. iii. § 9.
§ Ibid.
‖ See above in note e.
pressed by the prophet, foretelling the coming of it, as being included in those of the Law, by virtue of the proportion aforesaid) it were strange to think, that the coming and death of Christ is not sufficient since to determine the meaning of the prophet's words to it. And so likewise to the parable: that, if our Saviour found it not fit to express the consideration, upon which the pardon which the Gospel publishes is passed, yet, His death and sufferings coming after to interpret the intent of that which He had said before, that was to be declared, it is strange, that they should not be thought sufficient, to add that consideration, which before He had neither expressed nor denied.

§ 4. As for the free grace of the Gospel, I challenge all the reason in the world to say;—if God's free act, in providing the means of salvation by Christ and sending Him to publish the conditions upon which He is ready to be reconciled to those that accept them (tendering withal sufficient help so to do), be not a valuable reason, for which the Gospel is to be called the covenant of grace; though granted in consideration of that ransom by Christ, which the free grace of God provideth;—whether our Antinomians have not as good reason to say, that the promises of the Gospel are not free, if they require the condition of Christianity, as the Socinians, if they suppose Christ and His obedience.

§ 5. Here follows, I confess, a very valuable reason of Socinus, so long as that satisfaction of Christ which the Church teacheth is not understood; which it is no marvel if it carry them aside, not understanding the faith and doctrine of the Church aright. They allege\(^1\), that there can be no

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\(^1\) "Jam si . . . nemo corporales penas pro alio pendere potest, nec etiam pro alio id, quod est omnino facere tenetur, quisquam prestarre poterit. Par enim est utroboque ratio. Nec magis unus factum alterius fieri potest, quam unus mors aut corporis vexatio alterius esse. Et quemadmodum in penis corporali-bus infligendis non ipsa mors aut corporis vexatio simpliciter queritur sed cùjusdam certi hominis mors aut corporis vexatio; sic, in factis ex Legis praecepto præstandis, non ipsum factum simpliciter queritur, sed unius- cujusque, qui legi illi obnoxius sit, proprium factum." Socin., De Jesu Christo Serv., P. iii. c. 3.; Op., tom. ii. p. 197. a. And see the beginning of the chapter, p. 195. a.—"Potest quidem alius pro alio satisfacere: sed interim non ab eo, qui pro alio satisfacit, sed ab eo, pro quo satisfit, debetum exigeretur... At enim dices, Christum in Se universum debuit nostrum transtulisse: et ita, non a nobis, sed ab Ipso, id quod nos debemus, jure optimo exactum fuisse, nos vero liberatos esse. Jam ista ratione non eodem tempore satisfacto et remissio peracta esse. Nam simul atque istiusmodi translatio debiti fit, quam 'novationem' juris-consulti appellant, liberatur prior de-
BOOK II.

ground in reason, upon which one man may be punished for another man's sin; guilt being a moral consequence of an act, that is naturally past and gone (that is, for the present, nothing in rerum natura), upon a due ground of reason, which imputes the acts of reasonable creatures to their account, because they are under a law of doing thus and not otherwise. But that the sins of one man should be imputed to another, who cannot be obliged for another to do or not to do that, which redounds to the other's account if done or not done; is no more possible, than that he should have done or not done that, which the other is supposed to have done or not done. If it be said, that Christ voluntarily took upon Him the punishment of our sins, as a surety answers for his friend's debt; it is acknowledged, that this way turns off the debt from him, that it is paid for, to the surety; but extinguishes it not, as the undergoing of punishment extinguishes the crime in all the justice of the world, so that he, who had right to punish, can exact that no more, for which he hath received satisfaction once: which is to say, that the sufferings of Christ are not the punishment of our sins.

§ 6. And I, truly, do freely acknowledge, that the instances which have been brought, either out of the scriptures, or to shew, that one man hath been punished for another man's sin among civil people (so that it is not to be thought against the light of nature), are either insufficient or impertinent to the case. For I have learned from my beginning in the schools, that God, when He "visits the iniquities of the fathers upon the children," does not inflict upon them more punishment than their own sin deserves, but makes their sins His opportunity of bringing to pass His judgments against the sins of their predecessors, or those, who in regard of other relations are reasonably taken to be punished by their punishment. And this I will here prove no further; but, taking it for granted, infer, that it comes not home to the case of our Lord Christ, purchasing us by His death remission of sins [and] everlasting life.

bitor. Creditori vero non antea satisfit, quam is, qui in se debitum transitul, ipsi pecuniam numeret. Nec tamen istic illa debitii remissio intervenisset."

Id., ibid., c. 2. p. 192. b.

See below, § 20, notes z-b.

Added from MS.
§ 7. But my reason is, because it is evident to me, that one man’s doings or sufferings may be understood or said to be imputed to another two ways. First, immediately and personally, supposing that there is a ground in reason for it. And this that opinion requires, which holds that faith, which alone justifieth, to consist in believing that a man is predestinate to life merely in consideration of Christ’s death, suffering for the elect alone. For how should we be justified by believing this, but supposing, that Christ suffered upon this ground to this purpose? But having shewed this opinion to be utterly false, by shewing, that the Gospel supposes the condition of Christianity in that faith which alone justifieth: I must here presume, that this sense of the imputation of Christ’s merits (and, therefore, this intent of His death) is merely imaginary; and the supposition whereupon it proceeds, to wit, that one man’s doings or sufferings may be personally and immediately imputed to another man’s account, utterly unreasonable: and therefore must and do say, that, as it is sufficient, so it is true, that the sufferings of Christ are imputed unto us in the nature of a meritorious cause, moving God to grant mankind those terms of reconciliation which the Gospel importeth.

§ 8. This is evident by the opposition, which St. Paul maketh between the disobedience of Adam and the obedience of Christ; Rom. v. 12, 18, 19. Where, discovering the ground of our reconciliation with God, which the Gospel publisheth, he imputeth it to the “obedience” of Christ; in the rest of his discourse attributing it to His death. For, having said, that “Christ died for us being sinners,” and that “we are justified by His blood,” and “reconciled by the death of His Son, being enemies,” he inferreth; “Therefore, as by one man sin came into the world, and death by sin, and so death passed upon all:” signifying by the other part of the comparison, which he rendereth not till after a distance, that, “as by the offence of one it came to all men to condemnation, so by the righteousness of one it came to all men to justification of life; for as by the disobedience of one man many were made sinners, so by the obedience of one many shall be made righteous.” And hereupon, as the exaltation

= Above, c. vii. § 1—6.

P P 2
of Christ is imputed to His obedience in the state of His humiliation (by St. Paul, Phil. ii. 8, "He humbled Himself, becoming obedient unto death"), so are the effects and consequences thereof (Rom. iv. 25; "Who was delivered for our transgressions, and rose again for our justification") to be ascribed to the same. And that which the Father proclaims of the Son (Matt. iii. 17, xvii. 5), "This is My beloved Son in Whom I am well pleased;" cannot be understood in any other regard, but of His obedience, performed in publishing the message which the Father sent Him upon into the world, and suffering for it (in which He testifies so often in St. John’s Gospel,—that He “came not to do” His “own will but” His “Father’s”—that He “sought not” His “own glory but” His “Father’s”—He “did not,” He “said not, any thing of” Himself, “but what” He “had seen” His “Father do,” what He “had heard” His “Father say,”—that it were tedious to repeat the several places). And this according to the figure of David, Ps. xl. 9, 10 [Hebr.]: “Then said I, Lo I come; in the volume of the book it is written of me, that I should fulfil Thy will; I am content to do it, O Lord; yea, Thy law is within my heart.” Whereupon the Apostle saith, that “we are sanctified by this will, through the once offering of the body of Jesus Christ” (Hebr. x. 10); to wit, the will of God, which, by doing His will, Christ had moved to favour us. Even as, in the figure, punishment is remitted to David’s posterity; for the “promise” indeed (2 Kings viii. 19, xx. 6, 1 Kings xi. [3]6), but made in consideration of David’s obedience (2 Sam. vii. 13).

§ 9. Here I suppose further, that this obedience of Christ is not tendered as of debt (which they that believe Him to have been born a mere creature must hold); but, having proved, that He assumed man’s nature, being the Word of God, God of God from everlasting afore, do necessarily presume, that this obedience, being undue, is meritorious to whatsoever purpose God, That sent Him, accepts it: and hereupon infer, that God granted those terms of reconcilement, which the Gospel importeth (in derogation to His own original law), in consideration of it.

§ 10. For I do suppose, that man, being fallen from God,
yet knowing God, and himself to have been made by God, and to be governed by His providence, necessarily understood himself to be under the obligation of making God the end of all his actions, and therefore of enjoying no creature otherwise than the service of God should either require or allow; though that ignorance of God, which original concupiscence hath since brought into the world through the worship of idols and the corruptions that attend upon the same, had since so extinguished or darkened the light of nature in man, that the greatest part of mankind, though they could not deny this truth, nevertheless “held it prisoner in unrighteousness:” as St. Paul says, Rom. i. 18. This is that, which I call the original law of God; the transgression whereof bindeth over to that punishment, which God by His word declareth. And of this law the necessary immediate consequence is, that we submit to all such laws as God shall publish to man, inasmuch as He requires, and upon such penalties as He declares. So that, by publishing the Gospel, the original law of God is not abrogated, continuing still the rule of men’s actions, but rather strengthened, and enlarged to all those precepts, which are positive under the Gospel, and come not from the light of nature, as necessary conditions to salvation in all estates: but the publication of the Gospel is a dispensation in the exercise and execution of the original law, by the penalty which it enacteth, in consideration of Christ’s obedience; though (being general to all mankind after the publishing of it) it may be called a new law, as proposing new terms of salvation; which if any man challenge to be a derogation to God’s original law, I will not contend about words.

§ 11. As for the law of Moses, if we consider it as containing the terms upon which that people held the land of promise, the publishing of the Gospel neither abrogates it nor derogates from it: being only given to hold “till the time of reformation” (as the Apostle calls it, Hebr. ix. 10); therefore expiring when the Gospel was published, which limited the intent of it. But if we consider it as containing an intimation of that spiritual obedience, which God required of those that would be saved under that light by the outward and civil obedience of those positive precepts, whereby they were
restrained from the worship of idols and commerce with idolatrous nations, in proportion to the reward of the world to come, signified by the happiness of the land of promise; then must we acknowledge another dispensation in the same original law by the law of Moses, and for the time of it; which was also in force under the fathers from the beginning, though not burdened [with"] that multitude of positive precepts, which the law of Moses brought in for the condition upon which they were to hold the land of promise.

And, in opposition to those, it is called by the fathers of the Church the law of nature, not in opposition to grace; the very giving it by God's voluntary appearing to the fathers, and instructing them by familiar conversation, as it were, being a work of mere grace: as also the effect of it in the works of their conversation, which we find so truly Christian, that the fathers of the Church do truly argue from thence that Judaism is younger than Christianity.

§ 12. And, therefore, I do here acknowledge this His dispensation, by which the fathers obtained salvation before the Gospel, to have been granted also in consideration of that obedience, which our Lord Christ had taken upon Him to perform in the fulness of time: nothing hindering us to understand, in God's proceeding with them, something like that, which in the civil law is called "novatio" or "delegatio" —"renewing of bonds" or "assignment of payment" —God's accepting the interposition of our Lord Christ to the recon-

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* Corrected from MS. "which" in original text.

"Lex igitur Mosia... habere debuit quaedam tralatitia ex jure naturali, quaedam vero propria isti populo isticque temporibus accommodata. Agnoscit hoc discrimen in lege patria Josephus... Justinus in Colloquio cum Tryphone" (c. 45, Op., p. 141. A, B) "idem discrimen clare Judaeo ob oculos ponit, cum alia sit esse 'cathedra kal fovei kal aionia kal,'... qua qui olim praetulerunt, communem cum Christianis gloriae erant reportarii, alia vero 'προς ακορασίαν του λαου' (alioere poterat, 'et ob occasiones temporum ac locorum') 'dieradebatur.'... Sive in Constitutionibus" (Const. Apost., lib. i. c. 6; lib. ii. cc. 5, 35; lib. vi. cc. 12, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23: ap. Cotelier., PP. Apost., tom. i. pp. 207, 218, 248, 345, 352—356), "quae sic distantur Clementis, plurimus locis distinguuntur 't a φωνικά του κόσμου et 'τα ἑκάσταν.' Irenaeus quaere iv. 27' (Adv. Haer., p. 313. a) 'illa prioris potiorisque generis 'naturalia' Legis vocat.' Grot., Ad Matt. v. 17.

clement of them, being as if He accepted a new bond for an old debt, or of payment by proxy to be made at a certain term.

§ 13. This is a point as manifest in the Scriptures of the New Testament, as it was requisite, that a point, not concerning the salvation of those that live under the New Testament but the understanding of the reason thereof in the salvation of those that died under the Old, for the maintenance of it against unbelievers, should be manifest.

§ 14. For St. Paul thus writeth, 1 Cor. x. 1—4: "I would not have you ignorant, brethren, that our fathers were all under the cloud, and all passed through the sea, and all were baptized unto Moses in the cloud and in the sea, and all eat the same spiritual meat, and all drank the same spiritual drink; for they" all "drank of the spiritual rock that followed them; now the rock was Christ." They that entered into a covenant of works to obtain the land of promise, as I have shewed they did, entered not expressly into a covenant of faith in Christ for obtaining the world to come. No more tham, being "baptized into Moses in the cloud and in the sea," as he says here they were (that is, into his government, into the observation of the laws he should give, in hope of the promises he should give), they can be said to have been baptized expressly "into Christ," and that profession which His promises require. Wherefore, when he saith that "the rock was Christ," his meaning is not, immediately, and to those that rested in this temporal covenant of works; but as the manna was Christ, and Moses was Christ, by the means of that faith, which God then received at their hands: to wit, the assurance of everlasting happiness for them, who under this calling should tender God the spiritual obedience of the inward man, upon those grounds, which His temporal goodness, the tradition of their fathers, and the instruction of their prophets, afforded at that time. Now I appeal to the sense of all men, how those can be said to have that interest in Christ, which I have shewed that Christians have (and therefore upon the same ground), if there were no consideration of Christ in the blessings of Christ which they enjoyed. Wherefore, when St. Paul proceeds hereupon to exhort them

9 Above, Bk. I. Of the Pr. of Chr. Tr., cc. xii, xiii.
not to "tempt Christ as some of them tempted," we must not understand, that he forbids us to tempt Christ, as they tempted God; but that they also tempted Christ, Who went along with them in that angel, in Whom the name of God and His word was, as I said afore. 

§ 15. So, when the Apostle saith, that Moses "counted the reproach of Christ greater riches than the treasures of Egypt, for he looked at the recompense of reward" (Hebr. xi. 26); when, putting them in mind to follow their teachers, considering the end which they had attained and Moses aimed at, he addeth, "Jesus Christ" is "the same yesterday and to-day and for everlastings" (Hebr. xiii. 8); when St. Peter says, that "the prophets," who foretold the Gospel, "sought, against what time the Spirit of Christ, That was in them, declared and testified beforehand the sufferings of Christ, and the glorious things that followed" (1 Pet. i. 10, [11]); when St. Paul saith, that "all God's promises are yea and amen in" Christ (2 Cor. i. 20): methinks it is strange, that a Christian should imagine, that there was no consideration of Christ in those promises, under which they ran the race of Christians. Nor could St. Paul say, "As by Adam all die, so by Christ shall all be made alive" (1 Cor. xv. 22); nor could the comparison hold between the first and second Adam, which he makes Rom. v. 12—19: if that life, which I have shewed how Christ restores Christians to, were given to the fathers before Christ without consideration of Christ. Nor could the Apostle otherwise say, that Christ "is the mediator of a new covenant, that, death coming, for the ransom of those transgressions that were under the old, they that are called may receive the promise of an everlasting inheritance" (Hebr. ix. 15); but because those sins, which were redeemed only to a temporal effect by the sacrifices of

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[Other Scriptures.]

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\[\text{tempore promissus fuerit. Ea enim tantummodo ad universam populum semperque spectabant, quae fidelem illo per Mossem cum illis facto continuebat. Atque in horum numero futuri Messie promissionem nequaquam fuit; cum id nusquam in legis Mosaicae disciplina expressum reperiatur;" &c. Volkel, De Vera Relig., lib. iii. c. 11. p. 64.}

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\[\text{Above, c. xvi.}\]
the old law (as also those, which were not redeemed at all by any, as I said), were by the sacrifice of Christ redeemed to the purchase of the world to come. Which is that which St. Paul tells the Jews, Acts xiii. 39; that, "through Christ, every one that believeth, is justified from all things which they could not be justified of by the law of Moses." For as the Law did not expiate capital offences, so it expiated none but to the effect of a civil promise.

§ 16. And though we construe the words of St. John (Apoc. xiii. 8), "Whose names are not written in the book of life of the Lamb, slain from the foundation of the world," out of the same sense repeated Apoc. xvii. 8,—not that the Lamb was slain from the foundation of the world, but that their names were written in His book from the foundation of the world;—yet, inasmuch as it is called the book of the Lamb, "That was foreknown from the foundation of the world" (1 Pet. i. 19,) when Moses demands not to be written in God's book, or when mention is made of it in the New Testament, it must be the book of Christ in the mystical sense.

§ 17. And when St. Paul says that "Christ gave Himself a ransom for all, a testimony for due time;" what can he mean, but that, though He "gave Himself for all," yet this was not to be "testified" till the proper time of preaching the Gospel. And what is this, but that, though this is testified only by the preaching of the Gospel, yet He was "a ransom for all." Which reason suffers not the same term "all" (Hebr. ii. 9, Rom. iii. 23) to be restrained from that generality which it naturally signifies.

§ 18. Lastly, when the Apostle argues, that, if Christ should offer Himself more than once, that He might more than once enter into the Holy of Holies, "He must have suffered oft from the foundation of the world," that is, before the end of the world, in which He came indeed (Hebr. ix. 25, 26); he must needs suppose, that He suffered for all that were saved before the Gospel. For what pretence can there be, that He should suffer for sins under the Gospel before the Gospel; more than that the high-priest before the Law should expiate those sins which were committed against the Law by entering into the Holy of Holies.
And here you may see, that I intend not to affirm, that all that were saved under the Law, though in consideration of Christ, did know, in what consideration Christ should be their salvation; as Christians under the Gospel do: but to refer myself to the determination of St. Augustin, and other fathers and doctors of the Church, that they understood it in their elders and superiors, the prophets of God, and their disciples the judges of Israel (who were also prophets), and the fathers of several ages, of whom you read Hebrews xi.; who, being acquainted with the secret of God's purpose, were to acquaint the people with it so sparingly and by such degrees, as the secret wisdom of God had appointed.

§ 19. These things thus premised, I do acknowledge, and challenge, the act of God in dispensing in the execution of His original law, and bringing the Gospel into effect instead of it, not to be the act of a private person, remitting his particular interest in the punishment of those sins whereby his law was transgressed; but the act of a master of a household, or the prince and sovereign of a commonwealth, which you please, disposing of mankind as his "subjects or household servants" not denying, that a man, considered as free from all obligation of civil society and a member of no commonwealth,—that a sovereign in respect of another sovereign,—yea, in some sort, the subject of one sovereign in regard of another sovereign and his subjects,—may have right to exact punishment, which he may as freely remit; but resolving, that whatsoever can be said of such cases, is impertinent to ours, God being necessarily and essentially sovereign prince over His own subjects, His creatures, and master of them as His household goods: and this act, whereby He venit spectanda, . . . in omnibus quidem his actibus Deus praecipue spectandus est ut dominus absolutus, isque liberissimus ac nullius alterius potestati subjectus; sed aliquo modo etiam ut recensor. . . Quia dominus est noster absolutus ac herus, ipso creationis jure; cum quanti quanti summus, Ipsius simul, ab Ipso toti prodectus;" &c. Crell., Resp. ad Grot. de Satisf. Christi, c. ii.; p. 60. a: speaking afterwards of the "potestas gubernandi quam Deus in nos habet, ut herus quivis in suos servos ac mancipia."
dispenseth in the effect of His original law so as to introduce another instead of it, being such, that His glory must necessarily consist in the consideration upon which it is done, as the principal act that can be done in the government of the principal creature.

§ 20. And, therefore, I say on the other side, that the cases of Damon and Phintias the great friends (whereof the one suffered, or would have suffered, for the other under Dionysius the usurper of Sicily*), and of Zaleucus (who, having made a law for his country to punish adulterers with loss of both eyes, and his son being taken in adultery, pulled out one of his own and one of his son’s, to satisfy the law*), are not pertinent to our case. Suppose a friend had right to lay down his life for a friend; suppose the usurper had right to take away one life, and to accept another for it; suppose Zaleucus had right to dispose of his own eye to his son’s interest; suppose the people, that enacted the law, did dispense so far in it: the effect of a civil law is utterly satisfied by the evil once suffered (proportionable to the forfeit in the judgment of the law), not considering out of what intent of mind it was suffered, nor claiming any thing

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BOOK II.

further, when it is suffered. But I have shewed, that the 252 sufferings of Christ were accepted of God to the redemption of mankind in consideration of that free and pure obedience to God wherewith they were tendered to God; not to satisfy His wrath against us by the evil which He endured (for the time of mere punishment is not till the world to come), but that He might shew that virtue, and that obedience, which is not to be shewed but through the difficulty of afflictions: and this, not to the effect of making personal and immediate recompense for the sins of so many as shall be saved (which were it made, God could not in any justice impose upon them any condition, for obtaining remission of those sins, which He had received satisfaction for); but to give God that satisfaction (by so undue and so perfect obedience in such trials, that the world can never see the like virtue), as might move Him, in consideration thereof, abating that debt of punishment which we are engaged to, by transgressing His original law to publish an act of grace, admitting all to remission of sins and right to life everlasting, that will undertake to live true Christians. And this consideration, I conceive I may say, redounds as much to the glory of God, as it is possible to conceive that any can do; there being nothing more valuable than this obedience, nothing more acceptable in him that is a sinner than new obedience for the future: but the consideration, in the meantime, not personal, but in the nature of the meritorious cause, to which all satisfaction is reducible, as purchasing freedom from evil, though not right to good; for no man's debt is immediately paid by the pain which Christ suffered, but, in consideration of His obedience to God in undergoing such trials, all that will undergo the condition are admitted to remission of sins and everlasting life.

§ 21. Therefore the punishment, which Christ endures for our sins, importeth not that there was any ground of reason, why He should be accounted to have done them, or we accounted to have undergone His sufferings; but in regard to the evil which He suffered in consideration of our sins, with an intent to take them away in freely offering Himself to undergo what God should think fit to that pur-

* Above, § 7.
pose. Neither can it be pretended, that any thing is wanting to manifest the justice of God’s proceeding with Him, nor the reason why it redounds to our benefit. Now Socinus, having in detestation that opinion, which places justifying faith in believing that we are predestinate in consideration of the merits of Christ, suffering only for the elect, and abhorr ing as much the doctrine of the Church, which he took to be tainted with the leaven of Antichrist from the Apostles’ time; it remained, that he should run into another extreme, making the Gospel an act of God’s grace excluding all consideration of Christ, which could not be brought in but by voiding the faith of the Holy Trinity into the bargain.

§ 22. But though I allow Socinus to dispute, whether the sufferings of Christ be properly the punishment of our sins, or not; because I have shewed, that they are not the punishment which civil laws require (though not allowing him to blame St. Augustin, or other Church writers, that have so called them, much less to depart from the faith of the Church for the signification of a word); yet can it not be denied, that the death of Christ is properly “satisfaction,” upon the premises. For satisfaction is, properly, a payment that may be refused, as not in the nature and kind of that which was due. Suppose, for the purpose, when a band is forfeit, the forfeit incurred; recompense satisfies not. Indeed, it is contrary to natural equity in man, to refuse to be satisfied with such a recompense as makes up his interest: but between God and man it is otherwise. For, the forfeit of sin consisting in this, that the act is done which cannot be undone, suppose the sufferings of Christ (supposing His Divine nature from everlasting) both voluntary and meritorious of themselves, and that to an unvaluable value, even in justice, yet are they refusables in point of God’s justice; because He is not to be obliged by any thing, as receiving advantage by it. But, being accepted by Him, they become a full recompense to the purpose for which they are ten-

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4 See above, c. i. § 5, 6. 9.  
5 See above, § 5, note i.  
6 See the Testimonia Veterum collected by Grotius at the end of his Def. 
8 Corrected from MS. “refutable,” in orig. text.
BOOK dered, that is, for the obtaining of pardon and salvation for 253 them that embrace Christianity; and that, in the strict and rigorous estimate of justice, for the infinite value of the Person from Whom they proceed. And this according to Ulpian, 46. ff. iii. 1. 52; "Satisfactio est pro solutione"—"Satisfaction is that which succeeds instead of payment not made"; and according to Caius, 2 ff. viii. 1; "Satisfacere est desiderium alicujus splire"—"To satisfy is to fulfill a man's desire." For that God cannot be obliged but by His own will to accept it to this effect, whereas man is bound by natural equity to accept that for full satisfaction, which makes up his whole interesse, when civil law obliges him not; makes the tender of Christ no less the substitute to our payment of that debt which God's law requireth (for how is it less fit to be tendered, when it is not due to be accepted, than when it is?), no less able to fulfill God's desire: seeing nothing can be imagined more acceptable to Him, than the voluntary obedience of His own Son; consisting in those sufferings, wherein the greatest virtue that man's nature is capable of was seen; and tending to the redemption of mankind, which His love to His creature inclined Him so much to desire, as His wisdom found to comport with His native goodness and the exercise of His justice.

§ 23. I shall not here, as in other points, stand to clear the faith of the Catholic Church. When Pelagius is alleged for one, that held not the satisfaction of Christ; it is plain

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k "Quod Socini sententiam opinio- nem nuper natam appellat (Grotius), id, nisi docuerit eam ex Christi et Apostolorum dictis non esse excerptam, non magis nobis curandum est, quam curarn am ii qui hoc seculo veritatem denuo caerperunt ex tenebris Pontificis in luce profferre," &c. "Verum hac in parte non videtur satis convenire Grotio cum amico et defensore suo Vossio, qui adversus Ravenspergum scriptit" (Respns. ad Judic. Ravensperg &c., c. iii.; Op., tom. vi. pp. 884. a.—586. b.), "eandem, quae Soenii sit, saltem in principio capite, ante annos quingentos sententiam fuisset Petri Abaillardi;... quin etiam idem Vossius, tum Augustini auctoritate nixus, tum Driedonis verbis in eam rem adductis, docere conatur, annis circiter septin- gentis ante Abaillardum idem docuissae Pelagium. Driedo vero affirmat hanc sententiam Augustini tempore ecclesiam Christianam (ut ipsae judicat) in-
enough, that it can have no footing in, or allowance from, the authority of the Church, which hath disclaimed Pelagius. Only we may take notice, how well the evidence, which the witness and practice of the Church renders to the rule of faith, is understood by them, who, instead of alleging some allowance of the Church (by some person of noted credit openly professing it, and nevertheless esteemed to be of the Church), name us one that was cast out of the Church for holding it, whether expressly or by consequence. As for Lactantius, who, alleging the suffering of Christ for our example, adds further, nevertheless, "Pro crime nostro"—"For our crime" (Instit. iv. 23, 24, 26): though I might safely have said, as afore, that a word of his upon the by may well have passed without censure, because his credit was not such in the Church as to create appearance of offence; yet I shall not need to have recourse to this answer, his own words having given so much advantage for a fair interpretation of his meaning in the sense of the Church. As for Petrus Abailardus, that is thought to have said something to the same purpose, I shall not need to
insist what his opinion was. For as I allow, that he lived in
such an age, when something that is true might be enter-
tained with the censure of the Church; so, when it is said
to be in a point, wherein he is partizan with Pelagius, the
Church that condemned him, must needs, in condemning
him for it, be partizan with the Church that condemned
Pelagius. I will only allege here a doctrine, which I take to
be generally received by the ancient fathers of the Church:
—that the devil, by bringing Christ to death That had not
sinned, forfeited that "power of death," which the Apostle
speaks of (Hebr. ii. 14); to wit, that which he had over man
that had sinned, in bringing him to death. And I allege it,
because the Socinians seem to take it for granted, that the
Church is now ashamed to maintain this; which I confess
I am not. For if the devil be "prince of this world," as our
Saviour calls him (John xiv. 30), because he is employed by
God as His gaoler (or the executioner of those judgments,
to which He abandons those that forsake Him, by giving them
up to his temptations); shall we not understand the justice
of God to be seen towards him in limiting this employment,
as under the grace of Christ we believe it is limited, in con-
consideration of his attempting upon Christ beyond his com-
mission, because without right, He being without sin? And
therefore, the justice of God having appointed him this em-
ployment, and this justice satisfied by the obedience of

S. Ambros., Lib. de Tobia, c. ix. § 33
(Op., tom. i. p. 601. B, C); and Su-
per Lucam, lib. vii. cc. 118, 117 (ibid.
pp. 1436. F, 1437. D); and other pas-
sages of the Fathers, quoted (with these)
by Grotius, Test. Veterum, in fin. Def.
339 sq.

"Quod si testimonia patrum, quae
longo ordine recenset Grotius, inspi-
cias, conprieses illum esse primum, qui
a nostra sententia discedat, qui idem
a Grotio. Is vero est Originis; qui
Diabo locut Christi sanguinem, re-
demuntia nostra preatinum, persolutum:
quod Augustinum quoque et Ambro-
sium, patrum Latinorum lumina, sta-
tuose, Socinius jam monuit. Ab hac
vero sententia quis hodie non abhor-
ret?" Crel., Resp. ad Def. Grot. &c.,
Præfat., sign. * 2. b.
OF THE COVENANT OF GRACE.

Christ; it is but due consequence, that this employment, in which the principality of this world consisteth, should become forfeit and void, so far as the grace of Christ determineth it. By virtue of which reason our Lord Christ, rising from death, because, not having sinned, "He could [Acts ii. 24.] not be held by death," draws after Him all, that upon the sound of His Gospel embrace the profession of Christianity.

CHAPTER XXX.

GOD MIGHT HAVE RECONCILED MAN TO HIMSELF WITHOUT THE COMING OF CHRIST. THE PROMISES OF THE GOSPEL DEPEND AS WELL UPON HIS ACTIVE AS PASSIVE OBEDIENCE. CHRIST NEED NOT SUFFER HELL-PAINS THAT WE MIGHT NOT. THE OPINION THAT MAKETH JUSTIFYING FAITH TO BE TRUST IN GOD, NOT TRUE; YET NOT PREJUDICIAL TO THE FAITH. THE DECREES OF THE COUNCIL OF TRENT, AND THE DOCTRINE OF THE SCHOOL; HOW IT IS NOT PREJUDICIAL TO THE FAITH. AS ALSO THAT OF SOCINUS.

I will not leave this point, till I have inferred, from that which hath been said, the resolution of two or three points in question, necessarily following upon it.

§ 2. And first, that, though (as I have said) it is impossible for the wit of man to propose any course for the reconciling of men to God, by which the glory of God in the exercise of His Divine perfections should have been more seen, than is that which it pleased God to take; yet was it not impossible for His Divine wisdom to have taken other courses to effect the same, His glory remaining entire: according as St. Augustin hath long since resolved; though

See the arguments of Bp. Bilson (as quoted below in c. xxx. § 9. note f, pp. 229—233), who cites copious passages from the fathers.

"Eos itaque qui dicunt, Itane deflectit Deo modus alius, quo liberaret homines a miseria mortalitatis hujus, ut unigenitum Filium Deum Sibi constantem hominem fieri vellet, indueundo humanam animam et carnem, mortalernque factum mortem perpetui! parum est sic refellere, ut istum modum, quo nos per Mediatorem Dei et hominem Christum Jesum Deus liberare dignatur, asservamus bonum et Divinam congruum dignitatem: verum etiam ut ostendamus, non alium modum posse illum Deo defuisse, Cujus potestate cuncta aequaliter subjacent, sed sanandae nostrae miseriae convenientiorem modum alium non defuisse nec esse oportuisse." S. Aug., De Trin., lib. xiii. c. 10. § 18; Op., tom. viii. p. 935. C. D.—See also a very striking passage in S. Gregory the Great, Moral. in Job., lib. xx. c. 36. § 59; Op., tom. i. p. 670. A.: and others quoted by Bilson (as above), p. 287.
to the great displeasure* of all them, who distinguish not
the imagination of immediate satisfaction by the death of
Christ for the sins of them that shall be saved, from that
dispensation in the original law of God, which the Gospel
declareth to all that embrace the terms of it; to the effect
whereof, I have shewed, that God provided and accepted it.
For if God did not provide nor accept de facto the death of
Christ for immediate satisfaction to His vindicative justice, in
behalf of their sins that shall be saved; then was He not
tied, in point of right, to seek that satisfaction for the same,
either from Christ, or from us. And, truly, this opinion
(that God was tied to execute His vindicative justice either
upon Christ or us ) seems to represent God to the fancies of
Christians, as taking content in the evils and torments which
Christ suffered (that being the only recompense that vin-
dicative justice seeks), without consideration of that perfect
obedience and zeal to God’s glory in the saving of His
creature, together with His justice and holiness; in regard
whereof God indeed accepteth the same. Now, though it be
necessary for the maintenance of Christianity to say, that
the course which God taketh for the reconciling of man to
Himself according to it, preserveth His glory entire, as being
agreeable to His Divine perfections (for to say, that man
cannot propose a course more for His glory than that which
it advanceth, is rather honourable for Christianity than ne-
necessary for the maintenance of the truth of it) ; yet to say,
that God’s wisdom, in designing this course according to the

* “ Cæterum cum iis (Socinianis) solummodo mihi res non est. Sunt et
alii pili, probi, doctissimi Theologi, et ad
caput satisfactionis Christi quod attinet,
rurā δεδομένως retinentissimi, qui quam-
vis tale attributum et virtutem” (scil.
justiam) “essentialem Deo inesse di-
recte negare non suadissant, omnes
tamen ejus egressus, et totum circa
peccata exercitium, adeo liberum et
ex mero libero voluntatis Divinae motu
et benefaciendi dependens esse asserunt,
ut, illa non obstante, potuerit Deus,
motu Suo, vero, nullus cum negotio, alius,
extra satisfactionem Christi, modis et
vis (si modo sapientiae Suæ sic visum
fuisset), peccata auferre, condonare,
abolere, neque ullam poenam transgres-
sæ legis irrogare; et sententiam hanc
Augustino scilicet acceptam ferunt.”
Diatriba de Justitia Divina seu Justi-
tiae Vindicatricis Vindicis, quibus es-
entialis illa Natura Divinae proprietas
ex sacris Literis demonstratur, et con-
tra Socinianos . . asseritur: nemo ex-
crucitum ejus necessarium, una cum in-
dispensabili satisfactionis Jesu Christi
ad salutem peccatorum necessitate, ad-
versus virorum doctiss. G. Tissi,
G. Vossii, et S. Rhetorfortis, aliasque
impugnationes, praeteras astruiri:
authore Johanne Owen, Coll. Æd.

† This is the express doctrine of
Owen’s book as quoted in the last
134, 135.
OF THE COVENANT OF GRACE.

exigence of all His perfections, is so exhausted and equalled by the work of it (as it were), that His own wisdom could have designed no other course to attain the same end, preserving His own glory entire, is to make the wisdom of God subject to be comprehended by man, supposing what He hath revealed of the works of it. But as nothing is more derogatory to the glory of God, than to say that God can do nothing but that which He doeth; so, supposing the fall of man, the will of God to propagate mankind, and to tender him means of reconciliation, to say that God could take no other course to effect this but that which He took, is, without doubt, in the next degree, derogatory to His glory.

§ 3. In the next place, I infer, that as well the active as the passive obedience of Christ is imputed to us, in consideration of remission of sins and everlasting life.

§ 4. It is said, that this opinion,—that we are justified only in consideration of the sufferings of Christ,—was first heard of in the parts of Germany contained in the upper Palatinate; and, being censured by the divines of Wittemberg, went no further among those of the confession of Augsburg. But the remains of it subsisting at Heidelberg, John Cameron,

BOOK II.

it seems, studying there in his younger time, brought it with him into the Reformed churches of France: where it caused such a heat as had come to a breach, had not the dispute been put to silence*.

§ 5. I have not seen what reasons that ingenuous man maintained it with. This I may take upon me to say: one of the principal was this7:—because that, which we are released of in consideration of Christ, that of Christ is imputed to us, not that, which we are not: now, as it is certain, that we are released of punishment in consideration of Christ, so it is certain, that we are not released of the obligation to new obedience, according to the performance or neglect whereof God will judge us: therefore, in regard of the sufferings of Christ, our debt of punishment is discharged; whereas, were the active obedience of Christ imputed unto us, we could not stand bound to the like obedience, nor be judged by our bond to it: so that, ascribing remission of sins to the sufferings of Christ and faith in His blood alone, he ascribeth salvation to our new obedience; according to the manifest

* John Cameron spent a year at Heidelberg as tutor to the sons of the Chancellor of Navarre in 1607, 8 (Bayle, Diction.). After passing the next ten years at Bourdeaux as minister of the Reformed Church there, he was summoned in 1618 to be Professor of Divinity in the Academy of Saumur (Id., ibid.); opposed by the synod of Poitou on the ground of his holding the tenet of Piscator above mentioned (Id., ibid.); but admitted after some delay by the National Synod of Alais in 1620 (Id., ibid.: and Aymon, Syn. National des Eglises Réformées de France, tom. ii. p. 173. Hague 1710, or Quicke, Synod. in Gall. Reformat., vol. ii. p. 29, in Syn. Alem., c. viii. § 53).

He did not however introduce Piscator's tenet into France. It had been condemned (as Piscator's) by the Synod of Gap in 1603 (Aymon, tom. i. pp. 257, 258; or Quicke's translation, as above quoted, vol. i.); by that of La Rochele in 1607 (Aymon, ibid., pp. 301, 302); by that of Privas in 1612 (ibid., pp. 399, 400), which issued a detailed "Refutation" of the doctrine (ibid., pp. 457-461); and by that of Tonneins in 1614 (ibid., tom. ii. p. 13); but was "tacitly received, or at least pronounced void of error" (Mosheim, Eccles. Hist., Bk. iv. Cent. xvii. Sect. ii. Pt. ii. c. 2. § 13, vol. iv. p. 230. ed. Soames 1841) in the Council of the Isle of France. See also Bossuet as quoted in note u.

7 Piscator certainly urged this among other reasons.—"Si imputatur nobis obedienciat Christi quam Is præstiti legi Divinae, sequitur Christum illam præstitisse pro nobis, id est, vice nostra; ac proinde nos ab obediencia legis Divinae esse liberatos. . . . Atqui nos non sumus liberati ab obediencia legis Divinae. . . . Ergo obediencia Christi, qua Is obeditiv legi Divinae, nobis non imputatur." "Piscat., Thesæ Theol. (as above quoted), vol. iii. loc. xxxix. pp. 440, 441. And see also the Scripta Quedam Adversaria de Causa Meritoria Nostrorum coram Dei Justificationis &c., quoted in the same note. The same argument is attributed also to Piscator by Mentzer and Gerhard as there cited.—Cameron's own arguments do not appear to have been published. In one of his later tracts (entitled, Argumenta in Disputatione adv. Praecedentes Theses Proposita, Op., p. 364. b. Francof. 1642) he gives up the dogma itself.
sentences\textsuperscript{a} of the Scripture, which I have produced in due place\textsuperscript{a}.

§ 6. In the mean time you see, this opinion stands upon the same imaginary presumption of the immediate and personal imputation of Christ’s death in consideration of the remission of sin, which the adversaries thereof proceed upon, as well in consideration of God’s assigning everlasting life, as of His forgiving of sin. And therefore I shall easily shut it out of doors: upon supposition, first, of that which hath been said concerning the condition that qualifieth for remission of sins; having shewed\textsuperscript{b}, that it is no other faith but the sincere and cordial profession of Christianity: secondly, of that which hath been said here\textsuperscript{c}, to shew, that the immediate imputation of any thing done or suffered by Christ to any man’s person in satisfaction for his sins, is a mere imagination, which the Gospel of Christ never taught us; but only, that, in consideration of the obedience of Christ in publishing the Gospel under such difficulties as ended in the death of the cross, God grants remission of sins and life everlasting to all them, that take upon them resolutely and sincerely to profess Christianity. For, these things being admitted, it is manifest, that as well the active as the passive obedience of Christ is considered, in passing the promises which the Gospel brings, upon the terms which it requires. Neither indeed can there be any consideration of Christ’s sufferings in the business, without the consideration of the free and voluntary and perfect obedience which He undertook and underwent them with; all the course of His life, wherein He displayed that only accomplished mirror of virtue that ever the sun saw, being a continual course of suffering that hardship, which He was no otherwise obliged to undergo, than because He had undertaken to shew such example to such effect and purpose. And therefore, if any Scriptures seem to make mention of His sufferings without speaking of that obedience which He undertook and endured them with; it is easy to have recourse unto those, whereby I have shewed the account which God had of that free and constant obedience, which He undertook and went through them with.

\textsuperscript{a} Corrected from MS.; “sentence,” in orig. text.
\textsuperscript{b} Above, c. vi. § 3; c. vii. § 1, sq.
\textsuperscript{c} Above, c. xxix. § 7.
§ 7. And, truly, it is an inconsequence, which no reason
pardons, to imagine any other consideration for that re-
mission of sins which the Gospel tenders, than for everlasting
life: seeing it is manifest, that the Gospel tenders not re-
mission of sins without everlasting life; nor can any man
attain really the state of remission of sins without attaining
as really and effectually the right of everlasting life. For as
it is evident in reason, that in what consideration\(^d\) God one
day actually gives everlasting life, in that consideration He
determined from everlasting to give it; so it is no less evident,
that the person that becomes so qualified as the Gospel
requires, is, at that time and from that time that he becomes
so qualified, invested in the right of those promises which the
Gospel tenders, in the same consideration, for which they are
either granted from everlasting, or bestowed in due time.
And I conceive, that neither Cameron nor any of his opinion
would undertake, that eternal life is assigned to the new
obedience of Christians without consideration of what Christ
hath done for us; which surely was not done but in suffer-
ing, and by suffering for us.

§ 8. It is therefore for the honour of Christianity to
maintain, that God, for Christ’s sake, is ready to admit the
heirs of everlasting damnation into the inheritance of ever-
lasting happiness, in never so short a time, as we can believe,
that they can change their resolution from following sin to
profess that belief and conversation which Christianity im-
porteth. Suppose we believe Zosimus, when, to the disgrace
of it, he reports, that Constantine was persuaded to become
Christian in hope to come clear of those sins, which were so
great that he could find no other means to expiate them\(^e\);
provided we understand always the condition which Christi-
anity requires. Be a man’s by-past sins greater or less, it is
the claim of Christianity, that there is no sin so small as to
be cleansed without it, none so great as not to be cleansed
by it: all in consideration of Christ, Whom it preacheth. If
this be as soon done as a man’s mind can change, it is to be
remembered, that the change of a man’s mind infers the
change of all his life that remains; and that the change of

\(^d\) Corrected from MS.; "considera-
tions," in orig. text.

\(^e\) Zos., Hist., lib. ii. c. 29; pp. 149,
his life must obtain the effect of those promises, the right whereof he is invested with upon the change of his mind: all in the same precious consideration of our Lord Christ and His obedience.

§ 9. Lastly, I infer, that there is no reason to imagine, that the redemption of mankind should require our Lord Christ to suffer the pains of the damned; supposing that we are delivered from damnation by His sufferings: and, therefore, that this cannot be the intent of Christ's descent into hell, which the Apostles' Creed declares. I pretend not here to dispute, what are the pains of the damned, or what were the pains of the soul which our Lord Christ endured upon the cross; or, in order to it, how essentially requisite it is, in the pains of the damned, that they should despair of God's favour for ever, and therefore ever to come free of that estate. This I infer upon the premises, that the redemption of mankind doth not require, that Christ should suffer the same kind of pains, which we must have suffered had not He interposed for us; but that He tendered that obedience to God, in undergoing whatsoever the execution of that commission, which God had imposed upon Him, required, which, coming from the Son of God, was valuable.

f "Nihil actum erat, si corporea tantum morte defunctus fuisse Christus: sed operae simul pretium erat, ut Divinas ulterior copias aternasque mortis horrore, quasi consertis manibus, lucari. Correccionem passis nostris illi impositam fuisse ex propheta nuper retulimus, fuisse propter scele rae, nostra a Patre percussum, attributum propter nostras infirmitates. Quibus significat, in locum sceleratorum sparsorem, vadem, adeoque instar rei submissum, Qui dependeret ac persolveret omnes, quae ab illis expetendae erant, poneas: uno hoc duntaxat excepto, quod doloribus mortis non poterat detineri. Ergo si ad inferos descenderis, dicatur, nihil mirum est; quum eam mortem perturberit, quae sceleratis ab irato Deo indigentur." Calvin, Instit., lib. ii. c. xvi. § 10; Op., tom. ix. p. 132.

b. "It was rise in pulpits" (i. e. in England), "and usuall in catechismes, that the death of Christ Jesus on the Crosse, and His blood-shed for the remission of our sinnes, were the least cause and means of our redemption; but He did, and must, suffer 'the death of the soule,' and 'the very same paines which the damned doe in hell,' before we could be ransomed from the wrath of God; and this was that descent of Christ to hell, which we are taught by the Creed to beleive. This opinion began to preuaile so fast, that children were trained to it, and the people led to controlo the Scriptures," &c. &c. Bilson, Survey of Christ's Sufferings for Man's Redemption, and of His Descent to Hades or Hell for our Deliverance, Pref., p. 3, Lond. 1604.—See also Rob. Parker, De Descensu Domini Nostri Jesu Christi ad Inferos (Amst. 1611), written in defence of Calvin's dogmas against Bilson: Heylin, On the Creed, Art. Descend into Hell, pp. 279 sq. (Lond. 1673): and Pearson, On the Creed, Art. Descend into Hell, vol. i. p. 388. (Oxf. 1833), and notes.
BOOK II.

In worth to move God to dispense in that original law, which He had made the rule of our actions by right of our creation upon pain of everlasting death, and to allow everlasting life upon remission of sins to all that should embrace Christianity. For seeing the sufferings of Christ were not intended for mere punishment (so that, He enduring that which we were liable to, we should no longer remain chargeable with it), but to tender God a consideration, valuable to satisfy Him, not to execute the penalty of His original law upon us, but to abate of it by tendering us new terms of reconcilement and peace with Him; there can be no reason, why He should undergo the same kind and nature of punishment, which we must have suffered had not He interposed. And therefore, whatsoever the pains were which Christ endured in His soul, either upon the cross or in order to His cross, being abandoned by God to the will of Satan and his ministers, even unto death (which here I am not concerned to dispute); this I must infer from the premises, that we are to seek for no other consideration for which we are admitted to grace, but that, which the whole tenor of the Scriptures and the consent of Christ's Church holds forth to us; that is to say, the precious blood of our Lord Christ shed upon the cross for us.

§ 10. Having thus excluded the two extreme opinions concerning the justification of sinners by the Gospel of Christ, which I hold to be equally destructive to Christianity on contrary sides: the one acknowledging no condition to qualify us for the promises of the Gospel but the immediate imputation of the merits and sufferings of Christ, sent to die for us; the other acknowledging no consideration of Christ, in tendering or accepting the covenant of grace, and the condition which it requires: I will now proceed to resolve the merit of mean opinions concerning the same, from the premises.

§ 11. The first is the opinion of many of the Reformation: that make the justification of sinners by the Gospel to consist in remission of sins, tendered and embraced by that faith, which consisteth in a resolution of trusting and repos-
OF THE COVENANT OF GRACE. 593

premising repentance, as a condition requisite to make this confidence lively and Christian, not sensual, carnal, and presumptive; and supposing always, and inferring upon it, the promise of God’s Spirit, sanctifying, and enabling to perform that new obedience, which qualifieth for the world to come.

§ 12. That there is this opinion amongst the reformed, and those of them, that labour most to interpret the Reformation so as not to contradict the faith of the Church, I may well say, without going further than myself; who do acknowledge this to have been mine opinion for many years, and do certainly know, that it was maintained in my time, against the furious pretences of zealots, in the University of Cambridge.

§ 13. And of this opinion I will say three things. First, Not prejudicial to the faith. My reason is, because of that repentance, which it supposeth, and the consideration of new obedience in obtaining everlasting life, which it inferreth. For repentance, in this argument, cannot signify conversion from any particular sin, but the change of the whole man, of his intentions, and by consequence of his actions, to seek God instead of himself and this world: and therefore containeth in it whatsoever the Gospel can require, to make any man, that is surprised in the state of sin, capable of God’s grace by Christ; inasmuch as this change cannot be wrought without the tender of pardon for Christ’s sake, upon that which His Gospel requireth. For repentance thus understood, as it turneth from all sin, so it importeth a resolution to all that goodness which Christianity prescribeth; which is all, that he who is presently surprised in sin can have, to come out of it: supposing this resolution not to be superficial, but rooted in him by frequent prayers, and tears, [with*] such works of humiliation as are only able, and absolutely requisite, to make effectual impression in man’s mind, always apt through variety of objects to entertain impressions tending to contrary resolutions. And therefore, this repentance being required to the truth of living and justifying faith, as new obedience to the attaining of the world to come, and every thing required by God’s law being of necessity that, which quali-

* Corrected from MS. Misprinted “which” in orig. text.
BOOK II.

Sith for God's promises in His account who tenders the law; the condition, which this opinion requireth to qualify for the promises of the Gospel, is materially, and for the things it contains, the same which I have shewed that the Gospel requires: though formally, and in express terms, it renounces all consideration, in the justification of sinners, but that of Christ and His obedience embraced by faith; as I have said. This I may say, that in the remembrances of those things, which I have said in public to the people concerning this point during the time that I was of this opinion, I do not remember now, that there is any thing, that I could not presently say, my judgment being thus far changed.

§ 14. For, secondly, I must say, that this opinion is not true. As may appear by that which hath been said, to shew, what it is the Gospel requires on our part to qualify us for the promises which it tenders on God's; and, by consequence, what is that faith which alone justifieth. For having shewed the true sense of the Scriptures, according to that which the Jews' opinion that St. Paul disputes against (still extant and visible in their constitutions), which the consent of Christ's Church, which the consequences of the difference between the literal and mystical sense of Moses' law (pointed out in part by some modern writers), hath taught me; I do conclude the sense of them, which this opinion inferreth, though it be not destructive to Christianity, yet [is not] not deducible from the principles of it by good divinity. And, truly, to require repentance to the truth of that faith which only justifieth, and not to make it part of that quality, in consideration whereof God for Christ's sake allows remission of sins; is to say things utterly inconsequent: inasmuch as I have said, that God's consideration imports only this, that He decrees remission of sins for repentance in the nature of a motive cause, not that He is moved by repentance to decree it. Neither is it any way consequent for him, that admitted new obedience to be in consideration in bestowing everlasting life, to stick at admitting repentance to be in consideration

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\( ^a \) Above, cc. vi. vii.
\( ^1 \) See above, c. viii. § 5—16.
\( ^1 \) Above, c. ix. § 17—42.
\( ^1 \) See above, cc. v. § 10. note h, and

vi. § 17; and Bk. I. Of the Pr. of Chr. Tr., c. xiii.

\( ^* \) Added from MS.
in bestowing the right of it. For though the promises of the Gospel in this life are many (remission of sins, and reconcile-
ment, regeneration, justification, sanctification, adoption of sons, and if there be any thing else of that rank), yet, what-
soever difference a divine may justly argue between these
from the Scriptures, it were a gross inconvenience to say,
that, the condition of the Gospel being performed, they are
not all due to him in whom it is found. The term of sancti-
fication itself, though it necessarily imports the habitual
dwelling of the Holy Ghost in him that is reconciled to God,
because we know the Gospel promises it; yet it supposes not
only that promise, but also another, that God will accept it
for holiness in him, in whom original concupiscence notwith-
standing remains. And if the term of regeneration import
that inherent disposition of mind, to which a man by be-
coming a Christian is born anew; yet that of adoption ex-
presses the free will of God, by which He accepteth him,
that is changed to such a disposition, for His son. So that
neither remission of sins, nor right to the kingdom, can be
understood to be assigned under the title of justification in
consideration of Christ, without consideration of that con-
deration which the Gospel of Christ requireth.

§ 15. Lastly, I say, that the said opinion is apt to give
just occasion of a mistake in justifying faith, that may be
destructive to the Christian faith. My reason is, because it
is hard so to provide (as hitherto sufficient provision could
never be made), as to distinguish from it the opinion of justi-
fication, by believing that Christ died for him that believes
as one of the elect, for whom alone Christ died; which is no
less destructive to the faith, than the heresy of the Antino-
mians, that a man is justified in consideration of Christ,
before we believe it\textsuperscript{n}. And, truly, the manifold controversies
and everlasting wrangles, which the misunderstanding of the
nature of that faith which alone justifieth hath raised among
those that depart from the Church of Rome (some making it
to consist in believing that a man is predestinate to life,
others in trusting in God through Christ; some making
only the passive obedience of Christ, others both active and
passive, to be imputed to us; some making justification to

\textsuperscript{n} See above, c. i. § 11. note c.
consist only in remission of sins, others in that and in the imputation of Christ's merits both o), may justly move them to retire to the simplicity of the Gospel, which they will never find in any terms but those which I propose;—that all the promises thereof are due, upon making good the true profession of Christianity.

§ 16. If it be said, that those homilies, which the article of the Church of England p refers us to for the right understanding of justification and justifying faith, seem to express this opinion q, which I esteem neither true nor yet destructive to the faith: I answer ingenuously, that they seem to me so to do; but that, so doing, the sense of it is utterly unreconcilable with those things which I have quoted out of the office of baptism, and the beginning of the catechism r. Which being as much subscribed by the clergy as the articles and homilies are, and also containing the whole religion of the people, and the clergy's therefore as Christians (for the people, being not acquainted with the articles but when they change their curate, had no means to take further notice of them), is by consequence to be preferred in case of competition. Unreconcilable I say, as far as this opinion is unreconcilable to that which I have proposed: the communion of the Church no ways requiring, that men should be reconciled in the interpretation of the Scriptures, provided it draw no consequence destructive to the faith; as this doth not,
but that which in terms it complies with doth. And, therefore, I have held it my duty (that opinion having broken forth into a manifest heresy of the Antinomians, and the detestation of that tending to let in a contrary heresy of the Socinians, as first it bred it) to declare to all, that are not professed enemies to the Church of England, and the Catholic Church with it, the first misunderstanding, from whence I conceive such dangerous errors proceed; that, if God ever send order out of that confusion in religion which now rules among us, I may have contested, that there can be no sure ground for it, but the plain faith of the Catholic Church.

§ 17. It is well enough known, that there is still another opinion concerning justification; to wit, that of the school doctors⁴, which the council of Trent seemeth to have made matter of faith**: which maketh the beginning of justification.

⁴ "The publishing of this book may serve for my protestation, what is to be considered, if ever God send order, for the ground of the said order." Added in margin in MS.


a "Declarat praeterea (sancta synod. et ipsius justificationis exordium in adulta s Dei per Christum Jesum preveniente gratia sumendum esse" &c.

b "Dispoununt autem ad ipsam juditiam, dum excitati Divina gratia et adjuti, idem ex auditu concipientes, libere moventur in Deum, credentes vera esse quae Divinitus revelata et promissa sunt, atque illud in primis, a Deo justificari impium per gratiam Eius, per redemptionem quae est in Christo Jesus, et dum, peccatores se esse intelligentes, a Divinae justitiae timore, quod utilet concutientur, ad considerandam Dei misericordiam ac convertendop in spem ergiturunt, identes Deum sibi propter Christum propitium fore, iliumque tamquam omnis justitiae fontem diligere incipient; ac propriae moven tur adversus peccata per odam aliquod et detestationem, hoc est, per eam potentiem, quam ante baptismum agi oportet; denique dum proponent suscipere baptismum, inchoare novam vitam, et servare Divina mandata. De hac dispositione scriptum est: 'Accidentem ad Deum oportet credere quia est:'' &c. &c. "Hanc dispositionem, seu preparationem, justificatio ipsa consecuitur, quae non est sola peccatorum remissio, sed et sanctification, et renovatio interioris hominis per voluntariam susceptionem gratiae et donorum: unde homo ex injusto fit justus, et ex inimico amicus, ut sit hæres secondum sem vitae aternæ. Huys justificationis causa sunt: finialis," &c.&c.; "deum unica formalis causa est justitia Dei: non qua Ipsæ justus est, sed qua nos justos facit, qui videlicet ab Eo donati renovatur spiritu mentis nostræ, et non modo reputamus sed vere justi nominamus et sumus; justitiam in nobis recipientes, unusquisque suam, secondum mensuram quam Spiritus Sanctus partitur singulis propt vult, et secondum propriam cujusque dispositionem et cooperationem." Concil. Trident., Sess. vi. capp. 5-7: ap. Labb., Concil., tom. xiv. pp. 758. C—759. D.—"Quibus verbis justificationis impii descriptio insinuatur, ut sit translationis ab eo statu, in quo homo nascitur filius Adae, in statum gratiae," &c.

"Quae quidem translationis, post evangelium promulgatum, sine lavacro regenerationis, aut ejus voto, fieri non potest." Ibid., cap. 4. p. 758. B. C.—"Sacrosancta oecumenica et generalis Tridentina Synodus," &c. &c. "expone nere intendit omnibus Christi fidelibus veram sanamque doctrinam ipsius justificationis, quam . . . Christus . . . docuit, apostoli tradiderunt, et catholica ecclesia, Spiritu Sancto suggesterente, perpetuo retinuit; districtius inhibendo, ne deinceps audeat quisquam aliter cre-
to consist in that faith, which believeth the Gospel to be true; whereupon, as there necessarily follows servile fear of that punishment, to which it discovers all that refuse it to be liable, so it gives ground enough of hope to all that resolve not to refuse it; so that, the mind balancing between the love of God (which prefers the next world) and the love of ourselves and of this world (which prefers this), if a man (conceiving that sorrow for his sins, which the love of God, not the fear of punishment, suggests, and acting those works of penance, which, if a Christian before, the neglect of his calling and profession requires) resolve to prefer the love of God in all his actions for the time to come, the faith and the hope, which he had before without form, now being informed by the love of God above all, and his servile fear turned into filial, he becomes just, because formally endowed with this love, which makes all his endowments supernatural, and proportionable to the reward of everlasting happiness which the Gospel tenders; provided that he receive the sacrament of baptism, or effectually desire it, if it were to be had.

§ 18. Of this opinion I say, first, that it committeth as great a fault as the former in assigning the true conceit and notion of justifying faith. For whereas there are indeed (as I have shewed*) three significations of faith in the writings of the apostles (wherein only there is express question of the justification of Christians), the first and last whereof depend upon the middle, as the cause and effect of it; and that the apostles intend the second sense properly, when they dispute against the Jews, that a man is not justified by works nor by the Law, but by grace and by faith (that is, by the Gospel, tendering the covenant of grace, and by that faith, whereby we undertake that Christianity whereinto we are baptized); they, who make the office of faith in justifying no more than believing the Gospel to be true, seem as void of the truth in that, as those who place it in reposeing trust and confidence in God upon it. For as the Gospel gives sufficient ground of trust and confidence in God from the first moment that any man hears of it (what state soever it is, and how sinful, in which it overtakes him), if we speak of confidence that we
dere, pradicare, aut docere, quam prae- senti decreto statuitur ac declaratur." * Above, c. vi. § 1—§; c. vii. § 1, 2. Ibid., proem. in Decret. de Justifica-
may or shall obtain remission of sins upon condition of embracing and performing the condition which it advanceth; so, if we speak of trust and confidence in God, as indeed and actually reconciled to God, seeing it supposest justification, it must needs suppose that faith which justifieth: and so justifying faith cannot be said to consist in it, but by consequence of nature to produce it. On the other side: whereas all the works that a man can do, after he sincerely believes the truth of the Gospel, but before he hath made profession of Christianity by being baptized, cannot avail to the forgiveness of sin, much less to entitle him to everlasting life, according to the doctrine of the apostles; it can by no means be imagined, that when they attribute justification to faith, whether alone, or in opposition to works or to the Law, they do attribute it to that faith, whereby he remains not justified, not to that, which he is necessarily justified as soon as he hath. And this is the true end of that endless dispute between faith and good works; when it is questioned, whether true faith can be without good works, or not. For it is manifest, that heretics, schismatics, and sinful Christians, do as truly believe, either the whole Gospel (so far as the common salvation of Christians requireth), or at least that part which their heresy or schism contesteth not, as a good Christian really doth. It is no less manifest, that not only heretics and schismatics, but even bad and sinful Christians also, not only may, but really have a true and real confidence in God as to the world to come; without which those that believe the world to come could not live and die in that course, which indeed renders them uncapable of it. But the faith, which whosoever is baptized plighteth to God, to profess the faith which He hath taught to the death, and to live according to it, must needs either be counterfeit (and so produce no effect but the damning of him that is baptized with it), or produce the works of faith, so long as it is and continues sincere. And thus is the tradition of the Church concerning justification by the good works of Christians, reconciled not only with the doctrine of the apostles,—that a man is not justified by the works that go before Christianity,—but also with the tradition of the Church concerning the

\[ \text{See above, c. ix. § 17–42.} \]

\[ \text{See above, c. viii. § 11 sq.} \]
ingredience of baptism into the same work\(^a\): and with the
doctrine of the fathers, manifestly distinguishing that true
faith, which produceth good works, from that dead faith, which
doeth not, not by the accession of love, but by marks intrin-
sical to the nature of it\(^b\); manifestly distinguishing those
good works which indeed do justify, from those, which for
the mind which they are done with do not justify, but
for their kind might, had they been done by Christians, by
the boundary between them, which is baptism; but so, that
the works themselves are but the material part, that is, the
thing which the covenant of grace requireth; but the reason
and consideration, in which they are accepted by God to that
effect, is not the influence of our free will, though cured
of concupiscence (as cured it may be in this life) and acted
by God's Spirit, but the grace of God, moving Him in consi-
deration of our Lord Christ's sufferings, first, to publish the
Gospel, then to accept the profession and life of Christians
according to it for a condition qualifying them for that which
He promiseth by it. Which is but the English of that which
is commonly said, that God accepteth of our works as dipped
in Christ's blood; which He accepteth not, if He accept
them not to that effect which His Gospel promiseth, having
excluded\(^c\) (as He doth, if the Gospel be true) all that He
accepteth not to that purpose.

§ 19. Having said this, in common, as it were, to both
these opinions, in particular, to that which I proposed last,
or rather to the rest of it, I say three things. First, that it
may be understood two ways; to wit, that this holds, either
by virtue of the original law of God, or by virtue of that dis-
pensation in it, that abatement of the penalty of it, which the
Gospel imports. For so long as it is only said, that God
infuseth into him, that receives the sacrament of baptism out
of a resolution of loving God above all, a habit of super-
natural righteousness; which is formally the remission of
sins, as extinguishing them by contrary dispositions; and
that this is the righteousness, which he pleads to God for
the reward of the world to come: I say, all this while it is

\(^a\) See above, c. iv.
\(^b\) See above, c. vi. § 9.
\(^c\) So corrected in errata to the folio edition. That edition omits the word "excluded;" and the M.S. corrects, "hating (as He doth,"
&c.)
not said, whether the nature and kind of the quality thus produced oblige God to give him that happiness of the world to come in recompence of it; or whether the promise of the Gospel, decreed and declared out of His mere goodness, render that due by way of recompence, which otherwise this disposition could no way claim. For he that says, that the natural worth of the qualities here supposed claims the reward, as due by God's justice, must needs say, that they justify by God's original law; but he that says, by God's promise, and only by that justice which consists in keeping promise, by the covenant of grace. Now then I say, if that this opinion proceed upon [the4] first ground, it is destructive to the Christian faith. For I have shewed5, that the Gospel contains a covenant of grace, not only in regard of helps of grace to fulfil the condition which it requires (which I have shewed, that God grants in consideration of our Lord Christ and His obedience), but also, because in the same consideration He accepteth of the condition, both to extinguish the debt of sin, and to entitle us to everlasting life, which otherwise it enables us not to claim; and both these regards, I have shewed6, belong to the Christian faith. Now he that affirmeth, that the righteousness which God infuses into those that are baptized, challengeth remission of sins and everlasting life (or rather challengeth everlasting life, because it extinguisheth sin) by God's original justice, acknowledges indeed the grace of God in granting those helps, by which we attain the said righteousness (and that in consideration of our Lord Christ and His obedience), but acknowledgeth not the grace of God through Christ in accepting of it to such purpose; and therein, as I suppose, denies the covenant of grace which the Gospel contains.

§ 20. Secondly, I say, that there is enough in the doctrine of the School, or in the decree of the Council of Trent, to shew, that they cannot intend the first sense; but that they must acknowledge it to God's free promise, which being accepted becomes the covenant of grace. This follows upon several points of their doctrine. First, as they make at

4 Added from MS.
* Above, c. viii. § 4.

THORNDIKE.

Misprinted 253 in folio edit.
5 Above, cc. viii. § 4, sq.; x. § 1, sq.
6 Above, c. viii. § 4.
least the material of original sin to consist in concupiscence: the remains whereof in the regenerate are therefore (even with them) of the same nature and kind, though rebated and acquitted of the nature and effect of sin; which is, to make liable to death. For this cannot hold, but in regard of several laws, whereof the one forbiddeth this concupiscence, the other allows reconciliation and grace supposing it; as I said afore: that law that succeeds, being the covenant of grace. Secondly, as it requires the sacrament of baptism to the allowance of this righteousness, in lieu of the reward which it challenges. For, the sacrament of baptism being a part of the Christian law, which is the covenant of grace, and so a secondary and positive provision for the salvation of mankind, lost by God's original law; it were a contradiction to say, that any thing claimed by virtue thereof should be due by God's original law. Thirdly, and lastly, in regard of that sound sense, in which they clearly and freely maintain the satisfaction of Christ; which, by the premisses, is nothing else, but the consideration, for which God accepts the acts and the qualities which the Gospel requires in due plea for that which it promises. For, imputation being nothing else, in common reason, but the immediate consequence of satisfaction, the righteousness which God imputes to Abraham's spiritual seed, as to his person, according to St. Paul (Rom. iv. 16—24), cannot depend upon the mere worth of the condition required, but upon the free grace of God, accepting it for that it is not worth, in consideration of the obedience of Christ.

§ 21. Lastly, I say, there is appearance of reason, to move

[Yet in such way as to give appearance of reason for imputing the worse.]

b See above, c. xx. § 4. note s; and Laurence's Bampton Lectures, note 12. on Lect. iii.

1 Above, c. xx. § 32.

k See above, § 17. note u.

men that are jealous of the glory of God's grace, to think, that they claim the promises of the Gospel as due by God's original law to that infused righteousness, by having whereof they say we are righteous before God. First, in that they depart from the language of the Scripture, and the true meaning thereof, in making justification to consist in the infusion of righteousness; which though it presupposeth, by the premises, formally it signifieth not. For having shewed, that the condition which the Gospel requires, is allowed of grace, in consideration of Christ, to qualify us for the promises of it: it remains beyond question, that the righteousness which the Gospel requires, is of itself real true righteousness; because it is God, That allows it and accepts it to that effect, to which He accepts not the righteousness of a hypocrite: always understanding it to be the righteousness of one, that turneth from sin with a sincere and effectual resolution to serve God in all things for the future; whose righteousness may well be called infused righteousness, in regard of the helps of God's grace whereby it is effected, though we suppose no other kind of quality (beside that disposition which brings a man to baptism) to succeed upon it, but only the habitual assistance of the Holy Ghost, promised to enable all them, that sincerely undertake Christianity, to perform what they undertake. Thus then, making justification to consist, not in God's allowance, but in His act of infusing righteousness, they create appearance to reason, that the righteousness so infused is in their opinion that righteousness before God, to which the promises of the Gospel are due by His original law. For if there were not other points of their doctrine to create another interpretation of it, there could be no other sense for it than this. Secondly, in that they make this righteousness to consist, not in any acceptation and allowance of God, but in His grace really infused into that soul, which, out of an act of the love of God raised by the helps of His grace, supposing faith and hope joined with servile fear afore, had resolved upon baptism. For what allowance can this love be imagined to need, as of grace, to make the promises of the Gospel by God's original law due

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See n. g. the quotation from Vasquez, below in note u.

See above, § 17. notes t, u.
to it, if it be admitted for righteousness before God? Here
I must do them right. I must not say, that it is the Council
of Trent, or that it is any act of the Church obligatory to
all the communion that owns it, that obliges them to attrib-
ute the effect of justifying to God’s infused grace by virtue
of the nature of it, and not by virtue of His grace in accept-
ing it to that purpose. For it is notorious; and you may find
the names of the doctors in Vasquez (In Prim. Secund., Disput.
cxiv. numm. 1—35), that hold this grace not to render men
graceful to God for itself, but by His free accepting it to
that effect; the Nominalists in particular, besides Durandus
and Alliacensis by name. In the mean time, no man can

° See below, § 22.—That the Coun-
cil of Trent does not assert this extreme
doctrine in terminis, may be seen from
its words quoted above, § 17, note u : 
and from Vasquez’ arguments (as cited
in next note, c. iii. p. 681. a, b) to
prove that those words imply it. The
decree of the Council asserts, that the
one formal cause of justification is in-
herent justice, “qua videlicet homo fit ex
injusto justus;” and in explaining this,
speaks of it, as “renovatio” &c. “per
voluntariam suspensionem gratiae et
donorum.” But it does not decide,
whether such inherent justice justifies
per se, or by the free acceptance of God.
Vasquez argues (which seems
an additional step), that “nemo proba-
biliter dicere posset Concilium loqua-
tum luisses’ de gratia, prout est non
tantum justitiae, sed etiam
prout habet annexam acceptancem
Dei, qua homo diligatur.” See also
§ 22, note y, below.

p The title of c. i. of this Disputation
(tom. ii. p. 674. b. Ingolst. 1612) is,
“Justitiam inhaerentem, sine favore et
condonatione addita, nec justificare ani-
man, nec eam a peccatis mortalius
purgare, varie scholastiici senserunt.”
In § 1. (ibid.) Vasquez states, that
“circa hanc questionem due solum
opiniones esse videtur: altera est ni-
hil nobis inesse, sive habitum, sive ope-
rationem, quod suapte natura possit
justificare animam et a peccatibus
purgare, sed ad hoc necessario indigeat
favore Dei acceptantis illud, et con-
donatis, aut remittentia peccatum, quod
quidem favore accedente justitiae in-
haerenti et intrinsecus nobis nostra justi-
ficatio compleatur. In quam quidem
sententiam non pauci scholastici con-
spirarunt, tametsi varie Ipsam defend-
dant.” He proceeds to name Ricardus,
Scotus, Gabriel, Occam, Joannes Me-
dina, in § 1. (ibid.): and in § 2. (ibid.),
as holding the same view on a some-
what different ground, Ricardus, Scotus,
and Gabriel, again; with Bonaventura,
Durandus, Paludanus, Conradus; and
in § 3. (ibid. p. 675. a.), in a third way,
Occam with the Nominalists; and ac-
quiescing in their view, Gregorius (de
Valentia), Gabriel again, and Petrus
Alliacensis.

q Gul. de Ockham, In Sentent. P.
Lomb., lib. i. Dist. xvii. Qu. 1. (fol.
Lugd. 1495): in which Questio, “impug-
nat sententiam eorum, qui dicient
inhaerentem justitiam esse qualitatem,
que suapte natura non possit Deo non
placere, et non possit non reddere ho-
minem justum, et a peccato ipsum
purgare” (Vasquez, as quoted in last
note, p. 675. a.).

r Durandus a Sancto Portiano, In
Sentent. P. Lomb., lib. i. Dist. xvii.
qu. 10. num. 4. (p. 140. a. Lugd. 1587):
“Circa essentiam habituum superna-
turalium quos infusos dicimus, nihil
omnino possunt actiones nostrae bone
vel male nisi meritorie quod genera-
tionem vel corruptionem, augmentum
dem diminutionem, sed omnino sunt effec-
tive a Deo.”—and lib. III. Dist. xxxi.
qu. 1, num. 6. (ibid. pp. 599. b, 600. a).

s Petrus Alliacensis, In Sentent. P.
Lomb., lib. i. Qu. ix. art. 2.—e. g.
s. a.) “est, quod aliquis non est dignus
vita aeterna ab aliqua causa creatum sed
a sola acceptione Divina. Patet satis
ex praeditis,” &c.
deny, that it is lawful to hold, that we are justified by the
worth and natural perfection of God's infused grace; which
though He freely giveth, yet can He not refuse justification
having given it. And, therefore, they who place their reli-
gion in making their distance from heretics (as our Puritans
from Antichrist) as wide as they can possible, have taught
and still do teach, that the supernatural infused righteousness
of Christians (which, as I said, they make to consist principi-
ally in the love of God above all things), of its own worth
and intrinsical perfection, and not by God's accepting of it
to that effect, not only formally remitteth sin, as formally it
expelleth the same, but so justifieth, that God were unjust
should He not justify Christians in consideration of it\(^n\). And
what could have been said more express, that it is due by God's
original law, not by any dispensation in it which the promise
of the Gospel importeth? that the grace of God in Christ is
not seen in rewarding that disposition which the Gospel re-
quireth, but in giving those helps whereby we attain unto it?
A thing never a whit more contradictory to that which hath
been proved here, than to other points of their own profession
alleged even now.

§ 22. Before I leave this point, for the clearing of that
which I said,—that the Council of Trent seemeth to have
enacted the doctrine of the School for matter of faith, not
that indeed it hath so done,—I will observe, that it hath not
decreed that we are justified by grace habitually dwelling
in the soul; but only, that, "through the merit of Christ's

\(^{1}\) I. e. according to the decree of
Trent, and within the Roman Com-
munion, in which either doctrine is left
admissible.

\(^{n}\) E. g. Non possum non mirari an-
tiques scholasticos, quos hactenus me-
memoravi, quod de justitia nobis inha-
rente ita abjecte senserint, ut veram ei
adscribere formidaverint rationem jus-
titiae, et sanctitatis inhaerentis, qua
suapte natura Deo necessario placeat.
Recentiores vero Theologos multo mag-
gis miratus sum, quod post praecelum
Concili Trinitini definitionem ... tam
exilem justitiam inhaerentem justis con-
cesserint, ut ex se non habet virtutem
tergendi maculas peccatorum, nec eos
purgare valeat, nisi favore et condona-
tione Dei relaxentur. Utrique autem,
si eorum sententiae recte expendantur,
veram rationem justitiae inhaerentis
e medio tollere videntur, quam Patres
Tridentini pro viribus adstruere et de-
fendere moliti sunt, sicut ratione con-
vincere conabunt. In hoc autem capite
solum ostendam, talem esse justitiam
nobis inhaerentem, ut suapte natura
abque ullo favore nos justos reddat,
ita ut per eam renovati non possimus
tanquam justi Deo non placeere. In
sequente vero monstrabo hae inhaerente
justitia ex natura ipsius solum consi-
derata ita nos a peccato purgari, ut
nulla indigeamus conditione, et fa-
vore Dei condonantis, et remittentis
peccatum." Vasquez, as before quoted,
c. ii. p. 676. b.
passion, the love of God is diffused in the hearts of those that are justified, and is inherent in them, so that, in their justification, with remission of sins, they receive faith, hope, and charity, as infused into them" (Sess. vi. cap. 7*). For here it is expressly claimed by doctors of that Church, not that the grace whereby we are justified is a quality habitually informing the soul of man, as supernaturally infused by God into it; but only, that faith, hope, and charity are infused into them that are justified, and inherent in them, as shed into their hearts by the Holy Ghost; which, they say, may all be understood, supposing that a man is justified by the acts of faith, hope, and love, infused or shed into the heart by the Holy Ghost, as well as by habits supernaturally created to reside in the soul. For you may see by Morinus in his late work De Administratione Penticentiae, VIII. 2, 3, 77, that for twelve hundred years after Christ, a good while after the school doctors were come in, there was no question at all made, whether we are justified by an infused habit of grace or not; and that it was about the year 1250 that this opinion entirely prevailed in the schools. Whereby it appeareth, that, as this opinion contains nothing destructive to the faith, if it be understood in that sense which the Church of Rome allows,—that it is not the natural worth of it which justifies,
but God's accepting of it to that effect,—so, if it did, yet could not the Church of Rome be said to teach any thing destructive to the faith, but only to allow [some\(^*\)] such things to be taught. For the Council of Vienna under Clement V. determines it not as matter of faith, but as the "more probable opinion;" as you may see, Clement, De Summa Trin. et Fide Cathol., tit. i. cap. 3.\(^{a}\) And therefore Albertus Pighius, De Libero Arbitrio, lib. v.\(^{b}\), notwithstanding this decree, sticks not to count this doctrine forged without any authority of Scripture. And those that speak of it with more respect than he, think not themselves tied to that, which the Council holds the more probable. It is indeed manifest by the experience of all Christians, that the custom and practice, even of supernatural actions, to which the inclination of corrupt nature is utterly averse, breeds in a man an habituated disposition of doing those things with case and pleasure, which, at the beginning of his Christianity, he could not do without offering himself much violence. But that habit which custom and practice leaves behind it, though supernatural for the cause or effect of it, because the acts upon which it accrues, as also those which it produces, cannot accrue from mere nature without the help of Christ's grace, is notwithstanding, for that wherein it consists, a disposition really qualifying the nature and substance of the soul, and inclining it to act

\(^*\) Corrected from MS. "To allow since such," in folio edit.

\(^a\) "Quibusdam ex is (theologis) de centibus, per virtutem baptismi parvulis quidem culpam remittit sed gratiam non conferri: allis e contra asserentibus, quod et culpa eisdem in baptismo remittitur, et virtutes ac informans gratia infunduntur quoad habitum, etiam non pro illo tempore quoad usum: nos autem attendentes generalem efficaciae mortis Christi (quae per baptismam applicatur pariter omnibus baptismatis), opinionem secundam (quae dicit, tam parvulis, quam adultis, conferri in baptismo informament gratiam et virtutes) tanquam probabilorem et dictis sanctorum ac doctorum modernorum theologiae magis consonam et concordem, sacro approbante concilio, duximus elegendum": Constitutiones Clementis Pape V. in Concilio Vienensi (A.D. 1312) edite, tit. i. De Summa Trin. et Fid. Cathol., § 3: in Corp. Jur. Canonicis, tom. ii. p. 351. Paris 1687.

\(^b\) " Gratiae accipionem variam non ex scholis sed ex Divinis Scripturis petemus. Quandocumque in illis fere imaginantur gratiam Dei qualitatem aliquam, increatam animae nostrae a Deo: vel cendam cum charitatis habitu, vel distinctam ab eodem. Quae commentaria universa existimo nec ex Scripturis ullam auctoritatem habere." Albert. Pighius, De lib. Arbit., lib. v. fol. lxxvi. a. Colon. 1542: quoted in part by Morinus (as above, c. vii. § 8. p. 527. 1. D); who adds, " Dictum forsae intemperantis aequo; tantus scholarum consensus in habitibus ponendis, et Concilii Vienensis sententia, quam eorum probabiliter asserit, modestius excipi debuerat:" but quotes also many other Roman Catholic divines to a similar effect.
otherwise than without it. Besides, the Gospel promising
the Holy Ghost for a gift to abide with and dwell in those
that are baptized, nothing hinders the gift thereof to be held
and termed an habitual grace. In these regards, I find it
neither prejudicial nor inconsequent to the Christian faith,
to acknowledge habitual grace; though neither Scripture nor
tradition of the Church own any habit of grace, created by
God, and infused into the soul in a moment, as the School
imagineth.

§ 23. But they seem to have committed another mistake;
in that, the Church having decreed against Pelagius, that the
grace of Christ is necessary to all truly good actions, and,
therefore, that man cannot merit the first grace, this infused
habit of grace they have made to be that first grace which
God giveth, before man will endeavour any thing towards it.
For so the Master of the Sentences determineth that grace,
which preventeth man's endeavours, to be faith with love
(libro ii. distinct. 26. D.); which, though it be capable
of a very good sense,—that the motion to believe the truth
of Christianity out of the love of God is that which God's
grace prevents all man's compliance with,—yet, in what
sense they swallowed it, will appear by the difficulties and
disputes they were entangled with, about that sorrow, which
the heart conceives for sin out of mere love to God, not fear
of punishment, which the love of ourselves breedeth. For
this sorrow being necessarily a disposition preparing him for
justification that cometh to God, in regard the first grace
which God preventeth all man's endeavours with is to them
this infused habit of faith and love which formally justifieth;
how he should come prepared for justification by that contri-
tion, which without God's grace man cannot have, who is
justified by that infused habit of grace, which he was first
prevented by God with; hath been among them the subject
of endless jangles. Whereas it is manifest, the maintenance

\[c \text{ "Et si diligenter intendas, nihilominus tibi monstratur, que sit ipsa gratia voluntatem preveniens et pre-}
\text{pars, sic fides cume dilectione." Pet. Lombard, Sentent., lib. ii. Dist.}
\text{26. D.}
\]
\[d \text{ "Scholastici disputando tandem assecuti sunt, gratiam qua peccator}
\text{justificatur habitum esse a Deo animae infusum. Multi doctores contra hos}
\text{habitum reclamarunt, dicesque marte pugnatum; sed tandem circa}
\text{annum 1240 deferruit tota illa disputatio, omnesque doctores in habitu-}
\text{mum positionem consenserunt. Interea multi}
\text{magnique viri.. in hunc usque diem}
\]
of the faith against Pelagius requireth no more, than that the resolution of persevering in Christianity to the end be thought necessarily to depend upon the motion to embrace it, which God first preventeth man with, without respect to any act of man obliging God to grant it. And therefore it is manifest, that the Church decreed no more against Pelagius, but that the first motion to become a good Christian, that every man is prevented with, must be ascribed to God's free grace through Christ, not engaged by any act of man's going afore. Now, requiring only the actual assistance of God's preventing grace, it is easy enough to say, not how "attrition," that is, sorrow for sin in regard of punishment, accompanied with slavish fear, is changed into "contrition," that is, sorrow for sin out of the love of God Whom it offendeth (for it is not possible, that he who loveth God should be sorry for sin for the same reason, which he was sorry for while he loved the world); but how the man, that was "attrite," becomes "contrite." For when first the Gospel reveals unto a man his desperate estate in and by the first Adam, it is not possible that he should remain untouched, either with sorrow for the present, or apprehension for the future. And yet no less unpossible is it, according to God's contenderunt, licet reapse justificatio impii per habitum infusum fieret, sine illo tamen fieri posse per actus a voluntate cum auxilio Spiritus S. sine novo habitu elicitos. Cum autem ex antiqua Ecclesie traditione per S. Augustinum potissimum elucida constat neminem mereri primam gratiam, sed Deum eam in nobis operari sine nobis, statim judicarunt plurimi, habitum illum infusum quo peccator ex eorum sententia ex impio fit justus, esse primam illam gratiam quam Deus in nobis sine nobis operatur; et consequenter nulla opera meritoria gratiam illam præcedere posse, quam primam gratiam et gratiam gratum facientem vocarunt. Hinc concluserunt contritionem, qua ex omnium sententia peccatum pellitur et homo justificatur, esse natura, sive, ut loquebantur antiquissimi scholastici, causa, posteriorum prima illa gratia gratum faciente. Hinc sane apud multos scholasticos antiquis illis succedentes, qui licet codem modo de contritione philosopharentur, eam tamen asserebant esse dispositionem ad justificationem, difficultatum maximarum seges amplissima pullulavit, cum illis explicandum fuit qua ratione contritio justificationem impii natura subsequestra posset ad eandem esse dispositionem: nec hodie lis apud eos disputa est." Morinus, as above, c. ii. § 13. p. 505. 1. E.—2. C.


1 Morinus (as above, c. iii. § 12—18, and c. iv. § 1 sq., pp. 509. 2. E. sq.) enumerates seven different solutions of the question, "Qua ratione Attritio virtute sacramenti fiat Contritio:" adding, that it had then been debated in the schools 350 years, "nee unquam ab eo tempore debetur disputatio sed semper incaluit viresque acquisivit eundo."

* Misprinted 252 in fol. edit.
ordinary way of working, even by His grace, that he should
in an instant resolve to embrace the only way to give him
peace in that exigence. But while he neither casts off
the motion of grace, nor resigns his interest in himself and
the world to it, but considers upon what reason it behaves
him to resolve; this consideration by the work of God's
Spirit discovering to him, how much God and the next
world is to be preferred before himself and this; as the love
of God and the world to come prevails in him above the love
of himself and this, accordingly of necessity must the grief
of having offended God afore prevail in him above all that he
can conceive for the misery he hath incurred. And all this,
by virtue of those helps which God grants, though always in
consideration of our Lord Christ, yet not by virtue of that
covenant, which is not contracted till a man be baptized, but
of His own free goodness, dispensing the effects of Christ's
coming according to the reason of His secret wisdom, which
the covenant of grace discovers not.

§ 24. I need say no more to shew, how a man, that comes
into the world with concupiscence, becomes either habituated
to the love of God above all things, or endowed with the habi-
tual assistance of God's Spirit, by that promise which the
Gospel importeth. Thus much is to be seen by that which
hath been said,—that in the justification of a sinner by
Christianity (which I have shewed to be the condition of it)
there is a twofold change either implied or signified. For
that a man should become reconciled to God, continuing in
the same affection to himself and the world as before he
heard of Christ, is a thing which the soberest of them that
dispute justification by faith alone abhor. And that a man
by the Gospel should be entitled to no more, than that dispo-
sition, which he is changed to, obligeth God to give, is no
less horrible to them that dispute justification by the works
of faith. And therefore, besides that change in the nature
and disposition of him that becomes estated in the promises
of the Gospel, which justification involveth, there is another
change in God's esteem, which is moral, by virtue of His
free promise; which the change which his nature hath
received signifieth not, because God's will only infers it.
OF THE COVENANT OF GRACE.

The former of these the School insist upon: and they seem to follow St. Auguustin in it; who, though he have nothing to do with any conceit of habitual grace, yet most an end attributeth the effect of justifying, even before God, to those inherent acts of righteousness, whereby the grace of God translatheth His enemies into that state of His grace. The latter, though it be that, which both the Scriptures and the most ancient records of the Church do express, yet, so long as the effect of justifying is attributed to the disposition which is inherent in the soul, not for the worth of it, but by God's grace, it can contain nothing either formally destructive or by consequence prejudicial to the faith. That the one is fundamentally implied, the other formally signified, in the justification of a Christian, belongs rather to the skill of a divine in understanding the Scriptures, than to the virtue of a Christian in holding the faith.

§ 25. What the Church thinks of the works of those, who, believing, do not yet declare themselves Christians by procuring baptism; as it is a consideration fit for this place, so is it manifest, by the doubt which they make of the salvation of those, that die in that estate. For though the life that they live, supposing the preventing grace of the Holy Ghost to bring them to that estate, must needs be ascribed to the same, yet is it not as yet under the promise of reward, because they are not yet under the covenant of grace, but only disposed to it. And how good soever their life may be, yet, so long as it proceeds not to an effectual resolution of undertaking Christ's cross, it is but actual; and dependeth de facto upon the assistance of God's Spirit, which de jure they can challenge no title in, being not yet estated in God's promises, but only prevented by those helps, which they can claim no difference of right in from those that are not prevented with the same. But he that undertakes Christ's cross by coming to baptism with a good conscience, obtaineth

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1 See above, c. ix. § 15, notes n, o.
2 See above, c. ix. § 15, note o: and the ample admissions, as regards St. Auguustin's statements, of Calvinitz, Beza, Zanchy, Bucer, Paræus, Chamier, quoted by Forbes, Consid. Mod., De Justif., lib. ii. c. 5. § 1. pp. 175—179. For quotations from St. Auguustin himself, see Bellarmine, De Justif., lib. ii. c. 8; Controv., tom. lili. pp. 1062. D—1064. C.

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h This needs little proof: but see e.g. the Comment of Vasquez in l. 2. S. Thomæ, just quoted, Disputt. cii.—civ. sq. (tom. ii. pp. 633 sq.) and the authorities there cited.
remission of sins, adoption to be God's son, and right and title to everlasting life; which adoption, and which title, as they are moral rights and qualities, so are they mere appendices of that justification, which God alloweth the faith of those that are baptized sincerely, without consideration of works, according to the doctrine of the fathers: supposing, it is true, as much change as between a Christian and no Christian in him that obtains them (in which regard it is no marvel, if remission of sins or justification be ascribed to the said change many times, in their writings); for how such sayings are to be understood, imports only the signification of words, not the salvation of a Christian; but not importing God's consideration of their qualities, the consideration of whose works is excluded.

§ 26. St. Augustin, it is true, considering this change in him that is justified (which is indeed the ground upon which God accepteth of his faith to that purpose), and using the word "justifying" to signify the same, hath occasioned the School to agree in that form of doctrine which the Council of Trent canonizeth. But though he frequent the term more than others in that sense, yet can he no ways be thought to depart from the meaning of the rest: who do sometimes describe justification by the ground which it supposeth, sometimes by the quality in God's account which it signifieth; acknowledging, all of them, the gift of the Holy Ghost to be obtained by this faith which justifieth; of God's free grace indeed, which only moved Him to set the Gospel on foot, but as due by the promise which it containeth, to abide and to dwell with him that voids not the condition upon which it is granted. This grace of the Holy Ghost, habitually dwelling in them that have undertaken Christ's cross, to enable them to go through with the work of it, as it cannot be unfruitful in good works, so are those works henceforth under the promise of reward, which no works done afore baptism can challenge.

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* See above, c. ix. § 18—42.
* See above, § 24, note k.
§ 27. I must not leave this point till I have said a word or two of Socinus his opinion, as to this point of justifying faith. For as concerning the two points premised, I conceive I have shewed you, that it is no less destructive to faith: in teaching, that a man is able of himself to embrace and to fulfil all that the Gospel requires at his hands, without any help of God’s grace granted in respect of our Lord Christ’s obedience; then, that God accepteth what a man is so able to perform, not out of any consideration thereof, but of His own free goodness, which, moving Him to settle such a decree, moved Him to send our Lord Christ to publish and assure it. As for the rest of his opinion: having maintained, that the efficacy of all acts, whether of God’s grace or of man’s will, toward the obtaining of the promises of the Gospel, necessarily depends upon the receiving of baptism, where the outward fulfilling of the promises of a positive precept (which the only will of him that is converted to Christianity fulfilleth not) is not unavoidably prevented by casualties which his will cannot overcome; I suppose I have by that means shewed, that his opinion is destructive to Christianity, because destructive to the precept of receiving baptism, without which no man is a Christian. And truly this imputation reflects upon the other extreme opinion concerning the justification of a Christian: which, ascribing it to believing that a man is predestinate, excludes it from being necessary, either as a means to salvation, or as a thing commanded; both which considerations concur in the necessity of it, supposing the premisses. For the necessity of that which is necessary as the means, and the necessity of that which is necessary as a thing commanded him that will obtain salvation, differ only in this; that the necessity of the means of salvation is indispensables in regard of whosoever will be saved, but the necessity of a thing commanded takes not hold, till a man becomes liable to the precept whereby it is commanded. The want of baptism then not being peremptory to the salvation of them that are prevented of it by unavoidable casualties, but of all others; choose whether you will call it necessary as the means, not supposing that excep-

* See above, c. i. § 5, 6; c. x. § 1—3.
* Above, c. ii. § 1; and the following chapters.
tion, or necessary as a thing commanded, supposing it. But that opinion which justifies without it, because before it, and makes it signify nothing to the not-predestinate, to them that are, only to signify that which is done without it, is necessarily destructive to the covenant of grace: whereas, supposing repentance to justifying faith, the necessity of the baptism of repentance may be maintained; nay, repentance implying a conversion to all that Christianity requires, and Christianity requiring baptism, in reason implied it is in that repentance, which that opinion presupposeth to justifying faith. But that Volkelius* (Instit., iv. 3.) makes justifying faith to consist in believing all that Christ taught, and trusting in Him, out of a resolution to keep His commandments; I take to be the meaning of St. Paul, when he saith, that a man is justified by faith alone: provided that a man be baptized with that disposition which he calls justifying faith, believing, that, being enabled by the Holy Ghost in consideration of Christ’s merits accompanying his baptism to perform what he undertakes, he shall attain the life to come in consideration of the same.

*"Intelligendum igitur est, fidem istam tribus veluti gradibus contineri, intellectus ratione distinctia: quorum primus est, credere Jesum esse Christum; alter, toti Ipsius discipline nudum assensum praebere; tertius est, Ipsi confidere, perque Iustum Deo, atque adeo speci immortaliitis subnixum, totum sese ad Dei studium accommodare, id est, Christi et sic etiam Dei præceptis obtemperare." Volkel., De Vera Relig., lib. iv. c. 3. pp. 177, 178.—"Quare ejus fidei nomine, quae ad justificationem ac salutem homini ex Divina gratia partendum virium sits habet, pietatem tanquam animam ejus includi est necess. Animadvertendum autem est, nequaquam de eo pietatis sanctimoniasque studio hoc loco agi, quod perfectum, absolutum, omnisque prolapsionis prorsus expers sit," &c. Id., ibid., pp. 179, 180.—See also above, c. i. § 6. notes o, p.
CHAPTER XXXI.


That which hath been said, properly concerns only them, that first hear of the Gospel at man's age, and are justified by being baptized into the profession of it; but the reason of it is the rule of that, which is to be said of all. To extend it so as to answer all questions concerning all men's cases; there remains yet another question, whether those [that] are once justified, can fall from the state of grace, so as finally to be damned: which he that will speak truth, must allow to have been burdened with unchristian prejudices without any cause. For who knows not, that commonly it hath been given to understand, that whoso alloweth this, granteth God's everlasting grace and purpose towards him, whom He accepteth in Christ as righteous, to fail and become void? Which I grant to be truly consequent to the opinion of those, that hold justifying faith to consist in believing that a man is predestinate to life. For if that were so, then he, that should fail of his justification, must by consequence fail of his predestination; that is to say, the decree of God, by which He purposed finally to save him that is justified by believing that he is predestinate, must fail and become void, whenever he ceaseth to be justified. But what is that to him, that believes, and hath proved, that God absolutely decreeth, whom He will give and whom He will refuse the helps of effectual grace, whereby they attain that disposition which qualifies them righteous before God? that the helps of

* Added from MS.
Of three senses, one true, one inconsistent with the faith, the third neither true nor yet destructive to the faith. [1. The last, not destructive of the faith.]

§ 2. But as I said before, that there is so great difference between those that hold justification by believing a man's self to be predestinate to life, and by trusting in God for the obtaining of His promises in our Lord Christ, that the one opinion is destructive to Christianity, but the other not; at least, in those that require and presuppose true repentance to go before that trust in God, wherein justifying faith in their opinions consisteth: so must I consequently say concerning this point, that it may be held, and I have some reason to think that it is held, by divers, upon such terms as seem not to render it destructive. For when I see, that they require repentance to go before justifying faith, as a condition requisite to that trust in God, wherein justifying faith consisteth; I must needs infer (as I see some authors of that opinion to grant), that, when the children of God fall...
OF THE COVENANT OF GRACE. 617

into such sins, as (Tertullian says*) lay waste the conscience, neither remission of those sins, which justification includeth, nor that trust in God, wherein that faith which only justifieth consisteth, can be understood to have place before repentance; if they speak things consequent in reason to their own positions. How then shall they pretend, that the sentence of justification once granted, or rather the promise obtained by virtue of that contract which the Gospel tendereth, as I have shewed, can remain firm, the condition failing which it necessarily presupposeth? Surely, I suppose, in that manner as it is ordinarily said in many disputes (and that very truly, how much soever to the purpose), that a thing is in some respect false, which is absolutely true, or, contrariwise, absolutely false, which notwithstanding in some respect holds true. So seem they, that are possessed with this prejudice, to imagine, that when God admits any man into the state of grace by virtue of that contract which the Gospel tendereth (that is, as I say, by being baptized upon a sincere profession of Christianity), if this be done with an intent of granting the grace of perseverance, then is that person said absolutely to be justified; who, when he falls into such sins as I have named, becomes in some respect not justified, to wit, for the present, and in respect of those sins of which he is not yet reconciled by repentance. And, consequently, the act of justifying faith is suspended and interrupted; as in him, that cannot have confidence in God, as reconciled to God in regard of those* sins: the seed of it notwithstanding remaining, by virtue of that act of faith, whereby, being reconciled (as those* are, that are

1621.—"We grant, ... that all sinnes whatever, without repentance, in that kind and degree, that is appointed and accepted of God, are exclusive of the kingdom of God. ... We say then, that believers may so fall, as that, being on that account rejected from the communion of the Church, so as not to be restored but upon the evidence of their repentance (and we say that repentance is required for all sinnes, or men cannot be saved ...), and yet not commit such sinnes as whereby their faith must needs be wholly lost. ... We say also, that repentance for sinne being a thing promised of God for those that come to Him in Christ, upon account

THORNDIKE. 88

of the engagement of His grace for the perseverance of believers, all such fallers into sinne shall certainly return to the Lord by repentance, Who heals their backslidings." Owen, Doctrine of the Saints' Perseverance Explained and Confirmed, c. xv. § 38. pp. 349, 350 (fol. Oxf. 1654): who censurest Pareus and Ursinus (ibid., § 37. p. 340.) for the strong terms in which they describe the (possible) sins of believers.


* Corrected from MS. "these," in fol. edit.
for ever reconciled to Him), he remains certain of helps of grace, that shall be effectual to work in him true repentance, and of reconciliation upon supposition of them. Whereupon it must be said, [on\textsuperscript{b}] the contrary: that those, whom God receiveth into grace without any purpose of granting them the grace of perseverance, cannot be said to be justified, without some term of abatement; signifying the justification granted them, to be as to the sense of the Church, or to an opinion unduly conceived by themselves, but not as to God: so that their faith also must be understood to be a confidence unduly grounded, the failing whereof is not the disannulling of that, which once was good, but the discovering of that, which once seemed good and was not.

§ 3. This opinion, so limited as I have said, I should not think destructive to Christianity; for the reason delivered afore\textsuperscript{c}, concerning that opinion of justifying faith, upon which it follows. But as I then concluded, that, though not destructive to the faith, yet that opinion from whence it followeth is not true according to the true sense of the Scriptures, wherein the skill of a divine consisteth\textsuperscript{d}: so must I here conclude, that this opinion of perseverance, which proceedeth upon that supposition of justifying faith, which though not destructive to the faith yet is not true, is also not true, though not destructive to the faith; the other, which proceeds upon that supposition of justifying faith and predestination, which is destructive to the faith, remaining both untrue and destructive to the faith. I grant, that, though the gift of the Holy Ghost (which is, as I have said\textsuperscript{e}, the habitual assistance of it), being granted in consideration of a man’s undertaking Christianity, becomes void upon not performing that which a man undertakes, yet God, of His free goodness, not as obliged by any promise of the Gospel, may continue the assistance thereof; but upon the same terms, as He first grants the help of it to bring men out of the state of sin into the state of grace. I grant, that the resolution of believing the faith of Christ, and of living according to the same in the profession of Christianity, having been once made.

\textsuperscript{a} Corrected from MS. “it,” in fol. edit.
\textsuperscript{b} Added from MS.
\textsuperscript{c} Above, c. xxx. § 13.
\textsuperscript{d} Ibid., § 14.
\textsuperscript{e} Above, c. ii. § 9.
upon reasons convincing a man that he is bound so to do, cannot be changed at his pleasure in an instant; though it fall out, that he be overtaken with some sin that "lays waste the conscience." But the promises of the Gospel being made in consideration of undertaking the profession of Christianity (and therefore incompatible to those, that live not according to it), I say, that they all become void to him that falls into such a sin. For, the covenant of grace passing upon supposition of original concupiscence remaining in the regenerate, and ensnaring them all with the occasion of sin, it cannot be imagined, that all sin makes it void. But, on the other side, some sins, being of so gross a nature, that a man cannot be surprized by them (but that the being so conquered must imply a resolution to prefer this world before the world to come), must needs forfeit those promises, which depend upon the covenant of grace, a rebellion against which they contain and declare: so that, unless the free grace of God, by the operation of His Spirit, bring a man back to repentance, the whole resolution of being a Christian shall in time be blotted out, though the profession, because it imports the benefit of this world in Christian states, remain counterfeit. This is then the reason of my resolution, necessarily following upon the premises, that the sincere profession of Christianity is the condition of the covenant of grace: seeing it is not imaginable, that any man should hold any privilege at God's hands by professing that, which he performeth not; the profession, as it serveth to aggravate the sin which is committed under it (as done in despite of all the grace of God, and the conviction which it tendereth to reduce us to Christianity, and the profession made in submission to the same condemning a man by his own sentence), so containing the condition, upon which all the promises become due; upon the violation whereof, on the contrary, they must of necessity become void.

§ 4. And this is the reason, that leaves no place for any composition of this difference; by saying, that a man remains absolutely justified, when the particular sin which is not yet repented of is not pardoned. For seeing "the wages of" it "is [Rom. vi. 23.] death," so far as the covenant of grace dispenses not; and seeing the covenant of grace cannot protect him, that trans-
BOOK
II.

gresseth the terms of it; of necessity he falls into the same
estate, which he was under setting the covenant of grace aside:
as if to him our Lord Christ had neither been born, nor cru-
cified, nor risen again. Those, that suffer the truth of this
condition to be obscured by defective interpretations of that
faith which alone justifieth, and the scriptures concerning the
same; it is no marvel, if they can imagine a reconciliation
between the state of sin and the state of grace in the same
man at the same time: which makes the positive will of God,
declared by the Gospel, to dispense with the necessary and
natural hate He bears to all sinners for their sin. But when
it is once discovered, that, by the terms of the Gospel, God,
Who declares Himself ready to be reconciled to all sinners,
is declared unreconcileable to any, so long as he continueth
in sin; then must it necessarily appear, that, the positive
will of God declared by the Gospel concarring with the
natural detestation of sin which is essential to the purity of
His nature, whossoever is under the guilt of sin remains
liable to His wrath.

§ 5. And proceeding upon this ground, as I do, I shall not
think myself obliged to take notice of those things, which
have lately been disputed in great volumes upon this point, to
and again. For (presuming that the parties have not the
ground upon which I proceed, in debate), as, of necessity, he
who seems to come short of proving his intent without it,

"Viz., in Dr. Owen's book (quoted above in § 2. note x), entitled, "The
Doctrine of the Saints' Perseverance Explained and Confirmed; with a pre-
face, manifesting the Judgement of the Antients concerning the truth con-
tended for; also a discourse touching the Epistles of Ignatius, the Episco-
pacy in them asserted, and some animadversions on Dr. H. H'[ammond] his
dissertations on that subject" (folio Oxf. 1654). It was an answer to a
treatise by John Goodwin, called, "Redemption Redeemed; with the discuss-
ion of the great questions relating hereunto, and touching election and
reprobation" (folio, Lond. 1651). —The same question had been debated a little
earlier between Rich. Thomson (Dissirba de Amissione et Intercisione Ju-
stificationis et Gratiae, 8vo. Lugd. Bat. 1616, and 1618), and Robert Abbot,
Bishop of Salisbury (De Gratia et Per-
severantia Sanctorum Exercitationes
Aliquot, &c., quiibus accessit Ejusdem
in R. Thomson Anglo-Belgici Distri-
bam, &c., Animadversione brevis, 4to.
Lond. 1618).—Dr. John Prideaux also
had published XXII. Lectiones de To-
tidem Religionis Capitibus, &c., &c.,
of which Lecture VI. is De Perseve-
rantia Sanctorum on the Calvinist side
(3rd edit. folio, Oxon. 1648).—And
Prideaux's colleague, Sebastian Bene-
feild, Margaret Prof. of Divinity at
Oxford (De Perseverantia Sanctorum,
8vo. Francof. 1618), held the Calvinist
side of the same argument against
Barthol. Battus (De Possibilitate Apo-
stasiae Sanctorum sive Amissions In-
tercisionisque Gratia in Renatus et
Electis, libri duo, 8vo. Gryphiswald.,
1621 and 1625).
may with it be able to make the conviction effectual which he tenders, so he, that seems to have made the worse cause seem the better without considering it, must provide new evidence, to make the condition of the covenant of grace seem otherwise than I have shewed it to be, before he can think to have done his work.

§ 6. Notwithstanding, because there are many texts of Scripture, which evidently fortify the sum of Christianity settled upon the terms of the covenant of grace, by demonstrating the failure of the promise upon failure of the condition to which the Gospel makes it due, I take it to be part of my business to point at the chief of them: without being much troubled to bring all that might be alleged; because I may make this general inference from the premises,—that all precepts, all exhortations, all promises, all threats, made to induce man to perseverance in that estate to which the promises of the Gospel are any way signified to be due, are necessary arguments to shew, that those to whom they are made may fail of the perseverance to which they induce. And this, by virtue of the general reason premised, that they are all evidences of that free will of men, which the grace of God destroyeth not but cureth. And therefore, as, when they are used to induce men to embrace Christianity, they contain an evidence that he may do otherwise; so also, when they are used to induce man to persevere in that profession which he hath once undertaken, they must necessarily, by the same reason, contain an evidence, that it is possible for any man not to persevere, who is induced by them to persevere in the course of a Christian. For if it be said, that without the grace of God they cannot, with it they cannot but, be effectual: either it is supposed, the grace of God here named shall become effectual to induce them to persevere to the end, supposing that God foresees that they shall so persevere, or something else including the foresight of the perseverance itself, or not; if so, it is no marvel, that the said exhortations cannot but prove effectual, because God foresees they shall be effectual, and that which shall not be, can never be foreseen; but if, not supposing this, any man undertake to say, that the exhortations * of the Gospel with the

* Corrected from MS. “exhortation,” in fol. edit.
help of God's inward grace must necessarily prove effectual, he will necessarily fall into all the inconvenience which I have charged them with, who maintain, that the will of man is immediately determined by the will and operation of God to do whatsoever it doeth; which is no less than the destruction, as well of all civility, as of Christianity.

§ 7. But let us see what the Apostle writes, Hebr. vi. 4—8.

"For it is not possible to renew unto repentance those, that, being once enlightened, and having tasted the heavenly gift, and been partakers of the Holy Ghost, and relished the good word of God and the powers of the world to come, fall away and crucify to themselves and traduce the Son of God: for the earth, that drinks the rain that oft comes upon it, and bears herbs fit for them by whom it is tilled, receives a blessing from God; but that which bears thorns and thistles, is reprobate and near a curse, the end whereof is to be burned." Could more have been said to express the state of grace? For if any man can undertake to have the Spirit of God without premising Christianity, I say confidently there is no cause why any man should be a Christian. Therefore "φωτισθέντες" here, as Hebr. x. 32, signifies neither more nor less than "christened" (as "φωτισμὸς" with the ancient Church signifies baptism) because of the darkness of heathenism or Judaism, which it dispelleth. What is then the "heavenly gift," which Christians "taste?" Be it remission of sins, or be it the gift of the Holy Ghost that follows (expressing the same thing in several parallel terms),

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h See above, c. ii. § 7. note n, and so also Hammond (in loc.).—Grotius (ad loc.), admitting, that "verum est baptismum apud veteres nomen habuisse φωτισμοῦ, qui φωτισμὸν promittit... quo spectans Syrus vertit 'Qui ad baptismum descenderunt';" adds, that "simplicius est intelligi hic eos qui cognitione Evangelioe doctrine imbuti fuerat."—See Owen, Saints' Perseverance, c. xvii. § 80. p. 430; and Expos. on the Epist. to the Hebrews, on c. vi. vv. 4—6. tom. iii. p. 42. folio Lond. 1689; in the latter of which places he denies baptism to be meant.

i So Hammond in loc.—Estius (in loc.) interprets it to be "sacramentum Eucharistiae," but says also, that "Graeci remissione pecatorum in-
my business is done; if the gift of the Holy Ghost be not granted but upon that condition, which makes all other promises of the Gospel due. Wherefore I am content, that "relishing the good word of God" shall signify no more than that condition; to wit, that sense of Christianity, which resolveth a man to undertake it: but to "relish the powers of the world to come," no man can be understood, but he, that, upon supposition of the said condition, becomes sensible of that peace and joy of the Holy Ghost, which, under Christianity, only Christianity can give. And, therefore, though I dispute not here, how he means, that, "it is impossible to renew those, that fall" from Christianity, "to repentance;" yet I challenge that impossibility of renewing to contain both a former right in, and a possession of, that estate, to which they are renewed by repentance, and also the present loss of it, by falling from the condition which gives it. So that the comparison, which follows, of fruitful and barren land upon tillage, as it expresses a promise of following helps of grace to them that use those which went afore aright, contained in the promise of giving the Holy Ghost to enable them who sincerely profess Christianity to perform that which they undertake, so it convinceth the fruitless to be liable to the curse of fire; which it is said to be "near," because it is called "reprobate."

§ 8. The same is the effect of the like exhortation, Hebr. x. [Hebr. x. 26—29: "For if we sin voluntarily after receiving the acknowledgment of the truth, there remains no more any sacrifice for sin, but a certain terrible expectation of vengeance, and glowing of fire that is to consume opposers: if one set at naught the law of Moses, without mercy he dies upon two or three witnesses; of how much worse punishment, think you, shall he be thought worthy, that treads the Son of God under foot, and esteems the blood of the covenant by which he is sanctified unclean, and doth despite to the Spirit of grace?"

1 "Gustui huic" (scil. of the good word of God) "inest quidem intelligentia et essens Evangelii, latitiam aliquam in corde excitans, sed deest via charitatis et fiduciae effectiva. "Gomarus ap. Poli Synops. ad loc.—"Studiose etam phrasim servat Apostolus" (scil. tasting), "ut hos distinguat ab his qui par veram Christi tum perciununt et comedunt et quasi in suum et sanguinem vertunt." Owen (Expos. on Epist. to Hebrews) ap. Poli Syn. ibid.—And so also in his Saints' Persever., c. xvii. § 33. p. 432.
BOOK II. I say, this is to the same effect; if it be once granted, that this sin may be committed by a true Christian: which no man can deny. For can a Christian be thought to do that "despite to the Spirit of grace," which the Scribes and Pharisees are said in the Gospel (Matt. xii. 24—32, Mark iii. 29, Luke xii. 10) to do, sinning that sin against the Holy Ghost, which our Lord there pronounces irremissible? Is it not manifest, that their sin consisted in attributing the miracles, by which our Lord sought to convert them, to the unclean spirit, being in judgment convinced that by the Holy Ghost alone they were done? And is it not as manifest, that a Christian, having received the Spirit of grace, promised to those that are baptized out of a sincere resolution of Christianity, abuses the Spirit Which is so given him, and Which he hath, and Which had already wrought that work of conviction, which the Scribes and Pharisees suffered not to take effect in their hearts? Especially, when the Apostle expressly pre-miseth the "washing of them," called here "sanctifying by the blood of the covenant;" which is the cleansing of that vessel by remission of sins, into which the new wine of the Holy Ghost is to be put. Wherefore I will not say, that the faith of these men is "true faith," if you mean that only to be "true faith," which lasts to the end; which is many times, in common language, that which truth signifieth: but if you mean that to be "true faith," which effecteth remission of sins and qualifieth for the world to come, he must set the Scripture upon the rack, that will make it confess any other sense.

§ 9. Now consider, what the Apostle writeth of those Christians, who, he saith, are seduced by the heretics which he speaks of (2 Pet. ii. 18—22). "For, speaking bombast words of vanity, they catch with the bait of fleshly concupiscences, in

m "There is no mention of faith or believing, either in expresse terms, or in termes of an equivalent significance in either of the places mentioned" (scil. Hebr. vi. 4, 7, and x. 26—29). "Therefore true believers are not the persons intended to be described in these places." Owen, Saints' Perseverance, c. xvii. § 28. p. 426; who labours to prove, that "temporary believers are not true believers," ibid. c. i. § 17—22. pp. 10—14.—That temporary faith is at no time true faith, was the common doctrine of (among other Protestants) the Calvinist school; and was maintained by the Synod of Dort (Act. Syn. Nat. Dordr. in reject. errorum circ. doctrin. de Persever. Sanctor., § 7. p. 270. fol. Lugd. Bat. 1620).
uncleanness, those that had really escaped them that converse in error; promising them freedom, themselves being slaves to corruption; seeing a man is slave to that, by which he is conquered. For if, having escaped the pollutions of the world through the knowledge of our Lord and Saviour Jesus Christ, and being entangled in them again, they be conquered; the last error is become worse to them than the first. For it had been better for them not to have known the way of righteousness, than, having known” (or “acknowledged) it, to turn from the holy precept once delivered to them. But it is fallen out to them according to the old proverb: the dog that returns to his own vomit; and the sow that is washed, to wallow in the mire.” Is it possible, that all this should be thought to import no more, than profession as to men; without any effect as to God, but only to the Church”? For if we suppose them all to have counterfeited Christianity, not really resolving to live as Christians, how comes he to say, that they had “really escaped those that live in error,” whose ways they had not really left? And if they had “escaped the pollutions of the world by the knowledge of” Christianity, had they done no more than a man by mere nature may do? Then may a man by mere nature be disentangled of the pollutions of this world. But if they had conquered sin by those helps of grace which brought them to be Christians (for otherwise, how should they be “conquered by the baits of sin,” which those heretics deceive them with), then had they obtained those promises which the Gospel rewardeth that conquest with. In fine, can a “dog return to the vomit, or a sow to the mire,” which they never left? Or can “the latter” end be “worse than the beginning” to them, who never were clear of that damnation, in which they were overtaken by the preaching of Christianity?

* “By the dispensation of the Word, especially when managed by a skilful master of assemblies, men are every day so brought under the power of their convictions, and the light communicatored to them, as to acknowledge the truth and power of the Word, and, in obedience thereunto, to leave off, avoid, and abhor, the ways and courses wherein the men of the world... do pollute themselves;... and yet are not changed in their natures so as to become ‘new creatures,’ but continue indeed, and in the sight of God, ‘dogs and swine returning to their vomit and mire,’ though some of them hold out in the professions to the end.” And this is “the state and condition of men here” (2 Pet. ii. 18—22) “described by the Apostle.” Owen, Saints’ Per, sever, § 46. pp. 441, 442.
§ 10. To that of St. John, speaking of the antichrists of the time, them and their followers ([1] John ii. 19);—"They went out from among us, but they were not of us; for, had they been of us, they would have continued among us."—I will use no other answer than that which St. Augustin hath given us (De Corrept. et Gratia, cap. ix. 9);—that those, who are qualified by attributes signifying predestination, cannot fall away; as long as they are described by present righteousness, they may. For, saith he, had they persevered, they had persevered in grace, not in unrighteousness; neither was their righteousness counterfeit, but not durable: "therefore they were not in the number of sons, when they were in the faith of sons, because those are truly sons, that are foreknown and predestinate, and called according to purpose, that they may be like the Son." For St. John and St. Paul being assured of their own adoption according to purpose, it is no marvel, if they presume the like of those, whom they comprise in the same quality with themselves in regard of their present righteousness, the profession whereof was visible.

§ 11. I must not here omit the Epistle to the Seven Churches (Apol. ii. iii.), and the exhortations, promises, and threatenings tendered the angels of them; whether in behalf of themselves, it matters not much to this purpose, or (which is certain) in behalf of the Churches. In particular

'o 9 Nee nos moveat quod fillii Suis quibusdam Deus non dat istam perseverantium. Absit enim ut ita esset, si de fillis prædestinatis essent et secundum propositionis vocatis, qui vere sunt fillii promissionis. . . . . Sunt . . . quidam, qui fillii Dei propter susceptam vel temporaliter gratiam dicuntur a nobis, nec sunt tamen Deo: de quibus ait idem Johannes, 'Ex nobis exierunt, sed non erant ex nobis; quod si fuissent ex nobis, permansisset utique nobiscum.' Non ait, Ex nobis exierunt, sed quia non manuerunt nobiscum, jam non sunt ex nobis: verum ait, 'Ex nobis exierunt sed non erant ex nobis;' hoc est, et quando videbantur in nobis, non erant ex nobis. Et tanquam ei diceretur, unde id ostendit? 'Quod si fuissent,' inquit, 'ex nobis, permansisset utique nobiscum.' . . . . Cum ergo fillii Dei dicunt de ipsis qui perseveravit non haberunt, 'Ex nobis exierunt, sed non erant ex nobis;' et addunt, 'Quodsi

fuissent ex nobis, permansissent utique nobiscum.' quid aliud dicit, nisi, Non erant fillii etiam quando erant in professione et nomine filiorum? non quia justitiam simulaverunt, sed quia in ea non permanerunt. Neque enim ait, Nam si fuissent ex nobis, veram, non factam justitiam tenuissent utique nobiscum: sed, 'si fuissent,' inquit, 'ex nobis, permansissent utique nobiscum.' In bono illis volebat proculdubio permanere. Erant itaque in bono, sed quis in eo non permanerunt, id est, non usque in finem perseveraverunt, 'non erant, inquit,' 'ex nobis,' et quando erat nobiscum; hoc est, non erant ex numero filiorum, et quando erant in fide filiorum; quoniam qui vere fillii sunt, prescit et prædestinati sunt conformes imaginis Filii Eius, et secundum propositionis vocati sunt ut electi essent." S. Aug., De Corrept. et Gratia, c. ix. § 20; Op., tom. x. pp. 760. F.—761. D.
to that of Ephesus (ii. 4, 5): "But I have this against thee, that thou hast left thy first love: remember therefore whence thou art fallen, and repent, and do thy first works; otherwise I will come to thee suddenly, and remove thy candlestick out of the place thereof, if thou repent not." How should any man be exhorted by the Spirit of God to return to those works that were not the works of a true Christian? How should the judgment threatened take effect, and no soul perish that had been saved otherwise? To that of Thyatira (ii. 25—28): "But hold what you have until I come: he that conquereth, and keepeth My works to the end, I will give him power over the nations, and he shall rule them with an iron rod, as a potter's vessels are broken; as I also have received of My Father: and I will give him the morning star." What means this exhortation, to them that are not capable of doing otherwise? What means the power of Christ, and "the morning star," if not the reward of the world to come? To that of Pergamus (iii. 11): "Behold, I come suddenly; hold what thou hast, lest another take thy crown." Is it not plain, that he shall be saved if he "hold what" he "hath?" that he shall not, if "another take" his "crown?"

§ 12. Can St. Paul's severe sentences be avoided? 1 Cor. vi. 9, 10: "Know ye not, that the injurious shall not inherit the kingdom of heaven? be not deceived; neither whoremongers, nor idolaters, nor adulterers, nor the soft, nor abusers of themselves with mankind; nor thieves, nor those that defraud, nor drunkards, nor revilers, nor robbers, shall inherit the kingdom of God." Gal. v. 19—21: "The works of the flesh are manifest, which are these; adultery, fornication, uncleanness, wantonness, idolatry, witchcraft, enmities, strifes, jealousies, animosities, provocations, divisions, sects, envies, murders, drinkings, debauches, and the like to these; of which I told you beforehand, as I foretold you, that they who do such things, shall not inherit the kingdom of God." Eph. v. 5—8: "For this ye know, that no whoremaster, or unclean person, or that defrauded, who is an idolater, hath inheritance in the kingdom of God and of Christ: let no man deceive you with vain words; for for these things cometh the wrath of God upon the children of..."
OF THE COVENANT OF GRACE.

BOOK II.

[Ex. xiii. 18.]

disobedience: be ye not therefore partners with them: for ye were darkness, but are now light in the Lord; walk as children of the light.” They that “sew pillows” under sinners’ elbows (“excusantes excusationes in peccatis,” according to the Vulgar translation, Psalm cxil. 4), and treating terms of reconciliation between Christ and Belial, between the promises of the Gospel for everlasting and the pleasures of sin for a moment), will not have this to belong to the godly, whom they allow to do such things for a snap and away, without forfeiting their interest in the world to come; but to the unregenerate, who live in a settled course of such sins without remorse. And I freely allow, that so soon as the godly man, whom they suppose to be overtaken with any such sin, shall take such a course to turn from it, as may restore in him that resolution of mind, for which God accepts a true Christian; he is restored to the place which he held in God’s grace, not as never forfeited, but as recovered anew. In the mean time, if any pretence be made, that being once in God’s favour he can never fail of it, it is as easy to wipe it off with St. Paul’s argument, as any of those “vain words,” that were advanced in his time. For, if “for those things the wrath of God cometh upon” Gentiles, that are “darkness,” much more upon them, who, being become “light,” have a share in the works of “darkness:” if St. Paul’s argument be good. And whatsoever induces a man to believe otherwise, belongs to those “vain words,” which St. Paul forbids them to be deceived with.

P “Non declines cor meum in verba malitie, ad excusandas excusationes in peccatis; cum hominibus operatoribus iniquitatem.” Ps. cxil. 4. Vulg.—“Incline not my heart to any evil thing, to practise wicked works with men that work iniquity.” Ps. cxil. 4. Eng. vera.

q “The major proposition he” (Goodwin) “confirmit from Gal. v. 21, Eph. v. 5, 6, 1 Cor. vi. 9, 10: all affirming that neither ‘whoremongers, nor adulterers, nor idolaters, nor the like, have any inheritance in the kingdom of God,’ or can be saved. That the intendment of the Apostle is concerning them, who live in a course of such sinners, who sinne with their whole wills, and from an evil roote, with whose sappe they are wholly leavened and tainted throughout, not them who through the strength of temptation, and the surprisalls of it, not without the renitency in their wills, unto all sin, any sin, the sinne wherewith they are overtaken, may possibly fall into any such sinnes (as did David and Peter), was before declared, and in that sense we grant the Proposition.” Owen, Saints’ Perseverance, c. xv. § 26, pp. 340, 341: the first fourteen sections of which chapter (pp. 325—330) are occupied in drawing the distinction, according to Owen’s judgment, “between the sins of believers and the sins of unregenerate persons,” viz. that the former do not “sin with their whole will,” the latter do.
OF THE COVENANT OF GRACE.

§ 13. The prophecy of Ezekiel must needs have a room here; which, in order to induce the backsliding Israelites to repentance, protests, that God judgeth the righteous that turneth from his righteousness, and the sinner that turneth from his sin, not according to the righteousness or to the sin from which, but according to that to which, they turn: Ezek. xviii. 5—[28]. For to say, that the prophet of God, speaking in God's name of the esteem and reward which God hath for righteous and unrighteous, speaks only of that which seems righteousness and unrighteousness to the world, or which an hypocrite cozened himself to think such, is such an open scorn to God's word, as cannot be maintained, but by taking "righteousness" to signify unrighteousness, and "turning" for not turning, but continuing in that wickedness which was at the heart when he professed otherwise. Which is nothing else, but to demand of us to renounce our senses, and the reason common to all men, together with the signification of those words whereby God deals with us in the same sense as we among ourselves, to make good a prejudice so prejudicial to Christianity.

§ 14. And what shall we do with those examples and instances of holy men, recorded in Holy Scripture to have fallen from God's grace into His displeasure; beginning with our first parents Adam and Eve, whom no man doubteth to have been created in the state of God's grace, that will not have their fall redound upon God's account. For it be said, that this is a difference between the covenant of works, first set on foot with our first parents in Paradise, and

It could not be undertaken, that that covenant should be kept inviolable, because though God continues faithfull, yet Adam might prove (as indeed he did) faithlesse: and so the covenant was disannulled, as to any power of knitting together God and man.... In this co

* Corrected from MS. "these," in orig. text.

† "Thus was it with God and Adam.
BOOK IL

the covenant of grace, tendered by our Lord Christ: it is
said indeed, but it cannot be maintained, without destroying
all that hath been premised of the covenant of grace, and
the condition of the same; which, though it take place under
the covenant of works, which is supposed forfeit, to restore
mankind to the hope of a heavenly reward upon conditions
proportional to their present weakness, hath notwithstanding
appeared to be tendered to their free choice, as containing
conditions, by transgressing whereof they forfeit as much
as Adam could do.

[St. Peter.] § 15. The examples of Saul, and Solomon, and David, and
St. Peter, have in them indeed some difference one from
another; but is there any of them, that imports not the state
of damnation after the state of grace? St. Peter, it is plain,
forfeits the condition of professing Christ; Whom he that
denieth (if our Lord say true in the Gospel, Luke xii. 8, 9),
shall himself be denied at the general Judgment. And can
we imagine his tears to have been shed without sense of this forfeit?
Wherefore (whatsoever seeds of grace remained in
him to move him to repentance, as soon as he was become
sensible of his estate) it is manifest, that he had lost the state
of grace, which he laboureth to recover by repentance.

[David.] § 16. I will not examine, how much longer David lay in
his sins than St. Peter, before the prophet Nathan brought
him to the sense of them

It is enough, that he prays so
for pardon, as no man could do for that which he thought he
had afore. He prays also for the restoring of God's Spirit
to him again. Psalm li. 10—12: "Make me a clean heart,
O God, and renew a right spirit within me; cast me not
away from Thy presence, and take not Thine Holy Spirit
from me; O give me the comfort of Thine help again, and
establish me with Thy free Spirit." For that which he prays
God not to take away, he acknowledges to be forfeit: so that
it is but of reason, that he further desires, that it be restored
him, rather than continued. Some think they avoid this, by
understanding only the spirit of prophecy to be his desire;

"'David integro fere anno nondum pontiuerat' (licet enim criticis
libitum suo loqui), 'nondum ergo pec-cata fuerunt remissa; non itaque tota
illo tempore justificatus fuit.'" Abbot,
not wanting the spirit of regeneration, whereby he desires it: which, in the case of David, no way takes place without offering violence to the words. And I have sufficiently advised, that, by the help of God's Spirit granted out of that grace which preventeth the covenant of grace, and that state of grace which dependeth upon the undertaking of it, a man is enabled to desire the gift of God's Spirit to dwell in him, according to that which the covenant of grace promiseth.

§ 17. As for Saul and Solomon, both of them endowed with God's Spirit; the one of them must not be understood ever to have been in the state of grace, the other to have ever fallen from it.

§ 18. For it is alleged, that Balaam and Caiaaphas prophesied; and our Lord shall say to those that had prophesied and cast out devils and done miracles in His name, "I never knew you" (Matt. vii. 22, 23). But St. Paul's words would be considered, concerning his apostle's office (2 Cor. iii. 4—6):

"This confidence we have towards God through Christ; not because we are sufficient of ourselves to think any thing as of ourselves, but our sufficiency is of God; Who hath made us able ministers of the New Testament, not of the letter but of the spirit." For if the grace of an apostle suppose not the grace of a Christian, how hath St. Paul "confidence to God" in the grace of an apostle given him by God, which a Christian obtaineth through Christ? Certainly, no man spares to

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* "Et Spiritum Sanctum Tuum—
  i.e. vel spiritum propheticum, quem
  K(imchi) a Davide post peccatum sub-
  latum autam, vel potius, &c. Vera
  Chald., et Hebrei, et Lyra in Muisio;
  ap. PoliSynops. in Ps. li. 13. See Sim.
  de Muis, Comment. in Psalm., In Ps. i.
  (Hebr. li.) v. 13, tom. i. p. 266. 2. D.
  Paris. 1630.
  7 Above, c. x. § 7; and c. xix. § 24.
  8 So say some of those with whom
  Thorsdike is here arguing. E. g.—
  "Recessit a Saulo non spiritus re-
  generationis et adoptionis, quem nun-
  quam habuit, sed spiritus prophetiae,
  prudentiae, fortitudinis," &c. "Fui-
  autem electus non ad vitam sed ad
  regnum, sicut Judas ad apostolatum.
" D. Pareus's edit. of Ursinus's Corpus
  Francof. 1621.—See also Abbot, In
  Thomsoni Diatribam, c. v. p. 109; and
  Zanchy, De Persev. Sanct. as above

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* "Horum porro recitatis flagitiis,
  inferunt . . amississe fidem et Spiritum
  Sanctum. Si aliquo modo, concedo; si
  prorsus, nego." Zanchy, as above quoted,
  speaking of Solomon. So also Deodate
  and others at the Synod of Dort (see
  Goodwin, Redemption Redeemed, c. xiv.
  Doctr. de Persev. Sanct., § 94, 95;
  Op., P. iii. p. 334. b.—Others, on the
  same side, prefer denying that Solomon
  ever was in a state of grace.

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* This reference has not been traced.

Abbot says, that, "Sentient motus Spi-
  ritus in cordibus suis: scil. quatenus ad
  illuminationem," &c.; "non sentiunt ad
  regenerationem," &c. "Nempe ut Ba-
  laam, ubi sit, "Moritur anima mea
  morte justorum, et flant novissima mea
  similia illorum: qui tamen interim in
  populum Dei quam improbus mansit."
argue from these words, that we are not able of ourselves to think any thing towards the discharge of a Christian man’s office; as taking it for granted, that a good apostle supposes a good Christian. And what an inconvenience were it to grant, that God employs men that are not good upon His messages to mankind, giving them the operation of the Holy Ghost to demonstrate that He sends them, which is sufficient credit for all that they deliver as in His name: unless we will imagine it no inconvenience, that God gives testimony to those whom He would not have to be believed.

§ 19. As for Balaam, it is manifest, that he was employed by unclean spirits, to maintain men in their idolatries by fore-telling things to come by their means; and that God’s appearing to him, to hinder him from cursing His people, was upon the same account as Arnobius saith, that magicians did use to find the virtue of spirits opposite to those unclean spirits whom they employed, not suffering them to bring to effect those mischievous intentions, for which they set them on work. And by this means it was, that Balaam, not being employed by God, is forced to declare that will of God which he would have made void.

§ 20. As for Caiaphas, it is not to be imagined, that he had any revelation of that truth, which he declareth, by the inspiration of God’s Spirit: but that God, Who from the beginning had used the High Priests by Urim and Thummim to declare His direction to that people, directed his words so, that they might serve to declare that will of His, which He had never acquainted him with as a prophet of His; nor could have been acknowledged for that will, which God intended to declare by him, had not St. John by the Spirit of God declared God’s intent in so directing his words.

§ 21. Wherefore, when God changed Saul’s heart at his parting with Samuel and sent His Spirit upon him straightways (1 Sam. x. 9, 10), it seems, that, having liked so well of

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"Nonne accidere, fieri, licet asu dissimuletis, potest, ut alter pro altero" (acil. of the spirits invoked by haruspices) "subeat, fallens, ludens, decipiens, atque invocati speciem praestans? Si magi haruspicum fratres suis in accitionibus memorant antitheseos serpius obrepere pro accisis, esse autem hos quosdam materias ex cressioribus spiritus, qui Deus se fingant, nesciosque mendacii et simulationibus ludant, cum ratione non dispari credamus hic quoque subjiciere se alias pro his qui non sunt," &c. Arnobius, Adv. Gentes, lib. iv. p. 184. 4to. Lugd. Bat. 1651.

"So also Grotsius, in loc."
him as to call him to be prince of His people, He endowed him with the grace of His Spirit for the discharge of that place, which only a good man could rightly discharge. Whereupon it follows, that the taking away of this Spirit, and sending an evil spirit instead thereof to torment him, are the evidences of his fall from that inward grace, which the gift of God's Spirit presupposed afore. Whereby we may judge, what the parable of the unclean spirit, cast out and returning with seven spirits worse than himself (Matt. xii. 43—45, Luke xi. 24—26), imports, [no less] to our purpose; though, being a parable, I bring it not into consequence.

§ 22. The like is to be said of those, who, having prophesied and done miracles in our Lord's name, shall not be acknowledged by Him at the day of judgment. For when He saith, "I never knew you," He speaketh out of the knowledge of God: which, reaching from one end to the other at the same instant, when they had the grace of prophecy to witness their employment from God, foresaw that they would fall away, and becoming apostates retain no part in the kingdom of heaven which they had preached. No marvel if He take them not for His, who, He sees, are not to be His for everlasting: to which purpose the graces of God's Spirit are promised true Christians, Mark xvi. 17, Acts ii. 38, v. 32. And though Origen hath excellently said, that the name of Christ had such power over devils, that sometimes being alleged by evil men it did the deed, though rather when out of the sound and genuine disposition of believers (as those Hebrews, who in our Lord's time did exorcise devils, as He shews us Matt. xii. 27, and as we learn by Justin Martyr,)

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* Added from MS.

* The rule is borrowed from a suggestion as old as Irenæus (Adv. Hær., lib. ii. c. 47. p. 174. ed. Grabe), that "αἷς παραβολάς τούτοις διαφέρειν εἰρημένας συμφώνησαν, καὶ τὰ φανερὰς εἰρημένα ἐπιλύσας τὰς παραβολὰς;" whence later theologians lay down, that "Theologia parabolica non est argumentativa."

* "Τοῦτον ἀ'Βραδᾶν τὸ δύναμα οὐδεὶς μάθησε, μόνον, οἰκεῖον αὐτῷ Θεῷ ὅλης γὰρ καὶ πολλῶς ἐπιθύμων δολομαίνει, χρώνῃν ἐν τοῖς λόγοις αὐτῶν τῷ Θεῷ ἀ'Βραδᾶν ποιήσαντες μιὰν διὰ τὸ δύναμα καὶ τὴν πρὸς τὸν δίκαιον τοῦ Θεοῦ οἰκεῖότητα διὶ παραλαμβάνουν εἰς Ῥωμαῖον, οὗ τὸν θαμβήσαντι μοιεῖ, οὐ εποταγίσεται ο.wherein the context is fully legible and comprehensible upon the passage of the page.
BOOK II.

Irenæus, Tertullian, and Theophilus of Antioch, produced there by Grotius, that so they did till their time: yet the doing of miracles in evidence of the Gospel which they preached, alleged by those whom our Lord shall disclaim, seems to import a great deal more than the casting out of devils by naming the name of Christ; and, therefore, to contain the approbation of those men, whose employment from God they seemed to witness.

§ 23. Here is the place, where I will give the true meaning to three or four scriptures (for so many there are); that, in opposition to the whole stream of God's book, men will needs produce, to reconcile the promises of the Gospel with the present guilt and love of sin in Christians, that have been overtaken with it.

§ 24. "Jesus answered and said" to the Samaritan woman (John iv. 13—15): "Whosoever dranketh of this water shall thirst again; but whosoever dranketh of the water that I shall give him, shall not thirst for ever; but the water that I shall give him, shall be in him a well of water springing up to life everlasting: the woman said to Him, Lord, give me that water, that I may not thirst, nor come hither to draw." I allow him, that hath a mind to it, to vidi adversus semetipsum. Adeo nec illi in Beelzebule ejiciabant, sed (ut diximus) in virtute Creatoris. Tertull., Adv. Marcion., lib. iv. c. 26; Op., p. 442. D: quoted by Grotius, ibid.


"Si ego, inquit, in Beelzebule ejicio daemonias, filii vestri in quo ejicient? Hac vos quid magis portendet quam in Eo ejicere Se, in quo et filii eorum? In virtute seilicet Creatoris. Nam si putas sic aciepidum, Si Ego in Beelzebule ejicio daemonias, filii vestri in quo quasi illas sugillaret in Beelzebule ejiciéntes; resistet tibi prior sensus, Non posse Satanam di-
translate our Lord’s words “shall never thirst.” For it is plain the woman understood Him, as if He had told her of a water, which whoso should once drink of, should never be athirst any more as long as he lived. But if she failed of His meaning, because she understood not that He spake of thirsting in the world to come; do not they fail of His meaning, who, when He saith, “he that drinks of My water shall not thirst for everlasting,” understand it to be, that he shall never thirst in this world? being so plain, that he “shall not thirst” in the world to come. They make Him say, He that once tastes of My grace, in him the spring of it shall never die in this world; which is that the woman understood Him to say in the literal sense, because she understood not that He spake of the world to come. He, comparing this world with the world to come, saith, “He that drinks of My water” in this world, “shall not thirst” in the world to come. Which is to say, that he, who departs from the Christianity which once he professed in this world, does not “drink of My water” in this world; because he comes short of My promise, that “in him it shall be a well of water springing up to life everlasting.”

§ 25. I have no reason to be afraid any more of the diffic. [Rom. viii. 28—39; having shewed by evident arguments, that the subject of them are “they, that love God—they that are called according to purpose—they that He foreknew” to be such, “they that walk not according to the flesh, but according to the Spirit, in Christ Jesus.”] For to such I may well allow, that “all works for the best;” because God, having “foreappointed them to be once conformable to the pattern of His Son, that He might be the first-born of many,” calleth them to their trials, and, finding them faithful in them, justisifieth and glorifieth them therefore. Nor can St. Paul’s words signify more,—supposing, when he

\[\text{Rom. viii. 28—39.}\]

“Saith our Saviour, he that hath this Spirit of Grace, ‘shall never thirst.’ It is most emphatically express by two negatives, and an exegetical additional term for weight and certainty, ‘οὐ μὴ ἀποθηκήν’—‘he shall never thirst to eternity’; or as it is expressed, John vi. 25, he shall never thirst at any time.”

Owen, Saints’ Persev., c. viii. § 30. p. 206: who is there occupied in discussing the text at length.

\[\text{This is the pith of Owen’s interpretation of the text (as referred to in the last note), although not his express words. See also Beneield, De Sanct. Persev., lib. ii. c. 3, pp. 161 sq.}\]

\[\text{Above, c. xxvi. § 5.}\]
BOOK II

[Rom. viii. 29, 30.]

saith, "Whom He foreknew those He predestinated, whom He predestinated those He called, whom He called those He justified, whom He justified those He glorified," that he speaks of those whom God foreknew to be qualified as afore, —than this, that, knowing them to be such, He appointed them to bear Christ's cross, and to inherit His glory for the reward of it. Wherefore, when it follows, "What shall we then say to these things? if God be with us, who can be against us? He That spared not His own Son but delivered Him up for us all, how shall He not with Him give us all things?" it is manifest, that the quality, which St. Paul understandeth in them, whom he comprehends when he names "us," is no other but that which he hath described true Christians by, thus far. And therefore, when he proceeds,

[Rom. viii. 31, 32.]

"Who shall impeach the elect of God? it is God That justifieth—who shall condemn?—it is Christ That died, or rather That is risen again, Who is also at the right hand of God, Who also maketh intercession for us;" it is manifest, that this word "elect" hath no manner of reference to God's everlasting decree, but to the present Christianity of those, whom God declareth to account His "choice ones," His "jewels," His "first-fruits," out of all the rest of the creatures. So is ἐκλεκτὸς often used, in the New Testament especially, to signify "egregius" or "eximius," or that which they signify in Latin, when they speak of creatures chosen out of the flock to be sacrifices, or dedicated to God for first-fruits.

Examples you have in abundance; Matt. xx. 16, xxii. 14, xxiv. 22, 24, 31; Mark xiii. 20, 22, 27; Luke xviii. 7; Rom. xvi. 13; Col. iii. 12; 2 Tim. ii. 10; Titus i. 1; 1 Pet. i. 2, ii. 9; 2 John i. 13; Apoc. xvii. 14. In all which texts there is nothing to be found, that enforceth any more than the choice esteem, which God has of those that are there qualified His "elect;" without intimation of any decree of His, whereby He hath designed them to life everlasting.

v "Εκλεκτὸς, 1. proprie, electus . . . 2. eximius, maxime præstans, ad imitationem Hebræi ἄξιος, Genes. xxiii. 6. 1 Tim. v. 21, 2 Tim. ii. 10; ἐκλεκτὸς ἄγγελος, angeli venerabiles, eximii. 3. carus, dilictus, præbatus, beneficius ornatus . . . 1 Pet. ii. 9. γένος ἐκλεκτὸς populus Deo valde gratus et acceptus. . . Hinc ἐκλεκτὸς speciam in N.T. dicitur 4. verus Dei cultor, quem amat et probat, et maxime is, cui offeretur et confertur felicitas Christiana." Schleusner, Lex. N.T., sub voce.
§ 26. Which those⁹ that will not content themselves with, when the Apostle exhorteth to make our "calling and election sure" (2 Pet. i. 10),—to wit, to assure ourselves of the state and condition of God’s choice ones,—do entangle themselves in everlasting difficulties, how any man can assure himself of that, which he can never forfeit, being passed from everlasting.

§ 27. Let St. Paul then go forward.—"Who shall separate us from the love of Christ? Tribulation, or anguish, or persecution, or hunger, or nakedness, or peril, or the sword? (as it is written, For Thee are we killed all the day long, we are accounted as sheep to be slain.) Nay, in all these we are more than conquerors, through Him That hath loved us. For I am persuaded, that neither death nor life . . . shall be able to separate us from the love of God, which is through our Lord Christ."—Is there any thing in all this to signify, that sin cannot separate Christians from the love of God? not, that "neither life nor death, nor angels nor principalities nor powers, nor things present nor things to come, nor height nor depth, nor any other creature, can separate" those, whom St. Paul comprehends with himself in the plural "us," from the love of God to sin? Surely I cannot allow the curiosity of those, that would have St. Paul say all this out of a revelation made to him in particular of his salvation. For what shall become of this "us?" Whom besides St. Paul shall it comprise? But when St. Paul says "πεπροφητήκατο,"—"I am persuaded," he says no more of himself, than I can maintain every one of those, whom he comprises with himself in the plural "us," to say: which is, that every

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⁹ E. g.—"Electiorum confirmatio hic intelligitur non ratione Dei, . . sed ratione conscientiae humanae, tum, 1. nostrae, sive in mentibus nostris, quae ex bonis operibus ut propriis effectis probat causam procreantem, nempe vocazione et electionem: . . . tum, 2. aliene, ut per bona opera (vestra) reli siibi persuasent vos esse electos." Gomarus, Calvin, Vatablus, and others, ap. Poli Synops. ad loc.—"Quamvis enim firmis (electis nostris) sit in Deo, . . tamen quod nos et notitiam nostram firma redditur electionis fructibus," &c., "sine quibus fieri non possit, ut Spiritus Sanctus testimonium praebet spiritui nostro quod simus filii Dei." Benekeed, De Sanct. Persev., lib. i. c. 11. p. 63.

r "Excepte meane of himself by special revelation, or of the predestinate in general (in which two cases it may stand for the certitude of faith or infallible knowledge): otherwise that every particular man should be assured infallibly that himself should be justified, and not that only, but sure also never to sinne, or to have the gift of perseverance, and certaine knowledge of his predestination; that is a most damnable false illusion and presumption." Rheimons on Rom. viii. 38, 39. Antv. 1600.—Compare Bellarmine, De Justitie, lib. iii. c. 11. (Controv., tom. iii. p. 1138. D), and cc. 8, 9. (ibid., pp. 1118. A, 1123. B—D).
good Christian may aim at as firm a persuasion of attaining salvation, as he finds his own resolution to be firm to abide in the way of it; and that, having digested the greatest difficulties to which he is liable, and being assured not to fail of God's help in not failing of his endeavours by grace received from God, none of them shall be of force to cast him away. Indeed I find St. Paul more confident in the same purpose, when he speaks nearer death:—2 Tim. iv. 7, 8; “I have fought the good fight, I have finished the course, I have kept the faith; henceforth is laid up for me the crown of righteousness, which the Lord the righteous judge shall render me:”—as having it from God, that there was not much of his course remaining, and having digested in his mind the terrors of death. But when he saith further, “And not only to me, but to all that love His appearance;” I am confident, as those that “love His appearance” have the same crown laid up for them, so they, that know they “love His appearance,” may as well know, that they have the same crown in store: and, therefore, that St. Paul meant not to abate any thing of this confidence, when he said (1 Cor. ix. 26, 27), “I therefore so run as not at random, so fight I as not beating the air, but chasten my body and enslave it, lest having preached to others I leave myself a reprobate;” but that he expresseth hereby the supposition, upon which his confidence was grounded, together with his resolution to undergo the utmost of it.

[1 John iii. 7—9.] § 28. The words of St. John have no difficulty in them, if we take them together. 1 John iii. 7—9: “Little children, let no man deceive you; he that doth righteousness, is righteous, even as He is righteous; he that sinneth, is of the devil, for the devil sinneth from the beginning: the Son of God was manifested on purpose to dissolve the works of the devil: every man that is born of God, doth not commit sin, because His seed abideth in him; and he cannot sin, because he is born of God.” Was there not reason for St. John, to warn them against all deceitful pretences of righteousness before God in them, that live not in righteousness; when it is manifest, that he writes against heresies, which, wallowing in uncleannesses, pretended a secret ground whereupon they

* Corrected from MS.; “them,” in orig. text.
continued righteous before God? I say not, that this is the opinion I write against; but I say, that, if the Apostle's argument be true,—that sin is from the devil, and that Christ came "to dissolve the works of the devil,"—then he, that doth the works of Belial, hath no part in Christ, more than Belial hath. And therefore, when it followeth, "Every man that is born of God, doth not commit sin, because His seed abideth in him:" he means not to shew us a distinction, to sin, and enjoy the pleasure of sin, without committing of sin; as if the sins of the regenerate, overcoming so many more obligations, were not committed more than those of the unregenerate: neither doth he discover that, which every man knew before, by saying, that a Christian if he do like a Christian sins not, "because the seed" of his Christianity "remains in him:" unless we think our Lord's words to no purpose (Matt. vii. 16—18), "Do they gather grapes of thorns or figs of thistles? so every good tree bringeth forth good fruit, and a corrupt tree bad fruit; a good tree cannot bring [forth] bad fruit, nor a corrupt tree good fruit;" and that, speaking of the same heresies of which St. John is to be understood, as I have shewed", that they might not admit any pretence against that mark: or unless we think St. Ignatius his words to no purpose, who uses the same sentence in the same case. Wherefore, when St. John saith, that "he, who is born of God, cannot sin, because His seed is in him;" his meaning is that, which Tertullian expresseth (De Prescript. Heret. cap. iii.), "Non futurus Dei filius si ad miserit:"—"Because he cannot continue the son of God if he sin."

§ 29. It hath been much argued, that St. Paul, Rom. vii. 7—25, sets forth in himself, as regenerate, such a conflict between the law of his members and the law of his mind, that as a carnal man he confesses himself to be "sold under sin:" because, saith he, "what I do, I allow not; for what..."
BOOK II.

I would, I do not, but what I would not, that I do: which if I do when I would not, I agree with the law that it is good; but it is not I that do it, but sin, that dwelleth in me.” And this law in his members, warring against the law of his mind, he says, lead[s] him captive to the law of sin in his members; so that he cries out, “Miserable man that I am, who shall deliver me from the body of this death?”

§ 30. Whereunto is added the authority of St. Augustin, pressing this exhortation so hard, that it serves for an aspersion of Pelagius his heresy for a man not to allow it. Though St. Augustin is not alone in it. Methodius against Origen (in Epiphanius, writing against his heresy), St. Gregory Nazianzen, and others perhaps among the fathers, follow the same sense. But the aspersion is too abusive. For I have shewed, that the tradition of the Church, declared by the records of the fathers, extendeth not to the exposition of...
OF THE COVENANT OF GRACE.

particular scriptures, but to give bounds within which the Scriptures are to be understood. Wherefore, had St. Augustin and his party truly expounded this scripture, yet ought it not to be a mark of Pelagianism to maintain another exposition without supposing any part of Pelagius his heresy. But if they consider further, that St. Augustin acknowledges no more than the motions of concupiscence, which are alive in the regenerate, to divert the rigour of their intentions from the course of Christianity; not the committing of any sin, that "layeth waste" a good "conscience," to be consistent with the state of grace; they will have little joy of St. Augustin's exposition of this place. For what is that to the murder and adulteries of David, to the apostacy of St. Peter, to the idolatries of Solomon? Or what consequence is it,—because concupiscence is alive in Christians, that are at peace with God until death,—that, therefore, David, St. Peter, and Solomon, were at peace with God, before they had washed away those sins by repentance? Wherefore I must utterly discharge St. Augustin, and those of his sense, of having said any thing prejudicial to Christianity by expounding St. Paul according to it.

§ 31. The question that remaineth will be, how St. Paul can call himself "carnal and sold under sin:" how he can say, "I like not that which I do, for I do not what I would, but what I hate;" and, "To will is present with me, but how to do that which is good, I find not;" and, "I find a law, by which, when I would do well, evil is at hand to me;" and that this "law in my members, warring against the law of my mind, leads me captive to the law of sin that is in my members;" and, "Wretched man that I am, who will deliver me from the body of this death?" The question I say will be, how all this can be said of him, of whom it follows (Rom. viii. 1, 2, 5—8): "There is therefore now no damnation for those in Christ Jesus, that walk not after the flesh, but after the Spirit; for the law of the Spirit of life, in Christ Jesus, hath freed me from the law of sin and of death: . . . for they, that are according to the flesh, mind the things of the flesh; they, that are according to the Spirit, the things of the Spirit: for the sense of the flesh is death, but the sense of the Spirit,

* See above in note 2.
life and peace; because the sense of the flesh is enemy to
God, for it is not nor can be subject to the law of God;
neither can they, that are in the flesh, please God." For
if these things cannot be said of the same man at the same
time, it remains, that though we allow St. Augustin and
those of his sense, that a Christian falls continually into sin,
and by continual offices of Christianity comes clear of it;
yet, when he willfully runs into that sin which he cannot but
know that it cannot stand with his Christianity, he cannot
be of that number, for whom St. Paul says "there is no con-
demnation in Christ Jesus," that "walk not after the flesh
but after the Spirit."

§ 32. And, therefore, for the true meaning of the scripture
in hand, it will be requisite to have recourse to that figure of
speech, whereby St. Paul himself declareth, that he speaks
that of himself which he would have understood of others,
merely for the avoiding of offence (1 Cor. iv. 6) 4. So is it
no marvel, if, to make those that were zealous of the Law be-
lieve, that they could not be saved but by Christianity, he,
whom they took for an Apostle, shew it in his own case, be-
fore he was a Christian; saying, "Is the Law sin? nay, I had
not known sin but by the Law" (Rom. vii. 7).

§ 33. I have shewed you, how Grotius hath understood
him to speak of himself in the person of an Israelite, com-
paring himself, considered as having received the Law and
under the Law, with himself before he received it.

§ 34. If any man think this consideration too far fetched
for St. Paul to propose to those, zealous of the Law, that he

1 "Taiga δε, διδηλοφυς, μεταξωματι-
ta αις εμαστι και Απολλον, δι' ομοί.
1 Cor. iv. 6.—"Metaxωmatizëwa pro-
prie est 'mutare habitum.' . Inde
transfertur ad orationem, quae aliud
videtur dicere, aliud innuit: cujusmodi
locutio: ex vocari a Gracis solent ἠγοι
εκχωματισμὸν, quas 'controversias
figuratas' dixit Quintilianus ix. 11, et
'figuras' Suetonius; &c. Grot. ad
1 Cor. iv. 6.—"Notaendum est hoc
locu" (Rom. vii. 7) "ac deinceps Pau-
Ium in prima persona loqui, non quod
de se agat, sed quod modestiae causa
res odiosas sic exprimere malit; quod
ipse dicit metaxωmatizëw, 1 Cor. iv. 6.
Similia loquendi genera habet, 1 Cor.
vi. 12, 15, x. 23, 29, 30, xiii. 2, Gal. ii.
18. Chrysostomus ad 1 Cor. xii.; 'Αει
tα φορτικά ἐπὶ τοῦ αἰκελου προσαφός
γυμνὰτείαν ('semper de odiosis disserit
sua persona'). Hieronymus ad Da-
nielem; 'Peccata populi, quia unus e
populo est, enumerat persona sua, quod
et Apostolum in Epistola ad Romanos
facere legitur.' Neque vero non et
alibi talia occurrant," &c. Id., Ad
Rom. vii. 7.
2 "Apostolus autem hic" (Rom. vii.
7) "sub prima persona descriptus
Hебraeus genus quale fuit ἐν τῷ πολῶ
(maxima ex parte), primum ante Le-
gem, deinde post Legem." Id., Ad
Rom. vii. 7.—See above, c. x. § 15.
writes to; he may understand him to speak in the person of one of them, to whom the Gospel had been proposed (and thereby conviction of the spiritual sense of the Law); which therefore the concupiscence, which we are born with, cannot but make great difficulty to embrace, according to the premisses. For seeing the Scribes and Pharisees, having received the tradition of the world to come, in opposition to the Sadducees, had prevailed with the body of that people to believe, that the outward observation of the Law according to the letter was the means to bring them to the rewards of it; it is no marvel, if St. Paul, in the person of one so reduced, say, "I had not known concupiscence," had I not found "the [Rom. vii. Law" to say, "Thou shalt not covet." For he that understood not the law of God to prohibit the inward motions of concupiscence, till by the preaching of Christianity he learned that to be the intent of the precept, may very well say, that he "knew not concupiscence but by the Law" so preached. By that same reason might he say, as it followeth, "Without [Rom. vii. the Law sin is dead, but I was once alive without the Law," to wit, when he thought himself in the way to life under the doctrine of the Pharisees: but "when the commandment came" to be declared to him in that sense, which the salvation tendered by the Gospel requireth, it is no marvel, if "sin" that was in him, and concupiscence of it, "revived;" and he was discovered to be "dead" in sin, as not yielding to the cure of it. But that "the commandment which was given [Rom. vii. for life became unto his death, because sin, taking occasion by it, deceived and slew him;" all this takes place in that Pharisee, who, being persuaded by the Pharisees, that by not contriving to take away his neighbour's wife and goods he stood qualified for the world to come, now coming to know, by the preaching of the Gospel, the restraint of inward concupiscence is commanded by it, found himself by means of the Law cozened and slain, as enemy to Christianity, which tenders the only cure of sin. Whereunto the conclusion agrees well enough: for when, having questioned, "Miserable man [Rom. vii. that I am, who shall deliver me out of the body of this death?" he answereth, "I thank God by Jesus Christ our Lord," he seemeth to declare, that, the Gospel having over-

* See above, c. x. § 15.
BOOK; taken him in this estate and discovered him to himself in it, the embracing of it cured him, and gave him cause to "thank God through our Lord Jesus Christ" for his deliverance from it: all the rest, that followeth between these terms in the discourse of St. Paul, serving for a very lively description of that man's estate, who, being convinced of the truth of Christianity, findeth difficulty in renouncing the pleasures which sin furnisheth, for the obtaining of those promises which the Gospel tendereth.

§ 35. There remaineth yet one difficulty, concerning the polygamy of the ancient fathers before and under the Law; which to me hath always seemed an argument for the truth which I maintain, rather than an objection against it. If any soul, sensible of the fear of God, can imagine, that God's "jewels," His "choice ones," the "first-fruits of His creatures," knowing themselves to be under the law of having but one wife not to be parted with till death, should notwithstanding take many (and those many times so qualified, as the Law, much more Christianity, allows not; as Jacob two sisters, Abraham his niece, and so Amram), and to outface the law, hold them till death, and never come short of God's favour, Whose law they transgress "with bare face," as the Scripture speaks; let him believe, that a Christian, living in sin, can be in the state of grace. But he that sees the Law to have restrained marrying with the niece, which he sees practised afore; and sees withal, that plurality of wives is not forbidden by the Law (for, besides wives of an inferior rank, which may be called concubines, a captive Deut. xxi. 11, and a Hebrew maid sold for a slave Exod. xxi. 8—10, there can be no question in the Law of two wives, whereof the one is

1 "Quod rigidiiores Protestantes affirmant, polygamiam, et divertionem extra casum adulterii, lege morali non fuisset concessa, sed legibus tantum forensibus, et Mosem ut politicum magistratum, majoris mali vitandi causa, utrumque hoc contra legem Dei legem permisset, falsum est; Christus enim, Qui res forenses nunquam attingere voluit," &c., "hisce de rebus tamen veras nobis leges tulit: adde quod . . . hinc manifeste sequetur, sanctos Veteris Testamenti toties scientes (nisi forte communi esse casu satis crassa ignantia laborasse illos omnes affirmare malis contra legem moralem pecasse. . . Vide praeter plurimos aliis Hieronymum De Jure Belli et Pacis, lib. ii. c. 5. § 9): Vorstius (in Scholiis Alexicacis, pp. 240, 241)."

Forbes, Consid. Mod., De Justif., lib. iv. c. 2. § 9, pp. 326, 328.—Vorstius (as above quoted, loc. Gouda 1614) was arguing against one Sibrandus Lubbertius, who denied "Christum esse legislatorem," and was trying to avoid the force of the Gospel laws prohibiting polygamy and divorce.

2 See below, c. xxxii. § 41.
beloved the other not, Deut. xxi. 15; besides that the law restraining the king from having many wives seems to allow him more than every man had, and therefore that David might be within compass of the law, though Solomon trod it under foot): I say, he that considers these things, will be moved to be of opinion, that the Pharisees' interpretation of Lev. xviii. 18, is true, and that, before that law, there was no prohibition for a man to marry two sisters, which is there first introduced; and yet with an exception in Deuteronomy, in the case of a brother dead without issue; which before the δ. Law was also in force, as by the story of Judah (Gen. xxxviii. 8.) doth appear. I will therefore conclude, that, as the knowledge of God increased by giving the Law, so was the posterity of Abraham restrained from more by the Law, than the posterity of Noe, upon the promises given them, had been restrained from after the deluge. From whence in all reason it will follow, that the posterity of Abraham according to the Spirit, which is the Church of Christ, should be still restrained from more, than the posterity of Abraham according to the flesh by the Law: and so, that the fathers before and under the Law, living in God's grace, did not withal live in open violation of God's law; but that they knew themselves not to be under the law of one wife to one husband (though intended in paradise), by virtue of God's dispensation in it, till Christianity should come. For unless we presume, that not only all things necessary to our salvation, but all things necessary to the salvation of all men since the world stood, are recorded in the Scriptures; there can be no reason to presume, that they could not understand what laws they were under, but by those Scriptures, which for our salvation have been granted us.

§ 36. I argue yet further, that it will be impossible for true Christians, and good Christians, to attain unto assurance of the state of grace; if it be to be had for them, that commit such sins as Christianity consists not with: and this, upon supposition of the premisses, for the ground of this assurance. For, without doubt, were not some thing in the condition which the Gospel requirith impossible for flesh

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1 See Hammond, Of Marrying the Wife's Sister, § 17 sq.; Works, vol. i. pp. 582—585; and Of Polygamy and Divorce, c. i. § 7; ibid., p. 591.
and blood to bring forth, it were not possible for him, that embraceth the Gospel, to assure himself, that he doeth it out of obedience to God, not out of those reasons which hypocrites may follow. But I, having declared afore, and maintaining now, that no man, by the force of flesh and blood (that is to say, of that inclination to goodness which a man is born into the world with), is able to profess Christianity out of a resolute and clear intention to stand to it, am consequently bound to maintain, that he who so doeth not only may but must needs assure himself of the favour of God, inasmuch as he cannot but assure himself of that which himself doeth. For inasmuch as he knows what himself means, and what he does; as St. Paul says, that no man "knows what is in man, but the spirit of a man which is in him;" so sure it is, that a man's self knows what he means and what he does, as it is sure that another man knows it not. But, not allowing nor presupposing this ground of a man's knowledge, how shall he know it? Shall a man, by having a persuasion that he is in the number of God's elect, or by having in himself an assurance of God's love to the effect of everlasting happiness, be assured, that his assurance is well grounded, and that he is of that number which is elected to life everlasting? As if it were not possible for the temptations of Satan, and carnal presumption, to possess a man as much, even to this effect, as the Spirit of God can do. Where is then the effect of Christianity seen, if not in limiting such grounds, and such terms, as he that proceedeth upon, shall not fail of that grace of God, whereof he assureth himself upon those grounds?

§ 37. But he that placeth that faith, which alone justifieth, in believing that he who believeth is predestinate to life everlasting, or in the confidence of God's grace in attaining the same; I demand, upon what ground he can pretend to distinguish this faith from that, which he cannot deny that it may be false. For if it be said, that the Spirit of God That is in him assureth him, that his persuasion is well grounded; it is easy for me to say, that the question to be cleared (that is to say, whether it be the Spirit of God That

= Above, cc. x., xviii., xix.
tells him so, or not), cannot be the evidence to clear itself; and, therefore, that he standeth obliged to bethink himself of some means, whereupon he may assure himself that it is the Spirit of God, not the temptation of Satan, or carnal presumption, that assures him to be of the number of those that are predestinate to life everlasting. For if any man say, that he is assured that the act of his faith, which he first conceived when he was first converted from sin to righteousness, assures him of the grace of God, because it was grounded upon that conversion to God which the Gospel requireth; I will yield him all that. But then I will demand of him, who presupposeth true conversion to God according to the terms which the Gospel requireth (that is to say, joined with a sincere resolution of living for the future in that conversation that the Gospel prescribeth), to be the condition of those promises which the Gospel tendereth; I say, I will demand of him, upon what ground he can persuade himself, that having professed Christianity and failed of it he remains in that favour of God, which he obtained by professing that Christianity which he performeth not.

§ 38. Indeed, could it be said, that the condition which the Gospel requireth is a thing that God immediately determines man to do without and before any determination of his own, I should not much marvel, that a man, who is accepted by God upon such a condition, should continue in favour till it come again, and make him hate that sin for which he forfeited it. But having proceeded thus far in shewing, that the condition which the Gospel requires, is no less than the total change of a man’s intentions from seeking the world to seek God; and that the helps of grace determine him to this no otherwise, than by determining him to choose the better and leave the worse: for me to say, that, waving this determination, he remains possessed of the promises which it produceth, would be to say, that there is no reason why any man should require repentance as a condition, which justifying faith presupposeth.

§ 39. And therefore it is very much to be admired, that those, who would seem truly religious, should think it an abridgment to that security and confidence, that peace and joy in the Holy Ghost, that boasting assurance, which St.
Paul professeth to be the privilege of true Christians, that they cannot maintain it but upon just assurance, that upon their true conversion to God there was just ground for it: nay, further, that God invites not men to Christianity upon fair terms, unless He allow it. For I demand, is it not an act of infinite mercy in God, to set up a standard of confidence to all the world, conditionally that they embrace those terms which He propounds, out of His own mere goodness? is it not enough, that He allows them pardon upon condition of repentance? that He allows this to them, that have forfeited their repentance never so often by repenting them of their repentance? especially, to them, who ground themselves upon their repentance as the condition whereupon they obtained His favour, can it seem strange, that His favour should become void, when they repent them of their repentance?

§ 40. Some object the case of Caleb and Joshua; who, upon perseverance when their fellows fell away, are assured of the land of promise: to argue, that under Christianity, by perseverance in it, a man may obtain assurance of salvation, such as that which God's word createth to those who know it to be God's word, as to that which it assureth. The difference of the case is this, that they had God's word for their assurance: which I must needs have granted in St. Paul's case, had I granted, that the assurance of salvation which he professeth had been grounded upon a revelation made to him in particular, that he should be saved; but, seeing I have grounded that assurance, which he expresseth, merely upon that conscience of the common Christianity which he had, I say, that, supposing Caleb and Joshua to be certain of their inheritance in the land of promise by virtue of the promise there recorded (which nothing hinders to imply that condition of walking according to the law of God, upon which it is made), it is enough, that the Gospel can assure us of eternal life upon supposition of that disposition of mind, upon which St. Paul assures himself of it. For if it be said, that he who assures a man of God's grace upon condition of doing what he can to hold it, assures nothing; seeing it is agreed upon, that he which doth no more than he can shall certainly fall from it: the answer is easy,—that
nothing can be more injurious, than to measure that which man can do, when by the grace of God he hath been resolved to Christianity (and thereupon hath received of God the promise of the habitual assistance of His Spirit for the performance of that, which he hath undertaken upon confidence of God's assistance), by that which no man by mere nature is able to do. For, these promises being passed upon supposition of that weakness and perverseness by nature which they come into the world with, it cannot be imagined that they can become void by the means of those subreptions and surprises of native concupiscence, to which all men are liable. Though, if a man shall openly transgress his Christianity in that which he must needs know that it cannot stand with it, or if by continued negligence he cast off that regard that he hath professed to it; can any reason be imagined, why God should continue His favour or the inward effects of it, but that which all men have, to reconcile the present love of sin to the promises of the world to come?

§ 41. Wherefore, though I cannot allow that saying, which ["Deus neminem deserit nisi desertus."] the School hath allowed in many doctors,—"Facienti quod in se est Deus largitum gratiam;"—unless it be restrained to him, that complies with the helps of preventing grace; whom, I am persuaded, God will not fail to bring to the state of grace by following helps of grace: yet there is another saying of the School, which I do utterly allow;—"Deus neminem deserit, nisi desertus"—that "God leaves no man that leaves not Him first;"—because it is evident in reason, that the promise of the Holy Ghost must come to nothing, unless it may be held upon such conditions, as are possible to him that comes to be a Christian with original concupiscence; that is to say, so as not to forfeit it upon those surprises and subreptions, which morally no man can avoid; but upon departure from that, which a man upon deliberation had professed afore. He that considers, how many times God in the Old Testament delivers the Israelites from those oppressors, to whom He had given them up for their transgressions of

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*a* See above, c. xxxv. § 17. note y.
His covenant; will never believe, that upon every transgression of Christianity He will break with those, that sincerely desire to continue in His favour upon condition of it. And he that considers, that it is not commendable amongst men to break off friendship upon every offence, with them whom a man hath entertained it with in matters of privacy, and a long time; will never apprehend, that the Scripture, representing the friendship of God with His children according to His Gospel by the pattern of that love, which the best men shew to those whom they entertain friendship with, doth intend to express Him disobliged upon every offence: but unless we think it commendable for God to love men more than righteousness for the love of Christ, to Whom the same righteousness is no less dear than to God, will never think it agreeable to the honour of the Gospel, to propose the reward of that righteousness which it requireth, but upon supposition of performing of it. Certainly, Celsus had done the Christians no wrong, in slandering them, that they received all the wicked persons, whom the world spued out, into an assurance of everlasting happiness; nor could Zosimus be blamed, for imputing the change of Constantine the Great to a desire of easing his conscience of the guilt of those sins which Paganism could shew him no means to expiate: had the Christians of that time acknowledged, that they tendered assurance of pardon to any man, but upon supposition of conversion from his sin.

§ 42. These things supposed, it will be easy to resolve, that the assurance of salvation, which the Gospel enables a good Christian to attain, is not the act of justifying faith, but the consequence of it. Indeed, if a man were justified by believing that he is justified; so far as a man hath the act of justifying faith, so far he must necessarily rest assured, not only of his right to salvation at present, but of his everlasting salvation in the world to come. But neither is that opinion, which maketh justifying faith to consist in the trust and confidence which a Christian reposes in God through Christ for the obtaining of His promises, liable to the horrible and gross consequence of the same. To exclude all Christians
OF THE COVENANT OF GRACE. 651

282 from salvation, that they are not as sure that they shall be saved as they are of their Creed, is a consequence as desperate, as it is gross to make that assurance the act of justifying faith. The true act of justifying faith, which is constancy in Christianity, the more lively and resolute it is, the more assurance it createth, of those consequences which the Gospel warranteth. For no man is ignorant of his own resolutions: nor can be less assured, that it is God's Spirit that creates this assurance, than he is assured, that his own resolutions are not counterfeit. And, therefore, his trust in God, not as reconcilable but as reconciled, must needs be answerable. And the same trust may warrant the same assurance; though not of itself, but upon the conscience of that Christianity whereupon it is grounded.

§ 43. And by those things which were disputed, not only during the Council of Trent, but also since the decree thereof, it is manifest, that the Church of Rome doth not teach it to be the duty of a good Christian to be always in doubt of God's grace: but alloweth that opinion to be maintained, which maketh assurance of salvation attainable upon these terms; and therefore encourageth good Christians to contend for it.

§ 44. As for the assurance of future salvation, which de-

"Homo vere fidelis, id est, fidei justificante prædictus, certus est certitudine fidei de remissione peccatorum suorum et salute sempiterna sua per Christum." Sixth of the Lambeth Articles as originally drawn out by Whitaker. And see below, § 49. note u.

"Communiun Romanensium hac de re sententia negat certitudinem fidei Divinae justo de sua justificatione citra speciale revelationis privilegium: libenter tamen admittit ex vivæ fidei sensu, seu charitatis et bonorum operum experimento, certitudinem aliquam minoris et inferioris gradus oriri, quæ conlecturalis et probabilis nominari potest, et quæ, licet non omnem formidinem pellat, tamen tollit omnem anxietatem et hesitationem," &c. "Ideoque quando de aliqua aliqua Romanenses dubitatione loquuntur, non alius intelligere, quam quandam formidinem, quæ in omni assensu, etiam certo, qui non sit infallibilis aut evidens, reperitur, et late dubitatio vocatur: vide Bellarminum (De Justifi., lib. iii. c. 11.

pendeth upon the assurance of perseverance till death, or a man’s departure in the state of grace; you see St. Paul involveth all Christians in it with himself, by saying, ‘I am persuaded, that neither life nor death . . . shall be able to separate us from the love of God which is in Jesus Christ our Lord.’ And therefore, I conceive, it was a very great impertinence to dream of any privilege of immediate revelation for the means by which he had it. Whosoever is a Christian, so far as he is a Christian, hath it. ‘A double-minded man, that is unconstant in all his ways,’ as St. James speaks, (that is, who is not resolved to live and die a good Christian,) cannot have it. Whosoever hath that resolution, inasmuch as he hath that resolution[, hath it]; that is, so firm as his resolution is, so firm is his assurance. For, knowing his own resolutions, he knows them not easily changeable, in a matter importing the end of a man’s whole course; and, therefore, knowing God unchangeable while he so continues, is able to say full as much as St. Paul saith,—‘I am persuaded, that neither life nor death shall be able to separate me from the love of God in Christ Jesus.’

§ 45. As for the sense of the primitive and Catholic Church (putting you in mind of that which I said before, to shew, that it placeth justifying faith in professing Christianity, the effect whereof in justifying must needs fail, so soon as a man faileth of performing that Christianity, in the profession whereof his justification standeth): I shall not need to allege the opinions of particular fathers to make evidence of it, having laws of the Church to make evidence, that those who were ruled by them must needs think the promises of the Gospel to depend upon the covenant of our baptism; and, therefore, that they become forfeit by transgressing the same. The promise of persevering in the profession of the faith until death, and of living like a Christian, was always expressly exacted of all that were baptized (as now in the Church of England): and upon this promise, and not otherwise, remission of sin, right to God’s kingdom, and the gift of His Spirit, was to be expected. As, if it were not made

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1 See above, § 27, note r.
2 Corrected in MS.; misprinted
3 water,” in orig. text.
4 Above, c. ix. § 17, sq.
5 Above, cc. ii.—v.
with a serious intent at the present, baptism did nothing but
damn him that received it; so [it did damn him]², if it were
transgressed by gross sins, not to be imputed to the surprises
of concupiscence. For, the condition failing, that which de-
pendeth upon the same must needs fail. For the means by
which they expected to recover the state of grace thus for-
feited, we have the penitential canons (which, as they had
the force of law all over the Church all the better times of
the Church, so I shew from the beginning, that they had
their beginning from the Apostles themselves⁴); to assure us,
that all believed that, without which there could be no ground
for that which all did practise. Can any man imagine,
that the Church should appoint several times and several
measures of penance⁵, for several sins, to be debarred the
communion of the Eucharist, and to demonstrate unto the
Church by their outward conversation the sincerity of their
conversion to their first profession of Christianity; had not
all acknowledged, that the promises of the Gospel, forfeited
by transgressing the profession of baptism, were not to be
recovered otherwise? and that, the deeper the offence was,
the more difficulty was presumed in replanting the resolution
of Christianity in that heart, which was presumed to have
deserted it, according to the measure of the sin whereby it
had violated the same? This is enough to prescribe unto
reasonable men, against such little consequences, as now and
then are made upon some passages of the fathers, which upon
by occasions seem to speak otherwise.

§ 46. St. Augustin is the main hope of the cause⁶, so far [St. Au-
gustin.]
as it hath any joy in the consent of the Church. But what
joy they can have of St. Augustin, may easily be judged, by
his opinion of the seventh to the Romans, and the difference
which I have observed between it and theirs⁷. For what
can any man imagine to be the reason, why he should

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² Added from MS.
³ See Bk. I. Pr. of Chr. Tr., c. i. § 37; and Right of Ch. in Chr. State, c. i. § 21, sq.
⁴ See Morinus, De Pœnitentia, lib. v.: and Bingham, Bk. xvi.; and Bk. xviii. c. 4.
⁵ "But because I shall not burden the reader, being now entred upon the
place and time wherein very many wit-
nesses call aloud to be heard about the
difference in hand, of the first opposers
of the Pelagian heresy, I shall insist
only on him, who is indeed instar om-
nium, and hath ever been so accounted
in the controversies about the grace of
God: and I shall the rather lay this
weight on him, because it's evident that
he spake the sense of the whole Church,
in those days wherein he lived. This
is Austin." Owen, Doctrine of the
Saints' Perseverance, &c., Preface, sign.
E. 4 (notpaged).
⁶ See above, § 30, note z.
understand St. Paul to speak only of the surprises which
the regenerate are subject to, remaining regenerate; but
because he was assured, that they remain not such, when
they fall away to these gross sins, which no man is surprised
with? And he that shall take the pains to peruse what
St. Augustin hath written in his books De Correptione et
Gratia, and De Predestinatione Sanctorum⁶, may justly mar-
vell, how any man could come to have such an opinion of
St. Augustin. Besides, in his work De Civitate Dei⁷, and in
many other places⁸, he hath so clearly expressed himself;
that, unless a man resolve not to distinguish between the
state of grace and the purpose of God to bring a man to
everlasting life (which he that useth the common reason of
all men cannot but distinguish), it is a marvel how St. Au-
gustin should be taken to say, that the state of grace cannot
become void, because (it is true) he says so often, that the
decree of predestination cannot become void.

§ 47. St. Gregory is taken for one of the same opinion⁹;
because, expounding the words of the prophet Jeremy (Lament.
iv. 1.)—"How is gold obscured? the pure mass changed?
the stones of the sanctuary scattered in the head of every
street"—concerning Christians that fall from their profes-
sion, according to the true reason of the mystical sense, he
hath the words,—‘Aurum, quod obscurari potuit, aurum in
conspectu Dei nunquam fuit’—‘That gold, which could be
darkened, was never gold in God’s sight.’ But is it not
easy to understand, that the “sight of God” is that fore-
knowledge⁹, which the decree of predestination either sup-

⁶ See above, § 10. note o; and below, § 47. notes m, n: and Voss., Hist Pelag.,
a, 753. a.
p. 282. B, C); and lib. xx. c. 7. § 3.
(ibid., p. 582. A—E).
⁸ See quotations in Voss., Hist Pelag.,
748. a: and Andrews, Judgment of
Lambeth Articles, and Censura Censurae
D. Barrett, pp. 294 sqq., 301 sq. Ox. 1846.
⁹ After this was Gregory I., who,
lib. i. Epist. 99, speaks to the same
purpose with them in these words, ‘Red-
emptoris nostri,’ &c., &c. . . . ‘This
is the summe of what we contend for .
And most expressive to our purpose is
that discourse of his which you have
lib. 34. Moral. cap. 8.’ (sic) Owen,
Saints’ Persev., Pref., sign. F. 2: pro-
ceeding to quote the passage given be-
low in note i.

"Aurum quod pravis ejus (Dis-
boli) persuasionibus quasi lultum sterni
potuerit, aurum ante Dei oculos nun-
quam fuit; qui enim seducit quonque
non reversi possunt, quasi habitam
sancitatem ante oculos hominum vi-
dentur amittere, sed eam ante oculos
Dei nunquam habuerunt.” S. Greg-
M., Moral. in Job., lib. xxxiv. c. 15.
§ 29; Op., tom. i. p. 1129. D: quoted
by Owen, Saints’ Persev., Preface, sign.
F. 2.—S. Gregory had been comment-
ing just before (§ 26. p. 1128. D, E)
upon the passage above cited from the
Lamentations.

⁹ Corrected from MS. “free know-
ledge,” in origin. text.
poseth or produceth? and that those, whom God foreseeeth to fall from their Christianity, "were never gold" in His esteem, in regard of it? As I said afore, that He never knew them, whom He ever knew that they would not ever continue His.

§ 48. And, seeing St. Augustin expressly distinguisheth between sons of God according to that which they are at present and according to God's foresight and purpose, it will be necessary, consequently, to distinguish upon the attributes of "members of Christ," and "of His body, ingrafted into Christ," and "His disciples:" that those are truly called such, according to St. Augustin, that shall continue such for everlasting; though those, that shall not so continue, are so for the present, according to St. Augustin. As it is peremptorily evident by one exception;— in that hemaketh the difference between some of them who have the gift of perseverance, and others that have it not, to consist in this; that some are cut off by death, while they are in that estate, others are suffered to survive till they fall from it:— a thing many times repeated in the books aforenamed, and which could not have been said, but by him that held both for the present to be in the state of grace. Nor could he indeed dispute of perseverance, not supposing the truth of that, in which he requireth grace to persevere.

§ 49. I acknowledge to have seen the preface to one of the volumes that I spoke of, and in it some pretence of making St. Augustin, and St. Gregory especially, for the contrary purpose. But I do not acknowledge to have found any thing at all alleged there, that had not been fully an-

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1 Above, § 22.
2 "Istiu cum pie vivunt, dicuntur filii Dei; sed quoniam victuri sunt impie et in eadem impietate mortuiri, non eos dicit filios Dei præscientia Dei. Sunt enim filii Dei, qui nondum sunt nobis, et sunt jam Deo... Et sunt rursus quidam, qui filii Dei proper-
3 E. g.— "Ut enim alia innumerabili taceam, quae alis dantur, alia non dantur hominibus a Domino Deo,... sicut sunt celeritates, vires, bona valetudines," &c.: "ut non immorere etiam in baptismate parvulorum, ... cur illi parvulo detur, illi non detur; cum sit utrumque in potestate Dei, et sine illo sacramento nemo intret in regnum Dei: ut ergo haec taceam vel relin-
quam, illos ipsos intueantur de quibus agitur. De his enim dissimulatis, qui perseverantiam bonitatis non habent sed ex bono in malum deficientie bona voluntate morientur. Respondent, si possunt, cur illos Deus, cum fidelier et pie viverent, non tunc de vitæ hujus periculis rapuit, 'ne malitia mutaret in-
tellectum eorum, et ne fictio deciperet animas eorum.' Utrum hoc in potes-
tate non habuit, an eorum mala futura nescivit?" Id., ibid., c. viii. § 19. p. 760. A.—C.
4 "Owen, Of Perseverance:" added in margin in MS.
5 See above, § 46. note e; § 47. note h.
BOOK II.

swered before it was alleged there, in Vossius his Collections Historiae Pelagianae, libro vi. thesi. xii.—xv. And therefore I will discharge myself upon him in this point, rather than repeat briefly in this abridgment, that which he hath fully said there. For you shall find also there, upon what terms 284 and by what means Christians may and do overcome that anxiety of mind, which the possibility of falling from grace may affect them with, according to the fathers: even the same as according to St. Paul; whose assurance needed no revelation of God's secret purpose, but the knowledge of that resolution which God's Spirit had settled in his spirit; which, being assured that God will not forsake [him] while he forsakes not God, assureth him, that by God's help he will not forsake God: and not only him, but all, whom St. Paul comprises in the plural "us," as grounded like St. Paul. Other-

* Op., tom. vi. pp. 748, b.—761. b.
—"Ex altero hoc Augustinianæ sententiae additamento saturis claris liquet, tam Augustinum et Prosperum, quam Pelagium et ejus reliquias, super eo convenisse, quod fides justificans et gratia regenerans amittit possit, et aplerique amittatur: sed sanctos illos Patres praetera condindisse, Deum ab aeterno statuisse, quodam infallibili mediis perdurere ad vitam aeternam, quorum iccirco fides et caritas vel nunquam deficiat, vel amissa certo restitutur ante finem vitæ," &c. "Neuquam igitur antiquitatibus mentem assequantur, qui cum apud Augustinum et alios legunt, electos Dei vel deficiere nunquam, vel ad Deum ante obitum redire; inde colligunt, ex eorum sententia fideles semper in fide perseverare, aut saltem nunquam penitus Divina gratia excidere. Quorum argumentum hic nittitur hypothesi, quod fideles et electi αἰτιατρέφοντες, cum juxta Augustinum non reciprocantur electi et fideles, sed fideles perseverantes." Title of Thes. xii.; ibid., p. 748. b.


* Corrected from MS. "he," in orig. text.

* See above, § 27, 44.
wise, that a Christian, from the first instant of his conversion, should be able to say so; that whosoever is saved, before death must say so; out of the same confidence, knowing by faith that he is predestinate: as it is mere frenzy once to imagine, so never did any of the fathers maintain.

§ 50. Only, whereas the author of that preface, acknowledging that the Dominicans and Jansenians (who hold up the doctrine of St. Augustin concerning the grace of perseverance) suppose nevertheless them to be regenerate, that are not predestinate nor shall be saved, imputes it to "the abominable fictions of implicit faith, and the efficacy of the sacraments, in exhibiting and conveying the grace which they seal;" I would not have him think the efficacy of baptism can be counted a fiction by any but feigned Christians. Of the sacraments I say nothing in this place: for I need not so much as suppose what a sacrament is; and whether baptism be a sacrament or not (though a thing no man questions), is nothing to my present purpose. That God contracteth with man for the promises of His Gospel upon condition of Christianity; and that this contract is not only solemnized but enacted by receiving baptism; is not now to be proved, having been done from the beginning of this Book. And he that would be free of that, which he contracteth for by his baptism, whereby he holdeth his title to all that the Gospel promiseth; would make that step to the renouncing of his Christianity. What "implicit faith" should

" E.g. "Nostra est confessio, Christianum hominem non esse, qui non eadem fidei certitudine credit, et Christum esse Filium Dei, et se per Eum esse percepturum vitam aeternam." M. Bucer at the Conference of Ratisbon, as quoted by Forbes, Consid. Mod., De Justif., lib. iii. c. 3. pp. 270 sq.: and see above, c. vii. § 7. notes b, k.

" He (Didacus Alvarez) further proves at large, that the perseverance given to the Saints in Christ, is not a supplement of helps and advantages, whereby they may preserve it if they will; but such as causes them, on whom it is bestowed, certainly and actually so to do: and that in its efficacy and operation, it cannot depend on any free co-operation of our will, all the good acts tending to our perseverance, being fruits of that grace which is bestowed on us, according to the absolute unchangeable decree of the will of God. This indeed is common with this author and the rest of his associates (the Dominicans, and present Jansenians) in these controversies, together with the residue of the Romanists, that having their judgments wrested by the abominable figments of implicit faith, and the efficacy of the Sacraments of the New Testament, conveying and really exhibiting the grace signified, or sealed by them; that they are enforced to grant, that many may be, and are regenerate, and made true believers, who are not predestinate, and that these cannot persevere, nor shall eventually be saved." Owen, Saints' Persev., Pref. sign. F. 4.
BOOK II.

pervert the understanding of doctors, whose faith is explicit in all matters of faith, I understand not: unless he mean to acknowledge,—that which is most true,—that there never needed any express decree of the Church in this point (as in other points questioned by Pelagius), because never any man held otherwise. If this be the "implicit faith," which he means,—because the whole Church always held it but never decreed it;—I shall agree to it, but not that any Christian can be seduced by following it. Jovinian we read only of, confuted in this opinion by St. Jerom, not condemned by the Church; because he could never make it considerable, and so dangerous to the Church. But, in very deed, "implicit faith" here signifies nothing; being only employed to make a noise, for a reason of that for which no reason can be rendered,—how that can be thought to be the sense of St. Augustin, which never any of his followers, all zealous of his doctrine in the matter of grace, could find in his writings. And, therefore, the whole Church before the Reformation, and since the Reformation all that adhere to the Confession of Augsburg, in this point are in the balance against Calvin and his followers.

§ 51. As for the Church of England: if we consider matter of right, that is, what ought to be the sense of the Article, which alloweth penance, because men may cast off the Holy Ghost Which they have received; it is manifest, that the addition of "neither totally nor finally" is a gloss that destroys the text. For that facility of returning to grace once received, which frequent custom, even of supernatural actions, disposeth men to, may remain, when the gift of God's Spirit is forfeit. And though God may as well continue the assist-


8 Dr. Reynolds, at the Hampton Court Conference in 1603, "mooved his Majesty, that the Booke of Articles of Religion.. might be explained in places obscure, and enlarged where some things were defective. For example, whereas Art. xvi. the words are these; 'After wee have receiv'd the Holy Ghost, we may depart from grace;' notwithstanding the meaning be sound, yet he desired that, because they may seeme to bee contrary to the doctrine of God's Predestination and election in the 17th Article, both these words might be explained with this or the like addition, 'Yet neither totally nor finally;' and also," &c. Barlow, Summe and Substance of the Hampton Court Conference, p. 24. 4to. Lond. 1625.
ance of it, totally forfeited, as He did first give the help of it: yet is all title to the promises of the Gospel totally forfeit; and that finally, to those whom God hath not appointed the grace of perseverance: whom had He cut off at another time, they had been saved, according to St. Augustin. Besides, making justifying faith to consist in trust in God, according to the Article and Homily\(^a\), it will be utterly unreason-able to imagine, that this trust, which is not attained but premising repentance, should not fail, when that repentance is recalled by sin. But, making it to consist in the trusty undertaking of baptism, according to the Service and Cate-chism\(^b\), it is a mere contradiction to imagine, that it can stand entire supposing such sin. This for the sense of the Church of England, in point of right. In point of fact; as there have been always those, that have understood the Article according to that gloss which destroyeth the text, so is that force, whereby they have prevailed to destroy the Church of England withal, no means to prevent the damnation of their souls, that give themselves up to be taught according to it.

CHAPTER XXXII.


If it be the mark of a good resolution, that it assoleth all difficulties incident to the question that is resolved; I shall not doubt, that this will prove such, by the ready means which it furniseth to resolve those endless disputes which depend upon the premisses: as, in the first place, whether it is possible for the regenerate to fulfil the law of God in this

\(^a\) See above, c. xxx. § 16.

\(^b\) See above, c. xxxi. § 16, note q: and c. iv. § 17.
life, or not. For, supposing that which hath been said, the resolution is unavoidable:—that, if we consider the original law of God (which, under the Gospel, continueth the rule of that righteousness which we owe), it is not possible, that man, coming into the world with his original concupiscence, should fulfil it by doing every thing according to it; but, if we consider the terms of the covenant of grace (which is the law, by which God hath declared that He will proceed with all them that are under it), that no man can be saved but by fulfilling it. The reason is clear on both sides. For, seeing that original concupiscence remains in them who are regenerate by grace, and that it is confessed on all hands that by the means thereof all do commit sin, either there is no law of God which that sin breaks (and so it is no sin, which we suppose to be sin), or that law is not fulfilled which that sin violateth. On the other side, if God, of His grace, in consideration of our Lord Christ and His merits and sufferings, hath declared Himself ready to accept of all them, that return to Him by true repentance, and serve Him in the profession of Christianity with that new obedience which it requireth: either the Gospel is false, which tendereth remission of sins and everlasting life upon condition of this new obedience; or whosoever fails not of the condition, cannot come short of fulfilling of that law.

§ 2. For every contract is, by the nature thereof, a law to the parties that make it. And though the covenant of grace, according to which our Lord Christ will judge, is merely God's law, because He chooseth the terms upon which He enacteth it with those that are baptized (and, declaring them, becomes engaged to stand to them, before man engageth): yet He becomes further engaged by our embracing the terms which He proposeth; and much more, by our endeavours, in forcing our natural weakness and crookedness to perform what we undertake, and by the performance which these endeavours produce. And if, among civil men, friendship long exercised suffer not a man that stands upon his credit to break upon ordinary offences: we see the reason, why God so often helps His ancient people

\[ \text{Corrected from MS.; "these," in orig. text.} \]
OF THE COVENANT OF GRACE. 661

in respect of that covenant, which they for their parts had made void and forfeit; and, therefore, how much more He 286 obligeth Himself to pass by those failures and weaknesses, which Christians endeavour to overcome, and cannot fully do it.

§ 3. It is indeed most manifest, that the Gospel requireth [How far the fulfilling of the law is required by the covenant of grace.] of Christians the full innocence and holiness of paradise; all that the first Adam was created to, because created in it. But it is manifest also, that they, who undertake to be Christians, come into the world with concupiscence: and therefore cannot undertake never to sin; though they may undertake to persecute and to crucify their own inclination to sin, and to deny themselves things otherwise lawful, when they find themselves subject thereby to be seduced to sin. And it is likewise manifest, that our Lord Christ, Who shall judge all men according to their works, shall not judge the works of Christians according to that which they might have done, had not Adam failed, but according to that which every one in his estate may attain to in the performance of his Christianity. Here is then the ground, why those things, that are done against the rule which the Gospel proposeth, out of invincible ignorance or out of mere surprises of concupiscence (though, for the matter of them, contrary to that law which the Gospel enacteth for the rule of their actions), cannot, by the Gospel, be imputed to Christians, striving toward that perfection which Christianity importeth. For those, who do not study to mortify the concupiscence, whereby they have been seduced to sin; to watch over their thoughts, whereby they knew they may be seduced to sin; cannot be understood so to do. And, therefore, though sins of invincible ignorance, and upon mere surprise of concupiscence, are sins against the original law of paradise, and the directive part of Christ's law, which revives it: yet are they not sins against the covenant of grace, contracted upon supposition of original sin; nor against the vindicative part of Christ's law, according to which He will judge Christians.

§ 4. Certainly, it is a gross inconvenience, to acknowledge [Distinction between sins] any thing to be sin, which no law of God forbids. That venial sin should be beside the law of God but not against God's law
it, would make it no sin; which nothing but the transgression of the law determineth (1 John iii. 4, Rom. iv. 15). For why is any thing sin, but because it ought not to be done? Or why ought it not to be done, but because it is God’s will that it should not be done? Or what would God have done, that is not a law to His creature? Therefore all sin transgresseth that will, whereby God would not have that done, which it, doing, transgresseth His law. On the other side, how clearly agreeth it with the goodness of God, how necessarily followeth it upon that grace which His Gospel publisheth; that those, who are called to it, supposing them obnoxious to that concupiscence, which will certainly induce them to sin notwithstanding the grace whereby they are regenerate, should neither forfeit their estate in it by every sin which they commit, nor by any sin which they forsake by timely repentance? Therefore; how exact soever that obedience is, which the Gospel requireth at our hands; so long as it leaveth him, that returneth by repentance from that sin whereby he faileth of it, right of being re-estated in his reconcilement with God; it is manifest, that his estate in the promises of the Gospel is not forfeit by falling into sin, but by persevering in it. How much more, when it is acknowledged on all hands, that there are in the world so many means to divert our minds from the true end and rule of our doings, so numberless snares for our inclinations (naturally biassed towards that which seemeth best for the present); that no Christian can keep an exact account of the occasions, whereby he findeth himself to fail of that righteousness which he aimeth at: how much more, I say, is it to be presumed, that the grace of the Gospel reacheth further than any man’s repentance, and in consideration of

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d “Quarunt autem hic theologii Ecclesiae Romanae, An peccatum veniale sit contra Dei legem, an vero tamen præter Dei legem. Et quidem sunt inter eos multi qui existimant peccatum veniale non tam esse contra legem quam præter legem, et eo constituantur discrimen peccati mortalis et venialis, quod mortale sit contra legem, veniale solum præter legem. Quae est Bellarmini sententia lib. i. De Anijs. Gratiam et Status Peccati cap. 11. in Explicazione quinti Argumenti” (Con-
our Lord Christ accounteth not that to be a breach of coven-

§ 5. In this consideration, if any man will say, that some
sins are venial, others mortal, in regard of those terms of
reconciliation with God, which the Gospel proposeth (which

as no sin voideth if repentance follow, so those sins which
the present weakness of our mortal nature cannot easily
avoid, must not be thought to infringe); he shall say no
more, than the Gospel of Christ will warrant by necessary
consequence. But whether any sin be originally venial by
that first law of God, the transgression whereof it is; as it
is manifest, that we are not enabled by the Scriptures to
dispute (tending only to reveal by degrees God’s purpose of
dealing with man under sin, which the Gospel at last hath
clearly set forth), so it is certain, that it no way concerns
either my purpose or any man’s salvation to determine.

§ 6. And this distinction of God’s law is founded upon
the express words of St. Paul (Rom. iii. 27); where he saith,
that “glorying is excluded by the law of faith,” not “by the

... ‘Nonnulli sunt inter doctores Ecclesiae Romanae et quidem non infimae
note, qui docent omnia peccata juste a Deo morte eterna puniri posse; quod
vero quodam eorum ad peccam solummodo temporalem imputant, nec mor-
tiae externae reatum in peccatum indu-
cunt, et ictucro a peccatis mortalibus
distinguuntur, id tribuendum esse Dei
clementiam atque indulgentiam, quae hac
in parte toto Suo jure erga hominem
uti non vult. Hae est sententia Joannis
Gerson. .... His consentanea docet
Joannes Roffensis. ... Verum quam
haec sententia sub finem superioris se-
culi ab aliquot theologis in Belgio te-
eretur et publice assereretur, singulari
Bulla, cum multis aliis eorum assertio-
aibus, damnata fuit tanquam erronea,
a Pontificibus Pie V. et Gregorio XII.
Qua in Bulla inter multis alios articu-
los hunc quoque damnanti, ‘Nullum
est peccatum ex natura sua veniale, sed
omne peccatum meretur ponam aeternam’; ut reiﬁer Bellarminus lib. i.
De Amissione Gratiae et Statu Peccati,
c. 10. parag. Conﬁrmatur” (Controv.,
tom. iii. p. 10.; B). “Unde est quod
Schola Romana hodie communi con-
senso contrarium statuit, viz. quedam
peccata natura sua veniali esse, et
non tantum ex Dei misericordia atque
indulgentia; licet istud nondum habent
pro ﬁdei articulo, et re omnino certa
et deﬁnita.” Le Blanc, Thea. Theol.,
Thea. de Distinct. Pecati in Mortale
et Veniale, P. i. § xi—xviii. pp. 318,
319.—“Wee say therefore that some
sins are mortal and some venial,
not because some deserve eternity of
punishment and others do not; for all
deserve eternity of punishment;....
but because some sins, either in respect
of the matter wherein men do offend, or
ex imperfectione actus, in that they are
not committed with full consent,—ex-
clude not grace, the route of remission
and pardon, out of the soul of him
that committed them; whereas other,
either in respect of the matter.... or the
full consent wherewith they are com-
mitted, cannot stand with grace. See
that, contrary to Bellarmin’s position,
no sin is venial in its own nature, with-
out “respect had to the state of grace.”
Field, Of the Church, Append. to
Bk. iii., c. 9. p. 277.
law of works:” and St. James (ii. 12); “So speak ye and so
do ye, as those that shall be judged by the law of liberty.” For those terms which God hath proposed to Christians, whom He hath freed from sin, are that very law of Christi-
tanity, whereby those that are so freed shall be judged, whether they have walked in the freedom to which they were
called or not; the original law, which differenceth good from
bad, being set aside as to the purpose of giving sentence
by it. And upon these terms, whosoever dieth in the state
of God’s grace, fulfillleth God’s law, obtaining the promise
which the Gospel tendereth by fulfilling the condition which
it requireth.

§ 7. But whereas it is further questioned among the school
doctors, whether, according to the ordinary measure of God’s
Spirit which the Gospel bringeth, it is possible for the re-
generate to live without sin; and that, distinguishing whether
without mortal sin or whether without venial sin$: (because
I have allowed the distinction in some sense, and to some
purpose;) having already answered that which was necessary
to be satisfied, I am not solicitous of the rest.

§ 8. The Church supposed the faith secured; when it was
resolved against Pelagius, that the law is not to be fulfilled
without the grace of Christ$. For the rest: St. Augustin$ was

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$ See Le Blanc, Thes. Theol., Thes. An et Quatenus Homo per Christi gra-
tiam legem implore posuit. § xl. sq. pp. 567—569: and Forbes, Consid. Mod.,
De Justif., lib. iv. c. 3. pp. 338, sq.: and Field, Of the Church, Append. to
Bk. iii. c. 11. pp. 293, sq.

* See above, c. xix. § 19; and c. xxv. § 10. note p.

$ “Nam qui dicunt esse posse in hac vita hominem sine peccato, non est eis
continuo incauta temeritate obstis-
dum. Si enim esse posse negaverimus, et hominis libero arbitrio, qui hoc vo-
loendo appetit, et Dei virtutie vel mise-
ricordiam, Quic huc adjuvantem esse, de-
rogabimus. Sed alia questio est, utrum
esse possit; alia utrum sit: alia, si non
est cum possit esse, cur non sit; alia,
utrum qui omnino nunquam ullam
peccatum habuerit, non solum quasi-
quam sit, verum etiam potuerit ali-
quando esse vel possit. In hac quadri-
partita propositione questionum si a me
queratur, utrum homo sine peccato
possit esse in hac vita, confitebor posse
per Dei gratiam et liberum ejus arbitri-
urn.” &c. “Si autem quod secundo
loco posueram, queratur utrum sit,
esse non credo.” S. Aug., De Peccat.
Meritum et Remissione, lib. ii. c. 6. § 7,
8; Op., tom. x.x. pp. 43. D—44. B.—
“Non tamen ibi esse questionem, sed
in ipsa non peccandi possibilitate con-
tendit, in qua nec nos adversus eum
certare opus est. Nam neque illud
nihil cur, utrum fuerint hic aliqui,
vel sint, vel esse possint, qui perfectam,
cui nihil addendum esset, habuerint,
vel habeant, vel habituri sint caritatem
Dei (ipsa est enim verissima, plenis-
sima, perfectissima justitia); quo-
niam id, quod voluntate hominis ad-
justa per Dei gratiam fieri posse confi-
ter et defendo, quando vel ubi vel
in quo fiat, nimium certare non debeo.”
Id., De Nat. et Gratia cont. Pelag., c.
xxii. § 49; ibid., p. 148. C, D.— “De
B. Augustini et quorundam aliorum,
sed paucorum, Patrum sententias super
tender of denying, that a Christian may live without sin by grace;—for may it not do?—yet could have no good opinion of him, that should think himself the man that lives without sin. St. Jerom, with many of the fathers\(^1\), found it an inconvenience to grant, that God commandeth impossibilities, and therefore punisheth that, which a man must needs do; and yet he makes difficulty to grant, that a man may live without sin\(^k\).


\(^1\) See quotations in Voss., as quoted below in note n, Antith. vi. pp. 719. a—720. a.

\(^k\) "Potest, inquit, esse sine peccato, potest esse perfectus si voluerit. Quis enim Christianorum non vult esse sine peccato, aut quis perfectionem recusat, si sufficit ei velle; et statim sequitur posse, si velle processerit? Nulliusque Christianorum est, qui nollet esse sine peccato: omnes ergo sine peccato erunt, quia utique omnes cipient esse sine peccato. Et in hoc ingraturus tenebris, ut quia nullum aut rarum quumquam sine peccato proferre potes, omnes sine peccato esse posse

THORDIKE.
§ 9. The Council of Trent decrees, sess. vi. can. xviii.: "Si quis dixerit, Dei praecepta, homini etiam justificato, et sub gratia constituto, esse ad observandum impossibilia, anathema esto"—"If any man affirm, that the commandments of God are impossible for a man, that is justified and in the state of grace, to keep; let him be anathema!" Thus an opinion when Pelagius was condemned, becomes an article of faith by the Council of Trent. But my opinion is not pressed by the decree. For, having excepted invincible ignorances, and mere surprises of concupiscence, because the Gospel supposes concupiscence, the commandments of God may be possible; and yet not possible for a man, whose intentions are distracted about many, to avoid all sin. And it follows in the decree of the council, can. xxii.: "Si quis hominem semel justificatum dixerit ... posse, in tota vita, peccata omnia etiam venialia vitare, nisi ex speciali privilegio, quemadmodum de beata Virgine [Maria] tenet Ecclesia; anathema sit"—"If any man say, that a man once justified may avoid all even venial sins through all his life, unless by special privilege, as the Church holdeth of the blessed Virgin; let him be anathema." What Church holdeth that the blessed Virgin never sinned, I know not. That the Catholic Church holds it not, is evident by the opinions of doctors of the Church to the contrary; which you shall find, with the rest which I have alleged in this point, in Vossius his collections Historiae Pelagianae libro v. parte 1. But Andreas Vega, who main-
tains stiffly, that a Christian may live all his life without sin, will have much ado to shelter himself from this anathema.

§ 10. Thus far, then, I quarrel not the Council of Trent. [Of the 2nd Council of Orange.]

omnino peccatum longissimo tempore evitaret. Nec negare poterant, perfectionem quibudam tribui in Scripturis: sed dicebat, eam non fuisset a virtute nature, sed gratia: nec per omnem vitam, imo nec ullo vitæ tempore, fuisset plenam, et omnibus numerias absolutam; sed quæ crescere posset et operibus malis miscretur. Hoc est, ut vulgo dici solet, partum, non graduum perfectionem." Voss., ibid., title of Antith. 1. p. 707. a.—"Catholici negabant, ita sanctos esse laudandos, vel efficaciam baptismi vindicabant, ut perfectionem honos, qui (preter quem Christo) homini convenit nemini, sive vitæ tota sive post seriam conversionem, ullo die, idcirco non cum Christo fuissent communi. Aliquid tamen de Maria dispensatur erat: quam nonnulli ex hoc numero excipiabant; ac fortasse nec Augustinus ipse ab hac sententia abhorretur, quamquam certi aliquid de eo statuere non auderent." Id., ibid., title of Antith. ii. p. 710. b.—"Si Pelagius, Catholicores more, gratiae vocabulum intelligeret, et hoc solum et velle diceret, non quidem nativitate ipsa posse hominem vivere sine peccato, sed a conversione sua, vel statum, vel paulatim, ad tantam posse perfectionem pervenire, posse peccare, verum, per voluntatem; Catholici eos non pauci (nec enim constantes in eo sententiae eorum fuerant) sic quoque erratum Pelagium dicerebant: sed tamen tolerabilem fore hunc errorem: partim quia idem seniri aliqi doctores Ecclesiae: partim quia non admodum periculosum videtur, putare, illud hominem posse, quod praecarium esse vellet." Id., ibid., title of Antith. v. p. 715. b.—"Patres vero, quibus cum Pelagio negotio esset, fateri nolebant, Deum impossibilitatem præcepsisse. De Augustino non nimirum, qui hominem putaret per gratiam Dei sine peccato vivere posse, utut nemo, qui id fecisset, posset ostendi. At magis mirum de Hieronymo et alios: qui negarent, in cujusquam esse potestatem, ut longo tempore vivat abaque peccato. Tamen illi etiam concedebant, Deum non præcepsisse impossibilitatem." Id., ibid., title of Antith. vi. p. 718. b.

And those, who have the second council of Orange at their fingers' ends whenever the absolute efficacy of grace is questioned, will be ashamed to refuse the last canon of it: which saith; "Hic etiam secundum fidem Catholicam credimus, quod, accepta per baptismum gratia, omnes baptizati, Christo auxiliante et cooperante, que ad salutem [animae] pertinent, possint et debeant, si fideliter laborare voluerint, adimplere"—"Here also we believe according to the Catholic faith, that all that are baptized, having received grace by baptism, may and ought to fulfil those things which belong to their salvation, if they will faithfully labour it?" Which is no more than to say, that they have sufficient grace to preserve them from falling away; or from falling into those sins, which forfeit the state of grace: though I easily yield, this possibility is rather natural than moral; and that, considering the many opportunities and provocations even to those sins, which the occasions of the world present the inclinations of concupiscence with, it is in the judgment of discretion impossible, that a man should not forfeit the state of grace; though absolutely there is nothing to enforce, that it must necessarily come to pass.

§ 11. And truly the prophet David's prayer,—to be "cleansed from secret sins," but to be preserved "from presumptuous sins" (Psalm xix. 12, 13),—shews difference enough between the kinds: but the obtaining of this prayer, not to fall into any presumptuous sins, depends upon that diligent watch, which even the regenerate may neglect to keep over themselves. Now, for him that shall have committed this forfeit, though the promise of the Holy Ghost and the habitual assistance thereof is thereby void, yet the knowledge of Christianity, that is, the obligation and matter of it, and that facility of living the life of a Christian which custom leaves behind it, remaining; the actual assistance of the Holy Ghost, which always accompanieth the preaching of the Gospel, cannot be wanting, where so great effects of it are extant, to procure the recovery of him that is fallen away. Whether they shall take effect or no, it is in the justice and mercy of that providence, which only maketh

them effectual. The wisdom of God, which "shall laugh at the calamities, and mock when the fears of them come," that "refuse" when it "calls," and "regard not" when it "stretcheth out hands" (Prov. i. [24, 26]), representeth the condition of those that forfeit the promise, exceedingly terrible; in that they are fallen under God's mere mercy: though it be granted, that they want not sufficient helps to restore them, till they be come to the end of their race.

§ 12. But, in very deed, the hardest of this point is, to give account how this holds under the old Law: how any man could be saved by fulfilling that Law, which the Gospel declares to be taken away because no man could be saved by fulfilling it.

§ 13. To which my answer must be (according to the supposition premised concerning a twofold sense of Moses' law*; that is to say, a twofold law of God, under the Old Testament); that it is no marvel, if the civil happiness of God's ancient people (which the law of Moses, in the literal sense, tendered for the reward of it) were to be obtained by worshipping the only true God, and that civil conversation according to it, which [the*] people of their natural freedom were able to perform. True it is, indeed, which St. Peter says, Acts xv. 10; that "neither they nor their fathers were able to bear the burden" of Moses' law: and that, for that reason, which not only Origen& but divers others of the ancient fathers, have alleged against the Jews, that there went so many scruples to the precise observation of it, as it

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See above, c. v. § 10.

* Corrected from MS.; "that," in orig. text.


BOOK II. was not possible for any people in the world to overcome. For there being such variety of cases, incident to the observation of such variety of precepts, as no man could further be secured in, that he proceeded according to the will of God, than as the determination of those, whom God by the law of Deut. xvii. 8—12, xvi. 18, had referred it to, might secure him; and that always new cases must needs prevent new determinations: of necessity, the precise observation of Moses' law, even outwardly and in the literal sense, was in ordinary discretion a thing impossible. Which is effectual indeed to convince the Jews, that God never was so in love with their Law, as to accept them for precisely keeping of it, even in the world to come; but provided it for an outward and civil discipline, to countenance the inward godliness and righteousness of the heart, till He should think fit openly to enact it for the condition of the world to come. In the mean time, having tendered the Law for a condition by which they might hold the land of promise, it is manifest, that the obtaining of it depended not upon that precise observation of all scruples, which the nature of the subject rendered in human reason impossible; but that, in case they worshipped God alone, and observed the precepts of the Law with that diligence which a reasonable and honest man would use in that case, the promise must become due. Whereby the Law, in this sense, is a fit figure to represent, both the impossibility of God's original law, and the gentleness of that dispensation thereof, which the Gospel importeth.

§ 14. As for the inward and mystical sense of Moses' law: it is manifest, that the countenance which the Law gave true righteousness, by enforcing the worship of the only true God (together with so many acts of righteousness among men, and temperance, chastity, and sobriety) with temporal penalties; with the faith of the world to come, and the doctrine of spiritual righteousness of itself acceptable to God, received from the fathers, and maintained by the prophets and their disciples in all ages; maintained always a stock of such men, as God accepted of, even to the reward of the world to come. In whose condition, notwithstanding, we must observe a kind of limitation or exception to the temporal promises of the Law; not only at such time as the
people fell away from God to the worship of idols, but in regard of hypocritical governors, who, pretending zeal to God's laws of sacrifices and ceremonies and the promises of God due to them in that regard, under that colour took advantage sufficiently to abuse and oppress His poor people. For when these cases fell out, the prophets, whose office it was to reprove such things in God's name, and their disciples and followers, must needs fall under great persecution at these men's hands. So that their right in the land of promise turning to a sorry account of happiness for them, who of all men were the most severe observers of God's law; of necessity, the temporal promises thereof were supplied and made good to them by the hope of the world to come. Which (as Origen wisely and ingeniously observes) if a man well consider, he shall find that flaw in the promises of the Old Testament to be as a chink, or breach in a wall, through which we may discern the light of the Gospel beyond it.

§ 15. For if the matter be rightly considered, it will appear, that these hypocritical governors of God's ancient people (which thought the promises of the Law for ever entailed upon themselves and their successors upon the observing of sacrifices and other ceremonies thereof, how little soever they minded the true intent and meaning of it) were the true predecessors of the Scribes and Pharisees in our Lord's time; and the prophets and their disciples, the forerunners of our Lord, and His apostles: and that both persecuted both upon the same score of account; the inward righteousness of the heart, which God only alloweth, being that which both preached and professed, though the former under that knowledge of God and of His will which the Law, the other, which the Gospel, advanceth. And this [is] the true and real ground, why they, and that which befol them under the Old Testament, do bear the figure of our Lord and His apostles, and that which befol them by the rulers of the Jews in the New: according to the words of our Lord, Matt. xxiii. 34—[39]; where He sheweth, that by crucifying Himself, and persecuting His disciples, they...
do but fill up the measure of their fathers’ wickedness. And St. Paul of the Jews to the same effect, 1 Thess. ii. 15, 16: “Who both killed the Lord Jesus, and their own prophets, . . and please not God, and oppose all men; forbidding us to speak to the Gentiles, that they may be saved: for wrath is come on them to the end.”

§ 16. I say then, that, under that dim light of God’s will which the saints of the Old Testament enjoyed, when the world to come was not yet covenanted for, nor the sayings and doings of our Lord Christ manifested, to invite to Christianity, it is necessarily consequent, that God should accept of that obedience under the Law, which, as it must come from a sincere heart and studious of pleasing Him, so must it needs come short of that perfection which the Gospel requireth. For, as I said before*, that love of God “with all the heart and all the soul and all the might,” which the Law requireth, is limited by the precepts of the Law; which whoso observes with all the heart and so forth, must be thought to have performed that love, wherein then the observation of God’s law consisted. As for the precept of “not coveting,” of which St. Paul says (Rom. vii. 7—11), that he “had not known concupiscence, had not the Law said, Thou shalt not covet;” and St. Augustin† observes, that, being joined to the precept of loving God above all things, they comprise all Christianity: though all this be true according to the spiritual sense of the Law, yet, according to the letter, it cannot be denied, that the last precept of the decalogue forbideth only compassing that which is another man’s; counting his wife in that number, because there was then means to compass another man’s wife without breaking the Law, which allowed of divorces. And, therefore, this is the sense of that which followeth in St. Paul:—“Sin, taking

* Above, Bk. I. Of the Pr. of Chr. Tr., c. xii. § 8, 29—31.
† See above, Bk. I. Of the Pr. of Chr. Tr., c. xii. § 9, note h.—“In his, inquit, duobus præceptis tota Lex pendet et Prophetae. Quidquid ergo Dei legi prohibeantur, et quidquid jubeantur facere, ad hoc prohibeantur et jubeantur, ut duae ista compleamur. Et forte generalis prohibitio est, Non concupiscas; et generalis jussio, Diliges. Unde breviter et Apostolus Paulus quodam loco utrumque complexus est. Prohibito enim est, Nolite conformari huic sæculo; jussio autem, Sed reformamini in novitate mentis vestrae. Illud pertinet ad non concupiscere, hoc ad diligere; illud ad continentiam, hoc ad justitiam; illud ad declinandum malo, hoc ad faciendum bonum.” S. Aug., De Perfect. Justitie Hominis, c. v. § 11; Op., tom. x. p. 171. D, E.
advantage, wrought in me all concupiscence by the commandment; for without the law sin is dead: but I once lived without the law; but, the commandment coming, sin revived and I died; and the commandment, which was to life, was found for me to death: for sin, taking occasion by the commandment, deceived me, and so slew me:"—all this, I say, as the rest of that Epistle concerning the inability of the Law to bring us to righteousness, is to be understood of the outward and literal sense of the Law. To wit, that the Israelites, before they received the Law (and so, other men without the Law), understood not that it was a sin, but a piece of wit, to compass a man’s wife or goods without violence, or to commit that uncleanness to which the Law had assigned no penalty. So, the Law being given, and having assigned no penalty to the transgression of this precept, was it marvel, that sin, prevailing over that conviction of the conscience which the precept tendered, should seduce a man to give way to concupiscence, and turn the precept that was given for life to his death? He then, that was not imposed upon with this slight of sin, but received the commandment as God’s, Who hath other penalties in store than those which the Law assigneth: if, out of conscience to God, he observed the laws of His worship from the heart; if he kept all that, which not only the penalties assigned by the Law, but the will of God declared by the precept, convinced him to take hold of his conscience; is it not reason to conclude, that he fulfilled that measure of spiritual righteousness, which God for that time required of them, whom He assured of the world to come upon condition of such obedience? Which if it be so, that obligation to this righteousness, which was so declared under the Law, is that law of spiritual obedience, which God judgeth those by, whom for that time He accepted unto the reward of the world to come.

§ 17. As for the precept of loving our neighbour as our- selves: having shewed that it concerned only Israelites under the Law, I have also by the same means shewed*, that they were to detest the Gentiles as idolaters, that detestation being the means to keep them up to the service of God from falling away to idols; whereupon, as by the Law, he

* Above, Bk. I. Of the Pr. of Chr. Tr., c. xii. § 32—36.
that fell from the Law, and seduced his kindred to do the
like, was to find no manner of pity at the hand even of his
brethren (Deut. xiii. 8), so also it is provided by the Jews' constitutions, that they shall observe no rule of common equity in seeking evidence against such a one, to bring him to conviction, and to make him an example. And as for those hypocrites, which, under pretence of the outward and carnal observation of the Law, persecuted the preachers of true spiritual righteousness (the prophets of old, and our Lord and His apostles, who pretended to carry it unto the Gentiles, whom they themselves obliged to hate as having been once idolaters); it is visible, that those saints, who suffered persecution at their hands, did not find themselves tied to that measure, which the Gospel prescribeth, of praying for their enemies to the utmost.

§ 18. This is seen in those curses, which David and Jeremy pursue their enemies with: the Gospel having prescribed for a general rule to all Christians, “Bless them that curse you” (Matt. v. 44, Luke vi. 28, Rom. xii. 14, 1 Pet.-iii. 9, James iii. 9). I deny not, that herein they were figures and forerunners of our Lord and His disciples; and their sayings, prophecies of the curses, that should overtake the people of the Jews, for persecuting them: for I have shewed just now the ground, upon which this is to be received. But I challenge that ground also, which I settled at the beginning;
that the mystical sense of the Scripture always supposeth a literal sense, and that these things cannot be understood to be fulfilled in our Lord Christ, but that first they must have been verified in the prophets themselves: in whom, as it is plain, that the persecutions, for which they curse, did come to pass, so plain it is, that their curses fell upon their persecutors.

§ 19. For nothing can be more manifest, than that the [Jeremiah] prophet Jeremy first prayed for the people, that God would not destroy them: and when their sins were so great, that God would not hear him, but commanded him to publish their ruin; that they thereupon so hated and persecuted him, that his patience was overcome, and he prayed to God to punish their ingratitude to him with the judgments which he had denounced: Jer. vii. 16; xi. 14, 19, 20; xvii. 16—18; xviii. 18—23.

§ 20. And it is plain, that the case is the same with the [David] prophet David; and that he, receiving evil for good of his enemies, thereupon proceeds to those prayers which he makes against them: Psalm xxxv. 11—14; lxix. 5, 8, 10—12, 22—29; cix. 3—20.

§ 21. And what is the difference between this and that of [Elijah] Elias? Of whom St. James (v. 17) says, that "he prayed that it might not rain, and it rained not for three years and six months:" so that, when he says (1 Kings xvii. 1), "There shall be neither dew nor rain upon the earth, but according to my word;" he speaks upon the obtaining of that prayer of his. For afterwards the rain came not till he prayed for it (1 Kings xviii. 42). Whereupon it follows in St. James; "And again he prayed, and the heavens gave rain, and the [James v.] earth budded forth her fruit." For by these things you see, that he prayed for judgment upon the land of Israel for refusing his prophecies; even as he executed it upon the prophets of Israel, 1 Kings xviii. 40. And is not the reason the same, when he destroys two captains of fifties with their bands, by praying for fire from heaven upon them, for taking in hand to execute the command of an idolatrous king, and coming to seize him (2 Kings i. 10, 12)?

§ 22. Is it not the same in his scholar and successor [Elisha] Elizeus, when he curses the children of Bethel for despising
BOOK II. of him, being a prophet of God; whereupon two and forty of them are destroyed with bears out of the forest: 2 Kings ii. 23, 24? For had these children been bred in the fear of the true God, and not under idolatrous parents, it cannot in reason be thought, that they would have reviled one of God’s prophets; who were held in, and treated with, such reverence, even by the princes of his people.

[Samson.] § 23. And, truly, when Samson cast away his own life to do mischief to God’s enemies and the enemies of his people, out of this express consideration, of being revenged upon them for putting out his eyes; can any man’s heart be so hardened by misunderstanding the Scriptures, as to say that this can be reconciled with the principles of Christianity, which forbid all revenge? Jud. xvi. 28—31; Rom. xii. 19; Matt. v. 22, 38—48. It is said indeed, that Samson did this as a figure of Christ; Who killed His enemies, the powers of darkness, by His death. And it is certainly true. But that will not answer the reason formerly alleged. Whether we say, that Samson’s death was a figure of Christ’s by the intent of Samson, or by the intent of God, Whose providence so ordered things to come to pass, that his death might figure Christ’s death; it cannot be said, that the intent of figuring Christ’s death could make that agreeable to God’s law, which otherwise was not. Rather we are to advise, whether sinful actions, and not according to God’s own law, were fit to figure

Christ. Nor will it serve the turn to say, that he did it by the motion of God's Spirit; which we are indeed to allow, that the judges being prophets were endowed with. For it is not to be said, that the Spirit of God moveth any man to do that, which the will of God declared by His law forbiddeth. § 24. And, therefore, the fact of Razias (2 Mac. xiv. 37—46), though not undertaken with that confidence of doing mischief to God's enemies, which Samson had by the assurance of his being called to deliver God's people from them, yet, being done to deprive them of their pleasure they should have in insulting over God's people, destroying so faithful a servant of His, must needs be said to proceed from the same motive with Samson's: though I say not, therefore, that this can serve to prove that book of the Maccabees to be either canonical or otherwise. Thus much, I conceive, is to be granted: that the Maccabees' taking arms for maintaining their religion and nation against the tyranny of Antiochus Epiphanes, is not to be condemned as against God's law; because we see them commended by the apostle (Heb. xi. 35—38): and yet, for Christians to take arms for the maintaining of themselves in the free exercise of their religion (much more, for the power of imposing it upon others), is certainly contrary to the instructions of the apostles (Rom. xiii. 1—6, Titus iii. 1, 1 Pet. i. 13—17); as it appears by the practice of all the primitive Christians, who, maintaining themselves to be for number able to defend themselves by arms against persecution, maintain withal, that their profession did not allow them so to do. And indeed, though the godly Jews endured death rather than renounce God's law (as the Christians afterwards), yet a man may see a great difference between the motives of their several sufferings: if he consider, that they died for the laws of their country (which the heathen themselves have reputed a due consideration for a man to part with his life for, though out of carnal self-love); how much more to obey God's law (Whom
they maintained to be the only true God), by suffering death for the laws which He had given them? whereas Christianity requires to be maintained with our lives, though we become ignominious by the laws of our countries for maintaining it. Whereby we see, how true it is, that God allowed them some motives of temporal good, to invite them to undergo the hardship, which the profession of His laws should infer: whereas from Christians He challenges the same constancy, when He allows no presumption of help in this world, no hope but that of the world to come.

§ 25. Which is, indeed, another strong argument, that God accepted of a lower measure of obedience under the Law, than He requireth under the Gospel of Christians: because, forsooth, He always managed His ancient people (like babes, with the fear of the rod and the hope of cake-bread, so) with the fear and hope of the blessings and punishments of this present world, habituating them to presume of His favour or disgrace according to the same. Let any man read the Book of Psalms, and consider throughout the whole tenor of it;—what presumptions of God's favour, those, who indited them by God's Spirit, do raise upon temporal deliverances; of His disgrace, upon the insultsations of God's and their enemies;—and tell me, if it be according to the style of the Gospel, which alloweth only the assurance of God's providence for subsistence in this world, to persuade us to take up Christ's cross? Well then saith St. Paul (Rom. viii. 15): "Ye have not received any more the spirit of bondage to fear, but ye have received the Spirit of adoption, whereby ye cry, Abba," that is, "Father." For those that are led with the hope of temporal promises (as all must necessarily be led under that law, which was established upon such), must needs be subject to fear of disgrace with God, whenssoever their sins allowed not those promises to take place. So then, though they were then partakers of God's Spirit, as the prophet Ezekiel shews us (xxxvi. 27, xxxvii. 14, xxxix. 29), yet, inasmuch as it is called "the spirit of fear," there is due argument, that they were not partakers of that peace and joy in the Holy Ghost, which Christians after-

1 So Volkel., De Vera Relig., lib. ii. c. 21. p. 33. See above, cc. v. § 10. note h, and x. § 15.
wards were moved with to endure all persecution for the maintenance of their profession. But the apostle pointeth us out further the source of this fear (Heb. ii. 14, 15); when he saith, that our Lord Christ "took part of flesh and blood, that by death He might abolish him that had the power of death, even the devil, and discharge all those, that through the fear of death were all their life long subject unto bondage." For so long as the promises of this life ended in death, and the punishments thereof conducted to it, they, who knew that death came into the world upon the transgression of Adam, could not think themselves discharged of God's wrath, so long as they found themselves liable to the debt of it. No marvel then, if the Spirit of God were "the spirit of fear" in them, who saw not as yet the kingdom of death dissolved by the rising of our Lord Christ from the dead.

§ 26. Another argument I make from the words of our Lord, when the disciples were ready to demand fire from heaven upon those Samaritans that received them not, after the example of Elias (Luke ix. 52—56): "Ye know not what spirit ye are of," saith our Lord; "for the Son of man came not to destroy, but to save men's lives." Whereby He declareth, that, because the Gospel bringeth salvation, whereas the Law wrought wrath (as St. Paul saith) by tendering conviction of sin without help to overcome it (Rom. iii. 20, iv. 15, vii. 8—11), therefore God requireth under the Gospel of those, that are His, the spirit that seeketh only the good of them from whose hands they receive it not; whereas, under the Law, even His prophets revenged themselves of their enemies, by vengeance obtained at God's hands. And, by this means, we have an answer for that difficulty, otherwise insoluble, in our Lord's words of John Baptist (Matt. xi. 11): "Verily I say to you, there never arose among those that are born of women one greater than John the Baptist; but the least in the kingdom of heaven is greater than he." For if God under the Law required not of His prophets that perfection of charity, which the Gospel exacteth of all Christians; if in those things, which they said and did by God's Spirit, they have not expressed it: well may it be said, that "the least" of all those, that belong to the Gospel in truth, which
here is called "the kingdom of heaven," is in a respect of so
great concernment "greater" than the prophets of the Old
Testament.

§ 27. As for the example of Jael the wife of Eber the
Kenite, who, being in league with Jabin and Sisera, for the
good of God's people, knocked him on the head, being re-
tired into the protection of her house, and is commended for
it by the Spirit of God in Deborah the prophetess (Judg. iv.
17—21, v. 24—28): the instance indeed is difficult enough.
And they, that are so ready to condemn the fact of Judith
in cutting off Holofernes by deceit, and that by the example
of her father Simeon, that spoiled and destroyed the men of
Shechem contrary to covenant (Judg. ix. 2, Gen. xxxiv. 25),
are not advised, how to come clear of it.

§ 28. Suppose there was just cause of hostility between
them, a daughter of the house being dishonoured by the
prince of that people (for among God's people their chastity
was always as highly valued, as it was little regarded among
idolaters); suppose, that they condescended to be circum-
cised, not for love to the true God, but for hope of increasing
their own power and riches by bringing the Israelites under
their government (as there is appearance enough in the
words of Hamor, Gen. xxxiv. 20—22): yet, a league being
enacted upon such a pretence, the zeal of Simeon and Levi
in destroying those that were come under the covering of
God's wings so far, very well figures the zeal of the Jews in
persecuting the apostles, and not allowing the Gentiles any
room of salvation by their own only true God. And, there-
fore, it is excellently observed by St. Jerom (Tradit. Hebr.
in Genesin¹), that the scribes were of the tribe of Simeon, as

¹ See above, Bk. I. Of the Pr. of Chr.
Tr., c. xxxi. § 19, and § 38. note c.—
The ordinary arguments against Ju-
dith's act, as above referred to, may be
seen in Reynolds, Censur. Libb. Apo-
cryph., Praecl. lxxiii. tom. i. pp. 846—
867. 4to. Oppenh. 1611.—Grotius alle-
gorizes the history, principally however
on account of historical difficulties; as
others, e. g. Rabanus (Comment. in Ju-
dith., Op., tom. iii. pp. 245, sq.), had done
before him. Of Romanist Comment-
tators, some, e. g. Serarius, defend her
conduct without qualification; others,
as Lyranus, with much such qualifica-
tion as that of Thornrike in the text.
² "Levi enim hereditatem propriam
non acceptit, sed in omnibus sceptris
paucas urbes ad habitandum habuit.
De Simeon vero in libro Jesus scriptum
est, quod et ipse proprium funiculum
non fuerit consequens, sed de tribu
Juda quidam accipitur. In Parali-
pomenon vero manifestus scribitor;
quod quum multiplicatus fuisse, et
non haberet possessionis locum, exi-
erit in desertum. Quidam prophetice
interfectos homines, Apostolos; et sub-
the priests of the tribe of Levi; in whom the curse of Jacob
by the Spirit of God detesting their fact (and prophesying
the like to those their successors in the case of our Lord
Christ and His apostles,—“I will divide them in Jacob, and
scatter them in Israel;” Gen. xlix. 5—7), was evidently ful-
filled in the mystical sense: the tribe of Levi for gathering
of tithes, and the tribe of Simeon for employment of clerks
and notaries, dwelling dispersed through all the tribes; as
Solomon Jarchi in his gloss upon the place m literally ex-
poundeth it.

§ 29. But the case of Judith is the case of a stratagem in [Judith]
professed hostility; which, whether Christianity allow or not,
certainly no law of nations disallows. And therefore, though
she propose to herself the zeal of Simeon and Levi for the
honour of their people, and the success they had against their
enemies, yet, if we understand her not to commend the means
by which they brought it to pass (to wit, by violating the
public faith), we shall not find her contradict the Spirit of
God, which by Jacob condemns them for it.

§ 30. As for the fact of Jael, it is in vain to allege any [Jael]
mystical sense a to justify it, as some would do: unless we
can undertake, that there was no such thing done in the way
of historical truth; which, I suppose, no man will be so mad
as to do. And, therefore, if any man will not believe, that

nervatum taurum a Phariseis, Chris-
tum interpretatur.” S. Hieron., Lib.
Quest. Hebr. in Genesim, in cap.
xiix. 7 : Op., tom. ii. p. 546.—Thorn-
dike seems to have partly confused
the comment of Solomon Jarchi (as quoted
below in note m) with that of S. Jerom.

m “Dividam eos in Jacob—Separabo
eos invicem, ne sit Levi in numero tri-
bum; et ecce illi (hoc modo) diviai erant. Alia explicatio: non erunt tibi
pauperes scribæ et infantium doctores, nisi ex (tribu) Simeonis, ut sint dis-
pressi; tribuum autem Levi fecit (Jaco-
bus) circumscriere per areas ad (colligen-
das) obligationes et decimas, hanc ejus
dispersionem (Jacobus) dedit ei (tribui
Levi) per modum honoris.” R. Salo-
on Jarchi, Comment. Hebr. in Psal-
tatemach. Mosis, Latine vers. &c. a J.
F. Breithaupto, in Genes. xiix. 7; tom.
i. pp. 374, 375. 4to. Gothae 1710.

a “Quid est ulla mulier plena fidu-
ciae hostis temporis ligno transfigens,
nisi fides Ecclesiae, cruce Christi reg-
na diaboli perimem?” S. Aug., Cont.
Faust., lib. xii. c. 32; Op., tom. viii.
p. 342. F.—So also Origen, in Lib.
469. 1. F, 2. E; and S. Ambros., Lib.
de Viduis, c. viii. § 48—50; Op., tom.
ii. pp. 198. F, 199. C: and the un-
known author of the tract De Promiss.
b.—See Serarius, in Judic. c. v. qu.
xxviiiiii, pp. 139—141. Mogunt. 1609:
but the fathers above quoted are not
directly occupied in discussing the
morality of the act.—Later commen-
tators either defend Jael’s act wholly
(as e.g. Serarius and Montanus), or,
more commonly, make some similar
distinction to that used by Thornidike
in the text (as e.g. Magaliansus, and
Estius); but do not resort to the mys-
tical sense in order to avoid the diffi-
culty: see Poli Synops. ad loc.
the Spirit of God in Deborah extols only the temporal benefit, which the people of God reaped by that fact of hers (for which she was always to be famous amongst them), leaving to herself the justification of her conscience; let him seek a better answer. But he, who, transgressing that charity that is fundamental in Christianity (and, therefore, without which no Christian can obtain the Spirit of God), shall make her example a motive to that, which he cannot justify even in God’s ancient people; though I allow him to mistake Christians for pagans and idolaters (whose professed enmity to God’s people upon the account of religion was the ground of that revenge, which they were allowed then to pursue them with), yet I must not allow him to be a Christian, that teaches that wickedness, which a Jew dare not maintain: though it be just with God to suffer them, that presume of the assistance of God’s Spirit in understanding the Scriptures before they be principled in Christianity (which the gift of God’s Spirit to Christians presupposeth), to be led unto such wicked imaginations by reading the Scriptures; as He suffered those, that, setting up their idols in their hearts and putting the stumbling block of their iniquities before their faces, came to seek direction from God, to be seduced by the prophets by whom they should come to enquire, as the prophet threateneth (Ezek. xiv. 8—10).

§ 31. As for the fact of David and Hushai in ruining of Absalom (2 Sam. xv. 32—37, xvi. 16—19, xvii. 5—14); there is the less difficulty in it, because we are not obliged to maintain the actions of the fathers to be without sin, and the Spirit of God doth no where commend it. Which also holds in those officious lies, wherewith Rebecca, and the midwives of the Israelites, and Rahab the harlot, seduced Isaac, and the king of Egypt, and the rulers of Jericho, to the good of God’s people (Gen. xxvii. [6—13], Exod. i. 15—21, Josh. ii. 4, 5): because, whatsoever were the success which God blessed them with, yet (as St. Augus... observes) it is no

* This allusion has not been traced. —Peter Martyr (Epist. Theol., ad calc. Loc. Commun., p. 1124. fol. Tigur. 1587), thus addresses Queen Elizabeth: “Age itaque nostrorum temporum sancta Debra, quemplam tibi ad jungas pium Barac; ... ne verearis (conatus enim istos favere Deus non solet destituere) illum tecum habebis, ut instar Jaelis, mulleris fortissima, Jakini caput malleio tuae potentiae percivias, aique terre unde ortum habuit infgas, quo piee tume genti molestus esse desinat.”

* “Fortassis ergo, sicut de obstetri-
where said, that God blessed them for lying; but for that love to His people, which, though joined with their own weakness, He then rewarded. Though he, that well considers the nature of these acts (comparing them with those sayings and doings of David, and Jeremy, of Elias, Elizeus, and Samson, which I have shewed the Spirit of God aloweth), will without doubt find cause to believe, that the reason, why their acts, which were joined with such infirmities, were blessed by God at that time, is to be drawn from that measure of knowledge, which the means allowed by God at that time afforded; and the obligation which God required at their hands, proportionable to the same.

§ 32. From the premisses we may proceed to resolve that endless dispute concerning the intent of our Lord’s Sermon in the Mount: whether it was to take away those false glosses, which the Scribes and Pharisees had put upon the law of Moses (importing, that nothing but the overt act of murder, adulteries, and the like, stood prohibited by it); or to enlarge it unto a further extent of forbidding the first motions of concupiscence, in regard of that further light which the Gospel bringeth. For I have shewed, that the

cibus diximus, non hoc in eis remunerationem quod mentis sunt, sed quod infantes Hebraeos liberaverunt, ut propter hanc misericordiam illud peccatum veniale sit factum, non tamen existimetur non fuisse peccatum: sic etiam de Raab intelligendum est, remuneratum in illa liberationem exploratorum, ut propter samendem liberationem venia sit data mendacio. Ubi autem veniam datur, manifestum est, esse peccatum.”

S. Aug., Quæst. in Levit., lib. iii. Qu. 68; Op., tom. iii. P. i. p. 520. C, D,— Elsewhere (e. g. De Mendacio, c. v, § 7: Op., tom. vi. p. 423. D—G; and Cont. Mendac. ad Consentium, c. xii. § 26; ibid., p. 463. F, G) S. Augustin speaks of these cases (as well as that of Samson), as defensible because figurative.

a Corrected from MS.; “these,” in orig. text.

b “Eadem etiam communis fuit Patrum sententia, ut constat: plerique enim omnes fere, maximo consenso, Christum a versu 21. capitia 5. Matthei usque ad finem capitis, existimaret, non tantum falsas Scribarum ac Phariseorum traditiones et veterum legum interpretationes correxisse (sic cut Protestantes communiter arbitrantur, et quidam etiam Romanenses—vide Maldonatum in cap. 5. Matth. ver. 21.—in quibus Bellarminus ipse; qui tamen affirmat, non tantum Phariseorum corruptelam et depravationem legis de repudio emendasse, sed et legem ipsam de libello repudii, quam scilicet Moses tulerat, ‘penitus’ hic ‘abrogasse,’ &c.).”

C H A P. XXXII.

Whether the Sermon in the Mount correct the false interpretation of the Jews, or enhance the obligation of the Law.

For I have shewed, that the
most difficult passage of all, which saith, "Thou shalt love thy neighbour and hate thine enemy" (Matt. v. 43), is according to the practice of the law in David, Jeremy, Elias, and Elizeus; which is without question the best interpreter of the Law and the extent of it. How much more, if you translate it (as questionless the Hebrew will allow us to translate it*), "Thou shalt love thine neighbour, but mayest hate thine enemy." For it is manifest, that, when the fourth commandment saith, "Six days shalt thou labour and do all that thou hast to do," the meaning is no more but this, "Six days thou mayest labour;" to wit, as for this commandment. So that this clause is nothing else, but the consequence of that limitation, which the Law puts to the precept of loving a man's neighbour as himself; understanding his neighbour to be only an Israelite, and teaching to pursue idolaters with all manner of hatred. Now when our Saviour saith, "Ἡκούσατε ὅτι ἐρρέθη τοῖς ἄρχαλοις," His meaning is plain enough;—"Ye have heard that it was said to them of old" (that is, to the fathers at the giving of the Law):—not, "Ye have heard it said by your predecessors;" to wit, the Scribes and Pharisees, who about some hundred years before had begun to gloss the Law with their traditions: Matt. v. 21, 27, 33, 38, 43: the subject matter in all the rest, besides that which I have spoken of, being always the express letter of Moses' law, no tradition of the elders†.

* "Dicxit igitur R. Jochnan nomine R. Simeonis filii Josedeci, Omnium discipulam Sapientiam (seu sapientiam studiis), qui sese non ulciscitur et servat (inimicium) instar serpentis, non est discipulam Sapientiam," (quoted from the Codex Iota, cap. ii. fol. 22. p. 2. et fol. 23. p. 1):—"Jac. Cappellius in Observat. in N. Test. ad Matt. v. 43. citat R. Mosen de Kotsi, Mand. Neg. 5, sic scribentem; "Non silentio premes alium corde dolorem," &c.; "Quod si sapius corripueris et non admiserit correctionem tuam, tum tibi liebes illum odisset."†

† "Ως ἐρρέθη τοῖς ἄρχαλοι, . . . De horum quoque verborum sensu qui non parum ad consequentium intelligen
tiam facit, variant Interpretes. Alii enim τοῖς ἄρχαλοι . . . positum putant pro θνο τῶν ἄρχαλων, . . . aliī pro πρὸς τοῖς ἄρχαλων . . . rursum ἄρχαλων . . . aliī referunt ad Mosis temporis, aliī ad
§ 33. Yet it is not my intent to say, that our Lord's intent is not to clear the true meaning of the Law from the false glosses of the Scribes and Pharisees. For I acknowledge a false gloss of theirs upon Moses' law, which it is the intent, not only of the Sermon in the Mount, but of all the New Testament, to clear. I say, the Scribes and Pharisees, taking advantage of the truth of the world to come (which they thought to be covenanted for, and not only intimated, as the truth is, by Moses' law), did infer the reward thereof to be due to the outward and carnal observation of it. And this is that false gloss of theirs, which, as every where else, so here especially, our Lord cleareth; when He saith, "Unless your righteousness exceed the righteousness of the Scribes and Pharisees, ye shall in no wise enter into the kingdom of heaven" (Matt. v. 20). But this He doth, by clearly enacting that conversation which the Gospel requireth: whereof the fathers of the old Law had only expressed the rudiments and principles, out of that light, which the Law joined with the tradition of the fathers and the doctrine of the prophets had supplied; though so well accepted by God at that time, that He failed not to grant His Holy Spirit to them, who had attained that measure of righteousness. And therefore we are to conclude, that, during the Law, there was a sincerity of righteousness, consisting in the observation of the precepts thereof, not out of any temporal respect or hope of this world, but out of the

etatem quae Esdræ et Christi tempora intercessit. Ego pro commodo habeo dandi casu non eos qui verba fecerant, sed eos ad quos verba facta erant, indicari. Evidens enim est oppositio, 'Dictum est antiquis—Ego autem dico vobis:' quare, quomodo hoc 'vobis,' ita et illud 'antiquis,' sumendum est... Superest videamus ad quæ tempora antiquitás hæc sit referenda. Cur eorum accedam sententiae qui ab ipso Mosis tempore hanc antiquitatem repetunt, has causas habeo." seil. 1. the meaning of the word ἀγαλματις 2 because, "verba quae recitat Christus, ea ipsa sunt quæ in Lege reperintur, interdum nulla interpretatione adjecta, ut infra vv. 27, 31, 33, 38: et quod hic" (v. 21) "adjetur, 'obnoxios erit judicio,' quando infra additur commate 43, 'Hostem odio habebis,' non esse extra Legis sententiam infra ex-planabitur." &c. Grot., ad Matt. v. 21. And see above in note r.—"Kal μακάριος τῶν ἐχθρῶν σου:... Hic multe pu-tant firmum se habere argumentum quo probent omnia quæ Christus antiquis ait dicta, non ad Mosis legem, sed ad interpretationem legisinperatorum, referenda. Nos autem, qui cum veteribus plerisque arbitramur Mosis verba re-spici, sed ida ut simul refellatur prava interpretatio eorum qui ex oledentia legis illius, qua propria erat Judæor- rum, non tantum vitae hujus commoda, sed et regnum celeste, sibi spondebat, neglectis nature et caritatis legibus, etiam horum verborum sensum in Mosis lege exstare non dubitamus." Grot., ad Matt. v. 43: proceeding at some length to explain the clause in the same way as Thorndike does.
sense of God's will, Who searcheth the heart and judgeth the thoughts thereof; according to which the prophets of old and their disciples, as Zachary and Elizabeth in the New Testament (Luke i. 6), are to be counted "perfect" and entire in righteousness: comparing them, forsooth, with the Scribes and Pharisees, and all their sect, who in all ages of that people, as I have shewed, standing so much upon the precise observation of the positive precepts thereof for their own power and advantage, grossly failed in all performance, where the sincerity of the heart became requisite: but that, when our Saviour saith, "Be ye perfect as your Father in Heaven is perfect" (Matt. v. 48), it is manifest from the premisses, that He requireth of Christians that charity towards God, and all men for God's sake (or, to speak in those terms which I take to be more general, that respect to the will of God, and His glory and service, in all our doings), which He did not covenant for with His ancient people.

§ 34. Which point before I conclude, that we may the better understand wherein I make this perfection of Christians to consist, it will be requisite to resolve, whether or no Christians can do more than the law of God requires; and whether there are those offices, which the law of God commands not, but the Gospel only commends, as matters of counsel, to those that aim at perfection among Christians; not matters of necessity, for all that would only be saved; so that the works whereby they are pursued must be called "works of supererogation," because he that does them, lays out more upon God's service than he is obliged to do.

§ 35. They are the words of our Lord to the disciples, 296 Matt. xix. 11, 12: "All are not capable of this word" (of not marrying): "for there are eunuchs, which were so born from their mother's womb; and there are eunuchs, which were made eunuchs by men; and there are eunuchs, that have made themselves eunuchs for the kingdom of heaven: he that is capable, let him hold this." Here it is said, that God hath made some men of such constitution of nature, that they are able to contain themselves from marriage: and that this is the gift of continence; which whoso hath, falls under a command of not marrying, whoso hath not, of mar-

* Corrected from MS.; "these," in orig. text.
OF THE COVENANT OF GRACE.

But when our Lord exhorts those, that are able to contain themselves from marriage, to strive for that grace, certainly He makes not that a gift of nature, which He would have a man endeavour to attain. He that is exhorted to make himself an eunuch, is not so made by God: but from God he hath the grace to prefer the kingdom of heaven before even that content which God alloweth him here; and if he betray not that grace by preferring that content before the clearest and securest means of attaining it, he will not fail of grace to perform that which he resolves for God's sake. And, truly, it were strange, that the Gospel should make that grace, which conducts to the height of Christianity, to consist in an endowment of nature.

§ 36. But St. Paul's words will take no nay: 1 Cor. vii. 25—28, 36—38. "Of virgins I have no precept of the Lord, but give advice, as having received mercy of the Lord to be faithful. I think then this expedient for the present necessity, that it is good for a man to be thus. Art thou tied to a wife? Seek not to be loose. Art thou loose from a wife? Seek not a wife. But if thou marry, thou sinnest not; and if a virgin marry, she sinneth not. Only such shall have affliction in the flesh. But I spare you." Again: "If a man think he deals unhandsomely with his virgin, if she pass her flower, and so it must be, let him do as he please; he sinneth not; let them marry: but he that standeth firm in his heart, having no necessity, but hath power over his own will, and hath resolved this in his heart, to preserve his virgin, doeth well: so he that marrieth her, doeth well; but he that marrieth her not, doeth better." Is the sunshine more manifest than this? A man may resolve either of both for his daughter a virgin (supposing her will to follow his, as generally the duty of the children is, which St. Paul here supposeth), and not sin but do well; yet better in containing from marriage, because of the advantage which that state yieldeth Christianity, as St. Paul shews. Therefore he declares, that God hath given no law in it; but His apostle gives that advice for the best, which his Lord had done.

§ 37. The same apostle, of widows; 1 Tim. v. 5, 9—14: "And in "She that is a widow indeed and desolate, hopeth in God, and continueth in supplications and prayers night and day:"
and; "Let no widow be listed under threescore years old, having been the wife of one husband, having a testimony for good works, that she hath bred up her children, entertained strangers, washed the saints' feet, helped the afflicted, followed every good work; but refuse younger widows, for when they grow wanton against Christ, they will marry; being to be condemned, because they have renounced their first faith: and withal they learn to be idle, and to go about from house to house; and not only idle, but tattlers, busy-bodies, speaking things unfitting; therefore I would have the younger marry." Here is again a clear case. Timothy is directed to list some widows for the service of the Church in the state of widows, others to refuse. That which commends the one for the preferment, is the exercise of those works, which they could not have had opportunity for in the state of wedlock. That which renders the others dangerous, is, because for them to desire marriage is to "grow wanton against Christ." Wherefore, when St. Paul would have them to marry, it is not because he denieth in the next words that state of proficience, which he had acknowledged just afore; but because it is better to hold the mean, than to fall from the highest rank of Christianity.

§ 38. Which serves to resolve his meaning, as well as his Master's, 1 Cor. vii. 1, 2, 6, 7: "For that which you writ to me about, it is good for a man not to touch a woman; but, because of fornication, let every man have his own wife, and every woman her own husband: . . . . but this I speak of indulgence, not by command; for I would all men were even as myself: but every one hath his proper grace of God, some thus, some otherwise." Doth not the grace of God, in married people, assist in the offices of Christianity towards those relations which marriage procureth? Correspondently, therefore, the grace of God in the continent is not a natural temper, obliging them so to live; but the help that enables them to discharge themselves like Christians in a higher rank among Christians: so that the perfection of Christianity lies not in the state of continence, but in the work of it; that is to say, in those offices of Christianity, wherein their estate gives them opportunity to be conversant; the state

* Corrected from MS.; "helps that enable," in orig. text.
OF THE COVENANT OF GRACE.

being no otherwise so accountable, than because there is a
presumption that persons are such as they ought to be, and
as their state gives them opportunity to be. The perfection
of Christianity, then, consisteth in the love of God and in
His service, and the service of Christians for God's sake;
that is, in spending a man's life in those offices, in which
there is most regard to God, least to our own temporal in-
terest. But is it unreasonable to count that a state of per-
fection, which generally and in reason is the means for it,
because it is found to be practised to other effects? Is it
unreasonable to think, that God, Who hath need of all states
for the service of His Church, and giveth those several graces
which are requisite to make several men serviceable for
several states, should not determine by law, but leave to
their choice whom He endues with those graces, that which
contains not the work of Christianity, but, being indifferent
by kind, is nevertheless by kind the means to procure it?

§ 39. St. Paul gives this reason, why he wrought for his
living rather than take any thing of the Corinthians, in these
terms: "It were better for me to die, than that any man
should void that which I glory in: for if I preach the Gospel,
I have nothing to glory of, for necessity lies upon me, yea,
woe to me if I preach not the Gospel; for if I do it willingly,
I have a reward; if unwillingly, a stewardship I am trusted
with: what is then my reward? that I bestow the preaching
of Christ's Gospel without charge; so as not to use my right
in preaching it" (1 Cor. ix. 15—18). The necessity of preach-
ing the Gospel stands in opposition to the preaching of it
freely, which is therefore a matter of free choice. The woe
to St. Paul is for not preaching the Gospel; therefore, not
for not preaching it for nothing. Wherefore the reward
he means, when he saith, "What is my reward" (that is,
wherein lies my claim, my plea, or my pretence to it), is not
that which the Gospel covenants for with all Christians. For
that St. Paul was not to fail of, though he preached not for
nothing. Seneca

"Quæsitur a quibusdam, sicut ab
Hecatone, an beneficium dare servus
dominio posse?" Seneca, De Beneficiis,
lib. iii. c. 18: who discusses the question
at length on the affirmative side in cc.
18—28: Op., pp. 45—47. Paris. 1607:

alleging, inter alia, that "quædam
sunt quæ leges nec jubent nec vetant
facere; in his servus materiam bene-
ficii habet. Quamdiu præstatur quod
a servis exigi solet, ministerium est;
ubi plus quam quod servo necesse est,
by doing not only what he commands, but what he knows will please him, though he command it not. Such are not those whom our Lord speaks to, Luke xvii. 6, 10: "So ye also, when ye have done all things that are commanded you, say, We are unprofitable servants, we have done what we were indebted to do:"—"ye," that "have faith as a grain of mustard seed," that is, a small seed of Christianity; to whom the parable there is proposed. For it speaketh of those, who sit down when their Master hath supped: whereas there are others, that must sit down with their Master (Luke xxi. 30); others, that shall sit down as soon as He comes and Himself wait on them (Luke xii. 37). And therefore there are servants of God under the Gospel, that fail not of their wages, but oblige not their Master's goodness without promise. Above these wages, is the reward which St. Paul means; which though he pretend not, by discharging his trust so cheerfully as to preach the Gospel for nothing (which God commanded him not), he may nevertheless obtain his wages by giving a just account of his office. Therefore the word καταχρήσασθαι, when he says, "eis to μὴ καταχρήσασθαι," signifies not "abusing," but "fully using." As in Plato, "Οὐκ ὥρθος κατακέχρηται δωρέα"—"he used not the gift aright." And in St. Paul (1 Cor. vii. [31]), "Οἱ χρόμενοι τῷ κόσμῳ τούτῳ ώς μὴ καταχρώμενοι"—"they that use this world as not freely using it;" not, "as not abusing it," though it hath been so translated; because the rest of the opposites before run in the like correspondence,—"They that have wives as having none, those that weep as not weeping, those that rejoice as not rejoicing, those that buy as not possessing beneficium. Ubi in affectum amici transit, desinit vocari ministerium. ... Quidquid est quod servilis officii formulam excedit, quod non ex imperio sed ex voluntate præstatur, beneficium est." &c. Id., ibid., c. 21. p. 46. ... "'Καταχράσθαι ide est quod χράσθαι, nisi quod videtur plenius quiddam significare. Plato, Οὐκ ὥρθος κατακέχρηται δωρέα—'dono non recte usus est.' Lysias, ἄργων καταχρήσατο—'absumpsit.' Sicut et Romani 'abutì rem' dicunt pro 'utendo consumere.' Sic σχολή καταχράσθαι—'tempus insumere.'" Grotius, in 1 Cor. vii. 31.—And so also Erasmus, ap. Foll. Synops. in eundem locum; and Estius.—"Non est καταχρήσασθαι, 'male uti,' ut quidam putant; sed, 'uti,' aut 'periti,' ut supra vii. 31." Grot., in 1 Cor. ix. 18. ... "Plato (Epst. viii. tom. iii. p. 355. C. ed. Stephan. 1578), quoted by Grotius as above. And see numerous instances of the same use of the word in Mitchell's Index Graec. Platonicæ, tomo i. sub voce καταχρήσαθαι. ... "E. g. in both places, in the authorized English version; and in the former of the two, by Theodoret, Theophylact, and Ecumenius, quoted by Estius, who himself so translates the latter passage.
OF THE COVENANT OF GRACE.

Chap. XXXII.

298 ing; so, "those that use this world as not using, or not freely using, it:" and in the Latin St. Hierome (Quest. Hebr. in Gen.), "Sancti Apostoli his fere testimoniiis abutuntur quae jam fuerant in gentibus divulgata:"—"The holy apostles use" (I suppose no man will say St. Hierome meant that they abuse) "those testimonies which had been already divulged among the Gentiles:" and in Plautus, and the Civil Law, abuti is to spend, which is the full use of things that may be spent. For seeing St. Paul, in the beginning of the chapter, challengeth, that he might have done otherwise as well as the rest of the Apostles; either he might have done otherwise without sin, or he had not that right in point of conscience which he saith they used without sin.

§ 40. If then the law of God determine not a man to abstain from marriage, to abandon the world, and riches of the world, which he hath just title to; and yet this may be done to oblige God in point of goodness, not in point of promise: what is St. Augustin's fault in saying of St. Paul; "Voluit S. Paulus ex Evangelio victum sibi quaerere; quod maluit operari, amplius ergobat"—"St. Paul might have got his living by preaching the Gospel; in that he chose to work, he laid out more in God's service?" For this is not to say, that the love of God, for which he did it, is not commanded; but that he was not commanded to exercise that love in forbearing his due. Therefore, if any man shall teach the precepts of loving God above all, and all for God, and of morti-


"Qui abusus sum tantam rem patriam." Plaut., Trinumm. III. ii. 66. So also Bacchid. II. iii. 126.—And Cic., In Verr. iii. c. 9, "Nisi omni tempore quod mihi lege concessum est, abusus ero."—And Terence, Andr., proL 5.—See Facciolati in voc.; and other instances from Plautus in Pares, Lex. Piautin. sub voce.—"Propriissime, inquit Donatus, hoc verbo Plautus utitur, util in vino, unguentis, pigmentis." Ph. Pares, Lex. Crit. sub voce.

"Consumere... hoc enim proprae est abuti apud Jurisconsultos." P. Pares, Lex. Piautin. sub voce.

fying the first motions of concupiscence, together with the particulars into which our Lord's Sermon in the Mount brancheth those generals, to prescribe "works of supererogation," and matters not of precept but of counsel; as too many have been allowed (I say not, enjoined) to do in the Church of Rome: worthy, in that regard, is this professed in the Church of England to be a blasphemous doctrine.

Neither can it appear, that the ancient fathers ever intended any such sense by it: who, notwithstanding, all with one voice agree in the difference between matter of precept and matter of counsel under the Gospel; which difference Doctor Field, in his learned work of the Church, having acknowledged in the Church of England, no man can justly charge me with novelty in maintaining of it.

§ 41. Now though the perfection of Christianity consist, as hath been shewed, in loving God above all, and all for God; or in resolving to do all in respect of God's will and for His service: yet is not this perfection perfectly to be ob-

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See e.g., the argument of Bellarmin, De Monachis, lib. ii. c. 13. (Controv., tom. i. pp. 1551. D, sq.), against the reasoning of Peter Martyr from the command to love God "ex toto corde, ex tota anima, et ex omnibus viribus." And again: "If I should preach either of compulsion and servile fear or mere necessitie, ... I could not looke for reward in heaven: but now doing it, not onely as enjoyned me, but also as of love and charitie, and freely without putting any man to cost, and that voluntarily and of very desire to save my hearers, I shall have my reward of God, yea and a reward of supererogation, which is given to them that of abundant charitie do more in the service of God then they be commaunded; as S. Augustine expoundeth it, De Op. Mon. c. 5." Rheinm. on 1 Cor. ix. 16. p. 444. Rheines 1582. — And: "Holy saintes or other vertuous persons may in measure and proportion of other men's necessities and deservings, allotte unto them as wel the supererogation of their spiritual works, as those that abound in worldly goods, may give almes of their superfluities to them which are in necessitie." Rheinm. on 2 Cor. viii. 14. p. 485.

a "Voluntary works, besides, over and above, God's commandments, which they call works of supererogation, cannot be taught without arrogancy and impiety." XXXIX. Articles, art. xiv.

"The Papists imagine certaine degrees of morall goodness: the lowest whereof, who so attayneth not, doeth

sic sine, as not doing that the precept requireth; the higher, such as men are counselled unto, if they will bee perfect, though not by any precept urged thereunto; they that attaine to such height of vertue, are sayd by them to doe works of supererogation. But Gerson sheweth, that these men erre, in that they discern not betweene the matter of precepts and counsailes, imagining that the precept requireth the inferior degrees of vertue, and the counsailes the more high and excellent: whereas the precept requireth all the acts of vertue in the best sort they can bee performed, and the counsailes are conversant in another matter, namely, in shewing us the meane whereby most easily, if all things bee answerable in the parties, men may attaine to the height of vertue." Field, Of the Church, Append. to Bk. iii. c. 13. p. 331. ed. 1628. — See also Jer. Taylor, Duct. Dubit., lib. ii. c. iii. rule 12; Works, vol. xiii. pp. 59 sq. ed. Heber.
tained during this life. The reason is manifest:—because it is not morally possible, that the work of it should not be interrupted by original concupiscence; the mortification whereof, which proceeds by degrees, is that perfection which a Christian arriveth at, whatsoever he aim at. St. Paul had gone as far as another man, when he said (Phil. iii. 13—15): "Brethren, I count not myself to have seized; only, forgetting that which is behind, and stretching at that which is before, according to the mark, I drive to the prize of the heavenly calling of God by Christ Jesus: as many therefore as are perfect, let us be so minded." And 2 Cor. iii. 18: "We all, looking as in a glass upon the glory of God with bare face, are changed after the same image from glory to glory, as by the Spirit of the Lord;" to wit, by the same degrees, as the mortification of our own concupiscence makes room for God’s Spirit. And, therefore, he saith again of himself, 1 Cor. ix. 26: "I therefore so run, as not without appearance of going forwards; so fight, not as beating the air: but I cuff and enslave my body, lest, having preached to others, I myself become reprobate." Notwithstanding the law of Christianity, which the Gospel preacheth, supposing this concupiscence; and providing a right of re-establishment into God’s grace for all, that being cast down in this course shall return by repentance: manifest it is, that, though we are not saved by fulfilling the original rule of that righteousness to which the creation of our nature on God’s behalf obligeth us, yet by undertaking and pursuing that perfection, which the profession of Christianity importeth; provided that we persevere in pursuing it unto the end, though sometimes this pursuit consist in turning from those sins, by which we had started aside.

§ 42. Now the law of Moses is, certainly, a transcript or rude draught of this original righteousness due from man to God: and, therefore, purposely made so curiously scrupulous, that even the earthly promises of the land of Canaan, and temporal happiness in it, should not be obtained by the exact observation thereof; as I observed afore. But it was also an intimation of the Gospel of Christ, not only in the provision which it made for expiation of transgressions (the signification whereof the greatest part never understood), but in those
grounds of assurance, which it gave those that should observe it from the heart, as before God and for His love, of the reward of the world to come. In which regard St. Paul and the apostles so often allege the saying of the prophet (Habak. ii. 4), "The just shall live by faith:" and St. Paul (Rom. i. 17) saith, that "the righteousness of God is revealed" by the Gospel "from faith to faith;" that is, from the faith of Christ to come, to the faith of Christ come: and St. John Baptist saith of our Lord (John i. 16, [17]); "Of His fulness we have all received, grace for grace; because the Law was given by Moses, but grace and truth came by Jesus Christ." So that, though the grace of the Gospel came by Christ, yet it succeeded the same grace under the Law; though, as under a fainter light, so in a scarcer measure. And St. Augustin right accounteth those, that attain true righteousness under the Law, to belong to the New Testament; as carnal Christians under the Gospel, to the Old. But if the faithful at that time were saved by that scarce measure of righteousness, which the faint light they were under required; then were they also saved, though not by fulfilling the original law of righteousness due from man to God, yet by fulfilling that rule of evangelical righteousness, which God under the Law required at their hands. In which regard, if the fathers, by things recorded of them in the Old Testament, may be seen to have attained that perfection which St. Paul calls his "glory," in doing that which he was not commanded as a means to the discharging of that wherein the perfection of Christians consisteth; that which became matter of precept under the Gospel, is necessarily to be taken for matter of counsel under the Law: always understanding, that, as those helps of grace, without which I have shewed that they had not been able to perform such righteousness under the Law, were granted even then in consideration of our Lord Christ's interposing His mediation to the redeeming of mankind, so was the righteousness then performed, accepted in no consideration but of the obedience of Christ and His righteousness.

k See above, cc. xix. § 3. note j; and xxix. § 12—18.
CHAPTER XXXIII.

WHETHER ANY WORKS OF CHRISTIANS BE SATISFACTORY FOR SIN, AND MERITORIOUS OF HEAVEN; OR NOT. THE RECOVERY OF GOD’S GRACE FOR A CHRISTIAN FALLEN FROM IT, A WORK OF LABOUR AND TIME. THE NECESSITY AND EFFICACY OF Penance TO THAT PURPOSE, ACCORDING TO THE SCRIPTURES, AND THE PRACTICE OF THE CHURCH. MERIT BY VIRTUE OF GOD’S PROMISE NECESSARY. THE CATHOLIC CHURCH AGREES IN IT. THE PRESENT CHURCH OF ROME ALLOWS MERIT OF JUSTICE.

Another dispute there is, that makes an endless noise; never to be decided, but upon this ground; not to be maintained, admitting it: that is, whether the works of Christians merit heaven or not. Which I must enlarge into another point, of so near nature to it that both may as easily be resolved as the one: whether humiliation\(^1\) for sin, in praying, fasting, giving alms, by Christians, in confidence of the satisfaction of Christ, to obtain pardon of God, be satisfactory for sin or not. For inasmuch as to be free from evil is good, and to obtain a discharge from punishment is as much as to deserve a reward; in so much it is all one to satisfy for sin, so as to be discharged of punishment, and to fulfil an obligation, so as to claim a reward. Whereupon I said afore\(^m\), that all satisfaction is necessarily of the nature of merit. To this question then, or to these questions, the answer is necessarily consequent from the premisses: that, if we regard the original law of God, neither can any man make God satisfaction for his sin, nor merit the reward of everlasting life at His hands; but if we regard that dispensation in it which the Gospel preacheth, in consideration of the merits and satisfaction of our Lord Christ, neither shall any man attain forgiveness of sin without making satisfaction for it, nor the reward of everlasting life without making it due to him by virtue of God’s promise.

\(^{\S}2.\) The proof of the first point consists in all those passages of Scripture, which require repentance as a condition.

\(^{1}\) Corrected from MS.: “the humiliation,” in orig. text.

\(^m\) Above, c. xxix. \(^{\S}\) 22.
BOOK II.

requisite to the obtaining [of a] remission of sins: whether in the New Testament or in the Old; inasmuch as I have shewed, that the promises of the Gospel were obtained under the Law upon the same terms and conditions for substance, as under the Gospel; though, for the measure, proportionable to that light of knowledge and those helps of grace, which the dispensation of God under the old law afforded. In particular, taking notice of the theme of St. John Baptist, which our Lord also took for the argument of His preaching; “Repent, for the kingdom of heaven is at hand” (Matt. iii. 2, iv. 17; Mark i. 15): which the apostles also followed; Acts ii. 38, iii. 19. Upon that ground, which St. Paul also debates in the beginning of the Epistle to the Romans; that the necessity of the Gospel and Christianity is grounded upon a supposition, that both Jews and Gentiles are liable to sin without Christ, and by consequence to judgment. And again, of those texts of the apostles’ writings, wherein there is mention or intimation of penance required or enjoined by them, or by the Church in their time, for the obtaining of remission of sins by the keys; which I have handled in another place. And, thirdly, of those passages which I have quoted in this Book, disputing of justification by faith; to shew, that remission of sins done after baptism is obtained for Christians by prayer joined with fasting and giving of alms, to move God to give us pardon, as we forgive or give to our brethren.

§ 3. But this proof consists also in those scriptures, which I have alleged to shew, that the blood of Christ and His sufferings are truly and properly satisfaction for the sins of mankind. For as he, that believes this, can by no means imagine, that any man can make satisfaction for his own sins by the original law of God (for then the coming of Christ had been in vain, as not necessary, neither had there needed that dispensation in God’s proceeding with mankind upon the original rule of righteousness, which the Gospel declareth); so can he by no means imagine the satisfaction, which any man can tender God for his sin, to import any

* Added from MS.
* Above, c. xxi. § 16—25: and c. i. § 21—28.
* Bk. I. Of the Pr. of Chr. Tr., cc. xii., xiii., &c.
* Above, c. ix. § 35—42.
* Above, c. xxvii. § 1—12.
more, than the fulfilling of that condition, which God by His Gospel requireth to qualify any man, that is fallen from grace by sin after baptism, for remission of sin: because he supposeth aforehand, that the satisfaction of Christ's blood consisteth in obtaining such terms at God's hands, that, the condition being obtained, a man should become qualified for remission of sins. On the other side, the Gospel importing a promise of remission of sin in consideration of the sufferings of Christ, to them that turn by true repentance to that new life which it prescribeth; it cannot be denied, that those works, wherein the reality of true repentance consisteth, are properly satisfaction for sin (as for that respective sin for which they satisfy), by virtue of that promise, which God by the Gospel declareth, in consideration of Christ's cross. For if the civilian say true, that "to satisfy" is no more than "to fulfil a man's desire;" God by His Gospel requiring nothing else to be performed by us (that is, by any Christian that is overtaken in the state of sin) but to turn from sin, of necessity it follows, that God is satisfied with our repentance (which otherwise He would not accept of for payment at our hands); though the satisfaction of Christ is the consideration that makes it acceptable.

§ 4. The mistake seems to lie in this: that men take any kind of displeasure for sin to be that repentance, which qualifieth a man for remission of sin; presuming, that faith alone justifieth, and that the grace which the Gospel tendereth would come to too short an account, if at every instance a man might not have recourse to the blood of Christ for assurance of remission of sins. Whereas I have shewed, that in all estates, at any instant, a Christian hath assurance of remission of sin to be had, upon condition that he see himself qualified for it; but that absolute assurance of remission of sin, actually had and obtained, is not to be had by the Gospel, but upon performing the condition which it requireth: unless we would make Christ the "minister of sin" (as St. Paul speaks), by saying, that he came to discover [Gal. ii. 17.] a way, by which, standing in the love of sin and enjoying the pleasure of it, we may assure ourselves of pardon for it. For it can in no reason be imagined, that he, who hath wilfully

* See above, c. xxix. § 22. note i.  
* Above, c. xxxi. § 36.
committed sin, can instantly come to such a resolution of mind, as may reasonably be thought effectual to move him never to do the like any more. Will any body, that is capable to consider what a change it is for a man to undertake Christianity, being by the preaching of it become convict of that sin which it pretendeth to cure; will any man say, that it is possible for such a one, at the instant that he is first informed of a thing concerning him so much, to resolve to take the course, overcoming all difficulties which all the custom of sin can create? As for him, who, having made profession of Christianity, is notwithstanding overtaken with one of those gross sins, that express a formal contradiction to his profession so made; can he be assured of a firm resolution to stand to all that his Christianity requireth for the future, who sees himself so shamefully cast from a resolution solemnly professed, and perhaps grounded in him by so many years' practice as he hath been a Christian? This is the reason, why repentance is not to be measured by a wish that a man had not sinned (which those, that are not past remorse, necessarily have, because they must needs wish themselves at peace with God); nor by a desire of forgiveness (because they must needs wish themselves what the Gospel promiseth); nor by being sorry for the punishment which they have incurred (for that is not out of love to God, but to themselves); nor by being only sorry for having offended God (for who would not wish, that he could enjoy both the love of God and the pleasure of his sin). In fine, no disposition can qualify a man a convert, or penitent, but that which produceth a change in his actions. And that disposition not being produced, but by frequenting such actions of humiliation as may settle the impression of it upon a man's spirit; those actions, by which this disposition is wrought, are justly counted satisfaction to God, because they fulfil that, which He desireth of a sinner to qualify him for remission of sin.

§ 5. One material difficulty there is, that may be objected against all this from the Scriptures, especially of the Gospels; and those manifold invitations, whereby our Lord wooeth those, which are weary of sin, to come to Him for their cure. For, in very deed, the parable of the prodigal representeth

God so desirous to be reconciled, that there is no room left for conditions, limiting the pardon; which is granted, before it can be demanded, upon a bare desire expressed by returning home. And the Psalm of David seems to signify the same; when he saith, "I said I will confess my transgression to the Lord and Thou forgavest the wickedness of my sin" (Psalm xxxii. 5): which may be so understood, as if, David only having purposed to make confession of his sin, God prevented him with pardon before he did it. But, to say truth, this is more than the words can bear; because it is said just afore, "I made known my sins to Thee, and my iniquities I concealed not:" so as David's sin was not pardoned before he confessed it, but having confessed it, upon a grounded resolution so to do; and that, after so much trouble of mind for his sin, as the premisses of the Psalm express. As for the expressions of our Lord in the Gospel: having shewed, that it tendereth high promises, but upon conditions proportionable, considering the present weakness of our nature; there is no reason in the world to infer, that those, who have forfeited the promises by failing of that which they undertake, may as easily promise themselves reconcilement with God by repentance, as they are freely invited to be reconciled by baptism. For that which is done in the state of ignorance, is easily passed by upon condition of amendment. But where breach of amity may be reproached (especially tendered by God of mere grace, and upon His own charge, as it were, of Christ's cross), to presume of reconcilement upon mere acknowledgment of a transgression, were to tread under foot so great grace. And, therefore, that which hath been produced out of the Apostles' writings, soundeth to another tune. St. John saith, indeed; "If we say we have no sin, we deceive ourselves, and the truth is not in us; if we confess our sins, He is faithful and just to remit our sins, and to cleanse us from all unrighteousness; if we say we have not sinned, we make Him a liar, and His word is not in us" ([1 John i. 8—10]. For it appeareth by the premisses, that His word concludeth even Christians to be sinners. For St. John goeth forward and saith: "My little children, these things I write to you, that you sin not; and if any man sin, [1, 2.]

* Above, c. xxxi. § 7—12.
we have an advocate with the Father, Jesus Christ the righteous, and He is the propitiation for our sins.’ And when David (who had the Spirit of God upon the same terms as Christians have it, excepting that which hath been excepted?) prayeth, (Psalm xix. 13, 14 [Hebr.]); ‘Who understandeth his errors? cleanse me from hidden sins; keep Thy servant also from presumptuous sins, that they bear not rule over me; then shall I be upright, and clean from great transgressions;’ he sheweth sufficiently the difference between venial and mortal sins, as to Christians (which, in case of invincible ignorance and mere surprise, comes to no sin, as to Christians); but he sheweth also, that Christians, neglecting themselves, may come to fall into sins of presumption, which he prayeth against.

§ 6. For the rest, the same St. John, encouraging Christians to pray for the sins of Christians, with this limitation (as I suppose)—if by their advice they appear to be reduced to take the course, which may procure pardon at God’s hands,—acknowledgeth further, that ‘there is a sin unto death; I say not that ye pray for it,’ saith he, 1 John v. 16. And the Apostle to the Hebrews, vi. 4—6, speaketh of some sin, which he acknowledgeth not that it can be admitted to penance for the obtaining of forgiveness; which he protesteth again, Hebr. x. 26—31, xii. 16, 17. It is commonly thought indeed, that to deny the true faith against that light which God hath kindled in a man’s conscience, is hereby declared to be a sin, that repentance cannot cure; or rather, that God hereby declareth, that He will never grant it repentance.

7 See e. g. above, c. ix. § 10: and c. xxxii. § 16 sq.
8 ‘Pecatum ad mortem’ (1 John v. 16). ‘ non est partialis lapsus nec praecepti unius transgressio: sed apostasia universalis (Calvin, Beza, Gomarus, Lightfoot, Menochius, Tirinus), sive defectio a Deo (Beza), vel a fide (Menochius, Tirinus, Lightfoot), quam semel professi sunt: quia penitus a Deo se alienant (Calvin): quia quis Evangelii veritatem agnitar oppugnat (Gomarus), et directe se opposit Deo et Christo (Tirinus), scien et volens (Gomarus, Beza, Tirinus), destinata malitias (Beza, Tirinus), ex odio Christi (Gomarus): quod et ‘peccatum in Spiritum Sanctum’ dictur (Gomarus, Beza, Calvin).’ Poli Synops. ad 1 Joh. v. 16.—“Rursus, &c. Πάνω ἀνακαταληκτίνου εἰς περίστοις—Rursus vel denuo renovari, ut subaudias vel 1. sc. q. d. ut seipsum iterum renovent, ut poti in tali statu existentes (Paræus); vel 2. τινα q. d. ut quisquam renovet ipsum, i. e., absolute ut renoventur (L. de Dieu, Piscator) ... Græcismus est,” &c. “Revertitur hoc, vel 1. ad doctores,” &c. “vel 2. ad Deum, qui tales renovare nequid, non per impotentiam, sed per justitiam et veritatem Suam qua non potest mentiri (quidam ap. Paræum) aut Seipsum negare; vel ob naturam Eius constantissimam et immutabilem (Junius).” Poli Synops. in Heb. vi. 6.

And, truly, that "blasphemy against the Holy Ghost," which our Lord saith "shall never be pardoned neither in this world nor in the world to come" (Mat. xii. 31, 32; Mark iii. 28, 29; Luke xii. 10), manifestly consisteth in attributing the works, which the Holy Ghost did to convert men to Christ, to the devil; being convinced, that our Lord came from God, by the works He did for that purpose. Just as St. Stephen reproaches the Jews for "resisting the Holy Ghost as" their "fathers had done" (Acts vii. 51). And that there is no cure for this sin, it is manifest; because it consisteth in rejecting the cure. And apostacy from Christianity (which is manifestly the sin which the Apostle to the Hebrews intendeth) differeth from it, but as the obligation to Christianity once received differeth from that Christianity, which being proposed with conviction a man is bound to receive. But, otherwise, not only the Church, but the Novatians themselves, supposed, that those who had denied the faith might recover pardon of God by repentance. Nor can it become visible to the Church, what is that conviction, which whoso transgresseth, becomes unpardonable, because God hath excluded him from repentance. In the mean time, how difficult the primitive Church accounted it to attain pardon of such sins, appears by the excluding of the Montanists and Novatians first; then by the long penance prescribed apostates, murderers, and adulterers, lest the admitting of them to penance might seem to warrant their pardon upon too light repentance.

§ 7. St. Paul "admits" the incestuous person at Corinth, whether to penance or to communion with the Church; but upon what terms? Lest the offender "should be swallowed up with extreme sorrow;" and "lest Satan should advantage himself" against them, should he refuse it: and because, having "written out of great anguish of heart with tears" for them, who presumed to bear him out in it, he had found them moved with sorrow according to God, to repentance, with all

* See Right of Ch. in Chr. State, c. i. § 19; and Review, c. i. § 31, sq.; and Epilogue, Bk. I. Of the Pr. of Chr. Tr., c. ix. § 11, sq.

* "Antiqua illa Theologia peccata in tres classes distinguerebat... In prima classe tria tantum collocabant, Idololatriam, Mæchiam, et Homicidium, eorumque manifestas species et ramusculos... Primum peccatorum genus grandi illa et luctuosa penitentia sanabant et castigabant." Morinus, De Penit., lib. v. c. i. § 2. pp. 249. b, 250. a.
satisfaction, and desire of peace with the Apostle: 2 Cor. ii. 1—8, vii. 7—11. For we understand by St. Paul (1 Cor. v. 2, 2 Cor. xii. 21), that even the Church themselves, when they shut a sinner out of the Church, did make demonstration of sorrow for his case; and, therefore, himself much more was put to mourning, and to profess by his outward habit, that he thought his sin incurable without sorrow answerable to it. And when St. Paul commands the Colossians (iii. 5[6]), "Mortify your members that are upon earth, fornication, uncleanness, passion, evil desire, and covetousness (which is idolatry); for which the wrath of God cometh upon the children of disobedience:" it is manifest, that he placeth the mortifying of these vices in the afflict ing and humbling of our earthly members, wherein the lusts of them reside. Therefore he serves his own body no otherwise: but, striving for the prize of Christians (like one of their Greekish champions, that would not beat the air), he beats his own body black and blue, to bring it under servitude; "lest, having preached to others, himself should become reprobate" (1 Cor. ix. 26, 27). And certainly, if Christianity require this discipline over St. Paul's body, lest he should fall into sin: it will require very great severity of them, that are fallen into sin, to be exercised upon their bodies, the lusts whereof they have satisfied by those sins; to regain the favour and appease the wrath of God, and to settle that hatred of sin and that love of goodness in the heart, which the preventing of sin for the future necessarily requireth.

§ 8. The practice of the Old Testament sufficiently signifieth the same. Though David, in the Psalm that I mentioned afore, seem to make the pardon of his sin a thing easily obtained at God's hands (as it is indeed a thing easily obtained, supposing the disposition which David desired it with; but not that disposition a thing easily obtained); yet you shall find the same David, elsewhere, "wetting his bed and watering his couch with his tears," so that his "beauty is gone with mourning," his "flesh dried up for want of fatness," and his "bones cleave to" his "flesh for the voice of his mourning." Indeed, he always expresseth his affliction to be the subject of his mourning: but always acknowledg-
ing his sins to be the cause of those afflictions; which he therefore takes the course to remove, by taking this course for his sins. The prophet Esay (i. 16, 17.) thus calleth the Jews to appease God's wrath: "Wash ye, make ye clean, remove the evil of your works from before Mine eyes, cease to do evil, learn to do good, seek righteousness." Sure this was never intended to be done by the mere thought of doing it. But, the Prophet Joel having threatened a plague, what doth he prescribe for the cure? "And now, saith the Lord, return to Me with all your heart, with fasting, weeping, and mourning; and rent your hearts, and not your garments; and turn to the Lord your God; for He is gracious and merciful, long-suffering, great in mercy, and repenteth Him of evil: . . . blow the trumpet in Sion, sanctify a fast, invite the assembly, gather the people, sanctify a congregation, make the old and young and the sucking infants meet, let the bridegroom come forth of his chamber, and the bride of her closet; let the priests, the ministers of the Lord, weep between the porch and the altar; and say, Spare, Lord, Thy people, and give not Thine heritage for a reproach:"

Joel ii. 12—17. Sure this is something more than not allowing a man's self to sin, or not liking that which he does when he sins; which no man, that ever heard of Christianity, can do, till he have contracted such a custom of sinning, that he is not sensible of any remorse for it. And it is a thing most strange, that those, who pretend to be the cream of Christianity, should think the sins of the regenerate not to forfeit the state of grace, nor contract God's displeasure, because they are done with dislike*. Judas might have robbed the poor so oft, that at length he might be without remorse; but certainly he betrayed not his Master without reluctance. The regenerate, if truly so, and not hypocrites, must needs find the burden of sin, which they commit, aggravated by the grace which they had received afore; and, therefore, must needs find themselves obliged to a deeper measure of humiliation, to expiate their ingratitude, and to recover the favour

* See e.g. the long argument of Owen (Saints' Perseverance, c. xv. § 2 —26. pp. 325—340), to prove, that the difference between the sins of regenerate and unregenerate persons, which do not, and which do, forfeit God's favour respectively, is simply, that the former are not done "with the whole will and full consent," the latter are.
of God, which they had forfeited by abusing it afore. This seems, in my opinion, to persuade a good Christian, that works of humiliation and penance are requisite to recover the state of grace, and to render God again propitious to those that have fallen from the grace of their baptism; as that which I said afore to shew, that it is not prejudicial to the satisfaction of our Lord, that God should be satisfied by such means.

§ 9. Now the original and general practice of God's Church punctually agreeeth with that, which hath been said. Our Lord preacheth repentance; but admittesth all that profess it to be His disciples, not taking cognizance what they had been, professing to become such as He requireth for the future. So His Church, knowing that there is no sin so deep that His blood cannot wash away, admittesth all to baptism; declaring, that without repentance it availeth only to their damnation, but demanding no visible satisfaction of it in them, that were not hitherto of the Church. But those, who falsify the profession upon which they were admitted to baptism, and that so visibly, that the forfeiture of God's grace is visible by the same means; those were so excluded the communion of the Church (which ought to suppose a presumption of the state of grace, at least the possibility of it), that, at the first, the greatest question was, whether they should be admitted to any hope of reconciliation by the Church or not: as it appeareth by the breaches of the Montanists and Novatians, and partly of the Donatists, and Meletians. If this admission were granted, it was only to this effect, at the beginning; that they might tender the Church satisfaction of the sincerity of that sorrow, wherewith they pretended to satisfy God; that is, to appease His wrath, and to recover His grace. Those, who think penance was enjoined to no other effect, in the ancient Church, than to make satisfaction for the scandal which the notoriousness of sin had contracted,

1 See Bk. III. Of the Laws of the Church, cc. ix., sq.—“Vocarunt autem (Patres) ut plurimum satisfactionem, non compensationem, quae Deo redretur; sed publicam testificationem, qua qui excommunicatione multat fuerant, quum in communionem recipi vellent, Ecclesiam redebant de sua pontentia certiorum.” Calvin, Instit., III. iv. 39.

1 Above, § 3.
2 Corrected from MS.; “seems,” in orig. text.
3 See above, § 7, note b, and the passages there referred to. Meletians, according to Epiphanius (Adv. Hær., lib. ii. tom. ii. Hær. lviii. c. 2; Op., tom. i. pp. 717. D, 718. A.), was disposed for excessive severity to the lapsed.
are as far wide of the truth as those, who think it only made satisfaction for a debt of temporal punishment, the stain of sin and guilt of eternal punishment being abolished by submitting it to the keys of the Church, out of that sorrow which they call "attrition;" which they will have to be changed into "contrition" by the humility of that confession, which submitteth a man's sin to the keys of the Church. In what sense "attrition" may be said to be changed into "contrition" by the ministry of penance, I shall have occasion to debate again in the third Book. For the present, I must not forget the ground which I have presupposed, that the Gospel is presupposed to the being and constitution of the Church: and, therefore, that remission of sins by the Church, and the ministry of penance in the Church, supposeth the accomplishment of that condition, and the production of that disposition, which by the Gospel qualifieth for remission of sin. Neither can the ministry of the Church be otherwise necessary, than as it may be effectual to produce the same. How, in the penitent, that sorrow for fear of punishment which the first sight of sin necessarily causeth (which is "attrition" in their terms), is changed into that sorrow for having offended God which the love of God causeth; is to be understood, I conceive, by that which I said afore. That the ministry of the Church cannot supersede or dispense with the means whereby that change is brought to pass; as the argument proposed evidences by the Scriptures, so from the tradition of the Church, I conceive, I have peremptory evidence. For those, that deferred their penance till danger of death, then, confessing their sins, submitted to the keys of the Church, though they were not refused reconcilement in that estate, though they were admitted to the communion

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CHAP. XXXIII.

"Attritionem virtute clavium fieri contritionem," is the accepted doctrine of the later Roman schools. See below in Bk. III. Of the Laws of the Church, c. ix.: and Bellarm., De Pœnitent., lib. ii. c. 18; Controv., tom. ii. p. 1342. C: and Morinus, De Pœnitent., lib. vii. cc. 2, 3. pp. 507. 1, 2, sq.—"Cum primum Attribonis nomen in luce ordinavit, erudit quaeque haec quaestio, An Attribit fieri possit Contritio. In scholis agitata est annis prope centum nulla prorsus ad justificationem in Sacramento Pœnitentiae facta relatione." Morinus, ibid., c. 2. § 1. p. 507. 1. C: who proceeds to trace the "iliades quaestionum," which arose when the subject was connected with Penance.

1 Bk. III. Of the Laws of the Church, c. xi. (misprinted ix. in folio edition).
2 Bk. I. Of the Pr. of Chr. Tr., cc. iii., iv.
3 Above, c. xxx. § 25.
of the eucharist, yet their salvation remained questionable, 
in case they survived not to perform their penance. This 
you shall find at large in St. Augustin (Homilia xlii. ex L.) ; 
though some9 attribute it to St. Ambrose: but you have it 
in St. Augustin again, De Tempore, Sermone lvii. And when 
it is found in a letter of Faustus in answer to Paulinus of Nola,10

9 See Bingham, XVIII. iv. 6; and 
Morinus, De Penitentia, lib. iii. c. 9. 
§ 2—18. pp. 155. 1.—158. 2. The title 
of the chapter in Morinus runs, that 
"de Christiani salute et reconciliationem in iisdem angustiis, 
"(scil. in mortis articulo) "suscipiens plurimum diffidentem" (scil. Patres). 
However, in § 17. p. 157. 2, E, he 
cautions his reader not to suspect, "eae 
de salute, tam temporis acquirendo, 
possibilitatem dubitabat." 
"Si quis autem, positus in ultima 
necessitate agreditur sine, voluerit 
accipere pietatem, et accipit, et 
muta reconciliatur, et hinc vadit; fater 
vobis, non iili negarus quod petit, sed 
non praesumimus quia bene hinc exit. 
Non praesume; non vos fallo, non 
præsumo. Fidelis bene vivens, secures 
hinc exit. Baptizatus ad horam, 
secures hinc exit. Agens pietatem 
et reconciliatur cum sanus est, et postea 
bene vivens, secures hinc exit. Agens 
pietatem in ultimum et reconciliatur, 
si secures hinc exit, ego non sum 
secures. Unde secures sum, secures 
sum, et do securitatem: unde non 
sum secures, pietatem dare possum, 
securitatem dare non possum." S. Aug. 
Lib. Quinquaginta Homil., Hom. xiii. 
(edd. before Bened.); Hom. ccxxiii. 
S. Augustin had just been employed in 
contrasting the condition of a catechum 
seeking baptism on his death-bed, 
and a Christian in a similar state des 
iring to be reconciled by penance. 
"Eadem prorsus sententia, et pœ 
tentiae cum baptismo comparatio, le 
gitur iisdem verbis apud S. Ambrosium 
lib. ii. de Pœnitentia c. 12. vel in aliis 
codicibus ad finem ejusdem libri sub 
titulo exhortationis ad Pœnitentiam." 
Morinus as above quoted, § 3. p. 153. 
2. A.—"Dubius erat Lovaniensis, 
Verino autem et Vindingo falsus aut 
centonis in modum ex variis lacinia 
flatus videbatur" (scil. the above cited 
homily). "Ex tamen inter opuscula 
Ambrosii ac Cassarii, sed cum insigni 
varietate. Apud Ambrosium et Cæ 
sarium, prætermissa," &c., "incipit in 
hae verba," &c. "Sic in veteri quo 
que libro Ecclesiæ Carnutensis, in quo 
tamen Augustini nomen praebet." Note 
of Bened. editors of S. Augustin: who 
place the homily among S. Augustin's 
genuine works.
"Ad emendanda enim criminà vox 
pœnitentis sola non sufficit: nam in sa 
satisfacere ingenium pecatorum non 
verba tantum sed opera queruntur. 
Datur quidem etiam in extremis pœni 
tentia, quia non potest denegari; sed au 
tores tamen esse non possumus, quod 
qui sic petierit, mereatur absolv. Quo 
modo enim agit pœnitentiam lapsus? Quo 
modo agit pœnitentiam in extremis 
vite finibus constitutus? Quomodo 
enim pœnitentiam agere possit, qui nul 
la jam pro se opera satisfacions ope 
perat potest? Et ideo pœnitentia quæ 
ab inmero petitum, infirma est. Pœni 
tentia quæ a morte tantum petitur, 
timeo ne ipse moriarit." S. Aug., Serm. 
lvii. de Tempore (apercus accord. to 
Ben. editors); Serm. eclv. in Apr. 
Ben.—See many other authorities in 
Morinus as quoted in note o.
"Primo loco inquirendum putas 
visi; si incipientibus extremæ nece 
sitatis angustiis momentanea pœ 
tentia capitalis inimica persuasione 
mentitur, qui maculas longa etate 
contractas subits etiam inutilibus ab 
cludendas geminis arbiturat: quo tem 
pore confessio esse potest, satisfacio 
esse non potest. Nam quia 'Deus non 
irritetur;' ipse se deceptit qui mortem 
multis temporibus vicit, et ad quern 
reven 
viam jam semi-vivus adsurgit; ut 
tunc officiosus appareat, quando dom 
inices servituti omnia corporis et anima 
subtrahuntur officia. Circa exsequen 
di natione hominis sanitatem, non 
solum accipienti voluntas, sed agendi 
expectatur utilitas. Ita enim legitimus: 
'Si' (inquit) 'pecator pœnitentiam 
egerit pro pecatiis suis' (egeri, memo 
ravit; non solum dixit, acceperit), 'in 
sua,' inquit, 'justitia, quam operatus 
est, vivit.' Adversa, quod huicmodi 
medicina, sicut ore poscenda, ita opere 
consummenda est? Insultare Deo vi
it cannot be excepted, that Faustus is a suspected author because of his opposition to St. Augustin, in a point, wherein it is evident that he concurreth with St. Augustin. But in the fourth Council of Carthage also, can. vii. and viii., those, that submit to penance and receive the eucharist in danger of death, are not to think themselves acquitted of their sin, if they survive, "sine manus impositione:" that is, without performing their penance, during which they were, at the service of the Church, prayed for, with imposition of hands. And therefore he, who having thus submitted to penance and received the eucharist recovered, might be promoted to the clergy, according to the fourth Council of Toledo (can. liii.) and Concil. Gerund. (can. ix.); whereas, whosoever had done penance in the Church, could never be admitted to the clergy afterwards: because such a one had not been
detur, qui illo tempore ad medicum
noluit venire quo potuit; et illo, tunc
incipit velle, quo non potest. Opus
itaque est, ut quam in peccando fuit
abrupta et vegeta ad malum mentis
intento, tanta sit in vulnerum cura-
tione devoto." Fausti Rhetienis Galli-
liar. Episcopi ad Benedictum Pauli-
um Epistola, ap. Bibl. PP., tom. v.
4 "Hi Epistola et sequentia quae
subjiciuntur Fausti opuscula caute le-
genda, utpote opera rejecta et damnata
a Romana Ecclesia. Cum judicio lege
quae hic Faustus disserit; nam etai ex-
trema necessitate momentanea vera
penitentiae difficile habeatur, veram
tamen et legitimam interdum posse
tunc contingere nullus unquam ortho-
doxus dubitavit." Admonition prefixed
by De la Bigne to the Epistle of Faus-
tus above quoted.
5 "The canons intended are the lxvith
and lxxviiith.—"Is qui penitentiam
in infirmaite petit, si casu, dum ad
eum sacerdos invitatus venit, oppressus
infirmitate obmuterit, vel in phrenesi
sim versus fuerit, dent testimonium,
qui eum audiurunt, et accipiat peni-
tentiam. Et si continuo creditur mo-
riturus, reconcilietur per manus impo-
stationem, et infundatur ei ejus eucha-
ristia. Si supervixerit, adnomenatur
super dictis testibus, petitioni sua
satisfactum; et subdatur statuta pos-
tenitiae legibus, quin diem sacerdos,
E, 1206. A.—"Penitentes, qui in
infirmitate viaticum eucharisticæ acce-
perint, non se credant absolutos sine
manus impositions, si supervixerint." Ibi-
d., c. lxxvii.; ibid., p. 1206. B.—
And see Morinus, De Penitent., lib. x.
c. 5. pp. 726. 2. E, sq.
4 See Bingham, XVIII. iv. 3.
5 "Hi qui in discrimine constituti
penitentiam accipiant, nulla mani-
feesta acclera penitentes, sed tantum
peccatores se predicantes, hujsusmodi,
si revaluerint, possunt etiam pro mo-
rum probitate ad gradus ecclesiasticos
pervenir. Qui vero ipi penitentiam
accipiant, ut aliquod mortale peccatum
perpetrasse publice fanteatur, ad cle-
rum vel ad honores ecclesiasticos per-
venire nullatenus poterunt, quia se con-
fessione propriam notaverunt." Concil.
Tolet. iv. (A.D. 633) c. liv.; ap. Labb.,
Concil., tom. v. p. 1718. C, D.—See
Morinus, De Penit., lib. v. c. 18. § 11.
p. 299. I. D—2. B.
6 "Is vero qui segrimudinis linguore
depressus, penitentiam benedictionem
(quam viaticum deputamus) per com-
munionem acceperit; et postmodum
reconvallescens caput penitentiae in
ecclesia publice non subdidit; si pro-
hibitis viitis non detinetur obnoxios,
admittatur ad clerum," Concil. Ge-
rund. (held at Gerona in Catalonia,
A.D. 517). c. ix.; ap. Labb., Concil.,
tom. iv. p. 1509. A.—See Bingham,
IV. iii. 6.
7 See above, c. iv. § 15. note u.—
properly under penance, the sin that is supposed in the case of the former canon not being specified, but only generally confessed for sin. Whereby it appeareth sufficiently, that, in regard it is possible the sorrow wherewith a man submitted to penance in that case should be so sincere as to obtain pardon at God’s hands, therefore the communion was not refused; but, in regard of the doubt that remained in the business, the Church warranted not the pardon, till satisfied of his conversion by the performance of his penance. And therefore it is manifest, that the ancient Church did not believe “attrition” to be changed into “contrition” by submitting to the keys of the Church; making question of the salvation of those upon whom the keys of the Church had passed, because the operation of penance enjoined was prevented by death. And so the practice of the ancient Church concurreth with the doctrine of the Apostles, to assure us of the necessity and efficacy of the works of humiliation and mortification for sin, in appeasing the wrath and recovering the favour of God, in obtaining forgiveness of sin, and restoring to the state of grace; which the ancient Church calleth satisfying for sin.

§ 10. By the same means it remains manifest, that these satisfactions are neither enjoined grievous sinners by the Scriptures, nor notorious sinners by the Church, out of any intent of extinguishing a debt of temporal punishment, remaining after the sin is pardoned. That God, when He

Such was the rule among the Latins. In the Eastern Church, on the contrary, not the publicity of the penance, but the degree of the crime, constituted the bar to holy orders.—“Crimina spud Orientalis incapacitatis ad ordines causamuisse, non publicam Penitentiam.” Morinus, De Pœn., lib. v. c. 19. title, p. 203. l. D.

b See e.g. the admission of Morinus, and of Maldonatus quoted by him, De Pœn., lib. iii. c. 11. § 14. p. 103. 1. E. 2. A. “Ideo non mihi videtur a vero abhorrire quod scripsit Maldonatus tom. ii. De Sacræmentis c. 2. Et si sententia nostra (Catholicorum) ‘de poenæ satisfactione vera est; tamen veteres scriptores valde parce et valde raro fecerunt mentionem de illa; sed quosiscunque fere agunt de satisfactione, agunt de satisfactione pro culpa, ut perspicuum est ex superius citatis: non quidem quod ignorant hanc satisfactionem pro poena, sed quod cum egissent tam accurate de satisfactione pro culpa, quia difficillior est, non putant esse opus agere de altera satisfactione.”—And see the whole of c. 12. of Morinus himself; ibid, pp. 163. 2. C—168. 2. A.

“Quod sepe, remissa culpa, naneat debitu luendae poenæ?”—“Reatum poenæ temporalis, qui interdum remanet post amicitiam cum Deo reformatum, bonis operibus redimi posse?”—“Opera laboriosa, quibus reatus poenæ temporalis expiatur, sponte suscipi posse?”—but also, “Opera quibus reatus pecati præterit expiatur, recte a sacerdotibus injungi;”—“Opera satisfactoria esse, Orationem, Jejunium, et Eleemosynam;”—and, “Posse ho-
gave the Gospel, might have reserved a debt of temporal
punishment upon them, whose sin He pardonthy virtue of
it; I question not. That He hath reserved it, can never be
proved: the penalties, which He exerciseth His children
with, being rather chastisements of love than revenges of
wrath. That this debt, if not extinguished here by satisfac-
tion enjoined in penance, remains for purgatory in the world
to come, I cannot here dispute: not having yet considered
the effect of the keys of the Church in penance: and there-
fore, for the ground of it, which must come from hence, I
shall conclude according to the premisses—

§ 11. That the condition, which the Gospel requireth to
bring a man to the state of God’s grace for remission of sins
and right to everlasting life, in point of conscience as to God
(as well as in point of profession as to the Church), is pre-
supposed to every man’s being a Christian, and a member
of the Church: with this difference, indeed, between them,
that are invited by the Church to be Christians, and them,
who being Christians shall relapse to those sins which by
their Christianity they profess to forsake; that, to those that
are without, the cure of sin is tendered merely as physic,
which the physician hath no means to constrain a man to
take, but his own interesse: but to those that are within, out
of that authority and jurisdiction, which the corporation of
the Church foundeth. The last resolution whereof, though
it end in the interest of a man’s own good, which moveth
him to profess Christianity; yet, that profession having en-
gaged him to be a Christian, by it he stands bound to stand

minem justicatam vere Deo satisfac-
cere pro reatu poenae temporialis:”—are the propositions which Bellarmine
successively sets himself to prove, De
Poenitent, lib. iv. cc. 2—7. (Controv.,

Bellarm., De Purgatorio, lib. i. c.
1. (Controv., tom. i. p. 1775. C):
“Purgatorium, locus quidam, in quo
tanquam in carceri post hanc vitam
purgantur animae quae in hac non plene
purgata fuerunt, ut nimium sic pur-
gantur in corum ingredi valeant.”—And
see Id., De Indulgentiis, lib. i. c. 7.
Prop. 4: p. 45. Colon. 1619.—And
Eugenii IV. Bulla Unionis inter Gra-
cos et Latinos (Concil. Florentini. A.D.
1439, Sess. xxv.; ap. Lab. Labb., Concil.,
tom. xiii. p. 515. B): “Si vere poeni-
tentes in Dei caritate decesserint, antea-
quam dignis penitentiae fructibus de
commissis satisfecerint et omisssis, eor-
um animas poenis purgatoriais post
mortem purgari.”—And Bellarmine
again, De Purgatorio, lib. i. c. 7. (Con-
trov., tom. i. p. 1822. D): “Cum re-
cconciliantur Deo peccatores, non dimit-
titur semper cum peccato tota poena
temporalis: at potest fieri, et semper fit,
ut in tota vita aliquis non satisficerit
pleno pro temporali illa poena: ergo
necessario statui debet Purgatorium.”

See below in Bk. III. Of the Laws
of the Ch., cc. ix., sq.
BOOK II.

to the judgment of the Church, in all things within the authority of it. Now if the Church ought to presume, that he, who is admitted to the communion thereof, is qualified for remission of sin, before he be restored to it; then cannot a man, by being restored to the communion of the Church, become qualified for it: unless it can be said, that the abolution of the Church can presuppose that which it effecteth; which without a contradiction cannot be said. The Church then pardons not sin otherwise, than as, by the power of the keys, obliging the relapsed to use that cure which it prescribeth, upon presumption of the cure wrought, it warranteth pardon, as having effected that disposition which qualifies a man for it. So that all the satisfaction that the Church can have, that a man is qualified for pardon, proceeds upon a presumption, that God first is satisfied by the conversion of a sinner to that disposition, which He requireth to remission of sin; but evidently, in consideration of our Lord Christ, because by the Gospel, whereof He is the subject.

§ 12. As for the merit of Christian men's works in relation to the world to come: if it be considered, on one hand, how many ways the Scripture declareth, that it is impossible for any creature of God to come before-hand with Him that made it (because His all-sufficiency allows Him not capable of any advantage, that He may receive from it); on the other hand, that by original concupiscence we are utterly disabled to satisfy for that, in which we are come behind-hand with God, and for the future to satisfy that original rule of righteousness due from man to God, which our creation establisheth: I shall not need to use many words in a plain case, that by the original law of God no man can merit the reward of everlasting life. But, by the promise of the Gospel, God is tied to reward them with it. For, on the other side, it is most evident [by'] the Scriptures, as well of the New Testament as of the Old (in which I have shewed how that salvation which we attain by the Gospel is intimated), that the favour of God, and everlasting life, is the prize of that goal, the crown of that conquest, the wage of that good fight.

1 Corrected from MS.; "that," in orig. text.

Bk. I. Of the Pr. of Chr. Tr., c. v. § 35, and cc. xii., xiii.
of faith, which a Christian in this warfare upon earth pro-
fesseth: the scriptures that contain this sense being every
where so express, and so well known, that I conceive I do
the reader an ease in sparing him the pains of reading them
here again, after so many canvasses. But, besides, the main
point established at the beginning of this Book\(^h\) enforces in-
evitably all that this resolution imports. For if God have
by the Gospel imposed upon Christians the condition of new
obedience, which Christians through His grace by Christ are
able to tender Him, [promising\(^i\)] to recompense them with
such a reward; [then God\(^k\)] stands by His free promise en-
gaged to it, in consideration of that new obedience which He
requires. This is the utmost, which the name of "merit"
can enforce; understanding it to be grounded upon the pro-
mise of God, declared by the Gospel, which nothing but His
own free grace, designed through and in consideration of our
Lord Christ, before all consideration of any new obedience
of Christians (which wholly dependeth upon the same), could
ever have moved Him to set on foot. For having said be-
fore\(^1\), that a meritorious cause can have no place in respect
of God, otherwise than as He designs us good in considera-
tion of good, though the good He considers be originally His
own gift (whereas men are obliged, in reason and justice, to
reward that good which themselves are prevented with,
originally, as to them, moving and obliging them to reward
it); be the merit of Heaven never so fully ascribed to the
works of Christians (who are obliged to understand it so to
be ascribed by virtue of the covenant of grace), it can be
understood to signify no more, than a quality which it re-
quireth, upon which the reward becomes due by virtue of
that promise which requireth it.

§ 13. And that this is the sense of the Catholic Church,\(^\text{The Catholic Church agrees in}

among infinite arguments, this is enough to demonstrate: becaus, whereas it is very well known, that the Latin fathers it
do attribute the style and virtue of merits, and meriting at
God's hands, to the works of Christians, in respect to ever-
lasting life\(^m\); the Greek fathers, in whose mouths the word

\(^{b}\) cc. ii., sq.
\(^{i}\) Added from MS.
\(^{k}\) Added from MS.

\(^{1}\) Above, c. xxvi. § 5.

\(^{m}\) "Omnia que patimur, minora sunt et indigna quorum pro laboribus tanta
BOOK II.

could not be, expressing the same sense in such terms as their own language affords (for who ever undertook to shew any difference of sense between them?); those of the Reformation have always maintained, that their sense is the same with the sense of the ancient Church in the mouth of the fathers. For if in their mouth that word can import no prejudice to Christianity, neither can it import any now; unless the signification thereof be further limited by other terms, which being added to it, every man will allow, may determine a sense utterly prejudicial to it. True it is, divers have observed, that the word "mereri" in good Latin (especially of those later ages, in which the fathers writ) signifies no more than to "attain, compass," or "purchase:" arguing from thence, that the works of Christians merit heaven in their sense and language no otherwise, than because they are the means by which we attain it. So Cassander ob-
serves, that St. Paul's "Ἐλαχιστώτερον" (1 Tim. i. 13) is by St. Cyprian translated "misericordiam meruit"; not intending to say, that St. Paul "deserved" that mercy, which he professes to have received of grace; but only to signify, that he "found" mercy, and "attained" it. But though I should grant, that this word may signify no more in the language of the fathers; yet the faith, and the sense out of which it is evident that they spake, will enforce, that it doth signify as much as I say, when they speak of our coming to heaven by our works. For having once resolved, that the covenant of grace renders life everlasting due by God's promise to those, that live as at their baptism they undertook (though not for the worth of their works, yet by the mercy of God in Christ, which moved Him to tender such a promise); he that says, a man attains heaven by the means of those works which he lives in like a Christian, says, that those works of his do merit heaven, in the sense that I challenge.

§ 14. For as for those, that will have the works of Christians to merit heaven of their own intrinsic value; of those I have already said, that I conceive they do prejudice the Christian faith; in not allowing the necessity of God's grace through Christ, in accepting the condition, which the Gospel requires, for such a reward as the intrinsic value of it cannot deserve by God's original law. For granting those helps of God's grace in Christ, being supernatural and heavenly, to hold proportion and correspondence with the reward of life everlasting, which is the same; yet will it not follow, that in all regards (for the purpose, in that the actions which they produce are momentary, the reward everlasting; which is the consideration St. Paul uses, Rom. viii. 18, 2 Cor. iv. 17, 18)

ricordiam adeptus sum,' id Cyprianus (Ad Jubaianum) legit, 'Misericordiam meruit;' et multa loca sunt in ecclesiasticis officiis et precibus, ubi hoc vocabulum hoc intellectu accepit debet. Quæ vocis notio si retineatur, multa quæ durius dicit videntur, mitiora et commodiora apparebunt." Cassander, Hymn. Ecclesiast. (Op., p. 179. fol. Paris. 1616, and see also p. 263); commenting on the words of the hymn, "Cum suis sanctis mereamur aulam Ingredi coli, simul et beatam Ducere vitam." Forbes, who quotes the passage (as cited in last note, § 4. p. 432), adds, "Quæ verba more suo, hoc est, plane tyrannico, expungi jussurum Hispanici Censorum."


* Above, c. xxx. § 19.

* See a statement of the Roman doctrine to this purpose, in Forbes, Consid. Mod., De Justif., lib. v. c. 4, pp. 479, sq.

"1 Cor. vii. 17, 18;' in folio ed-
The correspondence will produce an equality of value. And though the first principle of them be heavenly and supernatural (which is the help which God for Christ's sake allows), yet, seeing that it comes not immediately to effect, but by the means of the faculties of man's soul infected with original concupiscence, it cannot be said, that they can demand a reward correspondent to heavenly grace alone, when earthly weakness concurs to imbase and allay the value of that which it produceth.

§ 15. But as it cannot be denied, that the Church of Rome, in which that order which maintains this extremity hath so great credit, allows this doctrine of merit to be taught; yet can it not be said to enjoin it: because there have not wanted, to this day, doctors of esteem, that have always held otherwise. Among whom I may very well name Sylvius, now or lately professor of divinity at Douay: who, in his commentaries upon the second part of Thomas Aquinas his Sum, expounds that "meritum de condigno," which the
OF THE COVENANT OF GRACE.

School attributes to the works of Christians, to be grounded 'in dignatione Dei;,' because God vouchsafes and 'deigns' to accept them, whose they are, as worthy of the reward; expressing also the promise of the Gospel, whereby this condescension of God is declared.

§ 16. The school doctors found out the terms of "meritum ex congruo et ex condigno"—"merit of congruity and condignity:" some of them, because they thought, that the works of mere nature deserve supernatural grace, in regard that it is fit, that God should reward him that doth his best with it; [some of them,] that works done in the state of grace are worth the glory of the world to come. But as the former

qui valorem seu dignitatem operis meritorii desumit volunt ex sola Dei externa acceptatione," &c.: for "juxta hanc sententiam opera justorum non habeunt condignitatem veram et intrinsecam ad mercedem vitæ æternæ, ac per consequens non essent etiam proprie meritoria de condigno, sed debetur eiusmod vitæ æternæ solum propter promissiónem et non propter opera:" Id., ibid., art. iii. Qu. 2. p. 882. 2. C. D.

According to Vasquez, Scotus, Biel, and Cardinal Cajetan, teach, that "posse hominem dolere de peccatis, propter Deum super omnia dilectum, ex propria viribus, et hanc esse ulti mus dispositionem ad gratiam habituali mori justificantem, et meritum ad illam, non quidam condignum sed congruum: atque hanc contritionem posterius natura inornatam gratia habituali esse jam meritoriam de condigno regni coelorum." Vasquez, In Prim. Part. D. Thomæ. Disp. xci. c. 10. § 59; tom. i. p. 645. b. Ingolst. 1609.—"Ex historia Concilii Tridentini" (Father Paul's Hist. of the Counc. of Trent, Brent's translation; "lib. ii., ad annum 1546," pp. 197, 198. Lond. 1640) "petit in eo concilio Franciscanos magna cum contentione defendisse jam dictam opinionem" (that above cited from Vasquez) "Gabrielis et Scoti, affirmantes operam moralia, ex viribus naturæ ante gratiam facta, hominem vere et proprie preparare ad justificationem, ac iliam infallibili et ex certa lege de congruo mereri, hominemque per naturam posse talen dolorem de peccato concipere, ut remissionem ejus de congruo meruiro." Le Blanc, Thes. Theol., Thes. an homo in statu peccati solis naturæ viribus, &c., § 7. p. 646.—

And after the council of Trent,—"Quamvis nullo si bini mereatur primam gratiam, secundum quod dictum est, potest tamen peccator se habilitare ad gratiam, faciendo quod in se est, quia nulli talium gratia denegatur: hoc autem non est ex merito digni vel condigni sed congrui." J. de Combris, Compend. Totius Theol. Verit., lib. v. c. 12. p. 405. 12mo. Lugd. 1579. And in the preceding chapter, "Dicendum ergo quod nullus meretur sibi primam gratiam merito digni vel merito condigni sed tantummodo merito congrui." Id., ibid., c. 11. p. 404.—And see the whole Thesis of Le Blanc, just cited, whence these passages are borrowed.—"Quamvis communiter doceant (doctores scholæ Romæ) bona opera justorum ad vitam æternam habere condignitatem et proportionem quandam, attamen aliis plus, aliis minus, hac in parte bonis operibus tribuant. Siquidem nonnulli sunt qui bonis operibus ex gratia Christi factae omnino pretium cum vita æterna tribue vi dentur. Inter hos numerare possimus Gabr. Vasquez. Nam tom. ii. in 1. 2 Disp. cxiv. c. 11" (§ 80, 81. p. 818. a. b.) "dicit vitam æternam et bona justorum opera inaequalia quidem esse secundum id quod formaliter habent, . . . sed hoc non obtine quos minus inter bona illa opera et vitam æternam sit equalitas secundum dignitatem et meritum." Unde postea disp. cxxv. c. 2" (§ 6. p. 823. b) "collegt a Colonien sibus Jesuitis recte dictum cœlum proponi nobis venale, et quod meritis condignis tantum pretio equali compara dentum sit. . . Alii vero minus dure laec in parte loquuntur. . . Bellarminus, De Justificatione, lib. v. c. 17" (Con-
part of the position, which is planted upon these terms, is rejected by many; so they, who only acknowledge "meritum congruit" in works done in the state of grace (that is to say, that it is fit for God to reward them with His kingdom), say no more, than that it was fit for God to promise such a reward: which whoso denieth, must say, that God hath promised that which it was unfit for Him to promise. And if the dignity of our works, in respect of the reward, may have this tolerable sense, because God deigns and vouchsafes it; the council of Trent, which hath enacted no reason why they are to be counted merits, can neither bear out these high opinions, nor be said to prejudice the faith in this point.

For "the kingdom of God is not in word but in power," if St. Paul say true. And therefore, though I affect not the term of merit (which divers of the Reformation do not reject), yet can I not think it so far from the truth, so prejudicial to the faith, as the peevish opinions of those, that allow not good works necessary to salvation, but as signs of faith. For that which necessarily comes in consideration

trov., tom. iii. p. 1300. B.) "dicit quidem bonum opus justi esse 'par etaeque mercedi' vitae aeternae: sed istud postea exponit de qualitate proportionali, c. 15" (ibid., p. 1304. B.); ubi dicit ad meritum ex condigno non requiri qualitatem absolutam inter meritum et praemium; sed satis esse proportionalum, quals inter fontem et flumen, ... inter semen et rem cujus est semen, ... inter viam et terminum ad quem via illa ducit" (c. 17. pp. 1301, 1302). Le Blanc, Thea. Theol., Thea. de bonor. operum relat. ad vitam aetern., P. ii. § 3—5, pp. 597, 598. —And see the Thesis itself at length.

a "Si quis dixerit, hominis justificati bona opera ita esse dona Dei ut non sint etiam bona ipsius justificati merita, aut ipsum justificatum, bonis operibus, quae ab eo per Dei gratiam, et Jesu Christi meritum, ... fiunt, non vere mereri augmentum gratiae, vitam aeternam, et ipsius vitae aeternae, si tamen in gratia desesserit, consecutionem, atque etiam gloriae augmentum; anathema esto."—Conc. Trident., Sess. vi. can. 32; ap. Labb., Concil., tom. xvi. p. 768. A.

b So e. g. Bucanus, Instit. Theol., Locus xxxii. De Bonis Operibus, Qu. xxiii. (p. 366. 12mo. 1604): "Annon etiam in Evangelio passim promittuntur bonis nostris operibus multa beneficia tam temporalia quam aeterna? Promittuntur sane. At non sub conditione operum, quae ipsa nobis procurrent illa beneficia, sed quae ostendant et arguant, tanquam effecta notoria nobis, participes nos esse conditionis illius, quae est in fide et gratia, quae sola impleta procurantur illa beneficia, nec ut debita sed ut gratuita promissa rependuntur."—And Beza, Confess. Christ. Fidei, c. iv. § 19 (pp. 46—49. Genev. 1586): "Quorum nobis utilia sint bona opera apud Deum et apud homines? Primum hac ratione sollemus proximos nostros vel Christo sacrificare," &c. "Secundo, bonis operibus certiora fimus nostre salutis, non tanquam causis ... sed tanquam testibus et effectus causae instrumentalis per quam adipiscimur salutem, fidei videlicet. Tertio ... profitemur, tandem esse Dei bonitatem, ut, quoniam adoptivos Suos filios non in ipsis sed in unico Suo Filio ... considerat, neque in estimandis donorum Suorum fructibus rationem habeat ejus pollutionis quae a nostrae carnis imbecillitate prominat, sed purissimi illius fontis a quo profun- dur, id est Spiritus Christi:" and so,
with God in bestowing the reward (which the condition He contracteth for, must necessarily do), though it cannot have the nature of merit (because the covenant itself is granted merely of grace, in consideration of Christ's death), yet it is of necessity to be reduced to the nature and kind of the meritorious cause. Nor can the glory of God, or the merit of Christ, be obscured by any consideration of our works, that is grounded upon the merit of our Lord Christ, and expresseth the tincture of His blood.

"eo usque probet (opera nostræ), ut mercede dignetur, tum in hac vita tum etiam in futura; . . minime id quidem quasi haec merces operibus nostris debeatur, sed pro mera Sua gratia et misericordia." . . . Quarto quum bona opera sint fidei nostræ testimonia, consequitur etiam inde petendum aliquo ex parte testificationem æternae nostræ electionis."—And to the same purpose, in his Quest. et Respons. Christian. Libellus, P. i. p. 65. 12mo. 1587.—And, at a later time, Placæus, Thes. Thol. Salmur., vol. i. De Justizif., Thes. xii. p. 35 (quoted by Bull, Harm. Apost., Diss. Post., c. iii. § 4: Works, vol. iii. p. 50); "Justificamur etiam operibus quatenus iiæ fides ostenditur."—And Tully, in his answer to Bull's Harmony, ap. Bull. Apol. pro Harm., Sect. iii. § 6. Works, vol. iv. pp. 340, 341: "Nec controvertitur, an sensu declarativo sua bonis operibus tribuenda sit justificatio, tum domi scilicet et in foro conscientiae apud ipsum justicatum, tum foris apud alios."—Again; "We confess a necessary use of good works: as, first, they doe serve as notable means and instruments to set forth God's glory by. Secondly, by them also our faith is shewed, published, and made known, for the good example of others. Thirdly our owne conscience also is thereby quieted, and our election daily made more sure unto us." Willet, Synopsis Papismi, p. 1037. Lond. 1614.—And, not to multiply quotations, the position is naturally inferred by Bellarmine (De Justizif., lib. iv. c. 9; Controv., tom. iii. p. 1203. A) from such language as that used by the conference of Altenberg, affirming good works to be necessary to a Christian, "non necessitate efficiente, sed necessitate presentia."—It should be added, that Chamier (Panstrat., tom. iii. lib. xv. c. i. pp. 509, sq.), in answering Bellarmine, explains away this distinction: and that even such a theologian as Paræus admits, when the proposition is put in express terms, that "vitam æternam promittit operibus, non solum ut sunt signa fidei, sed etiam ut sunt obedientia filialis Patriæ et debeat se ut sunt positio conditionis, sub quas Deus illis hereditatem vitæ æternae donare promittit." Paræus, Resp. ad Bellarm. De Justizif., lib. v. c. 3. p. 1242. Heldelb. 1615. And see Forbes, Consid. Modest., De Justizif., lib. v. c. i. § 12. pp. 444, 446.

THE END OF THE SECOND BOOK.

LAUS DEO.
** An Index to the whole of Thorndike's Works will be given in the concluding volume.